(8 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberAnd nor are we. It is an absurd suggestion. The principle that taxpayers’ money should not be used to lobby Government is perfectly reasonable and one that most people support.
A leading board member of the Charity Commission has written an essay calling for the UK to leave the EU. That comes after the Charity Commission tried to clamp down on charities engaging in the EU debate. Is the Minister able to explain why the Charity Commission rule on campaigning appears to be, “Do as I say, not as I do”? I welcomed his clarification that charity voices should and could be heard on the issues that affect them, but it flies in the face of the Charity Commission’s recent gagging clauses. Will the Minister confirm that charities are now allowed to speak out, but only if they agree with him?
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to have this opportunity to make a statement on the report by the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee entitled “Appointment of the Commissioner for Public Appointments”, which we published last week. The post of Commissioner for Public Appointments was established in 1995 following the recommendation of the Committee on Standards in Public Life in its first report, the Nolan report. The Nolan report recommended the creation of the post as a means of enhancing public confidence in the public appointments process and the quality of appointments made under it. The role of the Commissioner for Public Appointments is set out in the Public Appointments Order in Council 2015.
Since the post and office of the commissioner were established in 1995, there have been four Commissioners for Public Appointments. From 2011 to 2016, the post of CPA was held jointly with the role of First Civil Service Commissioner by Sir David Normington. However, with Sir David’s departure, the two posts of First Civil Service Commissioner and CPA were advertised separately. That was the result of a recommendation made to Ministers by Sir Gerry Grimstone prior to the publication of his review of public appointments. As indicated by the recruitment advertising for this post, the commissioner will be expected to work with the Government in implementing the Grimstone review’s recommendations. The Grimstone review, however, was published only in March this year.
After two hearings with the Government’s preferred candidate, the right hon. Peter Riddell, and after some discussion, we have given Mr Riddell a qualified endorsement as Commissioner for Public Appointments. He is well known to many in this House as a respected political journalist and commentator. He was appointed a Privy Counsellor for his work on the Gibson inquiry into the possible illegal rendition of UK detainees. He has also been chair of the Hansard Society and, most recently and perhaps relevantly, director of the Institute for Government.
PACAC remains concerned, however, that the changes proposed by the Grimstone review, as interpreted by the Government, alongside other changes, such as the introduction of enlarged ministerial offices—whereby Ministers, instead of the civil service, can themselves make appointments to their private offices—may be leading to an increasing politicisation of senior public appointments. We will report on our inquiry into the Grimstone proposals after the code of practice for public appointments and the new Order in Council have been published.
The proposals are controversial. They propose a significant removal of the powers exercised by the office of the CPA over the public appointments process. Ministers, instead of the CPA, would set the rules by drawing up the new governance code. Ministers could decide to run an appointment process without referral to the CPA. Ministers, not the CPA, could determine the membership of appointment panels, including the independent member. Ministers could include on selection panels an official acting as a Ministers’ representative without the consent of the Commissioner for Public Appointments. Ministers would have latitude to interview and appoint someone even if the selection panel had marked him or her below the line.
The new Order in Council and the new code of conduct for public appointments have yet to be published even in draft form. Publication of the Grimstone review was originally expected last year, but it was held back. There was a gap of only three days between the publication of the Grimstone review, along with the Government response, and Mr Riddell being named as the preferred candidate. That left us with no opportunity, by the time of Mr Riddell’s appearance before the Committee on 21 March, to consider the Grimstone review.
We concluded that it would have been inappropriate for us to make a report on the Government’s preferred candidate that could have been regarded as an implicit and unqualified endorsement of the Government’s interpretation of the Grimstone proposals. After our initial evidence session with Mr Riddell before Easter, we therefore issued a call for evidence on the Grimstone review. We took evidence from the outgoing CPA, Sir David Normington, from Sir Gerry Grimstone himself and from my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General prior to concluding our pre-appointment scrutiny of Mr Riddell on 12 April. I am very grateful to the Government for delaying Mr Riddell’s appointment while we completed our pre-appointment scrutiny.
We intend to report on the implications of Sir Gerry Grimstone’s review shortly. We will welcome any further written evidence. The present Committee on Standards in Public Life has warned that this could
“all add up to a public perception of a system which was being operated under increased political patronage. It could also run counter to the intentions to increase transparency and diversity.”
The outgoing CPA, Sir David Normington, has expressed his opposition to the proposals as a reversal of the Nolan reforms of 20 years ago. Sir Gerry Grimstone has made it clear that transparency rather than the direct powers currently held by the commissioner would enable the commissioner to remain a powerful regulator. However, the Minister for the Cabinet Office has made it clear that the CPA would be consulted by Ministers, but the CPA would no longer have the power to direct an independent appointment process, as now.
PACAC will therefore closely monitor how Mr Riddell works with Ministers to implement the Grimstone review’s recommendations, and how he responds to the recommendations that PACAC have yet to make on the Grimstone review. PACAC will underwrite Mr Riddell’s authority and independence as the Commissioner for Public Appointments, and we will make use of our ability to carry out follow-up scrutiny, if necessary, to make sure that any concerns we have are heard. We agree with Sir Gerry Grimstone that the role of the CPA should be robust and authoritative, and should not be undermined.
Furthermore, in the light of the Grimstone review’s proposed changes to the public appointments process and in line with other roles, such as those of the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman and the chairs of the Office for Budget Responsibility and the UK Statistics Authority, PACAC recommends that future appointments of the Commissioner for Public Appointments should be subject to a resolution of both Houses of Parliament. This will be an additional safeguard, and act as a public reassurance that the independence and status of the Commissioner for Public Appointments is not threatened. We also recommend that a similar procedure should apply to the post of First Civil Service Commissioner. I am very pleased to present this report to Parliament.
I commend the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee for his report and today’s statement.
Sir David Normington, the outgoing Commissioner for Public Appointments, said that the Government’s proposals put at risk 20 years of progress and risk ushering in
“a return to the days of political and personal patronage”.
Indeed, he said that as the commissioner, he would be contacted once a month by the Prime Minister or other Ministers, asking why party donors, office holders or former MPs had not been shortlisted or recommended for posts.
In the light of those concerns, does the hon. Gentleman share our fear that dismantling the powers of the independent Commissioner for Public Appointments will open the door to political cronies being gifted public service jobs either as a reward for donations or to create an army of political enforcers in the public sector? Rather than appointment being made on merit or according to skills or public service ethos, are not the Government putting themselves at risk of accusations of cash for jobs?
I think the danger is not that those things will happen, but that people will say that they may seem to be happening. Curiously, it might make it harder for the Government to put a friend or supporter into a public appointment job if the Minister is more directly involved. The current arrangements were created to protect Ministers.
If Ministers are frustrated that the wrong people are being interviewed, that people are being appointed according to the wrong job specifications or that people with the right skills are not being given an interview, it is up to them to make sure that the job specification for a job is as they think it should be before the recruitment process starts.
I will not defend the public appointments process in total. The Grimstone review has started a much-needed debate about public appointments, but before my Committee and I give a definitive view of Sir Gerry Grimstone’s proposals, we want to consider all the arguments and all the evidence.
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend has been completely tireless in her attempts to ensure that armed forces personnel can vote in the referendum, and rightly so. I can confirm the Prime Minister’s commitment given to her that we will enable all the armed forces to vote. I am happy to tell her that the chief counting officer for the referendum has now directed that postal ballots will be sent to the armed forces between 23 and 27 May to ensure plenty of time for their votes to be counted.
When the Government introduced new gagging clauses on charities in receipt of Government grants last month, they credited a report published by the think-tank the Institute of Economic Affairs, in which the policy was a key recommendation. Just four months prior to that, the Minister for the Cabinet Office received a £4,000 donation from the chairman of the IEA, Neil Record. That is surely just a coincidence, but in order to avoid any misunderstanding will the Minister, who has said that he is committed to freedom of information, publish all communications between the IEA and his Department as well as all the submissions and advice that he received from the civil service?
I did not have any discussions with the IEA on this. It is about ensuring that taxpayers’ money is spent on good causes and the right things, not on lobbying Government. It is right that taxpayers’ money should be spent on the things for which it was intended, not on ensuring that lobbyists can take politicians out for lunch.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 2—Disposal of assets—
“The Charity Commission shall ensure that independent charities are not compelled to use or dispose of their assets in a way which is inconsistent with their charitable purposes.”
New clause 3—Power to make representations—
“(1) A charity may undertake political campaigning or political activity in the context of supporting the delivery of its charitable purposes.
(2) A charity may campaign to ensure support for, or to oppose, a change in the law, policy or decisions of central government, local authorities or other public bodies.”
New clause 4—Power to hold hearings on fundraising regulation and charity activity—
“(1) The Commission has the power to hold public hearings with representatives from charities, charity trusts and other relevant bodies on fundraising regulation and charity fundraising activities.
(2) Representatives appearing at the public hearings specified in subsection (1) are protected by legal professional privilege.”
This amendment requires the Charity Commission to hold annual hearings on fundraising regulation and the workings of charities and provides participants with the protection of legal professional privilege.
New clause 5—The Charity Commission as primary guarantor of the regulatory system for fundraising—
“(1) Section 69 of the Charities Act 2006 (Reserve power to control fund-raising by charitable institutions), which inserts section 64A into the Charities 1992 Act (Reserve power to control fund-raising by charitable institutions) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for “Minister” substitute “Charity Commission”.
(3) After subsection (8) insert—
“(9) The Charity Commission shall report annually to the Minister on the exercise of its powers under this section.
(10) On reviewing the annual report or if the Secretary of State considers the Commission is not effectively exercising its function as guarantor of the regulatory system the Minister may himself exercise the powers under this section.””
This amendment makes the Charity Commission the primary regulator of charities fundraising activities, requires the Charity Commission to report annually to the Cabinet Office on its regulation of charitable fundraising, and allows the Government to intervene in this regulation as a last resort.
Amendment 9, in clause 1, page 1, line 12, at beginning insert “Subject to subsection (3)”.
Amendment 8, page 1, line 12, leave subsection (2) and insert—
‘(2) The Commission may issue a warning to a charity trustee, a trustee for a charity or a charity in any way it considers appropriate but may not publish a warning to a wider audience.”
Amendment 10, page 1, line 15, at end insert—
‘(2A) If the Commission decides to publish a warning under subsection (2) it must do so in a manner which does not identify the charity, or charity trustee, in relation to which the warning is issued.”
Amendment 11, page 1, line 16, after “give” insert “at least 14 days”.
Amendment 12, page 2, line 6, leave out subsection (b) and insert—
“(b) such advice or guidance that the Commission considers may assist the charity to remedy the conduct which gave rise to the warning, as referred to in (a) above.”
Government amendment 2.
Amendment (a), line 10 at end add—
‘( ) If the Commission publishes notice that a warning has been withdrawn under subsection (2), the notice must state the reasons for the withdrawal.
( ) No record of a warning withdrawn by the Commission should be held on the Register of Charities.”
Government amendment 3.
Amendment 1, in clause 9, page 10, line 2, at end insert—
‘(22) Before this section comes into force, the Secretary of State shall lay a report before Parliament on the impact of the extension of the disqualification framework on—
(a) people with criminal records who are trustees of, or employed by, charities, and
(b) charities which work with, or employ, ex-offenders.
(23) The report shall include, but not be limited to—
(a) an assessment of the number of people employed by charities who will be affected by the extension of the disqualification framework to cover senior management positions,
(b) an assessment of the number of people who are trustees of, or employed by, charities who will be affected by the extension of the list of specified offences for which people will be automatically disqualified from being a trustee of, or a senior manager in, a charity,
(c) an assessment of the impact of the new disqualification framework on former offenders who are seeking, or intend to seek, employment in the charitable sector, including on their recruitment, retention, career prospects and long-term rehabilitation and resettlement,
(d) an assessment of the impact of the new disqualification framework on former offenders who are currently employed in the charitable sector, including on their retention, career prospects and long-term rehabilitation and resettlement,
(e) an assessment of the impact of the new disqualification framework on people with criminal records who are trustees or employees of charities which are partners in, or are contracted by, community rehabilitation companies (CRCs) and its impact on the successful running of those organisations,
(f) an assessment of the effectiveness of the existing waiver process provided for under section 181 of the Charities Act 2011,
(g) an assessment of the impact of the new disqualification framework on the number of applications for waivers to the Charity Commission,
(h) a description of how the working group set up by the Charity Commission on the waiver process will be constituted, how it will be resourced, what timelines it will be working to, its working method and intended outputs, and how it will work in consultation with people with criminal records and charities that work with, or employ, ex-offenders,
(i) a description of the criteria the Charity Commission will adopt in considering applications for waivers, and the weight it will attach to the views of the trustees of the charity or charities concerned,
(j) a description of how the waiver process will operate in relation to prospective candidates for senior management positions in charities, including the timescales for decisions and mechanisms to ensure that ex- offenders do not suffer indirect discrimination as a consequence of delays in assessing applications for waivers while a competitive recruitment process is underway,
(k) an assessment of the impact of the new disqualification framework on the resources provided by the Charity Commission to administer the waiver application process.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay before parliament a report on the impact of the extension of the disqualification framework on people with criminal records who are trustees of, or employed by, charities, and on charities which work with, or employ, ex-offenders before the section came into force.
Amendment 13, in clause 10, page 10, line 7, after “person” insert “or persons”.
Government amendment 4.
Amendment 14, page 10, line 35, leave out
“(either generally or in relation to the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order)”
and insert
“, as defined by the Commission in a specific document to be published after consultation and renewed”.
Amendment 15, page 11, line 33, after “conduct” insert “both relevant and serious”.
Government amendments 5 to 7.
It is a pleasure to speak today on behalf of Her Majesty’s Opposition about this, my first Bill. The Committee process has been excellent, and I welcome this opportunity to revisit the Bill and talk again about some of the issues that were raised.
The main objective of the legislation is to provide a strong regulatory framework to support the charity sector and its trustees. In particular, it aims to strengthen the Charity Commission’s arm by giving it more powers to regulate charities. That is an important objective, which we support, but we are clear that the right safeguards must be in place. The Charity Commission is the guardian of public trust and confidence in charities. On the whole, it does an excellent job, particularly in the context of the assault on its budget over the past six years. It is important for the integrity of the charitable sector that the commission should have the tools to do its job properly, and for that reason we support many of the Bill’s provisions.
However, as with any regulator, it is vital to ensure that the commission’s powers are subject to appropriate safeguards. Unfortunately, some of new powers for the regulator introduced by the Bill lack such safeguards and therefore leave scope for the commission to overreach itself. That threatens the independence of charities and the integrity and reputation of the commission, and it could fundamentally change the relationship between the commission and the charity sector.
Our concerns are shared by the sector, its advisers and more widely—the Charity Law Association, for example, has said that the new powers in the Bill need to be balanced by appropriate and proportionate safeguards. It points out that the new powers will apply not only in rare cases of deliberate abuse but to all charities and their many hundreds of thousands of well-meaning volunteer trustees.
A group of sector umbrella bodies, including the Directory of Social Change, the Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations, the National Council for Voluntary Organisations and the Charity Finance Group, have all expressed serious concerns about the lack of safeguards. The Joint Committee of the House of Lords and House of Commons that scrutinised an early draft of the Bill called for necessary safeguards to be included, and, of course, we pushed for those in Committee.
The Minister may point out, as he did in Committee, that the Charity Commission has a statutory obligation to act proportionately. We acknowledge that, but experience has shown that, sadly, that is not enough. In a recent High Court case involving the commission and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, the Lord Chief Justice referred to “ludicrous time limits” imposed by the commission in a regulatory situation; he said he could understand why it was felt that the Charity Commission had behaved in an extremely high-handed manner in that case.
The commission should, of course, have the power to do its job, but sensible limits should be imposed on how it exercises its powers. Our amendment would redress the balance.
I congratulate my hon. Friend on her excellent speech. I am a trustee of many charities; one of the concerns that those of us who work in the charitable sector have had for a long time is the weakness of the Charity Commission. Usually, its legal department is terrified of a case ending up in the High Court. I support the Bill: we need a strong commission that can do its job as it has not been able to do it for many years.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right; that is why we support the Bill and the powers it gives to the Charity Commission. My hon. Friend is also right in talking about what is sometimes a lack of clarity and a confusion, which can be costly. We are really keen to get clarity on the grey areas, boundaries and improper balances in the Bill. It is really important that we get those on the record while the Bill has yet to be enacted and before we end up with costly processes in the High Court.
I turn specifically to new clause 1 and amendments 9, 8, 10, 11 and 12, which apply to clause 1, which relates to the Charity Commission’s new power to give warnings.
The Bill introduces a new power for the Charity Commission to issue official warnings to a charity or a charity trustee. The explanatory notes say that the power is intended to be used when the risk of an impact on charitable assets and services is relatively low, but the new power could have a far-reaching impact on charities that receive a warning. The Bill gives the commission complete discretion about publicising a warning. That could have serious reputational implications for the charity involved: the public, the media and funders may well not distinguish between a low-level issue giving rise to a warning and something much more severe. It is important that we consider the issue in the context of the high profile media issues raised recently. After all, official warnings issued by other regulators indicate a serious and high level of concern; under the Bill, the commission can issue a warning on the strength of a low-level breach of trust or just a breach of duty by a charity trustee. Indeed, it is our understanding that it intends to use the warning power in low-level cases.
As all hon. Members know, reputation is paramount for charities and charity trustees. The adverse publicity resulting from a warning could lead to a choking off of donations, grant funding and corporate sponsorships, leading to a closure of services and, potentially, to redundancies. A warning can be used as a trigger for further regulatory action; clause 2 makes a change to the circumstances in which the commission can take significant protective measures in relation to charities so that the failure to remedy an alleged breach of trust or duty specified in a warning is automatically a trigger to more serious action. That seems a startling implication for a power intended to be used in low-level cases and makes it all the more important that there should be safeguards around the exercise of the power.
Our amendments address those concerns in four ways. First, through amendment 9 and 8, they would limit the commission’s scope to publish the warning to a wide audience. The charity and its trustees would receive the warning, but no wider publicity would be involved. The warning would ensure that the charity took the commission’s concerns seriously, but would have no adverse effect on its reputation. If the charity failed to comply with the warning, the commission could take more significant regulatory action at that stage, and that might attract publicity. Low-level concerns, however, would not be publicised, to ensure that the commission’s action was proportionate and did not seriously impact—potentially fatally—a charity for a relatively minor error.
It has been stated numerous times that the Charity Commission often sees itself as a partner in trying to improve and work with charities. Would not the method that my hon. Friend is describing be one more of partnership, using the expertise of the Charity Commission to improve and tackle the challenges that charities face in the front line? That is a much more collaborative approach, aimed at delivering outcomes for the beneficiaries, rather than a public bust-up, which could damage the Charity Commission, charities as a whole and the individual charity concerned.
My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. It is clear that when the Charity Commission works in terms of its role of supporting, encouraging and giving guidance to charities, it is extremely effective. Particularly given the pressures on its finances, expecting it to undertake a wide range of enforcement in this manner is potentially quite costly.
Alternatively, amendment 10 would allow the commission to make details of the warning public without referencing the charity, or a charity trustee, by name. This would allow the commission to publish a warning anonymously if it felt that it held important lessons for the wider charitable sector, but without the consequent impact on the charity.
Secondly, under amendment 11 the commission would be obliged to give the charity adequate notice of its intention to issue a warning. The Bill states that
“the Commission must give notice”,
but there is no specified notice period. That means that there is nothing to stop the commission giving less than 24 hours’ notice of its intention to issue a warning, which would give the trustees, who are very often hard-pressed volunteers, and any charity staff almost no time to respond. This is a serious risk. In the High Court judgment that I mentioned, it is understood that charity trustees were given less than 24 hours to respond to the commission, prompting the Lord Chief Justice, as I said, to describe the time limits as “ludicrous”.
This concern has already been raised by the Joint Committee that reviewed an earlier draft of the Bill. It recommended that a reasonable minimum notice period to make representations on a draft warning should be made clear in the Bill. The Government’s response to the Joint Committee’s report accepted that a recipient should have the opportunity to make representations on the warning for the commission to consider before it is published. In our view, this requires the inclusion of a minimum notice period in the Bill, and that is what our amendment seeks to achieve. The Government may argue that there could be circumstances where the commission has such serious concerns that it must act swiftly and without notice. In such cases, the commission should exercise some of its other regulatory powers designed for more serious concerns, some of which may be used without advance notice. We have been told that the warning power is not intended for such serious cases.
We also propose a small amendment, amendment (a), to Government amendment 2 on the proposed power to withdraw or vary a warning. Our amendment is designed to help reduce any reputational damage to a charity that might result from the inappropriate issuing of a warning. It is absolutely right and fair that if the warning was subsequently found to have been incorrectly given, then it should be publicly revoked and any damage sought to be undone.
Thirdly, amendment 12 seeks to ensure that it is absolutely clear in the Bill that the commission will not be able to use its warning power to direct charities. It is not appropriate for the commission to be able to direct charity trustees on how to act. It is very clear from the Charities Act 2011 that the commission is not able to act as a charity trustee except for very limited exceptions. In a small range of circumstances, the commission can issue statutory directions to charities, but these are rightly subject to very strict safeguards. It seems that the Government agree with this principle. In responding to the consultation on the extension of the Charity Commission’s power that was a precursor to the Bill, the Government specifically decided not to extend the commission’s powers to make directions outside a formal statutory inquiry. If the commission could use the warning power as a way to direct charities, it would be able to give directions via the back door. This is a fundamental shift in the delicate balance of the relationship between the commission and charities, and it should not be allowed.
We would welcome some clarification from the Minister on this point, as there seems to be confusion in the sector about it. We understand that the commission does not regard the warning power as giving it the power to direct charities, yet the explanatory notes to the Bill imply the opposite, stating:
“Where the Commission considers it disproportionate and unnecessary to open an inquiry purely for the purpose of making a direction, issuing an official warning could be an alternative way of making it clear to a charity that they should take action.”
Confusion over a similar issue gave rise to the High Court case that I mentioned, prompting the Lord Chief Justice’s comments about the commission’s actions. Our amendment makes it clear that while a warning can be used to give advice or guidance to a charity—which can often be very positive, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hove (Peter Kyle) said—in order to remedy the conduct that gave rise to it, it absolutely cannot be used to direct the trustees to take action.
New clause 1 would allow for the issuing of a warning to be appealed to the Charity Tribunal. I have already explained the potentially significant consequences that the issuing of a warning has for a charity. The Charity Tribunal is a low-cost forum that was established in the Charities Act 2006 especially for charities wishing to challenge the commission. In the absence of an express right of appeal, charities affected by a warning are able to challenge it only via judicial review. Judicial review is expensive, complicated, and time-consuming. It is a completely inappropriate option for a mechanism that is intended to address low-level non-compliance. The Charity Tribunal was introduced precisely so that charities would not have to rely on costly judicial review proceedings to challenge the commission’s decision making. There is no good reason, and I am afraid none was forthcoming in Committee, as to why it should not be possible to appeal an official warning to the Charity Tribunal. It is illogical that the exercise of the warning power should be more difficult to challenge than the exercise of the commission’s more extensive regulatory powers, which can be appealed to the Charity Tribunal.
It might be helpful if I clarify one of points that the hon. Lady raised about the power to direct. An official warning is not the same as a direction power. I am aware of the potential confusion regarding the explanatory notes that she mentioned. If it is helpful to her, I would be happy to ensure that the explanatory notes are updated to make it absolutely clear that the warning power cannot be used to direct charities.
That is very helpful indeed. I really appreciate the Minister being so quick and forthcoming with his clarity on that, which will give the sector a lot of reassurance.
I now move on to our new clauses 2 and 3. New clause 2 seeks to replace a clause that was put into the Bill during its passage through the other place but removed in Committee. I pay tribute to our noble Friends in the other place who successfully added the clause to the Bill. As with so much legislation at the moment, we are finding them to be great defenders of social justice and fairness.
New clause 2 would support trustees in carrying out their existing duties by ensuring that they can adhere to their charitable aims and objectives, and it would protect them from being compelled to undertake an action at odds with their charitable purposes. As we have always made clear, especially in Committee, the provision is particularly relevant to housing. It aims to protect charities and housing associations if the Government mandates them to sell their charitable property under the right-to-buy proposals.
Labour Members want those who desire to be homeowners to achieve their aspiration. While the number of homeowners has fallen by more than 200,000 under this Government, the number rose by more than 1 million under Labour between 1997 and 2010. I want to be clear that we support people’s aspiration to own their own home.
I agree with what my hon. Friend is saying, but the level of owner-occupation is declining because house prices have risen way beyond the ability of most people to afford them. Is not the real problem the need to have decent social rented housing, and should we not keep all existing social housing in the public sector to make sure we can house people properly?
My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. We know that home ownership is falling and, as he says, the real crisis is in social housing. The purpose of new clause 2 is to protect what social housing we have and maintain it in the hands of the charitable sector and housing associations that own it, as well as to ensure that it is used for its intended purpose, not sold off for profit.
The problem our new clause seeks to address is that of compulsion. This is about the fundamental rights and the position in law of housing associations and charities. The independence of the charitable sector from Government is an important strength of British civic society, and one that must be cherished. We do not support the right of a Government to direct a charity, against its independent will and contrary to its charitable purposes, to dispose of its assets according to the Government’s desire. That is an infringement of the independence of charity, community and voluntary sector organisations. For many housing associations, it goes against the very grain of their founding purpose.
Housing associations, many of which are charities, provide 2.5 million homes for 5 million people on affordable rents. Many enable vulnerable people, or those with disabilities or care needs, to live independently. Other properties are for shared ownership, to help those on lower incomes to buy their homes. These aims are in the charitable DNA of housing associations and are not for the Government to tamper with.
The unintended consequences of the right-to-buy proposals for housing associations could undermine charity law that goes back centuries. In essence, the proposals will allow the assets of independent charities, and even the bequests of individuals or philanthropists—for example, the Peabody Trust, which has built and bequeathed housing to ameliorate the conditions of the poor and needy—to be seized. Housing associations currently build 45,000 homes a year. Ideally, they would like to build 120,000 homes. That aim may be undermined if they are forced to sell off their stock.
Housing associations often lever in private finance on the basis of assets they already own in order to meet their wider charitable objectives and to manage their assets effectively. Right to buy will force housing associations to sell properties. It will give them less control over such decisions. Importantly, in relation to this Bill, it will make it more difficult for them to meet their charitable purposes.
Furthermore, any diminution of the housing stock could harm housing associations’ borrowing powers. The National Housing Federation has said:
“With a nation in the throes of a housing crisis, it is key that housing associations are in full control of the assets against which they borrow to build homes.”
Labour, as well as many housing associations around the country, has always said that the extension of right to buy to housing associations, through the Housing and Planning Bill, is unworkable and wrong. It will lead to a severe and irreversible loss of affordable homes at a time when they can never have been more needed, because the Government have no genuine plan for one-for-one, like-for-like replacement. Historically, only one in 10 homes sold have been replaced under the right to buy.
Even those who support the sale of council houses and of housing association properties say that if the subsidy came directly from the Treasury, that would be very different from making housing associations and local authorities pay for the subsidy out of their assets.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It has been apparent throughout the proceedings on the Housing and Planning Bill that there is a black hole in the plans to fund the whole proposal.
There are currently 2 million people on waiting lists due to the dearth of homes on affordable rents for low earners. Our new clause 2, which protects housing associations from being compelled to sell off homes, would prevent the further reduction in the supply of affordable social housing. Too often, history has shown that right-to-buy homes are resold. Many homes are rapidly rented out by private landlords at the full market rent, which serves to drive up market prices and increase poverty through higher housing costs, as well as reducing the housing stock available on affordable rents. All of that goes against the charitable objectives of most housing associations.
In summary, we are concerned that the Government want to interfere with the duties of charity trustees to put their beneficiaries first and to comply with their fundamental charitable purposes in how they manage their assets. Housing associations can already partake of right-to-buy options for their tenants where that accords with their charitable objectives. The problem arises where that conflicts with their objectives and trustees’ duties risk being overridden by the Government, which is simply not acceptable. That is what the new clause seeks to prevent.
New clause 3 would enshrine in legislation the right of charities to undertake political campaigning activity. We are clear that this is a direct attempt to challenge the unfair and poorly applied Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014, commonly known as the gagging Act. Campaigning is an important part of democracy and civil society. One of the fundamental principles of a thriving and healthy democracy is that individuals and organisations can speak out on the issues they care about.
On new clause 2, the hon. Lady made a case about charities’ ancient rights. She will be well aware that the ancient rules, going back 400 years to the time of James I, were very much against charities involving themselves in politics. I accept that there have been changes in charity law more recently, but it seems rather perverse that she prays in aid ancient charitable rights in relation to new clause 2, but is happy to ride roughshod over them in new clause 3.
On the contrary, it was the gagging Act that rode roughshod over the historic rights of the charity sector to defend and campaign on the causes that charities fundamentally exist to tackle.
My hon. Friend makes an incredibly powerful point. This is about freedom of speech for everyone—every citizen and every organisation in this country—but it is also about making sure that the disempowered, both individuals and communities who lack a voice, have advocates that can speak in as unencumbered a way as is humanly possible and with the ferocity that those in our society who lack a voice deserve.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. He pays tribute to the charities that do some of the most important work with the most excluded. Such people need a voice and are often those who suffer the consequences of bad policy making in this place. Charities often have to pick up the pieces of such policy making.
I am slightly mystified by some of the comments about so-called political activity. We are talking about basic advocacy. We only have to go back to the end of the first world war to see the Royal British Legion campaigning for jobs for veterans and so on. We are not talking about party political campaigning. That is what the voluntary sector objected to in the 2014 Act.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As she has ably demonstrated, charities have a long-established role in educating, informing the public, campaigning and securing positive social change throughout our history.
Use of such terms can seem a little bizarre, but does the hon. Lady not agree that charities can already make representations, including to us as Members of this place? One of the big things about charities is that they have a special ethos that drives their work and activities. I therefore cannot understand why we should support new clause 3.
It is quite clear that the charitable sector felt that the 2014 Act prevented them from being able to pursue exactly the aims that the hon. Lady sets out. We in this House share many things in common with the charitable sector, not least the effort to build a better society, so it is absolutely right that we should work together in partnership to build better policy making and to shape the kind of society that she cares about. Our new clause has not come out of thin air. We are reacting to a very bad piece of legislation, about which the sector feels extremely strongly. We want to continue to protect the sector.
Part of the problem is the use of the word “political”. Before the introduction of the gagging law, there was no provision for charities to engage in party political activity—activity in favour of a political party—and CC9, the Charity Commission’s guidance document on campaigning for charities, is clear about that. What problem does my hon. Friend think the Government were trying to solve when they introduced the gagging law? I do not think there was any such problem.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I think the problem was that the Government felt challenged. From the outside, they were happy to talk about being the most open and transparent Government ever, but once in power, they pulled up the drawbridge and were nervous about the challenge they faced from the sector on key issues such as badgers and the bedroom tax.
No one minds scrutiny. We are very happy to have bodies that want to engage in political lobbying, but they should not be charities. Charities have certain benefits, including tax benefits. Bodies that wish to be party political, biased advocates are perfectly able to be so if they are companies or other corporations. The point is that the charitable sector brings with it a range of benefits, not least in terms of taxation, that should not be abused for party political purposes.
Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree, therefore, that for a charity that is picking up the pieces left by diseases such as cancer or heart failure, it is a better use of taxpayers’ money to lobby for better investment in prevention and research and development?
I am sorry to relive arguments that were heard in Committee, but the only example that was given to the Committee of the so-called chilling effect or of a charity being prohibited from carrying out activities by the so-called gagging law was that of the Badger Trust. That organisation was explicitly party political. The chief executive officer, Dominic Dyer, sent out an email using the charity’s email system to all its members, who may have had any party political affiliation or none, saying that he had contributed to the Labour party’s rural manifesto, that it was wonderful, that they should turn up at the launch of the manifesto, that they should take part in an anti-Cameron rally and, presumably, that they should vote Labour. The hon. Lady said that she supported that kind of behaviour, which was illegal. Surely Members from all parts of the House can agree that such behaviour is wrong. New clause 3 should be defeated because it would give the green light to that sort of extremely negative behaviour.
I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman has a problem with negative behaviour—I am afraid that it is a fact of life. Having looked at the evidence from the Charity Commission on that case, I still struggle to see what was wrong with the situation. I am very happy to continue that conversation with the Charity Commission.
The hon. Gentleman says that that was the only evidence given. More than 160 charities signed a letter to the Government ahead of the general election saying that the legislation should be scrapped, including Save the Children, the Salvation Army, Oxfam, Greenpeace, Age UK and Amnesty International. The charity sector is up in arms.
Surely the big problem that people had was that they did not like the idea of dodgy lobbyists giving money to dodgy politicians. It was not about victimising groups such as the Salvation Army. The hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) says that it was just the Badger Trust that was affected. If he had heard what the Countryside Alliance said at the all-party parliamentary group on civil society and volunteering about what it thought of the gagging Act, he would accept that a wide variety of groups are affected.
My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point about the strength of feeling in the sector.
I share the concerns of the hon. Member for Clwyd South (Susan Elan Jones). Does the hon. Member for Redcar (Anna Turley) agree that the gagging Act would have limited even the calls for the creation of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly, which were led by the Church of Scotland, which is a registered charity in Scotland? Without new clause 3, it will not be possible to have an impact like the one that the Scottish Parliament has had on the so-called unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom.
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point and I thank him for that contribution. I will make some progress, because I am conscious that many Members want to speak.
Not only should charities have the right to campaign, but they are often best placed to provide important insights that can inform and improve policy making. They are often the ones on the frontline who see the gaps in provision, the duplication of services and the inefficiency and waste, and who spot the best ways of solving or, better still, preventing problems. Many charities can make a bigger impact with their limited resources through campaigning than through service delivery alone.
Campaigning often saves taxpayers money in the long term, as issues can be addressed at their roots, rather than in the aftermath, which can be costly. For example, as I just mentioned, many charities provide fantastic care for patients with long-term conditions such as cancer, but is it not better for them to push for more effective treatment, more awareness of the symptoms and more support for diagnosis through campaigning? So much of that happens as a result of good policy making by politicians. That is why charities must seek to shape it.
I fear that under new clause 3, the hard-earned money that people donate to charities would be spent on political campaigning, rather than the initial cause to which they donate, such as true medical research. That is why the new clause is flawed.
I am surprised that the hon. Lady presumes to know what people want to happen when they donate money. Many people who donate money to large charities such as Crisis and Shelter are very aware of the high-profile public campaigning that they do and of the pressure that they put on all of us in this House. That is to be commended. Many people support the powerful voice that such charities have in the community.
To reinforce that point, many people support and donate to such charities precisely because they campaign.
I completely share my hon. Friend’s view and am grateful for his supportive intervention.
Charities themselves have set out their concerns, including the fact that the scope of the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 is very broad. They are concerned that the legitimate day-to-day activities of charities and voluntary organisations that engage with public policy will be caught by the rules and that a number of regulated charities, voluntary organisations and other groups will be substantially affected. They feel that the Act is incredibly complex and unclear, and that it will be difficult for charities and other voluntary groups to understand whether any of their activities will be caught, giving rise to the risk that campaigning activity will be discouraged.
Charities also feel that the 2014 Act gives substantial discretion to the Electoral Commission, creating an unnecessary and burdensome regulatory regime and possibly leaving charities, voluntary organisations and the Electoral Commission open to legal challenge. The legal opinion provided to the National Council for Voluntary Organisations by election law experts suggested that the rules were so complex and unclear that they were
“likely to have a chilling effect on freedom of expression, putting small organisations and their trustees and directors in fear of criminal penalty if they speak out on matters of public interest and concern”.
The 2014 Act stopped charities campaigning—they say so themselves—and caused unnecessary cost and confusion, according to a report by the Commission on Civil Society and Democratic Engagement, which looked at its effect on last year’s general election. Drawing on evidence from UK charities and campaign groups, the commission found that charities were faced with confusion about
“the ambiguity of the definition of regulated activity.”
The commission states that as a result of that,
“many activities aimed at raising awareness and generating discussion ahead of the election have not taken place.”
A representative of the World Wide Fund for Nature told the commission:
“I think the Act has created an atmosphere of caution within parts of our sector. It has also wasted time in terms of analysis of it, explaining it to Trustees, staff etc. It is not…a piece of legislation we need.”
Greenpeace told the commission:
“We were meant to be participating in a huge cross-NGO campaign, but all apart from a couple of the organisations ended up not campaigning during the general election period leaving us with not enough partners to run the campaign.”
The Salvation Army stated:
“As we are not traditionally a campaigning charity we were not in danger of exceeding the top limit. However, we were wary of supporting causes that could be considered coalition campaigning because we felt the administrative cost would be excessive and we couldn’t control the level of spending.”
The Commission on Civil Society and Democratic Engagement also found that voluntary groups undertaking Government contracts regularly faced threats to remain silent on key Government policies. Many neglect to speak out on issues that are plaguing society, for fear of losing funding or inviting other unwelcome sanctions.
I am afraid that I am nearly at the end of my speech, so I will finish.
The lobbying legislation looks to many in the sector too much like another deliberate and shameless act by a Government who are too scared to debate their record or to be open to scrutiny and challenge. The health of our democracy depends on people’s right to campaign on the issues they care about. The 2014 Act was an attack on our democracy. It limits the rights of charities to fight for important causes. It has left expert organisations that have a vital contribution to make to public debate unsure whether they are allowed to speak out. We seek to protect the right of charities to have a loud and respected voice in our democracy. I commend new clause 3 to the House.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Redcar (Anna Turley) on her first speech from the Dispatch Box in the Report stage of a Bill. She gave a thorough explanation of her case on behalf of the official Opposition, although I am not entirely sure that I agreed with all of it. No doubt she gave it a lot of thought. She certainly gave us the benefit of her views.
I will not follow the hon. Lady up and down the badger setts of England and Wales, if that is all right with her, but I will speak to amendment 1, which stands in my name. I will do so, with the greatest of respect, in a slightly less aggressive way than her, although there is nothing wrong with aggression when one has something decent to say. I must declare an interest, as is indicated on the Order Paper, because I am a patron of Unlock, the charity that seeks to help people with convictions, and a trustee of the Prison Reform Trust. Both positions are unpaid.
I became interested in prison issues, the rehabilitation of offenders and so on when the Prime Minister, then the Leader of the Opposition, appointed me in the middle of the last decade as shadow Minister with responsibility for prisons and probation. As a consequence of that appointment, I visited about 65 of the 140 or so prisons, young offender institutions and secure training units throughout England and Wales. It became apparent to me—it was not a new idea, in that others had discovered it previously—that one of the things that contributes to the high levels of reoffending among those people who have been sent to prison and come out again, particularly among youngsters, is that they do not have a job or somewhere settled to stay, and that they have, to put it loosely, relationship problems. If we can do something to help people to form strong, stable relationships with families, partners or others, and if we can find them somewhere stable to stay and live, and if we can help them to get training or work, the chances that they will reoffend and go back to prison are very much reduced.
As a consequence of the voyage of discovery that I went on from 2005 or so until I was appointed shadow Attorney-General in 2009, I wrote a paper called “Prisons with a Purpose”. I hope that the Secretary of State for Justice—I see his Parliamentary Private Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), sitting in his place to my left—is picking up many of the ideas that I and my right hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs (Nick Herbert) pushed forward in that period of opposition.
I suppose it is not a surprise that I have become attached to the Prison Reform Trust and to Unlock, but in speaking to my amendment 1, which is long—it is set out on page 5 of the amendment paper—I invite the Government to have a little think about the disqualification or waiver procedure that applies to people with criminal records, either in so far as they may be trustees of charities that have an interest in looking after ex-offenders, or in so far as they may be employees of those charities.
I hope that the framework of the amendment is clear in itself but, if I may—I will be as quick as I can because I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) and other right hon. and hon. Members wish to catch your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker—I hope he and the House will forgive me if I take a little time in setting out what I intend to do. I should confess at the outset that I am very grateful to the Prison Reform Trust in assisting me in preparing for today’s debate.
The purpose of my amendment is to require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament, before clause 9 comes into force, a report on the impact of the extension of the disqualification framework on people with criminal records who are trustees of, or who are employed by, charities that work with or employ ex-offenders. I intend to urge the Government to provide us with further clarification of the impact of the extension of the disqualification framework on people with criminal records and charities that work with or employ ex-offenders. The amendment also provides an opportunity for the Minister to outline in more detail how he and his Department intend to conduct the review of the waiver process to ensure that people with criminal records who are existing employees or charitable trustees, or who are seeking or intend to seek employment or a trusteeship in a charity, are not unfairly discriminated against.
Clause 9 and the policy behind it are entirely worthy and understandable. We clearly do not want people who are engaged in terrorism to be using charities to move money around or to hide their outrageous behaviour; that is not controversial, but one problem might be the unintended consequence of the clause on people whom the Government may not want to impact. One has only to read out clause 9(5) to realise that someone who comes within
“Part 1 of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act 2010…or…the Al-Qaida (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2011”
is not someone whom we want to be involved in charities. That is not a problem, but I am concerned about the unintended consequence of that perfectly understandable and worthwhile clause.
To take up that point, the right to buy affects charities, and we are debating charities legislation. The right to buy affects the ability of housing associations to control their assets, which is a fundamental change to the balance of the relationship between their role and the Government’s ability to tell them what to do. That is why we have debated it today.
The Opposition are obviously entitled to propose whatever amendments they want as long as they are in order, but the problem is not just that new clause 2 is completely unnecessary; it would also be damaging, although I am sure that that was not the hon. Lady’s intention.
Many of the rules that apply to charities’ investments in, and their disposal of, assets, derive from case law that has been built up over hundreds of years. Proponents of the new clause argue that it reflects the existing case law, but I simply do not accept that. A simple statutory provision such as the new clause cannot hope to reflect the accumulated detail of case law derived from many hundreds of judgments.
Case law already requires charities to use and dispose of their assets in a way that supports the delivery of their charitable purposes. That provides flexibility for certain circumstances that a statutory provision cannot provide. For example, how would the new clause affect compulsory purchase orders in relation to charity land? How would it affect the existing rights of more than 1.4 million housing association tenants under the preserved right to buy or the right to acquire? How would it affect the exercise of Charity Commission powers such as its power to direct charity property in the course of a statutory inquiry? There are simply too many questions about the measure to which we have not had satisfactory answers either this afternoon or during the course of the Bill’s proceedings.
New clause 2 would give the Charity Commission a new and very broad role in policing the use and disposal of charity assets. That is inconsistent with our current aim of helping the commission to focus on its core regulatory activities.
New clause 3, which is also in the hon. Lady’s name, is at best unnecessary and at worst damaging. Charity law already sets out clear rules on what charities can and cannot do in relation to campaigning and political activity. I explained those in detail in Committee and do not propose to do so again today. New clause 3 might seek to reflect existing law, but it does not. In a similar way to new clause 2, new clause 3 attempts to include in a statutory provision the existing case law. That seriously risks changing the boundaries of what is permitted.
New clause 3 would allow charities to undertake political campaigning or political activity, but does not define what that means.
Would it, for example, allow partisan political campaigning? If that were the case, it would represent a real shift in the law and I would strongly object to that. In particular, I think the public would be very surprised and disappointed to see charities taking part and campaigning on a party political basis. Existing case law does not allow charities to engage in political campaigning to such an extent that it calls into question whether in fact they are a charity or, rather, a political campaigning organisation. Again, it is not clear to me that new clause 3 would incorporate that crucial limitation, potentially opening up charitable status to organisations with a political purpose.
The representatives for Scotland were at the fundraising summit recently. This is a devolved matter, and it is up to them what rules they set for Scotland. They do not have to follow; this is an England and Wales Bill, which does not affect Scotland. It is therefore up to the Scottish regulator how they wish to proceed.
I maintain that it is important to keep a clear division between statutory and self-regulatory powers to ensure better regulation of fundraising. The best way to achieve that is to support the new fundraising regulator and, if it should fail, make a decisive and clear move to statutory regulation. Should self-regulation fail, the Government will not hesitate to intervene, which could include tasking the Charity Commission with the regulation of fundraising. However, we think it is too soon to commit the Charity Commission to an enhanced statutory role in fundraising, so I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex will understand why I do not support his new clauses 4 and 5.
Let me turn finally to Government amendments 6 and 7. It would not be fair to ask the taxpayer to carry the cost of fundraising regulation if it is the result of a failure by charities to protect the public from their own poor practices. Government amendments 6 and 7 would therefore enable the fundraising regulator or the Charity Commission to charge fees to those it regulates for that purpose. Many of the charities signed up to and paying for the old system of self-regulation were those that followed best practice, and there was a problem of free riders. To guard against that risk, the Etherington review suggested that any charity with fundraising expenditure beyond a certain level should be subject to a levy, requiring the large and medium-sized fundraising charities to pay for regulation.
Should the Government need to compel charities to register with the charity fundraising regulator, it is important that the fundraising regulator is able to levy fees for registration. That is exactly what amendment 6 would enable. Government amendment 7 deals with fees, should the reserve power be exercised for the Charity Commission to regulate fundraising. It would ensure that regulations could provide for the Charity Commission to charge fees across the range of bodies that it would regulate as the fundraising regulator.
I hope my explanations suffice to convince hon. Members that these amendments are an important part of the backstop to self-regulation and will help to ensure the effective regulation of fundraising in future, but I would of course be happy to provide more detailed responses. The main point is that I hope that these amendments are not needed and that charities will support the new, tougher self-regulatory system being established under the leadership of my noble Friend Lord Grade of Yarmouth. I commend these Government amendments to the House.
For the sake of colleagues, I will be brief. I thank everybody for their contributions this afternoon. There is a wealth of experience from the charity sector in the Chamber, which has added a richness to the progress of the Bill.
Let me turn straight to new clause 1. Although I do not share the Minister’s view that judicial review will be more cost-effective—that may be the case for the Charity Commission, but perhaps not for charities that are appealing, many of which will not be able to afford to go to judicial review—I am willing to work with the Charity Commission, the sector and the Government to monitor the use of warnings outside of primary legislation. Therefore, I do not wish to press new clause 1 to a vote, although I wish to test the House on new clause 3 and amendment 8, because I do not feel our concerns have been met on either issue. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 3
Power to make representations
“(1) A charity may undertake political campaigning or political activity in the context of supporting the delivery of its charitable purposes.
(2) A charity may campaign to ensure support for, or to oppose, a change in the law, policy or decisions of central government, local authorities or other public bodies.”—(Anna Turley.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
It has been an absolute privilege to serve on behalf of Her Majesty’s Opposition on the consideration of this Bill. I pay tribute to all the civil servants and Clerks of the House who have worked so hard on drafting it. I thank all the members of the Public Bill Committee, who gave up so much time to scrutinise the Bill line by line in a constructive and positive way that did the House great credit. I thank the Minister and his team for the open and co-operative approach they have taken to working with us, disappointed as I am—although not surprised, as the right hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) pointed out—that none of our amendments were accepted.
I want to place on the record my thanks to the Minister for Civil Society, which I did not have time to do on Report, for clarifying a number of points. He said that the Charity Commission is looking at the likelihood that it will give 14 days’ notice in most circumstances when issuing a warning. That was an extremely helpful clarification. It was also helpful to hear him clarify that the Charity Commission does not see itself as having a power to direct as a result of the warning. It was important to hear that it intends to notify the charity of the reasons why a warning has been withdrawn, which will allow the public record to be set straight. I was grateful for the clarification he gave on those issues.
I thank all Members who have debated the Bill both here and in the other place, in particular Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town. As ever, our noble Friends did sterling work and the Bill is all the better for their experience and expertise. Many Members of both Houses have brought a great deal of experience and knowledge of the charity sector and, as we found out today, its history in Elizabethan law to our debates, which is greatly to be commended.
Finally, I thank those whom the Bill is for: the millions of people in this country who give up their time, week in, week out, to volunteer, fundraise, donate and support in many other ways Britain’s fantastic charitable and voluntary sector. Britain is the most generous developed country in the world and we should be proud of the extraordinary things that are done by extraordinary people in the sector every single day.
There is no doubt that the charity sector has been through a rocky period in the past year. Alongside the ever-shrinking funding from central and local government, the ever-growing demand for the services and support that charities provide, and the ever-increasing public scrutiny, there has been a series of high-profile and deeply damaging cases that, although caused by the actions of a small minority, have had significant repercussions for the sector as a whole.
The sector has taken swift and positive action to respond to those cases, but it is right that, as parliamentarians, we do our bit to ensure that charities have the legislative and regulatory framework they need to enable them to fulfil their charitable objectives, and to maintain their integrity and the strong public support they enjoy. That is what the Bill seeks to do, and why the Opposition have supported it throughout its journey.
It is vital that we get the framework right and that the powers in the Bill serve to support and empower charities to thrive and flourish, and not to stifle or oppress. Charities are fiercely and proudly independent, and rightly so. They do vital work. They work with many of the most vulnerable and challenging people. Many work in the most dangerous places. Charities have to be able to take risks, innovate, shape new thinking and challenge prejudice. They must be able to find new answers to some of the biggest challenges we face in the world, when politicians too often fall short. Regulating such a sector is no easy feat. Getting the balance of regulation right is therefore critical if we are not to damage all that is good about the sector.
Throughout the passage of the Bill, the Opposition have raised a number of concerns. Although our amendments have not been taken up, we will continue to scrutinise and work with the Government to monitor them closely. There are four aspects I want to set out on Third Reading. Our concerns have not diminished, and we will continue to monitor progress.
First, on the new powers afforded to the Charity Commission, we have tried throughout the passage of the Bill to gain concessions on the new and fairly broad power for the commission to give warnings to charities. As the right hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster said, there is a danger of self-fulfilling bureaucracies. When we put that together with reduced budgets, there is a big onus on the commission to deliver in an ever more challenging environment. Throughout the debate, the Minister has insisted that the commission’s new powers will be used proportionately. We believe that that places a substantial burden of judgment on the commission in the absence of achieving more substantial safeguards in the Bill. We hope he will be proved correct.
Warnings that are meant to deal with low-level issues could, particularly when published, have a significant effect in choking off donations, funding and sponsorship. The reputational damage to a charity could be significant or even terminal. We would have liked a right to appeal a warning through the charities tribunal. We would also have liked to prevent warnings from being published or for the charity not to be identified if the details are published. I was grateful to the Minister for his clarification that the Charity Commission will not be able to direct a charity on the back of a warning. That would have been a significant shift in the relationship and in the independence of charities. We will watch the use of those warnings with care as the powers are implemented.
Secondly, it is important to get the powers relating to the charity trustees right. We were pleased to see the amendment in the Lords that expanded the restrictions on charity positions to those on the sex offenders register but, like the right hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier), the Opposition have concerns—we raised them in Committee—that the detail has not been sufficiently worked through as regards charities that work in the criminal justice system, and that work closely with current and ex-offenders for the purposes of their charitable aims. I welcome the Minister’s pledge to work closely to see that through.
On the fundraising powers, we believe the sector has made great strides in relation to the recommendations in the Etherington review, which we welcomed. The legislation supports that progress with improved reporting and monitoring while maintaining the self-regulation of the sector. It is absolutely right that people’s privacy is respected, that unreasonably persistent approaches are challenged, that people are not placed under undue pressure, and that vulnerable people are protected. The Bill sets standards for all of those things. We will watch that space carefully to see whether the back-up powers the Minister added to the Bill, which we support, will be required. We hope they are not.
Finally, we have tried unsuccessfully to tackle the measures on the freedom to campaign during the passage of the Bill. The Minister and I will not see eye to eye on this. As was shown by the vote today, the Opposition remain committed to the principle that the right of charities to campaign and influence the political process is a vital part of a healthy democracy and integral to the concept of civil society. As we have discussed today, charities are in the best place to identify problems in public policy, because they are often the ones picking up the pieces of political policy failures. They see the waste and the inefficiency, and they see the opportunity to prevent problems. They can achieve their charitable aims more successfully if they can help to shape the decisions that affect the people and the communities they support.
I am afraid we see before us an illiberal Government who are scared to debate their record or be open to scrutiny and challenge; a Government who have railroaded important proposals, such as tax credit changes, fracking and student grants through Parliament without proper debate; a Government who change child poverty measures and scrap targets they know they will not reach; a Government who see the Freedom of Information Act 2000 as an irritant and the Human Rights Act 1998 as an inconvenience; a Government who refuse to publish Cabinet Office papers for the first time in 50 years; and a Government who have no problem with millions of people dropping off the electoral register.
Charities are but the latest victims of a Government who ride roughshod over the legitimate views and voices of civil society. The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 was part of this fundamentally illiberal approach and a deliberate attempt to gag charities by a Government fearful of public scrutiny and accountability. It is a shame the Government did not use the opportunity we gave them today to put right that wrong.
On all those areas and many more, we will continue to hold the Government to account. We will watch the implementation of the Bill carefully, in particular the balance of power between charities and the commission. Fundamentally, we believe the Bill provides a good regulatory framework for the charitable sector, which, if used well, will enable charities in Britain not just to survive in this most challenging of times, but hopefully flourish.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMay I second the Minister’s comments and congratulate you, Mr Hamilton? Yours is an extremely well deserved appointment and we look forward to seeing the wealth of experience you bring to the role. It is not before time, so many congratulations. I would also like to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff Central, who is not with us but also received an appointment today. There have been some very good moves all round.
We support the Government’s new clause, which seeks to reserve powers to control charity fundraising. It could require mandatory registration in compliance with a specified fundraising regulator, or for fundraising regulation to be carried out by the Charity Commission.
Before going into more detail on why we support the new clause, I want to refer to the important point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hove. The strength of the Bill, and one of the main reasons for our support, is that it is important for charities to have the support, the regulatory framework and everything they need to ensure they are abiding by the highest standards.
We also think that there are many lessons to be learned from the sorry Kids Company saga. I was pleased to hear the Minister commit to conveying strongly the message from the investigations underway. We look forward to seeing the outcome of those investigations and to working with the Government to ensure that those standards are upheld within Government as much as within the sector.
Returning to the new clause, the Institute of Fundraising, the professional membership body for UK fundraising, and the Public Fundraising Association, the membership body for charities and agencies that carry out face-to-face direct debit fundraising, are in the process of merging to form a single professional body across the sector in the light of the Etherington review. Both say that they understand the reasons for amending the Bill to introduce these reserve powers and do not object in principle to their introduction. They hope, as do we, that ultimately the reserve powers will not be needed, and that the new self-regulatory structures will be effective. They commit to working to support the new system of stronger self-regulation to help ensure its success without the need for the reserve powers to be used. I welcome their positive commitment to that.
As we said in the previous sitting, we believe that the sector takes its responsibility in this field very seriously and will strive to reach the high standards set out in the Etherington review, which we welcomed. Standards have fallen short with some recent fundraising practices. I agree with the Minister that those practices were restricted to a small minority but had a substantial and disproportionate effect on public perception of the sector. When that does happen, it is important to ensure that charities and the bodies charged with regulation can act swiftly and effectively to restore public trust.
We believe that state regulation should be a last resort when self-regulation has failed, but these powers give self-regulation the opportunity to succeed, while ensuring that there is proper back-up should the new arrangements fail to deliver satisfactorily. We look forward to working with the Government on reviewing the steps that the sector takes to fulfil these commitments. Like the Government, we hope that the powers will not need to be invoked, but it is important, when tackling these issues, that we have backbone and teeth with such powers.
If the Minister had not indicated on Second Reading that he was going to amend the Bill in this way, we would certainly have put down an amendment, because we support the need for these measures. We welcome them, support them and look forward to working with the Minister to protect the integrity of charity fundraising.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 7 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 2
Power to make representations
‘(1) A charity may undertake political campaigning or political activity in the context of supporting the delivery of its charitable purposes.
(2) A charity may campaign to ensure support for, or to oppose, a change in the law, policy or decisions of central government, local authorities or other public bodies.’.—(Anna Turley.)
This New Clause would enshrine in legislation the right of charities to undertake political campaigning activity.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would enshrine in legislation the right of charities to undertake political campaigning activity. We are clear that this is a direct attempt to challenge the unfair and poorly applied Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014—the gagging Act, as it is commonly known.
Campaigning is an important part of democracy and civil society. One of the fundamental principles of a thriving and healthy democracy is that individuals and organisations can speak out about the issues they care about. Charities, in particular, have a long-established role in educating and informing the public, campaigning and securing positive social change throughout our history and, crucially, holding the state to account. It is the sign of a mature and confident democracy that we allow dissent and ensure that we have wide-ranging and representative public debate. Charities not only have the right to campaign, but are often best placed to provide important insights that can inform and improve policy making. They are so often the ones on the frontline seeing the gaps in provision, the duplication of services, inefficiency and waste, and indeed spotting the best ways of solving problems.
Many charities can often make a bigger impact with their limited resources through campaigning than through service delivery alone. Campaigning often saves taxpayers’ money in the long term as issues can be addressed at their roots, rather than having to address their costly aftermath. For example, is it better to care for victims of crime in the aftermath of an event or to help prevent crimes in the first place? It is good to help care for patients with long-term conditions such as cancer, but is it not better to push for more effective treatments, awareness of symptoms and support for diagnosis?
I thank the Minister for his intervention but, as I will say, the sector has made it clear that it feels stifled, particularly in the lead up to general elections, when there are serious debates about the future of Government policy. That is what this new clause seeks to prevent.
The lobbying rules affect charities because of their non-partisan campaigning activity. Organisations can campaign for changes to law or policy where such a change would support their charitable objectives. Although under charity law campaigning cannot be the continuing or sole activity of a charity, it is an entirely legitimate activity for charities to pursue. Under the current rules of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, some of that activity is already regulated by the Electoral Commission when an organisation has been deemed to produce election material. For many charities and voluntary organisations, raising awareness of the issues affecting the people and causes they support is a routine and important part of their work and central to their charitable objectives.
In a letter leading up to the general election last year, more than 160 signatories from the charitable sector, including Save the Children, the Salvation Army, Oxfam, Greenpeace, Age UK and Amnesty International, said that the legislation should be scrapped and that it is having a “chilling effect” on charities’ work.
One of the things the hon. Lady is talking about is the identification of political campaigning, particularly in the run-up to an election, and I understand why she feels that charities should have the right to campaign on issues about which they feel passionately. However, I am uncomfortable that taxpayer-funded bodies, which, let us face it, is exactly what charities are—the tax break means that the taxpayer is paying for this—are paying for a revolving door of special advisers and press advisers from political parties, notably one political party, to come back, take Government money and lobby the Government. I find it absolutely extraordinary that we are asking the British public to pay to be lobbied on their own behalf. It is very odd.
That logic refutes the need for any special advisers, who are of course paid by the public purse to implement a political manifesto.
Does my hon. Friend agree that there is ample charitable law stating that charities exist to serve their beneficiaries? They do not exist to serve special advisers or any other part of society; they exist to support their beneficiaries. That is the beginning, the middle and the end of the story as far as charities are concerned.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is their full purpose, and they should feel entirely able to stand up and challenge the Government of the day, whoever they may be, and any political party if they feel that their policy does not support their charitable objectives.
Some of the remarks made this morning do a disservice to many Conservative councillors and Members of Parliament. I can even think of Government special advisers with whom I have worked in the voluntary sector as paid staff, and they all did a very good job in the voluntary sector and are doing reasonably well in government.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and he is right to pay that tribute. There is often a political motivation behind such proposals that resents the fact that a party, once it is in power, has to accept that people will challenge it and hold it to account.
I draw the hon. Lady’s attention to the one case that I am aware of when a charity has been criticised for not being politically neutral during the general election. That was the Badger Trust. It is not a charity that I am particularly familiar with, but the Charity Commission said that there was a risk of its political neutrality being called into question. The example it gave was that Dominic Dyer, its chief executive officer, organised rallies in the lead-up to and during the general election, and emailed all its supporters, using the charity’s computer system, in advance of the Labour party’s manifesto launch on rural communities, saying that he had contributed to it and asking supporters to attend the launch event and support it—or words to that effect. Does the hon. Lady think that is right? Surely not.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that suggestion. I wonder whether he would have had the same concerns had that been done for his political party. Surely consultation is a positive thing. If a charity’s aims and objectives are welcomed and taken forward by a political party, it is surely right for it to welcome that success for its charitable objectives and its efforts to have influence, shape policy and change society. That is something to be welcomed, and the hon. Gentleman is on a difficult line with that.
I think that is perfectly acceptable, if people want to go to any party political event and offer their views. They may go to it and disagree with the party and challenge it. As far as I am concerned, we are in danger of separating politics from the realities of campaigning and policy making. Politics has to be open and accessible and must not exist in a vacuum. Many people are deeply involved in politics, from councillors and MPs to activists; there is not a small box for people to sit in because they are in one category but not another.
Does my hon. Friend agree that there are many ways to achieve social change? One is to go into communities and work with individuals on the frontline, and another is to change public policy. An individual using the front-line method can change hundreds of people’s lives, but changing public policy can change millions of lives for the better. Is not it right that charities should seek to bring about front-line change and involve themselves in public policy simultaneously?
I agree that that is part of their core objectives and part of what they have done for centuries. I am happy to support that.
I was a campaigner before I came to this place, and it sits uneasily with me that any organisation that deems itself to be a charity should align itself with a political party in that way. The policy for cancer patients is totally the responsibility of all our parties, in my view, so for someone to take their position in a charity and use it by way of promotion is wrong.
I totally disagree with the hon. Lady. That example, for me, is not aligning with a political party. I do not see it as an issue if someone who has influenced thinking—influenced a manifesto that will influence policy change—encourages people to go and have a debate at an event.
I will make some progress, if I may, because we are trying to finish our proceedings this morning.
Charities themselves set out some concerns, including the fact that the scope of the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 was very broad. They were concerned that legitimate, day-to-day activities of charities and voluntary organisations engaging with public policy would be caught by the rules. That means that a number of regulated charities, voluntary organisations and other groups will be substantially affected.
They felt that the Act as a whole is incredibly complex and unclear and that it might be difficult for charities and other voluntary groups to understand whether any of their activities would be caught, giving rise to a risk of discouraging campaigning activity. They also felt that it gave substantial discretion to the Electoral Commission, creating an unnecessarily burdensome regulatory regime, and that it might leave some charities, voluntary organisations and the Electoral Commission open to legal challenge.
Legal opinion provided to the National Council for Voluntary Organisations by election law experts suggested that the rules are so complex and unclear that they are
“likely to have a chilling effect on freedom of expression, putting small organisations and their trustees and directors in fear of criminal penalty if they speak out on matters of public interest and concern”.
I want to set out some further reaction from the sector to the 2014 Act. Julia Unwin, chief executive of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, said:
“It is my view that the provisions of the Bill, if enacted, could reduce significantly the effectiveness of the endowed foundation I lead, make it difficult for us to achieve our purpose, and divert charitable funds to responding to legal challenge in a way that is wholly inappropriate”.
The Royal British Legion called it “sloppy”. Mike Wild, chief executive of Macc, said:
“Community organisations from informal voluntary groups to large national and international charities need to be able to challenge politicians, ask difficult questions and say what they are seeing happening in communities around them. The ambiguities in this Act will leave many organisations uncertain over what they are allowed to say and when.”
On the second point, perhaps they have given up hope and they may have some despair. We have certainly had a lot of support and encouragement from the sector in taking these proceedings forward. Charities have asked us to continue to press the Government on this issue and to review it. We came under a lot of pressure, and our manifesto stated that if we had won in May we would have revoked the measure.
I have done some research into that just briefly over the past few days, and the only example I could find is the one about the Badger Trust, which I think most reasonable people would agree is an example of inappropriate behaviour by a charity. Can the hon. Member give us some examples of charities whose activities during the general election campaign were inappropriately curtailed as a result of the 2014 Act?
I will respond to the hon. Gentleman’s point and to the previous point before taking the next intervention. There has been a commission report. I appreciate that the hon. Member for Stafford takes the view that there was no difference in the last election, but there is evidence to suggest that charities felt that the Act has impeded the way they behave. I will talk about that further a bit later, if I may, but I will take the next intervention now.
The hon. Member is being extremely generous in giving way. Forgive me, but I come back to the simple point that the taxation element of this is really important. Regarding the element that comes from the taxpayer—the 25%, the gift aid, or whatever it happens to be—that break is money taken by force. Let us not forget what it is; tax is money taken by force. It is not a charitable gift and it is not an extra donation; it is money taken by force from people across our nation, and it is absolutely essential that we do not force people to support one political party or another. It is up to people themselves, because it is a free association and a free choice to support a political party, a campaign or perhaps an issue. However, she seems to be calling for charities to be enabled to use that money for political lobbying, which has to be wrong.
I do not understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, because gift aid is made automatically to charities that people may or may not support. A taxpayer may be paying gift aid to a charity whose aims and objectives they may not support. That is the logic.
May I invite my hon. Friend just to clarify one point? We are talking—are we not?—about charities having the ability to support individual policies. They are not being invited or allowed to support political parties.
My hon. Friend makes a really important point. This measure is not about party political campaigning; it is about lobbying and putting pressure on the Government, and on all political parties—[Interruption.]
I can only respond to one comment at a time, and I am trying to be as generous as I can. This measure is not about party political campaigning; it is about campaigning on issues and trying to influence every political party of the day by appropriate means. We think that is fair.
I am going to make some progress; I am sorry. We are going to run out of time.
As I said in response to the comments of the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling, charities’ fears have been realised. The Act did stop charities from campaigning—they say so themselves—and caused unnecessary cost and confusion, according to a report by the Commission on Civil Society and Democratic Engagement, which looked into its effect on last year’s general election. Drawing on evidence from UK charities and campaign groups, the commission found that charities were faced with confusion about the
“ambiguity of the definition of regulated activity”.
As a result of that, the commission says,
“many activities aimed at raising awareness and generating discussion ahead of the election have not taken place”.
A representative of the World Wildlife Fund told the commission:
“I think the Act has created an atmosphere of caution within parts of our sector. It has also wasted time in terms of analysis of it, explaining it to trustees, staff etc. It is not…a piece of legislation we need.”
An anonymous large non-governmental organisation told the commission:
“The Act meant we didn’t undertake some of the activities we planned. Also, joint campaigning was tough as many organisations were very nervous about the Act and (therefore) watered down their activities, meaning our ability to campaign in the run-up to the election was severely hampered.”
Greenpeace told the commission that it had intended to participate in a “cross-NGO campaign”, but that all but a couple of organisations ended up not participating due to the general election period, leaving Greenpeace without enough partners to run the campaign. The Salvation Army said that although it was not traditionally a campaigning charity and therefore not in danger of exceeding the top limit, it was still wary of supporting causes that
“could be considered coalition campaigning because we felt the administrative cost would be excessive and we couldn’t control the level of spending”.
The report stated that 12.5% of the organisations surveyed reported taking no part in coalition campaigning because of the Act, while a further 12.5% substantially reduced and 31% slightly reduced their involvement in coalition campaigning. The commission also stated that it had seen
“no evidence to substantiate the claim that the Lobbying Act was needed to avert undue influence on elections”.
I am afraid the lobbying legislation looks to many in the sector too much like a deliberate and shameless act by a Government scared to debate their record or to be open to scrutiny and challenge by the third sector. A Government who seek a big society and a strong civil society must not be afraid of one of the most fundamental aspects of such a society: freedom of speech and to hold the Government of the day to account.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way, because she has taken a lot of interventions. We need to remind ourselves that charities already make representations to Government on behalf of the public and of the many valuable causes that people promote and hold dear. Does she not agree that the new clause would risk fundamentally undermining that very relationship of trust, which we are seeking to strengthen in the Bill? Charities often value their independence from Government and politics.
I disagreed with everything until the hon. Lady’s last point. Charities totally value their independence. Previous legislation has sought to stifle their independence and to prevent proper challenge and scrutiny of Government in the build-up to an election, but the new clause seeks to protect that.
Does my hon. Friend agree that what would damage the trust of people who give so much to charities and of beneficiaries is to see Government discussing and making policies for an area that concerns them directly while the charity stays mute because it is not allowed by law to intervene or even talk publicly about that area?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. When people support a charity—whatever the issue, whether it is cancer treatment or supporting the elderly to have a dignified older age—they want to see it making a difference, and that is in everything, from campaigning and having a loud voice nationally to seeking to secure changes to our society.
I am going to make some progress, if I may—I apologise to the hon. Gentleman.
The new clause seeks to prevent what the shadow Minister for the Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson), described last month as
“a fundamentally illiberal Government that railroads proposals through Parliament without debate and seeks to limit scrutiny whenever and wherever possible”.
It is the same mind-set that regards
“the FOI Act…as an irritant and the Human Rights Act…as nothing but an inconvenience”
and that goes in for
“squeezing the finances of the political parties who oppose you becomes not just acceptable but desirable.”
The lobbying Act was a part of that fundamentally illiberal approach and an attempt to gag charities. It came from the same fear of public scrutiny and accountability. The new clause seeks to protect that important freedom.
In 2010, the coalition agreement promised that the Government would
“throw open the doors of public bodies, to enable the public to hold politicians and public bodies to account.”
How much, it seems, has changed, yet the Government still seek to ensure that charities are accountable—and rightly so. From today’s papers we can see that they are considering extending the Freedom of Information Act to charities that deliver public services. I would be happy to extend the Bill process if the Government wish to table further amendments to that end, so that we may have that discussion. Transparency, accountability and freedom to challenge must work both ways.
The hon. Member for Hove talked about the public’s expectations when they engage with or contribute to charities. Surely the public’s expectation is that charities will focus on their community work and their help for vulnerable groups, rather than on party politicking. The new clause would blur the clear line that we have now.
This is not about party politicking. Is the hon. Gentleman seriously suggesting that an organisation such as Shelter should simply stick to providing advice to Members and not seek to challenge the Government and politicians of all sides, holding them to account? That is what we are seeking to protect.
The Commission on Civil Society and Democratic Engagement also found that voluntary groups embroiled in Government contracts regularly face threats to remain silent on key Government policies. Many neglect to speak out on issues plaguing society for fear of losing funding or inviting other unwelcome sanctions. The health of our democracy depends on people’s right to campaign on the issues they care about. The lobbying Act was an attack on our democracy. It hits charities and campaigners and limits their right to fight for important causes while allowing professional lobbies to escape scrutiny. It has left expert organisations that have a vital contribution to make to public debate unsure whether they are allowed to speak out. Governments should not be afraid of criticism or lively debate. As the old saying goes, politics is too important to leave to politicians. We seek to protect this right of charities to have a loud and respected voice in our democracy. I commend the new clause to the Committee.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hamilton. I add my voice to those congratulating you on your new role in the shadow foreign affairs team. I am sure your experience will be greatly appreciated throughout the whole House.
I confess to feeling some responsibility for this discussion. The question we should always ask when debating any potential law is: what is the problem we are trying to fix? I understand the problem the new clause is trying to address. It is, as my hon. Friend the Member for Redcar described, the chilling effect that was undoubtedly caused by the gagging law passed by the previous Parliament. I will talk about that chilling effect shortly, but it is worth remembering why that gagging law was passed in the first place. It was, of course, because some very foolish Liberal Democrat MPs and a few Conservatives made the decision prior to the 2010 general election to sign a pledge in a Committee Room down the corridor with me, as president of the National Union of Students, that clearly stated, “I will vote against any increase in tuition fees and will campaign for a fairer funding system.”
The irony was that, prior to the general election, I was hauled in by members of the Liberal Democrat party leadership, who subsequently joined the Cabinet, to explain why the NUS had gone so soft and was not demanding abolition of all fees in line with Liberal Democrat policy. That would have been laughable in itself, given subsequent events, were it not for the fact that previously, as leader of the NUS, I was dragged up to a particularly dreary Liberal Democrat spring conference at Harrogate expecting to endorse its new graduate tax policy as the “Labour” president of the NUS. Of course, it was never a party political role—[Laughter]—but nevertheless, there I was, ready to endorse the Liberal Democrat graduate tax policy, which never came to fruition.
That is an important example because, even as president of the National Union of Students, which is arguably one of the most small “p” political charities where candidates stand on political tickets—I was elected as a Labour president of the NUS—there was never any doubt in my mind about who I was accountable to and who I served. I was elected first and foremost—in fact, only—to serve students. If that meant going up to a wet and windy Liberal Democrat spring conference to stand alongside its leader and endorse a policy that, sadly, did not come to pass, I was prepared to do it.
In the same way, I told Lord Mandelson, when he was Business Secretary, that unless there was student representation on the Browne review, he would find me and 100 other student union presidents outside the Business Department holding up signs saying, “Students let down by Labour”. The point is that, whoever is in government, if sometimes they take decisions that impact on beneficiaries or communities that we serve under the auspices of our charitable objectives, we must have the muscle to hold their feet to the fire.
That happens today to Labour politicians up and down the country, whether it is the Labour-led Welsh Assembly Government or Labour in local government. Look at the work that the Refugee and Migrant Forum of Essex and London does. It threatened to take the Government to court over their terrible “go home” vans and was prepared to turn up at its local Labour council to say it must do more to support refugees and migrants.
The Ilford Salvation Army does a load of great work on homelessness, and I want it not just to provide for homeless people with direct provision, but to turn up at the door of their local councillors or Members of Parliament asking them to explain why public policy is having a detrimental impact on those people and how it needs to change.
My hon. Friend raises a question of enormous public interest. Only last year the Charity Commission looked at whether charities should be required to submit details of their campaigning spend as part of their annual return process, details of which would have been published on the register of charities. The commission concluded that such a requirement would create a significant amount of work for charities and decided not to include that in the annual return for 2015. However, the commission did note the huge level of public interest in the issue and said it would look at the matter again. I welcome that and encourage the commission to keep the matter under review. I hope that clearly answers my hon. Friend’s question.
Even in the unlikely event that the boundaries of law were not shifted by an attempt at statutory definition, one would still expect legal challenges to test whether the law had in fact changed, by design or otherwise. There is further risk in putting this in the Bill since it would risk politicising charities’ right to campaign. Ministers, rather than the independent regulator and the courts, would be responsible for the provision, which could leave it open to political interference over time.
I hope the Committee will agree that one advantage of case law provision is that it is in the hands of an independent regulator and the courts and is not subject to ministerial intervention. As I said, my noble Friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts is currently reviewing evidence of the impact of 2014 Act on charities and other organisations in the run-up to the election. I understand his report is expected reasonably soon, and I look forward to seeing the findings and whether there are lessons to be learned.
I also point the Committee to the Charity Commission’s recent publication of the cases it investigated in the run-up to the 2015 general election. From looking at those cases, one gets a good impression of the independent regulator properly exercising its regulatory role in this area in a very proportionate way.
I hope that I have given the reassurances that Opposition Members seek about charities’ right to speak out for their beneficiaries, while cautioning against the dangers of statutory provision, and hope they will not press the new clause.
I thank the Minister for his explanation, although he has not convinced us—he will be surprised to hear that. We will not press the new clause to a vote now because we want to return to it on Report. I am sure hon. Members look forward, as I do, to further discussion on the Floor of the House.
I was struck by the Minister’s passionate defence of the independence of the charitable sector and his desire to protect it from the overbearing oppression of political campaigning forced on it by the new clause. I would love to know how many charities begged and pleaded with the previous Government to bring in the gagging Bill to protect them from overbearing political parties forcing them to campaign. In fact, the feeling from the sector was quite the opposite: they were asking for independence from being gagged and being told they could not. I fundamentally disagree with the Minister’s claim that he is trying to protect the sector’s independence. Its independence to speak with its true voice and commitment is what the new clause is about.
I hope I am not naïve in saying this, but for me the basis of politics is to try to make a difference and to find solutions to problems. So many of the aims and objectives that we in this room all share are completely concurrent with those of the charitable sector, so it is inevitable that on many of the issues we try to address and change, charities will feel just as strongly and passionately as we do. They will try to influence us because we are in a position of power to make decisions.
I would appreciate it if the hon. Lady gave me three quick evidence-based examples of charities being stopped from pursuing issues on behalf of their beneficiaries. I hope that her party has given examples to Lord Hodgson to show where that has already happened. It would help me and other Conservative Members to understand.
I gave examples during my speech. I will be happy to resurrect them on Third reading and to submit them. Going back to the point about the independence of student unions, a university in my area cancelled a hustings because it was extremely cautious. It had sought expensive legal advice and did not proceed because it was not sure that it was sufficiently meeting its charitable status in the number of people and different parties it was inviting. That is a clear example from my constituency.
The 2014 Act is a classic incumbency piece of legislation from a political party that has gone far from its roots and become immersed and entrenched in Government, pulling up the drawbridge and becoming separate from the ideals that drive politicians and the sector. I believe that it is incumbent on all political parties, but particularly in Opposition, to listen right through to the day of a general election to the challenges that civil society sets out to us, its problems with the policies we make and how it exposes to us the challenges facing society. We do not have all the answers, but it is important that, as I said, right up to the day of a general election we continue to listen. That Act had, as the sector has identified, a clear effect on its ability to do that.
The indignation of Conservative Members that this would not apply if charities were acting in this way toward their own party is a little hard to swallow when, as my hon. Friend said, the Government are attempting to weaken FOI. I note that the Minister did not respond to that point. I hope he will intervene and correct me. This year, the Government, including his own Department, failed for the first time in 50 years to publish Cabinet papers due to the National Archives and failed to come to the House and explain why. I hope the Minister will intervene and correct me on both points, or provide a timetable for action.
I thank my hon. Friend because she is absolutely right. Every political party comes into Government with the best ideals—we heard from the coalition that they would be the most open, transparent and accountable Government ever. Suddenly the fear sets in, and when they start to hear from the public things they do not like it is easy to pull up the drawbridge. We are seeing that with a range of measures from the Government.
Turning briefly to badgers—we have heard a lot about them today; I am very fond of them. I have not seen the email, but despite what Government Members have said, I am still struggling to understand the issue—[Interruption.] The Minister sighs in despair. I will try to explain and perhaps he will show some tolerance for those of us who are struggling to keep up.
If a charity has aims and objectives such as saving badgers, it might write to all political parties setting out what it would like to see in their manifestos, setting out its aims, ambitions and aspirations. One of those political parties might write back saying, “Fantastic; we love badgers too. We want to put that in our manifesto and to have an event to launch it. We want it to be part of our rural ambitions.” Would it not be understandable if that charity engaged with that political party, attended events, and discussed, debated and challenged that manifesto to promote its cause?
The Minister shakes his head, but I do not know why that is unacceptable. I admit that I do not know the individual case, so I cannot comment on the specifics, but judging by what has been set out, I do not have a fundamental problem with a charity that emails its members to advise them to go to a political event. It could advise them to go to three party events—if another party had accepted its views on badgers, it would have done the same thing with that party. This is about putting badgers first—badgers before politics.
The hon. Lady is being generous in giving way. The reason why it is concerning is not about party politics; it is about faith and trust in charities. In my constituency, 60% of the electorate voted Conservative, I am pleased to say, but I am sure that many of my constituents who voted Conservative share her passionate support for badgers and, if they were members or supporters of the Badger Trust, would have been disappointed to see it explicitly support one political party. The statistics about lack of trust in charities suggest that of those people who say that they do not have faith in charities or that their faith in them has been diminished, the number who cite partisan and party political campaigning by charities as a reason has tripled in the past three years. Is the hon. Lady not concerned about that?
I do not recognise that evidence, because what has come to us indicates quite the opposite.
Please do. To go back to the hon. Gentleman’s point, I am delighted for his sake—if not for ours—that so many of his constituents voted Conservative, but if many of them care passionately about badgers and see such measures in the Labour manifesto and not the Conservative manifesto, surely they can challenge that party’s views, because views can be changed. There will always be things that a political party stands for that we will disagree with—I am sure that many of us on both sides of the Committee feel that. Things are not set in stone and this measure does not seem inflexible and against the grain. I am happy to explore that case in more detail, but I remain to be convinced.
In the spirit of co-operation that we have had in the Committee, perhaps I can help the hon. Lady. The Charity Commission will send her a copy of its report on the Badger Trust so that she can see the details of the case. I hope that will help inform her for Third Reading and Report.
I very much appreciate that, but, on the principle set out, I do not see an explicit problem with a charity emailing its members about attending a meeting of a political party. That is my baseline, but I look forward to hearing more about that case, because I cannot make a decision without seeing all the details.
I want to make another comparison. Many charities attend political party conferences to lobby, influence and try to shape political thinking. Many of them will say, “Actually, we can’t afford to go to every party conference,” so they may go to only one, whether that of the party in government or in opposition or the party that most shares its views on whatever its issue of the day is—I will not say badgers again. Is it at odds with its political neutrality if it attends just one party conference to try to influence and shape thinking? Those are difficult issues for charities to think about.
Those charities are making commercial decisions about how they can best influence the landscape. That comes back to the element of trust; that when someone donates, they are donating to the cause and not to a political party. A problem would come about if I were donating to a charity that was explicitly promoting a political party via a policy. I would defend to the death any charity’s right to be at every party’s conference and to put its points forward. What is being proposed would allow people, via the back door, to support one party over another, and that is not right.
It would not; it would just allow charities the opportunity to be free from restrictions and to able to influence political parties in the way they think best, which is what the hon. Lady was trying to defend.
I promise that this is my last intervention on the hon. Lady on this point. We should be careful what we wish for here. In the United States, the blurring of the line between philanthropy and politics is much greater than in this country. In fact, it has been legal for charities to support parties and candidates for only 50 years in the US, where we see wealthy philanthropists setting up charities with blurred objectives. We should all defend against that passionately.
I totally agree, but I am not aware that we were in the same situation as America before the hon. Gentleman’s Government introduced this Bill. I do not share his view that our revoking these powers would provoke that kind of situation. As I said at the beginning, we are trying to defend the independence and voice of the charitable sector and to enable charities to speak truth to power without fear or favour and to shape and influence their view on what would build a better society, in accordance with their charitable aims and, hopefully, with the views of many in the Committee. We will not be pressing the new clause to a vote, but we will return to the matter at a later stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 3
Independent schools’ facilities: public benefit
‘In section 4 of the Charities Act 2011 (the public benefit requirement), after subsection (4) insert—
‘(5) Independent schools which are charities must engage actively with local communities and state schools with a view to sharing resources and facilities.
(6) The Charity Commission must publish guidance setting out the minimum that independent schools which are charities must do to comply with the duty in subsection (5).’.’—(Anna Turley.)
This New Clause would require independent schools to engage with their local communities and state schools to share resources and facilities.
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 4—Independent schools’ sports facilities: public benefit—
‘In section 4 of the Charities Act 2011 (the public benefit requirement), after subsection (4) insert—
‘(5) Independent schools which are charities must engage fully with local communities and state schools with a view to sharing sports facilities and coaching expertise.
(6) The Charity Commission must publish guidance setting out the minimum that independent schools which are charities must do to comply with the duty in subsection (5).’’
This New Clause would require independent schools to engage with their local communities and state schools to share sports resources and facilities.
New clause 5—Independent schools’ music and arts facilities: public benefit—
‘In section 4 of the Charities Act 2011 (the public benefit requirement), after subsection (4) insert—
‘(5) Independent schools which are charities must engage fully with local communities and state schools with a view to sharing facilities for music, drama and arts.
(6) The Charity Commission must publish guidance setting out the minimum that independent schools which are charities must do to comply with the duty in subsection (5).’’
This New Clause would require independent schools to engage with their local communities and state schools to share music resources and facilities.
New clause 6—Independent schools’ careers advice: public benefit—
‘In section 4 of the Charities Act 2011 (the public benefit requirement), after subsection (4) insert—
‘(5) Independent schools which are charities must engage fully with local communities and state schools with a view to careers advice, work experience and further education admissions advice.
(6) The Charity Commission must publish guidance setting out the minimum that independent schools which are charities must do to comply with the duty in subsection (5).’’
This New Clause would require independent schools to engage with their local communities and state schools to share careers advice, work experience opportunities and further education admissions.
I am sure that Members will be sick of my voice today, not the Minister’s! I rise to speak in support of new clause 3 and, for ease, I will also speak to all the new clauses in the group. New clause 3 would ensure that independent schools that wish to benefit from charitable status engage actively with local communities and state schools with a view to sharing resources and facilities. Again, I must pay tribute to the noble lords in the other place who supported the new clauses, particularly Lord Moynihan, sports Minister under Margaret Thatcher and chairman of the British Olympic Association between 2005 and 2012. For that reason, I was surprised to hear the new clauses criticised as “prejudiced and outdated” by the Secretary of State for Education in the media last night.
The vast majority of independent schools in this country—more than 2,000—benefit from charitable status, meaning that independent schools are effectively publicly subsidised by taxpayers whose children do not attend such schools to the tune of £700 million a year in the form of charitable rate relief. Charitable status for private schools may have made sense when many were established prior to the introduction of compulsory education. Many of them were set up to educate “poor and indigent boys”. Harrow, for example, was set up as a grammar school by instinct of charity to educate the needy, but the world has changed.
Seventy years ago, after the Education Act 1944, Conservative Education Minister Rab Butler reflected:
“The public schools are saved and must now be made to do their bit.”
I argue that that bit has not been sufficiently done. Sadly, despite the fantastic work taking place in many of our state schools and the strong investment and reform programme put in place under the previous Labour Government, which transformed state school achievement, the reality is that the gap is still too broad.
Independent schools remain one of the most significant bulwarks of social inequality in this country and continue to entrench privilege and hamper social mobility. Young people from independent schools, who make up 7% of their age group, take up nearly 50% of the places at Oxford and Cambridge, with the subsequent statistical likelihood of earning more and being more likely to be in professional employment within six months. Within the professions, 71% of senior judges, 62% of our senior armed forces and 55% of civil service departmental heads attended independent schools, compared with just 7% of the population.
I appreciate the Minister’s intervention. I am a realist and a pragmatist in all things. I recognise the huge contribution made to this country by many independent schools, faith schools and other schools that would not necessarily be my first choice for my children. I am not advocating their abolition, but rather that they should deliver over and above what they currently do and justify taxpayers’ money supporting them through their charitable status.
The hon. Lady is making some interesting points, and it might surprise her to know that I do not disagree with a lot of them. The best independent schools do exactly what the Bill proposes. Tonbridge School in my constituency does exactly that. Lord Moynihan is a very wise man, because he sends his children to Tonbridge School and appreciates what really good independent schools can, and indeed should, do.
I would argue strongly that it is not independent schools that have caused the division in society to which the hon. Lady refers, but rather the withdrawal of the ladder for the many others. The very best schools in my constituency—I must declare an interest: I am a governor of Hillview, a non-selective secondary school—do indeed provide that ladder and reduce the social division to which she refers. It is therefore not simply a question of identifying an independent school; it is about an entire educational range.
I agree with much of what the hon. Gentleman says. We have seen the damage that selective education has done, and the pulling up of the ladder has had a quite devastating impact. I do not believe that it is acceptable. Having been educated in Kent—I am going back to far too long ago—I have a strong view that there was quite a divisive approach to education in that county. Selective education is damaging to social mobility, and I share the hon. Gentleman’s desire to challenge that in all its forms. I also recognise that many independent schools do an extremely good job in supporting the state sector.
Just for the record, I actually do support selective education.
To clarify, the new clauses are about trying to get better value for the public from private and selective education. To use a previous argument of the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling, where taxpayers’ money is—
—taken by force and given to selective education, we need to ensure that the public who pay for it get full value for it.
I totally agree, and I will come on to that point shortly. I want to make it clear that my view of pulling up the ladder is selective education, but I will move on, because we can have a whole conversation outside the Committee on that. I agree with the good work that many independent schools are doing; it is just not enough, in my view.
A recent report by the Social Market Foundation showed that UK children who are privately educated are likely to earn almost £200,000 more between the ages of 26 and 42 than those in state schools. Independent schools seem to be stretching further away from even middle-class families, who have been priced out of private education because of an “endless queue” of wealthy people from outside Britain pushing up fees. Andrew Halls, the head teacher of King’s College School in Wimbledon, south-west London, recently said that local lawyers, accountants and military officers had stopped sending their children to the school because of the costs. He said that in many cases, such schools have become
“finishing schools for the children of oligarchs”.
It is simply not appropriate that while the social and financial advantages to independent school pupils persists, they are subsidised by the British taxpayer through the charitable status. My hon. Friend the Member for Hove made the point that I was going to make about the view of the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling on value for money. Charitable status is now an outdated and inappropriate financial privilege that is impossible to justify without substantial action from independent schools, which is what the new clauses seek to achieve.
Charitable status currently means that trustees of school charities have a responsibility to ensure they are running the school for the public benefit. Public benefit is part of what it means to be a charity, to operate as a charity and to report on a charity’s work. The Charity Commission produces guidance for charity trustees on each of those aspects of public benefit and the particular issues that relate to the different charitable purposes that the law recognises. All charity trustees have a duty to have regard to the Commission’s public benefit guidance and must report each year on how they have carried out their charity’s purposes for the public benefit. The Commission publishes those reports on the online public register of charities and checks a random sample of them. Trustees must therefore take action to ensure that the school does not solely benefit those who pay fees, yet the critical point is that it is up to the trustees to determine how that is achieved, and that is what we seek to challenge.
During the Bill’s passage through the other place, these new clauses were voted down on the understanding that the Charity Commission would pursue non-legislative routes. The Charity Commission updated its guidance in October last year, but the only change was to “encourage” schools to show in their annual reports how, for example, they have shared sports facilities; there is no compulsion to do so. It can only be concluded from that limited reaction that there is no desire for any progress on this issue. Indeed, it goes against the very principle of why people send their children to independent schools. Why would someone pay to send their children to schools for the facilities if other local children who do not pay get to use them? There is no inherent incentive for independent schools to share their facilities.
The new clauses assume that every independent school has the resources that large and well known independent schools have. That is not always the case. In fact, quite a lot of independent schools share facilities or have to use other facilities. The amendments take a one-size-fits-all approach that I do not think would be acceptable to some of the small independent schools; they seem to have been missed out of the new clauses.
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. The point is not how much the schools have, but the fact that the money they receive from the public purse is over and above what other schools receive.
I am very sorry, but as I said before I have to make some progress. I will rattle through, and I apologise to hon. Members on both sides for that.
If they want to keep facilities solely for their own pupils, schools must give up their charitable status. If they want to retain that status and the financial benefit that the parents of non-pupils pay for, they must allow non-pupils greater access. It is time to clarify the law. In the wise words of the Upper Tribunal, adjudicating between the Independent Schools Council and the Charity Commission,
“these are issues which require political resolution”.
That is the purpose of the new clauses.
Independent schools will of course seek to reassure us of the other public benefits they claim to provide, but even the chief inspector of schools, Sir Michael Wilshaw, said that that model of partnership between independent and state schools was meagre stuff, describing it as “crumbs off your table”. Why are independent schools expending their energy and resource—in fact, our resource as British taxpayers—educating the elites around the world, rather than helping to tackle the challenge of lifting educational attainment, expanding aspiration and tackling the social inequality that still exists in our country? That should be their charitable aim. That should be their public benefit.
There are many excellent schools in the state sector, some even better than independent schools, yet that is not true for all, and in some communities there is a stark division between the type of opportunities and facilities that can be enjoyed. The Opposition believe that this country deserves an education system where the majority of young people enjoy the same access to excellence as the privileged 7%. That is the intention of new clause 3.
I will quickly rattle through my comments on the other provisions. New clause 4 is about sports facilities, which I propose should be shared. I will not rehearse the broader arguments I just made, but will focus on the role that sport can play in tackling inequality, building cohesion and confidence and raising aspiration, and why sharing sports facilities can help schools to fulfil their public duty test and should be mandatory.
Evidence from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport shows that young people’s participation in sport improves their numeracy scores by 8% on average. Underachieving young people who take part in sport see a 29% increase in numeracy skills, and returns on investment in sports programmes for at-risk youth are estimated at £7.35 of social benefit for every £1 spent. Sports programmes can strengthen social networks and community identity, yet inequality in access to sport for young people is still a huge barrier. A study by the Sutton Trust shows that more than a third of British medal winners in the 2012 Olympics were from private schools. Indeed, the trust says that that figure
“comes as no surprise as children in independent schools benefit from ample time set aside for sport, excellent sporting facilities and highly qualified coaches, while in many state schools sport is not a priority, and sadly playing fields have been sold off.”
A survey carried out after the 2012 London Olympics found that “lack of facilities” was cited by parents as one of the biggest challenges facing schools trying to increase the amount of school sports. According to Sport England, the percentage of those on the lowest incomes participating in sport has hit the lowest level since records began. At a time of rising childhood obesity, less school sports and cuts to local authority leisure budgets, official figures show that most five to 10-year-olds say that the 2012 games did not encourage them to take part in sport.
In the light of all that evidence, the value of sport to young people, particularly those from the most deprived backgrounds, is clear. Independent schools should have a moral obligation as part of their charitable aims and their public duty test, and now, under new clause 4, a legislative obligation, to ensure that their facilities can have a positive social impact on children in their local communities.
New clause 5 focuses on music and, again, I will be extremely brief. We know that 84% of parents want their children to learn to play an instrument, and 82% say that music can help to teach children discipline. However, access to the learning of classical music, in particular, is restricted for many children. Sir Anthony Seldon, master of Wellington College, said:
“When the results achieved by independent schools are analysed, it is often without considering the role that a rounded education plays in this success—and particularly the role of the arts. It is also this unequal provision of culture that gives the alumni of independent schools a substantial advantage throughout life.”
The cost of purchasing instruments is one of the most prohibitive factors. The joy of learning classical music should not be the preserve of those who can afford it. For the many reasons I have given, we believe that music resources should also be shared by independent schools that want to retain their charitable status.
New clause 6 would require private schools to engage with their local communities and to share access to careers advice, work experience and further education admissions. We think it is a vital measure, because it seeks to get to the heart of some of the inequality that becomes entrenched for those in private schools by access to opportunity for outcomes in later life. As I set out in my earlier comments, the evidence on the difference in opportunity in higher education and careers for pupils from independent schools is stark and not diminishing. They take up nearly 50% of the places at Oxford and Cambridge, but I will not rehearse statistics that I have already run through.
That building of confidence for the future from which many independent school pupils benefit, the access to wider opportunities, the networks that many schools have with higher education establishments and the informal opportunities for internships and work experience in the professions are the key to unlocking opportunity. The evidence suggests that having work experience or an internship on a CV is critical to finding employment. More than one third of this year’s graduate vacancies will be filled by applicants who have already worked for the employer as an undergraduate. The critical questions are who gets those opportunities and how do they get them. Alan Milburn, in his 2009 report on social mobility, said:
“What has struck me so forcibly during the course of our work particularly when meeting young people from a whole variety of backgrounds is the emergence of a ‘not for the likes of me’ syndrome… Of course not everyone can be a doctor or a lawyer—and not everyone will want to be—but those with ability and aptitude need a fair crack of the whip to realise their aspirations…It is not ability that is unevenly distributed in our society. It is opportunity.”
By giving children from state schools the opportunity to access the advice, guidance, support and networks that independent schools use for the advantage of their children, new clause 6 will go some way to breaking down the disparity in and inequality of opportunity that exists in our society and help to release some of the potential in our young people that otherwise might never be realised.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hamilton.
I read new clauses 3, 4, 5 and 6 with a degree of sadness and, because of my age, no small feeling of déjà vu. How many times have I heard the justification that to be fair we must regulate? Regulation and quotas, however, do not always work as we might want—the Labour party might know that from current experience. What saddens me about the new clauses is the lack of understanding of independent schools and the benefits that they bring to the table, including how they already contribute to the public good. The proposals would apply red tape to something that is already working.
Independent schools are inspected by the Independent Schools Inspectorate or by Ofsted, and their contribution to public benefit is already commented on in those bodies’ assessments. The whole point of the Bill, it seems to me, is to give the Charity Commission the right to hold to account those who act in the name of charity. If an organisation has been granted the status of a charity, it is right and proper for it to be held to account for its behaviours and that of its trustees—we discussed that on Tuesday—and for its outcomes. That is as true for an educational charity as it is for any other.
Is there a little bit of mischief-making in the tabling of the new clauses? Yes, there is the cost of £700 million, but the taxpayer is also saved a cost in that the education of 500,000 children is paid for by individual parents, so the additional money is engaged in the system.
It is well documented that schools at the apogee, such as Eton and Wellington College, rightly sponsor local state schools and do all manner of things as part of their outreach. They teach older people computer skills, work with local primary schools, and cascade and absorb good practice—from the independent sector to the state sector and back into the independent sector from the state sector. It should be remembered, however, that 55% of all independent schools have fewer than 350 pupils, which means that it is not commercially viable for them to outreach all their systems to fill those gaps.
Incidentally, my children were educated nowhere near a private school. If we accept the new clauses, for those who are not fortunate enough to live near a well equipped private school we have created nothing but another two-tier system. Also, 28.7% of pupils educated in the independent system are from minority ethnic backgrounds, which is a higher proportion than in the state system.
A local example in my constituency is South Lee school. A new sports facility was required, and without prescription or any of the new clauses, the school set up a community interest company, working with my borough council, a charity called Sporting 87 and Bury St Edmunds cricket club. A community use agreement with the council kept rates for use affordable. The school uses the facilities during the day in term time and allows other schools to use them if possible. Everyone in the community is involved and at the weekends, evenings and in the holidays, it is fully used by tennis clubs, archery clubs, cricket and so on. Everybody gains.
I am big supporter of the National Citizen Service; it is a great thing. That is exactly the kind of example of what an independent school should be doing. If an independent school wants charitable status and its financial return, why can it not use that financial return for a programme like that?
On the point about setting a precedent, the difference is that independent schools provide a service over and above state provision. There is statutory universal provision, but people choose to go in over and above that and send their children to independent schools. We should question the right of those schools to receive taxpayers’ money. It is a unique situation in education, so we cannot simply say that it would set a precedent.
As I said, parents pay for education at independent schools, which relieves a huge burden on the state. It is very easy to dismiss the fact that private schools provide more than 500,000 places, but as I said to the hon. Lady earlier in our proceedings, abolishing independent schools would immediately create the huge problem for the state of how to educate those children.
There is a short-sighted financial view about the cost of educating children and the saving to the state sector of educating children in the independent sector. We are dismissing some of the value that those children, their parents and families would put back into the state system, were they to be educated there. One should not see children simply as a financial burden on the state; they will contribute greatly to the state system.
I worry that the hon. Lady, along with a number of Opposition Members, has a mindset that the independent sector is better than the state sector. That might have been true under a previous Labour Government, but state schools have improved enormously under this Government. It is important to make the point that independent schools do not necessarily offer a better, more advantageous education for our young people than state schools any more. That view is being degraded year by year by the reforms and protected investment that we have put into our education system. It is very sad that the Opposition do not recognise or welcome that.
May I take the Minister up on that point? He has made a sweeping statement that is not the case. He does a disservice to the reforms made by the Labour Government under the Building Schools for the Future programme—since cancelled—following 18 years of neglect that left many schools with leaking roofs. He does a disservice to our record. Why does the Minister think people send their children to independent schools, if there is no difference from the state sector? What is it that they are paying for?
There are many different reasons why people send their children to independent schools. I would not like to intrude on the decisions that families make up and down the country for the good of their children. Some may base the decision on distance, if they live in a rural area and the school is close.
If the hon. Lady is painting the situation as simply one of privilege, she is straying into territory she should not stray into. Many independent schools offer bursaries and many other ways to ensure that people who cannot afford to send their children are able to do so. We might want to pick up on that debate outside the Committee.
What is currently meant by public benefit has been determined by the courts over several hundred years. While not perfect, the current case law definition has served us well and we start interfering with it at our peril. In addition to our principled objection to these proposed changes, there are practical reasons why we do not support them. Over recent years, many independent schools have embarked on successful partnership projects with local state schools. Those have arisen from local needs and reflect good relationships between head teachers in the state and independent sectors. Forcing schools into particular types of partnership will not work in the long term and could undermine much of the good work that has already been done.
Legislation is not needed to make those partnerships happen. They are already happening and are growing in number. In answer to the earlier question from the hon. Member for Hove, according to the Independent Schools Council, 93% of its member schools—1,073—are already involved in partnerships with state schools. Of those, more than 900 are involved in sporting partnerships, more than 600 in music partnerships, almost 600 in academic partnerships, about 400 in drama partnerships and more than 200 in governance partnerships.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds said, when people think of independent schools they often think of the largest and most well known, but the reality is very different. More than half have fewer than 300 pupils, and in many cases they might have more limited resources than the local state school. For example, some may not have any sports facilities to share with local state schools. It would seem odd to legislate for something that some schools simply might not meaningfully be able to do. The measures proposed focus on sports, music, drama, arts and careers and higher education advice. They omit perhaps the most important category of partnership between independent and state sectors: academic partnerships.
Let me give an award-winning example. King Edward’s School in Birmingham aims to improve teaching and learning for pupils in local state junior schools across the city. Its outreach programme has doubled in size in each of the past three years so that the school is now in contact with more than 11,000 state-educated children and more than 450 teachers from 130 different junior schools. More than 50 members of staff and 300 pupils from the school are involved, and activities have included a city-wide maths competition entered by teams from 110 state primaries, which has proved so successful that it now hopes to run annually.
My hon. Friend makes her case powerfully. I would not seek to add anything because I agree with her. She is absolutely correct.
It is not just the largest schools with the most resources that are engaging in such partnerships. Belmont Preparatory School near Dorking has, for over a decade, provided facilities and resources for a local community pre-school music education group to meet twice a week, enabling early years children and their parents to enjoy music making and to form links between the local community and the school.
In order to show that strong partnerships already exist, the Independent Schools Council has created and is managing a “Schools Together” website that launches this month. I hope that everyone will have the chance to look at it. As well as showcasing existing examples of best practice, the website will act as a vehicle for the development of new partnerships between the independent and state sectors, enabling schools to register their interest in developing a partnership. So far, more than 175 schools have registered and reported on more than 400 partnership projects. I encourage the Committee, particularly Opposition Members, to review the growing number of projects on the website and support the development of new partnerships in their constituencies.
The ISC will undertake a census of all partnership activities and will promote partnerships among its member schools. The Charity Commission has updated its guidance on ways that trustees of charitable independent schools can ensure they run their charities for public benefit.
We discussed earlier today what happens when self-regulation fails. Does the Minister have in mind a framework of what improvement he would like from the sector? At what point will he intervene or look for some kind of back-up powers, as we discussed today, to try to ensure that further activity is made?
As the hon. Lady knows from the contributions made in the Lords, an agreement was reached on what independent schools will be doing. That agreement will need time to bed in, to ensure that it can progress in an orderly way. We have no intention of introducing any back-up powers, for the reasons I have stated; in principle and in practice, the hon. Lady’s proposals simply would not work. I expect independent schools to do more through partnerships, as I said at the start of my speech.
The updated guidance encourages trustees of charitable schools to comment on their individual approaches to public benefit in sport, drama, music and other arts in their annual report, and the guidance includes new examples of sharing sporting facilities. The commission also gives new examples relating to the sharing of sports, arts and music facilities in its example of a good trustees’ annual report. The ISC has disseminated new guidance to its member schools.
The commission has committed to follow up with a research project that will begin in 2017, when enough time will have elapsed to assess the impact of the new “Schools Together” initiative and the updated guidance provided by the commission. That research will draw upon data from charitable schools’ annual reports, as well as aggregated data that the ISC collects through its annual report. The terms of reference will be developed by the commission with input from the ISC, and a report of the research will be published in 2017, which will enable us to get a much clearer picture of the extent of existing and new partnership activities between the independent and state sectors.
I have been encouraged by the willingness of the ISC and its member schools to engage constructively in this debate, and I expect that many people will be surprised by the volume of partnership activity that is already taking place between the independent and state sectors but that has perhaps gone unreported in the past. The ISC is keen to showcase best practice and to encourage more such partnerships, and it has shown its commitment through its actions. An inflexible legislative solution is the wrong approach and could damage the good will that exists in the independent sector. The best partnerships are not forced but evolve through local needs and provide mutual benefits. We should welcome the ongoing work to nudge and encourage such partnerships, but we should not make them a legal requirement.
To recap, there are several good arguments, both in principle and in practice, for not pursuing these new clauses. I therefore hope that hon. Members will decide not to press the new clause further.
The Minister has been extremely generous with his time in responding to all our interventions, so I will not delay the Committee much further. I will just make a small point in conclusion. I appreciate that there are many examples of good partnership, which is to be encouraged, but words such as “nudge” and “encourage” are a little disappointing. Given that schools receive a financial rebate from the taxpayer, taxpayers have a right to expect some benefit from those schools. The pace has been positively glacial, so I am not convinced by the Minister’s arguments. However, we will not press the new clause to a vote today, but we may well reconsider it on Third Reading. We are not convinced that there has been sufficient progress that anything other than a statutory power will do anything to compel independent schools to justify the money they get back from the British taxpayer.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill, as amended, to be reported.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is instructive that Opposition Members do not want to hear good news about the businesses, jobs and investment in our economy. Sometimes, it can sound as if the plan for a northern powerhouse is all about the cities of the north of England. Our view is that by linking up the cities, we will help the towns in the north-west and across our country. It will also help rural areas because we are rebalancing the economy and increasing opportunity in the north of our country.
Q2. In 2014, in response to the flooding of the Thames valley, the Prime Minister said that money would be “no object”. In the light of his cuts to the flood defences, his cuts to the fire and rescue service and his cuts to the Environment Agency, can he say the same to the people of Leeds, Rochdale, York, Whitby and Teesside, or is it one rule for his constituents and another for ours in the north?
The hon. Lady is completely wrong about the funding figures. As I have explained in great detail, they have gone from £1.5 billion to £1.7 billion to £2 billion. What this Government have put in place is funding under Bellwin of not 85% of what a council spends, but 100%, so what I said absolutely stands good.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI wish you, Mrs Main, and all members of the Committee a happy and prosperous new year. I hope hon. Members did well from Father Christmas during the recess and that everyone has returned in good spirits.
After the conciliatory nature of the previous Committee sittings, it is a little sad to begin the new year on a slightly more divisive note. Clause 9 was an Opposition amendment inserted into the Bill in the other place. It was an undisguised attempt to undermine or even block the Government’s manifesto commitment to extend the right to buy to tenants of housing associations. At the very least it was to be a marker of concerns in the other place about that manifesto commitment. For several reasons, the Government believe that the clause is neither necessary nor desirable. It is now time to remove the provision from the Bill. It is important to note that the Charity Law Association agrees that the clause should be taken out.
Let me explain why the provision is not necessary. The clause was designed to attack and to frustrate the Government’s manifesto commitment to extend the right to buy to tenants of housing associations, most of which are charities. It was introduced into the Bill in the other place when there was concern about charitable housing associations being forced to implement the right to buy. Since then, however, we have reached a voluntary agreement with housing associations that renders the clause unnecessary, because there is no question of them being forced to dispose of their assets.
The Government believe that anyone who works hard and wants to get on the property ladder should have the chance to do so. The right to buy has already helped 2 million families to realise their dream of owning a home, but until now the discounts available under the right to buy have only been available to tenants in local authority properties and some former council properties. Extending the discounts to housing association tenants in England will end that unfairness and means that up to 1.3 million more families get a realistic chance to own their own home. At the same time, replacement of the housing stock will be ensured.
The National Housing Federation has worked with its housing association members to secure a voluntary deal that will give housing association tenants the opportunity to buy their home with an equivalent discount to the right to buy. The Government accepted the voluntary deal proposed by the housing associations, which will deliver the manifesto commitment to extend the benefits of the right to buy to 1.3 million tenants. Homes sold to tenants under the deal will be replaced one for one using the proceeds from the sale of the property. That will provide a significant increase to the overall supply of new housing.
So far, 93% of the total housing association stock is covered by those associations that have said yes to the deal. We want as many associations as possible to sign up to it, so that their tenants may access the same home ownership opportunities as other tenants, and the opportunity remains for more housing associations to do so. The deal includes examples of types of property that housing associations may decide that they do not want to sell to a tenant—for example, particular properties in supported housing, historic charity legacy stock or rural housing. In such circumstances, the tenant will be offered an alternative housing association property.
Housing associations are voluntary organisations and we strongly believe that they should continue to be independent of the Government. That belief is reflected in our decision to extend the right to buy to housing association tenants by accepting the voluntary offer from the sector, rather than implementing the policy through legislation. We have, however, included provisions in the Housing and Planning Bill to make the voluntary deal work, including financial powers to pay the housing associations for the cost of the discount and powers for the regulator to monitor and report on the terms of the deal.
Ahead of full implementation, a six-month pilot scheme is taking place with five housing associations, which will enable the new system and the voluntary deal to be road-tested properly in advance of full implementation. Tenants of those housing associations can already register their interest. This voluntary deal was achieved by working together with the housing association sector, resulting in a better outcome for landlords and tenants while delivering the Government’s manifesto commitment.
Of particular importance for the Committee today is that, under the voluntary deal agreed with housing associations, charities could not be compelled to dispose of their assets in a way that is incompatible with their charitable purposes. Under the deal, charities’ independence is preserved, and they continue to have their freedom to dispose of their assets in the way that they see fit and that is compatible with their charitable purpose. I would strongly argue, therefore, that the historic voluntary deal between housing associations and the Government renders clause 9 unnecessary.
I now turn to why clause 9 could have damaging unintended consequences for charities. When the clause was inserted into the Bill, it was argued that it effectively just stated the existing legal position. I disagree—it does not. Clause 9 is not a simple restatement of the existing law on the use and disposal of charitable assets.
As we have already said, charity law is a mixture of statute law and case law. Many of the rules that apply to charities’ investment in, and disposal of, assets derive from case law rather than statute law. Attempting to create a simple statutory provision for a large area of case law is fraught with danger. The problem is that a simple statutory provision will invariably fail to cover the many different circumstances and complexities that case law can provide for. It would be exceptionally difficult to find a satisfactory expression to properly cover the explanation and nuanced analysis that is often afforded in judgments in case law. As a result, there is a real danger that the clause will give rise to damaging unintended consequences, which I am sure all hon. Members would wish to avoid.
Charity Commission guidance on the disposal of land makes it clear that any disposal must be
“in the interests of the charity”
rather than “consistent with charitable purposes”. Those concepts have different legal meanings, with the latter being much wider in its potential application.
Clause 9 casts doubt on the power of the courts to direct charities to dispose of property—for example, under compulsory purchase legislation. It could also prove problematic to the Charity Commission in the exercise of its powers—for example, its powers to direct charities to take specified action, or to direct the use of property, in the course of a statutory inquiry. The commission can currently routinely use those powers under the appropriate safeguards, but the clause may mean that it would be unable to do so, and its compliance work may be frustrated. I am sure that that is not something the clause was intended to do when it was added to the Bill in the other place.
There will be some circumstances where what is in the charity’s long-term interests does not align with the application or use of assets for a particular charitable purpose—for example, where a charity must pay a contractual debt that puts its solvency at risk or where the charity’s purposes can no longer be met.
Furthermore, the clause covers all charity assets, which includes property other than land, such as investments. That raises the separate issue of the duties that apply in that context. For example, the clause could mean that trustees would be able to make an investment only where that investment was consistent with the purposes of the charity. Although that is sometimes the case, trustees can, and often do, make investments solely for the purpose of obtaining the maximum financial return consistent with commercial prudence. In that scenario, the charity’s purposes are furthered by the way in which the income from the investment is subsequently applied. Clause 9 as it stands could hamper trustees’ discretion to make such investments.
The clause also gives the Charity Commission a new and wide-ranging role in policing the use and disposal of charity assets that is inconsistent with our aim of helping the commission to focus on its core regulatory responsibilities. Requiring the commission to ensure that charities are not required to use or dispose of assets would be more than just an unwelcome distraction for the regulator at a time of very limited resources.
There is also the preserved right to buy in relation to housing associations, which 630,000 tenants already enjoy, and the right to acquire, which 800,000 tenants currently have. Those rights, when exercised, would compel the charity to sell its assets. Those pre-existing rights, which are set out in legislation, could be undermined by clause 9.
I hope I have been able to make a compelling case to the Committee for why we should remove the clause. As my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General said on Second Reading, it is regrettable that a Bill with widespread support was used
“in a narrow attempt by the other place to undermine the Government’s manifesto commitment to extend the right to buy”.—[Official Report, 3 December 2015; Vol. 603, c. 561.]
For that reason, and because of the damaging unintended consequences clause 9 would have for charities, we cannot allow it to stand, and oppose its inclusion in the Bill.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Main. I would like to echo felicitations for a happy new year for everyone on the Committee. I would also like to thank everybody across the community and voluntary sector who spent time over Christmas and the new year, as we know they will have done, in their communities undertaking many hours of community and voluntary service, helping those who are most vulnerable and in need at what for most of us should be a happy time.
I appreciate the Minister’s words on clause 9, to which I listened with interest, particularly about the amendments to the Housing and Planning Bill. We believe the clause is extremely important and we will try to maintain it in the Bill.
I pay tribute to our noble Friends in the other place who added the clause to the Bill, where we believe it should remain. It simply and effectively states the existing legal position and supports trustees in their existing duties by ensuring that they are able to adhere to their charitable aims and objectives, and it protects them from being compelled to undertake an action that is at odds with their charitable purposes.
The clause is particularly relevant to housing, as the Minister mentioned, and aims to protect charities and housing associations when the Government later mandates them to sell their charitable property under the right-to-buy proposals. I will come back to his point about it being a voluntary proposal.
The debate in the other place saw Tories, Lib Dems and Cross Benchers line up to condemn the Government’s proposal. I am surprised they are persisting in trying to remove the clause. As the Minister knows, the Opposition are not against the right to buy. Indeed, we want those who desire to be homeowners to achieve that. While the number of homeowners has fallen under this Government by more than 200,000, under Labour from 1997 to 2010, the number of homeowners rose by more than 1 million. We support people’s aspiration to own their own home.
However, the problem is compulsion. We want to limit the power of the Government to direct a charity against its independent will, and contrary to its charitable purposes, to dispose of its assets according to the Government’s latest whim. That is an infringement of the independence of charity, community and voluntary sector organisations. For many housing associations, it will go against the grain of their aims and objectives.
The Minister mentioned the voluntary agreement, but it was not unanimous and many housing associations do not sign up to that principle. He also said that the amendments in the Housing and Planning Bill will protect charities’ right to dispose of assets as they wish. That may be the case for that individual policy in the Housing and Planning Bill, but the clause goes wider—it is about all assets, not just about housing and planning. We believe clause 9 is still required.
What after housing might be next on the Government’s list in requiring charities to purge themselves of their assets? The principle is broader than simply housing, although housing is the focus. Housing associations, most of which are charities, provide 2.5 million homes for 5 million people on affordable rents. They are rented privately and many enable vulnerable people, or those with disabilities or care needs, to live independently. Other properties are for shared ownership to help those on lower incomes buy their homes.
Housing associations build 45,000 homes a year and would ideally like to build 120,000, matching what private developers are able to do. That aim could be undermined if they are forced to sell off their stock.
At the same time as the Committee is sitting, the House will debate the Housing and Planning Bill on Report and Third Reading. We believe that the Bill will lead to a huge loss of affordable housing. The Office for Budget Responsibility confirmed in its November economic and fiscal outlook that Government policies since the election could lead to 34,000 fewer housing association homes being built over the next five years.
We believe that, at every opportunity, the Housing and Planning Bill restricts the ability and obligation of the public and private sectors to provide genuinely affordable homes, and that it will intensify the spiral of ever-higher housing costs. The right-to-buy proposals will contribute to that, which is why we seek to protect charities from being obliged or compelled to be part of that.
The Opposition have always said that the extension of the right to buy to housing associations through the Bill is unworkable and wrong. It will lead to a severe and irreversible loss of affordable homes at a time when they have never been more needed, because there is no genuine plan for a one-to-one, like-for-like replacement.
Moreover, the right-to-buy proposals are expected to cost a staggering £5 billion or even more. We know that civil servants have warned Ministers about the costs and the difficulties of replacing the homes sold, leading to a shortage of affordable homes. Shelter predicts that the right-to-buy proposals could lead to the loss of 180,000 affordable homes over the next five years, when we already have a well known crisis in our housing supply.
I would like to respond to the Minister’s last point. I was going to make an intervention, but I am afraid I missed him. I appreciate his ambitions, but the Government’s record on house building does not fill us with confidence. The number of under-35s who own a home has fallen by 20%.
Order. I have allowed a bit of latitude, but we are straying off somewhat by going on to house-building numbers.
It is an important point in terms of ambition versus reality, but I appreciate your point, Mrs Main, and I will stick to the clause. I was interested to hear that about three quarters of housing associations have signed up, because the housing association in my area has not signed up and has strong views against it. I am also not convinced that the Minister has a plan for like-for-like replacement. The Government’s record on that is not strong.
I am grateful, Mrs Main, and I hope that I will not stretch the latitude you have given us. My hon. Friend is correct in expressing concerns from the charitable sector about like-for-like replacement, because that is about the sequestration of charitable assets for private use. Does she share my concern that in Brighton and Hove, which I represent, and other such cities, like-for-like replacements will almost certainly be built in areas very different from those in which the original properties are sold because of the constraints on the land in that area, so charitable assets that were deemed to be in one place will end up in other locations?
My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. The issue is the charitable ambitions of housing associations in supporting those who are most vulnerable and in need. The danger is that we are moving away from that.
The hon. Lady makes a valid point. In the realms of a charity selling a high-price asset, it could in a broad sense outreach its charitable work. However, the clause does not allow them flexibility; it ties their hands and means that they are completely unable to disburse their assets as they wish.
I disagree with the hon. Lady, because charities currently have the flexibility to do as they wish with their assets as long as that is in line with their charitable status. The removal of the clause is about trying to push charities towards selling off assets—selling off the family silver—but, whatever their charitable status may be, whether tackling poverty and inequality or sheltering the homeless, it is for them to decide how they use those assets.
I will not detain the Committee other than to comment on a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford North about Lord Beecham’s speech in the other place. That point is important and goes much wider than housing. Assets are a broad definition, so there is danger in not specifying in the Bill the fact that charities have an independent ability to dispose of their assets in a way they believe to be consistent with their charitable purposes. The clause is about giving broad protection to charities in the light of potential Government pressure to encourage, cajole or influence how they dispose of their assets. That is extremely important.
Finally, on the Charity Commission, I totally understand that it did not ask specifically for the clause, but the Bill was not drafted for the Charity Commission or by it. It was drafted in the best interests of the charitable sector to support its independence and to provide it with a secure regulatory framework in the future. There will be areas where the Charity Commission agrees with us and others where it does not, but we do not believe that the clause is burdensome for it. It is part of its role in defending the integrity of the charitable status.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
We agree with the Minister on clause 10 and will not suggest amendments to it. It sets out important new powers to disqualify individuals from being a charity trustee. However, there are still some concerns in the sector and among individuals, and we think it is important to explore them at this stage of the Bill’s journey.
First, it is important to reiterate that many charity trustees and senior management staff give many hours of time with passion, commitment and dedication, and do a sterling job, often working in difficult circumstances with some of the most vulnerable people. We want to encourage more people to get involved in the charitable sector as trustees and employees, and we want to ensure that there are no barriers for those who seek to do so.
We also do not want to exclude those who have had difficult experiences in their lives or have received charitable care in times of need and have so much of their own experience to offer. We recognise that service users and former service users can offer the sort of advice, insight and support that others cannot and that their involvement in charities and the voluntary sector is invaluable.
Moreover, charities can often succeed in areas of public service where the traditional sector cannot, such as in building relationships with those who have for too long had a failed relationship with the state, and can often build relationships with peers who have experienced similar situations. This is important and should be encouraged. However, I do not believe the clause will prevent the positive role that, for example, ex-offenders can play in the charitable sector, although it is important that this is kept under review and that the Charity Commission continues to take a positive approach to applications for waivers. I was encouraged by the statistics set out by the Minister.
This clause extends the criteria for automatic disqualification from acting as a charity trustee and adds a range of unspent criminal offences—I emphasise “unspent” because this is important—to those that lead to automatic disqualification, including money laundering, bribery and terrorism-related offences. There will be a ministerial power to add or remove an offence from the list subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, and we welcome that positive approach to parliamentary debate.
As a result of an amendment agreed on Report in the other place, which we fully support, being on the sex offenders register would also trigger automatic disqualification. We support that amendment because a person on that register is considered to require monitoring to manage the risk of sexual harm to the public. It is therefore appropriate that they are deemed not fit to be in that position of trust, controlling funds and activities carried out for the public benefit, and that they should be disqualified from being a charity trustee or being in a senior management role within a charity unless and until they are no longer subject to notification requirements or are granted a waiver from disqualification by the Charity Commission. For example, the commission might consider it appropriate to grant a waiver to enable someone to take up a position in a charity that works with ex-offenders, particularly sexual ex-offenders.
In 2015, we spent a lot of time discussing the crisis in the charitable sector due to damaging loss of public trust and confidence. If someone on the sex offenders register were able to serve as a trustee or in a senior management role, that could further undermine public trust and respect in the public domain. More importantly, people in such roles may well have privileged access to children or vulnerable people, even if the charity does not routinely work with such groups. In other words, its trustees and employees would not necessarily be subject to disclosure and barring service checks. There have been too many historic situations where people in positions of power have abused that power and not been challenged due to their position. To me, that is more significant and potentially damaging than financial misdemeanour and it is right that we maintain this provision.
The Minister referred to concerns about charities involved in terrorism. Again, we do not propose to challenge this. We believe these are important proposals, particularly in the light of the number of references in the inquiries that the Charity Commission has undertaken, but there must be support for charities in protecting themselves in such situations. Many charities do vital work in areas of conflict overseas and are faith-related charities. It is important that their role is not diminished and that they receive due support from the Charity Commission and are not perceived negatively without due cause.
We support the clause but some issues remain to be ironed out, not least further understanding and mitigation of its impact on charities working in the criminal justice sector which help to support and promote the rehabilitation of offenders and which employ ex-offenders or—as with the excellent charity Unlock, for example—aim to have at least 50% of trustees with some experience of living with a criminal record. While these provisions pertain to unspent convictions, we have some questions that we hope the Minister will answer.
How many people employed in the charitable sector does the Minister expect to be affected by the extension of the disqualification framework to senior management positions? What assessment has been made of the impact of the new disqualification framework on former offenders employed in the charitable sector, including on their career prospects and long-term rehabilitation and resettlement? What assessment has been made of the impact of the legislation on charities that work with former offenders who are employed by community rehabilitation companies as part of the Government’s transforming rehabilitation reforms? I look forward to the Minister’s response.
It is a pleasure to serve again under your chairmanship, Mrs Main. I wish all members of the Committee a happy new year.
I have a small number of points about clause 10. No amendments were tabled by the Opposition—the main substance of the clause is sensible and uncontroversial—but, as someone who worked previously as a criminal defence lawyer, I have some concerns about the process for obtaining a waiver to the automatic disqualification from being a charity trustee or holding a senior management position, and the impact on charities working in the field of rehabilitating ex-offenders.
At a time when the prison population continues to grow and the fragmentation of the probation service, post-privatisation, is seeing some private providers cutting jobs in probation by more than 40%, the rehabilitation of ex-offenders is more important than ever, and the pressure on charities working in this strand of the sector will be increasing all the time. Rehabilitation and reducing re-offending rates must remain a priority for the Government, and the work that charities such as the Prison Reform Trust and Unlock do—alongside incredibly hard-working and committed probation practitioners, who are under enormous pressure—is critical to this. Those charities have expressed concern about the waiver process and the impact it will have. I share many of those concerns.
As the Secretary of State for Justice has stated, we should not judge individuals by the worst moment in their lives. Instead of seeking to narrow opportunities for ex-offenders to reintegrate and contribute to society, we should be supporting their efforts to contribute to civil society, both through paid employment in the voluntary sector and as volunteers. The Committee may know that many charities that work to rehabilitate people with criminal records employ ex-offenders, either as trustees or, as my hon. Friend the Member for Redcar has pointed out, in senior management positions, because at the heart of the voluntary sector is the principle of working with service users, rather than doing things to them. This is no less important with people in the criminal justice system than with any other group. Any unnecessary barriers to the recruitment of people with convictions as trustees or into senior positions is, perhaps understandably, seen by charities working in this sector as a direct threat to their core mission.
I was struck by what the Staffordshire and West Midlands Community Rehabilitation Company said in its written evidence:
“Many of the people that we work with have no work history or any way of getting a reference through ‘normal’ employment routes but one of the areas that they can gain experience is by working with charities, particularly those that are service user led. If the Charities Bill makes it difficult or impossible for people with convictions to act as Trustees or paid employees of these organisations, and others, then it would be shutting down an opportunity for someone trying to re-establish themselves in society from getting a foot on the ladder. Working as a Trustee for example can give a person with a conviction(s) a sense of purpose, it can help them improve their confidence, increase their social circle, give them an opportunity to develop new skills, provide an opportunity to get a reference, to develop a work ethic, to feel that they are valued and can make an important contribution. All of these things are crucial to rehabilitation and desistance and if these opportunities are restricted or removed completely it makes the job of rehabilitating people more difficult.”
There are 1,750 voluntary sector organisations whose main client group are people in the criminal justice system, as well as a further 4,900 organisations that support them as part of their work. The Government have acknowledged the potential for waivers to be issued in cases where an appropriate individual seeks to be a trustee of, or a senior manager in, an ex-offender charity. The Minister has helpfully provided those statistics, although it is a very small number. The Government have said that they will ask the Charity Commission to review the waiver process and to consult charities.
Will the Minister tell us when the consultation is likely to take place? Is it the working group he has just mentioned? Has its work already started? When is the commission likely to issue its new guidance and the information requirements that it will be asking applicants to provide when they apply for a waiver? I have one further question, and I would be grateful if he answered it either today or in writing. Extending the waiver process to senior management positions will, of course, place additional burdens on the Charity Commission. What additional resources will be provided to the commission to meet the extra demands brought about by the inevitable increase—we are not yet clear how great it will be—in applications for waivers?
I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 11, page 10, line 5, after “person” add “or persons”.
This amendment aims to ensure that, where there has been a collective failure to act, a whole trustee board should be held accountable.
We support clause 11 in principle, but we seek to make some amendments to it. At present, the Charity Commission has no general power to disqualify a person from being a charity trustee on the basis of unsuitable conduct. It can remove a trustee only if it has instituted a statutory inquiry into the charity, it is satisfied of both misconduct and mismanagement in relation to the charity, and there is a need to protect the charity’s property or secure the proper application of that property. In those circumstances, the trustee who is removed is automatically disqualified. Clause 11 will provide the Charity Commission with a new power to disqualify a person from a charity trusteeship in relation to all charities, specified charities or classes of charity.
Amendment 7 would provide that the Charity Commission could take such action in regard to more than one trustee. If the conditions applied to more than one trustee—they could not be ascribed to one individual but were part of a collective failure—the amendment would allow the Charity Commission to act, particularly under conditions D, E and F. The amendment would enable action to be taken where there had been a collective failure on the part of the board to take any reasonable step to oppose misconduct or mismanagement of which the trustees were collectively aware. In the case of a serious child protection issue, for example, if a board is collectively aware of allegations of misconduct, or of misconduct itself, there is an argument for holding the board collectively responsible rather than singling out individuals. We believe that that could be important in situations where a conspiracy of silence may have led to behaviour being tolerated for fear of challenging it. That is why we have tabled the amendment, which would broaden out the clause so that it applied collectively to trustees rather than to specific individuals.
I hope it will help the Committee if I explain the purpose of clause 11 before I respond to amendment 7. The clause gives the Charity Commission a new power to disqualify a person from being a charity trustee or senior manager on a case by case basis. Most unfit individuals will be caught by the existing automatic disqualification criteria, which will be extended by the Bill, but the commission needs a power to act in cases where individuals are not excluded by automatic disqualification. The new power in clause 11 will enable the Charity Commission to disqualify an individual whose conduct clearly makes them unfit to be a charity trustee or senior manager, where, if the commission were not to act, there would be a real risk to charities or to public trust and confidence in charities.
There is no doubt that that is a tough new power for the regulator, but we made several changes to the provision as a result of pre-legislative scrutiny. More detail about the operation of the provision has been included in the Bill, and the commission must now apply a three-limbed test under the proposed power. First, one of conditions A to F must be satisfied. Secondly, the commission must consider that the person’s conduct makes them unfit to be a charity trustee. The commission has published draft guidance alongside the Bill on how it would operate that test, and it will formally consult on its guidance before the relevant provisions are commenced. Thirdly, it must consider that exercising the power is in the public interest to protect public trust and confidence in charities.
Although the power may be drawn relatively widely, its use would be targeted, and there are several safeguards. The commission has said that it expects to exercise the power on a relatively small number of occasions each year. In addition to meeting the three-limbed test, the commission will have to give notice of its intention to disqualify and give a period for representations to be made, which it must take into account before any decision is made. If a decision is made to disqualify, disqualification will take effect only after a period of 42 days has elapsed, during which the individual will be able to lodge an appeal with the tribunal. If the decision is appealed to the tribunal, the tribunal will determine the outcome. In making its decision it will consider the case entirely afresh, on the basis of all the evidence before it. It will not simply review the Charity Commission’s original decision. As I will not tire of reminding the Committee, in all its actions in the process the Charity Commission will have to abide by section 16 of the Charities Act 2011, which requires it to act proportionately.
A real case provides an example of when the disqualification power might be used. The police investigated concerns that a trustee had falsified charity invoices to claim public funding for their own personal use. The trustee accepted two police cautions for offences involving dishonesty or deception. The criteria for automatic disqualification refer only to convictions for such offences. Cautions are not considered to be convictions, so they do not result in disqualification. In the case in question the person resigned as a trustee but was free to take up trustee roles in other charities, and the commission is currently powerless to stop that. The disqualification power would enable the Charity Commission to consider disqualification of the individual on the ground that their conduct made them unfit to be a trustee.
Another example would be if a person had no relevant unspent conviction but had undergone a serious event such as being disqualified from a professional organisation while they were a trustee of a related charity, or if they had been subject to a judgment in the employment tribunal for repeated bullying of or racism towards staff members. That might mean that the person was unfit to be a trustee. Individuals often use the charity brand to reinforce their public status at the expense of the charity’s interest.
Amendment 7 would empower the Charity Commission to disqualify an entire trustee board if it was guilty of a collective failure. The commission already has the power to act and has done so, in cases of collective failure by trustees and systemic governance issues. The powers in sections 79 and 80 of the Charities Act 2011 to remove trustees do not explicitly or implicitly contain any restriction on removing trustees where that would leave one or none in place, nor does the proposed disqualification power in clause 11. There is therefore no reason why the commission would not take action against all of a charity’s trustees where that would be appropriate and proportionate and in accordance with the principles of best regulatory practice.
In most cases, however—I think the hon. Member for Redcar recognised this in her comments—the commission is likely to focus on the individuals who have been most responsible for any misconduct or mismanagement. That is in line with its much mentioned duty to act proportionately, which means that it would need to consider whether it would be fair and proportionate to hold all a charity’s trustees collectively and equally responsible for any misconduct or mismanagement. Often, in practice, some trustees are more directly responsible for the misconduct or mismanagement than others who may not have been directly involved, but who may have failed to identify it or act to stop it. Each case needs to be considered on its merits, but in most cases either there would be insufficient evidence or it would not be proportionate for the commission to take action against the entire trustee board on the basis of collective responsibility.
There is a secondary, practical point. Removing all a charity’s trustees would leave it with none, which would effectively create another quite different problem of finding and appointing appropriate new trustees. Often that is no easy task. It can take months or even years to find people who are willing to become trustees of a charity whose name has been tarnished through serious misconduct or mismanagement. We should remember that it is estimated that at any one time half of all charities have at least one trustee vacancy on their board.
Trustees who are directly responsible for misconduct must be held to account, but if there are trustees who were not directly involved in it and who are willing and able to help to get the charity back on track, it would be right for the commission to take that into account. In circumstances where there is an impact on the charity’s beneficiaries, the commission has tended to appoint an interim manager under section 76 of the Charities Act 2011, to ensure that the charity continues to operate and to get it back on track before new trustees can be appointed and take over full time. However, that can be a costly solution for the charity, as the costs of the interim manager are usually paid from the charity’s own funds, so in most cases, where there are trustees who are willing and capable of putting things right and who have not been directly involved in the misconduct or mismanagement, it is right that they be supported in getting the charity back on its feet.
I am indeed reassured by the Minister’s comments, and I look forward to working with the Charity Commission to ensure that we clarify some of the issues involved. I take his point about the ability to dismiss entire boards for systemic governance failures. It is an important power for the commission to have, and I want to ensure that it goes far enough. Conditions D, E and F raise issues such as whether people knew about misconduct and whether their conduct contributed to or facilitated the misconduct or mismanagement. Those are important contributing factors, and more than one individual could be capable of them. Whether or not a situation fits the strict criteria for systematic governance issues, we need to resolve it.
I look forward to working with the Charity Commission to clarify things and ensure that sufficient safeguards are in place for difficult and damaging situations in which several members of a board are guilty of misconduct or knew about the misconduct, so that action can be taken against them. I am reassured by the Minister’s example of a board that was dismissed in its entirety; that is helpful to know. I am also reassured to know that the Charity Commission will take each case on its merits.
The Minister made the point that it is difficult to get trustees. I totally accept that, but it is not a reason to dismiss the amendment out of hand. If a whole board were dismissed due to systemic governance issues, a difficult overhaul of the entire board would still need to be undertaken, and there would be all the expenses of having an interim manager. Although those are obviously difficult parts of the process, in the case of some circumstances that we have discussed, particularly those involving child protection, we think the issue remains. We will seek to take it forward with the Charity Commission to ensure that action can be taken against more than one individual where we believe that they knew of the misconduct, or where their conduct contributed to or facilitated the misconduct or mismanagement. However, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 11, page 10, line 31, leave out
“(either generally or in relation to the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order)”
and insert,
“, as defined by the Commission in a specific document to be published after consultation and renewed every five years”.
Instead of removing this power altogether, this amendment ensures the Commission publicises its definition of “person unfit to be a charity trustee” following a consultation.
As we have discussed at length since the Committee first sat, the Bill gives a raft of new powers to the Charity Commission, on which we are placing a large burden to exercise good judgment in its decision making. I appreciate that the Minister has re-emphasised the word “proportion”, which we heard a lot during the first sitting, but again, it is a subjective word. If the Charity Commission is to be provided with discretionary powers to disqualify someone who is unsuitable, any test of unfitness should be robustly and clearly defined. Safeguards should be provided to prevent such a test from being used inappropriately.
Included in the clause is condition F, which allows the Charity Commission to disqualify a trustee on the ground
“that any other past or continuing conduct by the person, whether or not in relation to a charity, is damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally or in the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order.”
That is too broad and subjective. In effect it leaves the determination of who can be a charity trustee to the opinion of the Charity Commission’s board and management, rather than any due process. It opens up the possibility that the power may be used in relation to any past or continuing conduct, whether or not in relation to a charity. It seems unlikely that there is any conduct that would meet the alternative conditions A to E that would not also meet condition F. Many in the charity sector, including the National Council for Voluntary Organisations and the Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations, have asked to have condition F removed, because in the light of the other conditions in the Bill, it seems unnecessary and open to subjective interpretation.
The Charity Commission, however, has long argued for this power and welcomes its inclusion in the Bill. It says that the power will enable it to protect charities from being run by individuals who are clearly not fit to do so. We therefore believe that rather than being removed entirely, condition F should be amended so that it is subject to more rigorous definition. The amendment would ensure that the Charity Commission publicised its definition of what constitutes conduct that
“is damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities”.
That could then be subject to consultation with the sector, which could help to define the kinds of scenario that could apply and play a role in exploring the word “proportion” and the decision making that we are asking the Charity Commission to undertake.
The Charity Commission has published a policy paper on how it would use the proposed disqualification power, which is a helpful guide. The commission acknowledges that this is a significant new power, and says that it is important to provide reassurance that it will use it only when there is a clear case for doing so and that it should clearly explain what it will take into account before using the power. The amendment is designed to provide that reassurance. We believe that the policy paper is a helpful draft, but it should be made a formal document, as mentioned in the Bill, published after consultation with the sector and revised every five years. For that reason, we hope the Government will accept the amendment.
I do not propose to repeat what I have said about the new disqualification power in clause 11, but I will focus on the specific details of amendment 5. I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s explanation of the amendment, which would give the Charity Commission the job of publishing at least every five years guidance on how it assesses unfitness. I recognise that this is an attempt to narrow the breadth of the commission’s discretion, as the hon. Lady said, but although I have some sympathy with the intention behind the amendment, I simply do not believe that it is necessary.
The Charity Commission has published details of its initial thoughts on how it would exercise the disqualification power, with positive feedback from charities and Members of the other place. It did so when the Bill was introduced in the other place. In the document, the commission recognises that this is a significant new power, provides reassurance that it will use the power only when there is a clear case for doing so, and says that it should explain clearly what it will take into account before using the power.
In the paper, the Charity Commission explains its initial thinking on how it would apply the first limb of the test—criteria A to F. It goes on to explain its initial thinking on how it would apply the second limb of the test—assessing a person’s unfitness to serve as a charity trustee. The commission’s assessment of unfitness, based on its regulatory experience, is that unfitness is likely to be a result of failure in one or more of the following broad categories: honesty and integrity, competence, and credibility. The commission goes on to set out, under each of those headings, the types of conduct that it would consider and examples of the conduct that in its view would demonstrate unfitness.
Under the heading “honesty and integrity”, the commission would consider evidence of abuse of a position of trust. That could be demonstrated by exploiting a position of trust for personal gain, misleading a public body, or other forms of dishonesty, deception or cheating that could give rise to concerns about the individual’s fitness to serve as a charity trustee. Dishonesty is well understood in charity law, and forms part of the 2011 Act, so this is not an entirely new or unfamiliar concept.
Under the competence heading, the commission would consider evidence that the person is incapable of or unwilling to fulfil the duties and responsibilities of a trustee. That could include, for example, failing to act
“in compliance with the governing document and rules of the charity”,
failing to keep proper accounting records for the charity, or showing
“a wilful disregard for management of conflicts of interests”.
Again, competence is a concept widely used by other regulators, so that is not entirely new either. By way of example, under section 61 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the Financial Conduct Authority may grant an application for someone to become an authorised person only if it is satisfied that the candidate
“is a fit and proper person to perform the function”
in question.
The Act does not prescribe matters which must be taken into account by the FCA in making the determination, but details are given in the FCA handbook.
Under the credibility heading, the commission would consider conduct that impacts on the individual’s personal credibility and reputation to such an acute extent
“that it calls into question their fitness to act in the quasi-public role of trustee”.
That could include, for example,
“support for and participation in discredited tax avoidance schemes”,
or
“actions in fundraising that gave them high personal benefits to the detriment of the charity or in which they used high-pressure selling or other discredited methods”.
Reputation is a key part of a charity’s assets under charity law, and a key part of the commission’s work in furtherance of its statutory objective with regards to public trust and confidence. Again, this heading is not an entirely new concept for the commission or the charity sector.
The final limb of the test is that the commission must consider whether exercising the disqualification power is
“in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence”
in charities. The commission’s draft paper explains that under this test it would consider whether disqualification
“will protect charities from those who would not carry out the role of trustee with integrity, honesty, capability or credibility in the interests of the charity and its beneficiaries, and ultimately be trusted by the public to do so”.
The commission sets out factors it would consider under this limb of the test, including
“the nature and seriousness of the conduct…the extent of the unfitness and whether it might be temporary or time-specific”.
I hope that hon. Members have had an opportunity to consider the commission’s draft paper, and that they take reassurance from it and from the commission’s commitment to work it up into proper draft guidance, and consult publicly on that guidance before the provision is commenced. Other regulators with similar powers are also given the responsibility, without defining the exact details in statute as this amendment proposes, to work up appropriate, proportionate and detailed guidance with regards to the use of this type of power. In addition, it is important to note that the commission keeps all of its guidance under review to ensure that it remains relevant and up to date.
As I have mentioned in previous sessions, the commission recently consulted on and launched an updated version of “The essential trustee” guidance. It is also consulting on an updated version of fundraising guidance for trustees, and there are other pieces of work under review. The commission can and does ensure that its guidance is relevant and up to date, and it will do so at the appropriate time. The whole Bill will be reviewed after three years, and subsequently every five years. This power will be looked at carefully, and the guidance will no doubt be important in the effective use of the power. On that basis, I do not think that amendment 5 is necessary. I hope that the hon. Member for Redcar will accept my explanation, and decide not to press her amendment.
That certainly has not happened to date—there has not been a conflict between the decisions of the charity tribunal and the Charity Commission—and I do not expect it to happen, because the Charity Commission works on the basis of the trust placed in it by the charitable sector. If the Charity Commission is regularly getting decisions wrong, that will have an impact on its status within the sector. The Charity Commission does all that it can to avoid a downgrade in its status. I hope that reassures my hon. Friend that the Charity Commission would always act in the sector’s best interests, in terms of proportionality and section 16 of the Charities Act 2011, which I have constantly mentioned, and that it would always try to get its decisions right, so that it does not come into regular conflict with the charity tribunal.
I thank the Minister for a thorough and helpful explanation of the steps involved and the safeguards that will be in place. To some extent, it sounded like there would be a triple lock through the commission’s criteria and the notice period for the tribunal, which is reassuring.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff Central for her helpful contribution. She made the really important point that the criteria have to be clear, unambiguous and properly defined. We look forward to continuing to work with the Charity Commission as it develops its explanation further. As I mentioned, we recognise the helpfulness of the policy paper that the Charity Commission published on how it would use the disqualification power. I was pleased to hear from the Minister that there will be further consultation with the sector and that the paper will be refined and published in full before implementation. That is reassuring, and we will continue to contribute to that. We look forward to working with the Charity Commission to ensure that it recognises the importance of the power, and we will work actively with the sector to refine it.
I also welcome the Minister’s reminder that the Bill will be reviewed in three years and in five years. We will seek to ensure that the Charity Commission regularly updates its guidance as well, particularly in the light of its experience in using it over the coming months and years. Given the Minister’s comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 11, page 11, line 33, after “conduct” insert, “both relevant and serious”.
To ensure a more narrow and relevant definition of “conduct”.
This amendment builds on the previous one. Although I am reassured by many of the Minister’s explanations, we want to talk through the matter further and set on record our concern about the breadth of condition F. Amendment 6 would limit the definition within that condition, which allows the Charity Commission to disqualify a trustee on the grounds
“that any other past or continuing conduct by the person, whether or not in relation to a charity, is damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities”.
The inclusion of the words “both relevant and serious” through this amendment is intended to put the onus on the Charity Commission to prove that it has interpreted that definition with sufficient gravity and sufficient evidence to justify the seriousness of the action, as the Minister sought to reassure me it would. We believe that the current definition is too broad and subjective, and that the amendment would help to narrow the definition and give the charity sector some reassurance.
Once again I find that I have a great deal of sympathy with the intention behind the amendment, but once again I do not think it is necessary, and I believe it could have unintended consequences.
Let me explain first why I do not think the amendment is necessary. I agree that the commission should only consider conduct that is “relevant and serious”; in fact, so does the commission itself. The commission has said that under clause 11, it would provide the individual involved with an explanation identifying the conduct in question and why it thought that conduct met condition F. If the commission took account of conduct that was not relevant to the person’s ability to act as a charity trustee or senior manager, I would expect that any such disqualification order would be thrown out by the charity tribunal on appeal. As I have just discussed with my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford, the Charity Commission would not want that to happen on a regular basis.
As I have said many times, the commission would need to act in line with the duty set out in section 16(4) of the 2011 Act, under which its regulatory activities
“should be proportionate, accountable, consistent, transparent and targeted only at cases in which action is needed”.
As a public body, the commission would also have to consider general human rights and equality duties.
The commission’s draft paper on its initial thoughts about how it would exercise its disqualification power provides some useful guidance. The commission recognises that condition F is widely drawn, but it gives examples of the types of conduct that it could take into account. For instance, if the conduct in question was by a trustee of a charity, it could consider whether it was misconduct or mismanagement, and whether it would put the charity’s property or reputation at undue risk. It could also take into account misconduct in another position of trust and responsibility; convictions relevant to the charity’s purposes, for example a conviction for animal cruelty by a trustee of an animal welfare charity; regulatory breaches that have been penalised by another authority, for example legal breaches on tax matters; a finding of misconduct by a professional body or regulator; or an adverse finding by a charity self-regulatory body or umbrella body.
I think the Committee will agree that those examples show the sorts of conduct that the regulator should consider. Whatever the conduct, which must be both relevant and serious, the commission would also have to meet the other two limbs of the test for disqualification: first, that the person is unfit to serve as a charity trustee; and, secondly, that making the disqualification order is in the public interest to protect public trust and confidence in charities. Under the disqualification power in clause 11, the commission would already need to consider conduct that was both relevant and serious.
I see and understand the point that my hon. Friend makes. The best way for me to deal with it, as we have a period of time before Report in which we can consider the matter further, is to write to him in detail. If people were able to conduct trawling, as he calls it, that would be a worrying scenario.
I hope the Committee will understand why I believe the amendment is not necessary and could be counterproductive. I hope that the hon. Member for Redcar will withdraw it.
I thank the Minister for his response and other members of the Committee for their interesting and thought-provoking questions, which help us and set out the benefit of going through a Bill line by line in Committee. It allows us to set out some of the issues that still need clarification.
In light of the Minister’s answer, and particularly the reassurance that he gave at some length on the steps that the Charity Commission will undertake to ensure that there are sufficient safeguards, we will withdraw the amendment. I am reassured to some extent, but we look forward to working with the commission in the coming months to ensure that the safeguards are sufficiently clear and agreed by the sector prior to implementation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Given that we have had such a wide-ranging debate on the clause, I do not intend to have a stand part debate.
Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.— (Sarah Newton.)
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI welcome you to the Committee, Mr Chairman. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
Clause 12 extends the duty of the Charity Commission to keep a publicly accessible register of people who have been removed from office by either the commission or the High Court. The register includes the name of the removed trustee, their address at the time of removal, the date when the order was made and the name of the charity concerned. It contains details of individuals who are disqualified only because they have been removed by the commission or the court; it does not contain details of those disqualified for reasons such as an unspent criminal conviction or bankruptcy.
The register can be searched by name on www.gov.uk. It is an offence to act as a trustee while disqualified, so all charities should have a vetting procedure in place to check that new and existing trustees are eligible to act, and checking the Charity Commission’s register of removed trustees is a good way to do that. It is also good practice for trustee boards to ask prospective trustees to confirm in writing that they are not disqualified. The Charity Commission provides a model declaration form that charities can download from the aforementioned website.
Under clause 12, the register of removed trustees would be extended to include details of persons who are subject to disqualification orders made under clause 11 and those disqualified trustees removed from office by the commission under clause 5.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hamilton. I welcome you to the Committee.
The Opposition support clause 12. We have tabled no amendments to it because it is an important measure in ensuring public scrutiny and accountability regarding the decisions taken by the commission and the court, along with the circumstances surrounding, and any learning that might come from, them. The clause provides that the commission must maintain a publicly accessible register of persons who have been removed from office by the commission or the High Court, and extends the register to include details of persons subject to a disqualification order.
My only question at this stage is whether the Minister envisages any scenarios in which it would not be appropriate to take that action. The clause states that “the register must include”, but the Minister mentioned exemptions in the case of bankruptcy and so on. Given that addresses and other details will be publicised, might he envisage a scenario in which, for reasons of public or individual protection, or any other reason, someone would not be included in the register?
I will give some thought to that question, but the commission already processes a vast amount of information in accordance with a number of legal obligations, including data protection legislation. It is important to mention that, because there might be concerns about publicly available information being in some way misused.
The commission currently maintains, in accordance with its statutory duties, including data protection considerations, a register of 164,000 charities. The commission fully accepts its responsibility to protect individuals from any unauthorised and unreasonable case for disclosure of personal information, while balancing that with legitimate considerations. The commission is overseen in its management of personal data by the Information Commissioner’s Office, as are all public bodies. I will write to the hon. Lady in answer to her question.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Participation in corporate decisions while disqualified
The provision is relatively straightforward and I hope to be able to provide the Committee with a quick and short explanation.
Trustees do not need to be natural persons; they can be legal persons. That means it is possible for a corporate body to be a trustee of a charity. This gives rise to a loophole relating to disqualified trustees. As the law currently stands, a disqualified trustee is not prevented from acting as an officer of a corporate body—where that corporate body is a charity trustee—and participating in decisions about the management and administration of the charity. This can potentially be used to circumvent disqualification. Clause 13 enables us to put this matter right. It prohibits disqualified individuals from participating in decisions about the administration of a charity where they are an officer of a corporate body and that corporate body is a charity trustee. It also extends the civil and criminal sanctions that apply where a disqualified individual acts as a trustee. It is a common-sense provision and I commend it to the Committee.
I support the Minister’s view on the provision. It is technical, but important. The clause inserts into the Charities Act 2011 new section 184A, which sets out that where a person is disqualified either under section 178 or new section 181A of the Charities Act 2011, which we have discussed in some detail in Committee, and where they are an officer of a corporate body that is a charity trustee, the provision prohibits that person from participating in decisions relating to the charity’s administration. We think it is absolutely right that we abide by the decision that the Charity Commission has made and that the person is not able to continue to participate through that loophole.
It is right that new section 184A extends the existing criminal and civil sanctions to apply to officers who participate in decisions relating to a charity’s administration when they have been disqualified from being charity trustees, and we therefore support the provision.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Fund-raising
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
You have me working hard this evening, Mr Hamilton.
The clause introduces important new requirements that will greatly increase transparency in relation to a charity’s approach to fundraising. These provisions were added to the Bill in the other place following a series of media exposés of poor fundraising practices in which elderly and vulnerable people were targeted by charities or subjected to undue pressure to donate. Many of those poor practices are completely and utterly unacceptable. It is important to remember that although bad practice has been uncovered, most charities fundraise well. They need to be able to ask people to donate to raise funds, and we should not forget that many do so responsibly and in line with best practice.
The sorts of poor practices that we have seen in the media recently are mainly in the areas of mass marketing fundraising, such as direct mail or telephone fundraising. In these high volume data-driven areas, some charities have been treating donors as a means to an end, rather than focusing on the charity’s relationship with the donor as an individual. The first new requirement under subsections 7 and 8 will ensure that charities put in place explicit safeguards for potential donors when they wish to fundraise through third party contractors.
The provision prohibits a contractor from fundraising for a charity unless the written agreement between the fundraiser and the charity includes standards such as how it will protect vulnerable people from undue pressure and how the charity will monitor the contractor’s compliance. It has become clear that much of the poor practice we have seen over the past year or so occurs when there is a lack of accountability over how charity fundraising is conducted. The new requirement aims to make it absolutely clear that charities are responsible for ensuring that third parties who are paid to fundraise on the charity’s behalf act in a moral, respectful and responsible manner when asking the public for money.
The second requirement under new section 162A will introduce much greater transparency in relation to a charity’s track record in fundraising. It will require charities to publicly disclose information on how they conduct fundraising, whether they subscribe to appropriate self-regulation, and whether any good practice requirements have been breached. They will also need to publicise more details on the number of complaints that they have received, as well as what principles they follow in order to protect vulnerable donors and the wider public from poor practice. That will ensure that high-quality fundraising becomes a board-level issue and returns to the heart of a charity’s operations where it belongs. In that respect, I also warmly welcome the Charity Commission’s new guidance for trustees on their responsibilities to do with fundraising. The new guidance, which is being consulted on, should be a must-read for all trustees of charities that fundraise from the public.
To update the Committee on our progress in strengthening the self-regulation of fundraising, which sits alongside the provisions in the Bill and is arguably more important, not only did we amend the Bill in the other place, but I asked Sir Stuart Etherington to undertake a review of fundraising self-regulation over the summer. He was supported by a cross-party panel of peers. His report, published in September, recommended the establishment of a new, tougher, single self-regulator to oversee charity fundraising with universal coverage, high standards of best practice, stronger sanctions and close links to existing statutory regulators.
The review also recommended the setting up of a fundraising preference service so that people who felt inundated with charity fundraising requests would be able to reset their consent to be contacted. That has proved a popular concept with the public. Taken together, the proposals will provide a strong and comprehensive framework for the self-regulation of fundraising.
We are making good progress on implementation. I appointed Michael Grade, Lord Grade of Yarmouth, to be the interim chair of the new fundraising self-regulator. In December he appointed his interim chief executive, Stephen Dunmore. He also appointed a working party to develop plans to implement the fundraising preference service, led by George Kidd, who has vast experience in direct marketing regulation. In December the largest fundraising charities were invited to a summit, which was streamed live and at which Lord Grade set out his vision for the new self-regulator. The meeting was a success and I left with the impression that the largest charities accepted that things needed to change and were willing to throw their weight behind the new regulator.
Over the next few months Lord Grade’s vision will be turned into reality and we expect to see the new regulator up and running from spring 2016, with the fundraising preference service following shortly afterwards. Most of the largest charities have committed to fund the new self-regulator’s set-up costs and I am sure that the others will soon follow. This is an opportunity for the charity sector to demonstrate its leadership and maturity and to show that it can put its own house in order.
I have every confidence that, with charity support, the new self-regulatory system will succeed and, most importantly, consign poor fundraising practices to history. If the new self-regulatory system were to fail, however, we need a back-up plan, which is where new clause 7 on the Government’s reserve powers to regulate fundraising through statute comes in. I will explain those powers to the Committee in more detail at our next sitting.
The Opposition welcome clause 14 and have tabled no amendments to it. However, it is important and deserves discussion, so I will take some time, with the leave of the Chair, to make a few points.
Due to the clause’s importance and, in particular, because of some of the public exposure that led to it, it is essential to explore some of the issues behind it. It amends section 59 of the Charities Act 1992 and prohibits commercial fundraisers from raising funds for a charitable institution unless the fundraising agreement between the commercial fundraiser and the charitable institution includes certain terms on fundraising standards that the commercial fundraiser undertakes to follow. That is extremely important, because many within and outside the sector have felt that what could be described as the outsourcing of a charity’s fundraising function can perhaps play a part in distancing that process from the charity’s original aims and objectives. People have also felt that the accountability of a charity itself could be somewhat loosened by the outsourcing of fundraising provisions. We therefore think the clause is an important amendment to ensure that a proper agreement is in place setting out a certain number of standards that must be followed.
Clause 14 also amends the Charities Act 2011 by inserting new section 162A, which requires charities whose accounts have to be audited in accordance with section 144(2) of the Act—currently, those with a gross annual income of more than £1 million, or those with a gross annual income of more than £250,000 and assets with an aggregate value exceeding £3.26 million—to set out in annual reports their approach to fundraising, including in particular whether they use commercial fundraisers and how they protect vulnerable people from undue pressure in their fundraising.
I thank the Minister for setting out the views and values behind the clause, which we welcome. Social investment is an important part of the fabric of our community and voluntary sector. We have tabled no amendments to the clause, and we recognise that it will make an important contribution.
As the Minister set out, the Bill is the first attempt to define in statute social investment, which is
“the use of repayable finance to achieve a social as well as a financial return.”
Community and voluntary sector organisations are playing an increasingly large role in society. As such, demands on the sector will be higher than ever. However, the third sector faces a chronic lack of investment. Many organisations are constantly in a state of fragility and vulnerability, and many are urgently seeking the next source of funding rather than investing to create a sustainable and robust social business. The climate of cuts, particularly in local government, as well as increased pressures and demands on many of the services that community and voluntary sector organisations provide, mean that they are facing a difficult climate. Any opportunity to look at new and innovative ways of raising finance are therefore to be welcomed.
Often, when funding comes it is unsuitably packaged for the purpose. It might be aimed at short-term projects or something specific, with many strings attached. It could come with unrealistic expectations and may not always be support the core aims and objectives of the charity. Social investment is growing in response to those needs and challenges. Done well, it could not only create more capital for the sector but help to build long-term capacity and develop a movement towards early intervention and prevention, which the Opposition welcome as part of our approach to public services. That could result in a stronger third sector that is better able to play its important role in society.
The Bill’s helpful explanatory notes give examples of acts that might constitute social investments, and the definition is welcome. Such examples include a charity for the support of homeless people letting out housing at a low rent; an overseas development charity investing in fair trade tea production; a charity for the advancement of medicine making a high-risk investment in a medical research company; a diabetes charity investing in a company that is developing foods intended to reduce the impact of diabetes on sufferers; or a charity for the reduction of reoffending investing in a social impact bond to fund a project that supports individuals leaving prison. Those are all worthy and important aims and objectives, and we support efforts to put a social investment framework into statute.
Nevertheless, it is important that we continue to see the funding of the community and voluntary sector as diverse and variable. We do not want a one-size-fits-all solution to the funding crisis in the charity sector, as not all charities will be able to make social investments. Some charities need to be able to take risks and fail, which is in the nature of any charity or community organisation. Because of the kinds of people that they support and deal with, or because of their aims and objectives, some community and voluntary sector organisations will have to spend money just to manage or prevent decline or difficult scenarios. We must ensure that charities that support such social investment, which may never have a financial return, are not starved of the finance and support that they would traditionally get through a grant-based model.
The clause sets out an important framework for social enterprise, which we support and welcome as an important new means for charities to gain income and to be longer-term and more strategic in their approaches. It gives charities the reassurance that they need to feel empowered to undertake investment. Definitions will continue to change and evolve, but in the meantime, this is an important regulatory framework to encourage and support social enterprise.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Reviews of the operation of this Act
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
This is a review clause. We took on board the concerns raised in the other place that five years would be too long before the first review, and we have debated some of those concerns today. We amended the Bill so that the first review will have to start within three years of enactment and conclude within a year. Subsequent reviews will have to take place every five years. All the reviews will be reported to Parliament.
We must remember that the Charity Commission estimates that some of the new powers might only be exercised once or twice a year, so allowing time for the development and publication of guidance and, in some cases, public consultation before the provision can be commenced means that for some of the powers there may be a limited evidence base for the first review after three years. Nevertheless, this is a sensible provision that will enable us to determine whether the Bill has achieved its aims, and I commend it to the Committee.
The Opposition support this clause because it is a simple and practical way of providing for the Minister to review the operation of the Bill. As he mentioned, we have had quite a lot of discussion and debate today about the timeframe for monitoring the Bill. We have had a lot of debate about the onus that much of the Bill puts on the Charity Commission, about many of the new powers and about many of the new expectations that will be placed on charity and community groups. It is right that we review those things.
The Minister has used the word “proportionate” many times when talking about the decision making and judgments that the Charity Commission will have to exercise in taking steps to raise standards within the charity sector. Continuing to review that will be important. We will also continue to assess the financial impact, particularly on the Charity Commission but also on the charity sector, of many of the new demands and powers.
As the Minister said, it is important that new guidance, new policy papers and new explanations, definitions and criteria for the Charity Commission will be set out, consulted on, established and reviewed consistently within three years of the enactment of the Bill. Three years, moving to five years thereafter, is a perfect timeframe to establish that, so we support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Short title, extent and commencement
I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 17, page 20, line 34, leave out subsection (6).
A technical amendment to remove the Privilege amendment that was inserted in the House of Lords.
This is a technical and procedural amendment to remove the privilege amendment that was made on Third Reading in the other place. The privilege amendment recognises that provisions in the Bill may infringe the privilege of the House of Commons with regard to the control of public money. Amendment 9 will leave out subsection (6), thus ensuring that the imposition of any charge resulting from the Bill is properly approved. In practice, the new powers that the Bill confers on the Charity Commission are expected not to result in additional costs for the commission. The commission itself has said that the new powers will help it to regulate charities more efficiently by ensuring that more proportionate and effective action can be taken at an early stage and by limiting the opportunity for delaying tactics, which can waste the commission’s resources.
The remainder of clause 17 addresses the Bill’s territorial extent, which is England and Wales. The Bill team has submitted a memorandum to the Committee’s Chairs for the purposes of Standing Order No. 83L covering the Government amendments that have been made today. It reflects the Department’s continuing view that the Bill, as amended, extends and applies to England and Wales only. We liaise with the devolved Administrations on cross-border charity law and regulation, and the Charity Commission similarly liaises with its counterparts in Scotland and Northern Ireland on matters of mutual interest.
The final provisions relate to the commencement of provisions in the Bill. We will work with the Charity Commission to publish an implementation plan for the Bill once it is passed. As I have mentioned, there are a number of provisions of which we will need to give charities, and those working in them, sufficient notice before we commence them. The extension of automatic disqualification is an important one. Other provisions will need guidance to be published before they can be commenced. I hope that my explanation suffices.
We support the amendment. We agree with the Minister that it is a technical, procedural amendment to ensure the passage of the Bill, and we have no comments to make at this stage.
Amendment 9 agreed to.
Clause 17, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.— (Sarah Newton.)
(8 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI beg to move amendment 4, in clause 6, page 5, line 2, at end insert—
‘(4) An order under this section will automatically be discharged on the closure of the inquiry under section 46 which is referred to in subsection (1).’
To restrict the power to ensure that if a tribunal appeal is successful, a direction by the Commission as a result of the warning is no longer relevant.
I welcome the clause, which inserts a new provision into the Charities Act 2011 to enable the Charity Commission, after it has instituted an inquiry, to make an order directing a charity not to take or to continue certain actions that the commission considers constitute misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of the charity. The order has to specify the action that must not be made or continued, and has to set out the commission’s reason for making it. The commission will have to review any order at intervals of not more than six months and there will be a right of appeal against the order.
When the Joint Committee on the Draft Protection of Charities Bill suggested that it would be helpful if the Government chose to revisit proposal 13, it set out that the provision must be tightly drawn to clarify the circumstances in which the power can be used and the safeguards that apply, in particular the right of appeal. The previous Government accepted the Joint Committee’s recommendation and said that they would revisit proposal 13 for inclusion in the Bill—that is now clause 6. I look forward to the Minister setting out some examples of the circumstances in which the power may be used and any safeguards. I am pleased to see the right of appeal.
The new power in the clause is broadly similar to a power that the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator has to direct that specific action is not taken. However, the OSCR’s power may take effect for a maximum of six months. There is no such limit under clause 6, although the Charities Commission must review the order at intervals of not more than six months.
The crucial issue, to which my amendment speaks, is that it is not clear whether the order may remain in place once a section 46 inquiry has been closed, so it could extend beyond the period of the inquiry. The amendment seeks to prevent that. The Charity Commission states:
“The purpose of an inquiry is to examine the issues in greater detail and investigate and establish the facts of the case so that the commission can ascertain the extent of any misconduct or mismanagement, establish the extent of the risk to the charity, its work, property, or beneficiaries, and decide what action is needed to resolve the concerns. If the allegations are not substantiated, the inquiry will say so. The ultimate aim is to stop abuse, ensure compliance and put a charity back on a secure footing. Where this is possible it may include restoring its reputation, protecting beneficiaries or assets and protecting and enhancing the reputation and public confidence in the charitable sector generally.”
That is all right and proper, and we agree with the Charity Commission’s view on the purpose of an inquiry. Once the inquiry has concluded, an order made under clause 6 should no longer be relevant and the findings of the inquiry, whether allegations are substantiated or not, should take precedence. Directions that have been given during the process of an inquiry, but which are not in keeping with the outcomes, should not be pursued.
The commission has recently clarified the fact that it has no power to require trustees to fetter the future exercise of their fiduciary powers under its general power to give advice and guidance, which appears in section 15 of the Charities Act 2011. That clarification followed judicial review proceedings in the High Court, where it was alleged that the commission had attempted to do exactly that. This is one of the concerns that we expressed earlier in the debate, and it could apply in particular to the commission’s powers to specify action that should be taken to rectify misconduct or mismanagement under clause 2.
There are situations in which the commission may direct trustees to act or not to act—clauses 6 and 7 introduce more such situations—but they are always carefully circumscribed. It is therefore extremely important that we are satisfied that the definition of such powers is carefully discussed, that their gravity is understood and that they do not continue beyond an exhaustive inquiry. That is why I moved the amendment.
The clause is a sensible extension of the existing powers of the Charity Commission that are available to it when it is conducting a statutory inquiry under section 46 of the Charities Act 2011. At the moment, when a statutory inquiry is under way and the commission is satisfied that there has been either misconduct or mismanagement, or that there is risk to charity property, it may direct a charity to undertake certain actions under section 84 of the Act. The purpose of the existing section 84 power is to allow the commission to direct any action to be taken that it
“considers to be expedient in the interests of the charity.”
Legal precedent confirms that “expedient” in that context means advantageous or beneficial, so the action that the commission proposes will be of advantage or benefit to the charity’s interests, which in effect means the charity’s beneficiaries. However, the advantage or benefit must be viewed only in the context of the issues raised through the inquiry and not in the belief that it would be good for the charity in general terms. Specific examples of where the commission already uses that power include ordering a charity to undertake a governance review in a defined period; review a legal agreement; provide specified documentation by a certain date; ensure that a named individual is monitored on charity premises at all times; draw up a risk management procedure in a certain timeframe and implement that procedure; and take legal advice in connection with a matter concerning the charity and its funds.
Published figures in “Tackling abuse and mis- management: 2013-14” show that the commission used that power to direct charities on 38 occasions. As we have discussed, the commission has been exercising its power more often and more effectively, so we may well see that figure increase in the report for 2014-15, which will be published in the coming weeks.
The power to direct a charity to do something is long held and the commission has well-established procedures and policies in its armoury. The commission also has the power under section 76(3)(f) of the Charities Act 2011 to restrict a charity from undertaking certain financial transactions. That existing power can be exercised in a number of ways, including freezing a charity’s bank account; requiring the charity’s trustees to seek commission approval before entering certain transactions; and preventing specific transactions. That was used on 15 occasions in 2013-14.
The commission does not have the power to prevent a charity from undertaking actions or activities that would amount to misconduct or mismanagement during the course of a statutory inquiry. That is a loophole and the clause is a common-sense addition that will give it that power.
Some people have expressed concern that the commission could use that power to undermine freedom of association or freedom of speech, in particular for charities with religious purposes, but it is important to point out that it would be available to the commission only to prevent activities that would constitute misconduct or mismanagement were they to go ahead or continue. Therefore, if a charity engaged in unlawful political activity such as supporting a political party and holding partisan events, the Charity Commission could act to prevent further such activity from taking place.
It is worth pointing out, as the hon. Member for Redcar did, that the commission’s equivalent in Scotland, the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, has a similar power. Section 28 of the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 enables the OSCR to
“direct any charity, body or person with regard to which it is making inquiries…not to undertake”
specific activities for a period of six months. The OSCR may seek a court order for longer restrictions.
The Joint Committee supported the inclusion of such a power, provided that it was tightly drawn to clarify the circumstances in which it could be used, along with the safeguards that applied, particularly the right of appeal. The new power in the clause will enable the Charity Commission to intervene to prevent misconduct or mismanagement from taking place rather than having to watch powerlessly, then take remedial action once the damage has been done.
The bar for exercising the power will be high and there will be six specific protections. First, the power can be used only in the context of a statutory inquiry. Secondly, the commission will have to be satisfied of the need to prevent misconduct, mismanagement or risk to charity property. Thirdly, the commission must set out a statement of reasons for exercising the power and review any order regularly—at least every six months. Fourthly, the making and every review of the order will be subject to a right of appeal to the Charity Tribunal and, like all its other protective and remedial powers, this power is subject to the Commission’s duty to act proportionately under section 16 of the Charities Act 2011.
Let me give the Committee two examples of cases in which the powers might be used. In recent years, there have been several cases of charities involved in the abuse of charitable business rates relief. In such cases, the so-called charity enters into multiple tenancy agreements with commercial property owners at reduced rents without any real evidence that the tenancies are in the best interests of the charity or are used meaningfully for charitable purposes. Once occupied by the charity, the property benefits from a reduction of at least 80% in business rates relief, which can be a substantial sum. The saving is often shared between the charity and the property owner. Local councils and honest taxpayers end up losing out. The commission has taken action in such cases, but it can do so only after the event. The new power would enable the commission to direct the charity not to enter into, renew or continue any further tenancies, in effect preventing the misconduct from continuing.
Another example in which the power could be used would arise if a charity had made significant loans to companies connected to the trustees. The trustees would seek to become insolvent and to wind up the charity, writing off the loans and resulting in significant financial benefit to the companies connected to the trustees. In that case, the commission would be able to use the new power to direct the trustees not to wind up the charity, buying time to sort things out by, for example, removing the trustees, or appointing new trustees or even an interim manager to act in the charity’s best interests, which could involve calling in the loans.
I thank the Minister for his helpful response. It was extremely important to hear his clarifications, particularly about the six protections that will be in place before the power is used, and the clear and helpful examples he gave of instances in which the power will be used.
The amendment relates not to the warnings and the tribunal dealt with in clause 1 but to whether the power will continue if it is used in the course of a formal inquiry, subject to the inquiry’s final outcome. I was reassured to hear that the inquiry’s outcome and the report’s findings will take precedence in the action going forward. It is extremely important that if allegations made in the course of the inquiry are unfounded, they are quashed and no further action is taken. We also wanted to know whether, if the inquiry report showed structural issues and there was a remedy that affected those issues, that would overrule the temporary protective amendments. The Minister clarified that issue, for which I am grateful. I am reassured by his response, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Power to direct winding up
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
We are progressing through the Bill at a rate of knots, so I will try not to delay the Committee too long. The Charity Commission’s usual practice, as many of us will know, is to try to restore a charity to health following a statutory inquiry and to ensure that funds dedicated for specific charitable purposes are used for those purposes. The commission’s current powers are based on that premise; that is as it should and, indeed, will continue to be. In practice, that may mean replacing some of the trustees, directing the charity to take certain actions or reforming its governance arrangements, but the principle is one of ensuring the continuation of the charity to deliver its charitable purposes.
There are, however, rare inquiry cases where it is more appropriate for the commission to take a different approach. In those cases, it is clear that attempting to restore the charity to health is unlikely to succeed and would not be the right strategy. A good example would be sham charities set up ostensibly for charitable purposes but really operating for private gain or some other non-charitable purpose. Such a body may never have had a genuine charitable aim in the first place and the commission is unlikely to be able to restore it to health.
In such cases, the Charity Commission can and already does act to transfer any remaining funds or assets to another legitimate charity with the same charitable purposes. It can do this under its existing inquiry powers. The commission can remove the trustees, ensuring their disqualification, provided that they do not resign before the commission can do so. What the commission cannot do under its current powers is tackle the empty shell that is left, so there is a risk that the empty shell could be reactivated at a later date to be used for further misconduct.
I am happy to take any interventions. We are indeed rattling through these clauses and are the beneficiaries of some excellent analysis of the Bill during its long progress through the other place and in pre-legislative scrutiny. A lot of action has been taken to clarify and improve the Bill. Indeed, it is clear from its drafting that this clause has benefited from much scrutiny.
Clause 7 will provide a new power for the Charity Commission to direct the trustees, or other people in the charity, to take the necessary steps to wind up the charity and transfer its resources elsewhere. The explanatory notes suggest that the power will be used in “rare cases” and state:
“The Commission’s usual practice is to attempt to restore a charity to health following a statutory inquiry”.
We all support the positive and supportive role that the Charity Commission would play. As the Minister said, the commission itself cannot wind up the charity, as that would be acting in the charity’s administration; it can only direct the trustees to do so themselves. That is absolutely right and within the boundaries of the commission’s power. The power would be available after the commission had instituted an inquiry and was satisfied either that there was misconduct or mismanagement, or a need to protect charity property. The commission would need to be satisfied on other matters specified in the clause, including that the exercise of the power was
“expedient in the public interest.”
Again, I fear that a burden of decision making and judgment is being placed on the Charity Commission. Just as the decision on whether to publicise a warning under clause 1 will be taken by the commission, so again we find the commission having to be the arbiters of public interest. I do not doubt that it will perform that duty admirably, but we must be conscious that we are asking it to make another judgment call. That risk should be looked at in the context of an environment in which the commission is under pressure to take action on charities that are threatening public trust and confidence, and to be seen to do so. The recent High Court judicial review case mentioned earlier provides an example of how easy it is for the commission to take precipitate and potentially disproportionate action. I sincerely hope that the commission will use its customary wisdom and good judgment in making these decisions. I was reassured to hear that it is expected to use the power only one or two times a year.
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. The clause is partly about restoring trust. It is also about making the Charity Commission work better and more efficiently and focus its funds on the areas where it can really make a difference—day in, day out. She is absolutely right.
Other barriers may make a person unable to comply with a commission direction of this type, such as restrictions in the charity’s governing document, which may prevent otherwise willing trustees or members from complying with this type of commission order because they are legally unable to do so. The Joint Committee recommended that we consider the inclusion of some form of statutory protection for a financial institution in cases where compliance with the direction from the commission in those circumstances might constitute a breach of its contract with a charity. The clause seeks to remove any obstacles by allowing the commission’s direction to overcome a contractual obligation owed to a charity.
Importantly, clause 8 continues to provide the specific, statutory protection for a financial institution—or, for that matter, any person holding the charitable property—in cases where compliance with the commission’s direction in those circumstances might constitute a breach of its contract with the charity. It is always important to consider the practical application of legislation and the clause will help the Charity Commission make use of the existing power more effectively.
I echo the Minister’s concluding comments. As well as supporting the Charity Commission, the clause will support many charities that often struggle with individual trustees who may have been unable to take necessary action. This will enable the commission to step in and essentially fill a void where no one has had the power to tackle the issue.
Again, we welcome clause 8. It will amend the power in section 85 of the 2011 Act, which enables the commission to direct the application of charity property, where it is satisfied that a person is unwilling to apply it properly for the purposes of the charity and it is necessary or desirable to make an order to secure the proper application of that property.
The clause will amend section 85 in two ways. First, the commission will now have the power to direct the application of the property, if satisfied that the person is unable to apply it properly, as opposed to being unwilling. I appreciate the Minister’s examples of where that will be applicable. It is helpful to understand the case studies that will ensue.
Section 85 will be amended to ensure that compliance with the order will not result in a breach of contractual obligations to the charity. The explanatory notes and the Minister have provided an example of banks that act on client instruction. That is the most common example of the problem, where financial institutions hold a charity’s property but are unable to comply with the commission direction to transfer that property because doing so would result in a breach of their contract with the charity. That closes an important loophole and enables the Charity Commission and charities themselves to progress with securing the property.
As the Minister showed with his examples, clause 8 will continue to provide the specific statutory protection for a financial institution, in cases where compliance with a Charity Commission direction in these circumstances might constitute a breach of its contract with a charity. We support the clause and welcome it as a useful addition to the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Sarah Newton.)
(8 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCopies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room. We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room. It shows how the selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue. A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first; other Members are then free to catch my eye to speak on any or all of the amendments within the group. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate.
Please note that decisions on amendments take place not in the order in which they are debated, but in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. In other words, debate occurs according to the selection and grouping lists, and decisions are taken when we come to the clause that the amendment affects. I hope that explanation is helpful. I will use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules following the debates on the relevant amendments.
Clause 1
Official warnings by the Commission
I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 1, page 1, line 16, after “give” insert “at least 14 days”.
To require a minimum period of 14 days’ notice of a warning.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Main. Thank you very much for this opportunity. As we stated on Second Reading, we wholeheartedly welcome the Bill and the intention to clarify and support charity law, particularly by introducing greater transparency, greater effectiveness in governance and greater efficiency. The Bill will also give charities a new power to make social investments.
The intention behind clause 1 is to introduce a new official warning for the Charity Commission where it considers that there has been a breach of trust or duty, or other misconduct or mismanagement. Our amendment, which we believe is important, would require a minimum period of 14 days’ notice if a warning is issued.
We welcome the clause in principle. We understand that the purpose behind it is to fill a gap for low-level breaches of the statutory provisions of the Charities Act 2011 or of the fiduciary duty where there are low risks for assets and services. The National Audit Office welcomed it and said it will give the Commission
“a stepped approach so that, rather than just having, on the one hand, advice and guidance and then the nuclear option of a statutory inquiry, it gives the Commission something in between”.
We welcome the principle of the warning process.
However, we have some concerns about the clause, particularly on the lack of safeguards, which we believe could threaten the independence of charities and fundamentally change the relationship between the Charity Commission and its volunteer trustees. The commission already has a number of powers to deal with regulatory concerns—even low-level concerns. In particular, it can do so by way of operational compliance cases, which it routinely carries out.
Statistics from the Charity Commission show that between 1 April and 30 September 2015 it opened 575 operational compliance cases into registered charities. If the matter is urgent, the commission can already open a statutory inquiry without notice and suspend the trustees, pending the use of additional protective powers. The decision to open a statutory inquiry and the subsequent exercise of protective powers can be appealed to the charity tribunal, known as the first-tier tribunal. There are no plans to change that.
Operational compliance cases are likely to be regarded very differently from the new official warnings, which could have a significant impact on a charity. First, it is likely that the public issuing of an official warning, which is allowed in this version of the Bill, will carry far more stigma than an operational compliance case and could risk damage to a charity’s reputation, with a resulting drying up of funding and support.
Secondly, failure to comply with a warning automatically gives rise to a right for the commission to take further, significant protective action in relation to a charity, after opening a statutory inquiry. That is not the case with an operational compliance case, so this is a fundamental shift in the relationship between charities and the commission.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Main.
The relationship between the regulator and charities is a sophisticated one, and it is important that the Charity Commission plays a supportive role as well as a challenging one. Does my hon. Friend agree that the ability to send a warning notice without notice is a sign of failure in the relationship between the regulator and the charity, rather than one of support or challenge?
My hon. Friend makes a really important point. The relationship is long standing, sophisticated and complex. It is right that there is an opportunity to give notice of a warning in the Bill. Our issue is that there is no significant timeframe and no notice of the timeframe. I will explain why that is such a critical issue, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right; it is important that there is a nuanced and balanced relationship and opportunities for both sides to state their case in any dispute.
I will now focus on the amendment. The Bill helpfully ensures that before issuing a warning, the commission must give notice of its intention to do so. However, there is no indication in the legislation of timescales for a warning. The briefing from the commission states that
“the Commission has confirmed it will ensure that a reasonable time for representations is given”.
It continues:
“The timing is likely to vary for warnings in different cases, depending on how much engagement and warning the charity has had during engagement with them, and there may be times when the timescales might have to be relatively short (if, for example, it relates to a time critical incident)”.
It states that operational guidance for its staff will be published. However, this seems very vague and gives total discretion in this situation to the commission. What is a reasonable time? Could that mean a matter of hours or a phone call before a press release is sent out? We know the potential damaging implications for a charity of publicity around the warning.
The problem with the term “reasonable” is that it is subject to interpretation. We can tell from case law and statute that what is reasonable in one circumstance is not reasonable in another. This will create a lack of clarity around the implementation of the Bill. Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be much better to have clarity and specific time limits so that both the Charity Commission and the charities are clear about what the expectation is?
I totally agree. That is the purpose of the amendment. There is a lack of clarity around “reasonable time”. Not only is that pretty indefinite, but it puts the onus back on staff at the Charity Commission, which could place an undue burden on them and leave open to interpretation what the definition of a reasonable time could be. That is why it is important to have a timeframe in the Bill.
Without a timeframe, there might be no opportunity for a charity to prepare a defence or to correct an unconscious mistake, which could be the cause of the warning, or to let trustees know. We might end up in a ridiculous situation in which they could read about a warning for their charity in a newspaper or a sector magazine because, as the Bill is drafted, the Charity Commission can publish the warning. Such a warning, especially if published, could have a substantial impact on a charity’s ability to raise funds and might have significant reputational damage.
It may be felt that a prescribed period of notice is not necessary because the Charity Commission will act reasonably and proportionately. I do not doubt that will always be its intention; I know that the Charity Commission does an extremely good job in difficult circumstances, often with many resource pressures. However, recent experience shows that is not always the case. In a recent High Court case involving the commission and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, the Lord Chief Justice referred to “ludicrous time limits” imposed by the commission. He also said that he could understand why it was felt that the Charity Commission had behaved in an extremely high-handed manner in that case, and suggested that there should have been
“an awful lot more time spent at the beginning talking, as people normally do, and not issuing ultimatums”.
There is therefore a real danger that the commission, if allowed scope to use this new power in a disproportionate way, may well do so, however well meaning its intentions.
If the power is intended to be used only for low-level matters, a minimum notice period of 14 days is entirely appropriate. It is not clear why there should be any objection to that. For more serious matters where the Commission is able to take more extensive regulatory action, it will be able to use its other powers without notice. That is the existing situation. The Joint Committee on the Draft Protection of Charities Bill recommended that a reasonable minimum notice period to make representations over a draft warning should be clear in the Bill. That safeguard has not been included and the amendment seeks to rectify that.
Moreover, it was clear, even from the Government’s response to the Joint Committee’s report, that a recipient should have an opportunity to make representations on a proposed warning and for these to be considered by the commission before the warning is published. There is no minimum notice period, and it is possible that a recipient will not have a meaningful opportunity to make representations. We know that there have been many situations in which advice and support given by the commission can be challenged and are open to interpretation by the charity.
A warning could have human rights implications. It might harm a trustee’s reputation, for example, or be in breach of his or her rights under article 8, particularly in the absence of a fair trial, as preserved by article 13. Is my hon. Friend concerned that the Bill has implications for human rights?
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. A later amendment sets out the right of appeal to the charity tribunal, which we think is an important safeguard. Even without that appeal, giving no notice whatsoever could entail significant risks, particularly with regard to reputational damage, as the Human Rights Act sets out.
My hon. Friend is being generous with her time. Trustees of boards of charities are volunteers, and they give up their time very generously. Quite often, boards are cautious in their approach. Does my hon. Friend think that seeing warning notices handed out to other charities might well be a deterrent to people giving up their time and lead to uncertainties over governance arrangements?
My hon. Friend makes another excellent point. We know how difficult and challenging it can be around the country to get good trustees and to get people to stick with it. Trustees are under a lot of pressure because of regulations and time commitments. There is the risk that the measure will disadvantage trustees and deter them from putting themselves forward. If a warning has been published, the reputational damage could be huge.
The Lord Chief Justice referred to “ludicrous time limits”. He also said that he could understand why it was felt that the Charity Commission had behaved in an extremely high-handed manner and that there was a real danger that the Commission, if allowed the scope to use this new power in a disproportionate way, may well do so, however well meaning its intentions.
We are not seeking to remove the power to publish a warning, because we think that it is important. The ability to publish a warning should be there, because of the opportunity it gives to create greater weight behind a warning. However, we think that before that step is taken there should be significant opportunity for a charity to challenge it. That is what our proposed 14 days’ notice seeks to do.
The power to publish a warning, the potential impact of which cannot be overstated, means that the public, media and funders will become aware of it. They will not be able to distinguish between a low-level issue that is giving rise to the warning and something that is much more severe. In the court of public opinion, such issues often become conflated. This year we have already seen a huge media furore relating to the charitable sector. Although relevant to only a small number of charities, it has had a substantial and damaging effect on trust in the sector. The publicity could lead to a choking off of donations and the loss of grant funding and corporate sponsorships, leading to closure of services and redundancies.
To give advance notice of 14 days of a warning, as our amendment proposes, would allow a charity to ensure that steps can be taken immediately to remedy a situation, where it is a small administrative error, to explain any extenuating circumstances and to challenge that with the Charity Commission. It would allow the conversations mentioned by the Lord Chief Justice in the High Court case to take place in a supportive and trusting environment.
We believe that there is no reason why there should not be a 14-day notice period ahead of a warning. We hope that the Government will support our amendment.
The problem is that if the evidence has been destroyed, no one knows whether it was there. That is the case I want to make. We want to make sure that correct action can be taken in a timely fashion.
The hon. Lady said that the measure could make the powers of the Charity Commission similar to those of other regulators. However, while many other regulators have the power to issue warning notices, they are often exercisable only in the case of a breach of a statutory requirement. This proposed power goes much further than that. A warning can be given on the strength of
“a breach of trust or duty or other misconduct or mismanagement”.
The hon. Lady will agree that that gives the Bill a fairly broad scope. The adverse publicity and possibility of more severe regulatory action that could flow from that would not match what had actually been breached at that stage.
I have to disagree with the hon. Lady. Regulatory abuse in charities is of course rare, but it is vital that measures are in place to ensure that the public and, indeed, the many charity volunteers do not lose confidence when it happens.
Clause 1 provides a suitable means of protecting our many charities, small and large, from unscrupulous behaviour. It will maintain the confidence of the public, the many donors and the amazing volunteers, as well as those employed by charities. I am delighted to have been able to speak in support of the clause, which I commend to the Committee.
Clearly it is not enough, because the Charity Commission has asked for the additional powers. I am sure the Charity Commission would be only too happy to answer the detailed question about the number of affected charities.
I want to return to the safeguards, because there are a number of important safeguards on which we should focus our attention. First, the Charity Commission must give notice of its intention to issue a warning to a charity and its trustees. The notice must specify a number of matters, including the grounds for issuing the warning and any action the Charity Commission considers should be taken by the charity to rectify the breach that has given rise to the warning in the first place.
The notice must specify a period for representations to be made about the proposed warning, and the Charity Commission must take account of any representations before it issues any warning. An official warning could also highlight the likely consequences of any further non-compliance, which would be likely to require a more significant intervention by the regulator, such as the opening of a statutory inquiry and subsequent use of its temporary protective powers or its permanent remedial powers.
I appreciate the Minister setting out those important safeguards. However, there is little evidence about the timeframe in the Bill, which means that charities have no control over their ability to present their arguments and let their trustees know. We will continue to press on this issue unless the Minister has some analysis of what is a reasonable time.
The criteria for issuing an official warning are now clearly stated in the Bill—breach of trust or duty, or other misconduct or mismanagement. These are not as narrow as the criteria recommended by the Joint Committee, but we decided that limiting the warning power to a failure to comply with a limited range of statutory provisions, or order or direction of the Commission, would result in a power that was only half effective at best. Charity law is a mix of statute and case law, and the scope of the warning power needs to reflect that. It would be wrong to limit the warning power to just breaches of statutory provisions or commission orders or directions, as this would limit the regulator to issuing warnings on less than half the legal framework.
I recognise that a breach of duty might not always be completely clearcut, but it is right that the regulator of charities should be able to reach a view on whether a charity’s trustees have breached their duties, and should be warned about their conduct. It would be wrong to expect the Charity Commission to have to open a statutory inquiry and consider exercising its more serious compliance powers in cases where charity trustees have breached their duties but not a specific statutory provision.
The Minister is being extremely generous with his time. Does he agree that there are things that lie between breaking a statutory definition and what we are talking about here, which is quite a low level of concern: a breach of trust or duty, or other misconduct or mismanagement? That is quite broad in scope. Should there not be further definition—not necessarily in statute, but perhaps from the Charity Commission—to identify the criteria for that?
My daughter has just taken up knitting. She is only eight and is doing a fantastic job.
It is clear that party political activity is outside the bounds of what charities should be doing. I think everyone accepts that. Sometimes there is a grey area, and if something is reported to the Charity Commission, it would rule one way or the other. I have stated on many occasions on public platforms that it is right that charities should be able to speak up for their beneficiaries, whether the Government like it or not, and I stick to that principle.
Another issue raised was the risk that adverse publicity could result from the publication of a warning. As I have said, it is important that charities are accountable to donors, beneficiaries and the general public. Since the 2006 Act, one of the commission’s statutory objectives has been to enhance that accountability. The argument against the clause is effectively that charities should not have to be accountable for things that they have done wrong. That is not fair to donors, beneficiaries and the general public, and reduces the incentives for charities to make future improvements.
A point was made about whether the commission should be allowed to publish warnings at all. Charities exist for public benefit and depend on public support, so there should be transparency. Official warnings should be published if the regulator considers it necessary to intervene, unless there is good reason not to publish the details of an official warning. Publishing those details also encourages compliance, thereby increasing the efficacy of the power.
Any published details of warnings would have to be removed by the commission after a certain period—as I said earlier, the commission currently archives after two years. There would be an opportunity to make representations about the factual accuracy of a statutory warning before it is published. A process for representations is included in the clause, following the recommendations that came during pre-legislative scrutiny. The commission has said that it will consult on and publish guidance on how it will use the official warning power before the power commences.
The hon. Member for Hove asked about the balance between the Charity Commission as friend versus the Charity Commission as regulator. I think we all agree that the commission needed to improve its regulatory performance on compliance and enforcement—the National Audit Office made that point—but that is not to belittle its other important regulatory functions, such as registration, guidance and permissions. We agree with Stuart Etherington of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations that in the past the commission sometimes blurred the distinction between being the regulator and being a friend of the sector. Getting the balance right is not particularly easy, but I am confident that the commission’s current leadership will try. The lack of guidance would create risk for the sector, but the commission’s guidance is well regarded and much has been done to simplify it.
The hon. Member for Ilford North briefly mentioned the commission’s need for extra resources to do its job. It has said that the powers would help it to undertake its compliance and enforcement work more efficiently, which is one of the reasons why we are introducing them. Gaps and weaknesses in the commission’s existing legal powers have occasionally frustrated its efforts to tackle abuse, resulting in delays and wasted costs that the Bill will help to minimise. We are helping the commission to become more efficient and to use its resources better than in the past.
A wider point was made about the amount of money that the Charity Commission receives. Obviously, all parts of Government need to contribute toward efficiency, and that includes the Charity Commission just as much as everyone else. Nevertheless, we recognise the need for targeted additional resources. In October we announced an extra £1 million of funding for 2015-16 and a further £8 million in capital investment between now and March 2017. That will be spent on technology and front-line operations, which will allow the commission to deploy its resources more effectively to prioritise its work.
I am sorry, but I do not support amendment 2. I hope the hon. Member for Redcar will understand that in practice, in the vast majority of cases, the commission will give sufficient notice, which I would expect to be 14 days. That will be set out in guidance that will enable some flexibility for particularly urgent cases. On that basis, I hope that she will not push the amendment to a vote.
I thank the Minister and everyone who participated in the debate. There is a wealth of experience in this room from within the sector and on the frontline, which does credit to this place and has informed the debate. I echo colleagues’ sentiments about charities’ fantastic work in local communities, in particular their work with the most deprived in some our most challenged communities. We appreciate the work that trustees do and the value that they provide while giving up so much precious time. In the spirit of working with the Government on the Bill, we hope that it will, through better support and guidance, allow trustees and charities to develop their role and create a better regulatory environment.
I am reassured by everything the Minister has said, but we will continue to want to iron out some issues throughout the Bill’s proceedings. While the vast majority of charities abide by the regulations and work incredibly hard to fulfil the criteria, I agree that our attitude cannot be that charities can do no wrong. Equally, our attitude cannot be that charities can do no right. Charities may have felt somewhat beleaguered over the past few months as a result of some media campaigns, so it is important that we send a message that we want to support them in doing the right thing. Some concerns remains, however. The Minister said “proportionate” a lot, and we are putting a lot of trust in the Charity Commission to decide what is proportionate. While I welcome his notification that the commission will set out in guidance the timeframe for issuing warnings, I look forward to seeing the detail.
The Opposition’s amendment specifies a 14-day window before a warning notice could be issued. Is my hon. Friend aware that several voices in the voluntary sector say that that does not go far enough, but that what she has proposed is a sensible compromise that gives flexibility and fair notice?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We received many representations from the charity sector suggesting that 28 days was the preferred option. We thought that 14 days was sufficient to give people the chance to notify trustees and to take immediate action to challenge concerns. The amendment is fair and I hope that the commission will consider our 14-day proposal as a good timeframe when setting out its guidance, so we look forward to seeing the detail.
I also look forward to exploring some of the Minister’s examples of when action must be swift and what steps the commission will take in such circumstances. I am also glad that the sector will be able to contribute during the consultation period. In the light of the safeguard of this being proposed by the commission and the constructive discussion with the Minister, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 1, page 2, line 15, at end insert—
‘(2) In Schedule 6 to the Charities Act 2011 (appeals and applications to Tribunal) insert in the appropriate place—
“Decision of the Commission to issue a warning under section 75A to a charity trustee, trustee for a charity or a charity | The persons are— (a) the charity trustees of the charity; and (b) (if a body corporate) the charity itself. | Power to quash the decision and (if appropriate) remit the matter to the Commission.”’ |
The Government have been reducing access to judicial review proceedings, which is another reason why this is of particular concern.
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. We know that judicial review is pretty much inaccessible without legal assistance, and that cuts to legal aid have had a hugely detrimental impact on people who are trying to access justice.
The hon. Lady is making a good point. Doe she agree that perhaps the best way to tackle that problem is through guidance from the Charity Commission? If the Care Quality Commission issues a warning, there is no formal way to appeal against it, but in the guidelines there is a 10-day period in which representations can be made to the CQC, which happens all the time. Then the CQC, having read the representations and at its discretion, can withdraw its warning.
The hon. Gentleman makes an excellent comparison, but what happens if, at the end of that representation, the Charity Commission does not agree? Where is the right of redress or recourse after that? Judicial review is too large, bureaucratic and expensive. It is a complex, time and resource-intensive activity that is largely inaccessible without legal assistance. It is widely known as the remedy of last resort for public body decisions when all other avenues of appeal have been exhausted.
There may be a perception among the public that charities should not use their funds to pursue judicial review applications, in particular in the light of some of what we have seen in the media in the last few days about how charities spend their money, which goes against the grain of what we are trying to encourage. It has been said that if it were possible to appeal against a warning, the commission might be reluctant to issue warnings full stop, as there would be a risk that appeal after appeal would gum up the system. This implies an awareness that judicial review is not really a remedy, as it so much more costly, complex and inaccessible than an appeal to the tribunal. In any event, research suggests that of the 103 inquiries opened by the commission between April 2014 and April 2015, no more than 5% were appealed to the tribunal, which is not a significant proportion. If the warning power is meant to be only for low-level issues but could precipitate adverse publicity—we have already discussed that at some length this morning—and the exercising of the commission’s protective powers, it is illogical that it should be more difficult to challenge than the exercising of the commission’s more extensive regulatory powers, such as the power to remove trustees, which can be challenged in the tribunal.
It is also worth noting that there seems to be confusion over whether the warning power can be used for low-level or medium-level concerns. When the power was first suggested, the Cabinet Office said that it would be for medium-range abuses, for which the commission’s protective powers could be used but it is not likely to be proportionate to do so. Yet the explanatory notes to the Bill say that it will be used where the risks are relatively low. There is still a huge lack of clarity about the difference between a medium-range and a low-level concern. The possible implications of a warning, as we know, are harsh for low-level matters, so it is important that charities have a right of redress and recourse to a tribunal. Without it, they might be unable to disprove what could potentially be false allegations. We also want to ensure that the Charity Commission considers warnings extremely seriously before issuing them.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her explanation of this amendment. I have already explained our thinking behind the official warning power at some length, and I do not intend to repeat it now, the Committee will be relieved to hear. I will try to be brief, but I do want to explain our thinking on why we propose relying on a representations process and judicial review as the means to challenge an official warning, rather than a right of appeal to the tribunal.
To use a footballing analogy, I consider official warnings to be like a yellow card, whereas statutory inquiry and the corrective and remedial powers that follow are more of a red card. It is absolutely right that the commission’s protective and remedial powers are subject to rights of appeal to the charity tribunal, but I do not accept that the warning power is in the same category.
Clause 1 provides for the commission to give notice of its intention to issue an official warning and for a period for representations to be made, which the Charity Commission will be obliged to consider before deciding whether to proceed with issuing the official warning. There is then the option of judicial review of the commission’s decision. We consider that that is proportionate in the sort of low-level yellow-card cases in which an official warning would be issued. It is exactly the same as the current position when the commission publishes details of its operational compliance case reports into non-inquiry cases that have attracted public interest and highlight important lessons for charity trustees.
The problem the commission currently has is that in between 20% and 30% of those non-inquiry cases, its advice and guidance is simply ignored, or the issues are not rectified in full. We believe that a right to appeal an official warning to the charity tribunal would be disproportionate and could render the power impractical for its intended purpose, which is to enable the commission to respond proportionately to the low-level non-compliance, misconduct or mismanagement that sometimes take place. The commission has told me that the resources required to defend tribunal proceedings would be disproportionate to the issues at stake in official warning cases, rendering the official warning power unusable from the commission’s perspective. The last thing I want to do, as I have said, is to give the Charity Commission powers that it cannot use because they are too bureaucratic, and that it could be criticised for failing to exercise several years down the line.
The Joint Committee on the draft Bill looked at the issue in some detail and agreed with us, stating:
“Although we note the arguments by some that the issue of a warning should be subject to appeal to the Tribunal, we see the practical difficulty this would present to the Commission as disproportionate to the benefits of doing so. On the assumption that the Government agrees to our recommendation that the necessary details be added to the face of the Bill, we are satisfied that the issuance of a warning does not need the further safeguard of an appeal beyond the ability to seek judicial review.”
It is important to point out that if the Charity Commission sought to escalate matters when an official warning had been ignored, by opening a statutory inquiry, the opening of the statutory inquiry would itself be subject to a right of appeal to the charity tribunal. Similarly, if the commission were to exercise one of its protective or remedial powers, that would also be subject to a right of appeal to the charity tribunal, so there are already two layers of appeal rights when a statutory inquiry is involved. It would seem wrong to add another layer of appeal to the tribunal in the case of an official warning, which could be used to frustrate commission regulatory action.
The Charity Commission has a high success rate on appeal—there were no successful appeals to the tribunal against the commission’s decisions to open a statutory inquiry in 2014-15. That shows that the concerns that some have expressed about the commission’s decision making are not based on reality. The issue for the commission is the amount of work and time that each tribunal case takes, even when it does not have merit. In 2012-13 appeals were made to the tribunal in five cases, and in 2014-15 appeals were made in 32 cases. The judicial review system is much better set up for setting right genuine wrongs, while discouraging or disposing of cases that are unmeritorious or that have been brought with the calculation that delay through litigation is the best tactic for avoiding robust regulation.
The requirement in clause 16, which I urge members of the Committee to look at if they have time, for a review of the legislation to begin within three years of enactment, will provide a timely opportunity to review the commission’s exercise of the official warning power and any judicial reviews of its exercise of that power.
The hon. Member for Redcar made a couple of brief points, one of which was about judicial review being costly and inaccessible. The administrative court judicial review system is much better set up for dealing with the concerns that are expressed—for putting right genuine wrongs, as I have mentioned—because there is a filter system. The tribunal, unlike judicial review, does not have a filter system in which the court’s permission to go ahead is sought. Cage is a recent example. The High Court refused permission on two of the three grounds, avoiding the spending of significant amounts of time on complex human rights arguments that were not arguable.
As for costs, a system such as that of the High Court, where costs are usually paid by the loser to the winner, can act as a sensible deterrent, encouraging parties on both sides to act reasonably and in accordance with the overriding objective.
Another question from the hon. Lady was whether the provision amounts to a direction power. The answer is no, it does not. An official warning is not the same as a direction power. The Government agreed with the Joint Committee’s recommendation to set out more detail in the Bill about the content of an official warning, including that the commission should specify how a charity should rectify any breach.
In some cases, such as a failure to file accounts, it will be obvious how a breach can be rectified. In others it will be less clear, and it is important for the commission to be able to set out guidance on the actions it considers necessary to remedy a breach. Ultimately, however, it will be for the charity’s trustees to decide how they will remedy a breach and then to demonstrate that they have done so effectively. A warning cannot force charities to take a particular course of action.
I think I dealt earlier with why there is no appeal in relation to warnings, so I shall not do that now. I hope that the hon. Lady will be persuaded to withdraw the amendment on the basis of my response.
I thank the Minister for his thorough and helpful response. Again, we will not press the matter to a vote, but we still have significant concerns. As a football fan I liked the Minister’s metaphor about yellow cards, but with a yellow card there is no immediate repercussion other than having to be a bit more careful about the next tackle. For a charity, there are potentially quite damaging repercussions of a warning, particularly given the public notification. There could be an impact on a charity’s ability to fundraise, its reputation and its ability to find trustees. Those are wide-ranging implications, and something of such seriousness needs to be able to be challenged.
We still have not come to a conclusion on that point. I take the Minister’s point about the lack of error making so far in the Charity Commission’s decisions, and I commend it for that, but that is not to say that it will always be perfect. The point about warnings is that they are more low-level, so the likelihood of error is going to be substantially lower. As yet, there is no means of redress, other than judicial review, if a warning has been incorrectly given or if it is subsequently found that the Charity Commission did not abide by due process. Judicial review seems hugely disproportionate, particularly in the case of smaller charities, for what seems like the small issue of a warning. There ought to be proper discussion about different means of redress and a way of allowing a charity to challenge the Charity Commission formally.
We will not press the amendment to a vote, and I appreciate the Minister’s point that the Commission will be setting out further information in its guidance. I also welcome the Minister’s acknowledgement that the Charity Commission cannot force charities to take a particular course of action on the back of a warning. That is a welcome message to the sector. Of course, people will want to rectify any errors or issues that have led to a warning being given. I am sure many will want to guard their ability to decide the future of their charity and not be directed on how to run it by the Charity Commission. I look forward to seeing more from the Charity Commission on how it intends to ensure that.
We look forward to working through further clarification away from the statute book, but on the basis of the Minister’s comments I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
As I said earlier, we will not be having a debate on clause 1 stand part.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Investigations and power to suspend
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2 sets out the powers for the Charity Commission to take action where a charity fails to remedy a breach as specified under a warning. Our amendment 3 sought to ensure that where a warning had been challenged through the charity tribunal the charity was not automatically able to take action under clause 2. Given that we withdrew our previous amendment, I decided not to move amendment 3, because it was pursuant on a charity tribunal.
My apologies, Mrs Main. I missed that—it was all too quick for me. I am a bear with a slow brain.
Clause 3 enables the Charity Commission to take account of a person’s other relevant conduct outside of the charity under inquiry. The provision will enable the commission to consider whether there is evidence of misconduct or mismanagement in other charities or conduct outside charities that could undermine public trust and confidence in charities and therefore ought to be taken into consideration before the commission determines how to act.
On the face of it, that appears to be a very broad power, but it is not. There are significant safeguards, which I will set out. First, there must be a statutory inquiry open into charity A of which the person is a trustee or employee and the Charity Commission must be satisfied that there is misconduct or mismanagement linked to that individual in charity A before it can consider any of their conduct outside the charity as a makeweight in its decision-making. Secondly, the commission, when exercising its powers, must provide a statement of reasons under section 86 of the Charities Act 2011, which would set out all the evidence it relied on in making the decision. This would include any evidence from outside the charity, which must, of course, be relevant evidence. Finally, there is a right of appeal to the charity tribunal in relation to the exercise of the commission’s compliance and remedial powers, ensuring judicial oversight of the exercise of the relevant power.
The Charity Commission could only take account of conduct that would be relevant to the management or administration of a charity and would have to set out in its statement of reasons, under section 86 of the Charities Act 2011 or under the new official warning power in clause 1, the conduct that it was taking into account in decisions to exercise any compliance powers. The Charity Commission would not be able to take into account any conduct that was not relevant to the management or administration of a charity.
Let me give an example of when the commission would expect to rely on this power in practice. Allegations are made against an individual who is a trustee of charity A about abuse of vulnerable beneficiaries in a charitable care home. The Charity Commission opens a statutory inquiry and determines that there has been misconduct by the trustee. During the course of the commission’s inquiry, other regulators provide the commission with evidence of past misconduct that resulted in the individual’s employment in a care home being terminated. The commission would be able to take this other evidence into account before making a decision on what action would be proportionate in the circumstances.
As things stand, the commission would be able to give no weight to this other evidence of unacceptable conduct. Another example could involve an individual who is a trustee of two charities, charity X and charity Y. He may have been involved in misconduct in charity X and the commission may have already taken action in relation to charity X. The regulator may then have concerns about similar misconduct taking place in charity Y but, as the law stands, the commission cannot take into account the individual’s track record from charity X. This provision would enable the commission to do so.
We made amendments to the Bill in the other place to modernise the language of this provision and others in the Charities Act 2011. These changes were suggested by Lord Hope of Craighead, who chaired the Joint Committee and is a former deputy President of the Supreme Court. He argued, rightly, that there is no place in the 21st century for the term “privy to”. It was used in the Bill and the 2011 Charities Act to identify trustees who knew about misconduct or mismanagement but turned a blind eye. We have now replaced the term “privy to” with,
“knew of the conduct and failed to take any reasonable step to prevent it”.
That is much better for the understanding of the lay reader of the legislation, which is something we must bear in mind when we consider that trustees are almost all volunteers. This clause makes sensible changes that will help the commission with its compliance casework, and I commend it the Committee.
I thank the Minister for that thorough and detailed explanation. He will be aware that we have tabled no amendments to this clause because we fully support it. It has been through a great deal of pre-legislative scrutiny and scrutiny in the other place, so we support that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Power to remove trustees etc following an inquiry
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4 basically does two things. First, it amends the existing power in section 79 of the Charities Act 2011 to allow the Charity Commission, in the course of an inquiry, to establish a scheme in relation to a charity. A scheme is a legal document made by the commission which can amend, replace or extend the trusts of a charity. It can set out new objects and purposes for a charity or amend or remove a prohibition or restriction.
Under the current law, the Charity Commission can make a scheme only where there is evidence of misconduct or mismanagement and a need to protect charity property or secure its proper application. Clause 4 would change that so that the Charity Commission can make a scheme where there is either evidence of misconduct or mismanagement or a need to protect charity property or secure its proper application. The commission considers this change to be necessary to enable it to take action in some cases where only one of the limbs can be demonstrated, but where commission action is necessary. Let me give two examples.
As with the previous clause, we support this measure. We believe it will give the Charity Commission an important power to safeguard the integrity of a charity, particularly its public profile. Misconduct and mismanagement are extremely serious and should be taken extremely seriously. As the Minister identified, the ability to address this loophole has long been missing from the Charity Commission’s powers. Representatives of the sector have not raised concerns with us about this proposal. They understand it is an important opportunity for them to protect themselves against misuse and abuse. On that basis, we are happy to support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Power to remove disqualified trustee
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I know that my officials like to pack a lot into my speeches, so they have longer paragraphs. Obviously it is important that we have proportionality. This is the sort of issue that arises dozens of times a year, so it is a regular occurrence and we need to take action to try to control and eradicate it.
Another example might be where a charity trustee is disqualified by virtue of having been convicted of theft. The person refused to resign his position, which was problematic for the charity because it affected their quorum for business and decision-making purposes and there was no power to remove a trustee within the charity’s constitution. The trustee board is already at its maximum size and is unable to act further. This new power would allow the commission to remove the trustee so that the charity can continue to operate quickly and safely.
The commission has estimated that the power would be used dozens of times each year to remove people who were refusing to stand down even when they had been told they were disqualified. This indicates that there is an issue to deal with. It is important to equip the commission with powers to take steps to remove a disqualified trustee from their role quickly and effectively. The new power was welcomed by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and I commend it to the Committee.
I thank the Minister for that full and thorough explanation. As trustees of charities—which many members of the Committee are—many of us feel it is important to fulfil our duties fully and with confidence, should a fellow trustee board member not fulfil their duties and be disqualified as a result. The Charity Commission’s standards for disqualification are high—it has set the bar at a good level. We wholeheartedly support the clause because we think it is in the best interests of trustees around the country. They want the integrity of their boards protected, and it is important that those who have been disqualified can be removed, because trustees often do not have the ability to do so themselves. The clause gives more powers to the Charity Commission, but we wholeheartedly support them and we know it will use them wisely.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Sarah Newton.)