British Children: Syria

Debate between Andrew Murrison and Madeleine Moon

Tuesday 22nd October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

I believe that that is the case. I do not discern a dramatic difference from the approach taken by countries with which we could reasonably be compared—that is to say, the countries that we have habitually speak to in this matter. I think there is a commonality of understanding that we need to ensure that those who are most vulnerable are prioritised. That is what we are doing. My right hon. Friend refers to a process being under way. I can assure him that the UK process is under way, and it seems to be in parallel with most countries.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

I trust the Minister’s integrity and honesty, and while he has been vague about the actions that are being taken, I accept his assurance that action is being taken. But the House still requires an assurance not only that the orphans who have been identified will be repatriated, but that we will look at the children who are with their mothers, because they cannot fail to have been traumatised. I suggest that the Minister look at the work of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, which has been asked by the UN and Washington to put together a system for bringing foreign fighters to justice.

[Dr Murrison]

I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s comments. Her tone, as ever, is spot on. I agree with her; we need to apply compassion to all in this situation. We also, of course, need to bring justice to those who must be brought before the courts. I am interested in the work that she cited and will certainly take a close look at it.

US Troop Withdrawal from Northern Syria

Debate between Andrew Murrison and Madeleine Moon

Tuesday 8th October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his statement, which has been very clear. He said that the issue has now moved into diplomatic discussions; this weekend, and over the next few days, it will also be moving into parliamentary discussions, as the NATO Parliament will be meeting here in London. I assure the House that parliamentarians from across NATO—the alliance is not involved in Syria but allies within it are—will be discussing this issue and talking to the Turkish representatives and the American representatives who will be at the conference. Across Parliaments throughout the alliance, discussions such as this one are taking place, and they are so important to the sending of clear, concise messages to the Governments who will be making decisions that will impact on all our countries and on the Turkish and Kurdish communities within them.

[Dr Murrison]

I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. She serves with great distinction as chairman of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. No doubt conversations will be had over the next few days and will particularly note Turkey’s status in NATO.

UK's Nuclear Deterrent

Debate between Andrew Murrison and Madeleine Moon

Monday 18th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

My hon. Friend is right, and the speech by the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) was also extremely powerful.

The redundancy proposition holds that advancing technology will make the continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent redundant. It is supposed—despite all evidence to the contrary—that unmanned underwater vessels will appear and render our oceans transparent, but that is pure supposition. We cannot approach our defence on the basis of what might happen in the future. History is usually a guide in these matters, and this year we mark the centenary of the introduction of tanks into the battle space. We could have said then, “We must not develop this technology because of the possibility of sticky bombs and tank traps”, but we did not.

[Mrs Moon]

One lesson from history must be from Nye Bevan, who said as Foreign Secretary that he should not be sent

“naked into the conference chamber”.

What sort of emperor in new clothing would go into a conference chamber with President Putin, for example, and say, “I don’t have nuclear weapons—well, I have some nuclear-powered subs, but there are no weapons on them”?

[Dr Murrison]

The hon. Lady is right. I am enjoying the consensual nature of this debate—it is the House of Commons at its very best. In 1929, J. F. C. Fuller said that tanks would make infantry redundant. In a sense he was right, but his timeframe was completely wrong, and the infantry was adapted rather than abolished. The imminent end of manned fighters was confidently predicted in a 1957 Government White Paper. The important point, which the hon. Lady was trying to make, is that we cannot base our defence on what we imagine might happen.

The threat of cyber and of unmanned underwater vessels should invigorate our countermeasures and our attempts to detect and potentially disrupt aggressors. Nevertheless, just as the Lightning II joint strike fighter may have only half a life before it is rendered obsolescent, we must be open to the possibility that the Successor submarine may at some point over its long life be made obsolete. However, I do not think that a sufficient argument to deploy against the decision we will make today.

The second proposition that I want to touch on is that of reputation theory. The argument is that unilateralism will in some way raise our standing internationally, but that is hopelessly naive. Try saying that to people in Ukraine; try waving the Budapest memo at them. Many will say that had Ukraine not given up its share of the USSR’s nuclear armamentarium—about a third of it—when it became independent, its territory would now be assured and it would not have been invaded by Russia. I do not want to take that argument too far, because others will make counter arguments about the wisdom of Ukraine having nuclear weapons—personally, I am pleased it does not—but from the perspective of a state that is trying to face down an aggressor, that is a powerful argument.

Some say that if we cut our nuclear arsenal others will follow, but there is no evidence to suggest that that is the case. We have cut our arsenal dramatically in recent years, yet other states have increased theirs.

Finally, in this atmosphere of Brexit, when we are re-forging our links with other international organisations and operating in an outward-facing way that I find refreshing, we must think about our permanent membership of the UN Security Council. That membership is contingent on this country offering something. It may pain some right hon. and hon. Members to ponder this, but in large part our membership of that body is down to our continued possession of this terrible weapon.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Andrew Murrison and Madeleine Moon

Monday 17th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

First, it is important to say that the Government welcome the rebalancing of US forces towards the Asia-Pacific region, which is very much in line with our assessment and renewed engagement in the area. It is hoped that partner nations will make similar determinations, noting of course the US’s continuing strong engagement in Europe and the MENA—middle east and north Africa—region, with UK encouragement, and approaching collective security and defence with renewed vigour against a very unfavourable economic backdrop.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

What assessment has been made of the capacity of the Government-owned contractor-operated organisation to facilitate joint trilateral and bilateral procurement with NATO allies?

[Dr Murrison]

It should be no different from the current situation, but I am sure that the hon. Lady will support any measure we can take to improve defence deliverables and salvage the current position from the mess we inherited.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Andrew Murrison and Madeleine Moon

Monday 14th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right about this. In the short time I have been a Defence Minister, I have had the privilege of seeing the work of defence attachés in a number of countries and challenging situations. He can be assured that the Government recognise the importance of defence attachés and defence sections. He can also be assured that they will be at the front and centre of the forthcoming defence engagement strategy, which will be the blueprint for how the Government intend to take forward the extraordinarily important things that the attachés do, and the soft diplomacy in defence deliverables they are able to achieve. They will be absolutely at the front and centre.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

Ministry of Defence reports in 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2012 showed that the majority of women in the armed forces were subject to unwarranted sexual harassment. Such harassment creates a climate in which rape and sexual assault can be prevalent; it creates a climate for these things to take place. What steps is the MOD taking to protect women in the armed forces?

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Debate between Andrew Murrison and Madeleine Moon

Thursday 4th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Moon]

It worries me that our defence capability is up for sale. We are selling off some of our defence industry’s crown jewels, and selling on to potential enemies—we do not know where they will be—those capabilities at a time when we are in desperate need. I totally object to that, because anti-submarine warfare is not a relic of the cold war. If we are to protect our aircraft carriers when they are deployed in high-risk areas, who will provide the air cover? We recently lost track of a Russian submarine in the Atlantic for three weeks. We cannot rely on allies who are comparatively poorly resourced, or hope that they will buy the Nimrods, save us the money and provide us with the security.

The Nimrod’s civil use must be emphasised, too. Let us look at the history of its search and rescue capability. When the Fastnet yacht race was hit by storms in 1979, and when the Alexander Kielland oil rig overturned in the North sea, Nimrods provided vital cover. They also did so during the Piper Alpha disaster and, just recently, for the Athena fishing vessel, which needed the Nimrod’s capability because Sea King helicopters could spend only 20 minutes hovering above the vessel. We must remember that we have an international obligation to provide long-range search and rescue missions. We will not be able to adhere to the international convention on maritime search and rescue, which we signed in 1979, if we cancel the new Nimrod.

Let us also remember the use of maritime surveillance capabilities against drug smuggling, human trafficking and piracy. The new maritime patrol aircraft, of which the Nimrod was the mainstay, had the capacity to counter drug-running operations in the Caribbean, fight pirate activity in the gulf of Arabia and form a crucial part of maritime counter-terrorism operations.

It has been a long time since the Conservative Government needed to reinforce the Falkland Islands. I pay particular tribute to the speech made by the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh), who recognised the vulnerability of the Falkland Islands, particularly given the growing demand for energy. The UK’s claim to energy resources in the south Atlantic, which are being explored as we speak, must be safeguarded. The Nimrod provides the only capability that could deploy to the Falklands within 48 hours. It can provide early indicators and warnings for forces that follow. The Royal Navy would take three weeks to deploy there. That is 48 hours for a Nimrod, but three weeks for the Royal Navy.

The Nimrod MRA4 has not been cleared for overland operations, but it does have a tremendously sophisticated suite of new sensors that would make a good surveillance and support asset for land operations. I fail to see why our security and defence capability has been reduced by the removal of this asset. It has the capacity to provide maritime eyes and ears at long range—up to 4,000 miles. Where else do we have a 4,000-mile capability for intelligence? It can move very rapidly—within two hours—and with persistence it can fly for 12 hours without refuelling. No other asset has that capability.

[Dr Murrison]

The hon. Lady is making a compelling case, but will she say what elements of the defence programme she would scratch, given our unfunded liabilities, to make good the spending commitment that she is apparently making?

[Mrs Moon]

That is not a matter for me. As a member of the Defence Committee, my objective is to look at what the Government propose and ask whether they are providing the best defence and security for the UK. Removing this platform is not in the best interests of Britain’s defence and security. I defy any Member to contradict me—and the Secretary of State for Defence, who said exactly that in his letter to the Prime Minister.

I acknowledge that the procurement history of the Nimrod MRA4 has been difficult. But past problems bear no relation to the decision not to bring it to service. The Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Mid Worcestershire (Peter Luff), made it clear that the decision to cancel the project was based on the future support costs of the aircraft—not the past spend, but the future costs. Considering what we have spent on research and development, the capability that we have put in place and the versatility of the aircraft, saving the modest future running costs is short-sighted.

If we really cannot find the pocket money that we need for those running costs, why do we not at least consider mothballing rather than selling off? Let us mothball, so that when the Treasury wakes up to the enormous capabilities that we would have, it can bring the Nimrod back into operational service. In the meantime, we must make sure that we do not lose the skills of the Nimrod aviators; there must be ongoing training and skills development to make sure that the capability is retained.

The Under-Secretary also said that the Ministry of Defence had

“sought to mitigate the gap in capability”

produced by the early retirement of the Nimrod MR2, through the use of a range of other assets:

“Type 23 Frigates, Merlin Anti Submarine Warfare helicopters and Hercules C-130 aircraft, and by relying, where appropriate, on assistance from allies and partners.”—[Official Report, 28 October 2010; Vol. 517, c. 451W.]

This was meant to be a short-term solution while the new Nimrods were developed, and we now need to know what longer-term plan will be put in place. How long are we going to rely on a patchwork of aircraft to fill the gap left by the Nimrod?

The decision not to cancel the renewal of the Trident nuclear deterrent has demonstrated a belief in the need for us to maintain a constant and secure independent nuclear deterrent, yet we cannot provide the reconnaissance to ensure the safety of those submarines and of our nuclear deterrent.

We are going to get rid of the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers as well, it seems, and we are cancelling the aircraft that would defend the carriers. It does not make sense. We have talked about asymmetrical warfare and the threat to our nation from individuals and groups rather than nation states, yet we are going to reduce our capability to protect national infrastructure and essential offshore assets, particularly our energy capabilities.

The Secretary of State concluded his letter to the Prime Minister by saying:

“Cuts, there will have to be. Coherence, we cannot do without”.

Not bringing the Nimrod into service does not represent a coherent approach to the defence of our country. I hope that the Treasury will listen and that the Ministry of Defence will yet again argue for this piece of equipment so vital for our defence and security.