Britain and International Security

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I welcome my hon. Friend and parliamentary neighbour to his place in this House. He brings a wealth of experience from the armed forces and, indeed, the Ministry of Defence to debates such as this one. His question allows me to emphasise the importance of the work of other Departments. These cannot just be military solutions.

The work of the Department for International Development is extremely important and I have always seen development and defence as two sides of the same coin. The money we can spend up-front on capacity building helps to avoid a bigger financial outlay downstream. That money and the work by DFID and the Foreign Office can help prevent crises and conflicts. By strengthening countries in Africa, we can do more to discourage people from leaving them, and because today’s aid budget is much better focused, with fewer countries receiving it, it has greater impact.

We are spending some £60 million on supporting millions of people who have been displaced by ISIL/Daesh, and we have pledged £900 million to answer the specific humanitarian crisis in Syria—the biggest ever UK response to any crisis anywhere.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

The OECD is this month considering whether to re-categorise official development assistance so that it includes elements of the military, particularly peacekeeping. Would my right hon. Friend welcome that?

[Michael Fallon]

There are a number of measurements, including the OECD one and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute one. The return that I have filed on behalf of the United Kingdom is to NATO, and it complies with NATO guidelines. The House will want to know that, on the basis of that guidance, we spent 2.2% last year and expect to spend more than 2% again this year.

As well as the 4,000 service personnel committed to the operations I have described, more than 10,000 people working in defence are stationed overseas—from Brunei to the Falklands, and from Cyprus to Kenya. They delivered courses in some 15 countries last year, and we have helped to train representatives from 90 countries in our military academies. More than 1,200 naval personnel are deployed in the middle east, helping to keep our energy supplies flowing and to counter terror.

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[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

What a privilege it is to follow the hon. Member for Dundee West (Chris Law) and his excellent maiden speech. I congratulate him and wish him well in his future career and his service in this place. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Ribble Valley (Mr Evans), I do not think back much to my maiden speech—it was not a happy moment and it is something I like to forget. Making speeches is something that we do, and people tell me it gets easier—ask me in about five minutes and I will say whether it does or not.

This important debate is on a vast and complex subject, so I shall endeavour to make just a few points, mainly on NATO, foreign aid and defence spending. I agree with the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) who said we must decide what sort of country we are in our attitude to defence and security—that conversation came up at a defence event last night, and there was some consensus.

Are we just another northern European power with armed forces that are broadly defensive and engage in a limited fashion in UN peacekeeping missions or—dare I say it?—on EU missions? Or are we, as I and perhaps the majority of British people think, a global force for good with the sovereign capability to defend ourselves robustly and to project power globally in the national interest, keeping our people and streets safe wherever the next threat may come from? Even if we are the former, we must accept that such things come at a financial cost. History demonstrates time and again that our wars choose us; we do not choose them.

A myth promulgated by certain sections of the liberal media is that somehow our engagements and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were merely wars of choice. I would disagree strongly with that and say that they were undertaken with the highest, most decent and honourable motivations to protect our national security, keep our people safe, and improve world security. In my view, in order to maintain our contribution to international security, keep our people safe and maintain our place in the world, we must be prepared to invest more in our defence capability. As Denis Healey—not someone I quote often or agree with much—said in 1969:

“Once we cut defence expenditure to the extent where our security is imperilled, we have no houses, we have no hospitals, we have no schools. We have a heap of cinders.”—[Official Report, 5 March 1969; Vol. 779, c. 551.]

He was absolutely right.

The cornerstone of our defence and security policy, and our place in the world, is our membership of NATO. Let me refer to the most up-to-date figures that NATO published last week on estimated defence spending by member states in 2015. Happily, this year we will comply with our treaty obligations and spend 2.1% of GDP on defence. Astonishingly, however, the only other countries in Europe that it is estimated will spend the agreed 2% of GDP on defence to be members of NATO are Estonia, Greece and Poland.

Poland has made a big improvement on last year, stepping up to the plate having been spending only 1.8%. France spends 1.8% and Germany 1.2% of GDP, which is the same as last year. Turkey is getting close with 1.7% of GDP, but Luxembourg is expected to spend only 0.5% of GDP on defence, the lowest in NATO. The other NATO members that will spend less than 1% of GDP alongside Luxembourg are Belgium, Hungary and Spain.

We have led by example. I agree with points the Prime Minister made last September at the NATO summit in Newport when he called on NATO members that are not making their 2% of GDP contribution to spend more. The UK and the US account for almost four fifths of the total NATO defence spend. The US will pay practically 73% of NATO’s total estimated budget for 2015. The European nations cannot keep relying on the Americans to write the cheques to provide them with the personnel, kit and manpower to protect them. We are next on the list, paying 6.6%, followed by France with 4.7% and Germany with 4.2%. It is estimated that Germany is planning to spend nearly £14 billion less than us on defence. France will spend £10 billion less than us. The US is spending around £300 billion more than the UK, Germany and France put together.

The home country of the President of the European Commission, Mr Juncker, is Luxembourg. As well as spending the smallest percentage of GDP, as I have mentioned, Luxembourg provides 0.3% of the NATO budget in real terms, less than any other NATO member apart from Albania. No wonder he is constantly calling for a European army, so that other people can write the cheques and provide the manpower to protect his country.

[Dr Murrison]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that if countries want the cover, they have to be prepared to pay the premium, but does he agree that, rather than insist on 0.7% or 2% imposed by supranational organisations, we should instead focus on outputs? In other words, we should focus on effectiveness—be that international development or defence. In those respects, this country does pretty well.

[Jack Lopresti]

They are not mutually exclusive. We need a benchmark figure to show we are serious and that we are maintaining a commitment. That does not diminish the other things we do, looking for value for money and finding other avenues for defence and security, which I will come to. It is an important commitment for a nation state to say, “I belong to NATO. I get the benefits of the protection. I am prepared to make the right contribution.”

The relatively rich countries of Europe cannot expect the United States and the UK to continue to look at their defence needs. On kit, NATO already has an over- reliance on the US for the provision of essential capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, air-to-air refuelling, ballistic missile defence, airborne electronic warfare and carrier strike. That is completely unsustainable.

Obviously, the use of soft power, including the Foreign Office, the Department for International Development and the BBC World Service, is key to our national security, but they must be backed up by hard power. I was shocked and surprised when I looked at the Library figures for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, MOD and DFID. According to Treasury figures on expenditure for 2015-16, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office spend is £1.3 billion; DFID spend is £11.2 billion; and MOD spend is £42.5 billion. It seems to me that, if we are looking at soft power, influence, defence, security and our place in the world, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is woefully underfunded. Obviously, the MOD spend needs to be increased. DFID does excellent work, but we ought to consider returning to the previous model, when a large degree of that excellent work was carried out under the FCO and MOD. That would help to focus what we are doing, save the taxpayer money, avoid potential duplication and waste, and be more concentrated. We should perhaps look at getting rid of DFID as a Department and going back to having ministerial representation in the FCO and MOD.

We are still a great nation and one of the biggest defence spenders. We are one of the largest economies in the world. Owing to our history, our contribution and our unique relationship with the United States, we are a global power. We are also a nation with moral authority, recognised around the world for our rule of law, parliamentary democracy, basic freedoms and common decency. However, to remain a global force in the world, we must accept that we cannot continue to do it on the cheap. Freedom is not free, and the Government’s refusal to commit to 2% of GDP for the duration of this Parliament is troubling to say the least. Two per cent. should be not an aspiration or the maximum but the absolute line that we will not fall behind. If we did so, it would send a terrible message to our allies and our enemies.

Finally, in the words of Donald Rumsfeld, the former US Defence Secretary: “Weakness is provocative. Time and again weakness has invited adventures which strength might well have deterred.”

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[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I am pleased to follow the excellent speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (John Glen), and more particularly to follow three extraordinary maiden speeches. I congratulate their authors enormously—my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Chris Green), and the hon. Members for Dundee West (Chris Law) and for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Stuart Donaldson). I agree with the hon. Member for Dundee West in his thesis that we risk, particularly in defence and foreign policy, becoming distant and disconnected—I think those were his words—from the views of those whom we represent.

In 2003 I voted against the Iraq war, though I went on to serve in that conflict. I was conscious at the time that the Government of the day were distancing themselves, as were the official Opposition, from the views being expressed to me by my constituents. It is important, particularly in this arena, that we try to reconnect with the views of the public—the people we represent. The hon. Gentleman was quite right to underscore the dangers we face in the event that we fail to do that.

Twelve years on, we should rule nothing out in dealing with Daesh. It is indeed illogical to conduct strike missions in Iraq, yet not to contemplate doing the same in Syria against an organisation that respects no national boundaries. I suspect that we can lead public opinion on that. Where I think we may have problems is in committing boots on the ground, other than special forces. We will face grave difficulty if such strike missions succumb to mission creep. Right hon. and hon. Members will, I know, be very mindful of their duty to reflect public opinion more fully in this endeavour than perhaps we did in 2003, when this House gave the green light to an unpopular war which badly stretched the patience of the public. We must not do so again. We must reflect on the lessons of the past.

Trust and confidence were very much part of the Anderson report that we debated in this place last Thursday, and were reflected in the title of that report, “A Question of Trust”. Next Tuesday will mark the 10th anniversary of the 7/7 bombings. We can see when terrorists win, but generally not when they are foiled, yet the public do not necessarily understand—Anderson touches on this—when it is necessary to do things in their name which they do not fully understand to protect their liberty. An attack foiled is a liberty upheld.

The pre-legislative stage of the investigatory powers Bill this autumn and the passage of that Bill in advance of the axe falling on the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 in December 2016 is an opportunity to socialise, as far as prudence allows, the activity of the intelligence and security community honestly, openly and with candour. Fear of the unknown and the unseen always promotes mistrust. Reality is often rather dull, but in this context dull is good.

As defence and security face down the rather techie challenges of the future, we have to ensure that there is no 21st century equivalent of the wild west—no ungoverned space, nowhere for organised criminals and terrorists to go, no refuge for the ill-inclined state and non-state actors from where they can threaten the people whose interests we represent.

In addition to its vital inquisitorial role, I look forward to the reconstituted Intelligence and Security Committee being in the vanguard of the promotion of better public understanding of the intelligence activities carried out in their name, and reaffirming consent, reducing suspicion and improving the trust to which Anderson refers and to which the hon. Member for Dundee West alluded.

The other subject on which I think we might be at risk of parting company with the public is international development, which is a vital part of what we are debating today. Let me be clear that I, like most Members of the House, support spending substantial sums of money on international development, because it is right that we do so. I support the Government’s spending of £11.7 billion on aid.

Conflict states do not meet millennium development goals, and states cannot attain prosperity without stability. It follows that if we are serious about international development, we have to be serious about the kind of contribution that our armed forces can make to stability and up-stream conflict prevention. It is strange that we cannot count the cost of the 500 British servicemen in Kabul who are training up security forces simply because they are part of the military and the OECD does not recognise soldiers. It appears that we count finding mates for lovelorn tropical fish in Madagascar as aid, but not squaddies teaching Afghans how to prevent their country from collapsing into civil war. That is clearly wrong.

I am pleased that the OECD is this month belatedly considering its rules for official development assistance—ODA. Perhaps it is time for a parallel system: it has been called total official support for sustainable development, known as TOSSD—acronyms in this field are rarely attractive—which would encompass some element of peacekeeping and up-stream conflict prevention. I think that is well worth considering. The Prime Minister has said that he is open to spending more aid on peacekeeping and security, and he is right to do so. The vehicle is the highly successful conflict pool, which it seems would be far better aligned with TOSSD than ODA, and much easier to sell to a sceptical British public.