National Security and Investment Bill (Twelfth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Andrew Griffith
Main Page: Andrew Griffith (Conservative - Arundel and South Downs)Department Debates - View all Andrew Griffith's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
National Security and Investment Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Andrew Griffith ExcerptsThursday 10th December 2020
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 View all National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 10 December 2020 - (10 Dec 2020)
Chi Onwurah
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention, which I think was made in the proper spirit of the Committee, by seeking to improve the Bill, help the Secretary of State, and help those who will be affected by the Bill to understand it. The hon. Gentleman is quite right that there is a trade-off.
During the expert evidence sessions, we heard both from those who felt that there should be a definition of national security and from those who felt that there should not. However, if my memory serves me, they all tended to agree that there should be greater clarity about what national security could include. For example, Dr Ashley Lenihan of the London School of Economics said:
“What you do see in regulations is guidance as to how national security risk might be assessed or examples of what could be considered a threat to national security.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 38, Q42.]
We also heard that in the US the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 2018 provides for a “sense of Congress” on six factors that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the President may consider—the term “may” is used well here—in assessing national security: countries of specific concern; critical infrastructure, energy assets and critical material; a history of compliance with US law; control of US industries that affect US capacity to meet national security requirements, which is very important; personally identifiable information; and potential new cyber-security vulnerabilities.
My argument is that if we look at examples from elsewhere, we see indications of what can be included in national security without having a prescriptive definition. That is exactly what the new clause tries to set out. It states:
“When assessing a risk to national security, the Secretary of State may have regard to factors including”,
and then it gives a list of factors, which I shall detail shortly.
The question, “What is national security?” is entirely unanswered, for Parliament, for businesses looking for clarity, for citizens looking for reassurance, and if hostile actors are seeking to take advantage of any loopholes in how the Secretary of State construes national security. I do have sympathy with the argument that we should not be prescriptive and limit the Secretary of State’s flexibility to act by setting down a rigid definition of national security that rules things out. That is the spirit of the new clause. It does not rule out the Secretary of State’s flexibility or set a rigid definition; it simply does what other countries have done well, as our experts witnesses have said, by giving a guide on some factors that the Government might consider, while allowing many more to be included in national security assessments. This is critical in order to give greater clarity to businesses puzzled by the Government’s very high-level definitions of espionage, disruption or inappropriate leverage.
Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)
The hon. Lady appears to be advancing two arguments simultaneously. On the one hand, I understand the argument about clarity, which is indeed something that many people would look for in this Bill. However, she also talks about flexibility and that we should not seek to tie the Secretary of State down to a particular, prescriptive definition at any point in time, which I think members on both sides of the Committee would agree on. Given that, I am genuinely confused as to why she would seek to advance this new clause, although I find its actual wording wholly unobjectionable. Perhaps the Minister will reply on this topic, because I think the record of these proceedings could provide that clarity without needing to press the amendment to a vote.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, which I found very helpful. If he believes me to be presenting both sides of the argument at once, perhaps that is because the Minister has been doing the very same thing so often during the past few sittings. As the Minister has often said, there is a balance to be sought between flexibility for the Secretary of State and clarity for the business community and other communities. This new clause goes exactly to the point made by the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs, and strikes that balance. That is why—I will say it again—the new clause does not prescribe what national security is, but it does not leave a vacuum into which supposition, uncertainty and confusion can move.
The new clause gives greater clarity to citizens worried about whether Government will act to protect critical data transfers or our critical national infrastructure. Are those areas part of our national security, even though they are not covered by the Government’s proposed 17 sectors? The new clause provides assurance in that case and—this is important—sends a message to hostile actors that we will act to protect British security through broad powers applied with accountability. It should be clear that we also need to consider how this Bill will be read by the hostile actors against whom we are seeking to protect our nation, and this new clause will send a clearer message as to what may be included in that.
The factors highlighted in this new clause are comparable to guidance provided in other affected national security legislation, most notably the US’s Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 2018. Paragraph (a) would protect our supply chains and sensitive sites, in addition to acting against the disruption, espionage and inappropriate leverage highlighted in the Government’s statement of policy intent. We have heard from experts, and have also seen from very recent history—namely, that of our 5G network—that our strategic security depends not only on businesses immediately relevant to national security, but on the full set of capabilities and supply chains that feed into those security-relevant businesses. We cannot let another unforeseen disruption, whether pandemic or otherwise, disrupt our access to critical supply.
Paragraphs (b) and (c) look strategically at our national security, not with a short-term eye. We have heard consistently from experts that national security and economic security are not altogether separate. Indeed, they cannot be separated; they are deeply linked. A national security expert told us that a narrow focus on direct technologies of defence was mistaken and that instead we should look to the “defence of technology”. That was a very appropriate phrase, meaning not specific technologies of defence, but defence of technologies that seem economically strategic today and might become strategic for national security tomorrow.
Peter Grant
I am grateful again for those comments. The hon. Lady has referred again to what is in the explanatory notes. Unless somebody has changed the rules, the explanatory notes are not part of the eventual Act of Parliament. In borderline cases, they may be used by a court to help to interpret what the intention of Parliament was when it passed a Bill, but as a general rule, the intention of Parliament is stated by the words in the Act as it is passed. If it does not say in the Act that a Secretary of State can take those factors into account, there will be an argument that will have to be heard and tried in court, if need be, that a Secretary of State should not have taken those factors into account.
Andrew Griffith
I do not know how familiar the hon. Gentleman is with the process by which the courts look at the definitions for judicial review, but one of the dangers of trying to write them down—I accept that it is “may” language, not “must”—is that the court will look at them. We could inadvertently circumscribe the degree to which the Act can be used. I know that is not the hon. Gentleman’s intention, but I have to say that, in practice—he might be familiar with how the courts work, particularly for judicial review—that is absolutely a legitimate consideration. That is one of the reasons why I would argue that the new clause should not be accepted.
Peter Grant
I hear what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but I am also looking at the following words:
“factors including, but not restricted to”.
Are those words completely without meaning? If they are, why is it that the Library has dozens, if not hundreds, of pieces of legislation currently in force that have those exact words included in them? Those words are there explicitly to make sure that the list is not intended to be comprehensive. The fact that the word “may” is in there is because it allows the Secretary of State to take the factors into account, but it does not require them to do it in circumstances where it is not appropriate.
The final aspect that I want to look at is the very last factor in new clause 1: money laundering. Everybody knows that money laundering is bad and that it is a threat to our economy; it is a threat to honest businesses and all the rest of it. If the only concern that the Secretary of State had about an acquisition was that it was intended to facilitate large-scale money laundering in the United Kingdom, can we be sure that a court would accept that, and that alone, as evidence of a threat to our national security? I hope it would. The way to make sure it would is to put it in the Bill right now.
We know there are very strong connections between the acquisition of huge amounts of property, particularly in London, by people who got rich very quickly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, large-scale money laundering and organised crime, with the money sometimes being laundered through London, and the growing effectiveness of the threat that the present Russian regime poses to our national security. The Intelligence and Security Committee report from about a year ago highlighted that very clearly.
We know that money laundering can become part of—[Interruption.]
Peter Grant
I am pleased to speak to the two new clauses, which stand in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South. Throughout our debate on the Bill, Members have spoken—sometimes with a surprising degree of cross-party consensus—of the need to find the right balance between protecting our collective national security and allowing beneficial investment into the United Kingdom to continue. New clauses 2 and 3 aim to give some recognition to the fact that among the Bill’s potential detrimental effects may well be a disproportionate detrimental impact on smaller businesses and early start-up ventures.
Smaller businesses often lack the resources to have their own in-house team of lawyers or other trade law experts, and they certainly cannot afford the services of the very experienced experts that gave evidence to the Committee a few weeks ago. They may be more adversely affected than a bigger business would be by delays in bringing in investment, because they do not have the same resources to fall back on. Compared with bigger businesses that may have more international connections, smaller businesses are unlikely to be as well informed about which possible investors or partners are likely to raise security concerns. There is a danger that small businesses could commit time and resources to negotiating deals, acquisitions, mergers or investments that a bigger business with a more global perspective would immediately know were non-starters. Small businesses may spend a lot of time on abortive deals and negotiations.
All the way through, I have said that these things may happen. I am not trying to reignite arguments about “may” and “must”, but at the moment nobody really knows what the impact of the legislation will be. We cannot possibly know until it has been in place for a few months, or possibly even a bit longer. What we do know is that when this legislation comes into force, we will rely massively on the growth of existing small businesses and the launch of new ones to drive our post-covid recovery. Big businesses will not do it, and they certainly will not do it on their own. We have all got a responsibility to avoid putting unnecessary obstacles in the way of small businesses who want to start to grow. If we do find that we have unintentionally put those obstacles in the way, we need to be able to remove them.
New clause 2 makes two simple requests—it has two simple requirements. The first is that the Secretary of State reports back to Parliament on impacts the Act has had on small and medium-sized enterprises and early-stage ventures, giving Parliament the chance—should it need it—to consider whether we have created unintended barriers to small businesses. The second requirement is for the Secretary of State to provide guidance to those same companies to give them a bit more certainty about what they need to do to stay on the right side of the law without having to spend money on expensive consultants or legal experts.
New clause 3 tries to minimise the potential damage that the Act could do to small businesses, particularly in the early days when they may be unused to some of the impacts. Clause 32 creates a new offence of completing a notifiable acquisition without reasonable excuse and without the proper authority of the Secretary of State. New clause 3 seeks to recognise that small businesses in particular may find themselves in the wrong side of that clause in the early days of the legislation, not through any malice or wilful neglect, but simply through ignorance, lack of experience or being too busy trying to run their business to be keeping an eye on what is happening in the Houses of Parliament. New clause 3 would effectively provide a grace period of six months in which a small business can put forward the fact that the legislation is new to be taken as a reasonable excuse, which would mean that neither they nor the directors were liable to criminal prosecution. It is critically important to bear in mind that nothing in new clause 3 would do anything whatever to dilute or reduce the effectiveness of the Bill in doing what it is supposed to do. It would not have any impact on the ability of the Secretary of State to take action to protect our national security. It would not have any impact on the exercise of powers either to block an acquisition or merger or to impose conditions on it, should that be necessary. It would not change the fact that if a small business during that six-month period completes an acquisition that should not have been completed, that acquisition would be just as void under the law as any other acquisition.
I understand that new clause 3 is a slightly unusual clause for a piece of legislation, but it would allow us to make sure that the Bill continues to protect national security to the fullest extent it can, but at the same time that we do not have businesses being scared to act in case they end up on the wrong side of the law. We would not have the possibility of the courts having to take up time dealing with prosecutions of small businesses or directors who genuinely meant no harm, but who just—
Andrew Griffith
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s conversion to the zealous promotion of free enterprise and the cause of small businesses, but would he extend his support to any new taxation measures, new business regulation or employment measures that are advanced by the Government? While I support the thrust, the principle and the philosophy from which he clearly speaks, I do worry that the new clause could create somewhat of a precedent, and I am not sure that all of his colleagues have fully thought through the profound implications for the application of the law on business in this land.
Peter Grant
I can assure the hon. Gentleman that I have been a supporter of small businesses significantly longer than he has perhaps. I did make it clear that this is a way that we can protect small businesses without in any way compromising the integrity of the Bill. There is nothing in the new clause that will in any way weaken the effectiveness of the Bill and protecting our national security. I would be happy at another time to debate the reasons why, for example, employment measures in Scotland should be taken by the Parliament and Government elected by the people of Scotland rather than somewhere down here, but that is not a debate for today. I expect, Sir Graham, that neither you nor anybody else would be too pleased if we started to take up time this afternoon on that subject.
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Opposition’s new clause 5 deals with high- and low-risk acquirers. It would require the Secretary of State to maintain a list of hostile actors, including potential hostile states and allied actors, to allow different internal security to be applied based on the characteristics of the actors linked to the acquirer. I will attempt to explain the exact thinking behind the proposal.
There has been widespread agreement inside and outside the Committee that we face a geopolitical context in which many—if not all—threats emanate from a set of hostile actors or states. In fact, the Government’s statement of policy intent for the Bill recognises that
“national security risks are most likely to arise when acquirers… owe allegiance to hostile states”.
Throughout this process, the Committee has heard from various experts, including experts on China, as well as from lawyers, intelligence chiefs and think-thank experts. They have told us that origin and state of origin should be important drivers of national security screening processes. Indeed, a number of our allies—most notably, the US—exempt some countries, including Canada, Australia and the UK, from some of the most stringent mandatory notification requirements, and include country of origin among the factors to be considered in assessing security.
In that context, it is perhaps quite concerning that the Minister and the Government have not caught up or been thinking about that. In previous expositions, they have simply maintained that national security is not dependent on a particular country. When we debated a similar provision earlier in this process, I think the Minister said the Government were “agnostic” about the country of origin. That could be a mistake, because national security is not exclusively dependent on a single country. It is short-sighted and, frankly, dangerous, not to see threats that are materially country-specific.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said, the former head of MI6 told the Committee that, essentially, we need to wake up to the strategic challenge posed by China in particular. I will explore that a little more with some specific examples from around the world of China beginning to tap into start-ups long before they are mature enough to be acquired. In Sweden, for example, between 2014 and 2019, China’s buyers acquired 51 Swedish firms and bought minority stakes in 14 additional firms. In fact, the acquisitions included some 100 subsidiaries.
More worryingly, in 2018, Chinese outfits, two of them linked to the Chinese military, bought three cutting-edge Swedish semiconductor start-ups. There is the 2017 example of Imagination Technologies—a top British chipmaker—which was acquired by a firm owned by a state-controlled Chinese investment group. Before that, a Chinese firm also bought KUKA, a leading German industrial robot-maker.
Andrew Griffith
Although this is interesting, I fear we are drifting a tiny bit off the new clause, which does not refer to geography. Given the Opposition’s desire to continue to shade in any ambiguity with greater clarity and the definition in new clause 5, will the hon. Gentleman give his definition of what “regular” would constitute?
Sam Tarry
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. The word “regular” would clearly need to be defined in a way that did not overburden the new part of the Department that would oversee the regime, but that would provide the information on a basis that enabled the Minister to make decisions, and to be scrutinised on those decisions regularly enough that the regime was effective and did not lead to oversights.