NHS Federated Data Platform

Andrew George Excerpts

Thursday 16th April 2026 Westminster Hall

[Martin Wrigley]

I agree with the hon. Lady entirely. The secret meeting in 2019 between Boris Johnson and Dominic Cummings and Peter Thiel—the founder and chair of Palantir—that started this whole thing, for which there are no minutes, must be clarified as well.

I ask the Minister to consider using the contract renewal point to stop the chaotic expansion of the Palantir platform monopoly, to work to a staged exit with a retender for British companies to build a replacement for Palantir, and to deliver a better, long-term solution providing British sovereign capabilities in line with principles outlined by the Science and Research Minister and the Prime Minister.

The current contract delivers a subscription service that leaves no deliverables after the subscription—no software, no improvements and no intellectual property after spending more than £330 million. All the specially written software and intellectual property rights belong to the supplier, says the contract. All the rights to any know-how are explicitly retained by the supplier and not passed across on termination of the contract. The contract delivers no software—not one line—just a subscribed service; a permanent lock-in; a single point of failure.

Why are we building a leased service wrapped in glossy marketing promises, rather than a product that the NHS can own and trust? We are paying the supplier to hire Accenture, PwC, NHS experts and consultants to create a solution that we do not own—the supplier does. It uses external AI platforms from OpenAI and Anthropic and brings questionable value itself. Prior to it buying an opportunity to provide its system to help manage the data from the covid vaccine programme, the supplier had no expertise in health.

The three-year contract asks for 13 core capabilities to be delivered. According to the National Audit Office and the supplier, after nearly three years, it has partially delivered on three or four of those capabilities. Hon. Members may have received letters from the supplier, which has also taken to sponsoring newsletters that we see every day.

When in front of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, the only benefit offered by the supplier and by NHS England was an improvement in managing staff rotas to deliver a higher operation throughput, which these days can be done by a relatively simple app. That is beneficial, but it perhaps relates more to the Government’s improvements in staffing and pay than to any magic from Palantir. It claims to have achieved waiting list reductions by removing people who do not respond to messages, but there is no external scrutiny or validation of results. This is a dreadful contract, and it is not in the national interest.

[Andrew George (St Ives) (LD)]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent case. I know that, in a moment, he will come on to the point that this contract is coming to an end. I am sure that it is being reviewed by the Government—the Minister will respond on that issue—but we are encouraging them to bring the contract to a close, for the reasons that my hon. Friend is properly explaining. He will perhaps also agree that we should go through a transition period to ensure that the conditions he has described are addressed, so that the Government can benefit from the software that has been developed.

[Martin Wrigley]

I think my hon. Friend has been reading my speech in advance. I absolutely agree with him.

I see that the outgoing NHS England chief data and analytics officer, Ming Tang, has publicly joined Palantir’s fightback, saying that the system is delivering—but having introduced Palantir and lobbied to deploy it, she would say that, wouldn’t she? Given Palantir’s habit of lobbying civil servants and the revolving door from Government, I wait to see where she will end up.

I ask the Minister to review the contract, particularly in the light of the Government’s policies on investing in UK tech, value for money, technical lock-in, key performance indicators and strategic supplier status, which suppliers should have. I ask the Minister to reject extending the existing contract, which locks in the NHS forever and delivers nothing tangible.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

I was expecting a promotion there, Dame Siobhain. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I congratulate the hon. Member for Newton Abbot (Martin Wrigley) on securing the debate. He has brought forward an issue that sits right at the centre of how we shape the future of our national health service: how we use data, who we trust with it and how we ensure that technology supports care rather than complicates it.

The debate has been a thoughtful one, and in many respects it has been revealing. It has shown both the promise of the NHS federated data platform and the unease that still surrounds it. That tension really matters. I am grateful for the significant contributions we have heard from right hon. and hon. Members, with 13 coming from the Back Benches by my count. Let me start by setting out where I think there is common ground across the House.

The NHS is under enormous pressure as demand is rising, complexity is increasing and waiting lists remain too high. Too often, clinicians are working without the full picture in front of them. Anyone who has spent time in the health service knows that this is not a system that lacks dedication. It is, however, a system that too often lacks coherence. Data is part of that problem as it is scattered, fragmented and difficult to use in a joined-up way. Records do not always reliably follow the patient, and information is duplicated, delayed or simply not available when it is needed most. The consequence of that is not just theoretical; it is time lost, inefficiencies and, at times, patients not getting the care they should when they should.

The case for doing things better is a strong one; in fact, it is unavoidable. The FDP is one attempt to respond to that challenge. It seeks to bring together information in a way that allows the NHS to work more effectively, helping clinicians and supporting managers with the ultimate aim of improving care for patients. There are some early signs that this is beginning to deliver; waiting lists have been cleaned up, and some hospitals have reported better flow through theatres and wards. Those are practical improvements. As is so often the case in government, the easier question is whether something can work; the much harder question is whether it will be accepted. There are clearly concerns here.

We have heard about reluctance in part of the workforce. I am not suggesting there is uniform opposition, but there is certainly hesitation and, in some cases, disengagement. We should be careful, however, not to exaggerate that. Big reforms in the NHS have always faced resistance, often at the start. This is not necessarily something new, and on its own it is not necessarily decisive. At the same time, however, it is not irrelevant; if the people expected to use this system do not have confidence in it, its impact will always be limited. Will the Minister say what is the assessment of staff engagement with the FDP and how the Government are ensuring that this is something done with the NHS, rather than done to it? In the end, that will make the real difference.

The same issue arises with public trust. People are right to care about their medical data—it is sensitive, personal and deeply private. Once confidence is lost in this area, it is very difficult to rebuild it. There are important safeguards in place: the data remains under NHS control, the access is tightly regulated, and the provider does not own or use the data for its own purposes. The legal framework underpinning those safeguards is strong. Those are not minor points—they really matter.

However, we also have to recognise something else. People are not just asking whether the system is safe today, but what it enables tomorrow. Could the data be combined in ways that reveal more than people expect? Could systems evolve in ways not originally intended? Could future Governments choose to use the capability in different ways? Those are not unreasonable questions; they are the natural questions people ask when large new systems are created. Again, I ask the Minister what more will be done to reassure the public about the limits of how NHS data can be used and whether he can set out clearly where parliamentary oversight comes in if the use of data is expanded in the future. Trust is not built by reassurance alone; it is built by clarity and restraint.

A significant part of this debate has understandably focused on Palantir, and it is right that it has. Palantir is now a major supplier within the NHS data infrastructure as well as elsewhere across Government, and that raises legitimate questions about not just capability but dependence. For some the concern is political, while for others it is about principle. For many, though, it is something much more practical: what happens if we become too reliant on a single provider for something as critical as health data infrastructure? I think that is a fair question.

However, we should also separate those questions from the broader argument about the company’s international work. In a global economy, companies will inevitably work with different Governments, and that alone is not a sufficient reason to exclude them from public contracts in the UK. The question of procurement design, competition and resilience, however, is a different matter.

[Andrew George]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I will not. I want the Minister to have sufficient time to respond to the multiple contributions there have been today.

I ask the Minister the following questions. How are the Government ensuring that the NHS is not locked into a single supplier over the long term? What is the plan for maintaining genuine competition in this space? How easy would it be in practical terms to move to an alternative system if that was ever required?

There is then the issue of resilience. Some have argued that the FDP creates a single point of failure, while others have argued that the current fragmented system is itself a weakness and that greater coherence improves security and oversight. Both arguments deserve to be taken seriously. But practical questions remain: how resilient is this system to cyber-attacks or technical failure? What safeguards are in place? What happens if something goes wrong at scale?

The last matter I wish to address is that of governance. With the abolition of NHS England, there is now a question about where the responsibilities for the FDP properly sit. That matters because accountability cannot be diffuse. I take this opportunity to ask the Minister: who is responsible for the programme now, where does that accountability lie, and how will Parliament be able to scrutinise its performance going forward?

Better use of data has a real role to play in NHS reform, and the FDP may well prove to be part of that answer. Success will depend on more than just delivery; it will depend on confidence within the system: confidence from clinicians that the system helps rather than hinders them, confidence from patients that their data is properly protected and confidence from the public that our decisions are transparent, proportionate and properly accountable. If those conditions are met, this reform can succeed. If they are not, even the best designed system will struggle. We, as His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, will support what improves care and welcome what works, but will continue to ask questions that ensure reform is done properly in a way that sustains public trust. I look forward to the Minister’s response.