Advanced Research and Invention Agency Bill (Fifth sitting)

Amanda Solloway Excerpts

Thursday 22nd April 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Amanda Solloway)]

May I start by saying what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg? I wish my colleague the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central well. In fact, I was just reflecting that if we were on the Star Trek Enterprise, we could have beamed her up and Dr McCoy could have sorted her out.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for her very kind remarks. I probably should have said earlier that the NHS, and the Royal Free Hospital, which treated me, showed all the support, kindness and innovation that Bones in “Star Trek” would have done.

[The Chair]

We need to come back to the business now.

[Amanda Solloway]

I add my appreciation for the NHS as well. I welcome the debate so far and look forward to continuing the discussion on this important Bill.

As part of the discussion on amendment 19, I will draw on two comments about failure in research that we heard in last week’s evidence sessions. The first is Bob Sorrell’s point that, compared with the US,

“there is a definite culture in the UK that failure is something that you hide under the carpet”.

He went on to say that ARIA

“is about establishing a culture in which we can accept failure and move on.”––[Official Report, Advanced Research and Invention Agency Public Bill Committee, 14 April 2021; c. 76, Q79.]

My worry is that the amendment, which requires the publication of a statement containing information regarding ARIA’s tolerance to failure, just misses the point. Focusing on the number and value of project failures versus successes as an annual output risks creating the wrong mindset, and risks losing sight of the ambitious multi-year goals.

It is also the case that assessing the failure of programmes and projects on an annual basis might have the effect of limiting risk-taking over the longer term. A high-potential project might qualify as a failure after one year, even though it may deliver great results over the longer term.

The second comment was made by Professor Dame Ottoline Leyser, who questioned how we will know that ARIA has succeeded, and what one would expect the percentage failure to be. She said:

“There is also serendipity…to factor in. If you set yourself a fantastic target of solving a particular problem or producing a particular new product and you fail to do that, none the less, along the way you might discover something extraordinary that you can apply in another field.”––[Official Report, Advanced Research and Invention Agency Public Bill Committee, 14 April 2021; c. 12, Q7.]

Although ambitious research goals might not ultimately be achieved, ARIA will generate value from failures and should therefore embrace failure, and there is value in knowing what does not work, as well as in the successes.

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[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for her remarks. We agree on the need for ARIA and for high-risk, high-reward research, but perhaps we differ on whether the publish share an understanding of that need. There are also, unfortunately, the realities of the environment in which we live: our culture does not have a high tolerance of failure. We truly believe that it is incumbent on us as parliamentarians and leaders to take what steps we can to help transform the situation and to not leave ARIA alone, so that we can all better understand the role that failure will play.

I am reluctant to detain the Committee. This was meant to be a constructive amendment, but if it has not met with the approval of the Minister, I am happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Amanda Solloway]

It is absolutely vital that ARIA operates at the cutting edge of science and technology, and I have consistently heard from the scientific community that ARIA must tolerate the risk of failure to succeed. This idea gets to the very heart of what ARIA is about and on Second Reading there was also cross-party support for it, too.

ARIA will set highly ambitious research goals, which, if they are achieved, will bring about transformative scientific and technological advances, and those advances could also yield significant economic and social benefits. It follows that, as these goals are expected to be highly ambitious, it is likely that only a small fraction of them will be fully realised as originally intended, which will necessarily require a high tolerance of failure. For example, it might be that when some failures are judged over a longer time horizon, they will lead to unexpected successful outcomes. Clause 3 allows ARIA, in exercising its functions, to give particular weight to ambitious research, development and exploitation, which carry a high risk of failure.

I will just say a few words about failure. Although ambitious goals might not ultimately be achieved, ARIA will generate value from project failures. For example, a particular goal may not prove technologically viable, but in pursuing it scientists may happen across another promising technology or develop a new method of data collection. There is also value to be had in knowing what does not work, as well as in the successes.

ARIA is also expected to be a convener of high-calibre individuals and organisations from across the public and private sectors, which otherwise might not have been brought together. However, ARIA is not just about ambitious research goals. Clause 3 also allows ARIA to take greater risks in the form of the support it provides, including the use of innovation funding mechanisms. For example, clause 3 provides ARIA with the potential to take equity stakes in start-up ventures for the purpose of developing and exploiting scientific research.

That approach also extends to funding research and development that is untested and untried, and not necessarily peer-reviewed, which is a clear dividing line between ARIA and other public research and development funders, such as UK Research and Innovation. For ARIA to be a fruitful addition to the R&D funding landscape, it must be able to pursue truly ambitious targets and to support them in a novel and sometimes risky way. It must not be scared of failure, and clause 3 seeks to enable that mindset and approach.

[Chi Onwurah]

We recognise that clause 3 is essential to enabling and empowering ARIA and ARIA executives in tolerating failure. That is part of ARIA, and the clause has our support.

On the exercising of functions in the Bill, following our debate on an amendment debated in the previous sitting, the Minister kindly sent me a letter about how the Secretary of State might consider removing the chair from their position. I thank the Minister for her comments that set out the way in which the chair might be removed. I point out that our amendment would have given powers to remove an executive member and the Bill only gives powers to remove a non-executive member, which is the issue we were concerned about.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly order to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Grants to ARIA from the Secretary of State

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Amanda Solloway]

Clause 4 creates a power for the Secretary of State to fund ARIA. The Committee will be aware that the Government have committed to funding ARIA with £800 million up to financial year 2024-25. The clause allows the Secretary of State to attach conditions to the grants made to ARIA, which will be set out in the framework document and funding delegation letter, which are agreed between my Department and ARIA. The documents will be drafted and agreed with ARIA’s senior leadership team ahead of ARIA becoming operational in 2022.

The documents will complement the Bill, setting the broad parameters within which ARIA can operate and ensuring appropriate use of public money. It is a requirement for arm’s-length bodies of Government Departments to have these arrangements in place. I will be exceptionally mindful that we do not tie ARIA up in knots with endless Government approval processes, as that would run counter to what ARIA is about, but some parameters must be put in place to safeguard the use of public money.

For example, I have spoken about the importance of providing ARIA’s high-calibre programme managers with the freedom to experiment with a toolkit of funding methods in a way that best suits the programme goals and that does not always fund the usual suspects. As the policy statement sets out, that may include the use of inducement prizes, grant-prize hybrids and seed grants, taking equity stakes and so on. Some of ARIA’s activities could be subject to delegation levels, which limit the amount of a single type of activity, for example. The ability to attach conditions to grants paid by the Secretary of State to ARIA will set the appropriate framework within which ARIA can then freely determine its activities and funding choices without ministerial interference.

Clause 4 is as significant in what it does not say as in what it does. Unlike the corresponding clause in the Higher Education and Research Act 2017, clause 4 does not include a direction-making power regarding the allocation or expenditure of ARIA. This is important because the funding decision-making power should rest with ARIA, not Ministers. Clause 4, in allowing ARIA to be funded, is essential to its functioning and should stand part of the Bill.

[Chi Onwurah]

As the Minister said, clause 4 enables the Secretary of State to make grants to ARIA. It is clearly essential—what is the point of an agency that is not able to receive funds? While we do not oppose the clause, however, we are concerned about the general tone and language in the discussion of the way in which grants and funding will be made available to ARIA.

The Minister talked about not burdening ARIA with bureaucracy. At this time, there are a number of investigations into accusations of sleaze and the inappropriate ways that funding has been made available to the mates of different Secretaries of State. Funding and procurement have been carried on through WhatsApp groups, rather than through the normal procurement procedures, for example. I believe that the clause would have benefited from setting out more robustly the importance of the procedures, which are to be agreed, as well as the importance of what the Minister calls “bureaucracy” in enabling and ensuring trust, which is so very important for this agency.

In the debate on Tuesday, the Minister talked about a “different model of trust” for ARIA. I put on the record that the Opposition believe strongly that it is not the model of trust that is wrong, but the way in which it is being followed or implemented by this Government. We believe that the current model of trust needs to be supported in relation to ARIA and in all funding and procurement decisions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

National Security Directions

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[Chi Onwurah]

Once again, my hon. Friend raises an excellent point, and indeed he brings together the themes of our amendments. He is right to say that if ARIA had a clear mission, there would be better understanding of the kinds of decisions and trade-offs that might well need to be made, and we could have a much better informed discussion around that. However, the fact is that we have neither a mission for ARIA, nor any opportunity to scrutinise the national security directives that might be made in the interests of addressing climate change, but also might be made in the interests of ensuring that we have oil drilling rights, or that we continue to fund minerals extraction around the world in order to support other research objectives. It is clear to us that we need to have this scrutiny.

As I indicated, there have been a number of debates on Intelligence and Security Committee scrutiny of other Departments, including in relation to the National Security and Investment Bill and the Telecommunications (Security) Bill. In those cases, despite that Committee being keen to scrutinise national security decisions, the Government have shown a great reluctance to allow parliamentary scrutiny of issues of national security. Some believe—I am not one of those cynical people—that this is because the Government are not happy with Parliament’s choice of Chair of the ISC. I am loath to believe that the Government would be so petty when it comes to such an important matter as national security, so I hope the Minister will clarify how we will have appropriate scrutiny of national security decisions made by the Secretary of State, as set out in this Bill, and why the ISC is not the right vehicle for that.

I will finish with two brief quotes in support of the amendment. In the National Security and Investment Bill Committee, we had the great privilege of taking evidence from Richard Dearlove, former head of the British Secret Intelligence Service.

He said:

“My view would be that the annual report has as much transparency as possible, but you are probably going to require a secret annexe from time to time. It is a bit like the reports of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I dealt with frequently as chief. They and we were keen that they should publish their reports, but there comes a point where it is not in our national interest that some of this stuff is put in the public domain.”

––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 21, Q23.]

That is the case here as well.

My right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) has said:

“I do not want to give the impression that the ISC is looking for work, because I have been a member for a number of years and we are busy with a lot of inquiries—I have three or four hours’ reading every week looking through reports from the agencies. However, it is important that the ISC can at least look at the intelligence that lies behind decisions.”––[Official Report, Telecommunications (Security) Public Bill Committee, 21 January 2021; c. 143.]

That is all that we are seeking to achieve through this amendment.

[Amanda Solloway]

Amendment 20 would require the Secretary of State to provide a report to the Intelligence and Security Committee at the end of each financial year detailing directions made by the Secretary of State to ARIA in the interests of national security and the national security risks that triggered the directions.

The Government take very seriously their duty to protect the national security of the country and its citizens. The ISC plays a valuable role in providing scrutiny and expertise in respect of its functions, as set out in the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the statutory memorandum of understanding. However, that remit does not extend to oversight of BEIS work.

I do not see any reason why such a report should be necessary. No such arrangements exist with UKRI through the Higher Education and Research Act 2017. Instead, the organisation has robust national security arrangements in place to ensure that appropriate action is taken. Similar arrangements will be put in place as ARIA becomes operational, and we are speaking with the relevant parts of Government to make sure that that is the case.

The clause reflects the fact that, while ARIA will be free from ministerial interference, we will always act on our responsibility to protect our national security. Information made known to the Secretary of State will be fed into the wider work of the Government to protect UK R&D from national security risks as appropriate. I see no case for ARIA to report on that to the ISC. I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw her amendment.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for her comments, but she has not responded to the underlying and constructive aim of the amendment, which is to ensure that the ISC has sight of intelligence and security decisions.

She makes a comparison with UKRI. This agency is about high-risk, high-reward research, which we are told will be transformative. During many of our National Security and Investment Bill Committee debates, the point was raised that the nature of national security threats is changing and, as we heard numerous times in evidence, has moved, and is moving, very much into the technological domain. The question whether or not we play a leading role in artificial intelligence, for example, is an issue of national security, as are our cyber defences, which I am sure any chief executive of ARIA would be keen to look at. The agency needs the kind of intelligence scrutiny that only the Intelligence and Security Committee can give. On that basis, I would like to press the amendment to a vote.

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Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Amanda Solloway]

Clause 5 creates a power for the Secretary of State to give directions to ARIA regarding the exercising of its functions that are considered necessary or expedient in the interests of national security. It is right that ARIA is free from too much ministerial oversight. However, when it comes to questions of national security, Ministers may intervene to prevent risk to the UK’s national security interests.

The necessary and expedient threshold of clause 5 offers adequate protection and limits the possibility of ministerial overreach, owing to a more broadly defined power. The direction-making power with which ARIA must comply can be general—for example, a direction not to conduct research in conjunction with partners from a particular jurisdiction that poses a threat to the United Kingdom’s national security—or specific: for example, a direction to terminate a specific contract.

Subsection (2) states that the directions include the

“power to vary or revoke”,

which is to say that directions can be altered or withdrawn depending on how the national security risk develops or subsides.

I would like to take this opportunity to assure the Committee that my team are working hard to ensure that ARIA is set up with national security risks front of mind. That ranges from reducing the risk of cyber-attacks, to ensuring that ARIA is plugged to the appropriate Whitehall national security networks. This work complements a direct-making power in the Bill.

[Chi Onwurah]

As I have said, Labour is the party of national security.

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[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 27, in clause 6, page 2, line 38, at end insert—

“(2) ARIA must provide relevant Select Committees of the House of Commons and the House of Lords with such information as the Select Committees may request.”

This amendment is intended to allow relevant parliamentary Select Committees to access information in order to scrutinise the value for money provided by ARIA.

I will not say a huge amount about the amendment, which pretty much speaks for itself. As ARIA is not subject to freedom of information, I think it incredibly important that there should be a commitment from the Minister that ARIA will provide information to Select Committees if they request it. If the Minister will stand up and say that ARIA will of course provide information to Select Committees, I will withdraw my amendment post haste.

[Amanda Solloway]

Amendment 27 would require ARIA to provide information requested by relevant Select Committees in both Houses. Sufficient measures are already in place to ensure that Select Committees have access to information that would allow them to scrutinise the work of Government Departments and public bodies.

I agree that Select Committees play an important role in examining the work of arm’s length bodies, and I am grateful for the interest and insight that the Science and Technology Committees in both Houses have had into ARIA so far. However, the Osmotherly rules provide guidance for how Government Departments and public bodies should interact with Select Committees. They are clear that the members of arm’s length bodies should be as helpful as possible in providing accurate, truthful and full information when giving evidence, taking care to ensure that no information is withheld that would not be exempted if a parallel request were made to the body under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. I believe that that is sufficient to ensure co-operation and a constructive relationship between ARIA and relevant Select Committees, as it is for other bodies such as UKRI.

On scrutiny of ARIA’s value for money, as was set out in discussions on schedule 1 the National Audit Office can conduct value-for-money assessment in the usual way. I wanted to address a comment made by the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central on Tuesday about the role of the National Audit Office in scrutinising the work of ARIA. I do not agree that the safeguard is very limited; in fact, value-for-money assessments are rigorous and robust, and provide the basis for the Public Accounts Committee’s hearings and reports. I therefore believe that the right arrangements are in place for Select Committees to scrutinise the work of ARIA. That is in line with standard practice. I hope that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North will withdraw her amendment.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I thank the Minister for her statement. She has made it clear that she expects ARIA to comply and not withhold information necessary for Select Committees. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

        Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

        Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Amanda Solloway]

Clause 6 focuses on the Secretary of State’s information rights with respect to ARIA. The Secretary of State may request information relating to his or her functions—for example, information required to determine the Government’s funding of ARIA, to make national security directions, or for the appointment or removal of board members. It is important that the Secretary of State has the information that he or she requires to perform relevant functions.

The information rights remain limited compared with the other arm’s length bodies of Government Departments. The Bill does not allow the Secretary of State to request ARIA’s strategy or delivery plan, for example, as the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 does with respect to UKRI. A limited set of information rights is an important feature of maintaining ARIA’s independence from Government, and it also helps the body to be an agile organisation that can focus on high-risk, high-reward research.

I remind the Committee that this is not the extent of the information provided by ARIA. As we have discussed with respect to schedule 1, for example, ARIA must also send a copy of its statement of accounts and annual report to the Secretary of State, to be laid before Parliament. It is also in the gift of the Secretary of State to oblige ARIA to make other types of information available—via the framework document, for example—as a condition of funding under clause 4. Clearly, it is important to strike a balance between transparency in the use of public moneys and not operationally overburdening a small organisation.

The clause also sets out stipulations regarding the handling of information. Disclosure of information by ARIA under the clause does not breach any obligation of confidence owed by ARIA, and does not, for example, require a disclosure of information should it contravene data protection legislation. I hope that hon. Members agree that the information rights set out in the clause are important to allow the Secretary of State to carry out their functions effectively.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for summarising clause 6. The theme of many of our amendments has been the importance of communication, information, understanding ARIA and its mission, and accountability, so we support the requirement for information to be provided by ARIA to the Secretary of State as appropriate. The duties in the clause seem entirely appropriate, but I have a couple of concerns that I hope the Minister will either respond to or perhaps write to me about.

Clause 6(3) states:

“A disclosure of information required under this section does not breach—

(a) any obligation of confidence owed by ARIA, or

(b) any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed).”

Perhaps this is something that I should already understand, but I am not clear whether commercial confidentiality would come under subsection (3). If ARIA were funding, as I hope it will, a high-risk, high-reward and sensitive project, would that be excluded on the grounds of commercial confidentiality? There is no requirement for the information that ARIA provides to the Secretary of State to be published or shared more broadly, so I would hope that commercially confidential information could be shared.

Subsection (4) states:

“This section does not require a disclosure of information if the disclosure would contravene the data protection legislation.”

Clearly, if disclosure contravened data protection legislation, it would be illegal, so I am somewhat confused about a requirement on ARIA not to break existing laws. I am happy for the Minister to write to me to say under what circumstances there might be a need to share information, the disclosure of which would contravene data protection legislation. I can only think that it might involve personal information, which suggests that the Secretary of State would ask for personal information. Earlier, we discussed the gender pay gap and disclosing information on that. Did the Minister think that that might contravene data protection legislation if, for example, only women worked for ARIA?

Those are my concerns, and I would be obliged to the Minister if she wrote to me about those questions, but we will not oppose the clause standing part.

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Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Amanda Solloway]

The clause introduces schedule 2, which contains provisions about schemes for transfer of staff, property, rights and liabilities to ARIA. It is very straightforward.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2

Transfer schemes

Question proposed, That the schedule be the Second schedule to the Bill.

[Amanda Solloway]

The schedule allows the Secretary of State to make one or more property or staff transfer schemes to ARIA. The permitted transferors are the Secretary of State or UKRI. The supplementary powers are standard and mirror those in, for example, the Higher Education and Research Act 2017. The principal purpose of clause 7 and schedule 2 is to ensure that important assets and personnel can be transferred from BEIS or, if required, UKRI, as ARIA is set up. For example, the chief executive officer and chair may be temporarily contracted to BEIS before ARIA becomes operational. It is administratively convenient to be able to use the power to transfer those staff to ARIA. Paragraph (4) provides that

“A staff transfer scheme may make provision which is the same as or similar to the TUPE regulations.”

That means that employers’ rights of transfer remain the same.

Alternatively, in the ARIA set-up phase, contracts may be entered into for an office lease or seed funding, which could be transferred to ARIA without contract novation. That means that the benefit and burden of the contract can be assigned to ARIA without having to obtain a third-party agreement. It is an important provision that may be needed to make ARIA operational.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 8

Power to dissolve ARIA

[Kirsty Blackman]

I beg to move amendment 38, in clause 8, page 3, line 21, at end insert—

“unless they are made under subsection (7)”.

This amendment ensures that ARIA cannot use its significant resources to fund weapon development.

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[Kirsty Blackman]

I thank the hon. Member for his characteristically sensible intervention. However, I feel so strongly about this that I think it is important that ARIA is excluded from doing that. There are other means that the UK can use to fund weapon development. I do not think ARIA should be one of them.

We are particularly concerned because of the lack of transparency and the issues that there have been around the use of weapons and the use of UK resources on weapons. We have said that we want the UK to immediately halt all military support and arms sales to regimes that are guilty of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The UK Government have not done so. Our concerns are well founded, which is why we have tabled what is quite an extreme amendment in comparison with others we have seen.

This is a subject of much moral debate. We will not ever accept the use of lethal autonomous weapons. Our concern is that, as they are on the cutting edge of technology, ARIA may consider looking at those weapons. I do not want that to be done in the name of the people I represent; they certainly do not want it done in their name.

The Minister has told us about the memorandum of understanding that will be in place between BEIS and ARIA. We have already touched on the issues of ethical investments that ARIA may or may not make. If the Minister was willing to make a statement about the ethical nature of investments ARIA will make and the direction that may be put into that MOU—we do not have as much information as we would like on the MOU—that might give us some comfort on the direction that ARIA may take. The lack of a mission for ARIA means that it is open to the possibility that this situation could arise, and that is a big concern of ours.

[Amanda Solloway]

Amendments 37 and 38 challenge so-called dual-use research—research that is intended for benefit, but might be misapplied by a third party to do harm. The ways in which that could be done will not always be easy to predict, and given the possible benefits of the intended civilian application, it would not be right to close the door to any research that might fall into that category.

I assure the hon. Member that, alongside the Bill, my team is working hard to ensure that ARIA is set up with such risks at the front of people’s mind, including regarding how ARIA is equipped to perform due diligence on potential research partners to minimise risk. It would not be right to dissolve ARIA immediately if it had taken all necessary precautions to minimise the inappropriate use of its research, which would be the effect of the amendments.

Clause 5 will allow the Secretary of State to give directions to ARIA relating to the exercise of its functions when that is necessary or expedient in the interests of national security. That would apply, for example, if ARIA worked with a researcher in another jurisdiction on the development of a technology that could be used by another country for nefarious ends such as weapons development. In that event, the Secretary of State could direct ARIA to cease the contract or research. Under schedule 1, the Secretary of State is able to remove members from office on national security grounds.

I emphasise that while we have learned from DARPA in creating ARIA, ARIA differs from DARPA in several ways, principally because it is not set up with a focus on defence or weapons development. I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I thank the Minister for her statement. I listened to it closely, and it did give some comfort about the possible direction of ARIA. Given what she said, I do not intend to press the amendment to a Division, but we will keep a close eye on what happens. When we scrutinise ARIA, we will examine whether it uses significant portions, or indeed any, of its resources to fund weapons development, especially in countries where there is concern about use for nefarious purposes—not that weapons can generally be used for a particularly good purposes—and with regard to lethal autonomous weapons. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Amanda Solloway]

Clause 8 allows the Secretary of State to make provision by regulation for the dissolution of ARIA

“ten years after the date on which this Act is passed.”

Before making such regulations, the Secretary of State will be required to consult ARIA and other persons he or she considers appropriate, who could include the recipients of ARIA funding or other experts in the field. That will ensure that those leading ARIA at the time will have the opportunity to contribute to the decision. As is set out in clause 11, regulations under clause 8 are subject to the affirmative procedure in each House of Parliament.

We recognise that ARIA is a new body that will take time to get up to scale and demonstrate success. Its exclusive focus on high-risk, programme-led research requires patience, so it should not be evaluated on short -term outcomes. The Commons Science and Technology Committee and the R&D sector at large have welcomed the long-term, patient approach that has been set out for ARIA, and the dissolution grace period is designed to take account of that. There is no obligation to exercise the dissolution power after 10 years, and the Government are, of course, optimistic that clause 8 will not be needed. However, we recognise that ARIA represents a new way of funding research so, as a matter of good administration, we have provided for a power to dissolve ARIA in the event that it is not successful.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Amanda Solloway]

Clause 9 introduces consequential amendments to schedule 3, which we will go on to discuss. It has no other effect, and I hope that hon. Members agree with its necessity.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3

Consequential amendments

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[Amanda Solloway]

The amendment would omit the extension of obligations on contracting authorities for the purposes of public contracts regulation that the Bill affords ARIA. I will take the opportunity to explain to hon. Members why the extension is so important.

I will make three points. First, ARIA is expected to commission and contract others to conduct research in pursuit of its ambitious goals. ARIA will often be procuring those services, and that commissioning and contracting is a fundamentally different way of funding R&D from traditional grant-making, where procurement rules do not apply.

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[Stephen Flynn]

I am very much in favour of freedom, for want of a better phrase, but does the Minister not understand the concerns that the public will have about transparency on such a key amount of public money? That is something the Government have an awful track record on at this moment in time. Does she not understand the public’s view?

[Amanda Solloway]

I make reference to all the methods that we have in place to ensure that we are transparent in the running of ARIA. As I have been clear about throughout, independence is an essential feature of ARIA. Its procurement will therefore be at arm’s length from Government and Ministers. I hope that this debate has demonstrated the necessity of such an arrangement and that the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central will withdraw her amendment.