Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Alex Davies-Jones and Jerome Mayhew

Report stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

Let me begin by emphasising that all women in England and Wales can access safe, regulated abortions on the NHS under our current laws. I also recognise and respect that there are strongly held views across the House on this highly sensitive issue, and I welcome the considered and informed debate we have had today.

The Government maintain a neutral stance on changing the criminal law on abortion in England and Wales. We maintain that it is for Parliament to decide the circumstances under which abortion should take place, and will allow Members to vote according to their moral, ethical or religious beliefs. If it is the will of the House that the criminal law on abortion should change, whether by our exempting pregnant women from the offences or otherwise, the Government would not stand in the way of such change. However, we must ensure coherence between the statute book and any legislation proposed.

It will be helpful if I first set out the relevant law. As hon. Members will know, in England and Wales, the criminal offences relating to abortion must be read in conjunction with the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967, which provide exemptions to the criminal offences. The Act defines the circumstances in which abortions or terminations can legally take place. Section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 is the offence of administering drugs or using instruments to procure an abortion. It is an offence for a pregnant woman to unlawfully take a drug or use instruments with the intent of procuring her own miscarriage. It is also an offence for another person who has the intent of procuring the miscarriage of a woman, whether or not she is pregnant, to unlawfully administer drugs or use instruments with that intent. It is also an offence under section 59 of the 1861 Act for a person to supply or procure drugs, poison or an instrument that was intended to be used to procure a miscarriage.

The Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 deals with acts in the later stages of pregnancies, including late-term abortions in England and Wales. Under section 1 of the 1929 Act, it is an offence for any person to intentionally destroy the life of a child before it is born, if it is capable of being born alive, unless it can be proved that the act was done in good faith and only to preserve the life of the woman.

Turning to the amendments, the purpose of new clause 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi), is to disapply criminal offences relating to abortion from a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy at any gestation. This means that it would never be a criminal offence for a pregnant woman to terminate her pregnancy, regardless of the number of weeks of gestation, including beyond the 24 weeks.

[Jerome Mayhew]

Will the Minister give way?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I apologise, but I will not. We are really short on time.

It would also not be a criminal offence for a woman to intentionally deceive a registered medical practitioner about the gestation of her pregnancy in order to procure abortion pills by post beyond the 10-week time limit. It would remain an offence for another person, such as a doctor, to do the relevant acts, and for a pregnant woman to do the relevant acts for another woman, unless the provisions of the Abortion Act are applied.

New clause 1 seeks to ensure that a woman cannot commit an offence in relation to her own pregnancy under the law related to abortion, including under sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. The phrase “related to abortion” is not defined in the clause but in practice will be limited to these provisions, as there are no other offences that relate to abortion in England and Wales.

It was suggested during the recent Westminster Hall debate on decriminalising abortion, and again today, that the risk with new clause 1 is that it creates a general power for the Secretary of State to amend the Abortion Act 1967 or the relevant criminal legislation relating to abortion. I would like to clarify that new clause 1 does not create such a power, nor do any other provisions of the Crime and Policing Bill. New clause 1 does not grant the Secretary of State additional secondary legislation powers, while clause 166 of the Bill does grant the Secretary of State a regulation-making power in relation to the provisions of the Bill. That can only be exercised to make provisions that are appropriate in consequence of the Bill’s provisions. It would not, for example, give the Secretary of State general powers to make substantive amendments to the Abortion Act 1967 in order to change the rules about abortion, or to amend the Offences Against the Person Act to reintroduce criminal offences, as that would not be consequential to new clause 1.

I turn to new clause 20, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), which would repeal existing criminal offences relating to abortion and concealment of a birth, place a duty on the Secretary of State to implement certain recommendations relating to abortion services, and create regulation-making powers regarding criminal offences relating to abortion.

[Jerome Mayhew]

Will the Minister give way?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will not give way.

This is a complex new clause, and I will not address all of its provisions or the policy intentions behind them. However, I will highlight areas where the House may want to consider whether the duties or delegated powers may be unclear or give rise to unintended consequences.

I acknowledge that my hon. Friend’s approach seeks to mirror the model used to decriminalise abortion in Northern Ireland. However, it is important to recognise that the circumstances in Northern Ireland at the time were markedly different from those in England and Wales. There was no functioning Executive, no provision of abortion services except in the most exceptional circumstances and no equivalent to the Abortion Act 1967, so provision had to be made to create a regime for abortion services. As such, the approach to decriminalising abortion in England and Wales, where the provision and regulation of lawful abortions already exists, needs to reflect the distinct legal context.

New clause 20 would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to implement paragraphs 85 and 86 of the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women in England and Wales by using the regulation-making powers in subsection (8). The CEDAW report contains recommendations relating to the criminal law on abortion, which would, in so far as they relate to England and Wales, already be addressed by the repealing of the offences through subsections (2) and (4) of the new clause.

The report includes recommendations that go beyond the provision of abortion services, such as on the provision of sexual and reproductive health and education. As I have mentioned, the CEDAW report and its recommendations were developed in the specific context of Northern Ireland and therefore reflected the position there at the time. The position in England and Wales is different, with existing guidance, services and legislation that already address many of the report’s recommendations.

I turn to the criminal law aspect of the new clause. Subsections (2) and (3) would repeal sections 58 to 60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, as well as the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929. Repealing those offences would remove criminal liability for a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy and would also decriminalise any other person doing the relevant acts to a pregnant woman, or in relation to the body of a child. For example, there would no longer be a specific offence to cover cases of forced abortion. That would mean that situations in which an individual subjected a pregnant woman to violence with the intention of causing a miscarriage would be dealt with under different offences relating to assaults and bodily harm rather than section 58 of the Infant Life Preservation Act. The moratorium on investigations and prosecutions contained in subsection (4) would discontinue such cases. Therefore, those suspected of forcing a woman to have an abortion before the offences were repealed could not be investigated for those offences.

Subsection (2) seeks to repeal section 60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which criminalises concealing a birth by disposing of a child’s body after its birth. Unlike sections 58 and 59 of the 1861 Act, that offence is not limited to abortion-related acts. Repealing it entirely could therefore create a gap in the law regarding non-abortion-related concealment of birth following a child’s death. While I understand the concern of my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow about investigations under section 60 relating to alleged illegal abortions, a full repeal may have unintended consequences.

I will briefly address a point that my hon. Friend made about existing offences that cover this matter. The offence of perverting the course of justice requires a positive act coupled with an ulterior intent that the course of justice will be perverted. Therefore, it is not necessarily the same and we do not want to provide unintended consequences. It is important to note that subsection (12) grants the Secretary of State regulation-making powers in the light of the repeal of these offences, subject to certain restrictions. The power could be used, for example, to create offences specifically targeted at forced abortions or concealing a birth by disposing of a child’s body. While I do not comment on the policy intent, the House typically exercises its full powers of scrutiny over the introduction of new and serious offences, rather than conferring a power on the Secretary of State to do so through secondary legislation.

New clause 106, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), deals directly with the Abortion Act 1967. The intended purpose of the new clause is to require women to attend an in-person consultation. Section 1(3D) of the Abortion Act 1967 does not apply to consultations that take place before the medicine is prescribed. Women would therefore continue to have remote consultations for prescription of the medicine, but would then be required to travel to a hospital or clinic for an in-person consultation before being able to self-administer the medicine at home. Alternatively, women could have an in-person consultation to be prescribed the medicine and then the medication could be posted to the women at home. The overall effect of this new clause would mean that no woman could legally have an at-home early medical abortion without an in-person consultation.

In conclusion, if it is the will of Parliament that the law should change, the Government, in fulfilling our duty to ensure that the legislation is legally robust and workable, will work closely with my hon. Friends the Members for Gower and for Walthamstow to ensure that their new clauses accurately reflect their intentions and the will of Parliament, and are coherent with the statute book. As I have already stated, the Government take no position. I hope these observations are helpful to the House when considering the new clauses.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Alex Davies-Jones and Jerome Mayhew

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Maria. I will deal first with whether clause 2 should stand part of the Bill. It is of course axiomatic. Right at the heart of the purpose of the Bill is the designation of undertaking. Importantly, it references clause 7, which deals with the turnover of an undertaking. I am looking forward to what the Minister has to say about clause 7, particularly with reference to the levels of revenue or turnover for an undertaking. The Minister has given definitions for “undertaking” and “firm”. I look forward to his further comments about those definitions, particularly when it comes to the classification of worldwide turnover and the revenue being undertaken within the United Kingdom. I am straying slightly into clause 7, but because there is reference to it in clause 2, I hope that is acceptable.

I am just flagging that there may be consideration under clause 7 as to the possibility of the manipulation of turnover where there is a global undertaking with global turnover of less than £25 billion, but where the turnover associated with the United Kingdom is approaching the £1 billion mark. It is foreseeable that we could start to have economically significant manipulation associated with the definition of turnover—I flag that because it is referred to in clause 2. Of course, the main body of clause 2 is right at the heart of the Bill. I welcome the constructive opening comments from the hon. Member for Pontypridd, and I look forward to engaging with her and the other Members of the Committee on that basis over the coming days and, I am afraid to say, probably weeks. [Laughter.]

I turn to amendment 55. This Bill is already hundreds of pages long, and it was often noted in my former career at the Bar that legislation gets longer and longer as it seeks to become more and more specific. However, there is a risk with seeking to list all the elements that we wish to cover. By having a list, we encourage exemptions and the seeking out of elements that are not quite on the list. Through that mechanism, undertakings can avoid the intention while complying with the letter. In my submission, the approach taken by the Government in the current drafting of clause 2 is the right one, because, as the Minister has already mentioned, it gives the DMU the wide scope it needs to take account of work that has already been done without constraining it by having a specific list, as amendment 55 would require. Proposed subsection (5), which the amendment would insert, says that an SMS investigation

“may take account of analysis undertaken by the CMA, on similar issues, that has been the subject of public consultation, within the five years prior to Royal Assent of this Act.”

Who could object to that? However, the Minister made the point that it is already encompassed within the powers of the DMU under the current drafting of the Bill. If we say that this is specifically included in the body of text, it prompts the question: what if someone is just outside that but would otherwise properly be within the consideration of the DMU? It raises arguments that will be explored via litigation, particularly by organisations that have substantial turnover and considerable economic interests to defend, as we heard in oral evidence over the past week.

The last thing we want is to have legislation that invites clarification by the courts. Although I and the Minister are very sympathetic to the intentions behind amendment 55, I fear that it might have the unintended consequence of increasing the chances of prolonged litigation as we seek to explore what exactly is and is not within scope of the DMU. For that reason, I do not support the amendment.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the comments from the hon. Gentleman and the Minister, but we would like to press the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

We do not oppose clauses 3 to 8, on the basis that they set out what constitutes a digital activity for the purpose of part 1 of the Bill. Clause 3 is an important clause with a number of subsections that clarify the exact definitions of digital activities and provision of services. These are all critical to empowering the DMU, which, if properly supported, has the potential to be a world-leading regulator and is ultimately the critical first step in modernising our competition policy.

We can all agree that the UK has the potential to be recognised as a global leader in technology and innovation, and capitalising on that is vital to our economic growth, yet the current situation, which sees a small number of firms dominate digital markets, is reducing competition for other businesses. Ultimately, it is consumers who are paying the price in the products and services we all receive.

This clause is crucial to defining exactly which digital activity will fall under the regulation, and it is welcome. After all, Labour has been clear and has long called for measures to regulate the digital space more widely. We specifically support the clause, as it gives us all clarity on how we can define digital activity.

Subsection (3), which outlines how the regime will give the CMA the power to treat multiple digital activities carried out by a single undertaking as a single digital activity, is particularly welcome. For different activities to be grouped together, they must either have substantially the same or similar purposes—for example, a social media provider offering a number of internet services under different brands with a common function, allowing users, such as advertisers and publishers, to interact and communicate with each other; or can be carried out together to fulfil a specific purpose—for example, services and products that are part of the same supply chain, such as services selling advertisements and the provision of an advertising platform. We all know the rapid rate at which companies can develop and expand, so it is particularly welcome to see this subsection.

Subsection (4), which sets out that where the CMA is required to give or publish a notice or other document under part 1 of the Bill, it may describe the digital activity by reference to the nature of that activity, brand names, or a combination of these, is also vital to the success of the regime. We clearly support the clause, which we regard as crucial to establishing the barometers of the CMA’s regulatory powers, and we have therefore not sought to amend it at this stage.

Clause 4 sets out the ways in which a digital activity could be linked to the UK for the purposes of designation. We are pleased to see that the clause considers the number of UK users in its criteria, as we have all read the reports of tech firms threatening to leave the UK if other legislation places requirements on them in future. That is why, with regard to pro-competition law, the UK user base must be considered when it comes to implementing this regime.

Once on the statute book, the DMU will be empowered to oversee a new regulatory regime for the most powerful digital firms, promoting greater competition and innovation in these markets and protecting consumers and businesses from unfair practices. It is vital that UK-specific connections are established in the Bill. The clause is also an important opportunity to highlight the significant impact that inaction is having on our digital markets in the UK. As we know, these markets are characterised by having just a few big tech firms with entrenched market power and the ability to shape the market to the detriment of consumers and smaller businesses. The 2020 CMA market study said:

“Both Google and Facebook grew by offering better products than their rivals. However, they are now protected by such strong incumbency advantages—including network effects, economies of scale and unmatchable access to user data—that potential rivals can no longer compete on equal terms.”

The current balance of power means the big tech companies often have an unfair advantage over their competitors and dominate key markets. For example, virtually all UK smartphones run either Apple or Google operating systems. In 2018, Google had a more than 90% share of the UK search advertising market, and Meta owns 50% of the UK’s digital display advertising space. Thanks to their dominance, Apple and Google made in excess of £4 billion of profits from their mobile businesses in 2021. The CMA estimates that Facebook and Google made profits of £2.4 billion above what would be considered a fair return in the digital advertising market in 2018. On Meta’s market dominance, the CMA noted:

“Facebook’s average revenue per user in the UK has increased from less than £5 in 2011 to over £50 in 2019.”

The consequence is worse outcomes for smaller businesses and consumers. That is why we welcome the clarity in the clause and support its inclusion.

Clause 5 requires the CMA to look at the next five years when assessing whether an undertaking has substantial and entrenched market power in respect of a digital activity. Specifically, it must be satisfied that the undertaking’s market power and influence in the digital activity is neither small nor transient. Although we welcome that requirement—ultimately, none of us wants companies to be stifled to their detriment—I hope the Minister will flesh out exactly how he thinks the clause will work in practice. The CMA is clearly well placed to assess digital firms’ plans for progression and development over the next five years, but we are concerned that the clause is broadly asking the impossible, given the rate at which technological developments and expansion can occur in this space. I would therefore welcome the Minister’s assessment.

The clause further outlines that the CMA must take into account expected or foreseeable developments if it does not designate the undertaking as having strategic market status in respect of the digital activity to which the investigation relates. Again, that is the kind of welcome and balanced approach to designation that we would expect of a new regulatory regime, but will the Minister confirm how the Bill will ensure that such decisions and designations are made public so that the transparency of the regime as a whole is enhanced? It would be helpful for all of us—parliamentarians, firms, civil society bodies and stakeholders in the sector—to understand how designations are made, and transparency is central to that. I hope the Minister will address those points. We seek some assurances, but I am sure we will be happy to support the clause as it stands.

Clause 6 sets out the terms by which an undertaking has a position of strategic significance. It sets out a number of conditions, including size, scale and the role the firm plays in terms of digital activity more widely. We support the need for flexibility in the regime, so paragraphs (c) and (d) are particularly welcome. Paragraph (c) is intended to cover circumstances in which the undertaking can use its position in the digital activity to leverage or expand into a range of other activities. That is vital, because companies have to be agile to dominate a variety of markets, and they can abuse that. Paragraph (d), which is intended to cover scenarios where an undertaking’s position enables it to determine or substantially influence how other undertakings operate—in other words, to set the rules of the game—is equally important.

It would, however, be remiss of me not to highlight our slight concerns about subsection (2), which gives the Secretary of State the power to vary the conditions set out in the Bill. The success of the regime relies on scrutiny and direction from the Government, but will the Minister clarify exactly what type of scenario would require the Secretary of State of the day to vary the conditions?

As I have said, we support an agile approach to regulation. After all, even across other jurisdictions, the idea of regulation and encouraging pro-competition across our digital markets is a complex process for legislation. We wholeheartedly support the need to get this Bill on the statute book—it is something Labour has long called for—but none of us wants the regulator to be undermined or constrained by the opinions of the Secretary of State of the day, so I would appreciate some reassurance from the Minister on that point before proceeding.

Clause 7 outlines the turnover conditions that must be met for the CMA to designate an undertaking as having strategic market status in respect of a digital activity. Subsection (2) sets out that the turnover condition is met if the CMA reasonably estimates that the undertaking’s UK turnover in the relevant period exceeds £1 billion or that its global turnover in the relevant period exceeds £25 billion. We welcome the clarity that only one of these thresholds needs to be met for the turnover condition to be met and, if the undertaking is part of a group, the turnover of that pooled group should be considered, which is a matter we will come to when we debate clause 114.

I will take this opportunity to highlight the fact that while the £1 billion and £25 billion turnover figures may seem high, they show the sheer market dominance that certain firms have over our digital markets. Setting the conditions at the current rate will not act as a deterrent for growth, which, of course, none of us want to see. We particularly welcome subsection (5), which requires the CMA to keep the thresholds under review and, from time to time, to advise the Secretary of State as to whether they are still appropriate and proportionate.

It would be helpful for all of us in the room and those listening elsewhere to understand how the Minister envisions that this will work in practice. Will it be on an annual review basis, and when will we have clarity on that? Will the reviews be made public to ensure proper and appropriate scrutiny? These are small points, but given the lack of transparency around the regime as it stands, I would be grateful for the Minister’s assurances. Despite that, again, we support the clause as it stands and do not seek to amend it at this stage.

Finally—thank you for your indulgence, Dame Maria—clause 8 makes provision about the value of an undertaking’s or a group’s UK or global turnover in the relevant period for the purposes of the turnover condition. We see this as a fairly procedural clause, which outlines the definition of global turnover by which the CMA will make its decisions on designation. We note that subsection (4) gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations providing further detail about how the total value of an undertaking’s or a group’s UK turnover or global turnover is to be estimated for the purposes of the turnover condition. Again, we feel that this could be problematic, and I would welcome the Minister’s reasoning as to why and in what instance the Secretary of State would need to make regulations to provide that further detail.

If the CMA is to be trusted to make reasonable decisions on a group’s turnover for the purposes of the turnover condition, it seems odd to give the Secretary of State the power to provide further detail when the merits or even the content of such further detail is so ambiguous. I hope the Minister can provide clarity and expand on that point. That aside, we support the clause because the turnover point is crucial for designation. The clause should remain and it should stand part of the Bill.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I briefly made mention of clause 7 in my earlier remarks. I am interested in the Minister’s view, particularly on clause 7(2)(b) and the definition of UK-related turnover being £1 billion or more. There is a legitimate question to be asked, because while that is a substantial amount of money, it is not that great in terms of global business. As I mentioned, I could foresee a situation whereby when a global undertaking’s global turnover is substantially less than £25 billion and its UK-related turnover is approaching the billion-pound mark, there might be a perverse incentive to direct investment and activity away from the United Kingdom because of that cliff-edge definition. I would love to propose a better alternative—it is above my pay grade—but I highlight that as being an issue we might need to take into account.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Alex Davies-Jones and Jerome Mayhew

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

Q Is the intervention not actually the exact opposite of what you are suggesting, in that, if you have a stricter requirement within the regulations, people find ways to get round that strict interpretation, but if you have an outcomes-focused statement as is currently in the Bill, the onus is on the companies to demonstrate compliance, and the CMA, with the fining power of 10% of global turnover, has the stick with which to enforce it?

Matthew Upton: I disagree, because I think the simplicity of simply saying, “You opt out at the end of a period” gives clarity. I think it is easier for firms to interpret. In reality, under the current set-up, I do not think you will see a lot of firms thinking in a positive way about how to interpret it. I think they will think about how they can push as far as possible.

Customer journey design is so complex—this is the challenge of emerging digital markets. It is not a case of being able to say, “You have two click-through screens versus three,” so that constitutes easy or hard. There are incredibly subtle ways to make it difficult. I think a lot of firms would continue to put their efforts into thinking about how they can stay as close as possible to the law to avoid CMA sanctions, while effectively still making it psychologically and in reality difficult for consumers. An opt-out would just simplify it, and would take that thought process off the table for firms.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q You mentioned schedule 18 already and some of the missed opportunities that you see there. Some things that have been highlighted are drip pricing and misleading green advertising. Can I push you a bit further on the missed opportunities in schedule 18?

Rocio Concha: In what respect? On why we want them there?