Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Twentieth sitting)

Alex Cunningham Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th June 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

New clauses 57 to 59 have already been debated.

New Clause 60

Time limits for prosecutions for common assault in domestic abuse cases

‘(1) The Criminal Justice Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) At the end of section 39 insert—

“(3) Subject to subsection (4) below, summary proceedings for an offence of common assault or battery involving domestic abuse may be brought within a period of six months from the date on which a report of the offence was made to the police.

(4) No such proceedings shall be brought by virtue of this section more than two years after the commission of the offence.

(5) For the purposes of this section “domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”’—(Alex Cunningham.)

This new clause seeks to extend the existing six month time limit for common assault in cases of domestic abuse.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 61—Discretion to bring proceedings in a case of common assault involving domestic abuse—

‘(1) The Criminal Justice Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) At the end of section 39 insert—

“(3) Any limitation of time on the bringing of proceedings in a case of common assault or battery involving domestic abuse shall not apply if, in the opinion of the court, it is in the interests of justice for proceedings to be brought.

(4) For the purposes of this section “domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”’

This new clause seeks to give magistrates discretion to extend the reporting period beyond six months in cases where someone hasn’t reported it sooner due to domestic abuse.

[Alex Cunningham]

New clauses 60 and 61 were tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), whom I commend for her considered and forensic work on this issue. Our consideration of the matter is particularly timely, as the national lockdowns of the past year have seen an associated increase in domestic abuse. The crime survey for England and Wales showed that 1.6 million women and 757,000 men had experienced domestic abuse between March 2019 and March 2020, with a 7% growth in police-recorded domestic abuse crimes. The national domestic abuse hotline saw a 65% increase in calls during the first lockdown last year. Research by Women’s Aid discovered that one in seven victims currently enduring abuse at the hands of their partners said that it had got worse in the wake of the pandemic. It has been called an epidemic within the pandemic, and the time is ripe to improve the criminal justice response to these awful offences.

Women experiencing domestic abuse often delay reporting incidents of common assault to the police. Sometimes that is because they feel traumatised or unsafe immediately after the incident. Sometimes it may be because they have an ongoing relationship with the perpetrator. Sometimes it might just be because they are dealing with the traumatic and logistical challenges of fleeing the abuse. Because of the six-month time limit on charging summary common assault offences, by the time that many women have the courage to come forward and are ready to speak to the police, they are told that the charging time limit has passed and that there are no further opportunities for them to seek justice against their perpetrator.

Even when women do report within the six-month time limit—say, three or four months after the incident—their cases can be timed out because the police, for whatever reason, do not complete their investigation within the time remaining. As a result, many victims are left feeling unsafe and unprotected from their perpetrators, who might continue to harass, stalk and terrorise these women for a long time to come.

New clause 60 would address this issue by changing the time limit for common assault prosecutions in domestic abuse cases, so that it was six months from the time of reporting rather than six months from the time of the offence. It would provide that charges still needed to be brought within two years of the offence. That would give survivors of domestic abuse longer to report to the police, but it would also retain a time limit to ensure that there was a safeguard against cases being dragged out.

New clause 61 would address the same issue, but take a different approach by introducing discretion for magistrates to extend the six-month time limit in cases in which someone has not come forward to report an assault, because of domestic abuse. Taken together, the new clauses would extend the window in which victims can access justice safely, while ensuring that the police conducted common assault investigations expeditiously. Both new clauses have the support of Refuge, Women’s Aid, the Centre for Women’s Justice and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. I look forward to the Minister’s considered remarks on both approaches later in our debate.

To illustrate the importance of reform in this area, I will share some testimony from a victim of these deplorable crimes that has been shared by Women’s Aid, because it is important that we listen to the voices of women who are calling for this change. This woman said:

“I am a victim of domestic abuse. I was in a violent relationship that ended late last year when I decided to leave. I have 4 accounts of physical assault which were sent to the CPS with evidence by the police.

I had a phone call from my police officer explaining that the CPS have come back and said that they are charging my abuser with only 2 counts of assault, as the other 2 accounts of assault are outside of the 6-month prosecution limit…It took strength and courage for me to come forward and now I’m being dismissed.”

I will finish with a quote from my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford, who puts it so well:

“Too many domestic abuse cases are currently not prosecuted because they are timed out by a six-month limit on common assault prosecutions. But unlike with other crimes, in domestic abuse cases, there are obvious and serious reasons why victims may take more time to report the abuse to the police, especially where there is an ongoing abusive relationship. This means many women who do find the courage to come forward and report these incidents are being badly let down because time has run out and the perpetrator is never charged. That can leave victims feeling more vulnerable than ever, while the perpetrators go on to commit more crimes.”

My right hon. Friend says that if the Government are serious about tackling violence against women and girls, they have to tackle this injustice. She is exactly right. We have heard much from the Government, throughout these Bill Committee proceedings, about how seriously they take tackling violence against women and girls, so I hope that they listen seriously to these calls for change and accept these new clauses.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)]

I can be brief in responding. I have met the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford to discuss a particular case in her constituency that appeared, on the face of it, to fall within the circumstances that she is trying to address through these new clauses. I take very seriously the concerns of the right hon. Member and, indeed, those of Refuge and Women’s Aid, and I am pleased to tell the Committee that we are looking into this issue very carefully.

The Committee will appreciate that we need to measure the problem and understand the scale of it before we can put measures before the House, or indeed in our domestic abuse strategy. On the basis that we are looking into this issue seriously and gathering the data—on the understanding that this is an active piece of work by the Government—I understand that the hon. Gentleman might be minded not to push the new clause to a vote on this occasion.

[Alex Cunningham]

The Minister is correct: I do not intend to push this new clause to a vote at this stage. However, my right hon. Friend might well choose to push it to a vote later in the process. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 63

Offence of requiring or accepting sexual relations as a condition of accommodation

“(1) It is an offence for a person (A) to require or accept from a person (B) sexual relations as a condition of access to or retention of accommodation or related services or transactions.

(2) For the purposes of this section, A is—

(a) a provider of accommodation,

(b) an employee of a provider of accommodation,

(c) an agent of a provider of accommodation, or

(d) a contractor of a provider of accommodation.

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a maximum of 7 years.”—(Alex Cunningham.)

This new clause would create an offence of requiring or accepting sexual relations as a condition of accommodation, sometimes known as “sex for rent”. This would be punishable on indictment with a prison term of a maximum of 7 years.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 64—Offence of arranging or facilitating the requirement or acceptance of sexual relations as a condition of accommodation—

“(1) It is an offence for a person, who may be a publisher, to arrange or facilitate an offence under section [offence of requiring or accepting sexual relations as a condition of accommodation].

(2) A person commits an offence if they intend to arrange or know that their actions would facilitate an offence under section [offence of requiring or accepting sexual relations as a condition of accommodation].

(3) A publisher commits an offence if they—

(a) know they are arranging or facilitating an offence under section [offence of requiring or accepting sexual relations as a condition of accommodation]; or

(b) reasonably should know their actions would enable the arrangement of or facilitate an offence under section [offence of requiring or accepting sexual relations as a condition of accommodation]; or

(c) were informed that their actions had enabled the arrangement of or facilitated an offence under section [offence of requiring or accepting sexual relations as a condition of accommodation], and they failed to take remedial action within a reasonable time.

(4) A person found guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of £50,000.”

This new clause is contingent on NC63. It creates an offence of arranging or facilitating an offence of requiring or accepting sexual relations as a condition of accommodation. This is intended to capture, for example, publishers or hosts of advertisements for such arrangements. The penalty for this offence would be a fine of £50,000.

[Alex Cunningham]

Before I speak to these clauses, I must congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Hove (Peter Kyle) on his tireless work in bringing attention to the terrible crime of sex for rent, as well as on his work on the topic of criminal child exploitation, which I will come to in due course. As my hon. Friend wrote to the Lord Chancellor back in January, the Opposition believe that people must be able to live in a safe home, free from the risk of exploitation, yet today many vulnerable young people in particular are being coerced into engaging in sex simply to keep a roof over their head. They are forced into the horrific situation of giving sex for rent, something that, to most, is unthinkable, yet this is by no means rare or unusual. Research by the housing charity Shelter estimates that 30,000 young women have been propositioned with sex-for-rent offers since the beginning of the pandemic. Meanwhile, investigations by the Daily Mail have found lists of sex-for-rent advertisements on the website Craigslist, with telephone numbers of landlords included.

While offering sex for rent is technically incitement to prostitution and a crime under section 52 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, at present the legal framework requires the victim to self-define as a prostitute in order to secure a conviction. Not only is this morally wrong, it acts as a clear disincentive to victims of this repugnant crime coming forward to the police. It is little wonder, therefore, that despite up to 30,000 people being propositioned with sex-for-rent offers during the pandemic alone, only a handful of charges have ever been brought against offenders using existing legislation. Despite repeated warnings from campaigners and the Opposition, the Government have done little to halt the sex-for-rent phenomenon. In particular, they have failed to create a new specific offence of sex for rent. That is why the Opposition have tabled new clause 63, which would create a new specific offence of requiring or accepting sexual relations as a condition of accommodation.

[Sarah Champion]

I fully support the arguments that my hon. Friend is making and the new clauses that he has tabled. They lead into arguments that I have been making myself, in that I do not think one ought to be able to buy consent, and that is fundamentally what is happening in this situation.

[Alex Cunningham]

That is exactly the point. If people have actually undertaken that sexual relationship with a landlord, apparently, they are seen to have been doing so willingly, which most certainly should not be the case.

Unlike section 52 of the Sexual Offences Act, new clause 63 would not require a victim of sex for rent to self-identify as a prostitute in order to secure a conviction. Put simply, it would allow victims of this horrendous crime to come forward without any fear of retribution or damage to their reputation. Similarly, it would give the police the powers they need to pursue a prosecution.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Jones]

Does my hon. Friend accept that some wider societal issues are pushing people into this situation? I had a constituent who had no recourse to public funds who had a child. She was working all the hours that she could for a cleaning company, but she was not earning enough, so she was renting somewhere with that very low pay, and the landlord asked her for sex in order to pay the rent. She chose not to do that and ended up literally street homeless, because she had no recourse to public funds. In the end, the council intervened, and she got housing, but she was in a very difficult position. The idea that she, in that situation, would have consent is not right.

[Alex Cunningham]

No one should ever be placed in that situation. My hon. Friend and I were both members of the shadow housing team when we discussed the housing crisis that faces many people, especially young people. No one should ever be in that situation. Perhaps a whole-society approach is required. If we did not have a problem with housing, perhaps young people such as my hon. Friend’s constituent would not find themselves in that sort of situation.

This offence would also extend to those who facilitate sex for rent directly—for example, by driving so-called tenants to and from their accommodation or by disguising sex for rent arrangements. Put simply, if it were not for those who actively promote or facilitate acts of sex for rent, the problem would not be a fraction of the size it is today. I hope the Minister will support new clause 64 and act today.

[Victoria Atkins]

I think that everyone who has heard about the work of the campaign of the hon. Member for Hove, as set out by the shadow Minister, will have deep worries and concerns about this appalling practice, and we welcome the work that the hon. Member is doing to raise awareness of it.

We are unequivocal that so-called sex for rent has no place in our society. We know that it often involves the exploitation of vulnerable people. Rape, sexual violence and sexual exploitation are devastating crimes, and we are determined to bring offenders to justice. There are existing offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 that may be used to prosecute this practice, including the section 52 offence of causing or inciting prostitution for gain and the section 53 offence of controlling prostitution for gain. Both offences carry a maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment.

[Alex Cunningham]

The Minister cites a prostitution law, but these people are not prostitutes. Surely she accepts that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Cunningham]

I welcome the Government’s work in this area. The fact that the number of prosecutions, and even of reports, is not reflected in the numbers reported through the likes of Shelter is a tragedy in many ways. Perhaps the Government should think about what they can actually do to encourage more people to come forward and report these offences.

I do not want to be insensitive about this in any way at all, but it would appear from what the Minister said—she did not spell it out as explicitly as I am going to—that the letter of the law would apply the word “prostitute” to a person who has provided sex for rent. I would be very happy to be corrected about that, but that is the whole implication: if the person has to identify as a prostitute under the law in order for the prosecution to take place, she is being called a prostitute. That is where the tremendous barrier exists to people coming forward. Is there a reason for that?

[Victoria Atkins]

To clarify, looking at section 52 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in particular, I would not want a victim who is going into a police station to report this offence to be under the impression—this is what I was trying to address—that she has to sit there and declare, “I am a prostitute.” That is absolutely not what is required. Section 52 states:

“A person commits an offence if… he intentionally causes or incites another person to become a prostitute”.

As I say, it is semantics, and there is a wafer-thin cigarette paper between us, but I would not want vulnerable people to think that they have to go into a police station and declare themselves to be that, because, of course, they are victims of a crime.

[Alex Cunningham]

I appreciate that clarification, but the fact remains that the prosecution requires that word to be used in the system. For me, that means that we need a newly defined clause in this area, so I am going to press new clause 63 to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 67—Crossing a significant age threshold between commission of offence and sentence—

“The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended by the insertion after section 58 of the following—

‘Chapter 1A

Crossing a significant age threshold between commission of offence and sentence

58A Crossing a significant age threshold between commission of offence and sentence

Where because of the age of the offender there is a difference between the sentence which may be imposed at the date of conviction and the sentence which could have been imposed on the date on which the offence was committed, a court may only pass a more severe sentence than the maximum that the court could have imposed at the time the offence was committed if there are exceptional reasons to do so.’”

This new clause is intended to put into law the advice at para 6.3 of the Sentencing Guideline on sentencing children and young people regarding sentencing when a significant age threshold is passed between the date of conviction and the date of the offence.

[Alex Cunningham]

This is an issue that I am personally very passionate about, so I am pleased to speak to these new clauses. The Minister will remember our long exchanges on maturity and young people during our debates last year on the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021. My sincere thanks go to Just For Kids Law for the vital work that it does supporting the legal rights and entitlements of children and young people and for its informed and extremely helpful input on these new clauses. I am also grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Hove for the energetic campaigning that he did in this area, standing up for young people in our justice system.

New clauses 66 and 67 address the issue of unjust outcomes for young people who commit offences while they are still children but, because of delays that are not within their control, are not convicted and sentenced until they have turned 18 and so are legally adults. Each year, approximately 2,500 children offend as children but turn 18 prior to conviction. Turning 18 prior to plea or conviction is likely to impact around one in 10 children who are cautioned or sentenced, so we are talking about a significant number of youth cases.

New clause 66 would mean that the reduced rehabilitation period provided for by section 5(2) of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 applied to all those who committed an offence while under the age of 18, instead of only those who were convicted of an offence when under 18. This would provide a consistent approach to childhood offending by ensuring that the same rehabilitation period was applied to all those who committed an offence while under the age of 18, including those who turned 18 prior to conviction or sentence, instead of only those who were convicted of an offence when under 18.

[Sarah Champion]

Does my hon. Friend share my concern that, because the courts are clogged up, such examples are likely to become more and more pronounced in the coming months and years?

[Alex Cunningham]

Indeed, yes. I know that the Government are working hard to clear the backlog, but the fact remains that the backlog is considerable, and it will impact on young people in the system. As a direct result of those problems, many young people will turn 18 before they have their trial and their case heard.

Our idea would mean that children who committed offences as children received a child’s spending period, which is a principle with which I would have thought all members of the Committee could agree. The criminal records system for children in England and Wales is already highly punitive compared with such systems in other countries. The Opposition are enthusiastically supportive of the Government’s direction of travel on criminal records, as shown with respect to our consideration of clause 163. None the less, as I said then and say again now, there is room to go further.

As Just for Kids Law notes, rehabilitation periods for those who turn 18 will generally remain more than double those for under 18s. For example, following custodial sentences of more than one year and up to four years, rehabilitation will be four years for those convicted over the age of 18, compared with two years for those convicted under 18, and that is regardless of the age of the person on the date the offence was committed. We know, and have discussed previously in Committee, the serious impact that disclosure of a criminal record can have on an individual’s access to employment, which in turn can have consequential impact on the individual’s ability to move on to a crime-free life.

That issue is especially pertinent to very young adults. In an excellent submission to the Committee, the Transition to Adulthood Alliance said:

“In young adulthood, there is a crucial window of opportunity where a pro-social identity and desistance from crime can be cultivated. The ‘plasticity’ of their brains means that it is a particularly good time for learning, personal growth and the development of pro-social identity… However, by virtue of their stage of development, young adults can quickly become disillusioned and disengaged from professionals if support is not forthcoming, appropriate or timely.”

It concludes:

“Young adults’ experiences of the justice system are therefore of utmost importance in determining their capacity to build a crime-free future, develop their potential, and contribute to society.”

The Transition to Adulthood Alliance is referring to young adults as those aged up to their mid-20s, and it bases its case on an irrefutable and growing body of evidence that the brain is not fully formed until at least the mid-20s, which means that young adults typically have more psychosocial similarities to children than to older adults in their reasoning and decision-making.

I have said throughout our consideration in Committee that the Bill does not do enough to recognise those maturity issues, but the injustice created by the Government’s lack of consideration of the issue of maturity is felt most keenly here—when we treat a child of 17 years and 364 days as a child, but treat the same person completely differently when only a day more has passed. Surely our intention is to support youth offenders to rebuild their lives far from patterns of offending, yet imposing longer rehabilitation periods on some child offenders—those unfortunate enough to have been convicted after they turned 18 because of some delay in court listing or a police investigative delay—will make it harder for them to do so, and indeed may even contribute further to their disengagement and disillusionment with the system.

I would be interested to hear whether the Minister thinks that is something the Government could consider addressing. We are enthusiastic about the direction of travel on criminal records, and I hope that this proposal might be something he feels his Department could include in its ongoing work on criminal records reform.

Let me turn to new clause 67, which would put in law the advice at paragraph 6.3 of the guidelines on sentencing children and young people, which states:

“When any significant age threshold is passed it will rarely be appropriate that a more severe sentence than the maximum that the court could have imposed at the time the offence was committed should be imposed.”

That principle already has cross-party support, as well as wide support in the sector among lawyers and academics alike.

I recognise the great work that the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Rob Butler) has done on the issue and acknowledge the wealth of professional experience and wisdom that he brings to it. If a child is convicted but turns 18 prior to sentence, they are entitled to receive a youth sentence. If they turn 18 before conviction, the youth court may retain sentence if crossing the age threshold would occur during proceedings, but if they turn 18 before proceedings start, they can no longer receive youth sentences even if they committed the offence as a child.

Just for Kids Law has pointed out what that means:

“Only adult disposals will be available to the court, despite the defendant being sentenced for offences committed as a child. As a result, they become subject to the purposes of adult sentences which include deterrence, punishment of the offender and protection of the public. This is a significant shift from the purposes of child sentences, which have the prevention of reoffending as the principal aim, and the welfare of the child as a central consideration.”

Surely sentences are meant to reflect the criminality of the offence, which is determined by the circumstances of that offence, not the random date on which the case was finalised.

I have mentioned this matter time and again—it needs to be addressed—but the overwhelming backlog of court cases further exacerbates such injustices. According to Crest Advisory, Ministry of Justice figures published this week show that at the end of March the number of outstanding cases in magistrates courts was 396,419—21% higher than in March 2020. Outstanding cases in Crown court at the end of March were up 45% and at their highest since records have been compiled in such a way, with 59,532 cases still not completed.

It is particularly relevant to our discussion that timeliness has got much worse. It is taking far longer for cases to be resolved. In magistrates court, at the start of this year the average period from an offence being committed to a case being completed was 200 days—nearly seven months. Even at the start of 2020 it took 175 days. In Crown court it is even worse, and the median period for a case to go from offence to completion is 363 days—almost a year. That is a long time in which a child may turn 18. That would be no fault of their own, but it would be the fault of the Government with respect to tackling the backlog. Turning 18 during that time has significant impact on the outcome of children’s cases: they are prosecuted in adult courts, so the opportunity to benefit from the youth justice system is lost.

Does the Minister think that the aims of the youth justice system—preventing reoffending and protecting the welfare of children—should expire because of his backlog? He and I have butted heads over the backlog many times, and he often points towards the impact that covid has had on the justice system. I agree that that has been significant, although there were serious issues before the pandemic. Does he think the aims of the youth justice system should be allowed to expire because of the pandemic? Is that a reasonable justification for denying children who later move officially into adulthood the benefits of the youth justice system? I hope he agrees that it is not and that he will support the aim of the new clause, which would provide a consistent approach to childhood offending and ensure that those who turned 18 between the offence being committed and sentencing were not subject to more severe sentences than the maximum the court could have imposed when the offence was committed, unless there were exceptional reasons to do so.

[Sarah Champion]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the point of our justice system is to be seen to be acting without fear or favour in a fair way, and that for a child this would not be considered fair?

[Alex Cunningham]

Exactly that. I am sure that young people will be confused by a system in which, all of a sudden, they find themselves appearing in adult court instead of youth court, particularly if they have previous convictions. They will be bamboozled by it all and frightened by the process.

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has been clear:

“Child justice systems should also extend protection to children who were below the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offence but who turn 18 during the trial or sentencing process.”

Children who offend as children should feel the benefit of the youth justice system and should be afforded access to the same sentencing framework. That would give those children a better opportunity to be diverted from a cycle of reoffending and help them to rebuild their lives, which is something I am sure every member of the Committee thinks is worth aspiring to. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Chris Philp]

I am conscious of time, so I will try to respond concisely. On new clause 67, when the offender has crossed a significant age threshold such as the age of 18 between committing the offence and being convicted and sentenced, the sentencing guidelines already say that the sentence that should be adopted as a starting point is that which would have applied at the time of the offence—that is to say, when the offender was younger.

Courts already have a duty under section 59 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to have regard to sentencing guidelines in those cases unless that would be clearly contrary to the interests of justice. The new clause would not make any material difference to the way the system operates because of the sentencing guidelines currently in force.

On the more general points about maturity and how people take until the age of 25 to mature, as the shadow Minister said, we have debated the issue many times—in particular, almost exactly a year ago during the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021. Pre-sentencing reports, which are prepared, take into account, and judges then take into account on sentencing, the maturity of the defendant when they are being sentenced.

The shadow Minister made some points about court backlogs, which I am going to address only briefly. Obviously, court backlogs have developed as a consequence of coronavirus, which is the case across the world. Huge extra resources—more than half a billion pounds—have been put into reducing those outstanding case loads, which in the magistrates court are falling consistently, as they have been for quite some time. Of the excess case load caused by coronavirus, about half has been eliminated already. Every week that goes by, the outstanding case load drops by—the last time I checked—about 2,000 cases.

On the Crown court, we have nightingale courts. There are no limitations on sitting days, and I believe the corner has been turned. Looking forward to a time when social distancing is eased in the very near future, I expect the courts will be running even more cases.

As the shadow Minister generously recognised, the Bill significantly reduces rehabilitation periods for children and for adults, which I think we welcome across the Committee. On the starting point, or the rehabilitation point, the regime that applies is calculated from the point of conviction, rather than the point of offence.

[Alex Cunningham]

Regardless of the duty on the court to which the Minister refers, it remains a fact that children are receiving sentences under the adult regime. There is no two ways about that. What concerns me most is the rehabilitation period. A child who commits an offence as a 17-year-old who does not appear in court until he is 18 can end up with a rehabilitation period of four years, which takes him to his early 20s. All that time, if he is applying for a job or with respect to other activities, he must declare that. That is a real concern for me.

I am not going to push the new clauses to the vote at this time, but the Government need to do much more thinking in this area and start treating children as children. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 69

Poaching of game

“(1) The Game Laws (Amendment) Act 1960 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 2(1), after “committing” insert “or has committed”.

(3) In section 4(1)—

(a) after “section thirty” insert “or section thirty two”, and

(b) at end insert “or any animal, vehicle, or other article belonging to him, or in his possession or under his control at the relevant time.”

(4) In section 4(2), after “gun” in lines 2 and 4 insert “, animal,”.

(5) In section 4, at end insert—

“(6) The court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence under either the Night Poaching Act 1828 or the Game Act 1831 may order the offender to reimburse any expenses incurred by the police in connection with the keeping of any animal seized in connection with the offence.”

(6) In section 4A(1)—

(a) in line 1, after “under” insert “section one or section 9 of the Night Poaching Act 1828 or”,

(b) after “thirty” insert “or section thirty two”, and

(c) omit “as one of five or more persons liable under that section.””.—(Mr Goodwill.)

This new clause is intended to broaden the powers available to the police and the courts for dealing with illegal hare coursers, measures include providing for forfeiture of animals on conviction and permitting the recovery of expenses incurred by the police in housing a seized animal.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr Goodwill]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Goodwill]

I am pleased to hear what the Minister has said and I am satisfied that the Government take this issue seriously—not just because of the words that I have heard her say now, but also because I was contacted by the office of the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, who has asked me for a meeting on the strength of the new clauses. It makes a nice change for Cabinet Ministers to ask Back Benchers to meet them to discuss issues. I am optimistic that action will be taken and hope that tabling the two new clauses has done precisely that. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 71

Child criminal exploitation (No.2)

“(1) A person (A) commits the offence of child criminal exploitation if—

(a) A intentionally takes advantage of an imbalance of power over another person (B) to coerce, control, manipulate or deceive B into committing a criminal offence,

(b) A is aged 18 or over, and

(c) B is under 18.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a maximum of 14 years.”—(Alex Cunningham.)

This new clause would define and create an offence of child criminal exploitation with a maximum prison term on conviction on indictment of 14 years.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss

New clause 72—Internal concealment of banned substances—

“(1) A person (A) commits the offence of internal concealment of banned substances if—

(a) A inserts packages of banned substances into the body of another person (B), with or without B’s consent, or

(b) A intentionally takes advantage of an imbalance of power over B to coerce, control, manipulate or deceive B into inserting packages of banned substances into B’s own body,

with the purpose of concealing the transport of those banned substances.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a maximum of 10 years.”

This new clause would create an offence of internal concealment of banned substances, meaning inserting packages of banned substances into the body of another person, or coercing another to insert banned substances into their own body, for the purpose of concealing the transport of those banned substances. This would be punishable on indictment with a prison term of a maximum of 10 years.

[Alex Cunningham]

Child criminal exploitation—the grooming and forcing of children to commit criminal acts by adults—is an emerging and fast-growing phenomenon. I have terrible problems saying the word “phenomenon”. Maybe I should have a drink—I assure you it is water, Mr McCabe.

Child criminal exploitation is often present in, but is not limited to, county lines activity. According to analysis by Labour of national referral mechanism statistics, up to 3,000 children are known to be criminally exploited every year, yet the real number is likely to be significantly higher, given that these figures are based only on the children known to services. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham said in her speech on new clause 17, the Children’s Commissioner estimates that at least 27,000 children are at high risk of gang exploitation. That is a truly horrifying figure.

Under the law as it currently stands, the only way to prosecute child criminal exploitation is through subsidiary offences—for example, possession with intent to supply—or under modern slavery legislation. The problem is that modern slavery legislation is poorly suited to the specific nature of child criminal exploitation. As written answers to parliamentary questions submitted by my hon. Friend the Member for Hove show, only a handful of modern slavery orders are handed out each year. We also know that between 2019 and 2020 only 30 charges were flagged as child abuse under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. We need a specific, singular offence of child criminal exploitation with a maximum tariff that acts as a real deterrent to those who exploit vulnerable children in this way. That is what new clause 71 seeks to do.

Under the new clause, an adult would commit an offence if he or she intentionally took advantage of an imbalance of power over a child in order to coerce, control, manipulate or deceive the child into committing a criminal offence. Any person found guilty of this offence would be liable to imprisonment for up to 14 years, in keeping with the maximum sentences applicable for causing or inciting the sexual exploitation of a child. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham said during our sixth Committee sitting, all too frequently it is the children who have been exploited who end up taking the rap, rather than being recognised for what they are—victims.

It is hardly surprising that in 2019-20 1,400 children were first-time entrants in the youth justice system due to drug offences and around 2,000 were first-time entrants due to weapons offences. Both crimes are heavily associated with child criminal exploitation, which raises the question: how many children are currently in custody as a direct consequence of being exploited by an adult? It would be interesting to know just how many children are in custody, so does the Minister have any information on that? As my hon. Friend has said, they are not criminals, but victims—in other words, children who have been exploited by adults to commit crime. And we can repeat that sentence time and again.

While the child victims of this horrendous crime languish in jail, their future prospects almost certainly ruined, the failings of the criminal justice system mean that the real criminals go untouched. We have raised this issue in previous speeches, particularly in relation to young people carrying knives or drugs, the latter on behalf of a controlling adult who is part of an organised criminal gang.

By creating a new specific offence of child criminal exploitation, we would allow for direct action to crack down on the gang leaders who are currently committing their crimes with total impunity. The Minister must recognise that the current law is not working. It is letting down child victims of horrendous crimes, while letting gang members off the hook.

The Government must take far more radical action to combat this crime. Creating a legal framework specific to child criminal exploitation is key to that. The Government say they take child criminal exploitation seriously, but now it is time for them to show it, so I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on new clause 71.

I will now speak, relatively briefly, about new clause 72. Once more, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Hove for tabling new clause 72, and I wish him well in his new post as shadow Schools Minister—a job I would have quite fancied myself. New clause 72 would create a new criminal offence of plugging, or the placing of banned substances into the body of another person, or coercing another to insert banned substances into their own body, for the purpose of transporting and concealing them.

As we heard from Iryna Pona of the Children’s Society during our evidence session on 23 May:

“Plugging is when young people are exploited by criminal groups to deliver drugs across the country and—sometimes—they are delivering those drugs inserted in cavities in their bodies.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 23 May 2021; c. 127.]

Plugging has been specifically recognised by the National Crime Agency as a particularly malicious form of child criminal exploitation perpetrated across county lines. For the children who are exploited to carry drugs in this way, the experience they suffer is simply horrendous. Naturally, it is also a great risk to their health and could even cause their death.

As is the case with child criminal exploitation, there is currently no specific area of law that criminalises those who exploit children to carry drugs in this way. Likewise, they cannot be prosecuted under existing sexual offences legislation, due to a lack of sexual intent. Again, we are left with a gap in legislation, which categorically fails victims of this horrendous crime, many of whom will be children, while letting the real criminals—dangerous criminals—off the hook.

When my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central asked the witness from the Children’s Society whether they thought there would be a benefit in trying to define plugging in terms of a specific criminal offence, the answer was instantaneous: yes.

Once again, as with child criminal exploitation, the Opposition are pleased to give the Government a chance to come up with the goods. New clause 72 would create a new and specific offence to criminalise the act of placing drugs into a person’s body for the purposes of trafficking them or coercing a person to do it themselves. Those found guilty of this new offence could expect to serve a custodial sentence of up to 10 years’ imprisonment.

By creating a specific offence, we could introduce a significant deterrent to gang leaders and extend the time spent in prison by those convicted of child criminal exploitation. I look forward to receiving the Minister’s support.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am conscious that we have already touched on some of these issues in the debate on new clause 17, which I will try not to repeat. Child criminal exploitation is a heinous form of abuse, and the Government are determined to tackle it. The exploitation, degradation and assault of a young person to conceal drugs internally for transportation, known as plugging, is immoral and unlawful and, again, the Government condemn it.

We are taking action to target those who seek to exploit vulnerable children through county lines operations. Earlier this year, we announced £148 million of investment to tackle drugs misuse and supply, along with county lines activity. That includes £40 million of investment dedicated to tackling drugs supply and county lines activities, and represents a surge in our activity against those ruthless gangs. That will allow us to expand and build on the results of our existing county lines programme, through which we have set up the National County Lines Co-ordination Centre to improve the intelligence picture and co-ordinate the national law-enforcement response, which includes protecting those young people who are abused and exploited.

Turning to the question of creating a specific offence of child criminal exploitation, we have discussed this issue carefully with law enforcement and others and, on balance, we are of the view that existing legislation is sufficient to address the exploitation of young people for criminal purposes. In particular, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides for the offences of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour, as well as human trafficking for all types exploitation. For child victims, it is sufficient to show that they have been chosen for exploitation because of their youth. There is no requirement to prove force, threats or deception, which may, in particular circumstances, be difficult to prove. A range of civil orders are available to law enforcement partners to respond to county lines and child criminal exploitation, including modern slavery and trafficking prevention orders, and modern slavery and trafficking risk orders.

To promote good use of those orders, the NCLCC has established a dedicated orders team to identify children and the perpetrators who exploit them, and to help forces with the application of such orders; to disseminate guidance and deliver training to local forces to upskill local force understanding; and to work with regional leads to improve best practice in gathering data on the use of orders in a county lines context. We are also committed to improving local safeguarding arrangements.

With the Department for Education, we commissioned Liverpool John Moores University to examine the effectiveness of multi-agency safeguarding partnerships in dealing with young people who are at risk or who are involved in serious violence and county lines. It has reported, and we are considering its recommendations. In addition, we have funded dedicated support for those who are at risk and who are involved in county lines. Between June 2020 and June this year, that work was carried out by the St Giles Trust, which worked with 170 young people to help them leave exploitation and exit gangs and other forms of coercion.

We continue to fund the Missing People SafeCall service, which is a national confidential helpline for young people, families and carers who are concerned about county lines exploitation, and we are funding the Children’s Society Prevention programme, which works to tackle and prevent child criminal exploitation as well as other forms of abuse and exploitation. We are therefore committed to tackling child criminal exploitation and bringing the perpetrators to justice, but we do not, on balance, believe that a specific offence would change the way in which young people are supported. Our efforts focus on improving the practical response to such criminality. We keep the legislative framework in connection with child criminal exploitation under review, and of course we will consider any additional evidence that supports the view that additional legislation is required as it arises.

--- Later in debate ---

We are committed to protecting vulnerable children against that pernicious practice, but we do not believe that a specific offence of plugging is needed at this time. We should continue to focus our efforts by working with law enforcement and safeguarding partners to strengthen their response to the threat.

[Alex Cunningham]

I agree with the Minister that a lot of work has to be done with support, safeguarding and everything else, but the income of local authorities has been devastated in recent years and the ability to provide the range of services required is somewhat compromised. That makes such situations all the more difficult for young people.

The Minister talked about the Modern Slavery Act, and so did I. Although it is a relatively young piece of legislation, it has rarely been used. I am not aware of any prosecutions whatever to do with the issues I have raised today—

[Victoria Atkins]

indicated dissent.

[Alex Cunningham]

I did say I was not aware.

[Victoria Atkins]

I will not cite cases, but I believe the first prosecution was in Cardiff Crown court, involving a county lines gang who originated in the south-east. I do not recall the details, but I would not want the Committee to think that it had not been used. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman said that he was “not aware” that it had been.

[Alex Cunningham]

I was referring specifically to the child exploitation element and the plugging offence. I am aware of no specific prosecution on those things. For me, it is a matter of child protection—of adult protection as well, in some cases—and we feel strongly about both the new clauses. We intend to press both new clauses to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Hywel Williams]

I thank the Minister for that response, and I am grateful for the news that there are continuing discussions with the Welsh Government even at this rather late stage in the consideration of the Bill.

Obviously, we have a fundamental disagreement. I would hold that the context in Wales is sufficiently different to require a specific assessment. That context is not only the fact that policy may diverge, but the fact that there is specifically Welsh legislation that may impact the provision. However, at this point I am content to withdraw the new clause and possibly bring it back at some other time. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 75

Automatic exemption from jury service for those who are pregnant, breastfeeding or on parental leave

‘(1) The Juries Act 1974 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 9, after subsection (2B), insert—

“(2C) Without prejudice to subsection (2) above, the appropriate officer shall excuse a person from attending in pursuance of a summons if—

(a) that person is pregnant,

(b) that person is breastfeeding, or

(c) that person is on parental leave.”’—(Alex Cunningham.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Motherhood has featured well in our deliberations today, and we are going to turn to it again, but first I want to pay tribute to all mothers. I am going to be a bit cheeky here and pay particular tribute to my own mother, who will be 88 in five weeks’ time, and to my dad, who will be 90 a few weeks later and who still looks after her in their own home—just a little indulgence there.

New clause 75 would provide an automatic exemption from jury service for those who are on maternity leave, breastfeeding, or pregnant. The Opposition have tabled it because the Government have yet to take the action called for by my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham West and Penge (Ellie Reeves), who has been leading an important campaign on this topic in recent months. The issue is that there is no default exception from jury service for mothers of newborn babies who are still breastfeeding, and this can cause serious difficulties for the mother. I do not need to go into the proven benefits of breastfeeding because—perhaps unusually, given the general content of the Bill—I have already rehearsed those arguments in my speech on new clause 27.

Jury service is an important civic duty that we should all engage in, as I am sure every member of the Committee agrees—indeed, in our debate on clause 164 we all recognised the importance of extending possible engagement with jury service to more citizens. However, that cannot be done at any expense, and certainly not at the expense of the wellbeing and health of newborn babies and of mothers.

My hon. Friend shared a case in which an expectant mother deferred her jury service because it coincided with her due date. That much was fine, as the initial deferral went through, but her postponed jury service then fell within the first six months of her son’s life, during which she was exclusively breastfeeding him about every two hours. As my hon. Friend explained in her letter to the Lord Chancellor:

“The Court she has been asked to attend—York Crown Court—does not offer child-minding facilities. This creates a number of problems. As she cannot defer a second time and despite appealing the decision she is being forced to attend jury service even though it will compromise her ability to breastfeed her son during the first six months of his life. If there are no child-minding facilities, she cannot be with her son to breastfeed him unless she is allowed to bring him into the courtroom which clearly presents its own difficulties. Even if there are child-minding services made available at the Court, she will have to leave once every 2 hours to breastfeed her son.”

The Minister’s response to the case was:

“Your letter refers to your constituent making an application for a second deferral but does not mention whether she applied for an excusal. The gov.uk website provides examples of possible reasons for excusal but there is no exhaustive list. Though I cannot say that an application for excusal would have been granted in this case, potential jurors must have a good reason for applying which could include exclusively breastfeeding a child. Each application is considered on its own merit and if not granted in the first instance, there is a route of appeal whereby a judge would consider the application, either by considering the information available or arranging a short hearing to speak to the potential juror in person to discuss their reasons.”

Imagine someone undergoing postpartum recovery and caring for a newborn—up at all hours of the day and night, with all their days filled with responding to the needs of their new baby. Is it really appropriate that the Government should expect them to trawl though the Government website and go through an application process that may then be denied and need to be appealed by attending the court to speak to the judge? As my hon. Friend noted in her follow-up letter, absence of an exemption means that a new mother has to

“deal with the effort and stress of navigating a bureaucratic process to secure exemption when she should have been free to solely focus on her pregnancy and new-born.”

That is illustrated by the case of Zoe Stacey, with which I know the Minister is familiar. Zoe was called for jury service in May, while she was breastfeeding her then two-month-old child. Her application for an excusal was rejected, so she had to appeal the decision. All the while, she was breastfeeding her newborn after weeks of painful medical problems, as well as having to look after her other son, who is in pre-school four mornings a week. Surely Ministers recognise that this is a hugely stressful time for anyone, and it was made all the more difficult by the fact that Zoe had little family support nearby. In the end, she did receive an excusal, but she should not have had to go through such a stressful bureaucratic nightmare to get it.

My hon. Friend knows of more cases, some of which she shared in her correspondence with the Minister. I understand that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), wrote to her earlier this week, informing her that the guidance has been reviewed and that some amendments have been made, including the addition of “new parent” as an explicit reason for possible deferrals or excusals and a change to Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service’s internal guidance so that it states explicitly that excusal applications on the grounds of caring responsibilities are to be considered sympathetically.

While my hon. Friend and I both appreciate that the Government are making an effort to address the problem, they are not going quite far enough. Why do excusal applications on the grounds of caring responsibilities need to be considered sympathetically? Why cannot it simply be that an excusal is guaranteed to be always granted in the case of a new parent when they ask for it? That does not remove the option of attending or deferring jury service if that is what the pregnant mother or new parent chooses; it simply ensures that any new parent has the automatic right to exercise an exemption if they wish to. I understand that the Government would not want to remove the choice to serve or defer from pregnant women and new parents, but they do not have to do that in order to provide a guaranteed exemption for all who want one. I hope that the Minister can see where we are coming from, and accept the amendment today.

[Chris Philp]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for raising this issue. The Government do support the principle behind the amendment. New parents, including those breastfeeding or women who are pregnant, should be able to serve on a jury at a time that is suitable for them. As the shadow Minister has said, we are aware of some of these cases that we have corresponded about in recent months and, as a consequence, have already updated the guidance that Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service uses to ask that a more accommodating and sympathetic approach is taken to somebody who responds to a jury summons by saying that they are pregnant, breastfeeding, or have very significant caring responsibilities in the way that he has described. Where that happens, a deferral is always considered in the first instance.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned the application process. Clearly, the summoning bureau will not necessarily know who is pregnant or who is looking after a child, so it is inevitable that there will always be some kind of application process; that cannot be avoided. The thing is that it is done in a way that is sympathetic. As I have said, that guidance has been changed already. We have also updated www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk  to make it clear that these are all legitimate reasons for requesting a deferral. I hope that a combination of that publicity on www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk and the work on updating the internal guidance in response to some of the cases that the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues have raised addresses the underlying issue. We still think that a case-by-case consideration is appropriate rather than a blanket provision such as this, which perhaps does not capture all of the circumstances that may arise. Allowing discretion to continue is the best way of handling this, but the sentiment—the direction of travel—is exactly the same as that of the hon. Gentleman.

There are, in the way in which this new clause is drafted, some idiosyncrasies. For example, on a technical point, the hon. Gentleman refers to parental leave, but there are other forms of leave that do not count as parental leave. Maternity leave and adoption leave, for example, are considered as a different form of leave. I am sure that this was inadvertent, but, as drafted, some of those groups that one would wish to include have been unfortunately omitted. We are on the same page as the Opposition on this, but the change in the guidance and the publications on www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk  address the issues that have been raised.

[Alex Cunningham]

The Minister had an over-complicated response to what I thought was a relatively simple and straightforward matter. He talked about supporting the principle and he talked about sentiment. Surely, we could save the time, expense and, of course, the anguish around this process. Of course, there will have to be some communication between the person called for jury service and the court, but that could be very simple: “Dear court usher, or whoever you are, I am currently pregnant, or currently breastfeeding, please may I have the exception that is granted under Labour’s excellent amendment to this particular Bill.” It is very straightforward, and I cannot understand for the life of me why the Government cannot just say that if somebody in such a situation does not want to do jury service, they should not have to do it. For that reason, I shall press the matter to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

It is customary at this stage to mark the end our deliberations in Committee by reflecting on the ups and downs, the agreements and disagreements and the range of subjects on which we have deliberated. Our debate on the police covenant at the beginning of the Committee’s deliberations feels like a long time ago. I am pleased that the Bill and no fewer than 84 new clauses have had the benefit of rigorous scrutiny by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee over the past few weeks.

I thank in particular you, Mr McCabe, for your stylish chairmanship of the Committee as well as your co-Chair, Sir Charles, who was equally stylish and equally good at keeping us all in good order. I thank the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South, for sharing the privilege, the pleasure and the workload of our Committee with me. I thank the Opposition Front Benchers—the hon. Members for Croydon Central, for Stockton North and for Enfield, Southgate—for their constructive and at times lively approach to the matters that we have debated, but that is all absolutely in the role of this Committee and what this process is supposed to do in this place.

I would, of course, get into lots of trouble if I did not thank the Government Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Corby. If Chairs keep us in order, Whips whip us in to make sure that we remain in good order. I give my sincere thanks to him because it is a very difficult job at times and one that does not get much praise.

I thank the Clerks for herding us in the right direction when we needed to be so herded, and the Hansard writers, whose ability to keep note of what we are saying never fails to amaze me. I thank the officials and the lawyers from the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and the Department for Transport. A huge amount of work goes on behind the scenes to help Ministers to prepare for a Bill Committee, and it is very much thanks to them that we are able to do so.

That flows inevitably to my very sincere thanks to the Bill manager for the Home Office, Charles Goldie, and the Bill manager for the MOJ, Katie Dougal—I hope I pronounced that correctly. They help Ministers to swim serenely above the water while they are working terribly hard underneath, so I thank them very much for their hard work and effort.

Thanks also to our private offices, who help Ministers to turn up at Committee on time. Finally, of course, thanks to the members of the Committee. I know that, for some Members, this was their first Bill Committee—I hope that we have not put them off for life—but they have all contributed in their own way and have played a vital role in scrutinising this important piece of legislation so that it is ready for the House’s wider scrutiny on Report in a week and a half’s time. Thank you all.

[Alex Cunningham]

The very fact that we are within three minutes of the reporting time for this Bill justifies my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate fighting for all the time that the Committee has had to deliberate. I thank you, Mr McCabe, and Sir Charles for chairing our weeks of deliberations with skill and good humour.

I thank the Government Members who made a contribution and even those who were able just to crack on with their correspondence, and Ministers for listening and making us some promises that I am sure they will keep. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle, recognised very early on that a 16-year-old is not an adult in any circumstances whatsoever, and the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Croydon South, very kindly said that he would act as an advocate for Opposition Members who might be having problems engaging with other Government Ministers.

My thanks also go to my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central for sharing the Front-Bench role with me and for championing our position on shopworkers and protests. I thank all the other Opposition Members who did a grand job holding the Government to account on everything else—from violence against women and girls, to pet theft. I thank the many organisations, too numerous to mention, that championed their causes and helped us to champion ours, too. Without them the challenge to the Government would have been all the poorer. I thank the Committee Clerks for their professionalism and their patience and, of course, our friends in the Hansard service.

Finally, I thank our Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate, who will now hang up his whip and get into his new role on a full-time basis, as I understand it. I thank him especially because I really did need him daily to tell me, “It’s okay, Alex, we will get through the business. We will get to the end. We will get all the new clauses dealt with—rest assured.” So, thank you to him.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.