Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [Lords] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateAlex Chalk
Main Page: Alex Chalk (Conservative - Cheltenham)Department Debates - View all Alex Chalk's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberYes, that is certainly true. Relationships do decline over time. Of course, my hon. Friend is right that in some cases the process of beginning a divorce will not be the start, but a fingerpost to a destination that had been established long before. In some other cases, however, a divorce will come as a complete surprise, because the Bill moves the emphasis towards the person who initiates the divorce and away from the respondent to such a degree that the respondent—usually, in my judgment, a woman—will be profoundly disadvantaged by this legislation.
Mr Evans, what a delight to have you in the Chair and to speak under your benevolent guidance. Finally, let me deal with the matter of family breakdown and children. A lot has been made of that in this debate. We know from all the evidence—I saw my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) in his place a few moments ago—and in particular the evidence from the Centre for Social Justice, that typically children do considerably worse in broken families. In broken families, children tend to do worse educationally and in all kinds of other ways. It is our job as a society to build strong and stable communities which comprise strong and stable families, and the Bill just will not support that objective. We want a better society. That is why we are all here across the House. Marriage is a key component in building that more wholesome and better society which will allow us to bring up children in a responsible and dutiful way to be the citizens of tomorrow.
The Bill undermines marriage, weakens families and risks weakening social solidarity. It is being rushed through the House by Ministers who refuse to listen to measured and moderate argument. If hon. Members do not agree with any of that, they can vote for it. On the other hand, if hon Members think that any of what I have said is meaningful, they should certainly vote against it. In doing so, they will be sending a signal from this House to the people that we care about marriage and, because we care about marriage, we want fewer people to be divorced.
It has been a genuine privilege to hear the speeches today. They have been powerful, poignant and humorous, but above all, on every single occasion, principled. From whichever point of view people have approached this argument, it has been from a position of principle. As I say, it has been an enormous privilege to have heard it.
Before I respond to the amendments and new clauses, let me make some brief introductory remarks. First, there is a suggestion that the Government are somehow diffident about marriage; that is not so. We recognise—and we are not diffident about saying it—that marriages and civil partnerships are vital to society. Why? It is because they are a way in which couples can not only formally express their commitment to each other but, yes, contribute, through stable relationships, to stable communities. I support marriage and the Government support marriage.
On speedy divorce, the difficulty is that there is a statistic available that states that in 50% of divorces that have taken place—that is quite a high percentage—people regret going through the divorce process. The Bill will just make it all the more easy for it to happen.
If that is right—I do not suggest that the hon. Gentleman is wrong about the statistics, although I have not seen the study—surely if we are in favour of reconciliation, we should be in favour of a process that does not so irretrievably toxify relations, so that there may be the chance of reconciliation. Instead, we are accessories to a system that encourages people to sling mud—mud that ultimately they cannot substantiate, which means that people can end up branded as unreasonable without the court having made a finding to that effect. That, in and of itself, reduces the chances of reconciliation.
I say this in the spirit of generosity that characterises my view of the Minister, but we conceded that point about fault. The amendment suggests that the Government support reconciliation, irrespective of the fact that the Bill gets rid of fault. The amendments are incredibly measured and moderate—the Minister must know that.
I do not suggest that any of the amendments are improper or immoderate, but not all of them would have the impact that my right hon. Friend calls for.
The Minister knows my grave concerns with the Bill, especially about the quickie nature of divorce. Will he reassure me that the Bill does not undermine the sacred marriage vows that I, and so many hon. Members, have taken?
My hon. Friend is another example of an extremely principled individual who I know has misgivings about this Bill. I can give him that assurance, but I want to deal with that point specifically in the course of my remarks. He has spoken to me; he has principled objections that I have listened to carefully.
On amendment 1, let me begin by noting what appears to be common ground between all parties—namely, all are agreed that introducing a minimum period before someone can apply for a conditional order is a sensible way forward. Currently—this bears some emphasis—there is no minimum period. Using the online service, a divorce can currently be secured in a matter of weeks—it is currently an average of 17 weeks up to the conditional order, which the Government think is too short. That is why we have prescribed a minimum period of 20 weeks before the conditional order, and six months in total, to allow time to reflect and, in appropriate circumstances, to think again. Crucially, however, as a result of the Bill, that reflection need not take place in an atmosphere that is toxified by hurtful accusations.
I also stress the word “minimum”, because issuing an application does not start a sort of countdown clock, or a ticking bomb that proceeds remorselessly to the dissolution of a marriage; no, it simply imposes a minimum period which, on expiry, changes nothing. The court makes no order, until such time as the further active step is taken to apply for a conditional order. At that point, the marriage still endures, and a further minimum period is triggered. Once again, at the end of that period the marriage does not automatically dissolve; it persists until such time as a further active step is taken to apply for a final order. In other words, it takes three active steps before a marriage can be dissolved. It is no wonder that the impact assessment prepared in advance of this Bill—here I am in the unhappy position of gently disagreeing with my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West (Sir David Amess) who gave such a brilliant speech—indicated that around 80% of divorces are expected to take longer as a result of these measures. I respectfully suggest that that gives the lie to the “quickie divorce” label.
My hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) wishes to extend the 20-week element to 46 weeks, so that a marriage cannot be legally ended until more than a year after the initial application, averring that it has irretrievably broken down. My first concern is that the amendment would not affect civil partners—that cannot be right, although I do not suppose it was deliberate. On the wider issue of the appropriate minimum period, to make a fair judgment we need an appreciation of the state of relations between the parties that typically prevails at the time a petition is issued—my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison) made this point. Is it the case, as my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton said, that applications—which, by the way, cost £550—tend to be issued in a fit of pique after a row, or as she powerfully put it, on the “spur of the moment”, or does the issuing of a petition tend to come at the end of many months, or even years, of sorrow, pain, periods of separation and attempts at reconciliation, counselling, or all of the above? Overwhelmingly, I respectfully submit, it will be the latter. The solemn and grave decision to seek a petition is rarely taken lightly or impetuously. That assessment does not only reflect our lived experience of the world that we bring to these proceedings; it also reflects empirical evidence from the 2017 study by the Nuffield Foundation, which is the only recent large-scale study on this issue in England and Wales.
I do not believe that I gave the impression, and if I did I wish to correct it, that the majority of cases would be issued on the spur of the moment, but I did say that I believed that some would be.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend.
On that issue, though, the 2017 Nuffield study noted that for people who have come to the hard decision to divorce and have begun the legal process of divorce, only one of 300 cases was known to have ended in attempted reconciliation. We believe that a total minimum period of six months, mindful of the circumstances that prevail at the time that it starts, is the proper—difficult, but proper—balance. We should bear in mind, too, that for those applicants who take the step after years of domestic abuse—again something that we have not really considered in this debate—six months may feel markedly or even unfairly onerous. Some people need to move on with their lives. Let us not forget the point made by the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham)—that 12 months would be especially harsh for couples who had already been separated for any length of time, not least because of the potential financial hardship. That, as I say, has a particular application for victims of domestic abuse, as they may be left in dire financial straits. Put simply, until they can sort out the divorce—until they can finish the process—how can they then move on with their lives, fund their lives, and fund the lives of their children?
Amendment 2 talks about joint applications. I will not go into that because I simply do not have time, but let me talk about sole applications. This is a really important point, and I have enormous sympathy with it. My hon. Friend the Member for Congleton effectively says that we should start the period when notice of proceedings has been received by the other party. I absolutely get this point. We entirely understand that no one wants to see respondents being ambushed; it would be nonsensical. I listened very carefully to what she said about this so powerfully on Second Reading. I will return shortly to the measures to address the risk. In fact, I will have to do it now because I am running out of time. In short compass, I spoke to the chair of the Family Procedure Rule Committee only this week. We would like, through that committee, to ensure that timings are imposed when people should serve these notices. That is a really good thing.
I anticipate that my hon. Friend will say, “Well, that’s very interesting, but why didn’t you put it on the face of the Bill?” My simple point about that is that overwhelmingly, whether in the criminal jurisdiction, the civil jurisdiction or the family jurisdiction, it is left to the rule committees to provide these rules. Indeed, there are rules for service of claim forms, particulars of claim and so on. It would create a strange imbalance if we had some rules in statute and some in the rules. It would create inconsistency that would be difficult for practitioners as well as, most importantly, for the individuals concerned. However, we entirely sympathise with the point and would want to see it addressed.
Amendment 3 seeks to prevent either party to a sole application for divorce from making any financial applications, pending suit, if the other party agrees to a financial application during the 20-week minimum period. While acknowledging the intention behind the amendment, such a restriction would introduce the scope for significant adverse financial impact on one or both of the parties, and, most importantly, on any children.
There is so much that I would love to go into, but I cannot, and I will have to write to my hon. Friends to give time for my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton to respond. We are unable to accept the amendments or new clauses. The points have been made very powerfully, but we are left with the position that this Bill, in the words of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom), will be pro-happiness because it is anti-bitterness. I commend it to the Committee.
I thank the Minister for his comments about addressing with the Family Procedure Rule Committee the very great concerns that I have regarding shortage of notice. I look forward to hearing from him as to how that issue will be addressed. Obviously I would have preferred it to have been in the Bill, but I thank him for his assurance.
I am sure that the Minister will have heard the grave and fundamental concerns about this Bill, particularly among Conservative Members. By my reckoning, more than half of today’s speakers have spoken with deep concern about the implications of the Bill. Given, in particular, the weight and volume of opposition during this debate on the shortage of funding support for relationships, for marriage and for reconciliation, I am minded to test the will of the House on that issue and, in due course, to press new clause 1 to a vote. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.