Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Bill (First sitting)

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 23rd July 2019 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Newton]

I am going to pass my opportunity over to Alex.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

Q Thank you very much. I declare an interest: I am pretty sure I have prosecuted offences that were defended at the bar by Bindmans.

Mr Schwarz, can I ask briefly about your helpful point on an apparent inconsistency between domestic and wild animals and explore a little bit about how much that matters? I am conscious that, if a robbery takes place and there are two robbers, one of whom is 18 years and one day old at the time of the offence and the other is 17 years and 360 days, they will be sentenced under different regimes, even though, as far as they are concerned, they are two young men of effectively identical age. Equally, if there is a traffic offence and a prosecutor decides the driving fell far below the standard of a reasonably careful and competent driver, they get charged with dangerous driving. Equally, if another prosecutor says, “Well, I don’t think it quite crosses ‘far below’, but it was below the expected standard, so I’m going to charge it as careless driving,” that offending would be sentenced under different regimes. Have the courts not shown themselves to be well able to deal with such discrepancies without any real manifest injustice to anyone?

Mike Schwarz: I can see I have struck a lawyer here. There is a difference, actually, and it is one of substance. There is a principle behind treating adults differently from juveniles, and a principle behind treating careless driving differently from dangerous driving. As we all know, the law has to draw a line because there is a reason for doing so. The distinction between the sectors of domesticated and wildlife animals, and treating them differently in terms of sentence, does not appear to have a principle, unless Parliament is saying that the animal suffers less in the wild as the result of unnecessary cruelty, or that it is more important to punish suffering in the domesticated area. For what it is worth, I think the suffering is the same, and it is for Parliament to decide whether the two should be distinguished from each other. That is where the distinction lies.

It begs the question of what the animal welfare legislation is generally about. It seems to be about protecting animals, punishing bad behaviour by humans and stopping it being propagated elsewhere. In the sentencing guidelines and the offences, however, there is no demarcation between sectors to say that one sector is more worthy of protection than the other is, which is why I go back to the point on the level playing field across the two areas.

[Alex Chalk]

Q It is an entirely fair and appropriate observation to make. Do you accept that the law has shown over time to be capable of growing organically? For example, the stalking legislation did not even exist—it was not even recognised by the law prior to 2012. Then the offence came in, the sentencing powers increased, and there were various other aspects on top of it. That would not in and of itself be a reason not to enact this legislation, even if, in the fullness of time, it may be that it has wider ramifications. Would you accept that?

Mike Schwarz: Obviously I accept that the legislation can and should be passed, but with the health warning that it is creating a disparity. It is not an artificial, in-principle, lawyer’s type of disparity; it creates problems for judges to have a judge in the Crown court sentencing on one set of facts and in the magistrates court on another. If one looks at the guidelines, how is a judge going to sentence someone who has committed a very heinous act against a wildlife animal if his or her sentencing powers lead to the conclusion that the sentence should be lower than for a less heinous act in another area?

Defence lawyers, as you and others know, would have field day with that, saying that the principles of proportionality and fairness require examination. I heard that there was feedback from the judiciary about the existing law. One can only think about what the feedback might be, pending a formal review or report, or not, if this disparity were not only passed—and I am not saying it should not be—but passed without a commitment to reviewing and evening up the playing field.

[Alex Chalk]

Q One very last point, if I may. Surely if, for the sake of argument, the sentencing guideline is there in place and says that, where a dog has had its tail docked and it was a sustained act of degrading violence, the brackets should be one to three years, and the defence counsel turns around and says, “Oh, well, if this were a wild dog I wouldn’t get as much,” the judge will say, “I am not terribly interested in that. The sentencing guideline is clear for this offence. Parliament has indicated that it takes it extremely seriously. We have no difficulty with dismissing that rather ambitious submission,” and take him down? Is that not, in fact, what would happen?

Mike Schwarz: I think that would happen, but it might bring the law into disrepute when, in the next court, something similar—

[Alex Chalk]

I take that point. Thank you very much. That is all I wanted to explore.

[Anna Turley]

Q Thank you very much for your evidence so far. Could you share from your experience on the degree of consistency or inconsistency in what you see from the sentencing so far in such cases under the existing legislation? As a second part of that, could you talk about how, when lawyers are defending their clients, they seek to convince the court that their client should face a lesser sentence? What mitigating factors, or even aggravating factors that work against them, have you seen so far? I will start with Inspector O’Hara.

Inspector O'Hara: The majority of offences that I have seen prosecuted by the police are probably not cases that would hit the higher end of the sentencing bracket. They are largely cases involving an animal hoarder—generally somebody who has some mental health problems or another underlying reason for amassing 20 animals in a property. It is that sort of offence that we typically see day in, day out. At the last count, when I ran the figures for the EFRA Committee inquiry report a couple of years ago, broadly speaking—this is from memory—around 85% of the prosecutions were done by the RSPCA and about 15% by police or local authorities, with the burden of that shared by the police.

That typically tends to be my experience. We have not had any tail-docking cases that I can think of in London, but we have ear-cropping mutilations and general animal cruelty rather than organised crime or that more serious end of it. All those cases have been dealt with in a magistrates court so far, but the sentencing in London is fairly consistent because all those cases go to one court, although elsewhere in the country it is probably not so. Most of those cases are dealt with by way of a fine or other ancillary orders rather than imprisonment.