Human Rights Abuses: Magnitsky Sanctions

Al Pinkerton Excerpts

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

I thank and congratulate the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) on securing this important debate. I seem to remember that he once referred to himself as a “quiet man”, but he has had a loud voice on this issue. I also congratulate the other excellent speakers we have heard today. The hon. Members for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton), for Dewsbury and Batley (Iqbal Mohamed), for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell), for Macclesfield (Tim Roca) and for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) took us on a journey through different territories, spaces and countries, and reminded us of the history of the important name that we associate with the kind of sanctions we are talking about.

We are living through a period marked by rising authoritarianism, escalating human rights abuses, and the increasing use of corruption and repression as tools of state power. In that context, Magnitsky-style sanctions are among the most powerful instruments in our armoury to uphold human rights, defend international law and promote democracy. Their strength lies in the fact that they target perpetrators, not populations, and individuals, not states, holding those responsible to account without inflicting further humanitarian harm on civilians—at least they do when they are working at their best. Magnitsky sanctions were designed to establish both legitimacy and intent. As Members have noted, they include asset freezes, travel bans, and restrictions on financial transactions, aimed directly at individuals who violate international law or commit serious human rights abuses. Their purpose is to reduce the humanitarian costs associated with blanket sanctions, to draw a clear line between civilians and abusers, and to provide a mechanism for accountability where domestic justice systems very often fail.

When used consistently and in co-ordination with our democratic allies, these sanctions carry real power. They deter future abuses, impose reputational and financial consequences, and challenge the assumption among perpetrators that they can act with impunity. Yet despite their importance, the United Kingdom’s current approach is, I contend, still falling short, and in so doing it is undermining the very purpose of the sanctions. Application remains inconsistent, enforcement is insufficient, as we have heard, and transparency and oversight are often inadequate. Sanctions retain their power only when they are applied coherently, consistently and with the political will to enforce them.

The Liberal Democrats believe that Magnitsky sanctions remain essential, yet too many individuals credibly implicated in serious abuses and corruption remain unsanctioned. Even where sanctions are imposed, those targeted continue to exploit evasion methods. Delays, gaps and selective application fundamentally weaken deterrence and erode confidence in that regime. We have consistently argued that the UK must be prepared to act decisively, rather than hesitating or allowing political convenience to override principle. On human rights and the rule of law, the United Kingdom must be a leader, not a follower.

A key weakness lies in how Magnitsky sanctions are operationalised. There is no clear, strategic approach to when and how the powers are used, leading to narrow and often selective application that ultimately undermines deterrence. Structural complexity has discouraged bold action, and weakened the overall effectiveness of the Magnitsky regime in the UK. That problem is compounded by a lack of alignment with our allies. A significant number of individuals sanctioned by partners such as the United States, the European Union and Canada are not mirrored by the UK, reducing the collective impact of co-ordinated action. In fact, in 2022 the UK failed to replicate 69% of global Magnitsky designations. Let me be clear: these sanctions will not serve their intended purpose without close international co-ordination.

Moreover, unlike the United States, the UK does not operate under a single, clearly defined Magnitsky Act. Instead, our framework risks producing narrower and less transparent criteria for designation, particularly in cases involving serious human rights abuses and grand corruption. If we are serious about accountability, we must be bolder, clearer and more decisive in how we use these powers. That is why the Liberal Democrats would prioritise the defence of democracy and the promotion of human rights globally, deepen co-ordination of sanctions policy with our democratic allies—particularly in relation to Russia—and strengthen economic crime legislation to close loopholes that allow sanctioned individuals to evade accountability. Sanctions must be backed by rigorous enforcement and tougher vetting of major investments, or they simply will not work.

That principle applies just as strongly to the protection of British nationals overseas. Arbitrary detention is not diplomacy; it is coercion. That is why, as well as appointing a dedicated envoy for arbitrary detention, Magnitsky sanctions must be a tool for enforcement, ensuring that hostage-taking carries a personal cost to those who seek to perpetrate it. Looking ahead, the future development of the UK’s sanctions policy must be genuinely joined up across Government. Only a whole-of-Government approach can ensure effective enforcement, close loopholes and maintain both the credibility and the moral authority of our sanctions regime.

The Liberal Democrats are clear about what that means in practice. Sanctions must target the individuals responsible for human rights abuses, not just states. Economic crime legislation must be strengthened to prevent evasion. Magnitsky sanctions must be used proactively, not reluctantly, as they so often appear to be used now. Arms export controls must reflect our human rights obligations, and asset freezing and seizure must be used to stop the flow of dirty money through our financial system.

That clarity must be reflected in our response to events around the world. In Hong Kong, a territory that has been mentioned several times during the debate, the Liberal Democrats want to see Magnitsky sanctions imposed on those responsible for the erosion of freedoms and the unacceptable targeting of pro-democracy activists, including those here in the United Kingdom. The arrest warrants recently issued by Beijing are disgraceful attempts to interfere in our democracy, and they must be met with actions that befit the words that are so often spoken in this place and elsewhere.

The same boldness is required in response to Russia. We must work with our European partners to seize and repurpose frozen Russian assets, up to £30 billion of which are held in the UK, and direct them towards humanitarian, financial and military support for Ukraine. Sanctions that are not enforced do not constrain aggression, but enable it.

That consistency must be extended to Israel too. The Liberal Democrats were the first major UK-wide party to call for a full ban on military exports to Israel, and we continue to demand sanctions against Prime Minister Netanyahu and his Cabinet Ministers for their conduct in Gaza. International law must apply to everyone, without exception, and that includes senior figures in the UAE for their personal and institutional support for the still unfolding atrocities in Sudan.

In conclusion, Magnitsky sanctions are undoubtedly a powerful tool, but they cannot be deployed only when politically convenient. If the United Kingdom is to retain credibility on the world stage, our sanctions regime must be principled, consistent and enforced with resolve. Only then can it serve its true purpose: accountability for abusers, justice for victims and the defence of the values we claim to uphold.