Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill Debate
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Viscount Younger of Leckie
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Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (Viscount Younger of Leckie)
My Lords, in its 10th report of this parliamentary Session, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee considered that the exercise of a number of the powers in these provisions should be subject to the affirmative procedure, at least the first time that they are exercised. The amendments in this group take heed of this recommendation. I am pleased to say that, in fact, they go further by requiring that not just the first use of the powers but all uses be subject to the affirmative procedure. I trust that this additional, significant safeguard in the Bill gives due comfort and assurance to those who have expressed concerns about the exercise of these powers. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I shall say just a few words on the Minister’s very welcome amendments in response to the 10th report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It is very interesting. The committee demonstrated the value of a collective memory, as it took us all back to the Digital Economy Act and the comments that it made at the time; it has been entirely consistent. It is good to see that the Government have responded. However, I wonder, especially in light of the fact that the Minister has confirmed that the affirmative process will be used for Clause 68, whether he will also confirm that the affirmative process will be used when the Hargreaves exceptions are introduced under the European Communities Act. The Minister has clearly stated that the Government will not be using Clause 66 when those exceptions are introduced; it will be purely for penalties. We very much welcome the assurance that the Minister gave on Monday. However, will he take the opportunity to confirm that the scrutiny process will be by the affirmative procedure of both Houses when those draft statutory instruments come under the ECA procedure?
Baroness Buscombe
My Lords, I add my welcome for these amendments and thank the Minister.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, I begin by expressing my thanks to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones for the important part that he has played in the passage of the Bill so far. This is indeed a complex area and his contributions have demonstrated an unrivalled depth of knowledge and a robust grasp of the intricacies of this debate. I appreciate and respect the vigour with which he has presented his position to the Committee. The Government know that at the core of his work on the Bill is his determination to see a stronger and fairer copyright framework in the UK. In answer to his question concerning the affirmative procedure when the Hargreaves exceptions are implemented, I can confirm that we will use the affirmative procedure. This will, I hope, go some way towards answering the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson.
I am pleased that these amendments have been accepted in the spirit in which they were intended. The Government recognise that the powers in these provisions could have a significant impact on creators and users of copyright works. I am confident that these amendments ensure that any use of those powers will be subject to significant parliamentary scrutiny.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, we on this side of the Room support the introduction of the measures to do with orphan works and believe that the extended collective licensing system represents a good way forward, albeit, as has been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that it has to be done in conjunction with the copyright hub, which provides the missing ingredient in a lot of what we have been discussing recently.
As was made clear, we have some reservations about how the Government intend to ensure high standards of operation for collecting societies which are, after all, effectively monopolies in many sectors, so we are keen to see, at a very minimum, clarity on the standards to be set for collecting societies and transparency over the way the powers that the Government are taking will operate in practice. We also want to make sure that everything that needs to be done is done to make the copyright hub work well. The new regime and the copyright hub should ideally be brought into existence contemporaneously.
However, we are confident that things are moving in the right direction, and we hope that there will be opportunities for your Lordships’ House to be regularly updated on matters such as this so that we can feed in our continuing thoughts and support. I particularly refer to the point about photography, which I absolutely endorse. There is an issue there that we will need to keep an eye on. Assuming that everything is going well, we cannot support the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in opposing Clause 68 standing part of the Bill.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, the very limited extent to which orphan works can be used is not just a cultural issue, but a real economic issue. The clause will allow for commercial and non-commercial use of orphan works in the UK. The Government estimate this could lead to benefits of up to £220 million a year. Nine out of 10 respondents to the Government’s consultation were in favour of commercial use of orphan works. The UK scheme has more safeguards than the EU orphan works directive. It includes a requirement that any diligent search is verified by an independent authorising body. The authorising body will not be able to license itself.
We are also making provision for remuneration of rights holders at an appropriate rate for the type of work and type of use. The directive is less restrictive about this. Remuneration will be paid whenever a work is used. It is yet to be determined how long such money should be kept on escrow for the returning rights holder. However, after a certain period it is envisaged that unclaimed money will be redistributed. Where the money has come from publicly funded institutions, such as archives, it may be possible for that money to be returned to fund archiving, preservation and digitisation costs.
The Government are pleased that the digital copyright hub is developing but have not yet made any decisions about who will run the orphan works scheme. However, regardless of its final decision, these powers are needed to enable the chosen organisation legally to operate the scheme.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and other noble Lords raised concerns about the potential impact of these proposals on photographers. The Government continue to work with the photography sectors. The working group on orphan works and extended collective licensing contains significant representation from the world of photography, including the Association of Photographers, the British Association of Picture Libraries and Agencies and Stop43.
The Government appreciate that the stripping of metadata is a real problem for photographers. As noble Lords have noted, this is a current problem, and the practice continues despite the existence of legal instruments making it an offence. I am willing to meet noble Lords, who, in the course of this Committee session, have raised concerns, to discuss possible solutions to the problem of metadata stripping. This is an issue that is also being examined by the industry-led digital copyright hub, following Richard Hooper’s July report. However, the Government do not believe that the introduction of the orphan works scheme will negatively affect photographers, because historical photographs held in museums, archives and libraries, will form the bulk of photographs licensed under the scheme. If anything, the orphan works scheme will very likely improve matters, as it will become more obvious if works are being used unlawfully. Officially licensed orphan works, whether sourced from digital or analogue sources, will carry a reference to the authorising body. Courts may also take a dimmer view of infringement, if there is a legitimate and legal means of using orphan works.
The provisions on extended collective licensing are designed as a tool to help streamline rights clearance, but only where the sector wants it. We know that some collecting societies already operate extended collective licensing-type schemes, which are unregulated and unlawful. This means that rights holders are unprotected and could be missing out on money owed to them. A statutory basis for such schemes would help remedy this. The Government know that extended collective licensing might not be appropriate for all types of works or rights, which is why it can be initiated only by a representative collecting society acting with the explicit support of its members. The Government would have no power to impose extended collective licensing on a sector. Collecting societies tend to be monopoly suppliers in their sectors, so members and licensees cannot simply shop elsewhere.
The clause and schedule introduce provision for the statutory regulation of collecting societies, where self-regulation fails. Any collecting society that fails to meet the Government’s minimum standards for self-regulation would be required to adhere to a statutory code of practice. Collecting societies would have to comply with specified criteria, including on compliance and enforcement. The Government welcome the progress that the industry has made on a self-regulatory framework. Self-regulation remains the Government’s preferred approach. The safeguard of enforceable minimum standards will help to ensure that collecting societies operate in a manner that promotes open and efficient markets. If it works effectively, the reserve power will not be used.
Noble Lords have raised a number of questions. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones raised the issue of having to wait for the hub before undertaking extended collective licensing, and pointed out that we need extended collective licensing because we have the hub. Both schemes are designed to facilitate legal and properly remunerative use of works; they are two sides of the same coin. The fact that ECL-type schemes are already in use in the UK demonstrates that there is a need. ECL cannot be imposed on a sector; if rights holders prefer to use direct licensing through digital copyright exchange, the hub or another method entirely, that is their decision. The hub cannot act on orphan works without the legislation in Clause 68 in place.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones raised an issue that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, raised previously, on photographers suggesting that we delay the implementation of the orphan works directive until the October 2014 deadline, and then implement only to relieve any restrictions that the copyright hub failed to address. I understand the concerns behind this suggestion, but this is not an option because we need to implement the orphan works directive in full, and we cannot go outside the requirements of the directive without this clause. This means that no one, including the copyright hub, would be able to license orphan works without the power of this clause.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, in a further question, raised the issue of foreign rights holders who would not be able to monitor what is going on in the UK. The collecting society must produce evidence with its application to show how it deals with those affected, including foreign rights holders. I hope that that answers his question. He also raised the question of FOCAL and BAPLA, which were unhappy with the ECL. Photographers do not have to have ECL—it is voluntary and can be initiated by the collecting society only with the consent of members, as I mentioned earlier.
I believe that my noble friend Lady Buscombe stated that extended collective licensing in Nordic countries is different and guarantees remuneration for rights holders. However, collecting societies in the UK must also show how they will find non-member rights holders and distribute money that is collected to them. I hope that that goes a little way to answering my noble friend’s question. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Lord Lucas
My Lords, I rise not least for the pleasure of supporting entirely what my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, have just said. This is a very present problem in the way that the world is developing. We are getting some very large corporations controlling a lot of the flow of copyright material. The noble Lord mentioned the likes of Facebook but Amazon is just as bad, given the rights you are left with as an author as it moves into the publishing of e-books. If you put an e-book through to Amazon, you have to sign over to Amazon the entire control over what your work is sold for. The terms that it goes for are most astonishing. Generally, we need to remember that copyright is about enabling people to create and remunerating them properly for it, not enabling vast corporations to reap the benefits that we intend for the creators. I entirely support this change and very much hope that the Government, if not accepting this exact amendment, will see their way to doing something equivalent.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, a change to the scope of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, as envisaged by this amendment, would warrant considerable investigation and public consultation. For example, contracts governing copyright are specifically excluded from that Act. The Government would need to assess the potential implications of amending the Unfair Contract Terms Act to insert copyright within the scope of that Act. We believe that we understand the intent behind this amendment, which is to address issues surrounding contracts between individual creators and other businesses. However, it is unclear whether the amendment achieves this, since some parts of the Unfair Contract Terms Act would not apply to business-to-business contracts. I would be very happy to have further discussions on this complex matter with my noble friends Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Lucas, and indeed with the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. I hope that in the light of the above, my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones will be able to withdraw his amendment.
“(2) The regulations may provide that, if a licensing body fails to adopt such a code of practice, any code of practice that is approved for the purposes of that licensing body by the Secretary of State, or by a person designated by the Secretary of State under the regulations, has effect as a code of practice adopted by the body.
(3) The regulations must provide that a code is not to be approved for the purposes of provision under sub-paragraph (2) unless it complies with criteria specified in the regulations.”
Viscount Younger of Leckie
The government amendments in this group are in response to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s 10th report of this parliamentary Session. Government Amendments 33A, 46A and 46B are intended to put additional safeguards into the Bill. In particular, Amendment 33A seeks to ensure that when a code of practice is put in place for a licensing body, it must comply with the criteria specified in the regulations. As the regulations will have been through the affirmative procedure, this gives parliamentary oversight of the code being put in place for a licensing body.
Amendment 46A makes it clear that all the provisions under sub-paragraph (1) are included, while Amendment 46B is intended to clarify that both the determination that there has been a breach and any related sanctions are subject to an appeal process. Amendment 46B, I should mention, gives effect to the intention behind Amendment 47, tabled by my noble friends Lady Buscombe and Lord Clement-Jones. Finally, Amendment 50A removes the power to make regulations which impose requirements on licensing bodies by reference to guidance.
I trust that these additional safeguards will reassure the Committee and demonstrate that the Government have listened to the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and have taken action. I will not at this point speak to the amendments in this group that other Peers have tabled. I will instead wait to hear what they say, but I beg to move Amendment 33A.
Baroness Buscombe
My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing forward the series of amendments in this group and for his explanation. Although the government changes to Schedule 21 are to be welcomed, I suggest that the Government could edge even closer towards improving the Bill yet further. Briefly, I should like to respond to the government amendments and then introduce those in my name; namely, Amendments 34 through to 51, excepting Amendment 49, which is in the next group.
Amendment 33A responds to the concerns of the 10th report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Its concern, as we have already heard, was that the Bill will allow the requirements of the default code, enforced by penalties, to be imposed or revised without parliamentary scrutiny, given that failure to comply may lead to sanctions. Equally important as parliamentary scrutiny, in my view, is the fact that it is indispensable that the code criteria should be subject to consultation by interested, informed parties. That would be the effect of my Amendments 43 and 51.
I very much welcome the Minister adding his name to Amendment 46, which I tabled. That will help to ensure that the regulations must now set out the process for determining non-compliance, determining the type or size of the sanction and for providing a right of appeal. I also welcome Amendments 46A and 46B. As financial penalties will ultimately be borne by the collecting society’s members, fines should be imposed as a last resort. A right of appeal is essential. Also Amendments 50A, 51A and 51B are welcome additions to the Bill.
I turn to the series of amendments that I have tabled. Although the government amendments put forward are very welcome and a big step in the right direction, my amendments address separate issues which, with respect, still need to be considered. The purpose of these amendments is to provide even greater clarity in the Bill for Schedule 21, which would help to ensure that the Bill meets the stated aim of fostering successful self-regulation. The effect of the changes would be to reduce the considerable uncertainties surrounding future regulations because the powers currently provided for by this legislation are simply too vague, even with the Government’s latest amendments.
Collecting societies have invested considerable time and money in adopting and operating voluntary codes of conduct. PRS for Music introduced a voluntary code of practice for licensees as far back as 2009 and then one for its members in 2010. Many other collecting societies have followed suit. The British Copyright Council’s Principles for Collective Management Organisations’ Code of Conduct, known as the BCC principles, are important to reference here, as many of these codes of conduct for members and users comply with these guiding principles, which have at their heart a commitment to transparency, accountability and good governance. I suggest that those are all good Conservative principles.
These collecting society voluntary codes also have regard to the Government’s recently published minimum standards for collecting societies and, therefore, include an independent complaints review ombudsman. Independent adjudication of a complaint is obviously an important feature of any sensible self-regulatory system. Those BCC principles also include provision for an independent code review process. This first such review is intended to start in November 2013. In short, the principles of good self-regulation are established and are generally being operated successfully by collecting societies.
Amendments are necessary to the Bill to make the path from voluntary to statutory regulation much clearer than is currently outlined in the legislation. It is only reasonable, I suggest, to give businesses the certainty that they deserve. After all, it is a big step to move from self-regulation to underpinning with state regulation.
First, it should be clarified that the majority of the powers in Schedule 21 are exercisable only in a scenario where it has been adjudged through a fair, robust and transparent process that there has been an unremedied failure of self-regulation. The imposition of a statutory code, and/or any statutory appointment of an ombudsman or code reviewer, will lead to significant additional costs and potential exposure to penalties, and should therefore be imposed only when it is clear that self-regulation has failed. Collecting societies need to have visibility of what triggers the imposition of statutory regulation so that they are not left in the dark about whether they are close to or far from crossing the line.
Equally, given that collecting societies are already offering, or on the point of offering, ombudsman dispute-resolution services and providing for a code reviewer, the regulations should also make it plain under what circumstances the Secretary of State would appoint a statutory ombudsman or code reviewer. Amendments 34 and 50 serve to clarify the processes and specific circumstances that would enable the Secretary of State to impose such regulation.
Improvements to the Bill can also be made so that the penalties for non-compliance much clearer and more proportionate. This is why I am proposing Amendments 44, 45 and 48. The Bill provides for sanctions in case there is failure to abide by a code. These sanctions include financial penalties that may be imposed on directors and other personnel. The highest fine stated in the legislation is £50,000. Under the Companies Act 2006, penalties on individuals arise in relation to very specific failures. Codes of conduct are typically of a general nature. I therefore believe it is unacceptable to impose personal liability and financial penalties for undefined offences that are less specific than UK company law.
Let us remember that all collecting society revenues are distributed to members after management costs are deducted, and fines are therefore a direct penalty on the membership itself. Any fines would be paid for by the members of the collecting society. There is a strong argument that fines on societies should be imposed only as a last resort. Instead, it would be more sensible to provide appropriate help or assistance to a society that has been deemed to have failed, as opposed to simply punishment.
I have also tabled Amendments 35 to 42, which are effectively technical. Paragraph 3 refers to a licensing code ombudsman. Codes of practice typically govern a collecting society’s relationship with its members and its licensees. I propose that the phrase “licensing code” should be deleted because it is not appropriate.
Let me conclude by saying that we should not forget that compliance with regulation is costly; and, ultimately, the resources which are devoted to regulation must in effect be paid for by the creator members themselves. It is entirely reasonable that the penalties for non-compliance are clearly set out and proportionate. This Government support the principle of good self-regulation; they should therefore take this opportunity to do just that and reduce the uncertainties provided for by the current drafting.
Lord Young of Norwood Green
My Lords, these government amendments, brought forward in response to the DPRRC recommendations, put flesh on the points that we made in respect of the previous group. As we said, we support the introduction of measures to deal with orphan works and believe that extended collective licensing is the way forward. We also want to see the copyright hub being developed, as we have said. These amendments go some way towards ensuring greater clarity over the standards to be set for collecting societies and transparency in how the powers that the Government are taking will operate in practice, and we are happy to support them.
The amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, aim to put more detail into the Bill on how the Government intend to supervise collecting societies and on what might constitute the minimum conditions and procedures that might be required, which would ensure that the Government can step in and require a body to adapt the Government’s standards for collecting societies. I shall listen carefully to what the Minister says in response to the amendments proposed by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, but at present we take the view that much of what is requested is more appropriate for secondary legislation.
I take the opportunity to say, as somebody who spent a few months of my life dealing with the previous Digital Economy Bill, of which orphan works were a part, but they unfortunately disappeared in the wash-up process, it is nice to know that at long last we seem to be getting near to liberating orphan works for the collective benefit of society as a whole. I welcome the Minister’s comments.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
First, I appreciate the general support of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Norwood Green.
On Amendments 34 and 50, there is already provision in the Bill for consultation before the appointment of a code reviewer. We have considered the proposals to put all processes for the appointment of an ombudsman and the implementation of a statutory code on the face of the Bill. However, the Government, together with stakeholders, need to learn how the schemes work in practice and respond as they evolve. This will help us quickly to remedy any unforeseen issues that result in problems or injustices for rights holders. We have considered Amendments 35 to 42 carefully and believe that the term “licensing code ombudsman” more accurately describes the functions of the role. That role is to investigate and determine disputes about a collecting society’s compliance with its code of practice.
On Amendments 43 and 51, as I noted with regard to Amendments 34 and 50, the Bill already makes provision for consultation when appointing a code reviewer. This is important to ensure independence of process. Codes of practice will be subject to specific criteria, which will be set out in regulations subject to consultation. Therefore, the Government do not consider that additional consultation is necessary.
We have spent some time looking at Amendments 44 and 45 on the power to impose sanctions on individual directors. Where it can be demonstrated that a director is responsible for non-compliance with a code, it is only right that they should be sanctioned. The default should not be to penalise collecting society members. The Government agree with the intent behind Amendment 46, which is consistent with the comments made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Therefore we accept this amendment.
On Amendment 47, I confirm that an appeal mechanism will be available for decisions on non-compliance and for any resulting sanction. This was earlier clarified in government Amendment 46B.
Finally turning to Amendment 48, the Government can confirm that these fees will apply only to a licensing body being regulated. If a licensing body adopts a code of practice which complies with the criteria specified in the regulations, no fees arise in connection with paragraph 1 of the schedule. In addition, paragraph 6(2) of the schedule contains a protection for licensing bodies, limiting the aggregate amount of fees payable for administration and operation of the regulations.
I shall respond to a number of questions raised by noble Lords. In her general comments, my noble friend Lady Buscombe raised the code criteria, which should be subject to consultation. Although I may well have covered this in my previous speech, the code criteria will largely be based on minimum standards on which there will already have been consultation. Specified criteria will be part of the regulations and will be consulted on.
In her general comments, my noble friend Lady Buscombe also raised the work done by the collecting societies on self-regulation. The Government welcome the work they have done and what they have achieved. I repeat that self-regulation is the preferred option, but we need a back-stop if it fails, a protection for licensees and members when dealing with monopoly suppliers. My noble friend Lady Buscombe also said that fines should be used only as a last resort. I entirely agree that they should be a last resort. We do, however, need an ultimate sanction, and fines would provide that.
My noble friend Lady Buscombe also mentioned collecting society revenues which are distributed to members, who are affected by fines, instead of giving help to failing collective societies. I agree with her; this is why, if a director is responsible, he or she, rather than the collecting society members, should be held accountable. Finally, my noble friend Lady Buscombe asked what triggers statutory regulation. The provisions for an independent code reviewer, who will independently assess the performance against the code, are the trigger. I hope that I have answered all the questions raised by noble friends and, if not, I will certainly write to them.
Baroness Buscombe
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his explanation of the various amendments to which I have spoken today. Of course, I want to think about what he has said, but the confirmation of an appeal mechanism is very welcome. I am always concerned about leaving too much to regulations. I remember that when we were in opposition the previous Government too often left so much to regulation, and we always complained about that. I find now that we are in a similar situation. It all comes down to certainty and clarity, hence the main purpose behind the amendments we have tabled. It is a huge step to go from pure self-regulation to having a back-stop power. I think it is right to say that the industry in large part does not oppose that back-stop power in principle. It is asking for as much certainly and clarity as possible and for the Government to recognise the work the industry has done and is continuing to do to put and keep its house in good order, so that creators and the works that they do are protected, and properly so.
We welcome the Minister’s support and understanding of the position of creators and their concerns in this regard. For my part, I think that the key to successful self-regulation is that all the parties involved in it are positive and buy into the system. It works extremely well as long as there is no uncertainty or a spectre of what they would deem unfair or disproportionate state interference. So often, the bottom line is that state interference leads to delay and cost. Just as within any court of law, delay and cost never produce a happy outcome, even for the person who comes out on top. It is not a happy resolution, and that is why I also referred to dispute resolution. I am pleased that the Minister has said that the Government want to be seen to be helping the industry as opposed to coming in with something of a cosh to deter those working in the industry doing the right thing or feeling that what they are doing is worth while and is properly protecting their members.
I do not want to delay this further, so I thank the Minister for his supportive comments. I will take his thoughts away and consider further whether we should come back on Report with further amendments, just to provide certainty in the Bill.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, I shall begin with Amendment 49. I can confirm that it would not be possible to make unconnected changes to the jurisdiction of the Copyright Tribunal under the power in Schedule 21.
Turning to Amendments 56A and 56B, I can assure the Committee that the proposed schemes already take account of the range of interested parties affected by them. Let me explain how. First, on extended collective licensing, the Government intend that the regulations will allow any affected party the chance to comment on a collecting society’s application before a final decision is reached. A collecting society authorised to grant licences must take into account the interests of affected parties including its members, its licensees and non-member rights holders. These obligations are required to be in the collecting society’s code of practice. An independent code reviewer will measure performance against these obligations. Where there has been an alleged breach of a code, rights holders and licensees will have recourse to an independent ombudsman.
Turning to orphan works, the orphan works authorising body is independent and will not be able to license itself. I submit that this is a stronger safeguard than that proposed by these amendments. The Government concur that representative rights holders, wherever possible, should be on the governing body. In practice, this will not always be possible with some types of orphan works, for example, old diaries, correspondence and other material never intended for publication or commercial use.
I would like to clarify an issue which was raised by my noble friend Lady Buscombe concerning Amendment 49. Any changes to the jurisdiction of the tribunal should be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny. All regulations, including changes to tribunal jurisdiction, are now subject to the affirmative procedure.
The Government have carefully considered these amendments, and I hope that in the light of my response my noble friend Lady Buscombe feels able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Turner of Camden
My Lords, I support my noble friend on this amendment. I sat through the earlier discussions which were not within my particular area of involvement but this certainly is. Of course, transparency is very important in employment relations. My noble friend has just said that my party has no problem with high pay, but we all have problems with low pay. Taxpayers have problems with low pay because it involves the Government paying out welfare. That is the sort of problem that shareholders should be forced to face from time to time, and would be bound to do so under the terms of this amendment. Therefore, I hope that the Government will understand that this is in line with good practice, that it operates throughout the best part of English commerce and industry and that it is something that we should have in the Bill. I hope that the Government will feel inclined to support it.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, noble Lords are very familiar with the arguments in favour of action on directors’ remuneration in quoted companies. In my opening remarks, I will be echoing many of the sentiments expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, and particularly picking up on the transparency aspect, as expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Turner.
Over the past decade, directors’ pay packages have risen on average by 13% per year, while the value of many of the companies they run has remained broadly static and workers’ wages have risen at a much slower rate. Business and investors recognise that this disconnect between pay and performance is damaging and not in the long-term interests of the economy. As Sir Roger Carr, president of the CBI has said:
“Now is the time to be more transparent, more responsible and more accountable”.
It is not government’s role to micromanage company pay, but there are actions that we can take to address what is a clear market failure.
Eighteen months ago, the Government initiated a broad, national debate on this issue. This has encouraged shareholders to become more engaged as owners of companies during the so-called shareholder spring. In 2012, several firms saw their remuneration reports voted down, including big companies such as Aviva and WPP. We have also seen many companies taking the initiative and engaging constructively in response. This is an important step for encouraging more responsible paysetting.
The Government’s reforms will build on this, and promote better engagement between companies and shareholders. By giving shareholders clearer information about what directors are paid and binding votes on pay policy, shareholders will be better equipped to hold companies to account. Business and shareholders agree that this comprehensive package of reforms strikes the right balance. It will promote a stronger link between directors’ pay and company performance but avoid placing unnecessary or inappropriate burdens on companies. The head of the Association of British Insurers has said that these proposals,
“are practical, workable and should help tackle excessive executive pay”.
The amendment requires that companies report on high and low pay outside the board. The issue of high pay below board level is most prevalent in the financial services industry because poorly designed remuneration structures can incentivise excessive risk-taking—a point alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell. The Government are committed to improving remuneration disclosure in banks and achieved progress on disclosure below board level as part of Project Merlin. At the same time, Europe has proposed bringing in its own disclosure rules. We await the outcome of these negotiations before deciding on how to proceed with any domestic proposals for disclosure below board level at banks. The Government will argue strongly for the right outcome and remain committed to ensuring that the UK has a transparent and comprehensive remuneration disclosure regime for all companies, including the financial services sector.
However, we do not believe that high pay below board level is a major issue in other sectors. Through our consultations with investors, we learned that there is no demand for such a disclosure, which, if adopted, would place an unnecessary regulatory burden on companies.
Regarding the pay of employees more generally and how directors’ pay compares to that of lower-paid workers, the Government recognise that this is an issue of concern for shareholders, employees and the public in general. We want remuneration committees to consider the broader context when setting top pay. That is why, under government proposals, companies will have to say more about how they have taken into account pay of employees at all levels, and publish the percentage increase in pay of the chief executive officer compared to that of the workforce.
Last year, we published a draft of the regulations that will implement these proposals. These regulations will determine the content of remuneration reports in future. We invited people to comment on the draft regulations and a copy is available in the House Library. Noble Lords will have the opportunity to debate this matter thoroughly later this year when these regulations are brought forward.
Amendment 58BB would mandate that regulations prescribing the content of directors’ remuneration reports must require companies to disclose information about fees paid to remuneration and recruitment consultants in respect of directors’ remuneration. Noble Lords will be aware that the Secretary of State already has the power to require companies to disclose this type of information in the directors’ remuneration report and that we have published draft regulations that would give effect to this. Under these proposals, companies would be required to explain how consultants have been appointed, what services they have provided and how much they have been paid. By way of an update for the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, we invited comments on these draft regulations and are currently considering the responses.
The noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, rightly drew attention to pay in banks, which I alluded to in my remarks. However, it is worth re-emphasising that high pay outside the boardroom is most prevalent in financial services, and we want to see greater scrutiny of how senior executives in large banks are incentivised because their behaviour can have a material impact on a firm’s risk profile. That is why we have committed to extending pay disclosure in large banks to highly paid non-board executives. This would mean that the UK had the most transparent bank pay of any major financial centre, but we do not propose to apply this in other sectors, as mentioned earlier, where it is less relevant. We consulted on this and found that there was no demand from investors for this extra information. Indeed, it would be an unnecessary extra reporting burden on companies.
I thank the noble Lord for raising this issue, but I suggest that the amendment is unnecessary, given that the Government already have the power to do this and have proposed considerable action in this area. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Mitchell
I thank the Minister for that reply. I think we are not too far away in our philosophy and in what we would like to do in this section of the Bill. What we are suggesting would perhaps give the Bill a little more bite than it has at the moment. It is something we need to think about. My instinct is that we need to pursue these amendments.
I shall say one thing in particular. I do not understand why non-financial companies are not part of this. If I were a shareholder, I would like to know this information, even if it were—to name one company—WPP, which is not in financial services. There are many companies out there that pay pretty massive salaries, and I do not understand why they should be excluded from this. The Minister said that consultation with the investment community showed otherwise, but for all of us who invest in companies, this is key information that we should have. I hope the Minister takes into account what I have said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, I concur with the noble Lord, Lord Young, in his interesting remarks that the interests of employees are important as a company cannot excel, or indeed properly function, without a workforce that is committed, motivated and content. This includes being content with their remuneration package in relation to their peers and superiors.
I should also like to pick up the point he raised concerning companies taking into account employees’ pay and their views. He is quite right: in revised remuneration reports, companies will now have to say whether, and if so how, they have taken into account employees’ views on executive pay and policy. In addition, they will have to publish the percentage increase in pay of the chief executive officer and that of the workforce, as I mentioned earlier. These will be discussed in more detail when we debate the regulations.
Amendment 58BC would require companies to consult an employee representative if they propose to change their remuneration policy before the next AGM. The Government agree with the view that it can be useful for companies to engage with their employees when considering directors’ pay. It is important that remuneration committees make their decisions based on a broad range of reliable and robust information. We know that some companies are already doing this and we want to encourage more to do so. That is why we have proposed that, in their annual remuneration reports, companies disclose whether, and if so how, they have sought employee views. They must also say how they have taken employee pay into account.
We also encourage employees to take up existing mechanisms to air their views, such as information and consultation arrangements, employee representative committees and works councils. However, we do not believe that it is necessary to create a statutory duty to consult employees on this matter. It is up to companies and their shareholders to decide whether, and if so how, to go about it. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 58BC.
Lord Young of Norwood Green
I thank the Minister for his comments, some of which I found helpful. I will read the points he has made carefully in Hansard. Some of them were a step in the right direction and we will consider whether they have gone far enough. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, Amendments 58BD, 58BF and 58BG would make the vote on remuneration policy a special resolution, requiring companies to secure the support of 75% of shareholders to pass. The level of support required for remuneration resolutions is a matter that the Government have consulted on extensively. The vast majority of investors agree that the vote on pay policy should remain an ordinary resolution. They would be concerned if a minority of shareholders could overturn the views of a majority. In cases where voting turnout is low, it would take only a small number of activist investors to reject the pay policy.
Investors have welcomed the Government’s decision to keep this as an ordinary resolution. They have shown this year that a majority of shareholders are often willing to vote against egregious pay policies. In 2012, we saw a succession of companies lose the vote on pay policy with at least 50% opposition from shareholders, as the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, said. Special resolutions should be reserved for rare issues that have a major impact on shareholder rights or company value, such as recapitalisation or changing the articles of the company.
However, the Government agree that companies should have to take action when a large minority of shareholders reject a remuneration resolution, even if legally it has been passed. Therefore, the Government welcome the Financial Reporting Council’s commitment to look at whether companies should formally respond when a significant number of shareholders vote against a pay resolution and to consult on this being in the Corporate Governance Code.
Amendment 58BE would remove the requirement for companies to put their remuneration policy to a shareholder resolution at least every three years—triennially—and instead require that this is done annually. We considered that carefully when consulting with investors and companies. They welcome the option of a three-year pay policy, which encourages companies to plan for the long term and discourages them from making annual tweaks to pay packages. Investors agree that this will help to put a brake on annual pay ratcheting.
Major investors and investor bodies, including the Association of British Insurers, have backed this approach. The ABI has said that it will,
“help the task of keeping executive pay proportionate and aligned to corporate strategy”.
Of course, companies can choose to have an annual vote on pay policy and will be required to if they make any change to it. However, if the policy remains totally unchanged, it is an unnecessary burden on both companies and shareholders to require a vote on it.
We have, however, built in a safety net. Shareholders will continue to have an annual advisory vote on how the pay policy is being implemented. If they are not satisfied, they can oppose the advisory vote and this will trigger a requirement to have a binding vote on the pay policy at the next AGM. Shareholders also have the existing right to force a resolution at an EGM. That means that shareholders could force an annual binding vote on remuneration policy, should they wish to.
The noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, asked whether the high-profile votes against pay last year were a flash in the pan. As he said, last year we saw several such votes against high pay—he cited some examples—which were a step in the right direction. We are pleased that shareholders and businesses are increasingly working together to sort out pay issues, but it will take more than one year to do so. The government reforms will come into force in October this year and will give shareholders more power to push for change. Looking further ahead at least 18 months, if we see less public anger over pay because companies have sensible pay packages, we will have gone some way towards succeeding.
The noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, echoing remarks made by my noble friend Lord Razzall, raised the recent Kay review, and I am grateful to noble Lords for their welcome of that review on how to encourage a more long-term view in our equity markets. This is one of the reasons why, after consultation, we considered that a three-year vote best enabled us to focus shareholders and directors on the long-term value of the company.
Given the wide support for the approach that the Government have taken on this issue, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Mitchell
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his comments. We are perhaps a little further away from each other than we were on the previous amendments. As the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, said, it is some event when the TUC and the CBI come together on such a key issue, but we still feel that the annual side of this is an important issue.
I shall deal with the special resolution and the 75%. It is part of what we are saying about the need for this issue to be treated as important. In the next round, we would probably want to keep it as it is, but I will think about it. As for the annual side, and the request that it stays on a triennial basis, every single year at annual general meetings a series of issues go through, such as the approval of auditors and accounts. I do not see any reason at all why there should not be an approval of directors’ remuneration principle and package; it should slot in: one; two; three. I am sure that is the correct way for it to be. It does not matter what companies want to do. It is what we should be telling companies to do, so that those who invest and are stakeholders in those companies can really understand what has been going on in the past 12 months.
Having made those points, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“( ) particulars of any remuneration payment (within the meaning of Chapter 4A of Part 10) made or to be made to the person after ceasing to be a director, including its amount and how it was calculated,”
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, Amendments 58BH, 58BJ and 58BK relate to the information that must be published by a company when a person ceases to be a director. They seek to clarify the information that must be disclosed and ensure complete transparency. Whenever a person ceases to be a director, shareholders want to know the details of their exit package. At present they may have to wait several months before they find this out. We believe that requiring companies to publish this information as soon as possible after a director departs will help to put pressure on companies to moderate such payments. Clause 72 introduces this requirement and requires the company to publish on its website details of payments for loss of office. However, because of the complexity of directors’ pay, some payments made after loss of office will technically be classed as remuneration payments rather than loss of office payments, so, legally, companies would not have to include details of them. Such payments can represent a substantial part of an individual’s exit package and so should form part of the disclosure on a company’s website. These amendments address this gap, bringing within scope,
“particulars of any remuneration payment … made or to be made to the person after ceasing to be a director, including its amount and how it was calculated”.
This will close a loophole which could otherwise have been exploited by companies attempting to evade the spirit of the legislation by not making full disclosures on exit payments. I beg to move.
Lord Mitchell
My Lords, we welcome this amendment. It is in the spirit of giving shareholders more information. We are very happy to support it.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
I am pleased to have support for these minor and technical amendments.
“Supply of customer data
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations require a regulated person to provide customer data—
(a) to a customer, at the customer’s request;(b) to a person who is authorised by a customer to receive the data, at the customer’s request or, if the regulations so provide, at the authorised person’s request. (2) “Regulated person” means—
(a) a person who, in the course of a business, supplies gas or electricity to any premises;(b) a person who, in the course of a business, provides a mobile phone service;(c) a person who, in the course of a business, provides financial services consisting of the provision of current account or credit card facilities; (d) any other person who, in the course of a business, supplies or provides goods or services of a description specified in the regulations.(3) “Customer data” means information which—
(a) is held in electronic form by or on behalf of the regulated person, and(b) relates to transactions between the regulated person and the customer.(4) Regulations under subsection (1) may make provision as to the form in which customer data is to be provided and when it is to be provided (and any such provision may differ depending on the form in which a request for the data is made).
(5) Regulations under subsection (1)—
(a) may authorise the making of charges by a regulated person for complying with requests for customer data, and(b) if they do so, must provide that the amount of any such charge—(i) is to be determined by the regulated person, but(ii) may not exceed the cost to that person of complying with the request.(6) Regulations under subsection (1)(b) may provide that the requirement applies only if the authorised person satisfies any conditions specified in the regulations.
(7) In deciding whether to specify a description of goods or services for the purposes of subsection (2)(d), the Secretary of State must (among other things) have regard to the following—
(a) the typical duration of the period during which transactions between suppliers or providers of the goods or services and their customers take place;(b) the typical volume and frequency of the transactions;(c) the typical significance for customers of the costs incurred by them through the transactions;(d) the effect that specifying the goods or services might have on the ability of customers to make an informed choice about which supplier or provider of the goods or services, or which particular goods or services, to use;(e) the effect that specifying the goods or services might have on competition between suppliers or providers of the goods or services.(8) The power to make regulations under this section may be exercised—
(a) so as to make provision generally, only in relation to particular descriptions of regulated persons, customers or customer data or only in relation to England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland;(b) so as to make different provision for different descriptions of regulated persons, customers or customer data;(c) so as to make different provision in relation to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland;(d) so as to provide for exceptions or exemptions from any requirement imposed by the regulations, including doing so by reference to the costs to the regulated person of complying with the requirement (whether generally or in particular cases).(9) For the purposes of this section, a person (“C”) is a customer of another person (“R”) if—
(a) C has at any time, including a time before the commencement of this section, purchased (whether for the use of C or another person) goods or services supplied or provided by R or received such goods or services free of charge, and(b) the purchase or receipt occurred—(i) otherwise than in the course of a business, or(ii) in the course of a business of a description specified in the regulations. (10) In this section, “mobile phone service” means an electronic communications service which is provided wholly or mainly so as to be available to members of the public for the purpose of communicating with others, or accessing data, by mobile phone.”
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, we announced at Second Reading our intention to introduce into the Bill a new provision on Midata. There are three elements to this new provision. The first relates to the supply of customer data, the second relates to the enforcement regime for the supply of customer data and the third is supplemental and explains how regulations would be introduced. I will explain each of these in more detail, but let me first say a little about what we are seeking to achieve by these amendments.
Midata is currently a voluntary programme led by an independent chair, Professor Nigel Shadbolt. Its aim is to encourage suppliers of goods and services to provide to their customers, upon request, their personal historic transaction and/or consumption data in an electronic machine-readable format. The provision we are seeking to introduce into this Bill is a power to impose a duty on business to supply certain data upon request from a consumer. Let me be clear that business already holds this information electronically and is simply being asked to give it back to consumers.
Let me reassure the Committee that the Government remain keen to see businesses continue to engage with the voluntary programme so that quick progress can be made without the need to resort to regulation. What we want, however, is flexibility to give the Midata programme legislative backing, if it is appropriate to do so, for the benefit of consumers and business in this area of increasing economic potential for the UK.
Midata gives consumers more control and access to their personal and transaction data, and UK businesses will be able to take advantage of new opportunities as potential developments in the data market continue to emerge. There are two main benefits from Midata. First, services which analyse and make sense of consumers’ transaction data will emerge and will help people to manage their spending much more effectively, putting them in a stronger position and better able to deal with the increased cost of living.
How valuable could that be? The company, billmonitor, estimates that 74% of UK mobile users with a contract spend an average of £171 more each than they need to every year, equating to almost £6 billion per year in unnecessary costs. A better alignment between consumer need and purchasing will enhance competition and this in turn will reward firms offering the best value products in particular markets, allowing them to win more customers, make profits and better utilise resources.
Secondly, Midata will act as a platform for innovation and will help to strengthen the competitive digital economy in the UK. It will lead to the creation of new businesses which will help people to manage, interpret and interact with their consumption data in many innovative ways. So what might people do? Services such as Money Dashboard or lovemoney already provide people with an instant, true view of their finances in one place, which helps individuals aggregate information about their money from multiple different financial services providers to gain a rounded picture of their financial affairs but are hampered by constraints in accessing the data. At present, consumers cannot always receive this information through existing mechanisms, or they may struggle to find it in a format that can be easily reused.
Giving consumers the right to obtain their own transaction and consumption data in portable electronic format will make it easier for them to use tools such as those I have described. They would simply be able to plug their past transaction or consumption data in at the press of a button. Automating the provision of data will also make such services cheaper to provide while making it easier for companies to provide innovative new services which can make use of the data. In this way, Midata can help turn a niche market for sophisticated money management tools into a mass market.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, I welcome the general support given to Midata by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, in her initial remarks. I listened carefully to the large number of points that she raised. She has clearly put a lot of thought into the issue and I would like to address as many of the concerns that she raised as possible. It may well be that I do not cover them all, in which case, I will write to her.
The first issue I want to address is the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, raised concerning the British Retail Consortium and the objections that they have expressed on Midata. To re-emphasise the point—the focus of the power of this Bill are the four core sectors of energy, mobile phones, current accounts and credit cards. We cannot say that there will never be circumstances where Ministers believe including supermarkets within the regulations is worthwhile. But, before they do so, they will have to take account of the factors set out in proposed subsection (7) in Amendment 58C. The relevant legislation to effect such a change would be subject to enhanced parliamentary scrutiny through the affirmative procedure.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, asked whether it was true that consumer bodies had been warning about the risk of this programme for some time. It is true that the Government continue to work with consumer representative groups and business to tackle any potential risks to consumers—the point that she raised. A range of consumer bodies endorsed the principles of Midata published by the Government in 2011, such as Citizens Advice, Consumer Focus and the Office of Fair Trading. Members of these consumer organisations also sit on the Midata strategy board, which is responsible for driving the direction of the overall programme. However, the Government are taking these concerns seriously and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills will continue to work closely with consumer groups to ensure that consumer privacy is protected.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, asked whether the Information Commissioner actually wanted the role of enforcement. I can reassure her that Ministers have discussed this with him directly and he was, indeed, willing to take on the role. The noble Baroness also asked if this was an appropriate role for the Information Commissioner and whether he had enough resources to undertake this particular role. We have had detailed discussions with the ICO on how the enforcement regime could work for Midata. If regulations are brought forward in the future, we are confident that the ICO’s existing expertise in data protection will help it to effectively enforce the Midata right for consumers. In addition, we did not want to place any additional cost burden on business, but we have included provisions enabling other bodies to be designated as enforcers, if that is later decided to be more appropriate than the ICO. For example, if we were to regulate for one sector only, it might be appropriate to designate a particular sector regulator.
The noble Baroness raised the issue of data protection. Existing consumer protections would still apply under Midata. All organisations that process personal data in the UK, including for the purposes of the Midata initiative, must comply with the Data Protection Act’s eight data protection principles. The DPA is enforced by the independent Information Commissioner’s Office, which has powers of prosecution and can issue monetary penalty notices requiring organisations to pay up to £500,000 for serious breaches of the DPA.
The noble Baroness also raised the issue of exclusions for smaller companies. I mentioned earlier that she will remember the issue of micro-businesses. The power allows flexibility for smaller companies to be excluded at the regulation stage. I hope that reassures the noble Baroness on that particular point.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, also raised the issue as to whether consumers would be charged. The regulations could allow for consumers to be charged if that is considered appropriate at that particular stage. The new clause already limits such charges to the cost of complying with the request for data.
There are two more questions raised by the noble Baroness. First, she asked why there has been no government lead on providing public sector data. These measures will not apply to the public sector. However, in parallel, the Government are looking at issues of public sector data. The Open Data White Paper sets out the Government’s position and plans on public sector data release.
The noble Baroness also asked what form the regulations would take. The Government want first and foremost to encourage voluntary progress on this particular Midata programme. If regulations are subsequently brought forward, they will be shaped by consultations with stakeholders first.
The Government will continue to engage with business, consumer groups, regulators and trade bodies involved in the voluntary programme to accelerate progress as well as to broaden our engagement with other sectors. In bringing forward these amendments, we are conscious that a balance needs to be struck between the rights of individuals, the costs to businesses and wider benefits to the economy. This balance also needs to reflect the digital age and the increasing amount of data that is now unavoidably available.
We believe that giving consumers the right to obtain their own transaction and consumption data in portable electronic format, thus enabling them to use tools to manage this information in a smart way, is an effective way to empower consumers in the 21st century, which is good for business and good for the economy.
Lord Whitty
It seems to me that the Minister was talking about charging by the current owner of the information, or provider—the person with whom you are dealing through your mobile phone company. But I understand that the Government envisage there being new intermediaries in this area that will obviously be looking for a profit out of it for themselves and to use that data in different ways. Would that restriction on charging apply to them? In a sense, you have doubled the administrative time with a provider and an organisation that is being subcontracted by that provider to deal with the consumer. It also complicates data protection and potential liability and redress.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, makes an interesting point. I will need to double check and revert to him to clarify his point.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. I am particularly reassured by the ongoing discussions with consumer groups. Perhaps it was not clear in what he said—I did not quite hear it—but it seemed to me that he said that no extra resources would be made available to the Information Commissioner. If that is not the case, perhaps that could be clarified.
“Supply of customer data: enforcement
(1) Regulations may make provision for the enforcement of regulations under section (Supply of customer data) (“customer data regulations”) by the Information Commissioner or any other person specified in the regulations (and, in this section, “enforcer” means a person on whom functions of enforcement are conferred by the regulations).
(2) The provision that may be made under subsection (1) includes provision—
(a) for applications for orders requiring compliance with the customer data regulations to be made by an enforcer to a court or tribunal;(b) for notices requiring compliance with the customer data regulations to be issued by an enforcer and for the enforcement of such notices (including provision for their enforcement as if they were orders of a court or tribunal).(3) The provision that may be made under subsection (1) also includes provision—
(a) as to the powers of an enforcer for the purposes of investigating whether there has been, or is likely to be, a breach of the customer data regulations or of orders or notices of a kind mentioned in subsection (2)(a) or (b) (which may include powers to require the provision of information and powers of entry, search, inspection and seizure);(b) for the enforcement of requirements imposed by an enforcer in the exercise of such powers (which may include provision comparable to any provision that is, or could be, included in the regulations for the purposes of enforcing the customer data regulations).(4) Regulations under subsection (1) may—
(a) require an enforcer (if not the Information Commissioner) to inform the Information Commissioner if the enforcer intends to exercise functions under the regulations in a particular case;(b) provide for functions under the regulations to be exercisable by more than one enforcer (whether concurrently or jointly);(c) where such functions are exercisable concurrently by more than one enforcer—(i) designate one of the enforcers as the lead enforcer;(ii) require the other enforcers to consult the lead enforcer before exercising the functions in a particular case;(iii) authorise the lead enforcer to give directions as to which of the enforcers is to exercise the functions in a particular case.(5) Regulations may make provision for applications for orders requiring compliance with the customer data regulations to be made to a court or tribunal by a customer who has made a request under those regulations or in respect of whom such a request has been made.
(6) Subsection (8)(a) to (c) of section (Supply of customer data) applies for the purposes of this section as it applies for the purposes of that section.
(7) The Secretary of State may make payments out of money provided by Parliament to an enforcer.
(8) In this section, “customer” and “regulated person” have the same meaning as in section (Supply of customer data).”
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, we very much welcome the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, and the noble Baroness, particularly their intention to clarify investors’ fiduciary duty. The amendments, as have been suggested, would clarify that institutional investors are not legally obliged to maximise short-term profits at any cost but “may”—that word was emphasised—take into account wider factors, such as the long-term sustainability of returns. This is modelled on Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, which similarly clarified that company directors may take account of longer-term and wider factors, such as their impact on communities or the environment.
We on this side tabled remarkably similar amendments to the Financial Services Bill last year. We remain of the view that the position of those who hold money or assets on behalf of others, and who take decisions about those assets, should have their real owners’ or beneficiaries’ interests centre stage. The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets of July 2012 acknowledged a problem with misinterpretations of fiduciary duties, based on what he said was,
“a narrow interpretation of the interests of … beneficiaries which focused on maximising financial returns over a short timescale and prevented the consideration of longer term factors which might impact on company performance, including questions of sustainability or … social impact”.
This can lead to unhelpful short-term behaviour by investors and is a barrier to the adoption of the stewardship approach. The Kay report concluded that,
“there is a need to clarify how these duties should be applied in the context of investment, given the widespread concerns about how these standards are interpreted”.
The Bill in front of us is about enterprise and long-term growth. The Government are giving shareholders additional rights, which we welcome, but these must be balanced with duties to the underlying beneficiaries, who may have wider interests than just immediate returns. These amendments propose that there should be no legal barriers to consideration of those beneficiaries’ interests. They do not mandate anything but they clarify the law. The amendments are, we would say, permissive rather than prescriptive, and would ensure that the law does not prevent trustees from taking a broader approach. The provision does not mandate them to do so; in fact, it restores the primacy of trustees’ discretion in deciding how best to serve their beneficiaries, as opposed to assuming that the law restricts them to taking a particular approach.
The amendments make it clear that the duty of fiduciary investors is solely to their beneficiaries, and that the interests of beneficiaries must be the basis for all decisions. They clarify that this need not always mean maximising short-term profits: if trustees believe that their beneficiaries’ interests will be better served by taking into account wider factors, they will be empowered to do so. Indeed, where trustees choose to take account of purely non-financial factors—such as beneficiaries’ ethical views or implications for their quality of life—the amendments specify that this must not be to the detriment of beneficiaries’ long-term financial interests.
Perhaps I may give one example to show why this amendment is so needed. A large pension fund, which I fear does not wish to be named in this debate, received legal advice to the effect that its policy on shareholder engagement and responsible investment might be unlawful. Its policy stated that the fund would seek to exercise voting rights in listed companies in which it held shares, and that it would take into account environmental, social and governance issues with the potential to affect the long-term value for the fund’s beneficiaries. This position is firmly grounded in the financial interests of beneficiaries, and is widely accepted as best practice within the industry. The Government endorsed such an approach by promoting the stewardship code, through its package of enhanced shareholder rights on executive pay, and, in the Commons, where Pensions Minister Steve Webb said that,
“the coalition Government fully support the highest standards of corporate governance and ethical behaviour. We agree that a socially responsible investment strategy is a sound choice for pension schemes”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/1/12; col. 1044.]
Despite this, the advice from a large and reputable law firm took an extremely narrow view of beneficiaries’ best interests, and suggested that the costs involved in exercising voting rights might render the policy unlawful unless the firm could demonstrate that such stewardship brought monetised benefits to the individual fund. The opinion cast doubt on whether such benefits could be demonstrated. This illustrates why the Government’s approach to responsible capitalism, which has focused on giving shareholders more rights, needs to be complemented by measures to remove any perceived legal barriers to the responsible exercise of these rights.
For long-term, sustainable growth and returns, we want responsible shareholder engagement with listed companies. The Kay review recommended, and the Government agreed, that the Law Commission be asked to review the question of fiduciary duty, with Kay himself indicating that statutory clarification may be necessary to resolve this. We would therefore ask Minister to confirm today that, if the Law Commission thereby recommends such statutory underpinning, the Government will take action.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, these amendments would introduce a statutory requirement for institutional investors to act in the best interests of their clients and beneficiaries. They seek to clarify that these investors are not legally obliged to maximise short-term financial returns, but may take into account longer-term considerations, including the social and environmental impact of the companies in which they invest.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Razzall, supported in name by my noble friend Lady Brinton, for giving us the opportunity to debate the vital issue of fiduciary standards in the investment industry. As noble Lords may be aware, the duties of investment intermediaries were considered by Professor John Kay in his 2012 independent review of equity markets and long-term decision-making. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, mentioned this in her speech. The Government have broadly accepted the recommendations of the Kay report in this area. Specifically, they have made clear their support for the view expressed by Professor Kay, and echoed in Amendment 58F, that institutional investors should not automatically assume that maximising short-term returns is sufficient to serve the interests of their clients or beneficiaries. Instead they should take into account long-term factors relevant to their clients’ interests over the time horizon of the investment. However, the Kay report also found that there was no clear agreement on what the law currently requires of those investing on others’ behalf, and recommended that the matter be referred to the Law Commission.
The Government have therefore asked the Law Commission to undertake a review of the legal obligations arising from fiduciary duties that dictate what considerations are appropriate for trustees and other intermediaries acting in the best interests of their clients and beneficiaries. The Government also support Professor Kay’s view that there should be a common minimum standard of behaviour required of all investment intermediaries. While I therefore have great sympathy with the spirit of my noble friends’ intentions, I do not believe that the approach taken in these amendments would achieve this. The amendments attempt to enshrine aspects of the common-law concept of fiduciary duties in statute, and to apply these to certain institutional investors in all circumstances. This includes applying them to certain FSA-authorised firms without due regard to the FSA’s existing regulatory requirements. This approach would add to confusion and uncertainty about the meaning of the word “fiduciary”, the circumstances in which a fiduciary relationship already arises and the standards already expected of investors in regulation.
The government response to the Kay report is very clear in setting out the principle that all investment intermediaries should act in the best interests of their clients or beneficiaries in line with generally prevailing standards of decent behaviour. In order to embed this principle effectively, the Government have asked the FSA, and its successor organisation, the FCA, to consider to what extent current regulatory rules in this area align with this principle and to determine what action might be desirable. This includes, if necessary, changes to regulatory requirements at EU level.
With these reassurances, I hope that my noble friends will feel able to withdraw their amendment.
Lord Razzall
My Lords, I must say I am slightly disappointed by the Government’s response to this. This amendment is not about looking at the issues that the noble Viscount has suggested need to be looked at. It has nothing to do with the FSA or European regulations. Its entire purpose is to clarify the existing law. For example, it seeks to clarify that institutional shareholders which had a shareholding in Cadbury’s were entitled to take the view that they did not have to accept a very successful financial bid if they were concerned about other characteristics. That is not an FSA point or a European regulation point; it is a simple matter of clarifying the law. That is all we are asking for.
I have serious reservations and concerns about the matter being referred to the Law Commission because I predict that we will be debating this in five or 10 years’ time—those of us who are still alive then—when the Law Commission eventually comes back with a recommendation that will cover much wider areas than are dealt with by the amendment, as the Minister has indicated. To my mind, that is typical of the way in which Governments respond to things, in that you propose a relatively small amendment and they say, quite fairly, that the whole area, which is huge, is being looked at, of which the amendment is just a small part, and therefore they cannot do anything about the small amendment until that huge area has been looked at. That is the problem, and that is what I worry about. However, in the mean time, I shall withdraw the amendment.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
I would like to clarify this matter or go some way to clarifying it. I re-emphasise that the Government are currently discussing the precise terms of reference for the review with the Law Commission and, as mentioned earlier, will make an announcement in the coming weeks. The objective of the review is to provide clarity for institutional investors on their legal obligations. It would not be appropriate to prejudge the Law Commission’s review on whether there is a need for legislation to achieve that end. I hope that goes a little way to clarify our position, but an announcement will be made in the coming weeks.
Lord Razzall
If I may say so, that very short response was more helpful than the Minister’s previous comments. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, this amendment seeks to amend the Insolvency Act 1986 to prevent suppliers withdrawing their services from a company after it enters formal insolvency. The amendment also seeks to address concerns about whether all utility providers are bound by an existing provision to prevent them demanding so-called ransom payments as a condition of continuing supply, which is an issue that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, highlighted in his speech. In addition, it seeks to extend that provision to IT suppliers.
The Government recognise the concerns that have been raised here and are looking very closely at these issues. My noble friend Lord Razzall recognised the difficulty in creating a balance here. We are committed to exploring any option which might help to rescue viable businesses and jobs, or which would improve the outcome for creditors of insolvent companies. The UK’s insolvency regime is very well regarded internationally. The regime continues to rank highly in World Bank reports for its ability to deliver quick and effective business rescue mechanisms. We want to maintain that standing and, indeed, build upon it.
However, I am sure noble Lords will recognise that this is a complex issue and that proper consideration must be given to the consequences that might result from such a change. For example, forcing suppliers to continue to supply an insolvent business might interfere with commercial behaviours and contractual rights. Freedom of contract is an important tenet in English law. Restricting a supplier’s right to terminate might also lead to knock-on insolvencies and could affect the pricing of contracts. While we recognise the advantages that such an amendment might bring, in the light of the important issues it raises, the Government wish to understand more clearly the consequences before deciding whether, and if so how, to change the law. In that way, we can satisfy ourselves that the right balance is being struck between the competing interests. I thank noble Lords for tabling this amendment and I assure them that the Government will consider this important issue very carefully.
Turning to Amendment 58HZA, this proposed new clause would require the annual report on HMRC’s charter to include a review of how its standards and values interacted with HMRC’s strategic objectives for the relevant year. It would also require the report to be made with the aim of taking a long-term view when considering proposals from individuals to repay their debts. The charter sets out HMRC’s role and the standards of behaviour and values to which the department aspires when dealing with everyone. The charter contains nine rights and three obligations. Examples include: the right to help and support; honest and even-handed treatment; professional behaviour; and acting with integrity. HMRC has six strategic objectives. These include improving the customer experience and maximising revenue to close the tax gap. The standards and values set out in the charter cover all aspects of HMRC’s work to meet these objectives, as well as its interactions with individuals and businesses.
At this point, I want to acknowledge the reference made in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, to StepChange. He produced some statistics and used the word “grim”. They are indeed grim figures, which I listened to extremely carefully. Whether HMRC should report on levels of personal debt was a question that the noble Lord raised. We very much recognise the issues that he raised about vulnerable customers and consumers, and the level of personal debt that he highlighted so eloquently. The Government very much recognise the need to look at these issues and we are doing so, which I should stress goes beyond HMRC’s remit.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
Noble Lords will be aware that the reforms to the debtor-initiated bankruptcy process being introduced by the Bill remove the order-making function from the court and replace it with a new administrative process. These are minor and technical amendments to the “Extent” provisions in Clause 78 relating to those reforms. Individual insolvency law is a devolved matter in Scotland and these reforms will have no substantive effect on legislation in Scotland.
The jurisdiction of the adjudicator is limited to the determination of bankruptcy applications received from debtors who meet the jurisdictional criteria of having resided or traded in England and Wales for the required period. However, certain consequential amendments made by the reforms extend to Scotland. The purpose of these amendments is to ensure that we have the legal power to make all those consequential amendments that are necessary to give effect to the reforms being made in England and Wales. The amendments make no substantive changes to bankruptcy law in Scotland, which is a devolved matter. I therefore beg to move.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, we have read the amendments and recognised the points. Rather surprisingly, given the volume of correspondence that we received on everything else in the Bill, we received no comments from anyone on this matter and therefore have to rely entirely on our own judgments. In this case, we are happy for the amendments to go forward.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, given that this is the last group of amendments in our Committee discussions, I would like to place on record my thanks to our Deputy Chairmen and the clerks who have masterfully steered our way through all the amendments; to the Bill teams involved; to the Hansard writers who have admirably recorded our discussions and, indeed, were obliged to stay somewhat later than the extended time allotted last week; and to the Doorkeepers for their unstinting assistance.
We have given the Bill careful and detailed scrutiny and I pay tribute to noble Lords opposite as well as my noble friends who have participated in our debates. Although there have been areas on which we have not wholly agreed, which we will discuss further on Report, as one would expect from this House, they have brought a depth of knowledge and analysis to the wide range of issues covered by the Bill. I would also like to thank my noble friend Lady Stowell for the part she has played and my noble friend Lord Popat and many other noble friends who have assisted and supported me and my officials.
The Government’s amendments to Clause 79 have two effects. The first is to commence all powers to make subordinate legislation by statutory instrument on Royal Assent. This is to assist with the orderly commencement of the Bill’s provisions. I should make it clear that these amendments should not be seen as suggesting that all the powers in the Bill will be exercised straight after Royal Assent, or indeed at all. Some are reserve powers which will be needed only if certain circumstances apply—for example, Clause 45 on the powers of sector regulators. Amendment 60AD adds further provisions to the list in Clause 79(2) which are to come into force automatically two months after Royal Assent without the need for a commencement order. I beg to move Amendment 60AA.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, it is probably totally inappropriate for me—as I am probably the person who has been here least in recent days—but I would like to join the Minister in thanking the clerks, the support staff and everybody who has participated on all sides during these debates. I also thank the various Chairs, including our current Chair. I extend that to the Minister and his colleagues and to the noble Lord, Lord Marland, who, many moons ago, started us out on this course.
Lest the Minister think he is going to get away after that, I have a couple of questions on this virtually final clause. As he says, the powers do not necessarily come in at the first date that is stipulated here in terms of implementation, but the Secretary of State will be able to implement them. In Amendment 60AB, he has already referred to proposed new paragraph (b), which relates to concurrent powers in Clause 45. The Minister may recall that during the debate on this there was considerable concern expressed about how the balance between the sector regulator and the new CMA would work. My understanding is that there will be different times in practice when each of the concurrent powers cease or are otherwise redefined; does that mean that, as it stands, Clause 45 would come in all at once on whatever date the Secretary of State determined after the first date? In fact, there may be a different date for Ofcom and the CMA or Ofgem and the CMA or the other sector regulators. It would be heavy work for the Government if they were all to come in at the same time, because there are different considerations in each of the sectors and there will be some inquiries which are still ongoing and some which need to be completed. In any case, we will probably have to return to the substantive issue on Report to get further clarification—if not to move further amendments—but it would seem that if all of Clause 45 were brought in applying to all sectors at the same time, it would be a problem.
My second point is about proposed new paragraph (f) in Amendment 60AB. This effectively says that anything that does not happen to be listed here can nevertheless come into play on the first day after Royal Assent. It seems, since Her Majesty will be signing them off, that this is getting fairly close to his late Majesty, King Henry VIII, in that if you do not specify the date in which various sections come into operation, then bringing any Section forward to an immediate date—even though it is not specified in this commencement clause—could seriously disturb the arrangements of the particular bodies that apply. For example, if there is a commencement of a particular power to either commence or cease, people need to know that in advance. Therefore, it is important that the Bill specifies that rather than have a catch-all ability for the Secretary of State, or some future Secretary of State, to bring any clause into play on the first day. If the noble Viscount tells me that this is normal, of course I shall withdraw it, but it is not something that I see in many pieces of legislation. Perhaps he could clarify the position.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, in the sunset of this Bill, for bringing up these issues, which I regard as quite technical in terms of the timing. I appreciate what he has asked and it is obviously my business to get back to him with some answers. It may help him to know that it is the powers only that will be commenced on Royal Assent; the substantive provision will come in separately later. It might help to facilitate the commencement of the Bill. That is the reason for it. It should reduce the number of commencement orders and the commencement dates. It is important for me to re-emphasise exactly why we are bringing in this issue. However, I might not have addressed his concerns entirely but I would be more than happy to take up this matter later and give him a proper response in writing, with a copy placed in the Library.
(a) section 19;(b) section (Power to remove concurrent competition functions of sectoral regulators);(c) section 51;(d) sections 66 to 69 and Schedule 21;(e) sections 74 to 80;(f) any other provision so far as is necessary for enabling the exercise on or after the day on which this Act is passed of any power (arising under or by virtue of that provision) to make provision by regulations or order made by statutory instrument.”