(2 days, 2 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, for moving his Amendment 161, and for the conversations that we have had on this and other things. I have a lot of respect for him and the way that he approaches issues, and it has been a pleasure to talk. As we heard, the noble Viscount’s Amendment 161 would require the Secretary of State to establish an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees when AEAT went into administration and its pension scheme went into the Pension Protection Fund. It also seeks to explore mechanisms for redress or compensation.
The Government’s position was set out by me in Committee and subsequently by the Minister for Pensions during an Adjournment Debate in the other place at the end of February. I regret that I am not in a position to accept the noble Viscount’s amendment. I put on record my sympathy for all those who accrued public sector pensions and transferred their benefits into private sector schemes, only to end up, through no fault of their own, experiencing losses and not getting the full value that they were expecting from their pensions as a result.
In this specific case, AEAT has a very long history. It is not straightforward to turn the clock back 30 years and revisit decisions that were made then or look at the conditions that obtained at the time. Since 2013, through revised Fair Deal guidance, employees who are compulsorily transferred from the public sector into the private sector are offered continued access to a public service pension scheme, so the situation that AEAT members found themselves in could not happen now.
The fact is that these issues have spanned many years and Governments of all colours. AEAT was privatised in 1996 under a Conservative Government; the pension scheme entered the PPF in 2012 under the coalition Government; and, following the pension scheme’s entry into the PPF, AEAT members raised complaints to a number of bodies under successive Governments. There have been opportunities over the years for different Governments, and their Ministers, to provide redress or to address the issue, but, due to the impracticality of trying to go back all that time, none have done so.
One of the bodies that the noble Viscount mentioned as having looked into the matter is the Public Accounts Committee. The first recommendation from the committee’s inquiry was that the Government should consider introducing pre-1997 indexation within the PPF. This Government are taking action on that. We have brought forward legislation to introduce annual increases on compensation from the PPF and FAS that relate to pensions built up before 6 April 1997, where schemes provided for this. I am grateful to the noble Viscount for acknowledging that. Sometimes, when one gives something, it is simply banked, and then everything else is asked on top of it, so I really appreciate his grace in having acknowledged that. I also point out that if previous Governments had made that change sooner, it would have made much more of a difference to AEAT members, who would have found their pensions building up over that time. But we are introducing it now through this Bill, and AEAT members with pre-1997 accruals will benefit.
I recognise that I cannot offer everything that noble Lords want on this and other cases that have been brought to me and the Minister for Pensions. We are offering the concrete changes that we can, and that is all that I can offer. For that reason, I hope that the noble Viscount will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for his support. As an actuary himself, his words were of great comfort and support. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, who has worked on this case before and knows it through and through, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, on the Conservative Front Bench. I am also grateful to the Minister for at least hearing me out.
I realise that I am probably asking the wrong ministry. Given that this mis-selling was presumably done by UKAEA in the first instance, I think the sponsor department at that point would have been the DTI—probably with the shareholder executive’s paw prints in it somewhere. The responsibility probably lies somewhere in there. I have listened to the mood of the House and realise that this is not something we should divide on, but I hope that the Government will continue to listen. Maybe, some time in the future, there will be an ability to do something to right the wrong for these poor people. With that, I beg leave to withdraw.
(1 week, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, for introducing his Amendment 22. Many members of defined benefit, or DB, schemes have seen inflation erode the value of their pensions, as he said. That is especially true where any uplift on older benefits depends on decisions made at the level of the scheme. I want him to know that I hear those concerns loud and clear. I have heard them expressed by affected pensioners, as many Members will, and I understand the strength of feeling among them.
As the House will know, schemes take different approaches to indexation: some schemes have to provide increases under their rules; some do not require them at all; and a significant number allow discretionary increases, but usually only where both trustees and the sponsoring employer agree. This amendment focuses on the role of trustees in relation to pre-1997 discretionary indexation. The fact is that, in many schemes, such indexation can be awarded only where the sponsoring employer provides consent, which reflects the scheme rules. It means that trustees may be unable to award uplifts where employers are unwilling to agree, even in well-funded schemes.
I recognise why many schemes give employers a central role. Employers ultimately stand behind the scheme and may have legitimate concerns about future affordability and their long-term liabilities. But the result is that when employers are unwilling to support discretionary increases, even when the scheme is in a strong funding position, trustees are, effectively, prevented from acting. I understand that that limitation creates concern, especially in schemes that appear well-funded and may be running surpluses but are not providing discretionary uplifts on older benefits.
However, although I understand the challenge, we cannot accept Amendment 22 because—the noble Viscount identified this himself—it would require a statutory review of trustees’ fiduciary duty in a complex area. Fiduciary duties underpin trustees’ responsibilities to protect all members and ensure the long-term solvency of their scheme. Changes that go beyond trustees freely acting in line with their fiduciary duties on this issue and removing trustee discretion, or removing the employer from any decisions, could have significant consequences for scheme funding, employer sustainability and member security. In any action they take, the Government have to consider all schemes, not only those that are well funded or have historically paid discretionary increases. Mandating a statutory review thus risks creating uncertainty for all trustees and employers, while we are undertaking wider work on surplus and helping schemes make endgame choices.
The key point, as I know the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, recognises, is that the difficulty in the hard cases is not typically that trustees lack the willingness or the legal ability to act. They are often acutely aware of the pressures their members are experiencing. However, I agree it would be helpful to develop a clearer understanding of the factors that prevent some well-funded schemes awarding discretionary increases, particularly where employer consent is not forthcoming. I am aware that the Pensions Regulator has been considering how it might build its evidence base in this area, and any insights from that work would be helpful in informing future thinking.
The Government recognise the importance of this issue. As I indicated in earlier debates, the wider package on surplus, including giving trustees the ability to agree surplus payments to employers, is intended to support more balanced negotiations so that both members and employers can benefit. I hope that has given at least an explanation to the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, as to the position that the Government are in but, for all those reasons, although I recognise the concerns he has raised, I hope he can withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for the comments of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and only sorry that I was not persuasive enough to get him to join my side. I am also grateful to the Minister, because the tea and sympathy has actually gone further than I might have expected. What she said in her response is very encouraging. It indicates that the Government are very much in listening mode on this. If we can find a way to encourage some of those schemes, particularly the BP scheme which I mentioned in Committee, to share those surpluses, and if the Government have a mind to perhaps put a bit of a wind behind that then that would be very good. In the light of that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(2 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords— that was a very interesting debate. I will come to some of the detail in a moment. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, and the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, for explaining their amendments.
We do not have a smorgasbord here, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, observed. Essentially, Amendments 26, 32, 38 and 39 would, in different ways, allow regulations to require member benefit enhancements prior to surplus release, require regulations to do so, and require trustees to consider indexation and the value of members’ pensions before making a surplus payment.
I say at the outset that I understand the concerns of scheme members whose pensions have not kept pace with inflation. They may have made contributions for many years and are understandably upset at seeing inflation erode the value of their retirement income. But I am afraid that I am not able to accept these amendments, for reasons I will explain.
I will give a bit of context first, because it is worth noting that over 80% of members of private sector DB schemes currently get some form of pre-1997 indexation on their benefits. However, as I explained in the previous group, we think the way forward is that our reforms will give trustees greater flexibility to release surplus from well-funded DB schemes and will encourage discussion between employers and trustees on how those funds can be used to benefit members.
In response to the final question from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, about deadlock-breaking, we do not think it is necessary because, in a sense, it is not a balanced position between employers and trustees. Trustees are in control. Employers cannot access surplus directly. Trustees are the ones who make a decision. If the trustees do not agree to release the surplus, the surplus is not being released. In a sense, it is quite intentional for the power to sit with the trustees, and that is the appropriate way to manage that issue. We think that that way of putting trustees in the driving seat is a better approach than legislating for how surplus should be used. I found that discussion of history, from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, the noble Lords, Lord Willetts and Lord Fuller, and others, very helpful.
The DB landscape is a complex situation. It has a varied history and there are variations within it: within schemes, over time, between schemes, across time and across the landscape. Benefit structures have varied, in many cases over the course of a scheme’s history. Although some schemes may not provide pre-1997 indexation, they may have been more generous; they may have been non-contributory or may have provided a higher accrual rate at different points in time. All schemes are different. That is why we do not think it is possible to provide an overall requirement on schemes for indexation. We think it is better that trustees, with their deep understanding of the knowledge of individual schemes, their characteristics and history, remain at the heart of decision-making in accordance with their fiduciary duties. In addition, of course, as I keep saying, they must act in the interests of scheme beneficiaries.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her explanation. However, does she agree that a case where the employer has the right to prevent the trustees making a payment—with some surpluses, the trustees may wish to make a payment but the employer can stop it if it is not going to them—is a special case, which needs to be looked at slightly differently?
I will need to come back to the noble Viscount on that specific point. Obviously, at the moment, a minority of trustees have the power in the scheme rules to release surplus; our changes will broaden that out considerably. If there is a particular subcategory, I will need to come back to the noble Viscount on that. I apologise that I cannot do that now—unless inspiration should hit me in the next few minutes while I am speaking, in which case I will return to the subject when illumination has appeared from somewhere.
It is worth saying a word on trustees because we will keep coming back to this. It was a challenge in the previous group from my noble friend Lord Davies. The starting point is that most trustees are knowledgeable, well equipped and committed to their roles. But there is always room to better support trustees and their capability, especially in a landscape of fewer, larger consolidated pension funds. That is why the Government, on 15 December, issued a consultation on trustees and governance, which, specifically, is asking for feedback on a range of areas to build the evidence base. It wants to look at, for example, how we can get higher technical knowledge and understanding requirements for all trustees; the growth and the use of sole trustees; improving the diversity of trustee boards; how we get members’ voices heard in a world of fewer, bigger schemes; managing conflicts of—