My Lords, we again understand the intention behind this amendment from the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. We also recognise the strength of feeling that exists on the question of pre-1997 indexation; I listened carefully just now to that strength of feeling behind the noble Viscount’s remarks. It is an issue that has been raised in this House and, separately, we have had discussions ourselves with representatives of a number of the campaigns that have taken a close interest in this matter. We have heard the arguments that they have put forward and understand clearly where this amendment is coming from and why it has been tabled.
However, we feel that there is an important principle at stake here. The noble Viscount said that his amendment was not perfect, but I will continue. The foundation of the occupational pensions system is fiduciary duty. Trustees and scheme managers are entrusted with the stewardship of pension funds on the basis that they must act in the best interests of scheme members and beneficiaries. That is the basic and fundamental point on which the entire system operates. It is also the basis on which people engage with the system in the first place: members can have confidence that those responsible for managing their pension savings are legally bound to act in their interests.
Once we begin to qualify or redefine what those best interests are, however well-intentioned the objective may be, we risk undermining that principle. If Parliament starts directing or reshaping how that duty should be interpreted in particular circumstances, we may end up tying the hands of the very people who are trusted to make those judgments. Trustees could find themselves placed in a position where they are, effectively, required to act in a way that they themselves do not believe is in the best interests of members, based on their professional judgment and their understanding of the scheme’s funding position.
I believe that would represent a concerning precedent. The strength of the current framework lies precisely in the fact that those decisions are taken by trustees exercising their fiduciary responsibilities, not by central direction or legislative qualification of what those responsibilities ought to mean in practice. We will, of course, hear more about the point that I am making on Thursday.
For these reasons, although we recognise the concerns that have given rise to this amendment and the sincerity with which they are held, we are cautious about moving in a direction that could weaken the clarity and independence of fiduciary duty within our pensions system. We regret that we are therefore not in a position to support this provision becoming a feature of the pensions landscape. I am sorry to disappoint the noble Viscount to that extent.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, for introducing his Amendment 22. Many members of defined benefit, or DB, schemes have seen inflation erode the value of their pensions, as he said. That is especially true where any uplift on older benefits depends on decisions made at the level of the scheme. I want him to know that I hear those concerns loud and clear. I have heard them expressed by affected pensioners, as many Members will, and I understand the strength of feeling among them.
As the House will know, schemes take different approaches to indexation: some schemes have to provide increases under their rules; some do not require them at all; and a significant number allow discretionary increases, but usually only where both trustees and the sponsoring employer agree. This amendment focuses on the role of trustees in relation to pre-1997 discretionary indexation. The fact is that, in many schemes, such indexation can be awarded only where the sponsoring employer provides consent, which reflects the scheme rules. It means that trustees may be unable to award uplifts where employers are unwilling to agree, even in well-funded schemes.
I recognise why many schemes give employers a central role. Employers ultimately stand behind the scheme and may have legitimate concerns about future affordability and their long-term liabilities. But the result is that when employers are unwilling to support discretionary increases, even when the scheme is in a strong funding position, trustees are, effectively, prevented from acting. I understand that that limitation creates concern, especially in schemes that appear well-funded and may be running surpluses but are not providing discretionary uplifts on older benefits.
However, although I understand the challenge, we cannot accept Amendment 22 because—the noble Viscount identified this himself—it would require a statutory review of trustees’ fiduciary duty in a complex area. Fiduciary duties underpin trustees’ responsibilities to protect all members and ensure the long-term solvency of their scheme. Changes that go beyond trustees freely acting in line with their fiduciary duties on this issue and removing trustee discretion, or removing the employer from any decisions, could have significant consequences for scheme funding, employer sustainability and member security. In any action they take, the Government have to consider all schemes, not only those that are well funded or have historically paid discretionary increases. Mandating a statutory review thus risks creating uncertainty for all trustees and employers, while we are undertaking wider work on surplus and helping schemes make endgame choices.
The key point, as I know the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, recognises, is that the difficulty in the hard cases is not typically that trustees lack the willingness or the legal ability to act. They are often acutely aware of the pressures their members are experiencing. However, I agree it would be helpful to develop a clearer understanding of the factors that prevent some well-funded schemes awarding discretionary increases, particularly where employer consent is not forthcoming. I am aware that the Pensions Regulator has been considering how it might build its evidence base in this area, and any insights from that work would be helpful in informing future thinking.
The Government recognise the importance of this issue. As I indicated in earlier debates, the wider package on surplus, including giving trustees the ability to agree surplus payments to employers, is intended to support more balanced negotiations so that both members and employers can benefit. I hope that has given at least an explanation to the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, as to the position that the Government are in but, for all those reasons, although I recognise the concerns he has raised, I hope he can withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for the comments of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and only sorry that I was not persuasive enough to get him to join my side. I am also grateful to the Minister, because the tea and sympathy has actually gone further than I might have expected. What she said in her response is very encouraging. It indicates that the Government are very much in listening mode on this. If we can find a way to encourage some of those schemes, particularly the BP scheme which I mentioned in Committee, to share those surpluses, and if the Government have a mind to perhaps put a bit of a wind behind that then that would be very good. In the light of that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken this evening. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for her support on the principle of the shift to value for money. Before I move on to the detail of her amendments and others, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, that I am not going to get in between him and my noble friend Lord Davies in fighting it out on who got us here. Of particular relevance to this debate is that we would probably all agree on the need to move from cost to value—and that is only one of the things that has been going wrong. If we have pension funds competing for business with employers on cost rather than value, we are never going to move to the kind of scale that we want to see, which is a consolidated pensions market with large and better-performing pension schemes, improving the opportunity to invest in a wider range of assets and, I hope, taking us in a direction that would make the noble Lord happy.
I start with Amendment 24. I recognise the consistent commitment of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, to improving outcomes for members, particularly through better service quality and clear communications for vulnerable members. The Government entirely share these aims. Where we differ is that we think that the Bill already provides the necessary powers to deliver them. Let me explain why.
Service quality is a core part of the VFM framework. The Bill ensures that these metrics remain central to assessments, while allowing detailed definitions to be set in regulations so they can evolve with member expectations and industry practice. Clause 12 makes it clear that trustees may be required to disclose data on service quality. However, defining a comparable quality of service is complicated, as I am sure the noble Baroness will appreciate. We have consulted with industry on appropriate metrics and how these should be measured to ensure that they represent the nuances involved in determining quality, without inadvertently disadvantaging those arrangements—for example, with a less engaged member demographic.
Defining this through regulations provides us with the scope to develop comparable data in this area in an adaptable, consultative and proportionate way, while still acknowledging the technical nuance required here. For these reasons, while fully supportive of its intent, we cannot accept the amendment as the Bill already provides the powers needed to achieve its aims.
I turn to another matter for the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, I fear. Her Amendment 32 would limit the Government’s ability to specify the consequences for intermediate ratings unless received for at least three consecutive years. I listened carefully to what the noble Baroness said, but the Government cannot support the amendment. Reducing reporting for such schemes risks missing early warning signals that changes are needed to protect savers. We believe that thorough, regular reporting ensures the long-term health and security of pension schemes for all members.
As the noble Baroness said, Clause 16 gives the Secretary of State discretion to set different consequences for different grades of intermediate rating. As proposed in recent consultations, amber-rated arrangements would face consequences, while light-green arrangements would not. A three-year threshold would mean potential problems going unchecked for too long. Instead, we propose giving schemes up to two VFM cycles to make improvements. We believe that is the right approach, and essential to protecting members.
Turning to Amendment 44 from the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, while I appreciate the desire for a statutory timetable, we cannot accept this amendment, as a fixed 12-month deadline risks pre-empting the essential consultation and undermining the co-ordinated regulatory process which is already under way. Our published road map aims for the first data disclosures and assessments in 2028, based on 2027 data. Providing clear powers in the Bill, with the technical detail and timelines set out transparently in secondary legislation, remains the most proportionate approach here. A government amendment, to which I will come later, deals further with this. Industry’s responses to the latest VFM consultation will inform draft regulations and guidance.
Moving on to the group of amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on simplifying language in VFM assessments with a view to making them more intuitive for members to understand, this is another area where we completely agree with the aim but disagree with the proposals. Let me explain. “Fully delivering”, as set out in the Bill, is a more objective term, which is aligned with the structure of the framework. The language in the Bill has to allow regulators to make clear, consistent and, crucially, legally robust determinations, and “fully delivering” gives them the scope they need to apply the framework as intended. By contrast, the term “good value” risks weakening regulatory clarity by introducing a term that is broader, more subjective and less tightly aligned with the evidence-based metrics underpinning VFM assessments. Given what will flow from these assessments, clarity is crucial.
The same argument applies to amendments looking to change the terminology of “not delivering” to “poor value”. Crucially, these statutory terms will not be used in public-facing communications. Instead, members and employers will see the simple and intuitive RAGG ratings—red, amber, light green and dark green. Simplicity and accessibility will be appropriately delivered, without sacrificing the robustness required in the legislation. That is why we cannot accept the amendments.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the Government. As drafted, Clause 122, “Commencement”, provides that the value-for-money measures come into force on the day on which the Bill is passed. Our amendments allow the VFM provisions to be commenced via regulations. This provides the Government with greater flexibility to introduce elements of the VFM framework in stages, following detailed design work and informed by consultation. That brings the VFM clauses in line with other parts of the Bill which are commenced by regulations. The FCA and TPR have recently concluded their consultation on the VFM framework, and we are using the valuable insights and feedback from industry to shape final proposals in order to ensure that the regime is fit for purpose across both the trust-based and contract-based sides of the market.
We recognise that introducing the VFM framework is a significant undertaking for industry that requires adjusting to the administrative and data obligations to which it will be subject. I want to be clear that it is and remains the Government’s strong intention that the first VFM data disclosures and assessment reports will be required in 2028. However, this amendment provides us with the option, if necessary, to stagger the introduction of parts of the framework to allow more time for industry and regulators to adjust to its introduction.
In Committee, we debated amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on reporting requirements for intermediate schemes. The consultation paper from the FCA and TPR sets out our proposed approach, which is to require improvement plans for amber-rated but not light-green-rated arrangements, and action plans for red-rated arrangements. Templates will help keep requirements proportionate. Taking the flexibility to smooth the introduction of different elements of the framework, should that emerge as a pragmatic way forward, enables us to continue working closely with industry to fully understand the potential implications of the VFM measures. I hope that this provides the House with reassurance that we recognise the potential burden for industry. This has informed our approach—to reach a balance between ensuring that members receive the value they deserve, and that industry is in a position to comply with these new requirements.
Lastly, I clarify that government Amendments 36, 37, 38, 39 and 26 to Clauses 18 and 12 are of a minor and technical nature and correct consistency mistakes. In light of all that I have said, I hope that noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendments and to support those in my name.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her remarks. I also thank all noble Lords who have spoken in support of my amendments, in particular Amendment 24, which I had hoped the Government might be a little more favourable towards than they seem to have been. I understand that the Minister says that the Government have consulted industry and that has fed into the production of the Bill. I hope that the Government will also consult consumer groups and members because it is they who really need to understand the value-for-money framework. It is those groups that I was addressing with my proposals because from the point of view of industry it looks rather different, perhaps, from how it does from that of the ordinary workers who are having their money put into the pension.
I understand that the Government do not wish to accept Amendment 24 but it will, I hope, still help provide a framework for some further discussions as we develop the value-for-money framework. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.