Crown Estate Bill [HL]

Viscount Thurso Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Douglas-Miller (Con)]

My Lords, in addition to the amendment standing in my own name, I support my noble friend Lord Leicester in his amendment. I would add to it the requirement of the offshore wind industry to provide adequate funding to research and understand the cumulative impact of all these offshore wind developments on migratory birds and fish. By way of comparison, what we now understand with aquaculture is that one farm on its own makes no material difference to the wider environment. The problem is that the cumulative impact of all these developments is devastating.

Most regrettably, the aquaculture industry has no obligation to pay towards monitoring this impact on the environment or on wild salmon and other species, with the burden of proof left to the NGO and charitable sector to fund the science that demonstrates the terrible impact that aquaculture is having. Let us not repeat this disastrous situation again with offshore renewables. It should be a cost of business and a licence requirement for the offshore wind industry to fund independent, ongoing research into the impacts of individual and cumulative sites on migratory birds and fish, with the results of this work directly influencing future developments.

On the amendment standing in my name, I declare my interests as set out in the register and draw attention to my roles as a trustee of the Kyle of Sutherland District Salmon Fisheries Board, as the past chairman of the Atlantic Salmon Trust and as the proprietor of two salmon rivers in Scotland.

I also support the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Forsyth, who spoke so passionately about the issues of aquaculture. During a recent Question for Short Debate tabled by my noble friend on the parlous state of the UK’s salmon stock, many noble Lords raised serious questions about the impact that aquaculture, and in particular open-cage salmon farming, was having on salmon stocks and the wider environment. This is becoming a worrying theme. We have all seen the harrowing pictures of malformed and diseased farmed salmon held in very questionable conditions by bad operators in this industry.

What is much harder to see is the impact that the cumulative size of this industry is having on our wild salmon and the wider environment. However, any objective review of the science leads to the conclusion that there are a number of serious negative impacts from this industry. The three most serious are: first, the catastrophic impact of elevated sea lice numbers caused by a direct result of intensive open-cage salmon farming on juvenile wild salmon survival; secondly, the impact of intensive salmon farming on animal husbandry standards for fish kept in open-net cages in such density and the subsequent cross-contamination of numerous diseases from farmed to wild fish; and, thirdly, the impact of genetic introgression from genetically modified farmed salmon escapees interbreeding with wild salmon populations, rendering them unfit to survive the rigours of the natural world. These are serious issues that are having a profound long-term negative impact on the natural environment and on wild salmon stocks specifically.

Why is this relevant to the Crown Estate Bill? In simple terms, salmon farmers are there only because they get a licence from the Crown Estate. Without a Crown Estate licence, they would have no right to be there, and the cumulative impact of the industry, and the bad operators among them, would not be causing the levels of environmental damage and animal suffering that they are. Given the nature of this monopoly, it is surely right that the Crown Estate commissioners are enabled through the Bill to hold to account those to whom they have granted a licence, and that they themselves are held accountable for the outcomes that they enable. Without these amendments, the Crown Estate commissioners are unable to fulfil their duty of care to others with whom they share the coastal space to ensure that they are not adversely impacted. They are unable to prevent the negative animal welfare issues from continuing; unable to ensure that there is no detrimental impact on other species that live in this precious ecosystem; and unable to ensure that the wider environment is not damaged by the bad operators to whom they have granted a licence to operate.

These amendments seek to give the public and the environment a practical and sensible level of protection against malpractice and environmental damage, by giving those who enable these fish farm operators—namely, the Crown Estate—the tools to manage the cumulative impact and to remove the bad operators. They will also give the Government the power to hold the Crown Estate commissioners to account to ensure that they do this. We have all seen the devastating impact that can occur if we fail to hold those in a monopolistic position to account in areas such as sewage discharge, so let us not repeat the same mistakes here.

As it stands, the Crown Estate has no ability to influence or remove bad operators in the aquaculture industry to whom it has issued a licence. Crucially, the Government have no ability to hold the Crown Estate commissioners to account for any negative outcomes arising from the issuing of these licences. It is simply not right that the organisation that is in the sole position to enable an entire industry—and, incidentally, to make tens of millions of pounds from issuing these licences—can have no influence over, or responsibility for, any negative outcomes from its actions.

The simple measure of requiring the Crown Estate commissioners to report annually on the impact of aquaculture on the environment and animal welfare standards—and enabling and compelling them to remove licences from those operators that fall short of the required standards—must surely be a desirable and fair outcome for everyone. It would significantly reduce any negative impact on the environment and help to improve animal welfare standards. These amendments have substantial cross-party support, and I hope that the Government will accept them as improving the Crown Estate Bill.

[Viscount Thurso (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to this group of amendments. I was not sure which one most suited the comments I wished to make, but I think it is probably Amendment 37F in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Leicester.

At the heart of all three amendments is a question about the relationship between, on the one hand, the economic activity that we wish to undertake, quite properly, and, on the other, the environmental and natural consequences that may take place. It is about the right balance between what we seek to do economically and what we seek to protect environmentally. I will speak to that general point.

Taking my lead from the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, I should declare my interests. I too am an angler, although I do not get to spend nearly enough time on the river, and I also happen to own the river, which is rather nice. I am chairman of the Caithness District Salmon Fishery Board, which is currently very involved with Crown Estate Scotland on various issues. I may also be—I hope—the beneficiary of a number of renewable projects. I have every sort of interest that you could possibly have; I think that they are broadly covered by my register, but I thought that I had better spell them out.

As I said, the heart of the three amendments is about seeking to ensure that, when we set out to undertake an economic activity of any kind—and this is absolutely what happens on land—we make a proper and full assessment of what the impact is likely to be on the environment that we are putting that economic activity into. That includes the flora, fauna, fungi and everything else that you might find there.

I want to give one quick example; it is in Scotland but I think it is relevant. We on the north coast have four rivers which are all in very good health. On the Thurso we electrofish every year and for some years now we have known that you cannot get any more juveniles into the river, it is in that good order. So, at a time when most of Scotland has salmon stocks that are endangered, as the noble Lord pointed out in introducing his amendment, we have the one bit of Scotland that actually is in good order and producing good salmon—and long may that last.

The west of Shetland wind farm, which is going to go ahead in the not-too-distant future, and which I support as a piece of offshore energy, may have a problem for us in the fishing world, and that is that we do not know where our smolts go. When the salmon grow in the river, they come to a point where they smoltify and they take to the sea and off they go. They are then called “smolts” or “post-smolts” and we do not actually know where they go. There has been smolt tagging and tracking in the Moray Firth which discovered that the fish that come out of various rivers in the deep south around Inverness and places like that have a tendency not to do what you would expect, which is to scoot up the coast and head past Orkney. For reasons known only to them, they leg it across to Aberdeenshire, which I always thought showed a bit of a lack of taste. The point about that is they do not go through the Beatrice wind farm and that piece of knowledge is vital in being able to look at what you may need to do to mitigate.

Similar studies on the west coast show that Irish and west coast fish tend to go due north, as you would expect, and straight off to Iceland. We just do not know where our smolts are going, so we made contact with Crown Estate Scotland, which I have to say has been incredibly helpful on this, and the chairman put me in touch with various people. As a result, I believe that there will be a smolt-tracking project which will allow us to know where our smolts are going and we will therefore know whether we have a problem, so we can look at what can be done to mitigate it if we have.

That comes back to the point I was making that, without information, you cannot make a decision on the appropriate thing to do. Crown Estate Scotland on this occasion has been extremely helpful, as I said. It wishes to make sure that it does the least harm, which is wonderful, but it seems to me correct that, in forming any legislation, it is appropriate, as we do with the nuclear industry and a whole range of other things, to state what it is that people have to provide by way of information in terms of an economic impact assessment and what they will do to mitigate the inevitable downsides that occur when you have developments of these kinds.

So I am not sure whether I am supporting anybody in particular—noble Lords will have to make up their own minds on that—but I am supporting the principle that we need knowledge and information about what may happen so that we can then make an informed choice on what mitigation is required and how much damage we are prepared to accept for the value brought by the economic activity.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

I am most grateful to the noble Viscount for giving way and I am much heartened to hear that his rivers and fish are doing very well. I just wonder what his reaction would be if someone decided they wanted to put a fish farm in the track of his migrating smolts when he knows where they are.

[Viscount Thurso (LD)]

I suspect I would be pretty horrified, given all the information that I know about it, but I have long tried to stick to a principle in your Lordships’ House to speak about what I really know about and avoid the things I do not know too much about, so I hope the noble Lord will forgive me if I do not go down that road.

To come back to my central point on the need to get information, it is about the right duty that we should ask the Crown Estate to have and then the process it should follow to deliver it. So my request to the Minister would be to look at the obvious strength of feeling on all of these points and perhaps the Government should look at what their view would be as to the right process and the right way to put it into the Bill and come back with an amendment that would achieve that and would suit the Government.

Fiscal Responsibility and Fairness

Viscount Thurso Excerpts

Thursday 19th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Danny Alexander]

I am not sure that is a matter for the House; it is a matter for the British people in the coming election, and I confidently expect that the Liberal Democrats will do far better than any of the pundits predict.

[John Thurso (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

I commend my right hon. Friend for setting out a fair path to a stronger economy. Will he join me in congratulating Wick tax office, which has done such a sterling job on cracking down on avoidance through film partnerships, and which is still open despite many Treasury attempts to close it? As the economy grows, will he pay real attention to investing in infrastructure and education so that we can maintain a sustainable recovery and invest in our future?

[Danny Alexander]

I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend and his work on the Treasury Committee, and to staff at Wick tax office for their work to ensure compliance in our tax system. They have brought in many millions of pounds of revenue that would not otherwise have been collected. He is right to stress the importance of investment in infrastructure. Under this Government, we have the largest programme of investment in our railways since Victorian times, and in our road network since the 1970s. The plans I am setting out today would allow and enable borrowing for productive capital investment after the books are balanced, which will allow us to do more of that still. That is the right, fair plan for this country.

Office for Budget Responsibility (Manifesto Audits)

Viscount Thurso Excerpts

Wednesday 25th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Ed Balls]

Of course, none of us is beyond reproach, including the OBR and including the Chancellor. The OBR has had a few rather sharp things to say about some of the Chancellor’s practices over the past few months as regards fiscal decision making. In the end, of course the voters have to decide; they have to look at the manifestos and make their judgment. In our view, if an independent body—the OBR—scrutinises the costings of individual proposals to check that they have been done properly, that can only be to the benefit of the public debate. Ultimately, it does not take away the voters’ choice, but why would we choose to have them misinformed or uninformed when we could have them properly informed? That is the choice before the House.

[John Thurso (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

Like the Chairman of the Treasury Committee, I fully support the principle, and if we can arrive at political consensus, I would be delighted. At the session from which my colleague on the Committee, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), quoted, Mr Chote put quite a lot of barriers and difficulties in place. At the end, he said that we should not rush this to arrive at an imperfect solution. Does the shadow Chancellor accept that if we cannot get it right, that is worse than doing nothing at all?

Oral Answers to Questions

Viscount Thurso Excerpts

Tuesday 28th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Nicky Morgan]

The point is that there were very strict criteria relating to pump price thresholds, cost of transporting fuel and population density. That is how the list was arrived at and that is why the hon. Gentleman’s constituency was not included.

[John Thurso (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

On that latter point, I commend the Government for listening in a way that the Labour party never did and I commend the scheme, but may I draw to my hon. Friend’s attention one anomaly, namely the petrol pump at Bettyhill? It meets all the criteria of the others, but because of an anomaly in postcodes will not be included. Is there anything at all that can be done to help that one station?

[Nicky Morgan]

As I mentioned before, very strict criteria were laid down by the EU. The scheme was brought in by this Government, not by the last Government, to help rural areas. My hon. Friend might like to consider campaigning for the postcodes to be changed.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Viscount Thurso Excerpts

Tuesday 9th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

Absolutely. Those are the very issues that should be in the Bill, but it is a pretty thin measure. We are still waiting, apparently endlessly, for the Government to decide to populate it at some point with the recommendations of the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards.

We need support for mutuality and greater diversity in the banking sector, and that is why the new clause refers to competition. We do not just want more plcs to enter the market; we want institutions of many different types, including mutuals, to be given a chance to compete for business. My hon. Friend’s Co-op bank, for example, might wish to have that greater choice were it available. The new clause was largely inspired by the recommendations of the parliamentary commission, whose most recent publication made it very clear that the sector suffers from a lack of serious competition.

Which?—formerly the Consumers Association—reported recently that 55% of people had never switched their main personal current account, and that the larger banks had not earned their market share by dint of innovation or the provision of competitive services but simply through “first mover” advantage, because they had been there for such a long time. It also reported that, sadly, customer surveys had indicated that the big five high street banks—Lloyds, RBS, HSBC, Santander and Barclays—consistently gave less satisfaction than others. Those banks have a very large market share, which has increased over the last few years. They control 85% of the current account market as opposed to 71% before the financial crisis, 67% of mortgage gross lending as opposed to 38% before the crisis, and 61% of the savings account market compared with 47% before the crisis. The inertia of their customers enables those large banks to sit on a fairly stable customer base. It has often been said that people are more likely to divorce than switch current account, although I am sure that that does include those who are in the Chamber today. The lack of dynamism and choice in the market is a significant worry, and it is no wonder that it has been criticised by the Office of Fair Trading.

There are major barriers to entry for new banks, which need to establish an infrastructure to have a fair chance of competing more widely. Recent suggestions include the adoption of utility platform sharing, and an extension of the payments system machinery beyond the big banks. I think that such ideas should be given serious and detailed consideration, but they pose a challenge to institutions that own and control payments systems, and we must think carefully about how they can be tackled.

Some of the big banks were supposed to divest themselves of branches. RBS was supposed to float off a number of its branches to Santander, but that did not get very far. Similarly, as my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield (Mr Sheerman pointed out), Lloyds was supposed to divest itself of many of its branches to the Co-op, and we all know what happened in that instance. In all, 1,000 branches were supposed to be out there creating a proper challenger bank, or at least mixing it up a little by increasing the number of players in the system. That has not happened, and I have to say to the Minister that the Treasury has not exactly covered itself in glory. I am not claiming that it is entirely the Treasury’s fault, but I think that it had a hand in overseeing some of the divestment strategy. I hope that the Minister will update the House, because divestment is very relevant to the issue of proper competition.

John Fingleton, chief executive of the OFT, has said:

“More than a decade on from the Cruickshank report, we still have a banking sector where competition is manifestly not working well for consumers.”

The hon. Member for Chichester, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, who has left the Chamber—oh, there he is, next to the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (John Thurso). I apologise to him. He is clearly negotiating away as we speak. He has said:

“The lack of competition in banking has been reinforced by a regulatory regime favouring large incumbents. Customers have lost out as a result. Moves to remove barriers to entry are essential.”

We all agree with that.

We constructed new clause 8 very much along the lines of the commission’s recommendation of

“a market study of the retail and SME banking sector, with a full public consultation on the extent of competition and its impact on consumers. We make this recommendation to ensure that the market study is completed on a timetable consistent with making a market investigation reference, should it so decide, before the end of 2015.”

The time scale is very important, because the issue has drifted on year after year.

[John Thurso (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

The hon. Gentleman has gone to the heart of one of our key recommendations, but what we had in mind was that the Government should just get on and do it. We did not envisage a need for legislation. Am I not right in thinking that, if properly instructed, the relevant authorities could undertake the work themselves?

[Chris Leslie]

I hoped that legislation would not be necessary, but I think it worth while for the House to express its view, particularly in response to the commission’s recommendation. Heaven knows, we have been here before. We have heard plenty of warm words from Ministers. They have said “We will certainly consider this, because there is a strong case in favour of it”. When it comes to the crunch, however, if the House of Commons is to do anything through this Bill—and we shall not be doing a lot, because so much is being left to the other place—I think that it is worth our trying to insert the new clause, just to keep the Minister’s feet to the fire. All that we are asking for is a market study in preparation for the proper market investigation reference before the end of 2015.

When the Vickers report was published in 2011, Labour Members felt that specifying 2013 would allow an appropriate time in which to assess the issue, and, two years on from Vickers, I do not think that anything has changed our minds in that regard. Getting that market study under way is the very least that should be done, and the Minister needs to commit to doing that. This is a critical point. When Members listen to what the Minister has to say, they must read between the lines. He will make all sorts of warm noises and say, “The OFT has started this process for SME customers”, but it has not done so for retail customers. That is the crucial difference; focusing merely on SMEs is not sufficient.

The Government have already claimed in their response to the commission’s recommendations that they will be fulfilling the commission’s proposal, but that is not the case. They are not putting in place that retail review, and I do not understand why they are so resistant to doing that. The Minister must explicitly set out why they are holding back from having a market study and investigation of the issues in respect of retail banking.

The Government response is full of warm words—they say they are in discussions and they are engaging with the problem—but it is not strong enough. It is too piecemeal and not sufficiently transparent, and they are not giving the commitment consumers, let alone commission members, would like. If the Government can at least acknowledge that they will not accept the commission’s recommendation, that will give us a clear choice when we come to consider what to do in respect of new clause 8.

The hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) has tabled new clause 15, which focuses on local stakeholder banks and local banking. I agree that we should look at sub-national financial provision, particularly for customers, who can feel that they have very little choice at all. She will know that in new clause 10 we say that if state-owned banking assets are to be sold, options for a regional banking network ought to be fully considered. That is a very important proposal from the Opposition. There are some very plucky and hard-working institutions across the country—the credit unions, the community development financial institutions and other smaller building societies and mutuals—that do a lot of very worthwhile work at regional and local basis.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr McFadden]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for making that important point. If consumers are going to have confidence in a system of speedy switching such as that being advocated by the hon. Members for South Northamptonshire and for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), these questions about privacy and security of information will have to be bottomed out to the public’s satisfaction. My view is that that will be a more important argument than the one about the cost to the banks of whatever IT changes will be necessary to put this system in place.

In conclusion, it is important that we give the seven-day switching service a chance to operate, but the report that the hon. Member for South Northamptonshire and my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East are asking for is also important, because it would bottom out theses issues and others that I have not mentioned. It is a shame that the hon. Lady does not intend to put her new clause to the vote. After all, it only asks for a report; it does not seek to mandate a change before we have done the work and got the proper evidence. I hope that the Minister will respond positively to her suggestion and that of my hon. Friend. It is really important that there is proper competition between providers in this sector to attract consumers and that the kinds of free choices that enable consumers to walk away and get another product from another provider are available in practice, not just in theory.

[John Thurso]

I also rise to support new clause 14 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom) and to which I have added my name.

The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) chaired a panel of the banking commission and one of the first visits we undertook was to Birmingham, where we had a number of sessions, one of which was with representatives from small and medium-sized enterprises who were very vocal about the importance of securing a fair deal from the banks.

Which? organised an evening session that allowed us to visit different tables where individuals talked about their experiences. I had an interesting experience when I asked a table of people of a variety of ages, although mostly younger than me—not that that is difficult—about the ability to switch bank accounts. They were not really that keen and said, “It’s too much hassle. Why bother? It won’t be any different.” I said, “Suppose you could do it in the same way that you change your mobile phone, where you take your SIM card-equivalent and plug it into another machine.” At that point they all said, “Oh, that would be wonderful. What a good idea. Is it possible?” I said, “Not yet, but it is very likely to happen.” They said, “Actually, even that won’t work because it will just be the same old names that I will be going to.” I said, “How would you feel if the chap who has that nice transatlantic airline had a bank?” They said, “Oh yes, that would be jolly good.” That bunch of average customers had no idea that it might be possible to move accounts and no idea of the array of accounts that might be available as a result.

That experience drove home to me that the relationship between banks and their customers has been the reverse of what it should be. We go cap in hand and say, “Will you please take my account?” It ought to be the other way around. The banks should be coming cap in hand to us saying, “Please can I have your business?” New clause 14 goes to the heart of that dilemma. All right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken have made the point that the new clause is not a silver bullet and that many other measures are required, but it would be one of the key enablers of that change in the relationship, along with the payments regulator and other things that might be done. Ultimately, we need banks to be genuinely fearful of losing business—at the moment they are not, because they know that people cannot go anywhere else —and genuinely to want to win business. The commission has made progress on that and new clause 14 is very much a part of that.

I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire told us early on that she will not press her new clause to a vote. I always find that Ministers go a bit further if one waits until they have said nice things before telling them that. Clearly, she has had a tremendous impact on the Minister ahead of the debate. I look forward to hearing what he has to say.

[Andrea Leadsom]

I do have great expectations of the Minister’s response.

[John Thurso]

I was going to say something about “A Tale of Two Cities”, but I will leave it at my hon. Friend’s great expectations.

[Mr Ruffley]

How about “Hard Times”?

[John Thurso]

Yes, something like that.

I am very tempted by new clauses 8 and 10, which were tabled by the Opposition. I will not vote against them, but I will not vote for them at this stage. There is an immense amount in them, but I will wait to hear what the Minister says. There is also a great deal of debate to come in the other place. I do not want to say that I am against the new clauses, but I am not sure that the wording is exactly what I would like to have seen. I ask for the forgiveness of the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) on that.

On new clause 10, there was a lot of debate in the commission about the good bank/bad bank split. We ended up with a central point that we all agreed to, but a number of us wanted to go more in one direction. However, whether a good bank/bad bank split is a good idea is a completely different issue from what should be done afterwards. If one takes the view that a good bank/bad bank split is not needed, one can still consider all the points that have been put forward, including the many things the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) said could be done to enhance regional banking and credit unions. All those things are equally possible whether or not one decides that the bad bank is necessary.

To my mind the good bank/bad bank argument is separate to what one does with a bank going forward. I happen to be somebody who believes that a good bank/bad bank split is right for the simple reason that if we take the flakier assets out of the bank and put them in a run-off bank, therefore liberating the capital being used in the balance sheet to support it, capital is then available in the good bank to be lent to SMEs and individuals. It is a simple mechanism for getting more capital flowing through, but I would make the point that it is not inextricably linked.

Following on from the slightly more partisan comments from the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East, one thing that comes out of this process, and which I have observed right the way through it, is that United Kingdom Financial Investments Ltd has not been the most successful of bodies. We have seen that there are politics in such situations, and that trying to put a mechanism in between muddies the water. That is one of the reasons why the commission’s report made its suggestions on UKFI.

Finally, the commission very much supports new clause 8. As I said in my intervention, I do not think this matter needs legislation. What I would be looking for from the Minister is a commitment that does not require me to look carefully between the lines, but is, in fact, a further commitment.

[Greg Clark]

This has been an interesting debate so far, and it will be a tall order to live up to the great expectations of my hon. Friends the Members for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom) and for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (John Thurso).

This set of new clauses has the common denominator of measures that can improve competition in banking. The parliamentary commission has made it clear that competition can, and should, bring about higher standards in the banking sector. It concluded that

“effective market discipline, geared to the needs of consumers, can be a better mechanism for improving standards and preventing consumer detriment than regulation, which risks ever more detailed product prescription.”

The Government completely agree. The British banking industry, at least at the retail level, was too concentrated before the crisis. The forced mergers of the crisis have exacerbated a bad situation. It is imperative that the regulators do not regard themselves simply as regulating incumbents, but act to promote new entry into the industry.

The commission welcomed the prudential reforms contained in the then Financial Services Authority’s barriers to entry review and commented that

“the concerns of challenger banks in this area appear to have largely been addressed”.

We accept the need to go further. Accordingly, we will be adopting the commission’s recommendation that the Prudential Regulation Authority should be given a secondary competition objective, and we will table amendments to the Bill to that effect in the autumn.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Viscount Thurso Excerpts

Monday 8th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr McFadden]

I do not propose to follow the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) by making a wide-ranging speech on the recommendations of the banking commission’s final report, as he has set them out perfectly adequately. However, I do want to say that I do not think the Minister has served himself or this discussion well by publishing the Government’s conclusions at lunchtime today, and then coming along and making a de facto statement of new policy, thereby simply compounding the sense of frustration in this House about the adequacy of the procedures for discussing these issues. Instead of going over all of that in great detail, however, I want to concentrate on the amendments before us, and on the discussion of ring-fencing and separation. I specifically want to talk about amendments 17 and 18 in the name of the shadow Chancellor and his shadow Treasury team colleagues; and amendment (a) to Government amendment 6 and amendment 19 in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester.

The banking commission’s first report, issued before Christmas, focused on ring-fencing and separation. It made two principal recommendations in respect of what has become known as electrification of the ring fence, which is the power to go further than the ring fence and enforce full separation between investment and retail banking.

The first of those proposed powers was in respect of individual institutions, and it was accepted by the Government, at least in name. The second power was in relation to the sector as a whole, and it was not accepted by the Government. No convincing reason has been given for accepting one and rejecting the other. The Government have today tried to make a virtue of issuing a response to the banking commission’s final report which says they broadly support its conclusions, yet in terms of the legislation before us the Government are continuing to reject a major recommendation of our first report, and as we have teased out of the Minister, even in the document published at lunchtime, they are rejecting recommendations on UKFI and regional banking. We may learn about others, too.

On the question of backstop powers to enforce separation in respect of either individual groups or the sector as a whole, one of the clearest lessons from the banking crisis of 2007-08 was how interconnected the banking system is. Institutions involved in banking are not islands cut off from one another. They lend money to one another. They engage in the same practices. Their culture is often shared. They place similar bets. When one falls, it often has the capacity to drag others down with it, as we learned to our great cost.

The same is true of the standards and culture questions we examined in such detail after Christmas. The LIBOR fixing was the straw that broke the camel’s back in terms of the establishment of the commission, but that did not just happen within one bank. Groups of traders within banks were co-operating with one another to rig the interest rates, and groups of traders across different banks were co-operating with one another to rig the interest rates. Against that background, it makes no sense at all to restrict the policy armoury that this Bill establishes to respond to the undermining of the system by taking powers that will affect only individual banking groups and not the sector as a whole. As the hon. Member for Chichester said about our recommendation on new criminal offences, some of those powers may never need to be used, but their existence on the statute book should focus the minds of those running these major organisations.

[John Thurso (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

We also discussed at length the fact that, if we do not have the weapon in the armoury, we cannot use it, and it is usually too late to put it in place once a crisis comes along. Far better to have the gun in the locker, even if we never use it, than not to have it at all.

[Mr McFadden]

I entirely agree.

--- Later in debate ---

In conclusion, we are dealing with a very important part of this discussion; it is stage two of these reforms, if we regard the regulatory changes as stage one. The commission believed that there was a relationship between structure and culture, and that is at the heart of the amendments. The recommendations for electrification aimed to reinforce that relationship to stop the kind of gaming of the system that has happened in that past and to make sure that the intention of the Bill is faithfully reflected in practice. That intention is well worth supporting.

[John Thurso]

May I begin by apologising to you, Mr Deputy Speaker, and to the Minister for the fact that I arrived after the start of the debate? The flight down was fine, but the Gatwick Express was not. Had it not been for that, I would certainly have been here.

May I briefly echo the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) in praising the staff of the commission, who did a truly outstanding job? One thing we did was to break out into panels—he chaired one, as did I and nearly everyone else at some point—where we had individual staff, and they were very impressive and helpful.

I wish briefly to address a question raised by the hon. Member for Chichester, who chaired the commission, by explaining why I feel it is of the utmost importance that the proposals we made are not only taken seriously but passed into statute, and why we came to some of our conclusions. We deliberated on the issues for hours and hours. As anyone who has read the transcripts of the Treasury Committee’s meetings from years gone by will know, I started out seeing things from a full separation point of view. I am a fairly unreconstructed Glass-Steagall supporter, but I do think that one needs to be guided by the evidence. The commission received a great deal of evidence, and I came to the view that although that principle is still one that I adhere to and think is right, there were greater complications in today’s modern operation of the financial services and markets than perhaps had existed when Glass and Steagall got together and that it was wise, therefore, to listen on that. So what I looked for, as did other colleagues who came at it from different angles, was to give the best effect to what we were seeking to achieve.

The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) rightly said that the commission linked structure and culture, and I was struck by the way in which the different cultures in banking are competing. One of the easiest ways to look at this, whether we are considering the Volcker rule, prop trading or whatever, is that there are two distinct cultures in every large banking organisation. The first of those is the professional culture of the people seeking to work with and to help individual clients, who are involved in investing or looking after depositors. I do not deny that the vast majority of people operating in the world of banking are professional, wish to be professional and wish to have high standards. The second is the completely separate trading culture, where there is no client at the end of the day; it is a zero-sum game where two people, or two sets of people, are trading specifically to make money and to beat the guy on the other side of the trade.

The problem so often was that although trading was necessary to give effect to that desired on the investment side, when the trading side took over in terms of profit and culture it infected the other side. The whole thing is about seeking to keep the cultures apart. People have talked about high-street commercial banking as being good and investment merchant banking as being a casino and being bad, but I do not take that view. I would split the types into three, because there is retail and commercial banking, investment banking and trading. All three have their uses, and how they relate and how they are governed is the important thing.

The universal bank clearly works, but if all the banks are universal banks, it does not, and that is the problem with it. If everybody is pursuing the same model, there is a real danger that the riskier side infects the more prudent side.

[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

The ordinary depositor—the ordinary working person who puts their money in their bank and wants to use it—would be deeply worried if they felt, and if it were the case, that their money was being gambled with by these risk-taking buccaneers in the City. Is there not a very strong case for making sure that ordinary people, such as me, who do not gamble in that way can have their banking protected from such gambling?

[John Thurso]

The hon. Gentleman makes exactly the point I am in the process of making, but he does it more simply, and I thank him for that. That is the key point about the ring fence. The utility aspects of banking, which are operating the payment system and taking deposits, should be so constructed within an entity that when a bank fails—I say when, not if, because there will be another bank failure and our purpose is to try to make it easier for banks to be resolved so there is less likelihood of taxpayer intervention, meaning that the bank will be more likely to be allowed to go under and that bankers will be likely to be more prudent—the ring fence enables that while protecting the ordinary depositor and the payment systems.

This is a long and complicated subject, as I learned over many hours, and the flow of capital from the lady who puts some money into the bank to the company that needs it to expand and grow the economy is necessarily complex. One must therefore be careful—[Interruption.] I know that other hon. Members want to speak and I promised that my remarks would be brief, so before I get a beady eye from you, Mr Deputy Speaker, I ask the hon. Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) to let me move on.

The critical point, which I completely accept, is that the compromise we came to is the ring fence. The compromise holds good, however, only if the ring fence works properly. Our conclusion was that it would not work if it were not reinforced, and the term “electrified” was coined. The point made by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East was that if one has at one’s disposal the ability to do something—the armoury, call it what you will—those who are engaged in the activity will check whether they are being looked at before they engage in it. It is the modern equivalent of the Governor’s eyebrow. If we do not have that, we will simply have a lot of regulation that might lead not to a successful conclusion but to a long dialogue that leads nowhere between the regulator, the Treasury and the institution. People must believe that when the weapon, whatever it is, is deployed, it will have a consequence. That is the essential point.

In conclusion, I think all members of the parliamentary commission came to a unanimous view. We started from different viewpoints and with different concepts, but we agreed—all five from this House, all five from the other place: all 10 of us together—that to give effect to the ring fence it needed to be reinforced. We thought it could be done in this way and my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester has laid out the arguments perfectly.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

In following the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (John Thurso), I apologise for the fact that transit issues meant that I, too, missed the start of the debate. I will take up only a little time in the Chamber today, but, following the comments made by the hon. Gentleman and by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East(Mr McFadden), it is important to make the point that it is not just those who have served the House well on the Parliamentary Commission for Banking Standards who have concerns about such issues and can see the difference between the Government’s offer and the amendments tabled by Opposition Front Benchers and by the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie).

We talk about the electrified ring fence and, essentially, the Government are offering us a Fisher-Price electrified ring fence—a VTech model. They have looked up ring fence in the index of the Argos catalogue and gone for the one in the toy pages. There is not much point the Government’s saying they have taken everything into account, that this is the best model and that it will give everybody reliable assurances. Frankly, that is like trying to pretend that a tyre is flat only at the bottom and that this is just a minor stylistic difference about perception. The difference is about substance and reliability.

I encourage the Minister to listen to what right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House have said, and particularly to those who have had the best insight into these issues through the parliamentary commission and who have changed and modified their views, like the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross. They have been able to give it more consideration than someone such as me, who comes to the question on a reflex reaction of full separation.

I recognise that the ring fence is the only show in town, but it must be reliable and meaningful. The Government’s proposed procedure in amendment 6 could take longer than the life of a Parliament to have an effect. There will be not just the preliminary decisions but the Treasury consents required for those decisions, and tribunals after the warnings and the decisions, then variations and consultation between the regulators—the whole thing will go on.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Viscount Thurso Excerpts

Monday 11th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[John Thurso (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

I begin by apologising to the Chair and to Members on the Front Bench; due to the vagaries of snow at Aberdeen and the fact that the plane I was on was not de-iced on time, I missed my connection and therefore arrived to hear only the latter part of the Minister’s speech. However, judging by the tone of the debate, I think that I have a fairly good idea of what he must have said.

The second point I would like to make at the outset relates to the staff of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier) made the good point that the Chair of the commission, my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), has done a sterling job, but we have also been extraordinary lucky in having staff of such high quality. The preface to our report lists the staff and shows the amount of resource that has been available to us. The staff who have been available to the commission are of an extraordinarily high quality. We have therefore been able to produce work of an extraordinarily high quality. I say that at the beginning because, whatever my poor remarks, I very much hope that those on the Front Benches will take note of the work that has been done to date.

I think that the next banking crash will happen some time between 2078 and 2088, with a couple of small wobbles between now and then. If one looks back to the dawn of banking, when an Italian moneylender first sought to made a buck or two, one sees that crashes have happened ever since. One of the best pieces of work I have read recently was a commission staff note setting out exactly how often crashes have taken place and the fact that they are pretty much identical. They all start with over-exuberance and an asset bubble, which is followed by a collapse, and on each occasion, going back several centuries, the Bank of England has intervened and the country has had to rescue the financial system.

The Bill sets out not to prevent those sorts of crashes from happening in future, but to try to make them survivable, in particular by making banks resolvable. If we are to have risk and reward, there will be problems in future. The Bill, and the recommendations of the parliamentary commission in relation to it, set out to try to make those situations less systemic and less of a risk to the country and the taxpayer. At this stage, the Bill is necessarily rather more about structure than it is about some of the other points that have been raised. I welcome the Bill and want to comment on one or two of the things that are not in it and to urge the Government to listen to the points that the parliamentary commission has set out in our report. When I have done that, time permitting, I would like to look at some of the wider points.

On the question of process, it is a matter of regret that the Bill is unlikely to have sufficient time in Committee to allow the House to consider all the issues. Once again, the unreformed other place will have the duty of sorting that out. I am particularly concerned about the fact that, should the important areas of standards, culture, competition and remuneration require any action in legislation—we have yet to deliberate on whether they might—the Bill will almost certainly have passed through this House by the time the parliamentary commission completes its final work.

Let me turn to the points that I wish to make. First, on the question of leverage, the key is risk-weighting assets. Much of the academic work has shown that, broadly, the banks that had better leverage ratios were the ones that survived. It is a very simple fact. The risk weighting of assets does not actually assist terribly much in that process. Andy Haldane made that point remarkably forcefully in evidence to both the Treasury Committee and the parliamentary commission. Therefore, the simple test of the leverage ratio is extremely important. Vickers came up with 4% and the Government have gone for 3%. I am convinced that 3% is not enough, but perhaps 4% is too much. Certainly, as the report we have published makes clear, we should be looking at that. There is a problem for Nationwide and for building societies, but we really cannot let that tail wag the dog when it comes to sorting out the banks’ part of it.

Secondly, there is the question of industry-wide separation, which a number of Members have referred to. I want to be clear about what we are setting out to do and what we have recommended. The electrification of the ring fence is by means of allowing the regulator a power to separate an institution. The institution is observed by the regulator to be burrowing, tunnelling, climbing over, powering through—however it is done and whether it is a tiger, fox, wolf or whatever—and the regulator then makes a decision for that one institution, saying, “You’ve tried your luck too far. That’s it: your institution is separate.”

The wider power seeks to address the fact that we are not going to have another crack at this for a good few years and that in all probability, in five or six years’ time, things will be recovering and people might say, “Well, the punch bowl is not there yet so we don’t have to pull it away. Let’s all just leave it be”. We are saying that the Bill should permit secondary legislation if necessary. There should be a review—I cannot remember whether we agreed that it should be every three years or every five years—at which time the Financial Stability Committee could recommend, were there an attempt to undermine the system, that the Government bring in secondary legislation to effect a total separation. That is an immense number of barriers between the placing of the possibility in a Bill and the actuality of it happening. I really hope that the Government will accept the argument that allowing for such a power in the Bill would stand as a potential encouragement to the banking system not to seek to undermine the ring fence.

Ever since I started to study this in the last Parliament, when I served on the Treasury Committee with the now Lord McFall, I have been a Glass–Steagaller. I am in favour of full separation. However, I accept the Vickers compromise, because it is where we have got to. I accept it on the assurance that the ring fence is properly electrified and that there is the fall-back power.

My third point relates to the sibling or parent governance structure. The parliamentary commission’s members broke up into panels, and we have now all reported back. I had the honour of chairing a panel on corporate governance. The evidence I saw was not reassuring. If there is a parental relationship, the temptation of the CEO to tell the ring-fenced bank what it should do will, over time, become overwhelming. Therefore, an equal governance structure, which gives proper independence required within the corporate governance of the ring fence, is absolutely essential.

The last point relates to derivatives. When someone defines a simple derivative, will they let me know what it is? I know what a simple product is. When I want to fix my risk by having a fixed-rate loan, I know that there is a derivative product that I am sold. I understand that and have no problem with that product. The problem is this: why on earth does that have to be originated in a ring-fenced bank? Why on earth can it not be sold on an agency basis? It will cost me a little bit more, but I will probably get advice on which is the best one in the marketplace. We have agreed with the Government that simple derivatives should be permitted but, as our report shows, it was pretty well surrounded by caveats.

My final point is that we need to answer the question what are banks for, because it is at the heart of the whole issue of separation. Over the past half century or so we have pushed together various businesses, some of which were never banking and never will be. The problem now is that we talk about bankers as a collective when we are really talking about bankers, financiers, traders, stockbrokers, and all sorts of other people. This makes it difficult when we come to consider regulation of the profession. Pure banking, if I can put it like that, is a profession, can be regulated as a profession, and can have professional standards expected of it, but many other areas should be regulated in different ways; traders should be licensed, and so on. I am sure that we will come on to consider that issue.

My right hon. Friend, if I may call him that, the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), chaired a panel on small and medium-sized enterprises and I chaired one on Scotland. One of the things that came out of that is that banks have completely failed industry, individuals and commerce. My worry is that this process will be about the political bubble talking to the financial bubble—the Westminster village talking to the City village. At the end of all this, we need a banking system that serves commerce and industry. If that means that we have to start by getting more competition through breaking up RBS or creating a “good bank, bad bank”, then so be it; there is a lot that we need to look at. However, what we must do is ensure the availability of reasonable credit to our constituents and provide a system that is resolvable, so that at least for a couple of generations we can go without a crash.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Professional Standards in the Banking Industry

Viscount Thurso Excerpts

Thursday 5th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[John Thurso (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie), a fellow member of the Treasury Committee. I am particularly grateful for his last point. I believe that there is an honest disagreement on the best route, but that there is far more consensus than members of the public who watched the early part of this afternoon’s debate might be given to think. There is a consensus both in the House and across the country that the LIBOR fixing is a scandal, that banking has yet again let down the country and that Parliament must take appropriate action to remedy that. There is also a consensus that further questions must be answered and advice taken to ensure that we take the right steps to remedy the banking industry for the longer term. Today’s debate should be about how to achieve that, and none of our constituents will be grateful if the result is a partisan deadlock while the bankers escape scot-free once again.

What do we actually need to know? First, we need to know all the facts relating to the LIBOR scandal. Secondly, we need to know how that has affected our constituents, both individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises, and how they can be compensated. Thirdly, and to my mind most importantly, we need to know whether banking as it now exists in the United Kingdom is fit for purpose and has the right model to deliver what society requires of it. How best are we to deal with that?

On the first point, with regard to Barclays we have all the facts relating to LIBOR. The report is comprehensive, as most people who have read it would admit, and, along with the US Justice Department’s report, gives us the facts we need. There will be new facts to come when the FSA reports on other banks, an important matter to which I will return. The FSA report on Barclays shows two things: traders fiddled for their own gain before the crash; and Barclays as an institution low-balled after the crash in order to protect itself. Both behaviours are unethical, and when I asked Mr Diamond about that yesterday he said, “Yes, they are unethical.” As I understand it, arrests may have been made and further arrests can be anticipated, so the facts are clear. What we need to know now is what we should do about it.

On the second point, which is about our constituents, the FSA has put forward a model for how it will redress the swap selling scandal, and it involves the financial services ombudsman. I suggest that that is a technical process that will be able to do the job, but that we should monitor it.

We come to the third and most important point: is banking delivering for society? What do we need from our banks, and not the investment banks, but those on the high street? We need a payments system that works. The RBS outage showed us that that is not always obvious. We need to have a safe home for deposits. Most importantly, we need a source of prudential lending for businesses. It should be a low-risk, low-return operation. It is clear that retail and investment banks have, and should have, separate cultures, so it is clear in my mind that they should be separated. We have had the Vickers recommendations, which represent the ring fence. I was prepared to accept that and would like it to be revisited as part of the inquiry.

There are a number of material points that we need to look at. I want to look at how best we can do that, because we need to get right the legislation when it goes through Parliament and the banking Bill that is to come. I happen to believe that a judge-led inquiry is not the best way to fulfil that objective, but I recognise fully that others take a different view. I believe that a parliamentary inquiry is up to the job, but only if the standard Committee procedure is improved. I believe that the Committee should have a QC, a legal team and, as the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) suggested, forensic accountants. It should have the resources that the Chancellor has said he will put in so that the new bits of evidence can be properly assessed and the barrister can lead part of the questioning.

If today’s debate, therefore, leads us simply to an entrenched partisan position, nobody wins and the bankers get away again. It is essential that at the end of today’s debate we support an inquiry, whether it be parliamentary or judicial.

When some more facts come to light in respect of what the FSA is looking at, we may decide that a wider and deeper inquiry is needed. Let us cross that bridge when we come to it, but let us for now get on with the job of taking what we have and putting it into legislation, so that we end up delivering for our citizens banks that are fit for purpose.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jenkin]

Actually, it is the Liaison Committee on which I serve as a Select Committee Chairman. I am personally looking into the matter and will report to the Liaison Committee next week; that will be part of our report on the powers and effectiveness of Select Committees, which we hope to produce before the end of this term. It greatly ill serves the House to denigrate the powers of Select Committees.

I am going to support the Government motion. I am not in favour of a judicial inquiry; I think it would be completely dotty to plunge us into such a lengthy procedure. However, I want to sound some warnings about the dangers that might befall a parliamentary Select Committee inquiry as proposed in the Government motion. We must be mindful, not least, that if Ministers or ex-Ministers were to be called to give evidence to try to sort out the absurd row that we have seen this afternoon, the Committee could not possibly function. Indeed, it could not possibly function if Opposition Front Benchers were determined to undermine its authority and operation.

It was highly irresponsible of the shadow Chancellor to fail to answer my question or that of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor about whether the Opposition will go on non-speaks if the motion is carried. I commend the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie), who said that even if the Opposition lose the vote, Scottish National party Members will co-operate with the inquiry. How is the House meant to make a judgment about whether to vote for the motion unless we have a clear view from the shadow Chancellor?

My hon. Friend the Member for Chichester mentioned the Marconi scandal. That occurred when Ministers—Liberal Democrat Ministers, I hasten to add, just for fun—were accused of buying and selling shares for profit—

[John Thurso]

I want my hon. Friend to tell us all about the Marconi scandal, but we were Liberals then.

[Mr Jenkin]

I beg my hon. Friend’s pardon. Of course—rebranded to cleanse the history.

Lloyd George’s Government were deeply embroiled in what we would call an insider dealing scandal. A Select Committee was very contentiously set up. It divided on party lines, it divided on whether to call Ministers as witnesses, it divided into party groups during the questioning of witnesses, and it divided along party lines in the writing of the report. In fact, it produced three reports—the official report, the Chairman’s report, and a minority report. Interestingly, the introduction to the 23rd edition of “Erskine May” says:

“Such highly visible failure condemned their successors”—

Select Committees—

“to a very limited role for almost half a century.”

I place great faith in my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester that he will draw stumps on the exercise if there is any danger that the Joint Committee is going to collapse in such a welter of recrimination. First, it could not produce a decent report under such circumstances; and secondly, it would damage this House in a very serious manner.

I do not wish to give succour to Her Majesty’s Official Opposition, but I note that the consequence of the Marconi scandal was the passing of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 when, following a subsequent scandal that engulfed the Government, it was decided that there had to be an alternative means of conducting a judicial inquiry outside Parliament with a judge, and that is how that format came into being.

The report by the Salmon royal commission on tribunals and inquiries, which was produced in the 1960s and is still the bible of how tribunals and inquiries are conducted, said that it would be “a retrograde step” to resurrect the format of a judicial inquiry within Parliament. Among the drawbacks listed by Lord Salmon were that Committees were composed of Members representing the relative strength of parties in the House, that parliamentary Committees do not hear counsel—something that has been suggested today—that some of, if not all, their members will have no experience of taking evidence or cross-examining witnesses, and that witnesses might not enjoy the same absolute privilege as in a tribunal set up under the Act. Those are the dangers that we have to guard against when we vote for the motion.

As I say, I am going to support the motion, but I add one other caveat. I would be grateful if the Minister will confirm that the Government will not present any objection to providing the resources—the money—that the Joint Committee will need to carry out its functions. We cannot have this new Committee raiding the staff and resources of other Committees. I think that if the inquiry is confined to matters of policy and recommendations for legislation rather than trying to settle the internecine disputes that we have seen on the Floor of the House this afternoon, then it can function with the support of the Opposition, but if the Government want it to happen it must have the necessary resources, which may be substantial. I would also recommend recalling a senior Clerk who has recently retired instead of raiding a Clerk from another Committee, because otherwise all our work will be disrupted.

LIBOR (FSA Investigation)

Viscount Thurso Excerpts

Monday 2nd July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

It is for the House of Commons and the House of Lords to pass a motion, so ultimately it is a matter for the House.

[John Thurso (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

At the heart of this matter is a culture that has seen bankers go from trusted advisers to salesmen and clients go from valued clients to marks. Given that culture, is it not right that the Committee be asked to interview the Vickers commission again to see whether, in its view, ring-fencing is adequate following these events?

[Mr Osborne]

It would be entirely up to the Committee to call whomever it would want to call, and it might well want to speak to John Vickers, who has enormous expertise in this area.

LIBOR (FSA Investigation)

Viscount Thurso Excerpts

Thursday 28th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. A lot of Members want to speak and I want to get everybody in, but we need brevity in both questions and answers.

[John Thurso (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

This ruling surely confirms that the financial markets, as many of us suspected, have been neither free nor fair, but rather a sewer of systemically amoral dishonesty. Is not the case for separation of retail banking from merchant banking now so overwhelming as to be unanswerable?

[Mr Osborne]

I agree with my hon. Friend that we should separate retail banking from investment banking, but the best way to do that is through the ring-fence as proposed by John Vickers. We asked him and his distinguished commission to look at the structure of banks, and explicitly to consider the option that some had proposed of completely separating retail and investment banking. The commission considered and rejected that option, and instead proposed an approach that it thought would be stronger for financial stability, and particularly for the stability of retail banking. That is the ring-fence approach, for which we will now legislate.