Sentencing Bill

Debate between Viscount Hailsham and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Wednesday 26th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, said, save that I think that the Bill already deals with the problem identified by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe. It is important to look at the text of the Bill: this is a “presumption” against short sentences; it is not a bar to them. Of course, there is a philosophy behind the presumption: the authors of the Bill and the Government have taken the view, which is not a revolutionary view in relation to the evidence that has been collected over many years, that, generally, short sentences are not a great idea. They do not lead to rehabilitation; they do not help with reoffending.

If you disagree with that and think that a short, sharp shock is a jolly good thing, you are obviously going to disagree with the Bill and these provisions. Having lists of various offences is a good wheeze, but it is not consistent with the philosophy of the Bill, which is that, in general, short sentences do not work—they do not keep the public safe because they do not rehabilitate anyone and, in fact, some people go to the university of crime for a short course of less than 12 months and come out with drug problems, relationship breakdown and other issues that they did not have before. But this is only a presumption; it is not a bar. To respond to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, with whom I so often agree, I do not think that anything else is required as an alternative to the list approach of exceptions, because there is the residual discretion provided in the Bill for exceptional circumstances.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Is this not a case for the Sentencing Council to express some guidance on these matters rather than go down the route of the list system in a statutory form?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I find myself back in the comfortable spot where I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Of course, that is something that we will come to later, no doubt, when we discuss the independence and the constitutional role of the Sentencing Council. If noble Lords are worried that I am being too glib, because “exceptional circumstances” seems too vague an alternative to a prescriptive list of offences which are exceptional, the answer is, on the one hand, to trust the judges—this is about their discretion, and they know jolly well about the awful case that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned, and about situations where people are repeatedly not paying their fines or breaching community orders, which should be exceptions to the 12-month presumption.

The second part of the argument is that the judicial limb of our constitution has in the form of its Sentencing Council—and I use that language deliberately because I am for the independence of the Sentencing Council—a council to help guide judges so that there can be an element of consistency in courts around the country as to the approach on what is exceptional, and therefore what type of case justifies the exception to the presumption and the philosophy of this measure that short sentences are a bad idea.