Protest Measures

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Tuesday 13th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I hope my noble friend will be cautious about invoking criminal law unless there are clear mischiefs to be addressed. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about face coverings and was much reassured by what my noble friend said, but I am much less happy about war memorials. Clearly, clambering over a war memorial is an unattractive and distasteful business, but I am far from clear that it is such a mischief that we should invoke the criminal law and impose criminal penalties. Many years ago, when my wife was 20, we were clambering over the lions in Trafalgar Square. I do not want to be told that we were defiling the memory of Lord Nelson.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I take my noble friend’s point, though I must admit that I did not realise that he had quite such a colourful past. I am afraid that, on this, the Government disagree, and think that this is a proportionate measure.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, in the short time available, I shall concentrate on my conclusions. The first point that I wish to make relates to the policy that the Bill is intended to facilitate: namely, deterring small boats. I do not believe that the Bill, if enacted, will serve as an effective deterrent. I believe that individuals who choose to make the perilous journey across the channel in overcrowded and vulnerable boats are unlikely to be deterred by the slight prospect of being relocated to Rwanda. Those of your Lordships who have principled reservations about the Bill should not support a Bill that cannot achieve its desired objective.

My second point, and my principal objection to the Bill, is the statutory reversal of the Supreme Court’s judgment that Rwanda is not a safe country. Whether Rwanda is or is not a safe country is a matter of fact, to be determined after careful assessment of the relevant evidence. This is what the Supreme Court did. In my view, it is contrary to long-standing principles to reverse, by a statutory pronouncement, a judicial finding of fact.

I turn to my broader objection. This country prides itself on being a country in which the rule of law prevails. We are a country which adheres to its international obligations. The Bill trashes our reputation for domestic and international probity. I cite two provisions. Clause 1(4)(b) states:

“It is recognised that … the validity of an Act”—


any Act, I note—

“is unaffected by international law”.

International law is very broadly defined: see Clause 1(6). That provision is right in strict law, but its sole purpose in the Bill is to provide comfort for the Braverman wing of the Conservative Party and it is a proposition that we should voice with very great caution.

Clause 5 enables a Minister, at his or her discretion, to determine whether or not to be compliant with judicial rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. Members of the international community reading the Bill would be entitled to conclude that the given word of the United Kingdom cannot be relied on.

On Clause 3—the disapplication of the Human Rights Act in respect of individuals who would otherwise benefit from its provisions—I call to mind the words of Pastor Niemöller, spoken in 1947:

“First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out—


Because I was not a socialist.

Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out—

Because I was not a trade unionist.

Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out—

Because I was not a Jew.

Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me”.

Of course, the circumstances are very different from those of the 1930s, but we should beware the precedent that we would create. It is best not to step on to a slippery slope; it can end in some very murky places.

I end with what I hope is a constructive suggestion: the Bill should not be implemented without a positive resolution of both Houses of Parliament. Such a resolution should not be considered until Parliament has received a report on the safety of Rwanda from, for example, a Joint Committee of both Houses appointed for the purpose; there may be other ways of meeting the objective. In the event of no report or an unfavourable report, the Bill would remain in the long grass, where it should be. Such an approach could be reinforced by sunset clauses and constant, continuing assessment. That way, Parliament would at least have an assessment of fact on which it could properly rely. Incidentally, it also accords with the judgment of this House in last week’s vote.

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[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way. Is there not a difference here—a difference between disagreeing with a view and disagreeing with a finding of fact?

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord; I am coming on to that point. There were certain unusual aspects of the decision of the Supreme Court, which is normally concerned with points of law of general public importance rather than findings of fact. It might be better to describe the decision as rather more of a risk assessment based on the evidence before it rather than a finding of fact but, in any event, the Government have since responded to the court’s concerns, as your Lordships have heard.

I ask the question rhetorically: if the matter were before the Supreme Court today, would the judges come to a different conclusion? One should bear in mind that, even before the new steps taken by our Government and that of Rwanda, this case was finely balanced. The Court of Appeal was not unanimous on the matter and the Divisional Court found in favour of the Government. I also note Lord Sumption’s evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights acknowledging the Government’s response to the Supreme Court.

The Bill tackles some really big legal issues. In the view of the lawyers for the Government, it has gone as far as it can go without infringing international law. We know that there remain opportunities for litigation—lawyers have already announced their intention to take them—but the arguments on the law will have to wait until Committee.

At this stage, it is important to consider what the alternatives to the Rwanda scheme are, and so I turn to Labour’s position, and here I would like to mention Sir Keir Starmer. He has been criticised as being a “lefty lawyer”. I have had the privilege of being against him in court and, if he is a lefty lawyer, he is certainly a good one. I think it inappropriate to criticise him for the fact that some of his clients would not necessarily feature high on everybody’s desired guest list for a dinner party. What is his policy vis-à-vis the boats? There has been some talk of better relationships with France and better safe routes, but at the absolute centre of what is said to be the strategy is apparently Sir Keir himself. He reminds us regularly that he was DPP from 2008 to 2013. He was not in charge of Border Force or the National Crime Agency; he was supervising prosecutions at a very macro level—which is why I am reluctant to blame him for shortcomings in relation to the prosecution of, say, Jimmy Savile, or even the poor victims of the Horizon scandal. But he cannot have it both ways. Is it really suggested that, on the very arrival of Sir Keir, a former DPP, at No. 10, the smugglers will simply roll up their rubber dinghies and give up their promising and profitable business model? Is Labour’s alternative deterrent none other than Sir Keir himself? I am afraid I am unconvinced by that.

It comes to this: Rwanda is, at the moment, the only game in town. We all agree that we must stop the boats. The Government have made progress but need to go further. This Bill will enable the scheme to take effect—courts here and in Strasbourg permitting—and I admit it may deter those who sustain the people smugglers’ business. Other European countries face the same challenges and are actively considering similar schemes. Of course your Lordships’ House will scrutinise this Bill carefully, but we should retain some constitutional modesty. The elected House has passed the Bill. Many people in this country consider that their Government should be able to control our borders against illegal migration, and we should not ignore them. In the absence of any cogent alternative, while we should strive to improve the Bill, we should not wreck it.

Asylum Seekers: Deportation from France

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Monday 4th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Really? I will find out and come back to the noble Lord.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, in the event that the Government decide to derogate from any part of the convention, would Ministers agree to publish in advance, before doing so, a paper identifying which of our international obligations might be impacted by such a decision?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I cannot anticipate what may or may not be in the Bill. Obviously, the Bill will be presented to Parliament in the usual way.

Rwanda: Asylum Arrangements Treaty

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Tuesday 21st November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I do not have that detail because the Bill has yet to be presented to Parliament. However, as I understand it, the timeframe is 21 days after laying, when both Houses are sitting, for the treaty process to take effect.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that, for the purposes of assessing the safety of a country, a theoretical commitment to treaty obligations is not sufficient? What counts is the performance of those obligations, which requires a period of assessment.

Illegal Immigration

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Monday 20th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I cannot comment on that at the moment, but, again, I am sure we will come back to it in due course.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Does my noble friend agree that whether Rwanda is or is not a safe country is a matter of fact and that to displace such a finding of fact by the Supreme Court using a statute is very hard to reconcile with the rule of law? Perhaps I may make this suggestion. If we must have this Bill, we could have a delayed implementation date, to be triggered only by an affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament, with that debate to be preceded by a report of a Joint Committee of both Houses advising on whether Rwanda is a safe country.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend, regarding the Supreme Court’s decision, that as of 14 June 2022 it did indeed regard it as a fact that there was a risk of refoulement. However, that is a fairly narrow interpretation of the rest of the system that is currently set up in Rwanda. Again, I will not speculate on how things may change. I also note that the Supreme Court specifically acknowledged that there were cases where it could see the situation changing in the fullness of time. I expect that this is the area we are looking to explore.

As regards my noble friend’s suggestion of an affirmative SI, I am happy to take that back and enter that into the conversation that is taking place.

Abortion Clinics: Safe Access Zones

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Monday 20th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Does my noble friend agree that these women will be in a very fragile state of mind, and it is highly undesirable that they should be subjected to coercive behaviour by the opponents of abortion?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I completely agree.

Sir Edward Heath: Operation Conifer

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Tuesday 24th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I would say to the noble Lord that of course we have arrived at a situation where Mr Veale has been held to account, so the public should therefore have faith. It perhaps took too long, but he was appropriately investigated along the way. In November 2017, the PCC in Wiltshire referred two matters concerning Mr Veale to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The investigation related partly to an allegation that a mobile belonging to Wiltshire police was deliberately damaged. He was subject to a management action plan—that was felt to be appropriate after the investigation by the various authorities. So I think it is unfair to say that nothing happened to Mr Veale, but perhaps it did take too long to reach a conclusion. As noble Lords might appreciate, I would certainly agree with that.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend understand that many of us simply do not comprehend how a relatively senior police officer could have given credence to allegations that were such patent rubbish?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, with hindsight of course we can call them “patent rubbish” but, at the time, all these allegations had to be investigated; I do not think there is any doubt about that.

Illegal Migration Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 5th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 156A and 161. Due to a technicality, Amendments 156 and 157 were not formally withdrawn, but they will be withdrawn, so it is Amendment 156A which is under consideration. I note my interests as a trustee of Reset and with the RAMP project, as laid out in the register.

I thank the usual channels for changing business on Monday so that this item was first today rather than last on Monday. We noted previously that, both during the Nationality and Borders Bill and during this Bill, age assessments have been talked about at 2 am and just after midnight. I am truly grateful to the usual channels for hearing my plea about not being last on the agenda again.

I am grateful also to the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister, Lady Neuberger, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for their support of these amendments. This is not the level of legislative scrutiny—which we should have in Committee—that we owe to children. There were some questions put in Committee to which we did not get full answers, and I hope the Minister might provide them today.

The Bill significantly restricts any legal avenues for challenging an incorrect age determination. The appeal mechanisms instituted by the Nationality and Borders Act, though they have not yet been implemented, will now be disapplied. Following government amendments at this late stage, judicial review will also be limited to such a narrow scope as to make it impossible for a potential child to challenge the assessment of their age based on evidential fact.

All the while, if the Home Office were to inaccurately assess a child to be an adult, the implications would be disastrous and irreversible. A child would face entering an adult system alone, where they would be detained with adults before potentially being removed to a third country with no safeguards in place, perhaps without ever encountering a child protection officer. This is simply absurd, but to remove all legal safeguards and weaken a putative child’s access to justice, when the implications are so grave, is as horrifying as it is immoral.

We must not forget that the Home Office does indeed get age assessments wrong. Based on the Home Office’s own data, we can see that last year nearly two-thirds of all age dispute cases were found to be children. Currently, no method exists that can determine accurately and consistently whether a person is a child; that fact is well acknowledged by the Home Office and is clearly there in the children’s impact assessment that we got yesterday. Therefore, it is understandable that subjective and visual age assessments by immigration officers can lead to inaccurate judgments.

Because of this fact, a potential child must not be disqualified from a judicial review on whether their age decision was wrong on the basis of fact and judicial review must serve as a barrier to a child’s removal. Not to permit the courts to grant relief when the verifiable age of a child is available would allow the Government to proceed with the removal of a child when they know their decision was flawed. Last year, this would have meant over 1,000 unaccompanied children could have been eligible for removal to a third country. A child should not be removed from the UK on such a fallible basis. For the sake of children, this cannot be allowed to stand, and that is reason enough why access to judicial review should be there.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I have been saying—and I hope to reinforce this point—that I have one anxiety. As I understand the amendment, it confines the right of appeal to the grounds set out in Clause 56(5), which exclude an appeal on the basis that there has been a mistake of fact.

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

I was about to sit down, but I will note that. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for bringing back these amendments. I am also grateful to the Home Office for finally publishing its child rights impact assessment yesterday afternoon although, I must say, getting it has been like pulling teeth.

However, on age assessment and other children’s rights issues, it reads more like an attempt at post hoc justification than a serious analysis of the implications for children’s rights. The initial reaction from the children’s sector is damning. That it continues to use misleading statistics on age assessment that were challenged in Committee is disappointing, to put it mildly.

In Committee, I asked for an explanation of

“why the Government have ignored the very clear advice of their own advisory committee on the question of consent”,

raised by Amendment 161. The Minister’s response was:

“Of course we consider the advice”,—[Official Report, 12/6/23; cols. 1806-16.]


but the fact is that Clause 57 represents a rejection of that advice. Will the Minister explain why, having considered the expert advice, the Government then rejected it? In effect, their approach is that of guilty until proven innocent but, as we have heard, Clause 56 will make proving innocence—or, more accurately, that one is a child—much more difficult than now in what is increasingly a culture of disbelief.

The limitations on appeal and JR rights are, as the JCHR points out and despite what the CRIA says, clearly not in any child’s best interests. Likewise, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressed concern and recommended that age-disputed children should not be removed to a third country. I asked in Committee what the Government’s response is, but received no reply; nor was it explained what steps would be taken to ensure the following, in the words of the supplementary ECHR memorandum, echoed in the CRIA:

“The appropriate support and facilities will need to be in place in the country of removal to ensure that the individual can effectively participate in their judicial review from abroad”.


It is difficult to believe that effective participation would be possible, even with support. We need, at the very least, to know what that support would be. Even if the child managed to challenge the decision successfully from abroad, they could then order only a reassessment. How would that be meaningfully carried out if the child is no longer in the UK? If the child were then reassessed as a child, would they be moved back to the UK?

I have a final question. The Nationality and Borders Act provided for a new statutory right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to replace judicial review as the means to challenge age assessment under that Act, so that it

“can be resolved as swiftly as possible”

and

“to ensure that genuine children don’t slip through the net and are classed as adults”.

Over a year on, this section has not been commenced. Can the Minister say why and set out the Government’s timetable for doing so, or has it been jettisoned before it has even come into force?

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 156A, although I regret the limited nature of the appeal contemplated by that amendment. I very much welcome Amendment 158A, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.

As a matter of principle, I am very much in favour of giving individuals the right of appeal although, as I said when I intervened on the right reverend Prelate, I fear that his amendment provides for a more limited right of appeal than I would wish.

A decision on the age of an individual is critical in determining a person’s status under the legislation. I am concerned that, in many instances, the original decision about age will be made in a somewhat perfunctory manner. I imagine that immigration officers may get rather impatient and make rather perfunctory decisions. At the end of the day, age is a matter of evidence and I cannot find any persuasive reason why the original position on age should not be challenged. In my view, the right of appeal should extend to appeals based on the ground that the relevant authority had made a mistake of fact. That is what the noble and learned Lord seeks to achieve in Amendment 158A. However, if I have correctly understood the amendment and its relation to the Bill, the grounds of appeal are limited to those set out in Clause 56(5) of the Bill as it stands. The grounds specified there are essentially judicial review grounds—for example, that there was some procedural unfairness, or the ground of irrationality—and appeals based on fact are expressly excluded. I regard that exclusion as highly regrettable.

To meet some of the anxieties that I fear will be expressed by the Minister regarding my comments and the amendments, I make this point as well: the rights of appeal could be abused, and I would therefore like the burden of establishing the appeal to be on the appellant. It must be for them to satisfy the relevant appellate body that the grounds of appeal are made out. That may in fact be the existing law and practice—it has been such a long time since I practised in that field of law that I simply do not know. If it is not, it should be, and it would meet many of the anxieties likely to be expressed on the government Benches.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I understand very well the child rights impact assessment on this issue. Naturally, the Government are concerned about people’s ability to pretend that they are under age when they are not, but that does not in fact deal with the underlying problem: there are a large number of children from countries outside Europe who mature much more quickly, certainly quicker than children in western Europe.

I remember going on a visit to Safe Passage, which was offering a drop-in centre for young men under 18. A number of those I met, and whom Safe Passage was absolutely satisfied were under 18, had beards or moustaches. If such person is interviewed by the Home Office, will it not immediately assume that a moustache or beard absolutely means that they are over 18? In the case of some of these young people, that will be incorrect.

I also remain very concerned about the issue raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in relation to Clause 5. If the issue is, as I suspect it will be, that they got it wrong, it is not necessarily—or probably not ever—an issue of law but a question of fairness. It is a question of dealing fairly and in the best interests of those who are genuinely under 18.

Reading through the child impact assessment, what depresses me is the suggestion regarding the extent to which the Government are following the principles of the Children Act—which every Government in my lifetime have followed—and looking out for the best interests of children. They are saying it again and again and, quite simply, doing the exact reverse. This is extraordinarily depressing.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, as we have heard, these amendments take us on to the provisions regarding age assessments. Given that, under Clause 3, unaccompanied children will be treated differently from adults, and given the obvious safeguarding risks of adults purporting to be children being placed within the care system, it is important that we take steps to deter adults from claiming to be children and to avoid lengthy legal challenges to age-assessment decisions preventing the removal of those who have been assessed to be adults. Receiving care and services reserved for children also incurs costs and reduces the accessibility of these services for genuine children who need them.

Assessing age is inherently difficult, but it is crucial that we disincentivise adults from knowingly misrepresenting themselves as children. Our published data shows that, between 2016 and March 2023, there were 8,611 asylum cases in which an age assessment was required and subsequently resolved. Of those cases, nearly half— 47%, or 4,088 individuals—were found to be adults. This percentage aggregates initial decisions on age taken upon arrival, comprehensive assessments and the outcomes of legal challenges. I make clear that only those assessed to be adults will fall within the duty.

Accordingly, Clause 56 disapplies the right of appeal for age assessments, which is yet to be commenced and was established in Section 54 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, for those who meet the four conditions in the Bill. Instead, those wishing to challenge a decision on age will be able to do so through judicial review, which will not suspend removal, and can continue from outside the UK after they have been removed. In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I say that we are keeping the commencement of Section 54 under review, but I am unable to provide a further update at this stage.

Clause 56(5) provides the basis on which a court can consider a decision relating to a person’s age in judicial review proceedings. It provides that a court can grant relief

“only on the basis that it was wrong in law”,

and must not do so on the basis that it

“was wrong as a matter of fact”.

This distinguishes the position that the Supreme Court adopted in its judgment in the 2009 case of the Crown on the application of A v London Borough of Croydon, page eight. The intention is to ensure that the court cannot make its own determination on age—which should properly be reserved for those qualified and trained to assess age—but instead can consider a decision on age only on conventional judicial review principles.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

The court will receive evidence from people who have made these assessments, and courts are well versed in determining which evidence is to be preferred.

Illegal Migration Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 76 which, in my view, sets out in the clearest possible terms the principles that should be applied to the power of detention presently under discussion. Indeed, if I have correctly understood the law—of which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, reminded us—Amendment 76’s principles are principles that are currently being applied by the courts, and will be applied unless this Bill is enacted in its present form.

It is perhaps worth reminding the House of the strategic purpose of the Bill: to deter would-be migrants by the prospect of deportation to their country of origin or to a safe country. In my view, that is a perfectly legitimate objective; nation states are entitled to regulate the flow of migration. However, I also think that, in the modern world, that can be done only by the collective action of countries working together. That may require—I think it probably will—the substantive amendment of existing international agreements and conventions. I think there is very little prospect of unilateral action succeeding, save on the margins of the problem. The policy that underpins this Bill will fail because it will not be possible to deport migrants in sufficient numbers to constitute an effective deterrent.

Given that, I am extremely concerned about the ability of a Secretary of State to use a power of detention to reinforce, rather than to implement, the policy of deterrence. That would be an improper use of the power of detention. I am also deeply concerned that the power of detention as contemplated by the Bill will be used as an administrative convenience: detention without obvious limits of time in the hope that some possible prospect of deportation in respect of an individual will turn up. In my view, that would be highly objectionable.

I come to the four detailed provisions in Amendment 76. They should be considered individually. I will not repeat each one, because the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has read them out, but just take the first and ask a sensible question:

“the Secretary of State must intend to remove the person being detained and can only use the power to detain for that purpose”.

That seems to be a very fair statement of the law, and we are entitled to know from my noble friend the Minister what the principled objection to such a statement is. The same question applies to each of the remaining three provisions. I will not read them out because the noble Lord already has. Each one of them seems to me to be wholly right as a statement of principle, and this House is entitled to know the principled objection to them if there is one.

As it happens, I think I know the principled objections—at least I know the objections—because they are set out in paragraph 95 of the Explanatory Notes. The Government wish to give the Secretary of State, rather than the courts, the right to determine the length of time deemed to be reasonable for a period of detention. Moreover, when early deportation is not practicable, the Bill will give the Secretary of State the power to detain for such a period that the Secretary of State deems reasonable. That is a huge enlargement in the discretionary powers of a Secretary of State, and I do not want to give any Secretary of State, least of all the present Home Secretary or her immediate predecessor, such additional powers. In my view, the judgment of the legality of detention should be left to the judges and the courts, in applying the principles that are so well set out in Amendment 76.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I have been asked by my Front Bench not to speak at all and, if I break that, to speak in the shortest possible terms. I can do that, because I completely support the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in the speech that he just gave and most particularly in his admonishing the Government for not withdrawing this Bill. I have read the two court judgments and can say only that, until or unless the Supreme Court takes a different view, Clause 2 is a nullity, and that is the heart of the Bill.

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A person’s detention will continue to be subject to judicial oversight. We are not removing the involvement of the courts, as some in the House may have suggested. That oversight will continue by way of a writ of habeas corpus in the first 28 days, via an application for bail to the First-tier Tribunal, or a judicial review after that initial 28-day period. In any such judicial review proceedings, the Secretary of State’s assessment as to whether a period of detention is reasonable can be challenged on conventional public law grounds, including whether the decision is Wednesbury unreasonable. To be clear, the Bill explicitly does not, as has previously been suggested, provide for indefinite detention. The Government’s aim is to ensure that people are not held in detention for any longer than is absolutely necessary, as I have already said.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

If my noble friend is right, he is effectively saying that people who are detained will be released if there is no prospect of deportation. If that is right, the policy of deterrence is entirely without merit.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My noble friend is right, in that it is one of the Hardial Singh principles that, if there is no reasonable prospect of removal, that person should not be detained. But I cannot agree with him that the policy of deterrence is not right, because it is clearly the Government’s intention to remove any illegal entrants to a safe third country. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I add that the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed with that being lawful as a matter of principle.

We recognise that circumstances can change. Where that is the case, detention must be reviewed. If it is considered that the anticipated period of detention is not reasonably necessary, the individual will be bailed. This reflects the existing legal and policy position on the use of detention.

It remains the Government’s view that the provisions in Clause 11 provide an appropriate balance between the respective roles of the Home Secretary and the courts. Accordingly, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Tuesday 13th June 2023 Lords Chamber

I do not know whether noble Lords will be aware of the extensive publication of this change; why on earth does the Minister think that is acceptable, in particular the way the Government justify themselves in answer to the criticisms of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee? I will tell noble Lords—

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I have not seen the additional Explanatory Memorandum. Would the noble Lord tell us what additional material is in it? If it is substantial, surely it should be provided to all Members of this House before the debate proceeds.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Government can table a new statutory instrument any time they like. They are perfectly entitled. They can table a statutory instrument and invite us to consider it—or, far better than that would be to produce primary legislation which we can debate properly and can amend if we think it appropriate to do so and which will then go back to other place for it to consider.

If it does not agree with us, we will, I am sure—as the noble Lord, Lord Reid, rightly said—follow our customary practice and give way, because it is the elected House. What is so objectionable about this is that all of those procedures are removed. All we can do, as he said, is express regret: we are very sorry about this. Well, I express regret that the Labour Front Bench is not prepared to see through the implications of its own view that this is a constitutional outrage. It is something that we should stand up against and vote against.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, with little exception, I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said. I start by having considerable sympathy with the motives that have caused the Government to come forward with this statutory instrument. However, for the reasons that were advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I feel that the process is very defective. However, again, for constitutional reasons, which I shall mention very briefly, I cannot support the fatal amendment.

That, in summary, is my position; if I may, I shall elaborate a little further. So far as the motives of the Government that lie behind the statutory instrument are concerned, I share very many of these views, as indeed does the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. In a free society, individuals have a right to demonstrate. However, their fellow citizens have a right to go about their daily business without unreasonable obstruction. I fear that, increasingly, we are seeing on the part of demonstrators a disregard for the obligations they have to their fellow citizens.

So I can well understand the motives that activate the Government in bringing forward the changes in the statutory instrument. However, for the reasons advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I have very real reservations about the process that is being adopted. The process and its defects were identified by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. He is entirely right, and his report is extremely direct on the subject. The statutory instrument is in fact designed to reverse the defeat in this House earlier this year.

If that is a desirable thing to do, it should be done by primary legislation. That is the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Amendments made to a Bill by this House on Report can always be considered further in the House of Commons and, where appropriate, they can be the subject of ping-pong; that is the proper way forward.

A statutory instrument is an unamendable legislative device and, in my view, one that should not be used to make significant changes to the law, in particular to the criminal law. So one needs to go to the purpose of this statutory instrument. The Home Secretary set it out in yesterday’s debate in the House of Commons. At column 55, she set out the four purposes of the instrument, and said later, of the police, that

“we are trying to clarify the thresholds and boundaries of where the legal limit lies, so that they can take more robust action and respond more effectively”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/6/23; col. 74.]

Now, that raises at least two pertinent questions. Either this statutory instrument, in effect, does no more than tidy up existing legislation and ensure that existing case law applies equally across the statutory waterfront, or it is intended to make significant changes to existing law. In the first case, it must be doubtful whether the statutory instrument is required; in the second case, if, as I suspect, the statutory instrument does make substantial changes to existing law, it should be done by primary legislation—and that is what this House intended to do in January.

So, finally, we get back to process, which is fundamental to tonight’s debate. I share all the reservations expressed in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. They constitute good reasons why the procedure adopted by the Government is flawed. I would like to think that if the amendment is passed—and in all probability, I will vote for it—the Government will withdraw the statutory instrument and resort to primary legislation.

I am afraid that I cannot support the fatal amendment moved by the noble Baroness. Here, I find myself in agreement with the views expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Reid and Lord Rooker. The House of Commons passed this statutory instrument last night by a very substantial majority. The fatal amendment has a much more dramatic consequence than those occasions when the House amends a Government Bill. In such cases, the Bill can be further considered by the Commons. However, if this House carries the fatal amendment, the statutory instrument is killed. That goes beyond that which an unelected House should in general do.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

The noble Viscount seems to be saying that the difference here is that if this House votes down a measure in primary legislation, it goes back to the Commons to be reconsidered. That is not what happened in this case: the amendment was introduced in the House of Lords, not the other place, we voted it down and it disappeared. It did not go back to the other House. Exactly the same thing will happen tonight if noble Lords vote for the fatal amendment.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I entirely understand this point, but we need to draw a distinction between amendments that this House makes in Committee and on Report, when it is possible for the House of Commons to consider again and come back to this House, and—

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Will the noble Viscount give way?

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

May I just finish this point?

In this particular case, if we pass a fatal amendment, as advocated by the noble Baroness, we will be killing a statutory instrument which was supported by the House of Commons last night. I am very unwilling to support that proposition as a precedent, and I agree with the views expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Reid.

I say this as one who was in the House of Commons for 30 years. I am under no illusion as to the nature of the House of Commons. My father used to speak and write about the “elective dictatorship”. He was entirely right, but at the end of the day we have to decide where authority lies, and however imperfect its authority may be down the road, it does have the authority of an election, and we do not have that. I give way to the noble Lord if he wishes to intervene further.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am very grateful, but the noble Viscount makes another error in his assertions. This was not an amendment to the Bill introduced by the Opposition in this House. It was a Government amendment introduced in this House, which was defeated by this House, which means that the amendment could not then be considered by the House of Commons. Therefore, there is no practical difference between the voting down of that Government amendment, killing it completely, and voting for a fatal amendment to the statutory instrument, which would kill it completely.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

The noble Lord is cavilling at this point. We are, in a sense, talking about principle. Where does authority, in the end, lie? It lies down there because they are elected. It does not lie here because we are not elected. It is for that reason that I shall vote for the amendment moved by the noble Lord, and I do not feel able—although I agree with a great deal that the noble Baroness said—to vote for the fatal amendment.