Investigatory Powers (Amendment)Bill [Lords]

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Report stage
Monday 25th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

I very much hope the right hon. Gentleman has brought Lord West’s smelling salts with him, because I would like to clarify the concession that Lord West got in the Lords here in the Commons. I can happily commit to strengthening the language on notification requirements in the code of practice, when it is formally brought forward in due course, to require that the Prime Minister “will” be notified of any decisions under the alternative process, rather than “should” be.

[Mr Jones]

I welcome that, but can I hear it again and pin the Minister down a little more? I am sure it is a massive victory, but is he giving a solemn pledge to the House that the code of practice will remove the word “should” and insert the word “will”? Is that what he is agreeing to?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Yes.

[Mr Jones]

Victory at last—there is such power in changing one word. The Minister has given a solemn undertaking on the Floor of the House that the code of practice will change the word “should” to “will”. A small victory for the ISC, but I am sure my colleagues will take it in the spirit in which it is offered. I say to the Minister gently that we could have agreed that the other day when we met, but no doubt the issue that we will be voting on tonight was concentrating his mind.

With that great victory under my belt and those of the members of the ISC, I turn to other amendments. New clause 3, in the name of the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, deals with

“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.

I understand why he has proposed the new clause. It is always worthwhile debating the issues, which run through the entire Bill. Am I assured that there are processes in place that protect our civil liberties? Yes, I am. However, there are occasions when things can go wrong or people ignore them. I think they have been strengthened greatly, but the right hon. Gentleman refers to an important point. I was on the Committee in 2017 when we did the inquiry into detention and rendition. That took a long time, but it was a good report given where it got to. It unearthed things that were not pleasant but had been done in our names as a democracy.

One conclusion the Committee came to was that in its view the UK tolerated actions and took others that were regarded as inexcusable. Well, they were inexcusable, because as the report outlined, we passed on information to allies who then used it. I think things have changed, and to give Members an example of how the ISC can improve things, we called for a review of the consolidated guidance surrounding the way that security operatives should operate regarding issues of rendition or torture. That led to the Fulford principles, which I think have moved on and tightened up the rules and guidance for members of our security services. That was a big movement forward.

I do not think the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden will push the new clause to a vote, but it reinforces the point that if we have a situation whereby, again, we get information that is passed to one of our allies, we must ensure that those principles are upheld. Am I confident that they are upheld now? I think I am, but how did we get to that pretty damning report in 2017? We got there because those principles and the guidance in place were not followed. We must be vigilant about that, and over the years the right hon. Gentleman has done not only this House but the country a service through his tenacity on these subjects.

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[Mr Jones]

I agree, but that then places an unnecessary burden on the system. The current process with the Secretary of State, the judicial commissioner and the Prime Minister is robust enough to ensure that people are not doing this to find out what someone ordered on Amazon Prime this weekend or to look at their Tesco account, so I think those assurances are fine.

New clause 4 would

“remove the ability of the Secretary of State to authorise the interception of the communications of, or the obtaining of communications intended for, or private information belonging to, Members of Parliament.”

Again, it is good to have this debate, but I would support such a measure for the reasons I have outlined.

The other change in the Bill concerns bulk data. The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings covered the original investigatory powers in detail, but there are now big data sets held not only by public authorities but by others, and that has made it more important that our security services are able to access them. Whenever we do this, however, it means more intrusion, so let me deal with the issue of oversight in the Bill, and with the broader, more intrusive powers to obtain internet connection records for the discovery of targets.

Again, that is something that I and other ISC members totally support, but the authorisation process is internal. One stance that the ISC has taken throughout all this is that if we are to give more powers to our security services, there must be a balance. There will not be a situation whereby what people have seen can be identified, but this power will drag in a lot of people who, as the right hon. Gentleman said earlier, are completely innocent. As I said, there is a need for such a power, but we thought there should be more oversight from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Therefore, the points I made about amendment 15 are important.

The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office does a great job of ensuring public support for what we do, but, again, there is an issue around bulk datasets. Some of the examples that were given to ISC members—thanks must go to the Minister, who arranged a meeting for the Committee to be briefed on this—make sense when it comes to the issue of low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. It is burdensome, for example, to access the electoral register, but today the Government have said that somehow that is a secret document. Well, that is not the case under this Bill, in which case it is important that the security services should be able to use it, rather than having to go through the warrantry process. That goes to the point, which my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central raised earlier on, about the definition of “low expectation”.

Another perfectly legitimate reason that the security services need these measures is related to testing new AI models of learning. They need access to these new big datasets, which are out there and which companies use, and the Bill will allow them to have it without going through the warrantry system. If intelligence is going to be on the front foot when it comes to AI, we will have to have these big datasets that will teach the systems how to do it.

The problem comes back my hon. Friend’s question of what is deemed a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. That is something we have considered throughout this process. One thing the ISC has considered is adding to the existing categories. One suggestion we put forward was that, when the agencies do this, they should have to email the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to notify them that they have done it.

[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

[Mr Jones]

I hope the Minister is not going to intervene again. My legs might get wobbly if I have to sit down again. I might even need some smelling salts. He has explained the internal system, which I am quite satisfied with, but as I said to him and his civil servants—I think other members of the ISC have also said this—it is not us that he has to convince, but the public.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the right hon. Member for giving way. I just want to assure him that I have taken on board his points. I went back to the agencies and assured myself of the challenge that he had raised and found what I think is a better answer than the one we looked at when we were chatting. I wrote to Sir Brian Leveson and I am delighted to say that he responded, confirming that he will pay specific oversight to this regime in the early years until he is content that it operates in the way that the ISC, the Government and the British public would expect. IPCO has taken on this responsibility, which, I think, answers the question more succinctly than it would be if it were included in the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

Well, I shall take that as half a victory.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Take them where you can get them!

[Mr Jones]

May I just get some clarity? That is a perfectly legitimate way of doing it, and it will mean not interfering with the existing system, which was the concern of both the services and the Minister. I understand that this not as simple as an email being sent. Will that mean that there will be a section looking at this issue in the first annual report? If that is the case, we could at least say to the public that it is actually being considered and the promise is being followed up.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Member will understand that IPCO is operationally independent, so I will not instruct the office or speak for Sir Brian, who has been unbelievably rapid and helpful in his response today. I am sure that he will have heard the comments that the right hon. Member made and, no doubt, will want to draw attention to any areas where he has any doubts at all.

[Mr Jones]

That would be helpful. That would give reassurance to the public and provide a test of how the system works. As I have said, I am comfortable with the process of authorisation, but the public must be comfortable with it as well.

[Mr Jones]

I understand where the right hon. Gentleman is coming from. Our original idea about having an email was explained when I met the Minister and his civil servants. I think that that would really cut across some of the processes that we have in place. The suggestion that has been made would be one way of doing it, but IPCO already has the powers to look at such things. The only problem with doing that is that we would then have to set up someone in the agencies to produce another report. I do not want to do anything that holds up their work, and I think that that might do it.

Possibly the Minister’s suggestion of how Sir Brian Leveson is going to do it will give the public some reassurance. Let us not forget that Sir Brian has the power to take action if things are not being done correctly. If we read his reports, we can see that he is not fearful of doing these things. A fair compromise has been put forward. I think we have one and a half victories so far—

[Tom Tugendhat]

I think it’s two.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

Again, just to clarify for my right hon. Friend, this Bill offers no greater expansion than his own Bill did in 2016. In the same way he ensured that Bill was no snoopers’ charter, I assure him that this one is not either.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

rose—

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[Tom Tugendhat]

If my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me, I will be able discuss that in a more secure environment, but I can only say, “Not necessarily.” I will be able to describe why that is in a different environment, but I cannot do it here.

The reason for not accepting amendments 22 and 23 —I understand the points made by right hon. and hon. Friends and Members across the House—is that we are talking about a very limited number of people. One Secretary of State is already used to do the initial request. The second person on the triple lock is a judicial commissioner—a judge. The third therefore has to be one of the four Secretaries of State left. Therefore, it is important that we make sure that it is somebody in whom the Prime Minister has confidence. Given that we are about to have a new Government—I hope the new Conservative Government, but still a new one—it is entirely possible that there will be a new Cabinet and that the routine explanation will not be satisfactory. As routine duties do not have legal clarity, we will not use them.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

The Minister has used that argument before about new Secretaries of State, and it is complete nonsense, is it not? It would not happen on day one unless the Prime Minister suddenly got covid or was indisposed. By the time this came in, those three people would be there anyway. His argument is pretty weak.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Member has made his point and I have made mine; I am afraid I will leave it there rather than continue. The ways in which we have been able to engage on the Bill has been incredibly supportive and helpful.

The removal of clause 15 from the Bill would prevent the intelligence agencies and the National Crime Agency from detecting some national security and serious crime threats, and those intent on committing child sexual exportation and abuse. Given the robust oversight of the regime in general, and the internet connection records in particular, we simply do not believe that this is in the best interests of the British public. Removal would benefit only those who threaten our safety and serve to make the work of the intelligence services and the NCA significantly harder as they seek to protect us and bring paedophiles to justice. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner already has the necessary powers to inspect and report on all parts of the CD regime. If the Investigatory Powers Commissioner wishes is to focus attention on condition D of the internet connection record, they have the power to do so. With those clarifications, I commend the Bill to the House.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Mr Kevan Jones]

It is gratifying that we will get this Bill on the statute book, because it will give our security services the necessary powers to keep us all safe. I add my thanks to the staff of the Committee on which I and other Members served, and like the Minister I thank the civil servants who I have engaged with throughout the passage of the Bill. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) for his engagement on the Bill. The right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) would have liked to have been here today. He has played an integral part not just in speaking about the Bill, but in his work on the ISC. As I said earlier, unfortunately he is at the funeral of Lord Cormack; the House will understand his reason.

As I said, the Bill will improve our abilities. Perhaps the Minister would also like to put on record his thanks to the ISC, which he forgot to do. It might have been a painful process at times, but can I give him some advice, possibly for the future? He may well have been able to solve some of these issues earlier in our discussions, and avoided keeping his colleagues here on a Monday night—[Interruption.] The Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities says from a sedentary position that that was impossible, but the Minister has agreed to our amendments.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I was going to do so!

[Mr Jones]

The Minister says that he was going to, but if he had done that last week we could perhaps have had very short discussions tonight.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Committee stage & Report stage
Thursday 7th March 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Sir John Hayes]

It does the Minister great credit that he has made that list available during the course of our consideration. That is very important. What I had feared might happen was that we might not get it while we were in Committee. In fact, I have not actually seen it, but I am grateful to him for making it available, at least, during our consideration.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

This is an area that concerns me. I am quite certain the security services have protocols on how to deal with such things, but it worries me that the DWP is on that list. Having been involved in work on the Horizon Post Office scandal for many years, I know the DWP did not cover itself in glory on some of those cases. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that there are protocols governing when and how it will use those powers? That, I think, would give the public some assurance that there is a standard for how they will be used.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman tempts me towards an area that the Bill does not cover, so I hope he will forgive me for focusing on what it does cover, such as the safeguards. Clause 14 will limit communications data acquisition to the purpose of a body required to meet its civil functions and duties, such as a regulatory body providing oversight of financial markets, or indeed the DWP overseeing different elements of its responsibilities. Where disclosure is in support of a criminal prosecution and IPA part 3 authorisations for communications data must continue to be sought, using the existing safeguards and oversight provided for by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s office, the courts will oversee the use of those powers by public authorities in the same way as the acquisition of non-communications data under the existing powers. He has asked me specifically about a connected area, so—I hope he will forgive me—I will have a look at it and write to him very specifically about that.

[Mr Jones]

May I suggest that the Minister does write to the Committee? I accept the safeguards in place, but for organisations other than the security services, I want to know what internal mechanisms they have to ensure that use of those powers is proportionate in terms of investigations and so on, and what training and protocols they are using. If the Minister could write to us on that, that would be helpful.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Forgive me, but the right hon. Gentleman is asking for a very large piece of work there. I am setting out the legal authority under which those organisations can act. Their internal processes may be different in different circumstances and be answerable to different Ministers.

[Mr Jones]

I am sorry, but I do not agree with the Minister. He is giving those other public bodies additional powers, and I think it is quite reasonable for this Committee and the public to be assured of how those powers are actually going to be used. As I say, I have no problem with the security services, because I am well aware that they have very clear, strong protocols and safeguards governing the use of their powers internally, with authorisations and so on. I think he just needs to ask those other Departments how they are going to do this, and what the internal mechanisms are.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am very happy to ask them; I am just stating clearly that they are not under the responsibility that I have as a Minister. The legal powers that they are given are not additional powers; they are repetitions of the IPA 2016, so they are not additional powers—[Interruption.] Forgive me, but they are not additional powers. Their existing codes of practice under the different organisations have their own responsibilities within them.

[Mr Jones]

I beg to differ. In the next clause, we will come on to the breadth and depth of the new powers, but that is a different argument—I will save that until then. However, he is the Minister and, in my experience, the Minister leads the Bill. I would have thought it would be quite simple to ask those other Departments what those protocols are. If he does not ask, he does not get.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will happily ask. The right hon. Gentleman is asking for internal management structures, though.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

To be absolutely clear, the letter was in response to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings, so it was sent to him, it was copied to the secretariat of the ISC and it is in the Bill pack. The hon. Member for Barnsley Central therefore has access to it.

[Mr Jones]

May I ask the Minister to look at his internal process again? We also had this problem with the National Security Bill. I do not know whether he should change the pigeon post he is using to ensure people have it. May I also point out that the ISC is not constantly in session? Therefore, if he has to send it to the ISC, we do not automatically get it until our next meeting or when we do the next reading.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am delighted to clarify that the letter was emailed to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings. He is a traditionalist in many ways, but I believe he has entered the electronic age.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

As usual, right hon. and hon. Members have raised some excellent points. Let me be clear: it is not true to say that there is no judicial oversight. To say that there is no judicial oversight would be correct if the IPC were not in place. I know what the right hon. Member for North Durham is going to say, but that is a form of judicial oversight.

As to the way in which the authorisations work, I hope that I have been clear—I will repeat it to ensure that I am—that an investigating officer would have to make an application to use the powers. That would have to go to a senior officer in their service who is not in their chain of command: someone who is not overseeing the operation or in their management chain—a separate element. Any abuse of that system could mean that that individual, or those individuals, are in violation of section 11. I know that the right hon. Member for North Durham takes his responsibilities on the ISC exceptionally seriously and is fully aware that sometimes there can be a pressing need for operational action at pace. That is what this is also designed to help. It is important that officers have the ability to act under a regulatory framework that means that abuses are, at worst, extremely limited due to various constraints.

[Mr Jones]

I accept that and I have confidence in the internal protocols—do not get me wrong on that—but the Minister does not have to convince me or members of this Committee; it is about the public perception. What is the problem? If we are not going to have judicial oversight in terms of judicial authorisation, what is to stop us having another system whereby, when it is used, the IPC is informed? We could send a simple email so that it would at least have ongoing oversight when these powers are being used.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman is creating his own haystack here. Although I hope as ever that this power will be used only exceptionally rarely, sadly the nature of serious and organised crime and terror in this country means that it will be used more often. There is a slight misunderstanding as to how this will be used. Targeting a train website or a single authority would not be proportionate or meet the necessity provisions within the Bill. It would be neither necessary nor proportionate. In fact, it would be unnecessary and would be vastly disproportionate, because it would be a mass collection exercise that would neither be targeted in a way that would satisfy the proportionality requirement, and nor would it give a useful answer—it would give such bulk data as to be useless—and therefore it would not be necessary.

The whole point of this is that it sets out a series of conditions in which these powers could be used—perhaps against a certain website, that is true—but on the basis of intelligence. It would have to have a particular cause and a particular time. This is not a Venn diagram with a single circle, but a Venn diagram with four or five circles; it must be in the centre of those for it to be necessary and proportionate.

[Tom Tugendhat]

“Exceptional” does not mean that there is necessarily huge amounts of time to act; exceptional means that the seriousness of the offence is extremely grave. These powers are for things such as child sexual exploitation. I wish it were not so, but even in this country, the police very often have to act extremely speedily to prevent harm to a child and sometimes, very sadly, multiple children. They have also to act extremely speedily to prevent terrorist plots or other forms of very serious organised violence or criminal activity.

That is why “exceptional” does not necessarily mean that it can be dealt with in a procedural way over a number of weeks; exceptional may mean absolutely pressing as well, and that is what this is designed for. The right hon. Member for North Durham may have been aware from briefings that I believe he has received that, in some circumstances, this Bill will reduce the time taken to interrupt serious abuse of children, from months and occasionally years down to days and weeks. That is surely an absolutely essential thing to do, but that will not work unless these powers are used according to the Act, with the important words being “proportionate” and “necessary”. The reason I repeat those words is that were the intelligence services to go on some sort of fishing expedition—and I know that the right hon. Gentleman is not suggesting that they would—that would not be legally permissible under this Act and nor would it achieve the required results, because it would turn up so much data that it would simply be an unusable, vast collection of fluff. Effectively, instead of targeting the needle, they would have merely collected another haystack.

[Mr Jones]

It is not about a fishing expedition, but they will get into a fishing expedition anyway. He says that train lines would not be affected, but they would. If someone wants to see an individual’s travel pattern, that is what they may do. Therefore, a lot of people’s data will be dragged in, not because it has been looked for but because it will come in anyway.

The problem is that if the argument is about speed—which I do not necessarily think is the case in some cases—the Minister has to do two things to reassure people that the powers are going to be used in the right way. First, he must provide pre-authorisation judicial oversight, and secondly, the IPC should be told, perhaps via a simple email, when the powers are used. That would at least allow it to look at the trends and uncover any concerns. I accept the protocols in place and am 100% sure that they are being followed, but it is possible that some people will not follow them and that is what we have to guard against.

[Tom Tugendhat]

This is a somewhat odd argument, because the right hon. Gentleman and I are slightly together but also arguing at cross purposes. Both of us have a very high regard for the intelligence services and are confident in their integrity, but we are slightly at cross purposes because he believes that we are not satisfying the oversight element, but I believe we are.

Let me be clear. I am not being a stick in the mud about this for any political reason. I actually happen to believe that this is the right way to approach this. There is a constant balance in all forms of oversight between the ability to act quickly and the ability to be controlled from outside. I believe that this sets in place a very significant, burdensome requirement on those who are taking these responsibilities to act according to certain principles. To repeat, the principles are necessity and proportionality. I do not think anybody in here would argue against those. What this requires them to do is make sure that the principles are met by effectively targeting in advance.

The right hon. Gentleman’s comment about train line use would, I am afraid, not satisfy that proportional need. The individual would have to be specifically identified in advance. The pattern of use of the website from the single point and to the point of contact—from a phone to an internet server or whatever it might happen to be—would have to be clarified. These ICRs are Venn diagram circles that are getting narrower and narrower. The idea that this would end up with some sort of week-long or month-long trawl of a train line website is, I am afraid, not permissible under the 2016 Act. Were any intelligence officers to do it—though I do not believe that they would—they would fall foul of section 11 and would not be acting necessarily and proportionately. Therefore, it would not be permissible.

It is pretty clear that existing conditions B and C already enable public authorities to make an application for a known individual’s internet connections. New condition D only enables a request for details to identify individuals who have used one or more specified internet services in a specified time.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

I will give way to the right hon. Member for North Durham.

[Mr Jones]

I do not think anyone could describe the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings or myself as woolly liberals, but I do have a concern with this. Where we are giving an extra power—which is what this is, although the Minister disagrees about the breadth—I want to ensure somehow that, in a democracy, we have oversight of it. I do not want to make it difficult for the agencies to implement their powers, but there are simple ways of doing so. That could mean telling the IPC when it occurs.

I have faith in the internal mechanisms that the Minister refers to, but I was also on the Intelligence and Security Committee in 2017, when we did our rendition and detention inquiry. All the safeguards were in there then, and they were ignored. That led to some fundamental changes, including the Fulford principles. There are occasions when the best things in legislation are not followed through, and that can lead to some very serious consequences.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I take the right hon. Gentleman’s point and the spirit in which it was made. I reiterate that requests for communications data must be approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, as he knows, unless they are urgent or for the purposes of national security. That is where this is being focused. Condition D, which we have spoken about, will be restricted to only the intelligence services and the National Crime Agency when it is pursuing a national security element within its remit—that is a separate area, as he knows. Those organisations have the necessary expertise to raise compliant and proportionate restrictions.

Again and again, the principle in the Bill is that the least intrusive power must be used. The oversight starts internally, but very rapidly goes externally, whether it is to IPCO or a judicial commissioner. The ability to review is always there, and the penalties under section 11 of the 2016 Act, which we all hope will never be needed or used, are pretty onerous on anybody who abuses their power or in any way exploits their ability in order to conduct themselves in a way that we would all agree is unsatisfactory in a democracy. It is really important to say that.

Going back to the question raised by the hon. Member for Midlothian, the reality is that condition D applications will limit collateral intrusion as much as is reasonably practical. The returned data may only provide an indication of involvement in an investigation, and further analysis will likely be necessary to allow fuller determination. That is the nature of handling intelligence data and then conducting an analysis on the back of it. In all cases, that activity will have to be justified, and will be no more than is necessary to achieve the desired outcome.

To be absolutely clear, that has to be targeted. This is a series of circles in a Venn diagram to target as narrowly as possible. Were others to be captured in that narrowest possible target, that data could not be held, or a separate application would have to be made in order to hold it. For example, one can imagine a circumstance in which an intelligence agency is targeting a paedophile on a particular street. Using different forms of communication technique, it narrows it down from a handset to an operator, a particular website, a particular time, and so on, so the Venn diagram narrows—it is very focused. If it turns out that there is another paedophile operating in exactly the same area at that time, that would require a separate application, because it is a separate target. The data could not just be held. Nor would it be ignored—I am sure the hon. Gentleman would not suggest it should be. But the judicial oversight needs to be gone through and the application needs to be made. It is a separate warrant, and so on.

[Mr Jones]

In the example the Minister gives, at the same time the agency targets that individual, it will have a lot of other people who communicated with that individual. How long will that information be kept? That is the concern people have. It is not the depth, but this is broad. Most of those people would be completely innocent of anything. There is then the issue of how long that information is kept and who makes the decision about how long to keep it.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Forgive me, but I disagree with the right hon. Member on this. It is unlikely that there would be a large number of people at a specific geographic location, using a specific cell site, from a specific handset, viewing a specific website at a specific time. Once it is narrowed down like that, the numbers are very small. That does not mean that any intrusion that is not legally authorised is acceptable—that is absolutely not what I am saying. But we are getting down to very small numbers of people, and quite deliberately so, in order to achieve an intelligence outcome.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

In the existing Act, one would have to be entirely specific about a particular time. It could not be 5.30 pm to 6.30 pm; an internet connection record could be done only at 5.30 pm exactly. The Bill extends that a bit, but it still has to be very targeted. This is a proportionate change in the law to allow the intelligence services to collect information that would enable the targeting of serious and organised crime.

[Mr Jones]

Let me go back to the Trainline example. Suppose it is not child exploitation—the Minister is possibly right that it is specific, and hopefully there are not many people in one street—and someone is trying to look for a person’s travel plans, so they want to know how many people in an area have contacted Trainline. It will be more than one person, so there will be a lot of other people they are not looking for in there. That is the problem, and that is all that the ISC, the hon. Members for Midlothian and for Glasgow South and the Labour Front Benchers are saying.

Earlier the Minister used the words “control from outside”. I am sorry if he sees oversight as control, but I certainly do not. It is about giving confidence to the public that there is independent oversight over these powers, whether that is informing the IPCO when they are used or having pre-authorisation, as was suggested earlier. I do not see the problem with keeping people informed. The Minister is hiding behind IPCO, but it was introduced in the first place to give the public confidence.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I suspect we are not going to come to an agreement on this, so I will probably leave it after this point. The IPCO oversight means that IPCO can look at a request at any point. The maximum period it can go without looking at it is 12 months, but it can look at any point. We have said that requests for communications data must be approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office

“except where they are urgent or are for the purpose of national security”.

That interaction, which the right hon. Gentleman rightly supports, is already there, so I do not accept it is lacking.

On the question of proportionality, the amount of information that one may need to investigate a paedophile network, for example, may mean being slightly vaguer about the specific time, whereas following a known individual may require different forms of flexibility and proportionality. I am afraid I am going to be very cautious about setting out what each one means, because these principles will have to adapt and be applied as appropriate.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

I am entirely supportive of the idea that IPCO should update the ISC and the Secretary of State about how it is working and provide information so that a proper view can be taken. I think that is entirely appropriate.

[Mr Jones]

Well, that would be fine if the Government did not redact things in IPCO reports and try to stop us getting access to—[Interruption.] I am sorry, but the Government are doing that. They have done it over the past few years. That is the problem. The Government are paying lip service to the ISC. We are not trying to thwart the work of our security services; we are an important part of the democratic oversight of them. That is why we were set up under the Justice and Security Act 2013. I am sorry to say that the Government are trying to drive a coach and horses through it, including by preventing information from IPCO from being given to us.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I think we have covered the area, and I have said all I am going to about the matter.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Powers to require retention of certain data

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I thought we had had a victory—one of those rare things we get with this Government—from the ISC in the House of Lords, but clearly the Minister has found a way of clawing that back.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I don’t think so!

[Mr Jones]

I think so, because the original wording talked about being able to nominate basically anybody. It was then defined, but the amendment widens it again. It says, “necessary operational awareness”; is that, for example, that any Secretary of State is aware that it is a voluntary process? For example, the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary sign warrants, and another Secretary of State could say, “Yes, I’m aware of that.” As the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings said, “operational experience” would be better wording, because “necessary operational awareness” is too broad. What does it actually mean in practice? For example, must they have any experience of having signed a warrant before? Or do they just need to know that the warrantry system exists?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

First, I place on the record my gratitude to the ISC, to which I have listened extremely carefully on this matter; indeed, the Bill has been changed because of it. Let me be clear that although many people are aware of things, to be operationally aware is not the same as to be just aware. Many people were aware of the conflict in Helmand, but I argue that only the hon. Member for Barnsley Central and I were operationally aware of the conflict in Helmand. It is rather a different requirement. It does not mean that one knows about the operation; it means one is aware in an operational sense of it. It is not just an observation of the challenge.

[Mr Jones]

I have to say that from my experience as a former Minister in the Ministry of Defence—I said I was never a Secretary of State—I was not only aware of what was going on but operationally aware. Could an Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence therefore be designated as one of these people? On Tuesday mornings every week, I was very operationally aware of what was going on in Helmand, for example.

[Tom Tugendhat]

First, this goes alongside the code of practice, which challenges the right hon. Gentleman’s point. It would need to be people who were briefed into the warrantry process. It needs to be somebody who understands what a warrant is, so it is not somebody who is merely observing it, such as a Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport.

On the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings made about experience, I understand the debate. There is a possibility—I know that he and I will do everything we can to prevent it—that there will be a change of Government soon. In that case, there will be an awful lot of people who have absolutely no experience at all of these matters. It would therefore be wise not to set up a provision that would immediately require amendment. Disappointed though we would be at that outcome, my right hon. Friend would agree that he would not want a law to be amended in its first year, if we could possibly avoid it.

To be clear, the Government view the four alternative approvers as being likely to be the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary. Only three would be able to act as the triple-locking Secretaries of State, because of course we would have already used up two of them to do the first two functions. That is why the numbers are required, and why I am incredibly grateful to the ISC for pointing it out and being very cautious on it.

[Mr Jones]

If what the Minister has just said is the case, why do the Government push back on a suggestion that I think they actually made earlier on? The Minister is now pushing back on it. Although I understand the need for the code of practice, if there was a change in it—because there might be sometime—would that come back to Parliament to be approved? We are dancing on the head of a pin here. I do not know why, but that is quite common with the Home Office. The Minister says that it will be mainly four people, but I would love to know what he means by “necessary operational awareness”, which is clunky language.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

Codes of practice will be brought forward through regulations in the usual way, as the right hon. Gentleman is aware, and the House will scrutinise them in the usual way. This is a very legalistic process, as I recognise from the inside as much as he does from the outside. It is true that if, for example, the Northern Ireland Secretary became the Education Secretary, they could then be included. The idea is to ensure that it is somebody who is appropriate to the task, which is why the measure is worded as it is. I always listen to right hon. and hon. Members across the House. I believe that the amendment is the best version that we have come to so far. I will continue to listen to the right hon. Gentleman, as always.

[Mr Jones]

May I make a simple suggestion, then? “Necessary operational awareness” is clunky language; surely what is meant is operational experience. That would cover it, would it not?

[Sir John Hayes]

Given what the Minister said about a change in Government—I do not expect one, but I suppose it is a remote possibility—perhaps the words “operational responsibility or experience” would cover the point made and be slightly tighter than “awareness”. Also, there is the matter of notifying the PM. The Committee made the good suggestion that the PM should be notified as soon as practicable, which may be something with which the Minister agrees. If the Prime Minister were indisposed because of illness or whatever, they would be notified as soon as is practicable that a warrant had been issued.

[Tom Tugendhat]

On the second point, I am sure that, like me, my right hon. Friend finds it absolutely inconceivable that that PM would not be notified. I am not convinced that that must be in primary legislation. I find it genuinely inconceivable that the Prime Minister would not be notified at the earliest opportunity. Obviously, if they could be notified immediately, the provision would not be required.

[Mr Jones]

I made that point to the Home Secretary on Second Reading. Yes, I think that is logical—

[Tom Tugendhat]

Thank you—I am astonished. [Laughter.]

[Mr Jones]

But, Minister, let us be honest: a lot of things that we would have taken for granted were ignored in Downing Street over the last few years. Until Boris Johnson became Prime Minister, it had been a great part of our constitution that convention was followed. Surely it would therefore be better to have the point about notification in the Bill; otherwise, we are leaving it to the free will of convention. I would have trusted convention, but we have had Boris Johnson as Prime Minister.

[Sir John Hayes]

I want to help the Minister, because I do not necessarily agree with the right hon. Member for North Durham; occasionally, he and I do disagree, despite the impression that we have created in this Committee. Notification could be covered in a piece of statutory guidance that supports the Bill. It could state that the Prime Minister should be notified as soon as reasonable practicable, exactly in the terms just described. How’s that?

[Tom Tugendhat]

As is so often the case, I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister put it in the guidance, then?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will look at putting it in the guidance, as suggested by the right hon. Member.

[Mr Jones]

Just say it. If the Minister says it to the Committee, his civil servants will not have to do it. It is easier doing it that way than having negotiations in the office later on.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I have said what I am going to say on the matter.

Amendment 3 agreed to.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Committee stage & Report stage
Thursday 7th March 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Tugendhat]

Before I address those points, I want to address the shadow Minister’s somewhat contentious argument that learning French is not a security issue —that was a bold innovation from him.

The points that have been raised are essential to understanding exactly why the Bill is so important. I will cover the “no” and “low” areas separately, for the reason that the hon. Member for Midlothian touched on. We all know what no expectation is; that has been largely covered, and the reality is that even the slightly more restricted version of the electoral register is shared with political parties, as the right hon. Member for North Durham knows.

[Mr Jones]

I agree with the Minister on party access— we get access to it, for example. However, does the person who ticks that box and takes their name out have a reasonable expectation? Do they know that it is being shared? No, they do not.

[Tom Tugendhat]

That is what I was going to say. Although the register is not publicly available and therefore would not fit in this category, that is where we get to the line. The “no” is for publicly available data, and that is relatively clear.

The “low” comes in areas such as the idea of leaked papers, which somebody raised—forgive me, I cannot remember who. That is where the Bill sets out terms under which datasets should be considered, because of course it is impossible for me to give an answer that applies to every single dataset into the future. One example that came up recently, as right hon. and hon. Members will remember, is the Panama papers. One would not argue for a second that the people listed in those papers had an expectation of openness initially. However, after those papers had been published and republished over many years, at what stage do we really think the expectation of privacy is maintained?

That is where the dataset becomes low expectation. We have set out the oversight regime in another area of the Bill, but I will touch on it. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner has a range of responsibilities, the judicial commissioners have other responsibilities for approving warrants and IPCO has responsibility for overseeing the regime. That is where that is addressed—in slightly ways at each moment of influence and each moment of power, but everything is covered.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

If I may, I will come to the last point first. The information going to the ISC on this basis would be, as far as possible, the same as that going to the Secretary of State. Obviously, the operational data may not be included, depending on the relevant operational case. I hope that will reassure this Committee and, indeed, the ISC that the intention is to make sure that the ISC is as fully informed as possible.

On the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, he will know that the Bill, in many ways, has been a joint project between the Government and the ISC. I have spent many hours with members of the ISC, including the Chair, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), and with various members of the Committee. Their input has been exceptionally important to me and has been included in many areas of drafting on this.

Turning to amendment 15, the right hon. Member for North Durham and the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, in many ways, have both been the Occam’s razor of the Bill process, not just here, but in other areas. They have been rightly keen that we should not include powers or requirements that would otherwise constrain or block processes or confuse the law. I understand the argument that hon. Members are making about a one-line email, but the reason that I am not convinced—though I am very happy to have the conversation suggested—is that the reality is that it is possible for IPCO to investigate at any point, and it must investigate at 12 months. Therefore, if we ask for a legal requirement on the services, that would force an extra legal duty into the various elements and it will be an extra change.

[Mr Jones]

I disagree with the Minister. Yes, IPCO can look back and can go in at any time to look at things, but if it does not know where the needle in the haystack is, how is it going to actually find it in the first place? This is not an onerous proposal, and I do not understand why the Minister is resisting it, to be honest. This measure would just send another reassurance to the public that, again, the extra powers being given to the security services, which I fully support, at least have some oversight. We need to address the Bill in detail and in such a way that we cannot be accused of handing over powers without also providing very light-touch reassurance that there is outside oversight. I accept that, in most cases, IPCO would not actually look at any of these.

[Tom Tugendhat]

In the spirit with which the right hon. Gentleman has approached this, may I commit to meeting him and the hon. Member for Barnsley Central to discuss this?

[Mr Jones]

We might do it in the wash-up anyway.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Well, the right hon. Gentleman could make a virtue of a necessity if he wishes. I certainly will. I shall enjoy meeting him to discuss this, and I hope that he will take that commitment in the spirit with which it is made.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [Lords]

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

2nd reading
Monday 19th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Let me start by thanking our security services. I think I am now the longest-serving member of the ISC, and it is a privilege to work with them and scrutinise their work, as our Committee does. They do not get a great deal of publicity—for the right reasons—but when they do, it is sometimes not factual by any stretch of the imagination. They do an invaluable job, and in protecting our democracy, the threat that they face—that we all face—is changing, so the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 needs revising.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle) said, the important point is that any new powers that we give the security services to act on our behalf should come with an equally balanced level of scrutiny and oversight. I see the scrutiny of our security as like a three-legged stool, with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, and the ISC. Well, actually, I would say that it is more like a two-and-a-half-legged stool, because the Home Secretary has done what most Ministers do; they say how wonderful the ISC is, how much they value our work, and that they want us fully involved—in passing this legislation, for example—but since 2017, when I first sat on the ISC, there has been a marked increase in lip service paid to it, as I think we see again in the Bill. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) said, we have not met the Prime Minister for 10 years—any of them; I think we had one who offered to come in the dying days of her Administration. We have taken evidence from the security services on the Bill, and I have to say that they are not the problem: it is the Government who are the problem all the time. That was the case with the National Security and Investment Act 2021. Frankly, it is an uphill struggle to get things changed in this Bill—changes that would not only improve the Bill, but make sense. One has just been highlighted by the Chairman of the ISC, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis).

On occasions, it is a bit like going round in circles. I will give an example. We have actually made one little advance in the other place, in terms of acceptance of the changes to do with the triple lock. Now, though, the sensible thing we are asking for—that it should be in the Bill that the Prime Minister should actually see those warrants—is being resisted as though it would somehow stop the world. I am sorry, but I do not think it would. I think the Government believe that they have to be seen to be resisting any changes. I like the Minister, but the passage of the National Security and Investment Act was a pretty dark day for the Government’s relationship with the ISC, because we had to fight tooth and nail to try to get anything changed in that Bill.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I was not in the Government then.

[Mr Jones]

I think the Minister was, actually. I think he picked up the tail end of that Bill.

The ISC has looked at this issue in detail. We have taken evidence from the heads of the security services, and we want to be supportive of change, but we also want that important role of scrutiny and ensuring the public are protected from the occasions when things might go wrong. The other thing that struck me today is that, although the Home Secretary can read a good speech, I am not sure he had a great grasp of some of the detail of the Bill. All I ask of the Minister is to please take on board some of the things we are saying, so that we can make progress in Committee. They are not radical things that are going to upturn the Bill; they are things that will improve it. I suspect that in certain parts of the Government there is a hatred of the ISC, and the belief that we have to be resisted at all costs. That will lead to a poorer Bill, because the amendments we will be tabling would actually improve the Bill. Lord West also did a great job in the other place.

I now turn to clause 2 of the Bill, which introduces the bulk personal data regime. There is a worrying gap: oversight of what are deemed low or no privacy datasets added to category authorisations. At the moment, the system does not work, because things like the electoral register have to get special permission. That is silly, frankly, but we need to ensure that these provisions are scrutinised.

New part 7A of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, introduced by clause 2, provides for a light-touch regime for the retention and examination of bulk personal datasets by the intelligence services where the subject of that data is deemed to have low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. As the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) said, people are increasingly giving their personal data with little thought to how it is going to be used—not just by the intelligence services, but for commercial purposes. That needs looking at.

Approval of such a dataset will be sought either under a category authorisation, which encompasses a number of individual datasets that have a similar content and may be used for a similar purpose, or by individual authorisation, which covers a single dataset that does not fall neatly into a category authorisation or is subject to a complicating factor. For a category authorisation, a judicial commissioner will approve the overall description of the category authorisation before it can be used. A judicial commissioner will approve renewal of the authorisation after 12 months, and the relevant Secretary of State will receive retrospective annual reports on the use of category and individual authorisations.

However, as the Bill is currently drafted, this oversight is all retrospective. The problem is that what is missing is real-time or even near real-time oversight of changes. Under the present regime, once a category authorisation has been approved, the intelligence services have the ability to add individual datasets to that authorisation through internal processes alone. They examine the dataset without being subject to any political or judicial oversight, and they would be able to use those datasets for potentially a year without anybody being any the wiser.

We do not question why the security services need these powers, but there is potential for mission creep without any oversight of what is being authorised. We are not saying that these powers are not required; they are required. What we are really being asked to do is rely on the good faith of the intelligence services to use the powers in a certain way. I do not think that is strong enough, and no legislation should be solely dependent on good will. We also have to guard against—there are such occasions—situations when mistakes happen or people use powers for purposes that are not in the public interest.

It is important that we fill this 12-month gap, and the ISC thinks that the easiest and simplest way to change this process would be for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to be notified when an individual bulk personal dataset is added by an agency to an existing authorisation. I understand that Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in his review of 2023, recommended a similar proposal. The argument from the Government—it is similar to what they have used throughout this Bill, as the Committee Chairman has remarked—is that that will be onerous in adding to the work of the intelligence services. Well, it would not, because it would simply mean sending a one-line email to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner containing the name and description of the bulk personal dataset as soon as reasonably practicable.

The decision would be approved internally and then sent to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, so it is not actually asking for approval. It is just making sure that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is aware of what is being added, and that the individuals taking such a decision realise that they must inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That would obviously allow the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to look at trends in what is happening. Clearly, after the 12 months, they could look back, but they could also intervene if they thought something was not in touch.

An argument the Government use quite often about this Bill is that it is to have a light-touch approach, and I think this suggestion is for a light-touch approach. I do not know what is onerous about the security services sending an email to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I think it would ensure the oversight that is needed. Real-time oversight is what we are suggesting, and I do not think it would add to the administration of the security services, but it would lead to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner at least having some visibility on another layer at which decisions are taken.

The proposal would be a very simple thing to do, and I do not understand why the Government are resisting it. I suggest they are resisting it for the many reasons they have resisted some of the other sensible things we have put forward: just because they want to do that. I do not know how we go forward with the relationship between this present Government and the ISC. Dragging information out of them screaming and kicking is taking a long time, even though we have a legal duty to get information, and the critical point now is the starvation of resources from the Committee which is creating real problems in the way that it can operate.

I hope that things change and that when we table amendments we will not get the usual response that amendments to this type of legislation should only be done in the Lords. Are we here to cause trouble for the security services? No, we are not; we want to ensure we do our job, which is set out in statute, to supervise the security services and improve the powers, but to ensure that the public have the recognised safeguards we should expect in a democracy such as ours.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

As my right hon. Friend will know, several powers in the earlier Bill—the one that he took through the House—were indeed overseen in various different ways. The Bill does not seek to undermine any of that oversight; what it seeks to do is clarify, in certain areas, where it is necessary. My right hon. Friend has highlighted individual agencies or bodies, and I should be happy to write to him to ensure he is aware of exactly where that is being covered.

The right hon. Member for North Durham spoke about prior judicial authorisation for ICRs. The purpose of the Bill is to try to streamline operations for the intelligence services in areas where the risk is of, as we are calling it, low or no expectation of privacy. He will have seen in the Bill what the expectation means, including areas where information has already been readily made public. I accept his commentary and I would be happy to enter into further conversations with him, but the reason we are not currently going down that route is simply that the existing law, the IPA 2016, allows the collection of bulk data with prior authorisation. This is intended to speed the process up. If we put in the measures he is referring to, we would effectively remain in the same place that we are now. That would make it harder for the volume of data that is now coming to be considered by the intelligence agencies. That is why we have made the provision for a subsequent approval rather than a prior approval. He is right to say that it involves a maximum of a year, although I think it unlikely that it would go to that maximum. That will be in cases where this is low or no expectation of privacy—after it has already been agreed by a judge to be in the correct category. I think the right hon. Gentleman might be looking at this through the other end of the telescope.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

What the Minister has to realise is that the big concern from the public—although let’s be honest, the public are not looking at the detail of this—is that somehow the security services will be getting access to huge amounts of bulk data and just having a free run at it. All that I and the Committee are suggesting is that an email should be sent when there are changes to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That would be a simple thing. It would not be onerous, and it would reinforce the point that there was at least some potential oversight of the process.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I think we may be conflating different aspects of the Bill. I do believe that this already has oversight.

Let me answer the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, which touches on a similar area. Where people have the right to and expectation of privacy and freedom, this provision does not remove that right. What it does is allow the intelligence agencies to use bulk data to target an individual at a particular point, and the excess collected information will not be able to be used for targeting an individual without the warrant process that would be expected for any initial search. In that sense, this is not undermining anybody’s privacy; it is allowing for the fact that information is now largely in bulk format. The hon. Member for Barnsley Central was talking about steaming open envelopes. It is impossible to steam open a single envelope today; one has to steam open thousands because that is how data comes. Without an amendment such as that set out in the Bill, we would simply be interrupting the work of the intelligence services to the degree that it would hold them back and make the process harder, but I would be happy to take this up with my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne later if he wishes.

I thank the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), who was here earlier and made an interesting point about the various ways in which the memorandum of understanding should be looked at through the National Security Act 2023. Friends of mine will know my thoughts on that and know that I gave the Conservative party the chance to allow me to change that 10-year absence, but the Conservative party chose somebody else to make that decision so I have sadly lost the ability to have that influence.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) made a typically insightful speech and typically sensible comments on the ways in which we must consider how the authorisation must not be used to mount general surveillance. Condition D will be used only when an applicant makes a clear and compelling case, based on tangible, reliable intelligence leads, information and analysis, that the resulting data will identify parties involved in a relevant serious crime or national security-related specified operation or investigation. The applicant must explain any anticipated collateral intrusion, and how this will be managed to ensure that the application is necessary and proportionate to the outcomes of the investigation.

Draft Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Revised Guidance) Regulations 2023

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Tuesday 14th November 2023 General Committees

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank all hon. Members on all sides for the tone in which the debate has been conducted. The hon. Member for Barnsley Central is absolutely right that the first time we met I was sent out to shadow him. I very much hoped I would not have to take his job because we were in a combat theatre. This time, sadly, he is gunning for mine. I assure him I will resist just as hard as we resisted together nearly 20 years ago.

It is a great pleasure to work with the hon. Gentleman on this. As many will know, trust between individuals is what makes this Parliament work when it works at its best. We oppose each other on various areas—or rather, he opposes me as I try to do the best for the Government of the country—but the co-operation we have had has improved our ability to co-operate on things that matter. This is something that matters.

I want to pick up on the points the hon. Member—

[Mr Jones]

Right hon. Member.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I apologise to the right hon. Member who is sitting at the back and ask him to forgive me. He is an old friend and, again, he has raised some interesting matters.

As a friend of Jo Cox and a friend of David Amess, I appreciate the equality of terror in all its horror, in all its pain and in all its agony. I do not think that any of us in this place require a lesson in that. I hear point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, but I would just say that the services, the intelligence agencies and the police fully appreciate that. The right hon. Member will also know that his words about professionalism in the Prevent space are absolutely right. We have heard frankly disgraceful commentary about the professionalism of our Prevent individuals, who are conducting these services, which completely ignores the fact—and it is a fact—that Prevent is about making sure that all British citizens are treated equally. It is about making sure that there is no soft racism of cultural misunderstanding that tolerates the extremism in one community rather than another, because “that’s normal for them”. No—all British citizens deserve the protection of the British state. They deserve protection from violence used against them, but they also deserve protection from the radicalisation of their children or themselves. That is what Prevent is about. It is about equality; it is about the rights of British citizens; and it is about the right of every citizen and individual in the United Kingdom to be safe.

The hon. Member for Barnsley Central made some interesting points. The point about mental health is valid and true; we are working with the Department of Health and Social Care on that. It is a complicated area, because while it is extremely likely that an individual who seeks to do harm through terrorism may well be suffering from a form of mental illness, that does not undermine the fact that their ideology is radicalising them towards violence. I am afraid that the overlap between mental health and terrorism does not negate either side. The reality is that both can exist at the same time, and we must address both at the same time.

The hon. Member’s point about the recent protests was also extremely valid. One of the things that has shocked me most—I use the term appropriately, I think—is the number of people the police have identified and want to talk to about incidents of racism, antisemitism and vile hatred who fill positions of responsibility in our society. That is completely unacceptable. The normalisation of antisemitism that we have seen on the streets is utterly unacceptable. It is wrong and deeply harmful. Not only is it harmful in the fear that it spreads in parts of the communities that we are lucky enough to represent, but it is wrong because it normalises in the minds of young people attitudes and actions that could easily lead to their causing greater harm and pain. We are absolutely committed to this, and I know that the Prevent professionals working in this space are fully aware of the dangers that we face.

A lot of the engagement on the AI question that the hon. Member spoke about is covered in different ways in the Online Safety Act 2023. The work that has just been done by the Prime Minister at Bletchley Park—the hon. Member will know what a remarkable achievement it was to get all those countries around the table for the AI safety summit—was an extraordinary effort that started to address some of the questions he spoke about. I am delighted to have the hon. Gentleman’ support on that, because it will evolve. The reality is that artificial intelligence is an extraordinary process. It is not just an event, but a process by which the acceleration of algorithms produces information and consequences much faster than many other systems have allowed. We are seeing extremism operating in a very different environment. We are also seeing a very different environment in which the information flowing into algorithms and producing artificial intelligence is changing the way in which different people understand things. This is a question about not just the process, but the input.

The last point I want to make is on the question about mixed, unstable or unclear ideology. In response to the right hon. Member for North Durham, the reality is that while there is extreme right-wing terrorism, it is not in any way ignored; in fact, it is addressed very clearly by our policing and Prevent professionals. Sadly, a huge amount of it is emerging at the moment from the Muslim community. It is a real problem, and we are addressing it. To protect young men and women in the Islamic community, we need to be sure that we support them in a way that would support everybody in the United Kingdom and attack those centres of radicalisation. It also means that we must look at other areas where they are emerging. The question about incel violence—involuntary celibate violence, or mixed, unstable or unclear violence—is also emerging. Sadly, it has grown at different points. It is still a smaller percentage of the events that we see, but sadly it is far too present even now.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the draft Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Revised Guidance) Regulations 2023.

National Security Bill

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Consideration of Lords message
Monday 26th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Lady will be delighted to hear the rest of my speech, in which I answer her wonderful questions.

As this House will be aware, the Intelligence and Security Committee memorandum of understanding can already be revised by agreement, which is one of the points that the right hon. Lady is raising. We do not believe that primary legislation is an appropriate mechanism for making amendments to the MOU. However, we recognise the strength of feeling on the issue, and in a spirit of compromise we have tabled amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 122B. The Government’s amendment will achieve a similar result and will create a duty on the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee to progress a review of the MOU within six months of the provision’s coming into force.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

That is fine, but the ISC has been raising this issue for the past two years. It takes two to tango. Unfortunately, the only reason we have this Lords amendment is a sense of frustration—certainly among members of the ISC, but also among a lot of Members of this House.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I assure the right hon. Gentleman that I have heard him. I hope that the amendment will now satisfy the ISC with respect to its concerns. I am sure that hon. Members across the House will support Government amendment (a) in lieu.

I turn to Lords amendment 22B, which would require political parties to make an annual return to the Electoral Commission, setting out the details of donations from foreign powers. It would also create a duty on political parties to write an annual policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from foreign powers. I understand the intention behind the amendment, and I share the strength of feeling behind it.

The Government are very much alive to the risk that foreign interference presents. I am pleased that we have already taken action to address it, and I am pleased with the support that we have received on both sides of the House for our reforms to Companies House, which will deliver more reliably accurate information on the companies register, providing greater powers for Companies House to query and challenge the information it receives. The Government are also legislating, via the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, to enhance data sharing between Companies House and public authorities, including the Electoral Commission. This will help the enforcement of the rules on donations by providing greater confidence in the accuracy of the data held at Companies House.

National Security Bill

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Report stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

rose—

[Tom Tugendhat]

On that, I will give way—not for the last time, I am sure—to the right hon. Member.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

The Minister talks about Darwinian change, but evolution takes a long time. Many things in the Bill have been kicking around for at least six or seven years, and that includes the issue around the foreign influence registration scheme, which was only put in the Bill at Committee stage after it was omitted on Second Reading; even now, there are amendments to it. Is the Minister satisfied that the Bill—in terms of the major changes that it will achieve—will fulfil its purpose and that it has been properly scrutinised in this House?

[Tom Tugendhat]

What I am so pleased about with this Bill is that it introduces so many ideas that the right hon. Gentleman and I have discussed in private over many years when I was in a similar position to him—scrutinising a Government. The Bill introduces some of those ideas that, yes, he is right to say, seem to have been introduced quickly, but the reality, as he knows very well, is that they have been discussed slowly. Many aspects of the Bill not only date six or seven years into the past, but update aspects that date a lot further back. Sadly, some of our national security legislation is better placed to hunt those who would send secret notes on pigeons back to Germany than to hunt those sending secret messages through the internet. This is updating quite a lot of laws that date all the way back to the first world war. I am very glad that we are doing it, and I am very glad that the right hon. Gentleman’s scrutiny in the Bill Committee has been so rigorous and so onerous.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones]

As my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) said, we had four Ministers in the Bill Committee. Yes, the Minister has listened, but nothing in the Bill has changed. It is still a mess, and that goes back to the fundamental point about not including the Security Service Act 1989 in the reform that is needed. Let me tell the Minister now: the lack of scrutiny in this House means that the Bill will be absolutely torn to shreds in the other place.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to hear that we disagree on that element, but it has been a great pleasure to work on the Bill with him and with many others in the Chamber, and to hear their comments and criticisms. There are many other supplementary areas that I would like to work on in different places at different times, but the Bill answers the essential need that we have now, which is to update our national security legislation to keep the country safe and defend our people, and to ensure that those who have the courage, integrity and wisdom to keep us all safe have the tools at their disposal to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

It will not surprise the hon. Gentleman to know that one of the first things I did on arrival at the Home Office was to ask for it to be prepared for publication. I will come back to him with it, I hope, urgently—I will let him know.

Many different points have been raised. I pay enormous tribute to my many right hon. and hon. Friends who have spoken and to those who have approached the Bill with the diligence and seriousness that the subject demands, particularly the hon. Members for Halifax (Holly Lynch) and for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald), who have been extremely supportive critics and have been challenging in the right spirit. I am glad to say that those discussions have resulted in most of the Bill going through in the way that was intended, and that those challenges and changes have improved it.

I accept that there are some differences of opinion. On areas such as the Serious Crime Act and the changes to statutory requirements, I believe that the Government are right because the exercise of the functions of an officer of the state are exactly what should be the limiting functions of their powers. That is why this reform makes sense, although my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) raised some important points and challenges that we will have to look at.

My right hon. and learned Friend also asked about damages and whether they followed in the way that he described, and I agree that they do. The point is that we should neither make it harder or more applicable to have damages, nor prevent it where judges seek the discretion to do so. Where they have that discretion, they may continue to do it, but we are asking them to look and consider the situation in which those damages arose to make sure that they are truly applicable. It is merely a review policy, rather than a block. That is an important element of the Bill; judges may already have that power but this measure merely puts it on the statute book.

Much of the debate has focused on whistleblowers and the public interest defence, and the way in which various people could argue that they are acting in the interests of the wider polity in raising different objections. This is a hugely important area and I understand that many hon. Members have raised different points. The head of MI5, the heads of various agencies and many others who have engaged on it have been absolutely clear on this point, however, because we need to make sure that we are not introducing any defence that forces the Government to reveal the damage that has been done in order to provide a defence.

The reality is that forcing the publication of damages may indeed be further damaging to the initial offence. That is why although I take the point about the public interest defence, which is a wider question for the whole of Government and the whole country, and I take the point about whistleblowers, which is again a wider question and not specific to the Bill, I am afraid that I hold with the head of MI5 and others who have been extremely clear on this point.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

With the greatest respect, that is a weak argument, because there can always be closed hearings on national security grounds. I say to the Minister that this issue will not go away—the courts are deciding it anyway. I would sooner state a protection in law than leave it to the whims of a jury, which is what we have now.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I have a great trust in our jury system, and I know the right hon. Member does, too.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I haven’t actually.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Oh, he does not. I do have trust in our jury system and I do have trust in the Great British people to make decisions appropriately. One of the decisions sometimes made by juries is to strike out a case because they disagree with it. I am afraid that is simply one of those—

National Security

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Tuesday 1st November 2022 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank my hon. Friend for his work on the all-party parliamentary group. He is to right to highlight the threat of disinformation and, indeed, the way in which cyber is being used against us. I am not entirely sure whether it was flattery or mere coincidence that as soon as I took this job, the BBC ran a series of programmes called “The Capture” in which the Security Minister—rather better-looking than me—had managed to annoy a certain hostile power of which we have been speaking this afternoon, and was subject to a number of cyber-attacks. I very much hope it was coincidence, not prediction.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

As a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I welcome the announcement of the Minister’s taskforce. Some of the issues he has raised were highlighted in our Russia report of 2020. I heard his commitment to the Chair of the ISC to work with him closely, but may I just say to him that, like the rest of us, he is—to use a Robin Day phrase—a here today, gone tomorrow politician? We need this taskforce’s scrutiny to be embedded in the memorandum of understanding between the Committee and the Government, because otherwise—this point was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Denton and Reddish (Andrew Gwynne)—it will be impossible for much of the taskforce’s work to be scrutinised in this place.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman is right to suggest that institutions and structures are what guard us against the “here today, gone tomorrow” whims of politicians, and that setting up such structures is the way we keep ourselves safe. Indeed, the best of our institutions have endured for hundreds of years in order to guarantee those freedoms. The right hon. Gentleman can be absolutely assured that I will be looking at ways in which we can embed such structures to ensure that we keep ourselves safe.

National Security Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Tugendhat]

It is not entirely unheard of to make reference to other legislation that is going through at the moment. Should there be issues, then there may be obstacles, but—

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

The Minister needs to clarify—he can do so in writing, if he wants—whether that Bill is going through. It has been stayed, has it not? It has been pulled, so it will not even go forward. Therefore, I think we need some clarification.

[Tom Tugendhat]

That is simply not correct.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am conscious that another Minister is on their feet and a vote may be imminent so, if I may, I will whizz through my response.

Many people have looked at the public interest defence. Although there are differences of opinion, I would be happy to immediately assure the right hon. Member for North Durham that I will accompany him to a meeting with senior officials that he has requested in the past, but which has not yet happened. I will make sure that happens very soon; it is important that he hears the explanations of others and not just ministerial colleagues. I will make sure that happens imminently, because this is an important element. I appreciate the tone with which he has approached the issue; he is trying to be serious and sober in his reflection of the defence of those who are trying to do their best for our country but may indeed be doing harm as well.

I am not a believer argument in the floodgates argument—I do not believe that is a correct assessment of what could happen. It is, however, true that even a single release of some of this information could be extremely damaging to the national interest, as he is aware and would no doubt wish to avoid. I am very happy to have this conversation further and to cover various other issues.

It is also worth noting that other countries have a public interest defence, and we looked at them and the legislation. When considering reform, we looked particularly at the Five Eyes countries, but it is important to recognise the UK context in wider circumstances, so it would not be right to assume that a public interest defence that works for others is exactly the same as for this instance. I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s points, but I ask, on that basis, that he withdraw the clause and that we engage in further conversation.

[Mr Jones]

I thank the Minister. This issue is not going to go away, so we need to have further discussions. The Law Commission’s recommendations seem to have been ignored, and I think engagement with them would be useful before the passage of the Bill is complete. With the undertaking I have been given, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

May I thank the shadow Minister, the Member for Halifax—she has been of tremendous assistance to me in the very unusual position that I have found myself in—as well as Opposition Members? I also thank enormously my hon. Friends, who have been extraordinarily generous supporters at times when I have been quite literally learning on the job.

I also thank the Clerks—particularly Chris, who was my first Clerk on the Foreign Affairs Committee, which brought me right back home—Home Office officials, the intelligence community, with whom it is such a pleasure to work again, and of course all those who have contributed to the Bill, including you, Mr Gray. Thank you very much indeed.

[Mr Jones]

On a point of order, Mr Gray. I think it would be remiss not to thank the two previous Ministers—

[Mr Jones]

And the previous Whips, yes. One previous Minister was thrown a little more into the deep end than this one, so I want to put on the record my thanks to him.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Quite right.

National Security Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank hon. Members for their comments so far. I will first touch on the point that has been raised about the explanatory notes. I am told that it is normal procedure for that to be published before the Bill is introduced to the Lords—

[Mr Jones]

Not true!

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will bow to the superior knowledge of age and give way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

That is complete nonsense. Usually, there are explanatory notes for amendments, so I do not know where that suggestion has come from.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will be taking that up with officials later, and I will find out why that has been said.

[Mr Jones]

And stop making things up.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman knows that I would never do such a thing. In response to the provision on oversight, we discussed in the last sitting that we are looking at different forms of oversight. While that has not yet been clarified, I will engage with the hon. Member for Halifax to ensure that we have a form of oversight that works, be that from one of the existing oversight bodies or from another body. There are various different arguments, so I will come back to the hon. Member on that.

The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East asked what the measures were based on. The Bill is based on the Terrorism Act 2000, but we also looked at the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. We sought consistency in the schedules by using the so-called TACT and the Proceeds of Crime Act as their basis. It is important to note that Police Scotland has been involved in this endeavour and is content. It has been a very important part of the conversation.

The hon. Member for Halifax asked where these orders could come from. Police need to compel individuals or organisations to answer questions. Because of the different natures of potential production orders, they may involve not just a single individual, but multiple sources; that is why I mentioned multiple companies. In this case, one may be following a particular individual but not be certain which airline they travelled on. Therefore, this could include either multiple companies that may have produced a good or a service, or multiple agencies that have supplied it. That is where it comes from.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 8 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 9

Customer information orders

“Schedule (Customer information orders) makes provision for customer information orders.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new clause introduces the new Schedule inserted by NS2.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

The question as to why we have not addressed this sooner is a fair one. The UK’s investigation legislation is complex, as the hon. Member for Halifax knows only too well from the homework she has obviously done for our sittings. For example, in the Proceeds of Crime Act there are more than seven investigatory orders used in criminal and civil investigations. The consideration that has gone into this has naturally been complex, and it has required a lot of time and input. This Bill, as she knows very well, has been some years—and, indeed, some Ministers—in the making.

[Mr Jones]

More to come!

[Tom Tugendhat]

Let us see. The fact that there are no recorded uses of the information orders in TACT demonstrates how sparing the use of these provisions will be.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 9 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 10

Account monitoring orders

‘Schedule (Account monitoring orders) makes provision for account monitoring orders’.—(Tom Tugendhat.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

These are sensible proposals to give our law enforcement agencies the powers they require, but I would like clarification about definitions. The Minister referred to a bank, and it is clear that this is about monitoring bank accounts. The explanatory statement, expansive as it is—I think it is one line—says:

“These orders may require financial institutions to provide specified information relating to accounts.”

I want to clarify the definition of financial institution. If we go back 20 or 30 years, it was quite clear: we had bank accounts and financial products. Today, though, there is a complex environment of organisations that work and deal with financial accounts. For example, Bitcoin is now traded between organisations, some of which are covered by the Financial Conduct Authority and others not. I am trying to get some understanding of how widely this will go.

The other issue is about bank accounts that are not in the UK. I am particularly thinking about bank accounts in the overseas territories, and what happens there. We need clarification about the remit. The measure might work very simply with banks and other financial institutions, but in an ever-changing world we have a lot of organisations that deal with people’s “accounts” where they are not regulated.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Member for Halifax asks again about the term “constable”. She is right to ask, but that is not an oversight; it is accurate. There are different levels at which different officers are allowed to warrant things. As she rightly identifies, “constable” is the generic term, and then at various points different ranks of officer are required for different levels of authority. That is in line with the TACT powers. This area of authorisation is considered less intrusive, and that is why a lower-ranking officer is allowed to ask for it.

On financial institutions, the right hon. Member for North Durham identified that banking has changed somewhat since he and I had post office accounts in the early—I will leave that there. Schedule 3 uses the same definition as that used in paragraph 6 of schedule 6 of the Terrorism Act 2000; it is designed to align. The definition of financial institution in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 can be found in paragraph 1 of schedule 9. Account monitoring orders can be used as part of a broader set of purposes, such as civil recovery, and they are applicable to a broader range of financial institutions. Such breadth is unnecessary in respect of state threats, which is why that is slightly narrower, but the definition is there.

Obviously, these powers cannot be used to compel institutions overseas, so we are asking for co-operation from police forces.

[Mr Jones]

I appreciate that in terms of overseas bank accounts, but there has been a lot of controversy about individual using overseas territories. If the Minister does not know the answer, he can write to the Committee to clarify the point. I just want to see how far these orders could go in terms of their effect.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman knows very well that overseas territories come under slightly different jurisdictions, whether they are Crown dependencies or overseas territories. It depends on the jurisdiction, but I will be happy to write to him.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 10 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 11

Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements

‘(1) A person (“P”) who makes a foreign activity arrangement must register the arrangement with the Secretary of State before the end of the period of 10 days beginning with the day on which P makes the arrangement’

(2) A “foreign activity arrangement” is an arrangement with a specified person pursuant to which the specified person directs P—

(a) to carry out activities in the United Kingdom, or

(b) to arrange for activities to be carried out in the United Kingdom.

(3) “Specified person” means—

(a) a foreign power specified by the Secretary of State in regulations;

(b) a person, other than a foreign power, specified by the Secretary of State in regulations.

(4) The regulations may specify a person other than a foreign power only if—

(a) the person is not an individual, and

(b) the Secretary of State reasonably believes the person is controlled by a foreign power.

(5) A person is controlled by a foreign power if—

(a) the foreign power holds, directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the shares in the person,

(b) the foreign power holds, directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the voting rights in the person,

(c) the foreign power holds, directly or indirectly, the right to appoint or remove an officer of the person, or

(d) the foreign power has the right to direct or control the person’s activities (in whole or in part).

(6) In subsection (5) “officer”—

(a) in relation to a body corporate, means a director, member of the committee of management, chief executive, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body, or a person purporting to act in any such capacity;

(b) in relation to a partnership, means a partner or person purporting to act as a partner;

(c) in relation to an unincorporated association other than a partnership, means a person who is concerned in the management or control of the association or purports to act in the capacity of a person so concerned.

(7) The Secretary of State may make regulations specifying a foreign power or a person other than a foreign power only if the Secretary of State considers it reasonably necessary to do so to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(8) The requirement in subsection (1) does not apply to a foreign power.

(9) Regulations specifying a foreign power or a person other than a foreign power may provide for subsection (1) to apply, with modifications specified in the regulations, in relation to a foreign activity arrangement made with the specified person before the regulations come into force.

(10) A person who fails to comply with subsection (1) commits an offence if the person—

(a) knows, or

(b) ought reasonably to know,

that the arrangement in question is a foreign activity arrangement.’—(Tom Tugendhat.)

NC11 to NC28 require certain arrangements with, and activities of, foreign powers and foreign persons to be registered. They are intended to form a new Part 2A, referred to in explanatory statements as the registration scheme. This new clause requires registration of arrangements with specified persons to carry out activities in the UK.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman will see that I have a number of pages of text that I will be coming to. If he will forgive me, I will explain all these elements as we get to them.

The scheme’s exemptions are as follows: individuals to whom privileges and immunities apply in international law, as provided by, for example, the Vienna convention on diplomatic and consular relations; legal services, as well as information subject to legal professional privilege; domestic and international news publishers, including confidential journalistic material and sources; and arrangements to which the UK Government are party.

The scheme has also been designed to uphold the letter and spirit of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. To that end, any arrangement with Ireland, or with a body incorporated or associated under the laws of Ireland, will be exempt from registration, as are activities to be carried out by such entities. That will avoid interference with the rights of citizens of Northern Ireland who identify as Irish, as well as the activities of cross-border entities and institutions.

I want to close my opening remarks—that is right; we are just starting—by mentioning George Brandis, the former Attorney General for Australia who was responsible for passing the Australian scheme. He was recently reported as commenting on the announcement of the UK scheme:

“This ought not to be in the cockpit of political controversy in the U.K. It ought to be something, because it is necessary for the protection of the national interest, that commands bipartisan support.”

That is certainly the sentiment that I have taken from Second Reading and our deliberations in Committee so far, and I look forward to working with all sides to ensure the requirements are effective and proportionate.

With that, I turn to the group of new clauses relating to the enhanced registration requirement. Each of the new clauses is substantive and so, after setting out the benefits of the enhanced requirement, I will take each in turn. The enhanced registration requirement will provide greater scrutiny of the activities of specified foreign powers or entities while deterring the use of covert arrangements. I describe it as “enhanced” because it creates wider requirements to register than the primary registration requirement, which we will come to later. That is proportionate to the aim of this part of the scheme: to provide greater assurance around the activities of specified foreign powers or entities.

The enhanced registration requirement will provide three principal benefits. First, it will provide the Government and the public with a greater understanding of the scale and extent of activity being undertaken for specified foreign powers and entities within the United Kingdom. Secondly, the offences and penalties for non-compliance will increase the risks to those who seek to engage in covert activities for foreign powers, either directly or through specified entities. Finally, the requirement offers potential for earlier disruption of state threats activity, where there is evidence of a covert arrangement between a person and a specified foreign power or entity but it is not yet feasible to bring charges for a more serious state threats offence.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will, very briefly, but the right hon. Gentleman may find that the point is covered—

[Mr Jones]

If the Minister wants to come here and just read his speech to us, that is fine, but that is not what scrutiny is. I am fully supportive of the proposals under tier 1, but I find it difficult to understand how tier 2 will work in practice. Putting countries or companies on the list will cause huge diplomatic incidents. Let us say we put Huawei on the list, for example; I am sure there would be fallout from that. As well-meaning as tier 2 is, practically, I do not think it will ever be used.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman and I have had many debates on the nature of different foreign influence in the seven years that I have been here. We have discussed many different companies and countries in various ways. I know he shares my absolute passion for protecting the United Kingdom from foreign influence and knows the difficulty that that causes in diplomatic areas. He appreciates better than almost anyone how difficult it is sometimes to match the economic needs and requirements of the United Kingdom with the need to protect ourselves from foreign influence. He is right that this will cause difficulty. There is no getting around the fact that making a decision on the enhanced tier will have diplomatic repercussions. But the reality is that if we do not make those decisions, the implications for our economy and domestic security will be very high.

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that there are companies that some of us have stood up to and made a point of identifying as actors for a foreign state—he mentions Huawei; there are others—and which are in many ways difficult examples. I am not going to say whether Huawei would or would not be subject to the enhanced tier, as we have not looked at any determinations on that, but it is quite clear that there are some countries—Russia is a good example today—that would absolutely require the enhanced tier. Different elements of Russian business would no doubt fall within it.

[Mr Jones]

Yes, but the Minister knows that there are many countries in the world that, although they are not comparable with Russia, would also cause economic harm but are not in the higher tier. Would it not be better to have a broader scheme that mirrored tier 1, with tight definitions of what needs to be registered, and apply it to all countries? We would then give ourselves protection and avoid the diplomatic pitfalls every time we wanted to follow this process.

[Tom Tugendhat]

People have to register under tier 1 anyway. That will be a public scheme that already identifies many areas. Tier 2 will make sure that there is an enhanced aspect that allows us to be clear what exactly is going on, rather than relying on a general identification. That is an important distinction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am glad to see the hon. Lady nodding. The second point is the enhanced scheme. That is where influence may come in different ways, where co-operation and interaction with different businesses that pose a particular and distinct threat may be required. That is why—we will come to this later—the political register will be public and the second register will be private, but the identification of those who are required to be registered will of course have to be public and there will be a political and a diplomatic decision that will go with that.

[Mr Jones]

I sympathise with what the Government are trying to do, and I think my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood does too, but I am never in favour of putting things on the statute book that look tough but that, frankly, will never be used. There must be a more direct way of doing this—a broader measure that applies to all countries, which is then used against relevant countries. My fear is that the measure as it is written at the moment looks tough but will not be usable.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman raises a fair point, but I simply do not believe that if he were in my position, he would not use the powers. I would use them, and I am sure he would use them in a situation where they were required. I know that he has never shrunk from a fight or diplomatic argument, but I think that this is important. The problem is that if the enhanced power were to be used for every nation, the volume of data produced would be enormous and the imposition on companies would be huge.

[Mr Jones]

I agree with the Minister, but he has a problem. He and I have dealt with the Foreign Office and other diplomatic entities over many years: he knows that the pressure that the power will come under, and the competing arguments against security, will make it unusable.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I do not accept that, so I think we will have to end this discussion with an agreement to disagree.

[Mr Jones]

Not for the first time.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Indeed. But I entirely respect the right hon. Gentleman’s position, and I do understand the point he is making.

New clause 11 will require Ministers—specifically, the Secretary of State—to be willing to engage in a strong discussion with other Departments that rely on investment or, indeed, diplomatic leverage. Yes, I am afraid that is a balance that the Government have to make; the right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to identify it, but I simply do not accept that that means the power will not be used. It is true that the power will be constrained, but that does not mean that it will be unused—Ministers who see the threats before them will be willing to use the powers that they have. We will no doubt continue this discussion later.

New clause 11 will provide three principal benefits. The first is that it will provide the Government and public with a greater understanding of the scale and extent of activity being undertaken for specified foreign powers and entities within the United Kingdom.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

The nature of the registration will not be a secret, but who has had to register will be kept private at the moment. I am already keeping this matter under discussion, so I am glad that the hon. Gentleman sympathises with my concerns. He and I are fully aware that journalism is a very powerful force in many of these areas.

[Mr Jones]

This baffles me, as it does the hon. Member for Dundee East. Tier 2 registration will not be private, will it? The order will have to be moved to put them on the list in the first place. Everyone will know, so what is the problem with providing transparency? I do not think you can have two tiers with different levels of transparency.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Let me clarify. Whoever is identified as being on the enhanced tier will be identified publicly. It is those companies that may be co-operating; at the moment, there is a discussion as to whether that should be public or private. The reason for that discussion is that some companies will be co-operating and we may feel that we wish to see that co-operation continue, even though we wish to have the compliance and registration so that we know who is doing what. The argument is that the Government should have the ability to have that information.

[Mr Jones]

If I am the CEO of a company and the Government put my company on the list, surely that will get out anyway. I would have to report it to my shareholders or board, so I am not sure about the benefits of keeping it a secret.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Forgive me, but I think the right hon. Gentleman has got this slightly the wrong way round. By definition, the company that would be identified would be a foreign company, not a UK company.

[Mr Jones]

Yes, but if I headed a French company—I am not suggesting that we use this power against the French for one minute—and had shareholders, surely I would have to tell them, and report at board meetings, that I had been on the list. It will get out anyway, so what is the point of keeping it quiet?

[Tom Tugendhat]

We are clearly speaking at cross purposes. The state that is on the enhanced register would be public. The company would be public. Those UK companies that are registering may not be. The right hon. Gentleman has it the wrong way round.

[Mr Jones]

I don’t think I have.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

My understanding is that—in fact, I will come back to that when I sum up, because the hon. Gentleman has raised an interesting point.

We consider a power relationship to include, for example, where the specified foreign power or entity has formally contracted a person’s support for an activity, or where it is paying a person to deliver a service. It could also include a situation where a specified entity is making a request of its subsidiary—again, the direction might be in the language of a request, but the power relationship would make it a direction. Where such formal structures are not established, a direction should include where a person is requested to act, but through the promise of compensation or coercion—for example, future payment, benefit or favourable treatment.

To be clear, though, it would not be enough for a specified foreign power or entity to simply provide funding in support of an activity—through subsidy or donation, for example. Nor could a generic request from a specified foreign power or entity be considered a “direction”—a request made through a public communication to a large distribution or mailing list, for example.

A power relationship, whether formal or informal, is necessary to ensure that unilateral activity on the part of the person is not within scope and nor is activity that is part of a collaboration and absent a power relationship. We shall set out in guidance what we intend by a direction so that it is clear to the public and to the courts what arrangements are registrable.

An arrangement also captures where a person is to arrange for activity to be carried out at the direction of a specified foreign power or entity, as well as where the person is to carry out the activity themselves. That is to ensure that a person in a direct arrangement with a specified foreign power or entity cannot avoid registration by simply contracting out the activity to a third party, creating a degree of separation between the specified foreign power or entity and the ultimate person who will carry out the activity.

Thirdly, I turn to the definition of “control”, where a specified entity is said to be subject to foreign power control. It is important that we capture the commonly used practice of foreign powers channelling state threat activity through private entities. To capture this effectively we have defined “control” under subsection (5) as being where a foreign power holds, be it directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the shares or voting rights of the entity, or the foreign power can appoint or remove officers of the entity.

Control can also be demonstrated where the foreign power has the right to direct or control the entity’s activities, allowing the Secretary of State flexibility if foreign powers exercise other significant forms of control that fall below those thresholds. The more than 25% threshold is in line with existing legislation on substantial control over an entity.

[Mr Jones]

I appreciate that it is difficult to identify control, but how would we get around the situation of a Russian oligarch who is clearly under the influence of the Kremlin, but whose company is owned through myriad different offshore companies? Would it have to be proven that the ultimate beneficiary was that individual to fall under this legislation? Those people, and even states, are very clever and hide who ultimately controls that company.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman is identifying a problem that we have had with foreign ownership of companies for a very long time. That is why the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill is very important, because the ownership of companies is something that has been a challenge and he is correct to identify it. This Bill addresses certain elements of that control, but he is right that it does not address the totality, although it provides an important brick in the wall that we are building. That is why the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill and the companies registration are important.

[Mr Jones]

So, really, what we are enacting in this legislation will have to be dovetailed with the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill. The issue around Scottish limited partnerships has been quite controversial. Is the Minister saying that when the two come together, they will form the toolkit to tackle these individuals?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman knows that there is not a single tool to deal with every task. The Bill will certainly help with a lot of things that already exist; the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill will add to it, and no doubt, in future years, different Governments will add further tools.

May I finally come to my fourth point? [Interruption.] I hear the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley chuntering. I will briefly summarise the procedural element of the new clause. The requirement is to register a foreign activity arrangement within 10 days of its being made, or otherwise before the activity is carried out. That is important because it may not be obvious to the Government under whose direction the person is acting. The prior registration of arrangements offers some opportunity for the Government to be informed before an activity pursuant to a foreign activity arrangement takes place. It also offers an opportunity to enforce the requirements of the scheme prior to an attempt to carry out covert influence activity.

Subsection (10) makes clear that an offence is committed if a person fails to comply with the requirement to register, and knows—or ought reasonably to know—that the arrangement is a foreign activity arrangement We will discuss the proposed range of offences shortly.

The offences relating to the other part of the scheme—where the registration of political influence activities are concerned—come with a higher bar for the prosecution to meet. Given the likely attention that the measure will receive if a foreign power, part of a foreign power or an entity subject to foreign power control is specified through regulations under subsections (3) and (4), a person should not be capable of avoiding prosecution by claiming they were unaware of the requirement to register. That said, we are mindful that a person who is unwittingly acting for a specified foreign power or entity should not be criminalised. That is why the test is such: a person can be prosecuted only if they ought reasonably to know that they were acting for a specified foreign power or entity.

New clause 12 makes it an offence to carry out activities, or arrange for an activity to be carried out, in the UK pursuant to a foreign activity arrangement that has not been registered. The requirement to register a foreign activity arrangement, which is an arrangement with a specified foreign power, part of a foreign power or entity subject to foreign power, applies to the person who is party to that arrangement—in such a case, that is the person directed by the specified person.

In practice, many other people could be involved in the activity or activities pursuant to that arrangement. For example, if the person party to an arrangement with a specified foreign power is a company, multiple employees could be all engaged in registerable activities within the UK under the arrangement. While I have already explained that the responsibility for registration would rest with the company in this example, and that that is necessary to avoid the burden of each individual employee being required to register separately, the effect of the new clause is to make it an offence to carry out an activity, or arrange for the activity to be carried out, pursuant to a registerable arrangement that has not been registered.

There are two main justifications for the offence. First, it will reduce the likelihood that activities pursuant to an unregistered arrangement with a specified person will be carried out, supporting the overall aims of the scheme. It makes it clear that all individuals have a role to play in ensuring that the requirements of the scheme have been complied with. Where there is doubt that an organisation or company has registered its arrangement with a specified person, it is a good outcome if its employees take necessary steps to clarify that their registerable activities are covered by registration.

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[Mr Jones]

How does the Minister define “foreign power control”? What would be the evidential test? I have heard him argue, for example, that all Chinese companies are ultimately under the control of the Chinese Communist party. Is that the evidential test? Or to take the Russian example, would the evidential test be a company being owned by an oligarch who is close to Putin? Clearly, if the Chinese Communist party wants to control a Chinese company, it can. Would that be the threshold at which a company would be caught by the measures?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman is right to ask. Control over an entity means 25% of a shareholding—that is one thing that we have already identified—or it could also be formal mechanisms within the company, including voting power or other forms of control. Some foreign powers enact legislation to oblige entities to comply with their security services or intelligence agencies—the right hon. Gentleman knows what I am referring to—giving them a right to exercise an element of control over those entities outside formal governance structures.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I do not think that is the case. The hon. Gentleman should realise that foreign control of any kind is under the general provision of the so-called ordinary provision, while the enhanced provision would be specifically identified, so individuals required to register under the enhanced provision would be aware that they are contracting within an organisation or entity that falls under it. All those contracting with a foreign entity will know that they have to register under the ordinary provision, so the legislation covers both cases.

[Mr Jones]

That does not clear things up for me. I have mentioned China. I am sure if I googled long enough I would find a speech that the Minister has given where he suggests that all Chinese companies are controlled by the Chinese Government, if they wish to have foreign influence. There is clear, direct evidence about doing business in Russia—it is not the law, but there is coercion regarding the individuals around Putin. If we are saying that the Chinese Communist party can control most companies, is the Minister saying that all those companies will have to register?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman knows very well that what we express in private and what we say from the Dispatch Box cannot always be absolutely aligned. I am not going to identify every single Chinese company in one go. He knows that there are different elements of control. The Companies Act 2006 sets out the nature of those different elements.

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[Mr Jones]

I am sure the Minister will get some China hawks on the Back Benches of the Conservative party arguing that all Chinese companies should have to be registered under the scheme. I think the measure needs some clarification before it goes any further. There are also certain individuals that the Minister’s party has taken money off who very clearly have connections with the Kremlin and who control companies in this country through front people; the ownership is actually individuals who we would not want to be associated with.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman knows very well my own views on foreign influence on political parties. Sadly, we have seen such influence in all political parties, where parties or members of political parties have unwisely, sometimes rashly and often extremely foolishly, taken money off Chinese, Russian or other individuals. That is completely wrong and I know he and I share complete revulsion at it. I am very glad that we are sorting some of that situation out. It is a problem that the whole of the United Kingdom and many other political parties around the world have to face. We need to deal with it, and that is what the Bill is doing.

New clause 13 is the second aspect of the enhanced registration requirement. It will require the registration of activities to be carried out within the United Kingdom by a specified person. The first aspect of the enhanced measure, which we dealt with earlier, was the registration of arrangements with a specified person. Although arrangements are important, we recognise that activities within the United Kingdom will be carried out by the specified person themselves and not just those they direct. I should be clear: “specified person” in the context of the requirement can only be a specified entity subject to the foreign power control. I have already explained that foreign powers themselves are not required to register under the foreign influence registration scheme. We are therefore proposing that the specified entity subject to foreign power control, for example a company or organisation, be required to register its activities within the United Kingdom before they are carried out. An offence would be committed where the specified entity had failed to register its activity and it knew or ought reasonably to know that the activity in question was not registered.

To ensure that the requirement is practical and proportionate, the requirement to register is to be fulfilled by the entity and not its individual employees. Although we recognise that an employee is also capable of being directed by its employer to engage in the same registerable activities, we considered it disproportionate to require each individual to register in such a scenario. There would also be practical difficulties, not just in administration but also in consistency. If each individual employee were required to register the same activity, that increases the likelihood that the information provided is materially different and possibly even contradictory.

Finally, hon. Members may wonder why, compared with the requirement to register an arrangement, there is no 10-day period within which the registration must be made. The requirement to register an arrangement within such a period is necessary, as it may not be immediately clear that a person is acting at the direction of a specified person, as the person receiving the direction is separate to the specified person directing the activity. Where the specified person—the entity subject to foreign power control—is acting itself, it should already be clear and it is therefore enough that the registration takes place before the activities are carried out.

I want to finish my remarks by reiterating that if we did not include that requirement there would be a clear gap. A person who is separate from the specified entity, for example a different organisation, would be required to register an arrangement that involves being directed to act in the United Kingdom, but there would be no requirement for the specified entity itself to register its own activities. Leaving such a gap would not make sense in the context of countering state threats. I also want to stress again that we intend the use of the enhanced measure to be limited. It is there as an additional tool of assurance and its use will be subject to parliamentary approval through affirmative procedure. I ask the Committee to support the clauses.

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[Mr Jones]

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. That is why I do not think the provision will be used in practice. That is the problem and, as I have said, I am never in favour of putting such provisions on the statute book. A more narrowly defined set of criteria applied to all countries would be better than the complicated system that we have here.

The other point is about transparency. Clearly, the public record for tier 1 will be there—it is published. Why the second tier should be done differently, I do not know. The information is going to get out anyway. It is not going to be a great surprise if a company is on this list. If I was running a company and was suddenly put on the register, I would not tell people that—I would not tell the investors and shareholders. I do not understand why the Government are treating the second tier differently from the first tier.

[Tom Tugendhat]

May I interrupt with a point of fact? Any company that is designated under the highest tier will be public by definition. That element will be public. It is the UK element that is having to register. The right hon. Gentleman gave an example of a completely spurious French company, which would of course never be on the enhanced list, as we are such good allies with the French. That company would be publicly declared. That is not the bit that is being kept out of the publication. It is the UK element registering it.

National Security Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Committee stage
Thursday 8th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Jones]

There is lots in the Bill on which there is cross-party agreement. We want to achieve a situation whereby law enforcement, our agencies and others have maximum powers to stop the real threat out there from those who wish to do us harm. Clause 57, and the ones on legal aid, which we will come to next, seem to have been plonked into the Bill as headline-grabbing measures—“We will do this because it will look as though we’re tough on terrorists.” I do not think they add anything to the ability of our security services to do their work; nor do they ensure that our courts deal with such cases effectively, as my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood has outlined.

My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned a case. I will not refer to it in detail—my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood and I are members of the ISC, which has looked at it in detail—but it comes back to the checks and balances point that I made this morning, and not just in terms of security. When the state does something that leads to a wrong being committed against a citizen, there needs to be a redress mechanism, and I share the concern of my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood that the provision will be extended to other areas. The measures will get a nice headline for the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton, who clearly wants to be seen as tough on terrorism, but I am not sure that, in practice, they represent anything of the sort.

Increasingly—and this is a slippery slope of which politicians need to be wary— we in this country react to newspaper headlines about what the courts do, such as “They have got X, Y or Z wrong.” Is the justice system or the jury system perfect? No, they are not, but they are robust. As my hon. Friend has just said, judges know in most cases when someone is pursuing a claim that is not grounded—they are experienced. I believe that we should leave that to courts and judges to decide.

When a newspaper rings up to say, “This judge has just done X, Y and Z. Isn’t this terrible?”, I always urge colleagues to dig into it because in most cases, the headline is completely different from the facts of the case. Without hearing the facts of the case in detail, making an instant judgment is difficult. I do not accept that our judges and judiciary are somehow woolly liberals who are prepared to turn a blind eye to justice; they are robust individuals who want not only to uphold the law, but to ensure that they get the right balance between the rights of the state and the rights of the citizen, as I mentioned earlier.

I accept that the Minister cannot accept the amendments today and that he perhaps does not want to carve out this piece of the Bill now, but discussion needs to be had on this—we will come to the next bit in a minute. If it does not get carved out here, when it goes to the other place, which is full of legal experts and people with a lifetime and huge experience in this area, it will get sliced to pieces. It is not just bad drafting; it is Ministers trying to put provisions in Bills for political purposes, rather than because they make common sense. As I said the other day, what irritates me is that, if we are going to take the provision out, we should do so in this House rather than allow it to go to the House of Lords. It will not survive that process, and we need to be honest about that. It is far better that we do it, and actually do our job, which is scrutinising legislation.

I said the other day, when the Minister was not here, that there is something that has built up over the last 21 years that I have been in the House: Ministers take it as a slight if a provision gets dropped when a Bill goes through the Commons, as though that is a weakness of the system. No, it is not: it is proper scrutiny. With a certain amount of co-operation, much of the Bill could go straight through, but measures such as this cannot, unfortunately.

[Tom Tugendhat]

First, I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for her comments. I appreciate the tone with which she approached this matter, and the intent with which she seeks to amend the Bill. She also heard my comments, and my commitment to listen more closely. There are slight differences—important differences—between terrorism and other crimes: one is a direct attack on the state, and a betrayal of the very protections that the state affords to everyone, whereas other crimes are by their nature of a different nature. That is not an absolute, and I appreciate that that raises different elements, but it is worth noting.

It is also important to remember that we have already instructed parliamentary counsel to prepare a redraft of part of the Bill, to make it narrowly drawn and to capture only those involved in terrorism. I appreciate the points that the hon. Lady made. I would argue that, as I mentioned, courts do not generally consider reducing damages in these cases, and we are not telling them to do so but inviting them to consider doing so. Courts are still independent, and I appreciate her point.

[Mr Jones]

I am sorry, but what is the purpose of the measure? I know judges. The Minister might want to ask them to reduce damages, but he is not going to interfere with their independence. Frankly, therefore, is it really worth it?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The point of this House is to indicate opinion as well. I do know two judges, under whose roofs I have lived, and both of them left me in absolutely no doubt as to who takes the decision. I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s point.

As I said in my opening speech on the clause, the courts when awarding civil tort damages will only very rarely exercise their right to limit them. That is why we believe it is right to require the courts to consider doing so, even if they then do not do so. I hope that answers the questions at this stage, and I repeat my commitment to engage in further conversation with members of the Committee.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady asks a fair question. This is a plan for the future or rather a concern over the future, rather than provisions based on existing cases. It is the Government, I hope, doing a responsible thing and looking forward, which is, I hope, what we would expect them to do.

Let me give an example. When making their application, the security services will provide evidence of the claimant’s involvement in terrorist activity and relevant associations, together with their risk assessment of the likelihood of the claimant’s using the money to fund terror activities.

[Mr Jones]

I like the idea of the Government being able to look into the future. We have established that there are no cases so far, so what are the limitations of the existing legislation on the statute books? What is the difference that explains why we need this provision? I ask because I am never in favour of putting on the statute book things that are already covered by an existing freezing order, provisions on proceeds of crime, or anything else.

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[Mr Jones]

The Ministry of Justice and the Home Office employ a wide variety of talents among the individuals whom they recruit, but I did not realise that they actually recruit fortune tellers. That is what we are into here. We have established that there have been no such cases. I am not aware—perhaps the Minister can provide some examples—of why the security services think this is a risk. If that does not exist, this is in the realms of predicting the future, and if there is one thing that we can all agree on—possibly everyone—it is that we cannot predict what happens in the future.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley just said, why only the damages? There is already extensive legislation on the statute books to freeze proceeds of crime and bank accounts if they are to be used for criminal activities. What extra weapons will we give to the courts? I do not see anything that is not there at the moment.

As for using the measure—as opposed to freezing, for example, as I said to the right hon. Member for Dundee East—there is already legislation on the statute book to prevent someone from financing terrorism. In such a situation, what evidence would the Government or the state actually put before the courts? They cannot say simply, “We think he or she might use their proceeds for terrorist activity in future”; it has to be based on intelligence. Again, putting the evidence into court would still expose the state. I presume the existing process would be followed, but it would still mean that we might be putting intelligence in the courts that is not just historical, but actually live, in terms of things such as associations. I just think it is a very clumsy way of trying to proceed. We do not want any money, wherever it comes from, to be used for financing terrorism, but I do not understand where the proposal has come from in the first place. I would be interested if the Minister could find out, because I am also clear that we should not put measures on the statue book unless we have to.

Another point—it is quite amusing in one respect—is the idea that we can decide that an individual who is going to potentially fund terrorism is only going to get half or part of their settlement. I am reassured that the lawyers will be getting their fees, because it would be dreadful if they were having to go to food banks after not getting their pay from a case. However, the Minister then said that care costs and other things would be taken into account. How would the decision be made? Using care costs as an example, if a person gets a certain amount in damages, they might need them for a few years to come if their care costs are ongoing. So, we could not really cap where that is going to go, and that affects the individual’s ability to claim on the state for their care costs. This is a mess. It is one of the examples in the Bill where the odd thing is just thrown in that is not needed. If the Minister could demonstrate to me why this is so important to include in the Bill, I would back him 100%. However, I think that the measure is clumsy, that it will never be used, and that it will damage the reputation of this Bill, which some people have done a good enough job of doing as it is. The Minister certainly will not accept the amendment, but this is another issue that he might want to cogitate on, and decide whether it is worth the candle.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I welcome Committee members’ comments. I notice that Occam has many cousins in this place, and that his razor is very sharp. On that basis, I merely mention that the issue is with not just damages payments, but the enormous resource currently used in fighting such claims.

[Mr Jones]

That is absolute tosh. If this gets on the statute book, what on earth would it cost if somebody challenges and appeals? The initial damages will be completely insignificant compared with what it will cost to have special courts and everything else like that.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Member and I will delight in having a conversation about this when I have written to him.

The reality is that this is looking at an identifiable risk, which is from court proceedings, rather than an unidentifiable risk, which is lottery winnings. I have put that on record and we will no doubt discuss this later. It is also worth making the case that the courts are experienced in calculating case costs and ongoing costs. I will leave it there.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

I appreciate enormously what right hon. and hon. Members opposite have said. As I have been familiarising myself with the detail of this Bill, I will be asking questions and engaging in conversation with colleagues from all parts of the House. I will absolutely be engaging with Opposition colleagues.

I am sure right hon. and hon. Members will appreciate it if I cover the clauses as they stand. Clause 62 will narrow the range of circumstances in which individuals convicted of specified terrorism offences can receive civil legal services. That includes individuals convicted of terrorism offences listed under schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code, where there is a minimum penalty of imprisonment for two years or more, as well as for offences where a judge has found a terrorism connection.

The restriction will apply to future applications for legal aid for individuals convicted of terrorism or terrorism-connected offences from 2001 onwards. The restriction will not affect ongoing cases.

[Mr Jones]

Is the Minister suggesting that this measure is going to be retrospective to 2001 for some individuals?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My understanding will be clarified in a letter to the right hon. Gentleman very shortly, unless it is clarified in the moments to come.

[Mr Jones]

I find that very difficult. If it gives him time for his civil servants to provide the answer, I will say that it is very unusual to have retrospection in a law such as this. If the Minister does not have the answer in time, I am sure he could send us all a note.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am assured that it is retrospective. I will, of course, be looking at this as part of the whole. [Interruption.] It is retrospective to 2001 for past offences. I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman on that.

The effect of the restriction is a suspension on accessing civil legal aid from the date of conviction. The restriction will last for 30 years for individuals convicted when aged 18 years old or over, and 15 years for individuals convicted when under 18. The restriction will not apply to individuals under 18 years old, but will take effect when they turn 18 and make a new application for civil legal aid.

As the clause is drafted, access to the exceptional case funding scheme will remain available for those subject to the restriction who can demonstrate that, without legal aid, there is a risk of a breach of their ECHR rights or their retained enforceable EU law rights. Applications for exceptional case funding are generally subject to means and merits tests.

Clause 63 ensures that—

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way on the point he just made?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Go on.

[Mr Jones]

In effect, this measure is going to be useless, isn’t it? I would think that if, for example, someone with no means is subject to one of these orders, it would not take a great legal genius to argue in a court that it infringed their rights to a fair trial. Is it not therefore the case that, in most cases, they will get special legal aid anyway? It is a bit odd to implement a thing that might sound tough but, in practice, will end up with people getting legal aid anyway.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Occam is making his case. The right hon. Gentleman will be assured that I will respond in full, and in kind, as soon as we have had the opportunity to have this discussion among a slightly wider party of colleagues.

Clause 63 ensures that the correct data-sharing and data-processing powers are available to enforce the restriction on access to civil legal aid for those convicted of specified terrorism offences. To enforce the restriction effectively, we must be able to check that an individual has a relevant conviction that would prevent them from accessing funding. To do this, a legal gateway must exist within the legislation to use conviction data for the purposes of administering legal aid. The clause will allow the details of an individual’s conviction status to be requested from the director of legal aid casework and shared from a competent authority that holds the criminal conviction data. This data can be used only for the purpose of identifying whether an applicant for legal aid has been convicted of a specified terrorism offence, in order to determine whether the restriction will apply. Such information may include an individual’s name and date of birth, and the dates of any convictions.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

I will clarify the process for the hon. Lady. It is not that unreasonable, frankly—

[Mr Jones]

What?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Hang on a minute. It is not that unreasonable to check with competent authorities before various provisions are made. It is pretty standard, and this measure is another check. I appreciate the hon. Lady’s point, and I will come back to her with how this is done and how it is followed up.

Finally, clause 64 makes a minor amendment to clarify how civil legal aid is available for terrorism prevention and investigation measures proceedings. I want to make it clear that the clause will not change that fact. The clause seeks to reduce unnecessary complexity in the administration of the legal aid scheme, and it will ensure that all legal aid decisions for TPIMs are made under one paragraph of the statutory framework, rather than being funded under multiple paragraphs. The clause will also remove references to “control orders” in the legal aid legislation; control orders were the predecessors to TPIMs and have now been phased out.

[Mr Jones]

Why?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Because the term “control orders” has been phased out.

[Mr Jones]

No, I mean why is it for TPIMs? Why one and not the other? It is what we said earlier: it is pushing one way and pulling the other way, surely.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I see the right hon. Gentleman’s point. We are going to move on, because he knows that we will be talking about this later.

I thank both the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for tabling their amendments, which seek to carve out an exception from the restriction where the case type involves domestic abuse. I recognise the strength of voice that the hon. Lady has brought to the scourge of domestic violence, and the voice that she has given to so many victims in the House. It is an enormous tribute to her that she is recognised around the country for it, and I certainly listen to her very carefully on this issue. I reassure her that I will be looking at not just the provisions in the clause but the amendment she has tabled. I will also be looking at the exceptional case funding scheme, and I will be discussing it. It is certainly true at the moment that 74% of applications to the ECF are granted, but she has already made the point that there is a hurdle before approaching the 74%. I accept that, and I will be looking at it. I will be taking it seriously. I ask her to withdraw the amendment ahead of future conversations.

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[Mr Jones]

I broadly welcome the new clause, because it is obviously another weapon in the armoury to counter foreign state interference, but I just want some clarification to be made in terms of the broad nature of what is actually being proposed.

One of the examples that I want to raise is the issue of academia. As my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax has already said, the United Front Workers Department of the Chinese Communist party is active across the globe and influencing academics and even legislators here in this country and in other countries, for example, Australia. So I just want some clarification about how someone would get caught under this measure.

As I say, one example is academia. I cannot remember who—I was trying to rack my brains to think of the name of the academic at Harvard University who I think is currently being prosecuted in the United States. It relates to the definition of “intelligence service”. We know that the Chinese Communist party does not work directly; it will work through front organisations. As I say, I am trying to think of the name of the academic in the US; it will come back to me in a minute.

However, let us suppose a British academic is approached by an entity in China or an individual based here, who then says to that academic, “Will you do some academic research? Will you write a paper for us?” And they give the academic money for that. There are examples of this happening, and I think that in the example from the United States, which is currently ongoing, the academic then received a retainer for providing research information for a Chinese university. I think there is evidence that suggests that that was a way in which the Chinese Communist party or the Chinese security services were funnelling money to academics.

I would be really interested to know how we will differentiate between the academic who quite clearly wants to do research, and co-operation with China. The benefit they get—for example, being paid for a visit to a conference, for an academic paper or for research—does not fall within the scope of this measure, because, to be fair to the academic, the source of the funding might not be clear—it might be clear in some cases, but not in all.

I can understand if, for example, the security services approach an academic and say, “Are you aware that your money for your paper is coming from x intelligence agency?”, and the academic says, “Oh well, I’m not bothered. I’ll keep on doing it.” That is fine. However I just want to know—and I think some guidance has to be given to academics.

The other example is a bit closer to home, which is my hon. Friend the Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner), who received large amounts of money from a woman called Christine Lee. She made quite a substantial donation for him to run his office. I am still baffled as to the reason why, but still. It was proven later that that she was working on behalf of the Chinese Communist party and the Chinese Government. Would an individual like that—a Member of Parliament—be dragged into this, under the new clause?

Certainly, I am sure that most of us, if someone offered us half a million pounds, would actually want to know why we were getting it, but people make their own decisions. Would that be classed under this? There are clear examples of the Chinese in particular using academia as a cover for intelligence gathering and actually funding things that will obviously influence, such as stealing academic research. For example, if a paper is normally worth £1,000 and someone is getting £20,000 for it, does that mean that the rest is a bung and that they should really raise questions about it? I doubt many academics are going to be saying, “I am not worth £20,000”. It comes back to the point on this, which I would like some more information on. I am not against what is being proposed, but I think that it has some issues that will raise alarm bells in certain sections, and academia is certainly one of them.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will pick up on the second set of points first, if the hon. Member for Halifax does not mind. I will pick up on those points because I am glad that it is not just me who is baffled at what the United Front thought it was gaining from this relationship. I think we are all equally mystified, but it appears that they had the resources not to care.

It does suggest, however, that we have to take this extremely seriously in all of our duties—not just when we talk about people outside this place, but when we talk about people inside this place because we have a particular responsibility to the service of our country and our communities. So I think that this needs to be looked at extremely carefully. I am not going to go into individual cases for various reasons, except to express surprise.

[Mr Jones]

It is wider than just that one case because, when the ISC did its Russia report, there was clear evidence of certain Members of the House of Lords, for example, being given posts as consultants and other things. Whether there is any proof that they were actually given by the intelligence services, I do not know, but it has certainly, in some cases, raised certain questions that ought to be asked.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that there are certain individuals in our society—some of whom, sadly, have seats in this Parliament—whose actions are questionable and demand further investigation. He can be absolutely assured that that is something that I take extremely seriously. He knows that I drafted a policy paper a long time ago on updating our Terrorism Acts. This debate is not about that, but there are various reasons why I took that seriously so many years ago and why I am very pleased to be doing this job. I accepted this job from the Prime Minister because this is a matter that I think is of enormous importance in the United Kingdom, particularly today. I will not go into the details of it, but he can be absolutely assured that I will be looking at it as soon as I have got my feet a little bit further under the desk, if he will forgive me.

These provisions, of course, do apply in various different ways, and he has highlighted some of the ways in which foreign intelligence services pay agents. Disproportionate or excessive payments can be considered in different ways, such as bribery. While the individual in question may of course claim that they were worth what they were paid, I think a reasonable benchmarking process would normally establish that they were, at best, surprised, if not actually encouraging the situation, which was not conducive to the safety of our country.

I am not, as I have said, going to go through individual cases, but this entire new clause refers to benefits in various different ways, such as to a benefit received through a business; it does not have to be direct. I am going to have to come back to the hon. Member for Halifax on her question about the nature of sexual inducements. I cannot answer that question now, but I will come back to her.

[Mr Jones]

I accept that the Minister has done a lot of work in this area. Would it be possible for Committee members to be briefed on the reason for this provision, but also how it will act in practice because, once it is implemented, guidance is going to have to be given to companies and to academia? I think just getting some understanding of how it would work in practice would reassure many of us in Opposition.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Personally, I commit, absolutely, to engaging with Committees, not just the right hon. Gentleman’s own. The Intelligence and Security Committee is an important one. This Committee is another one, of course, but the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee and various other Committees would, I am sure, have an interest in this area. I absolutely do commit to engaging to ensure that this clause is understood properly.

I would add, however, that to be a benefit in this area, and to be in scope of the offences, it would need to be a material benefit, so either money or money’s worth. Forgive me, I have received an answer. Before bringing a prosecution, a careful consideration of the nature of the benefit and the circumstances would be undertaken. A person has to know that they are obtaining a benefit from a foreign intelligence source, and there are several protections to avoid capturing legitimate activity. Legitimate activity, of course, as I said, refers to supporting an embassy that is in pursuit of its diplomatic functions or working with a police force, for example in the Republic of Ireland when an individual lives in Northern Ireland.

The hon. Member for Halifax also made points about the timing of this. I appreciate that entirely, and I entirely respect her position. We must ensure that this goes through with the consent of the House.

[Mr Jones]

The Minister is being very helpful, but could I clarify something? If, for example, somebody received a benefit from a university, but it was subsequently found that the money was coming from a foreign intelligence agency—or if someone did work for a company then found out that it had been involved—that person perhaps did not know that. Am I assuming that, as it is written, if they continued after they were made aware of it, then they would fall into scope? If they could actually say that they did not know about it, is that a defence?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman is exactly right. The point of the defence of “reasonable” is that, in order for this to be an offence, the individual needs to be aware that the benefit is supplied by a foreign intelligence source. Therefore, so long as they are unaware of it, it is not an offence. When they become aware of it, it is an offence.

The last point that I wish to make is on the delays. I know that the hon. Member for Halifax will understand that the Ukrainian situation, and a certain change of Government office holders most recently, may have interrupted the provisions. However, on that note—

National Security Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Committee stage
Thursday 8th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Tugendhat]

It has. That is because they have held it together and been a phenomenal asset to the Home Office. I am grateful to them.

On the various points that have been made, the hon. Member—

[Mr Jones]

Right honourable.

[Tom Tugendhat]

My apologies: the right hon. Gentleman. He is quite right. He asked some questions, as did the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, or the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I warmly welcome the Minister to his position. He and I go back a long way: when I was a Minister in the Ministry of Defence, he was a bright, fresh young officer, and I think we both have fond memories of our time working together. One of the dangers he faces is being appointed to a position that he knows a lot about. That is always a downer for any Minister and strikes fear into the civil service. I wish him well, and he will do a good job.

Throughout the entire Bill, there should be an ability for the individual to have recourse to appeal. That is not because I am somehow soft on terrorism or on the individuals we are dealing with. It is because we must have a system whereby, when the state takes hard measures to limit someone’s freedom, they need the counterbalance of the ability to appeal. That is why I welcome the measures. My problem with the Bill is that, although this measure is present in this part of the Bill, there are no safeguards in other parts of the Bill. Those types of appeal mechanisms balance state power and the individual.

I have two specific points on the process, which I support. How will the appeals be done in the court? Some of the information that the Secretary of State will rely on will be highly classified, so how will the process work? It will mean the disclosure of some information that we would not want disclosed in open court. I shall not rehearse the arguments on part 3, but it is clear that, if part 3 is retained, the individual will not have recourse to legal aid for an appeal. I am opposed to that. That is not because I am on the side of individuals who wish us harm, but we must ensure that we have a system that is robust in ensuring that justice is done, and people must not be arbitrarily detained or subject to those restrictions if they clearly have legitimate arguments against what the state is trying to apply.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Before I come to the right hon. Member for Dundee East’s words, I will just address the very generous tribute from the right hon. Member for North Durham. I remember that I used to call him sir; he never called me sir, and he still will not. I do not feel special in that; I do not think he has ever called anyone sir in his life. It was very kind of him.

On the question raised by the right hon. Member for Dundee East, clause 38 means that there has to be a review wherever a STPIM notice is imposed, which is in clause 35. The individual can attend the automatic review. I will come on to that element, because as the right hon. Member for North Durham rightly says, there is likely to be material that is extremely sensitive. That is why the procedure relates to what is already established with special advocates. The right hon. Member knows much more about Special Immigration Appeals Commission hearings, and the various ways in which advocates can have access to information that is relevant to a court but is not then shared with somebody for whom that would not be conducive. That is the way that the proceedings will work, and I think that provides the right balance between disclosure, justice and protection.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

Jurisdiction in relation to decisions under this part

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I think the Minister has explained that. I take the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East, but as I said earlier on, I think the rules are a sensible safeguard in terms of what we need. Frankly, with no access to legal aid they are for the birds, because no one will be able to use them. We will come on to that debate later.

I want to ask the Minister about the issue of juveniles, which is an increasing problem for our security services. For example, the “Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism” report that we just produced in the Intelligence and Security Committee found that, increasingly, those individuals are young people—some as young as 15. If we are going to apply the rules in some possible circumstances to those individuals, what are the protections for them? If the Minister does not know the answer, I am quite happy for him to write to explain the situation. We are perhaps fixated on thinking that this is about Islamic terrorists and grown-ups, but certainly according to the ISC report, very sadly, in many cases those who are now coming before the courts are minors.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Let me quickly answer the question on who is the appropriate advocate. That is somebody appointed by the Attorney General under schedule 7(10)(1). The person has to be an appropriate law officer, so a barrister or a solicitor. That is how it is determined.

On the question of genuine national security, I understand the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East. He will understand that this is a matter of concern for many of us who are devoted, as he knows I am, to the application of the rule of law and the access to justice that this country and many countries in Europe have secured over the past century. That is vital to the provision and protection of liberty in our country. I appreciate his point and the right to a fair trial is essential.

However, it is simply the reality of life in our world that sometimes we need to frame that justice within certain provisions to allow it to be real, and not to be silenced by the inability to bring together evidence that would otherwise protect British people. That means that we have to find ways of balancing it. That is why these court proceedings, which are less than ideal and not the ones that we would like to see, are sadly necessary because of the security restrictions that apply.

On the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, he knows that I spent some time in the past few decades hunting people who sought to do our country harm, and he is absolutely right. Sadly, it was not always the people who we see on the various TV shows. Very often, it was people who came at it from a very different angle. I therefore appreciate his point; I will look into it and come back to him.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 7 agreed to.

Clause 48

Reports on exercise of powers under this part

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

The amendment from my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax is, as I said earlier, part of a broader piece about ensuring that we get the balance right between giving our security services, agencies and people the powers that I personally support, and providing proper scrutiny for the individual and for the operation of the Bill. That is the thing that has been missing from the Bill. Knowing Sir Brian Leveson, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, I know that system works well in terms of warrantry and so on. If we are going to give powers to our agencies to do their job rightly, we have to ensure that they are robust and reviewed as things change.

I know the Minister is only a day or a bit into his job, so he might not be able to accept an amendment today, but I think this aspect needs to be looked at throughout the Bill. It was certainly raised with his predecessor, though I cannot remember if it was his immediate predecessor or the one before that.

My other point is to do with this issue of laying before Parliament. I support that, but the report will be very anodyne in terms of what it can provide in public, so I might look to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I am not looking for work for that Committee, but it has the ability to access material that cannot, for obvious reasons, be put in the public domain. The Minister will soon learn about the battles going on at the moment with parts of the Cabinet Office, Home Office and various other agencies about our role and access to material. We already get, for example, the independent commissioner’s report, but we have an ongoing row about our access to the annex, which we had in the past but for some reason are now not allowed to have. Given the role of Parliament and for its reassurance, will the Minister consider the ISC having access to the information that cannot be put in the public domain? That would be helpful. I accept that some people think the ISC just agrees with everything the agencies do, but it is another review body that can give assurance to the public and Parliament that the powers are proportionate.

We know that once we implement the Bill, we will learn and powers will change. I am not against Brian Leveson, the independent tribunals and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner—they do a fantastic job. They have helpfully pointed to some of the lessons that need to be learned, for example, from the terrorist attacks in London and Manchester. The ability of parliamentarians at least to ask the questions and have access to the information that cannot be put in the public domain would be an added layer of scrutiny, allowing the public to know at least that we have a full spectrum to ensure that such things are done proportionately and are working effectively.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank hon. Members for the tone of this discussion. I appreciate that scrutiny is important. This is about protecting not just the rights of individuals, but the agencies that are carrying out such important work on our behalf. Their heroism and courage on operations need to be protected, so that the agencies are not later found in legal difficulty in areas where they have acted not only with integrity but with enormous courage. I therefore appreciate the tone.

Briefly, I will touch on the question of scrutiny and laying before the House. I will make an absolute commitment to bring forward reports as soon as possible. I appreciate that there have been a few issues of late, which may have delayed things. I assure the hon. Member for Halifax that I will do my best to ensure that those timelines are reduced and are as sharp as possible. I absolutely appreciate her point. The issue of being laid before both Houses is made absolutely clear in the publication.

To touch on the question of who the commissioner might be, that has not been resolved as yet. I appreciate the hon. Lady’s point and there is merit on both sides of the argument, but either way, there is huge merit in ensuring that whoever is doing TPIMs has a very close connection with whomever is doing STPIMs. Whether that is a newly appointed individual or the extension of a role, I am happy to ensure that they work closely together.

National Security and Investment Bill

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

First, I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), who has spoken very kindly about the work of the Committee that I am privileged to chair. I also pay huge tribute to the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi). He has been tireless—that word has been overused in this place, but he has been tireless—in reaching out to all Members to speak to them about the Bill and ensure that the amendments tabled are helpful and conducive to not only the public good but the national good. He has been doing that at the same time as he has been running a vaccination programme. I have to say that the Minister’s wife’s loss is the nation’s gain: she has been selfless in allowing him to slave away for our country on two very important subjects.

The reality is that this is a hugely important Bill, and because it is so important and such a big change for the United Kingdom, it raises huge questions that are very difficult to answer. The way that the Minister has approached this is exactly right. He started off by speaking to businesses, to our intelligence services and to our regulators to understand what exactly the threat is, how it is affecting our businesses and how it can be addressed. He has had, I hope, as much help as he possibly can from them, and I hope that the help being offered from the Select Committee that I am privileged to chair and the Committee that my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) is privileged to chair is helpful.

We are trying to improve what is already a good Bill and make it into an excellent one. We have had various conversations with not only the Minister but his Whips, who have been extremely helpful—I know that this is a very odd thing to say in the House—in ensuring that he is informed about the way in which we have conducted this discussion. It would not be right for me not to also thank Alice Lynch of our Committee and Nicole Kar of Linklaters, our specialist witness who has helped us through the process of writing this report.

I rise to speak to new clause 4, which is in my name and the names of fellow members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. We looked carefully at the Bill because, over the last two to three years that I have been chairing the Foreign Affairs Committee, much of our work has been on the threat of foreign interference in the UK. One of our earlier reports in May 2018 was entitled “Moscow’s Gold: Russian Corruption in the UK”; I believe the Minister was still on the Committee when we started that report, though he had already been promoted to greater things by the time we published it. The report touched on the way that dirty money plays into our systems and the way in which we must protect those systems.

Since then, we have looked at various aspects of how our foreign policy is fundamentally about keeping the British people safe. We have always focused on the interests of the UK and the interests of the people we are lucky enough to represent. We sit here representing our communities—not other communities, not business and not anybody else, but our communities and what is fundamentally in their interests. We built up, from that early report, into looking at the various ways in which money has moved around, influencing academic freedoms and changing the way in which businesses have acted. As the Minister knows, we have called out those who we feel needed to be called out. That is why I am so pleased that he is in his place and has produced this Bill, because it finally sets a process by which this Government—any Government—can look at decisions that are being taken and assess them properly.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman and his Committee on the excellent report they have produced, but this is about the scrutiny of decisions of mainly private companies and others. Does he share my concerns about some decisions taken by Departments, particularly in the light of the Ministry of Defence’s decision to buy E-7 Wedgetail aircraft from Boeing, which results in two of them coming from China?

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman tempts me, but I am not going to get drawn on the Wedgetail discussion, as that is a slightly separate conversation. He is right to say that this Bill affects not just private business, but the way in which the Government will also conduct their procurement, so it is absolutely right that in future decisions may be looked at in different ways. This Bill, however, is slightly different, because it looks at the purchase of British business and not at the UK purchasing others.

Let me come back to where I was before the right hon. Gentleman cunningly got in his complaint about an MOD decision. This Bill goes a long way to making sure that we are in the right place, but it raises a few concerns, which I will touch on. That is why we have introduced new clause 4, which is not supposed to be a definition of national security, because that would, as the Minister knows, constrain the ability of a Government to adapt this law as national security changes. It would in effect tie concepts from 2021 into the law as it progressed. Given the change we have seen in the past 10 or 15 years, that would frankly be unwise. After all, who could have known that some of the decisions we have taken, perfectly innocently and rationally, over the past decade are some of the worst that a Government have made?

I am referring to two decisions. First, the sale of DeepMind to Google was one of the worst strategic moves a UK Government have taken. I am not blaming anybody for it; it was a decision taken rationally at the time, without understanding the future power of artificial intelligence and the extraordinary strength of DeepMind. That is a huge credit to the team at DeepMind and to much of the investment Google has put in, but it is also a recognition that a change of ownership and geographic basing—even though the people do not change, the ownership changes—has undermined the UK. The second is the sale of Arm to SoftBank. Again, this is one friendly company being sold to a company of another friendly nation. These are not geographically specific points; they are entirely geographically neutral. My guess is that one of Arm’s products is in everybody’s pocket, because they are in 95% of computer products and so will be in almost everybody’s phone. This is one of those moments where we risked losing control of an absolutely fundamental technology that could in future promote Britain’s interests greatly. That moves us into a question about Nvidia that I will not get drawn into now; I am just putting into historical context decisions we made that we will live to regret.

This Bill allows us to look at those things and update with the times, which is why I agree that we should not have a fixed definition of national security—we should have a framework for it. Here I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) and others on the Committee, who came up with this proposal and were extremely rigorous in doing so. I pay particular tribute to Nicole Kar of Linklaters, who helped us with the drafting of it and to the Committee Clerks who got us through it. There is a real opportunity here to enable this framework to defend us.

Governments throughout the European Union and, indeed, around the world have already started to look at how their laws that are similar to ours will apply. If we do not give enough strength to our Government, there is a danger that we will be the only ones found to be naked when the day comes and the choices have to be made. That would be a huge mistake, because the world is changing; there is a lot more cash from state-owned enterprises going around than there has been for many years. Sadly, there is likely to be a prolonged period of economic difficulty as we come out of covid; those companies and countries that are willing to underwrite companies will have an advantage when they start to snap up businesses around the world. That is why we need this legislation now.

National Security and Investment Bill

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Tuesday 17th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I start, as many other hon. Members rightly have, by paying tribute to the ministerial team and the team of civil servants for their consultation on the Bill with not just Members of this House, but the wider business community. It is a hugely important Bill. When, no doubt, some of it becomes an Act, we will all be living with the consequences, which are difficult to imagine in a fast-changing world in which technology is evolving.

I welcome enormously not just the consultation that the Secretary of State has already contributed to, and which he has welcomed, but that which he has also invited, because that is a really important part of the next few weeks and months. It shows wisdom and extreme judgment to make sure that the Bill survives contact with the enemy.

I welcome the fact that the Bill has been crafted to recognise the competition that we are seeing increasingly between states. The Minister in his place, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), as a former member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, knows only too well what we are seeing around the world and has regularly spoken with me about the various natures of competition that he, too, envisions. I welcome that he sees the Bill as being about the UK’s response and ensuring the prosperity and happiness of the British people around the world.

Power is not just about state power; it is also about the economics of strategic challenge through business. As the sadly likely recession following the covid pandemic rises, the reality is that state capitalism will pose a greater problem. As the wells of private sector investment dry up, companies able to draw on national reserves may do better.

Other countries have already seen that and reacted early. In March, in response to similar pressures that the Secretary of State responded to earlier, the Australian foreign investment review board reduced the threshold to zero for calling in acquisitions. In August, France reduced the shareholding required to trigger an inquiry from 25% to 10% for similar reasons. The United States has not followed suit on that basis, but the CFIUS regime, as we all know, is one of the most mature in the world. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has, in some ways, led the way, so the need to adapt to changing circumstances is not so immediate.

For our Government to introduce the Bill now is a welcome demonstration that the UK sees the changing circumstances and recognises that state-owned enterprises pose a different threat from five, 10 or 20 years ago. The Bill also recognises, in the 17 sectors that other hon. Members have spoken about, the rapid pace of technological change that we are seeing and the urgency of making sure that we realise what we are looking at. As assets are being developed that are essential to our continued prosperity and security, they now emerge much more quickly than we ever imagined.

Indeed, I would argue that two of the biggest strategic losses for the United Kingdom in recent years were the 2014 sale of DeepMind to Google and the 2016 sale of ARM to SoftBank, but they have been completed. What those two firms have both enabled, however, is quite phenomenal. Deep Mind, which one can pretty safely say is the world’s premier AI company, is an extraordinary asset. When it started in 2010, it was seen as a sideline, but today in 2020 it is seen very much as the main event.

The UK is not directly comparable with some of the other countries that we have spoken about. Some people have mentioned France, Germany or Australia, but the UK has about double the foreign direct investment of France or Germany, and our international co-operation—our links abroad—are quite different.

Here I declare that my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests shows that I, too, invest in businesses across the UK, and the reason why is that I think, as a Conservative, that if someone believes in business, they should put their money where their mouth is. I am proud to support some young people who have come up with some ideas, some of which may succeed and one of which may even make me as rich as the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon—[Laughter.]

This Bill looks at the challenge that such businesses are starting up with, and here I pay tribute to my constituency neighbour and right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark) who spoke about the de minimis clause—the minimum amount that should be called in. Of course, it is absolutely right that companies can evolve. Technology can adapt very quickly, and ideas that one thought were insignificant can become very significant.

However, the reality is that that rarely happens overnight and, with the nature of British capitalism being as it is, the value of a company will be appreciated in the market a long time before the technology is appreciated by the Government. Therefore, although I understand why the minimum number is set at zero, there is an argument—I would welcome the Government’s thoughts on this—for setting it even as low as £1 million, which is actually a very small sum these days for many of the venture capital enterprises in our country.

I welcome the fact that this Bill makes the important distinction between national interest and national security. I see the hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) in his place, and I know well that if this Bill were about national interest, he would be making one of the strong speeches about the steel industry that I have heard him make over the past five years, but this Bill is not about that. This Bill is fundamentally about the threats to the UK people and to our national security, not just our immediate interests.

It is important to make that distinction in the long term because, of course, to change that would be to fundamentally open a different question. It may be one that Opposition Members or, indeed, some Government Members, would wish to engage with, but it would be a big change to the investment environment of the United Kingdom. It would change our employment structures considerably and challenge many of the services that are built on the UK economy, from law and accountancy to finance and investment. It is a rather larger question, and I am glad that it is not included in the scope of this Bill.

The Government recognise that more consideration is needed, and they could do a little more, if I may say so, just to advertise the consideration that they are looking for in the 17 sectors. Having spoken to many lawyers in recent days—a confusion of lawyers, in fact—and to several businesses, it is quite clear that, although the consultation is welcomed, not all are as aware of what is required as would be beneficial.

If I may, I am going to start claiming some credit for some of this, because the Minister will know that the Foreign Affairs Committee has long pressed for tougher measures to protect our vital national security interests against growing threats. In our May 2018 report entitled “Moscow’s Gold”, we highlighted the corrupt investments associated with the Kremlin, but not unique to that Mafia-style regime, that have direct implications for the UK’s national security. The sanctions regime we rejected is a welcome addition to the state’s arsenal against those who seek to damage our national security. In 2019, we went further: in our report, “A cautious embrace: defending democracy in an age of autocracies”, we recommended that the Government establish a power to block listings on the UK markets on national security grounds as a matter of urgency. The Government have now announced their intention to do so to stop companies with questionable ownership from taking advantage of UK listings.

The fact that the Bill builds on both those reports is enormously welcome. They also led us to ask some pretty important questions about how the Government could achieve their aim, because there are various elements in which those questions exposed gaps or failures in the British structure that would allow the Government to be properly informed of where to get the information. That is why I will ask a few initial questions, before the Foreign Affairs Committee spends a few weeks hearing evidence and listening to commentators on the Bill and investors, practitioners and lawyers about its application. Indeed, we may even suggest amendments.

To turn to my first question, the Government have been clear that state-owned entities and sovereign wealth funds are not inherently more likely to pose a national security risk, especially if they have operational independence in economic investment strategies. This is of course important for many countries around the world, including Norway and many others, who operate very large sovereign wealth or national pension programmes. However, regimes such as that of the Chinese Communist party use opaque ownership structures to hide state interference. Will the Minister tell us what structures will be created and legal powers given to ensure that we can draw on the expertise and knowledge of those Departments and agencies across Government, including the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, to shape decisions accurately? It is clear to all of us that UK missions around the world will need to be actively involved to ensure that the information required to take decisions is provided in a timely manner.

My second question is about the fact that this Bill provides gateways for disclosure of information to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and disclosure by him to a public or overseas authority. What we really need to know as well is not just how much he is able to exchange, but how much he is able to draw on other intelligence agencies and other partners and particularly, perhaps, on those in democratic and law-abiding countries, including the European Union, as we will no longer be part of the investment screening regulation and we have never been part of the different agencies or regulators in the United States, Australia and many other countries. Who are the likely partners with whom he is intending to share and how will we support each other?

Thirdly, the best estimate of the impact assessment suggests that the new notification regime will cost about £49 million a year and about £425 million over 10 years. Those numbers are, of course, uncertain. The new regime is expected to result in up to 1,800 notifications a year, which is a vast increase compared with the approximately 60 notifications a year that the Competition and Markets Authority currently deals with. The Bill introduces an investment security unit that will be staffed by 100 officials. May I seek assurance that this unit will have the capacity and necessary competencies to effectively screen this high volume of transactions and to expand if notifications are more than expected? The Minister will have heard from many people that there is the possibility that voluntary notification will result in a much higher level of disclosure than anyone is currently expecting, and therefore, the 100 officials could rapidly become overwhelmed and the timelines that he has very sensibly set out, of 30 and 45 days, could become impossible.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that this unit or some of the individuals in it will need a high classification of security clearance? Without that, they will not be able to make informed judgments on some of these applications.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I agree entirely with the right hon. Member that what we are looking at here is a multi-agency taskforce, not a BEIS departmental body. The reason, of course, why it has to be a multi-agency taskforce is that, as he says quite correctly, the need to have access to high-level intelligence is clear, but so is the need to be able to understand the changing nature of the technology and, indeed, the changing nature of some of the individuals and groups that may be affected. It is, after all, entirely possible that a company owned one day by one individual abroad is likely to be, or is in the direction of being, controlled by a rather less salubrious individual only a few days later, and the need for such multi-agency taskforce access is clear.

Insufficient resources would of course cost delays and have a serious impact on the UK economy. Indeed, it could lead to the various obstacles that I know the Minister has been incredibly careful about avoiding, which is why he has made the scope of the Bill so narrow. I am sure that he will be able to help me in assuring me that this group will have the resources it needs. Fourthly, given the sensitivity of the cases—my mistake: I was going to repeat exactly what the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) said, so I shall skip it. I was going to ask for exactly the same.

As this Bill makes its way through the House, the Foreign Affairs Committee will be following it closely. As I have said, we will be conducting various hearings with various people along the way in the next few weeks, and we will, I hope, be making welcome suggestions that the Minister will be able to consider. Properly implemented and with due consultation and consideration, this new investment regime should provide certainty and transparency for UK businesses and investors in this country. It is an important and valuable change to our laws to ensure that our businesses are able to prosper in the safe knowledge that the information they develop and the innovations they provide allow the happiness and prosperity of these people, our friends and our allies.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I was going to say it is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bolton North East (Mark Logan), but I am not sure that it is. I welcome any measure that aims to protect or increase our national security. We live in an interconnected world now—a global world—in which capital is no respecter of national boundaries. We also live in a world in which nation states are using strategic investment as a way to pursue their own national interests, and there was mention earlier of the Chinese belt and road initiative.

We also live in a world in which nations or individuals use investments to launder money or to buy influence or protection, as was highlighted in the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia report. So the measures in the Bill are to be welcomed but, as the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) said, the issues that it addresses were raised seven years ago in the ISC report on Huawei. None the less, I wish to mention a few areas where the Bill is still deficient.

The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) mentioned the Secretary of State’s role. A call-in will be triggered on whether a transaction creates a risk to national security. Notification takes place in one of two ways—a transaction is notifiable either under four criteria or under a voluntary system. I believe the voluntary system is fraught with administrative difficulties and needs to change. However, I want to focus on how the assessment is then made and the role that the Secretary of State plays in deciding whether a case goes forward. I do so by reference to a recent case—that of the Cobham company.

The Bill would not have prevented the £4 billion sale of Cobham to a US company, even though the Ministry of Defence had huge issues around the sale, partly because it would allow unauthorised persons to understand either the details of the MOD capacity and activities, or give them a more strategic picture of the capabilities and activities that had been built up. The MOD said that the transaction posed a risk to the existing MOD programmes if the merger entity took decisions to exit from an investment or to move offshore the associated capabilities.

At the time, Lady Cobham’s concern was that Cobham would be split into various entities and sold off—and, lo and behold, that it is exactly what is happening. It has gone from four divisions to nine, and the risks to national security were clearly evident at the time. I see nothing in the Bill that would have stopped that, because it comes back to the decision of the Business Secretary.

I am not anti-business in any way, but I am not sure that BEIS takes a view in terms of security issues, which would be perhaps more evident in the Ministry of Defence and so on. So there is an issue about who takes the final decision on such bids’ going forward. I would prefer that to be a decision of the national security committee or a sub-committee of that, so that we may have in-depth intelligence reasoning—and I accept that such decisions should be taken on national security grounds only. If we look at the United States model, we see that some very dubious decisions are taken there on national security grounds, which, frankly, are more to do with protectionism rather than anything else.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that there is a real role for Committees of this House in such processes and that the ability to subpoena both witnesses and papers would add not only depth to the Government’s investigation but protection to the Business Secretary who was forced to take the decision?

[Mr Jones]

I agree. There is an issue, in some of these cases, around national security. A point was raised earlier in the debate about whether the ISC should look at such decisions. Certainly there is an argument for an annual report, which I would welcome.

I said earlier that I had a fundamental problem with one individual’s taking such decisions, and I am sorry, but I do not think that the new investment security unit is the vehicle. The hon. Gentleman has referred to it as a taskforce, but unless it has national security at its heart, the push for business to get things moved on will take over, rather than what we should be looking at—national security. So decisions should not be left with the Business Secretary.

The other issue I raise is with supply chains. We all know that supply chains are now very complicated, long and diverse, from small companies right down to SMEs. I asked who will map those supply chains. We might say that small companies will self-notify, but would we miss things? There is a key role here for our security services in terms of flagging up things about particular companies, and I do not see that in this process. A small company very low down the supply chain, which may have only a very small element of either a nuclear project or a defence project, might lead to a security risk. I do not think that the new investment security unit will be able to deal with this. That is a role for our security services, which should be at the heart of this, rather than just being a member of the taskforce.

The other area I wish to focus on is in relation to the core areas. Listing them in the way that they have been listed is not helpful. For example, the term “military dual use” brings in a whole host of issues. Is a vehicle that is used for military purposes “dual use” even if it has a civilian use? Trying to define things in a list is actually very unhelpful. I would sooner come at it from the point of view of security and intelligence-driven information, which would inform the decisions that are taken. I am also a bit reluctant for things to be added to that core list by secondary legislation.

Then we come to an area that has already been touched on, which is the role of universities. The Bill mentions

“moveable property, ideas, information or techniques which have industrial, commercial or other economic value.”

When does an idea become a commercial value? I personally think that we need to be looking carefully at this. There is some perfectly legitimate and important foreign investment in our universities, and I do not want to stifle it, but if we have, for example, a Chinese or Russian company investing in a university, particularly in a research programme, is that covered by this Bill? At the initial stage, the investment goes in, but there is no actual product as such. A separate look at that needs to be part of our overall assessment, and, again, that can only be done not from a broad brush stroke approach, but from letting our security services look at some of these areas.

The other point I want to make is to do with land, which is referred to in the Bill, but, again, what is strategic? Would it be allowable, for example, for a Chinese or Russian company, or any company, to start buying up real estate with Government offices on it? The other thing that the Bill does not really cover—the Minister might say that there are measures to cover this—is the issue relating to the well-trailed arguments about the way in which Russian and former eastern European countries have used the property market in the UK, not only to launder money but to build up huge assets in terms of power and influence.

I have just two final points. One is referred to in the appeal system as closed hearings. Members may be aware of what closed hearings are. This is where intelligence, which is an informed decision, goes before a court within a closed hearing. These hearings are mainly used in terrorism-related activities or other national security cases. I would be interested to hear from the Minister in his summing up exactly how he envisages that working in relation to this Bill and how he will manage closed cases, because they are very controversial. At the moment, for example, there are a lot of legal challenges to cases when intelligence goes before the court and then it is ruled that it cannot be heard in open hearings. I just wondered what the Minister has to say on that.

My final concern is around the time limit, which I do not quite understand. It is six months from the date that it comes available to the Secretary of State. I am very opposed to anything that is retrospective, because, as has already been argued, to try to unpick these things will be very difficult. I just want to understand from the Minister the reason behind the five-year retrospection.

Yes, I welcome this Bill, but what it should have at the heart of it is security and intelligence. At the moment, there is too much emphasis on business. I am not arguing for one minute that we should get security and intelligence looking at every single investment decision. I am pro-investment, but the balance here is possibly wrong if we are trying to stop what we all want to stop, which is malign activity in our economy.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Lord Beamish

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I like the hon. Member, but he is talking complete nonsense. If he has read the Smith case, which went before the Supreme Court, he will know that combat immunity is completely covered under the Human Rights Act. It did not change that one iota, so what he suggests just will not happen. That case reiterated the point about combat immunity under the Human Rights Act.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am sorry, but the right hon. Member is completely wrong. If he reads “The Fog of Law” written by—oh—me in 2013, a paper for Policy Exchange written alongside actual lawyers, rather than me, such as Richard Ekins, with a foreword written by Lord Moses of the Supreme Court, he will see exactly what I am talking about. If he reads “Clearing the Fog of Law”, which explains the situation, he will see clearly why this is a problem. This is absolutely an issue.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?