Oral Answers to Questions

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 20th May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Leo Docherty]

We take the threat Iran poses very seriously. We note that it uses its malign influence to continue to destabilise the middle east through its pernicious use of proxies. Our judgment is that that capability and intent remains. Our role in deterrence regionally is hugely important. I was very pleased recently to visit the magnificent sailors of the Royal Navy stationed in Bahrain. I reiterated that point about the fantastic deterrent effect they were having when I had a highly productive interview with the British Forces Broadcasting Service. You will know, Mr Speaker, if you listen to BFBS as I do, that that point cannot be over-made. We are grateful for the magnificent activities of our Royal Navy in the Gulf, which are keeping us all safe.

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

As the Minister has said, Operation Shader was originally put together in 2014 to defeat the Sunni Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The Liberal Democrats are very supportive of the way in which the Royal Air Force was used last month to help to intercept the Iranian bombardment of Israel, but the last parliamentary vote on Operation Shader was held in 2014, when Members were approving resources and deployments of UK armed forces to defeat ISIL. Will the Minister subject any operation that is designed to deter Iranian attacks to a debate and a vote?

[Leo Docherty]

It seems to me to be the settled view that Operation Shader is a good thing, and I do not sense any appetite for a parliamentary debate among colleagues across the Benches in this House. I should put it on record that I was very pleased to meet the men and women of the Expeditionary Air Wing in Romania, who have contributed so bravely over recent months to magnificent military effect through that operation.

Defence

Richard Foord Excerpts

Tuesday 7th May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Grant Shapps]

I am pleased to reassure my right hon. Friend from this Front Bench that no such delay would be countenanced. Just in the last few weeks we have issued the defence nuclear enterprise Command Paper—[Interruption.] I thought the Opposition Front Bench knew that there was a coalition Government, but perhaps they missed it. Perhaps they also missed the point that my right hon. Friend was making.

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

I am grateful to the Secretary of State for giving way, and I can offer him the assurance that the Liberal Democrats embrace the continuous at-sea deterrent with four submarines. What is more, the strategic environment in which we were operating in 2010 was very different from that which we see today: the Liberal Democrats made the right call then, and we have made the right call now.

[Grant Shapps]

You heard it here first, Madam Deputy Speaker. I warmly welcome that commitment, which was not available under the then coalition Government. It is an important moment, and I welcome that commitment from the hon. Gentleman, as I welcome it from Labour.

I gently remind the House that 11 Opposition Front Benchers have voted against the deterrent in their time here, including three members of the current shadow Cabinet, including the shadow Foreign Secretary, the shadow Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Secretary, and the shadow Deputy Prime Minister. The House is right to ask, and the country will want to know, whether that commitment is as firm as we now hear it is from the Liberal Democrats. It will also want to know, even if the commitment is said to be firm, whether Labour is prepared to fund it. Again, it comes back to the 2.5%.

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[Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)]

I am glad to be in the Chamber for this debate. It is an important debate; those of us on the Defence Committee would probably say that we do not have them often enough.

I wanted to pick up on a point made by the right hon. Members—my right hon. Friends, I hope—for Warley (John Spellar) and for North Durham (Mr Jones) about the reduction in defence spend, and the discussion we had at the Select Committee recently. As is our duty as a Committee, we challenged the Secretary of State on expenditure, and I wanted to pinpoint one specific issue, which relates to people—at least for us on the SNP Benches, people are the bedrock of a defence policy and posture—and to concerns about defence infrastructure and security, especially for those of us who live around nuclear defence infrastructure. We might not necessarily agree with it, but it is there, so we would hope it is secure at all times.

Coming back to the point that my right hon. Friends made, I wanted to look at some specific concerns about the Ministry of Defence police budget. In 2010-2011, the defence police budget was £154.8 million, equating to £226.78 million today when adjusted for inflation. Right hon. and hon. Members may correct me if I am wrong, but I think there was a Labour Government at that point. However, the budget in 2022-23 was £161.3 million. Leading back to the question posed at the Committee, that is a real-terms reduction of about £65.5 million in the defence police infrastructure over the past 12 years. That is something that Ministers might want to come back to later on.

The shadow Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey), made some comments about the £75 billion, and I share his concern. Like me, he understands that the assumption from the Government is based on a baseline of spend, as a percentage of GDP, that is frozen in cash terms, so without borrowing or extra debt, it comes nowhere near £75 billion. I wish the Government well on that point.

I would maybe want to have a wee bit more of a conciliatory approach to this. There will be at least some consistency from the SNP Benches, which I am sure the Minister will appreciate. Although he and I have different views on the nuclear deterrent, we are at least consistent. It was quite interesting to see someone else getting taken over the barrel for that—it makes a change. On the commitment to Ukraine, the Minister can take it from the SNP that, whoever the Government happen to be this year or next year, say, we will also be steadfast on the support for Ukraine. The right to defend national territory, and the right to national self-determination, are elements of human dignity for any modern nation state and alliance. As I said, the gist of my remarks is in three things: people, place and our partnerships.

Let us talk about the ordinary ranks. That is a term that I find quite problematic. I come from a services family. My brother was a sergeant, and my nephew is in the forces as well—in the “ordinary ranks”. There is really nothing ordinary in serving.

[Richard Foord]

I think the term is “other ranks.”

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

Let me come to that in a second, but in common parlance, I think they are always called the “ordinary ranks”—[Interruption.] The Minister may want to listen for a wee second. Whether it is “other” or “ordinary”, that type of terminology says nothing about the men and women who served in Iraq, such as my brother; in Afghanistan; out in the Red sea, no matter what happens there—and there is concern that there might be mission creep—or in other deployments such as the joint expeditionary force in Estonia, which I know, as the co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Estonia, that the Estonian Government welcome.

Those ranks deserve more from us—not just from the Government and the official Opposition, but from all of us as parliamentarians. They deserve it that we take them more seriously in the structure of how we support and pay them, and in their entire terms and conditions. I know that there is probably profound disagreement about my approach, which would be an armed services representative body. Although I am saddened that the official Opposition changed their position, if they form the next Government, the SNP would support their new approach, which we think is at least a step in the right direction.

However, I do not think that having a Government appointee represent the armed forces personnel is the right step forward, because the lived experience of members of the armed forces who have been on the frontline needs to form part of an understanding, as with any engagement on terms and conditions with a trade union, for example—although an armed forces representative body from this party is not a trade union and does not have the right to strike our proposals. We have to say to those ranks that we believe they can come together as a collective and have critical engagement with Government and, more importantly, with Parliament more broadly. We need to have that discussion with them; they need to be part of defence policy and posture. They are people we want to send to the frontline to fire a gun or a missile, but technically we are saying to them that we do not believe they have the capability of coming together to discuss and debate collectively their terms and conditions. I find that slightly bizarre.

If we do not engage with those ranks in a more robust fashion, as equals, we will go around a consistent revolving door of reports, as we have seen for years in Committees, especially the Defence Committee. I am mindful of the report produced by the Women in the Armed Forces Sub-Committee—I intimated that I would mention them—which was chaired by the hon. Member for Wrexham (Sarah Atherton), who is not here today. That report was profound. Do I think that if we do not have real engagement with the frontline, there will be substantial change? I have grave concerns that there will not be.

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[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

It is an honour to follow the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray), and I pay tribute to him as the chair and lead of the all-party parliamentary group for the armed forces. He hosts lots of highly experienced, very senior strategic thinkers from the armed forces as part of that APPG.

I welcome this opportunity to debate UK defence policy at greater length. I have been struck that so far many of the speeches have been about defence capability and equipment, but I was particularly impressed by the comments about the strategic environment. The most senior military personnel in our kingdom talk about strategy in terms of ends, ways and means. It would be a mistake to spend all our time talking about means when they expect the Government and Parliament also to think about ways and particularly ends—the end state that the UK is seeking to bring about. I will focus my remarks more on the strategic environment and the wider security context, and towards the end I will talk a bit about cuts to the regular Army. I will also comment on the suggestions that have been knocking around recently about a citizens army.

I was impressed by the remarks of the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) about the strategic environment. I am glad that in the west we seek to take the peace dividend when we think it is available to us. One thing that stands out about democracies is that when the security environment allows, we try to invest in health and education. It is absolutely appropriate to champion that, but we should also be realistic enough to recognise when times do not allow for that.

We have talked today about continuous at-sea deterrents and the role of the coalition Government in having a Trident alternatives review, which is not to be regretted. In the security context of the time, when Obama was talking about a reset button and we signed a strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia—New START—it was appropriate to be thinking along the same lines as in the 1990s, when the west and the Soviet Union were mutually trying to reduce the threats from our nuclear weapons. As it happens, the events from 2014 onwards plainly proved that we absolutely need to be as strong as possible.

The Prime Minister’s remarks a fortnight ago were interesting. He talked about a new defence partnership between the UK and Germany. I welcomed the fact that he made the announcement in Berlin and the idea that we should have greater interoperability with our allies, but he then fell into this business of talking about putting the defence industry on to a “war footing”. Indeed, that chimed with the Defence Secretary’s statement that we are entering a “pre-war era”. When we throw such remarks around, we need to qualify what we mean, because we know that our adversaries listen carefully to what we say. We do not need belligerent tones and a mismatch between our rhetoric and our capability; instead, we should speak quietly while making ourselves as strong as possible. That is of course what the armed forces are for. “Bello te praepares” was the motto of the Army training regiment when I was there as a platoon commander. We were very much about preparing for war, but we were doing it quietly. It would be sensible for the Defence Secretary to make those preparations as ardently as possible but not in a showy fashion.

If the Defence Secretary’s motivation is genuinely to send a message to Ukraine that we are in this for the long haul and that there is certainty, he will not want to make this a party political issue or suggest that Opposition parties are somehow less supportive of Ukraine. He asked earlier whether we would match the £500 million uplift per year for Ukraine. Yes—we recognise the characterisation of Russia’s westward expansion as a threat to all Europe, so Ukraine can be assured that, regardless of a change of Government later this year, it will continue to receive £3 billion in support from the UK.

The Foreign Secretary said last week, when he was in Ukraine, that Ukraine is free to use long-range Storm Shadow missiles over the border into Russia. I am surprised that that has not come up in our discussion today. That may be because such things should not be done on the Floor of the House, and I very much welcomed the approach of the former Defence Secretary, who would share with Opposition parties, well in advance of the debate, the urgent question or the statement, what he intended to say through his special adviser. That was a way to have such conversations not on the Floor of the House or in such a public fashion. As it is, the strategic communications people in NATO will now have to work all the harder to counter the false narratives and lies that Russia pumps out about Ukraine somehow being a threat to the Russian people, or even Russia being threatened by NATO itself.

From an operational standpoint, that use of missiles makes good sense. Clearly, main supply routes, arms dumps and fuel depots will now be brought within range, but we should remember that the centre of gravity here is the Russian people and their willingness to fight. We know that the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan after 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed. To encourage Russians not to sign up, we need to persuade them that the state of Russia is not threatened by Ukraine or, indeed, by NATO.

On the cuts to the regular Army, I was interested by the remarks of the right hon. Member for Hereford and South Herefordshire (Jesse Norman) about recruitment and consent. I would point to the issue of consent when we talk about parliamentary approval of military action. I do not believe that Governments were merely seeking top cover when they had a debate in Parliament on the intervention in Iraq in 2003 or on the intervention in Syria in 2013. Rather, they were genuinely seeking to engage with us as representatives of the people to try to get support.

Finally, I come to a proposal that was leaked to a journalist, David Parsley, at the i a couple of weeks ago about a 20,000-strong volunteer force that could potentially train a 200,000-strong volunteer Army. I do not expect the Minister to comment on that or any other leak, but if that is the response from the Government to the pressure they have been under on cuts to the Army, it would not be a sensible approach. The plan talks about an annual spend of some £500 per recruit in training allowances per year for the initial 20,000 ex-forces personnel during peacetime. That amount would not go very far. Service personnel would suppose that the MOD was once again budgeting to withhold blank rounds in favour of commanders asking trainee soldiers to shout “Bang!” We cannot have an Army on paper that does not exist in reality. We need a regular Army of 82,000. We need to reverse the cuts that we have seen in recent years, and we need to build credible armed forces so that we are strong not only in our rhetoric, but in our capability.

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[James Sunderland (Bracknell) (Con)]

It is a great privilege to speak in this debate. I am not a Minister—to echo the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray)—but I am a former serviceman, and I hope to bring some value, as a practitioner, to what we are discussing.

We know that the first duty of any Government is the defence of their people—that is quite clear—so the need to keep people safe is non-discretionary. Right now we have war raging across Europe, not too far away, and multiple threats are proliferating right across the globe. Given that the international landscape now is probably more dangerous, unstable and incendiary than it has been at any time since world war two, defence spending is absolutely essential. Voters care about their security, and many are nervous about what is happening across the world. Most importantly, it is our duty as politicians to keep them safe.

That is why the Government’s commitment to a defence budget equal to 2.5% of GDP by 2030 is so important, both strategically and politically. As a member of the UN Security Council, the UK’s continued role as a bastion of global rights and democracy can be underpinned only by hard power. It is a reality of history that we may yet be called upon to protect our own security and that of our allies. We know that the Defence Secretary has recently increased military aid to Ukraine, securing an extra £700 million and thereby taking Britain’s total contribution beyond £3 billion—that is a lot of money—so we are doing our bit.

On the 2.5% target, it is extra money, but the issue is what we do with it and how we spend it—that is important—so I advocate for a capability audit right now. The reason I say that is that the extra injection of funds means that we need to work out what we can now do. When I was working at Northwood permanent joint headquarters many years ago, we had this thing called the JOECR—the joint operational estimate of capability and readiness. In my view, with the extra money that we have now, we should be turning all those capabilities that are flashing red to green—in other words, we should plug the capability gaps—and not just on land, at sea and in the air, but in space and cyber. Yes, state-of-the-art platforms are fine, and yes, we must procure weapons that we know can beat our adversaries, but it is also about spending wisely and smartly where necessary.

My second point on the 2.5% is that we need to better operate what we already have so that every part of our lexicon works. We must not rely on the exquisite exclusivity that we have spoken so much about; we must ensure that all our platforms work and can be sustained across the battlespace.

In terms of equipment generally, as one part of capability we need to procure what we need and nothing more. It is about strategic lift as well as exquisite exclusivity. If we do not have the ships—the roll-on roll-off ferries—or the strategic lift, including C-17s and A400Ms, to get equipment and people right across the globe, there is no point having the kit in the first place. It is therefore about enabling expeditionary reach. We cannot put boots on the ground if we cannot get the boots there. Plus, Minister, it is about logistic tail, spares, the supply chain, sustainment, defence contractors, delivery and munitions. We must be careful to ensure that if we buy it, we will be able to use it and then fight it through, and it must be sustainable and enduring.

“Platform” is an interesting word. It means the platform on which a capability sits, but what is put on that platform also matters. I therefore favour a modular approach for future equipment programmes, whereby we can apply different degrees of mobility, firepower and protection, but it is the kit that is bolted on and bolted off that really matters, and that is the battle-winning equipment for me. For me, this is about a commonality of platforms, about spares, about logistics, about interoperability and about cannibalisation. If we run out of something, can we get it? With complex platforms and complex supply chains, we cannot, so let us please go for modular and for commonality.

[Richard Foord]

Is the hon. Member aware of the Supacat range of vehicles, which operate in much the way that he has described?

[James Sunderland]

I am very aware of Supacat. I have visited the company, which is in the hon. Member’s neck of the woods. It is a very impressive British company. Yes, we need to do more to ensure that it produces and builds what we need. Let us work with it a bit more on that. As the hon. Member suggests, this is about fewer variants, an easier supply chain, and not having equipment that is too complex to use or to maintain. That is very important: we should keep it cheap, simple and easy.

Let me say a little about NATO. As we know, it is the only show in town. It is the umbrella for European security in the north Atlantic. It now consists of 32 countries, and that is to be welcomed. It has responded magnificently to Putin’s aggression in Ukraine. It has galvanised the alliance since the invasion, in a way that Putin could not possibly have conceived. In many ways, it is much stronger because of what has happened. Article 5 is the prize for NATO membership. It has defined Putin’s actions in Ukraine, in that so far he has not attacked a NATO country. Why? He is worried about article 5, and that strategic uncertainty underpins our security in Europe.

However, there are issues with NATO. First, only 18 of its 32 member countries are currently committed to 2% of GDP, and that is not enough. In addition, the five non-EU members—the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Turkey and Norway—contribute 80% of the operating budget, which is outrageous, with 96% of the EU effectively reliant on NATO for its security. That is a stark contrast. Europe must therefore become much more responsible for its own security, and that is non-discretionary.

Defence Personnel Data Breach

Richard Foord Excerpts

Tuesday 7th May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Grant Shapps]

I welcome my right hon. Friend’s comments about attribution. MPs and the electoral register have been hacked, and he therefore encourages me to jump to the conclusion at the Dispatch Box that the malign actor is China in this case as well. I am simply unable to do that at this stage. He would expect me to follow due process, but I rather support his view that if attribution is required, it should happen in a timely and speedy manner. I undertake from the Dispatch Box to ensure that that happens in this case, and that we do not have many months or years pass by without it being mentioned.

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

The malign actor did not need to access the armed forces payment network to find out the salary of a British private soldier. A quick search of Google—or indeed Baidu—reveals that the salary of a British soldier on completion of initial training is less than £24,000 a year, which is less than the average UK salary of £35,000 a year. Russia is currently paying its soldiers a starting salary of more than 2.5 million roubles for fighting in Ukraine. Will the data breach by the Conservative Government’s contractor shame the UK Government into paying some of our lowest-paid servicepeople a decent salary?

[Grant Shapps]

That was creative, if nothing else. The fact that we paid a nearly 10% pay increase—9.7% last year—to many ranks of our armed forces, and that the Conservative party has committed to spending 2.5% of GDP, which is a pledge I have not heard repeated by the Opposition, rather suggests that we are prepared to do something about pay and retention.

UK Armed Forces in Middle East

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 29th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Leo Docherty]

We are clear-eyed in our assessment of Hamas: we regard them as a terrorist organisation that has prosecuted an atrocity. We call on them to lay down their arms and to release the hostages. That is the precondition for any kind of meaningful and sustainable ceasefire.

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

The Government have so far resisted having a proper debate and a vote on British military engagement in the middle east this year. The engagement of the British Army in Bosnia in the 1990s started out as being for the purposes of humanitarian aid, but was subject to mission creep as British soldiers were attacked by the warring parties. In 2006, John Reid said:

“We would be perfectly happy to leave in three years’ time without firing one shot”.

Will the Minister assure us that if the Government proposed using British troops on the ground in Gaza, they would first grant this House a debate and a vote on the matter?

[Leo Docherty]

The lessons of Bosnia are interesting, and are not lost on Government Members. The hon. Gentleman should have no doubt that Ministers and the Government will remain fully accountable to this House.

Defence Spending

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 24th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Grant Shapps]

I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for his comments. He is right to point out the need to be prepared to use the abilities that we have. Ours is one of the only countries with both the global reach and the desire and preparedness to use those abilities, which is why we have ended up defending ships in the Red sea from the Houthis. I can report that a specific incident along those lines has taken place today, with our armed forces in action, and we can be very proud of everything they do for us.

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

On behalf of the Liberal Democrats, I welcome the right hon. Gentleman’s statement about increased defence spending, although it relates to a time six years hence rather than being specific about funding in the intervening years. Eighteen of the 32 members of NATO are still not spending even 2% of GDP on defence, including France, Spain and Italy. Encouraging them to spend more is not so much about fairness as about persuading sceptics in the United States that North America should remain engaged in Europe. Leverage at the NATO summit in July will come too late. What additional commitments did the Secretary of State and other Ministers obtain from our allies before announcing the 2030 pledge?

[Grant Shapps]

First, I assure the hon. Gentleman that it starts this year—the half a billion pounds is in this year’s budget. We have opted to give that money directly to Ukraine, in addition to the money that we are already gifting it, bringing the total to £3 billion.

Secondly, let me gently say that I do not think I have ever heard Liberal Democrats argue for more defence spending, but I strongly welcome the hon. Gentleman to the cause. I agree with him entirely that 2%—which we ourselves set back in 2014—is no longer the baseline that we should be working to, but I gently point out to him that the reason it has taken some time to replace Trident, and in particular the submarines, is that there was a short period under the coalition when we could not get our Liberal Democrat partners to agree to get on with the job.

Oral Answers to Questions

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 25th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge]

I am aware of those companies, which do an excellent job supporting the supply chain, particularly for our primes and for key programmes, especially naval programmes. I do not recognise the hon. Gentleman’s description of training. As he will be aware, defence is the biggest employer of apprentices in the country. We are doing everything we can to support that. The key is to have a close relationship with industry, and to bring it into our requirements early on, so that it can plan and deliver the supply signal, particularly for skills, to match our demand signal.

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

I would like to build on the incisive question asked by the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois). More than 125,000 applicants to the British Army were rejected in the past five years. It has emerged that 70% of applicants were dropped or withdrew at the paperwork stage. More than 8,000 withdrew their applications, having waited for at least six months. What consequences will Capita face for this record, and when might the Army bring soldier and officer recruitment back in house?

[James Cartlidge]

I encourage the hon. Gentleman to direct questions about recruitment to the Minister for Defence People and Families. As to the company the hon. Gentleman talks about, my focus is on industry and supporting jobs, which the original question was about. I think we have a fantastic record, boosted by not only the exports I referred to earlier, but the ones that my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby (Mark Pawsey) was talking about.

Armed Forces Readiness and Defence Equipment

Richard Foord Excerpts

Thursday 21st March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

I echo the positive words that have been spoken already this afternoon about the reports from the Public Accounts and Defence Committees, and it is timely that we get all this out into the open. In the Budget earlier this month, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that defence spending “will rise to 2.5% as soon as economic conditions allow.”—[Official Report, 6 March 2024; Vol. 746, c. 846.]

What indications has the Minister had from the Prime Minister and Chancellor about when economic conditions might allow? What are the conditions that might allow, and when might they be met?

This week the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, the hon. Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier), gave an interview to the i newspaper, in which she described “big nasties” facing public spending. She talked about “slow politics”, where decisions are made with a long-term strategic perspective at the forefront. That is especially pertinent when it comes to defence capabilities. As we are entering a period of global uncertainty, it is concerning to read in the PAC report that there are glaring discrepancies around how spending is identified for single services. For example, the report highlights the way that planned spending is reported. Whereas the Royal Navy includes all costs in its plans, creating an on-paper deficit of more than £15 billion, the Army includes only what estimates it can afford, resulting in a running deficit of about £1.2 billion. Had the Army followed the same procedures as the Royal Navy, its deficit would soar to over £13 billion. Such inconsistency in budget reporting is, I am sure, not a deliberate lack of transparency, but it can bring about distrust when it comes to planned defence spending.

The Defence Committee’s “Ready for War?” report stresses the need to replenish our much depleted munitions stockpiles. It highlights that there has been a “hollowing out” over the past 14 years—we have heard that talked about, including from the Dispatch Boxes—but that has been brought into sharp relief by an emboldened, aggressive, nationalist Russian state. If we cannot co-ordinate defence spending in a clear manner, we risk weakening the perception of our defence capabilities. The issue of the budget deficit goes further, with the Committee highlighting a £16.9 billion deficit over 10 years, due in part to rising inflation. We know that defence inflation is greater than other measures of inflation, partly because a lot of our defence equipment is imported from overseas, particularly the United States.

There is a 62% increase in spending on the Defence Nuclear Organisation, and the report states that defence spending would need to increase to around 2.5% of GDP to plug that gap. Ministers are entrenching the uncertainty around budget planning, meaning that important projects risk being deprioritised. At present, the defence budget is thought to be about 2.1%, and some measures try to include our defence commitment to Ukraine, so that it might rise to 2.25%. The MOD said that the difference between 2.25% and 2.5% of GDP is about £6 billion or £7 billion. There are important reasons why that increase might be necessary. Although we spend 2.1% on defence as a whole, around 6% of that goes to fund our nuclear capabilities. Prior to 2010, the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent was kept out of Ministry of Defence spending measures and held centrally, whereas now it is all included in the defence budget, meaning that our conventional spending has seen a great deal of squeeze over the last decade-plus.

By failing to invest in our armed forces over a sustained period, we have heard cries of operational readiness being affected, and people crying about overstretch. I recall that word from my own service about 20 years ago, when people were declaring that the armed forces were running hot and that they were overstretched. That is why it is essential for Governments to know how much they can commit their armed forces. That comes back to what we used to call the defence planning assumptions about how many operational overseas deployments might take place simultaneously. Up until 2015, those defence planning assumptions were published, but since 2015 they have not been published and have been very much held behind a cloak. I see no real reason from a security perspective or from the point of view of what our adversaries might think, for keeping those withheld. As was pointed out to the Defence Committee, our adversaries probably know our capabilities well, and they will be analysing our intentions. It is arguably better to be transparent about those defence planning assumptions if that means a reduction in the call on the armed forces by other Departments of Government.

In recent years, we have seen that a lot, with Departments having sought to use the armed forces for military aid to the civil authorities, whether for ambulance strikes or to cover for the fire service. The armed forces have been pulled in for those roles and taken away from training, which is essential to their mission. Transparency is very much required.

When that is combined with the persistent issues of repeated cuts and reductions in personnel, our armed forces could be in an even more challenging place than is currently suggested. We really need to sort this out. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) referred to the recent speech by the Secretary of State for Defence about moving from a post-war period to a pre-war era. I was alarmed to hear that speech. I am an advocate for the Roosevelt phrase,

“speak softly and carry a big stick”.

In talking about moving from post-war to pre-war, I felt that he was doing quite the reverse: investing no new money in defence while speaking with a rather loud mouth.

It strikes me that the Defence Secretary is not doing enough to advocate for spending in private, because he is doing it in public through leaked letters to the Chancellor, as reported in The Daily Telegraph. His predecessor, the right hon. Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace), did the honourable and decent thing by stepping away from his Cabinet role when he could no longer tolerate Cabinet collective responsibility in relation to defence spending.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Does the hon. Member agree that the strategy the Defence Secretary is employing has nothing to do with defence but is possibly to do with a future bid to become leader of the Conservative party?

[Richard Foord]

I grateful to the right hon. Member. While I will not speculate on the Defence Secretary’s intentions, I certainly think that has had the effect of putting him out of step with the Chancellor and the Prime Minister such that he is no longer engaged in collective responsibility.

It seems to me that by talking up increases in the defence budget in cash terms rather than real terms, the Government are hiding behind recent high inflation. I will give the House a specific example. Following the publication of the PAC report on 8 March, the Prime Minister’s spokesperson, who was asked to respond to that report, replied:

“We are ensuring that we have the largest defence budget in history”.

That is so much spin as to be like a vortex—it is way off to suggest that. As we heard from the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), during the cold war, defence spending was north of 6% of GDP. I am not advocating for defence spending to return to anything like those levels, because I recognise that we were dealing then with an eastern Europe in the grips of Russia and very much surrounded by and part of the Warsaw pact, with all its contributions assisting the Warsaw pact inventory, whereas now our spending is very much contributing to NATO’s defence of Europe and the deterrence of Moscow. I would understand the phrase “as soon as economic conditions allow” if we were talking about an absolute cost—for example, the cost of a frigate or a platform, with a price tag—but we are not; we are talking about a relative cost. The Government need to set out what those economic conditions are.

Finally, I turn to land. As we have heard rehearsed in the House many times, the Army is being reduced from 82,500 to 73,000 soldiers. Earlier, Mr Deputy Speaker talked about the considerable expertise in this place, but the greatest defence experience is probably in the other place. Those who rose to the top of their professions in the armed forces now speak with the greatest wisdom on defence. I would therefore like to quote from some of them, starting with three former Chiefs of the General Staff.

In January, Lord Richard Dannatt said:

“The bottom line is numbers do matter… It is a fact that at 73,000 the British Army has never been smaller”.

In March 2021, Lord David Richards said that “mass still matters”. In May 2022, General Sir Nick Carter said that

“in the order of 80,000”

soldiers are required to ensure that the UK could field a full division as part of a combined NATO force.

Although the current Chief of the General Staff is somewhat restricted in what he can say while in post, in June 2022 he said that the UK was facing a “1937 moment”, and that

“it would be perverse if the CGS was advocating reducing the size of the Army as a land war rages in Europe”.

I firmly advocate for the Army to be restored to that 83,000 figure. When will those economic conditions be met so that we might see 2.5% spent on defence?

Defence Acquisition Reform

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 28th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge]

I am honoured by my right hon. Friend. We enjoy our robust exchanges, but that was an example that I shall particularly remember.

The phrase “a sense of urgency” is, I think, what the public want to hear. Important as today’s exchanges are, this is really serious; it is above politics. This is about the fact that our adversaries are ramping up their procurement and their technology—frankly, in some instances, at a frightening pace. That is why embracing the deep relationship with industry, the constant feedback loop on data from the frontline and from war gaming, is so crucial. I think the Committee has an important role in this regard. I set out our intention in my statement, but for it to be embedded we will have a key set of milestones that will enable us, if we work together, to show that it is being implemented; if we can do that together, we can put the pressure on to ensure that it becomes manifest.

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

I would like to pick up on the point about urgency. We have seen what the UK is capable of in defence acquisition from urgent capability requirements or, previously, urgent operational requirements. These harness the ingenuity of British industry and combine it with the professionalism of the British armed forces personnel. They remove bureaucracy, focus on the capability rather than detailed specifications, and deliver amazing equipment in very short timescales. A great example is the Jackal, the all-terrain mobility platform that was developed at Dunkeswell in my Honiton constituency. How much is the new integrated procurement model informed by the UCR process?

[James Cartlidge]

On matters of defence procurement, it always strikes me how many former service personnel will raise the issue of urgent operational requirements or whatever else we call them, whatever variation of the acronym. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to stress their importance. They are not something that can be used at scale for the whole procurement system, but in specific, urgent areas they are critical, and we will continue to use them. I am considering them in a couple of sensitive areas, which obviously I cannot talk about further, but he makes an excellent point. By the way, the Jackal is an excellent platform. My first trade mission on exports was to the Czech Republic, and the Jackal was there. I was proud to receive glowing reviews about it from the defence select committee there.

Ukraine: Military Equipment

Richard Foord Excerpts

Tuesday 27th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge]

My right hon. Friend asks about an excellent point. Both the Secretary of State and I have commented on that. I have held meetings at the Treasury and with defence companies about the ESG—environmental, social and governance—issue, as well as with financial institutions, at Rothschild in the City, because it is extraordinary that anyone should think we should not invest in core munitions when we see now that the cause they support is peace, freedom and democracy. If we do not fund our defence sector, we simply will not be able to defend those fine principles.

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

President Zelensky said yesterday that without new military aid from the United States, Ukraine would be unable to defend the Black sea shipping corridor, which has enabled the export of 33 million metric tonnes of Ukrainian grain. That has been enabled in part by the supply by the UK of the Storm Shadow missile and by France’s supply of the SCALP missile. What are the Government discussing with German counterparts about their potential to supply their equivalent, the Taurus missile system?

Ukraine

Richard Foord Excerpts

Thursday 22nd February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Grant Shapps]

I am delighted that my hon. Friend was in Poland yesterday. The Poles have been right on the frontline next to Ukraine on this. They have been tremendous in their support for Ukraine and in investing in their own defence sector. He is right to highlight British military assistance, which comes in many different forms, much of which we cannot discuss, but it has certainly assisted in Poland and elsewhere in the region. He will be pleased to hear that we also contributed to Poland’s own defence: before its election, we provided two Typhoons to prevent escalation and exacerbation by Putin. We also provide other air defence mechanisms to Poland. I would be happy to provide him with a further briefing.

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

On behalf of the Liberal Democrats, I very much thank the Government for the statement and offer our wholehearted support for it. This week, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev asked the rhetorical question, “Where to stop?” Medvedev, who is now deputy head of Russia’s security council, answered, “I don’t know.” He continued:

“Will it be Kiev? Yes, probably it should be Kiev.”

He went on to make an outlandish claim that there is a threat to the Russian Federation from Kyiv, and he made outrageous threats, including to the UK. Will the Defence Secretary first condemn the ambiguity of Medvedev’s rhetoric on Russia’s ambitions? Secondly, will he rebut the wild claim that the Russian Federation is somehow threatened? Thirdly, will he ask his counterparts in Delhi and Beijing to urge Medvedev to halt his nuclear sabre rattling?

[Grant Shapps]

The hon. Member is absolutely right to point out those irresponsible comments, which very much follow in the footsteps of what Putin goes around saying. It is completely irresponsible in the modern era to have world leaders going about threatening others. There is absolutely no justification whatsoever for an autocratic state or any state walking into a demographic neighbour and claiming it as its own. To go further than that and to start threatening other states on a trumped-up charge that NATO somehow wishes to do the same in reverse is, as the whole House will know, complete fiction. NATO has no desire to do anything but defend the existing borders. That is why NATO is no threat whatsoever to Moscow.