(1 year, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I rise to speak in support of new clause 33 and new schedule 3.
I am concerned that amendment 455 will be inadequate to maintain trust in the system. Collecting comprehensive data, such as the detailed statistics outlined, in an assisted dying regime serves several critical purposes that revolve around ensuring transparency, accountability, safety, equity and continuous improvement of the system. It is about ensuring from the very start that there is good data and learning from the paucity or the blanks in other regimes and from where they have been criticised.
The Secretary of State would have the power to amend the new schedule, but Parliament’s intent and our expectation that the system will be scrutinised would be crystal clear. We need to collect data for monitoring and oversight and gather detailed information about individuals who request assisted dying, and about the process itself. That would allow regulators to monitor how the system is functioning, which would help to ensure that the law is being applied consistently and fairly, preventing misuse or abuse.
We need to safeguard our vulnerable population. Data on characteristics such as age, ethnicity, disability and mental health conditions and on deprivation indices can reveal whether certain groups are disproportionately seeking or being denied assisted dying. That helps to identify potential coercion, discrimination or gaps in care that might drive requests, ensuring that the system protects vulnerable individuals.
For the purpose of improving healthcare and support services, information about the prior involvement of palliative care or psychiatry teams, and about referrals made after requests, highlights whether patients are receiving adequate support before opting for assisted dying. If data shows low referral rates or unmet needs, it could prompt improvements in healthcare, access or quality, potentially reducing the number of requests driven by untreated suffering.
For the purpose of evaluating the process, tracking timelines—that is to say, from initial discussion to death—and procedural steps such as second opinions and panel decisions ensures that the process is efficient yet thorough. It can reveal bottlenecks, delays or inconsistencies, allowing policymakers to refine the system for both patients and clinicians.
For the purpose of understanding motivations and outcomes, collecting the reasons for requests, refusals and complications such as drug efficacy or adverse reactions provides insight into why people seek assisted dying and how the process unfolds. That can inform public policy, clinician training and patient counselling, ensuring that decisions are well informed and voluntary.
For the purpose of ensuring accountability, data on clinicians, pharmacies and panel decisions creates a transparent record of who is involved and how often. That helps to prevent overreliance on a small group of professionals, ensures that ethical standards are upheld and allows for audits if concerns arise.
For the purpose of public trust and ethical debate, detailed statistics foster transparency, which is essential for maintaining public confidence in a sensitive and controversial practice. They also provide evidence for ongoing ethical and legal debates, enabling society to assess whether assisted dying aligns with its values and goals, and for the purpose of learning and adaptation. By analysing complications, drug effectiveness and reconsideration requests, authorities can refine protocols, such as by adjusting approved substances or dosages, to make the process safer and more humane. Long-term data collection supports evidence-based adjustments to the regime.
Almost all jurisdictions around the world have systems for reporting on people requesting and having assisted deaths. However, there is a high degree of variability in the data reported around the world; very few data items are published consistently in all jurisdictions. We have an opportunity to learn from monitoring and reporting systems elsewhere, and to put the most robust possible system in place.
Research published in BMJ Supportive & Palliative Care in 2022 examined in depth the data reported in jurisdictions around the world. It identified official data reports from 16 jurisdictions in which assisted suicide or euthanasia is legal. It found that although most jurisdictions report the number of patients who die by assisted dying, only three—New Zealand, Canada and the state of Victoria in Australia—document the number of patients who make a request to die by assisted dying. The research is from 2022, so it is possible that there are now a few more jurisdictions.
Unless we know about the applications that are assessed as ineligible, we will not have adequate insight into the functioning of patient safeguards and eligibility criteria. That is a point that Dr Annabel Price made in oral evidence and in an editorial in The BMJ in 2015. We need to understand not just who has an assisted death, but who is ineligible and why, to understand how the safeguards are functioning.
The 2022 paper identified Colorado, Hawaii and Maine as reporting the number of patients who received assisted suicide prescriptions, but not the number of persons who actually die by their ingestion. In these jurisdictions, there is no record of how many of the patients ingested the prescribed drugs. This is stipulated in the 2021 data summary for the Colorado End-of-life Options Act, which states that the Act
“does not authorize or require the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment to follow up with physicians who prescribe aid-in-dying medication, patients, or their families to obtain information about the use of aid-in-dying medication.”
The official statistics reported therefore
“reflect all deaths identified among individuals by prescribed aid-in-dying medication…irrespective of whether their death was caused by ingestion of medication, the underlying terminal illness or condition, or some other cause.”
These states do not appear to have a mechanism to ascertain the amount of unused assisted suicide drugs circulating within the community. The fate of many therapeutic drugs with the potential for abuse or use for fatal overdose, such as diazepam or morphine, is not monitored, but the doses and combinations of lethal drugs used in assisted suicide and euthanasia may present a heightened risk, so monitoring the fate of those drugs should be considered.
Concern about pressure on vulnerable groups warrants the detailed reporting of patient demographics. It is needed to ensure patient safety because it allows researchers and monitoring organisations to monitor trends to determine whether there is disproportionate participation among vulnerable or minority groups and, if so, why.
Even basic patient characteristics, including gender, age and ethnicity, are not universally reported in other jurisdictions. Although marital status could be an indicator of at-home support, fewer than half of reports include it. The level of education can be an indicator of socioeconomic position, but is not routinely reported by many jurisdictions.
Although we have been told that studies that have analysed routine statistics did not indicate a disproportionate use by lower socioeconomic groups, socioeconomic trends have changed over time and new evidence has emerged. For example, in Oregon, the proportion of assisted dying patients on state health aid has doubled in the past decade; it reached 79% in 2021. That indicates an increase in use over time by those in a lower socioeconomic position.
Similarly, an in-depth review by Ontario’s coroner last year showed that those dying by their assisted death legislation, both track 1 and track 2, were more likely to be those with longer prognoses. Given the impossibility of prognostication and the pressure being brought to bear by some campaign groups for the Bill to be wider, socioeconomic data will be very important to ascertain whether there is equity of access to assisted dying and whether financial pressures, including access to benefits, are involved in areas of higher or lower uptake.
Knowing whether patients have received care from hospice or palliative care services provides an understanding of whether patients have been provided with alternative end of life care options. That information is included in fewer than one half of the reports from jurisdictions around the world, with none providing information on the duration or scope of hospice or palliative care involvement. For example, while official reports indicate that 80% to 90% of Canadian patients who have assisted deaths receive palliative care, other studies have shown that fewer than half of such patients had seen a specialist palliative care team.
It is also essential to have information about the clinicians who participate in assisted dying, because the clinical demand of assisted suicide and euthanasia is highly time-consuming, with evidence from other jurisdictions, such as an Australian study of those participating clinicians, showing that it takes 60-plus hours of work per assisted death. Understanding the number of clinicians participating in assisted dying and their speciality is important in understanding the willingness of clinicians to participate, and how the clinical demand for assisted dying is distributed across specialities and practitioners.
Information on the drugs used in assisted deaths is critical to understanding the safety and efficacy of different drugs and drug combinations. The 2022 paper found that just six jurisdictions report the drugs used to bring about patient death. There is no one drug or drug combination that has been shown to be most effective and safe for ending patients’ lives. If that research existed, we would not see such variation in the drugs used. Data on complications following drug ingestion or administration is needed to understand the safety of different drug combinations, but it is rarely reported.
Even in jurisdictions where information on safety is included, missing data can be high. For example, in Oregon, data on complications is unknown in up to 70% of cases annually. Reporting the drugs used to bring about patient death, as well as information about the assisted dying process, including the time from drug ingestion or administration to patient unconsciousness and death, and the presence of complications, would enable the safety and efficacy of these drugs to be assessed.
As in many jurisdictions around the world, what I am proposing relies on retrospective reporting of data, after the patient has died. I suggest that this is the minimum standard that must be achieved. Ideally, we would also build in processes for prospective scrutiny, before the person has died, as well as formal review processes that scrutinise individual cases in more detail. Analyses from Belgium and the Netherlands, where review processes are established, have shown that 48% of assisted deaths in Belgium, and one in five of such deaths in the Netherlands, are not reported via the official reporting system. In some cases, legal requirements are not followed.
Setting up a post-event review panel, such as happens in the Netherlands and Ontario, would improve understanding and safety. In the Netherlands, every case is reviewed by a panel, and many cases, especially the controversial ones, are published to promote education and debate. Controversial or worrying cases will occur in England and Wales if this Bill passes, and it is essential for ongoing patient safety that these are not swept under the carpet, but that there are transparent processes to understand and learn from them.
We have heard frequently in Committee that there is no evidence of harm from other jurisdictions, but we have also heard it powerfully argued that other jurisdictions do not collect the data we would need to determine that. In Oregon, information on complications following ingestion of lethal substances is missing in around 70% of cases. Robert Clark, the former Attorney-General for Victoria, has written:
“The Victorian oversight and accountability structure can best be described as one of ‘hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil’. In other words, it appears designed for the regulator to find out nothing, investigate nothing and report nothing that could suggest that assisted dying has been anything other than an unblemished success.”
Let us not repeat those mistakes. We can lead the way in rigorous, comprehensive data collection and transparent monitoring.
Amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Spen Valley change responsibility for oversight from the Secretary of State and chief medical officers to the commissioner. This brings a danger of bias in reporting, as there could be an element of marking one’s own homework. This means that there is even more reason for complete data reporting and transparency. Ensuring that data collected is comprehensive and reporting is transparent may go some way to assuage that concern. Importantly, strengthening data collection reporting and monitoring will not make the process harder or more lengthy for the person requesting an assisted death. It just makes the system safer and stronger.
In this amendment, I am not proposing doing anything new or radical. We are simply taking the strongest aspects of what is done in other jurisdictions and bringing them together to enable the best and most comprehensive reporting in the world. All new laws have risks as well as benefit. We must identify and be open about those risks in order to learn from harms and improve onward safety. New schedule 3 will help us to achieve that.
I rise to speak to amendments 455 and 456, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. Under the Bill as drafted, an annual report would be issued by the chief medical officers for England and Wales. If the other amendments pass, that report will be issued by the voluntary assisted dying commissioner.
Amendment 455 will do two things, broadly speaking. Proposed new subsection (2A) states that the commissioner’s report
“must include information about the application of the Act in relation to…persons who have protected characteristics”.
Amendment 456 clarifies that the definition of “protected characteristics” is the same as that used in the Equality Act 2010. Proposed new subsection (2A) also provides that the commissioner must report on any other description of persons specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI will conclude my remarks by observing that the only reason that we are looking at contracting out assisted dying services to a private provider is that the country is simply not ready for assisted dying. We know how overstretched and under-resourced our NHS is, and we are looking at cutting corners in the Bill, in our policymaking, in our scrutiny of this legislation, and in how this legislation and the service is delivered.
It is interesting to follow the hon. Member for Richmond Park, because I rise to speak to amendment 537, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley. The amendment goes further than the hon. Member for Richmond Park would as far as local authorities are concerned.
The amendment also concerns both the national health service and the provision of healthcare by charities. My hon. Friend the Member for Shipley knows both fields extremely well. She was the director of quality and strategy and chief analyst at the Department of Health, and then had a senior role at the Centre for Ageing Better. Her amendment would mean that assisted dying services could be provided only by charitable organisations and not by the national health service.
I strongly support the general principle that if we do have assisted dying, it should be free at the point of use. If this House decides that people do indeed have the right to an assisted death under the conditions that this Bill sets out, then it should not be something limited to those who can afford private healthcare. There are, however, strong objections among general practitioners to providing assisted dying as part of their services, and I do not think we should plan to have private firms work under contract from the NHS to provide assisted dying either.
The Royal College of General Practitioners said in its written evidence that
“any assisted dying service should be seen as a standalone specialised service that healthcare professionals may opt to provide with additional training and should not be deemed core GP work.”
The royal college’s advice, which is founded on the views of its members, means that we should give very strong consideration to putting assisted dying outside the normal workings of the NHS. If we do that, it seems that there are a few options. One is for the Secretary of State to invite private firms to tender for contracts and administer assisted dying services. As I have said, there are very strong reasons why we should not plan to have private firms work under contract to the NHS to provide assisted dying; for me, that it is one of the worst possible options.
Another option is for the NHS to fund a specialised assisted dying service that would be separate from its other functions. That could potentially be feasible, but it could also represent a significant cost for the NHS, because we still have not had the impact assessment from the Government and we have no idea how significant that cost may be.
There is also the worry that if assisted dying becomes available on the NHS, some people will become too frightened to access palliative care, as was outlined to the Committee by Dr Jamilla Hussain. I will read a brief part of her written evidence to the Committee. After talking to the patients in ethnic minority and other disadvantaged groups, she said:
“Overwhelmingly, racialised communities expressed deep concerns that they would be more likely to be pushed towards AD through systemic biases and societal attitudes about whose lives are valued… While safeguards were acknowledged, many remained sceptical that they would be applied fairly and equitably, fearing that vulnerable individuals, particularly those who lack strong advocates or English proficiency, might be at greater risk of being guided towards AD rather than offered appropriate care options.”
I want to share something with the Committee. We often get taxis to and from work and home; I got into a cab yesterday, and the chap who was driving was called Dave. His 84-year-old aunt died on Friday. When we were discussing this option, he told me really clearly that she has opted for a cremation, which would cost less money, just because she internalised that idea of burden and she did not want a cost for those that she left behind. She had not seen a doctor for 40 years. That brought home the idea of internalised coercion, internalised pressure and mistrust, because he also talked about what happened during covid. We had an interesting conversation. I told him that it was interesting that he had said that, and today I am talking about it. That is the reality: it is about how people perceive healthcare provision, the potential inequalities, and what the barriers are to access—all the preconceived ideas that we have about the provision of healthcare.
That brings me to a potential third way, which is what amendment 537 is about: charities. Charities are one way of addressing the concerns I and the hon. Member for Richmond Park have outlined about the risk with private companies and the risk of loss of confidence and access to the NHS, as well as the concerns outlined by the Royal College of General Practitioners. They could well be mitigated by ensuring that the lead responsibility for administering assisted dying is given to charities rather than the NHS.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe hon. Member is absolutely right. The Court of Protection has described eating disorders using language typically reserved for terminal illnesses. It has described an eating disorder as being in “the terminal stage”, talked of “all treatment options” having “been exhausted” and used words such as “incurable”. It is immensely regrettable, but nevertheless the case—even though eating disorders are always treatable—that if a person suffering from an eating disorder is deemed to have capacity and is refusing treatment, there may well be nothing that can be done to stop them choosing that path, which may ultimately lead to their death.
Is the hon. Member aware that in nine of the 10 cases that went before the Court of Protection, the young ladies were deemed not to have capacity, but the judge still decided that it would not be in their best interests to feed them, and they were put on palliative care pathways?
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI accept that the majority of those 60 cases are in such jurisdictions, but to me it does not matter whether it is the majority or one—one death is too many, as I am sure my hon. Friend will agree. In Oregon, the evidence was that it was two, but it is also important to reflect on the fact that Oregon does not record these things. There is no record of the people who had anorexia—by and large, it is women—and who felt that they fit the criteria for assisted death, or that they were on a trajectory to fit it, because they had decided not to eat. So we cannot exactly rely on the two cases that have been found—and those were found only because of the research that was carried out. That does not quite satisfy the question.
Does the hon. Lady agree that it really does not matter what happens in other jurisdictions? The question is, does this legislation prevent people who are currently suffering from anorexia from seeking an assisted death or not?
I completely agree with the hon. Member.
Coming back to the physicians who justified eligibility by citing the physical complications of anorexia, not just the mental disorder itself, we know that in all 60 of the cases that have been cited, the person did not have a terminal illness other than the one that was caused by anorexia, because that then fit the definition. Under the Bill, the same could happen here. I say in response to the hon. Member for Richmond Park that eating disorders or substance use disorders could still qualify if a doctor determines that the resulting physical deterioration meets the criteria for terminal illness. I will speak to anorexia in much more detail when we debate a further amendment that I have tabled.
Amendment 181 would also remove references to the Equality Act and the Mental Health Act, and the Bill would not define disability or mental disorder. That raises serious concerns, so I will not support the amendment. I encourage Committee members to strengthen the Bill in this regard and not weaken it. The Acts define mental illness and disability as taking a clear medical model, and again it is not clear whether my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley is further suggesting that a new definition should be used—but I am going over ground that I have already been over.
I thank the right hon. Member for his intervention. I have talked about that case, and the court concluded:
“The prospects of her recovery overall approach zero… Given that it is extremely unlikely that Ms L will recover from her anorexia it is…in her best interests to”
move to palliative care, as it was considered a terminal illness. In some ways, that makes my point for me: she was diagnosed as terminally ill. The purpose of the amendment is to close that loophole. The majority of these cases are young girls and young women. I do not want them to get to a stage where they qualify under the Bill because they have a terminal illness due to refusing food, because that can be treated. That is the point that I am trying to make.
Let us say that only one or two people with anorexia have an assisted death if the Bill becomes law without my amendment. I hope that every member of the Committee would agree that even one such death would be unacceptable. Some might say, “Oh, but we must not make the perfect the enemy of the good.” That has been said in the debate, or sentiments have been expressed that reflect that sentence.
That is a good argument to make when we are trying to persuade our teenagers to finish their homework for school and so on. It does not wash for me when we are trying to create a Bill with the strongest possible safeguards for vulnerable adults, and it is too close to the arguments made in favour of brutal actions across the globe. We say things like, “To make an omelette, you’ve got to crack a few eggs.” If we want to make the Bill the best it can be, we cannot use such arguments. Perfection is not the enemy of the good—perfection is absolutely what we should be pursuing in this Committee.
Reference was made to one of the witnesses who gave oral evidence. I remember being aghast at the idea that these two people who died in Oregon were somehow a red herring and that there had been only two. It was really disappointing, and I was extremely angry at that comment. That is not something we should be doing or the standard we should be setting. We cannot be saying that.
There is nothing good about letting people who have sadly reached an advanced state of malnutrition be given assisted dying. Surely we can agree on that. If this Bill does not include my safeguard, it will do two things. First, it will increase the dangers of anorexia. People already develop anorexia to such a degree that they perish of malnutrition. Allowing such people to apply for assisted dying will mean that more severe anorexics die. If we do not adopt my safeguard, we run the further risk that those who are not anorexic, but wish to hasten death, stop eating in order to qualify for an assisted death. Both of those would be truly malign. I would hope all Members of the Committee will accept my amendment to protect those who would otherwise be at risk of starving themselves to an assisted death.
I also want to bring to the Committee’s attention a public letter that has been released this afternoon by nearly 40 individuals who work in the field of eating disorders. They have said, on the amendment to which I am speaking:
“This amendment states that mental illness alone does not qualify as a terminal illness, but as the legal text (“Nothing in this subsection…”) makes clear it has no effect beyond restating that the condition must meet the requirements of clause 2(1). If a doctor holds that a mental illness meets the test in clause 2(1) for terminal illness, this amendment will do nothing to prevent that.”
They further say:
“Eating disorders are treatable. They are life-threatening when left untreated or poorly treated, but this risk is preventable, and deaths from eating disorders are not inevitable. As campaigners, clinicians, charities, and organisations working with those affected, we urge the committee to take these concerns seriously and ensure this bill does not put people with eating disorders at risk of premature death under the guise of assisted dying.”
On my amendment 402, they say:
“Amendment 402: Explicitly states that a person cannot be deemed terminally ill because they have stopped eating or drinking.”
On amendment 48, they say:
“Amendment 48: Clarifies that a person is only considered terminally ill if their death is reasonably certain within six months, even with all recommended treatment.”
They are supporting those amendments, 9, 10, 48, 402 and 11. On that note, I will finish.
I rise briefly to speak against amendment 234 in the name of my good and hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough. I will keep it brief as I know he is not going to press to a vote.
First, the Bill that was voted on on Second Reading was a Bill for terminally ill adults in the last six months of their lives. I do not believe attempting to amend the scope of the Bill in Committee is what the House has asked us to do. I think the House voted for a Bill that was specifically for people within the last six months of their lives and that to be amending it—although I accept he is not putting it to a vote—is not in order.
Secondly, I want to reflect on Professor Sir Chris Whitty’s oral evidence to the Committee about how difficult it is to determine when somebody is within six months of the end of their life and how much more difficult it would be to determine whether someone is within the last 12 months of their life, notwithstanding that we are talking about a very specific category of people. For me, that really does give rise to the fear that we would not be able to make a specific determination on whether somebody was in the last 12 months of their life. There would be a risk that people actually have many years left to live. In the case of motor neurone disease, for example, we have seen prognoses of between two and five years, so we risk shortening people’s lives unduly. Furthermore, people might not want to make the prognosis, and therefore people who would like to have the right to end their life in their final 12 months because they have a neurodegenerative disorder might be denied that right, because it is impossible to come to such a determination.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMy hon. Friend comes from a mental health background, and I appreciate his expertise. We have talked a great deal about coercion—we have debated it for hours and hours—and I agree palliative care specialists, who deal with such issues as their day job, can provide that intervention and support the patient by establishing a much stronger relationship with them. I added my name to this amendment because I feel very strongly that palliative care must be a central part of the Bill if it is to provide patients a real choice at end of life. There should not be an assumption, as there is in the Bill as drafted, that assisted death is the predominant option once a person embarks on this pathway.
Let me return to the matter of minoritised voices. Dr Jamilla submitted written evidence, and spoke passionately, about the options available to people from black and minority ethnic communities. She said that they feel very much ignored. As I have said previously, palliative care is not fit for purpose because there is postcode lottery: provision depends on where a person lives, whether they have a hospice nearby, what the hospital options are and so on. There is a fear among ethnic minority communities of being pushed towards assisted death.
Does the hon. Lady agree that the purpose of this amendment is to ensure the Bill delivers for the people for whom it is intended, such as the person the hon. Member for Spen Valley spoke about? It would put in place protections for the people for whom there is a choice, and that where those choices exits, they are laid out in full and properly examined before a final decision is made.
I completely agree. It is imperative that those options—pain options and care options, including with the family—are explored in detail. The last time that I spent time in a hospice was when my brother-in-law was dying of cancer, and I remember that, as a family, we were very much involved in those conversations. Having such expertise empowers not just the patient but the family. Losing somebody who has a life-threatening condition is a difficult time for families and loved ones. When the wraparound model of palliative care, with specialist nurses and doctors, is good, it can be amazing. I have heard plenty of stories about when it is good. Last week, I mentioned a friend of mine who lost her husband last year, and she said that the palliative care nurses and doctors could not do enough. That gives the family confidence to explore the options. In that instance, that person would have benefited from this Bill—she encouraged me to support it.
As Dr Jamilla said, some people would absolutely benefit from the Bill, and they cannot be dismissed, but how do we legislate to cover people who do not have equal access to palliative care or to healthcare? There is discrimination. The covid experience that we went through recently showed the impact of inequalities. Disabled people, people with mental health conditions, elderly people, and people from black and minority ethnic communities, say that they were DNR-ed—subject to “do not resuscitate” orders. There is already a lack of trust in services, so we need to strengthen palliative care.
There is a fear among these communities that they will be pushed towards assisted dying. A consultation with participants from Pakistani, Roma, Nigerian, black Caribbean and Indian backgrounds revealed overwhelming mistrust, which is deeply rooted in the experience of discrimination and the disproportionate impact of covid-19. As one participant put it,
“They are doing this to save money…to kill us off.”
To get confidence among communities back, we need specialists people can rely on. That is what the amendment speaks to, and I hope that the Committee will support it.
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI would like to hope that that would never happen; I have a huge love of the NHS and of the people I know in it who make decisions every day, particularly given all the cuts—even more so, post covid. But there is that risk; I would like to hope that it is very small.
When it comes to mental health, the debate is similar to the one about capacity: it is the same conversation about whether something is fit for purpose. Just because something already exists does not mean that it will necessarily suit what we are doing here.
On International Women’s Day, the Minister for Safeguarding and Violence against Women and Girls, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), eloquently reads out a list of victims of domestic violence who have been murdered. There are two a week—I make no apologies for keeping coming back to this. Only yesterday, there was an article about women’s charities that support victims of domestic abuse citing their concerns. The amendment speaks to those concerns. How could it not be supportive?
I am not convinced by the idea that the amendment would introduce an element of jeopardy. People make decisions with their families every day. We sit and have conversations. I speak from a position of privilege—as we all do in this place, frankly. We speak from positions of privilege about how we could have these conversations with our families. But we know that inequalities exist and that some people do not have those privileges. We know that society is unequal. We know that domestic abuse, elder abuse and mental health issues exist.
In my constituency, it takes 14 months just to get a child and adolescent mental health services referral for a young person; I appreciate that we are not talking about young people. My point is that there is a real backlog in the NHS—in terms of waiting times and pain medication, for example. Palliative care is not equal, as I said yesterday. I am genuinely asking Committee members: which bit of the amendment can we not support?
The hon. Lady is making a powerful speech. She referred to an article she read yesterday about domestic violence in relation to the Bill; it may have been the article by Sarah Ditum in the New Statesman, which I also read yesterday. It cited two cases in which people had been on trial for murder and had pleaded mercy killing, or said that they had carried out the killing of their spouse or partner on the basis that that person was suffering greatly at the end of their life. In both cases, when the evidence was examined, the men were found guilty of murder, because it was very clear that that was what had actually happened.
The article had a profound impact on me, because it demonstrated the risk that we are running: that people will be able to use the Bill in instances of domestic violence. We have to take that very seriously and consider the implications.
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI heard Sir Chris Whitty in particular say that it would be preferable to have a more straightforward Bill that did not have too many bureaucratic hurdles for people to overcome. That was why he was keen for the Mental Capacity Act to be retained. However, I tabled the amendment precisely because, when people are thinking about whether assisted dying is an appropriate decision for them, I do not think that it is safe for them to be judged merely on the basis of their capacity. It is by no means my intention to increase bureaucracy; I am merely proposing that the Act is not sufficient in this case.
Three psychiatrists gave evidence to the Committee in person: Professor Allan House, Dr Annabel Price, of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and Professor Gareth Owen. All expressed doubts about the use of the Mental Capacity Act to assess whether a person was in a fit state of mind to undertake assisted dying. Does the hon. Lady agree that we should place great weight on the opinion of psychiatrists when assessing whether the Act should be used to assess applicants for assisted dying? It is a horse before the cart scenario, because the Act was not made for this context; when it was passed, we were not talking about the ability to choose to die.
I agree exactly with the hon. Lady’s point. The Act was not designed for this purpose, and it is essential that we carefully scrutinise whether it should be used in this way.
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Professor House: Well, it increases, but there are so many factors. I will give you one example. Oregon has been widely cited as a model for this sort of thing, although people have been a bit more uncertain in recent times. At the time that Lord Falconer introduced his Bill in the Lords in 2014, Oregon was cited as a place where levels had stayed much the same—not of suicide, but of people receiving assisted dying. In the decade since then, the number of people going through the assisted dying programme has gone up 500%, and the number of suicides has gone up 20%.
Q
Professor House: Vulnerability is not just an inherent characteristic of individuals. It is the presence of these external factors, circumstances, and internal factors, state of mind, that influence and bias somebody’s thinking about whether their life is worth continuing with and whether they want to end their life. Its importance is that exploring those factors and considering what can be done to ameliorate them can lead to a change of mind. If we do not explore those factors and we do not attempt to ameliorate them, we are losing an opportunity to change the mind of people who may rethink their desire to end their life.
Why I think of it as a vulnerability, rather than just as factors that influence a rational decision, which feels rather like how it is considered in the Bill, is that the emotional tone of the discussion that you have with people about all those factors is negative. They are not people asserting autonomy and pleasure in their ability to make a choice; they are people describing to you things that are negative influences on their life. The worry is that because there is nothing in the current medical assessment that requires a careful exploration of these factors, there is really no opportunity to change them.