Retail and Hospitality Sector

Lord Young of Acton Excerpts

Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union. I congratulate the four new Members on their excellent speeches.

I draw the attention of your Lordships’ House to Section 21 of the Employment Rights Act, which extends the liability of employers for the harassment of their employees to third parties, and its impact on the hospitality sector. From October this year, employers will have a duty to protect their workers from third parties. I should make it clear that we are not talking about third-party sexual harassment, which they were already liable for, but third-party non-sexual harassment.

What does that mean for the hospitality sector? Employers will have to take “all reasonable steps”—those are the words in the Act—to protect their employees from harassment by customers. That might not sound too onerous, until you factor in that harassment includes indirect harassment, which has been defined by the employment tribunal as including overheard conversations, remarks, comments or jokes that an employee may find offensive or upsetting by virtue of their protected characteristics. It is for that reason that the Free Speech Union has been referring to Section 21 as the “banter ban”.

A couple of weeks ago, the Government quietly released a 40-page impact assessment about Section 21. It says that it is likely to cost the owners of small businesses £23.7 million to familiarise themselves with their new legal obligations, with ongoing costs of £124,000 a year for 10 years. The total cost during that period, it says, could be as high as £59 million. That is a woeful underestimate.

One of the assumptions in the impact assessment is that it will take business owners no more than half an hour to master their new duties under Section 21 of the Act. That is not the view of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, as set out in a briefing that it produced for your Lordships’ House when we were debating the Bill. The EHRC drew attention to the conflict between Clause 21, as it then was, and existing anti-discrimination provisions. It said that a third party may themselves be protected from discrimination while their conduct could simultaneously be considered harassment by an employee. That makes the legal balancing of rights and obligations difficult for employers to manage in practice.

I will give just one example of the kind of conflict that the EHRC has in mind and which hospitality businesses will now have to navigate. Should they prevent trans women customers from using the ladies’ lavatories? On the one hand, a female employee may have a claim for third-party harassment in the tribunal if she finds herself having to share the facilities with a biological male. On the other, a trans woman customer may have a claim for discrimination if the business owner, as a service provider, fails to discharge its duty under Section 29 of the Equality Act, which makes it unlawful for a service provider to discriminate against a person who is using, or seeking to use, its services.

This is precisely the issue that the Women and Equalities Minister has been wrestling with since the EHRC submitted its advice last October about how to revise the code of practice on services, public functions and associations covering, among other things, access to single-sex women’s spaces. We were told in this House only this week that the reason there has been such a delay in issuing this code of practice is that this is such a fiendishly complex area of law and it is essential that the Government get it right. Yet, if a Government Minister cannot master this area of the law in three months, with all the legal resources at her disposal, what hope do publicans have to get their heads around it in half an hour?

Section 21 of the Employment Rights Act imposes a new duty on small businesses in the hospitality sector that touches on an incredibly complicated area of law, with real financial risks if they get it wrong. For many publicans, the cost of the legal advice alone, let alone the compliance costs, will be the final straw. Remember that we are talking about just one section of the Employment Rights Act. Could the Minister, at the very least, give retail and hospitality businesses a 12-month reprieve before strangling them with this new profoundly unwelcome bit of red tape?

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Young of Acton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Young of Acton]

416E: After Clause 144, insert the following new Clause—
“Abolition of non-crime hate incidents(1) Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (code of practice relating to non-crime hate incidents and related procedural requirements) are repealed.(2) Non-crime hate incidents shall not be recognised as a category of incident by any police authority in the United Kingdom.(3) No police authority or police officer may record, retain or otherwise process any personal data relating to a non-crime hate incident.(4) Subsection (3) does not mean a police authority or police officer cannot record information they regard as relevant about a suspect’s motives in the course of an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution.(5) Within three months of the coming into force of this section, any police authority which has retained any record of a non-crime hate incident, save in accordance with the provisions of subsection (4), must delete such record.(6) For the purposes of this section—“non-crime hate incident” means any incident or alleged incident which does not constitute a criminal offence, but is perceived, by any person, to have been motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice towards a person or group on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity;“police authority” means a person specified in sub-section 158(1);“police officer” means any person acting under the authority a police authority.”

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union, which has been campaigning against non-crime hate incidents for at least five years.

I thought it might be helpful to begin with a definition of what an NCHI is. The amendment itself says that it is

“any incident or alleged incident which does not constitute a criminal offence, but is perceived, by any person, to have been motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice towards a person or group on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity”.

How many of these incidents have been recorded by the police since the concept of NCHIs was introduced by the College of Policing in 2014? The Telegraph submitted an FoI request to all 43 police forces in England and Wales in early 2020, and 34 of the 43 —about three-quarters of the police forces in England and Wales—responded and disclosed that 119,934 NCHIs had been recorded in England and Wales in the five years from 2014 to 2019. By my calculation, that is an average of 65 a day—and remember, that that is just in England and Wales, and just three-quarters of the real total. There is no reason to think that the number being recorded every day by police forces in England and Wales has declined from that average of 65 since then, in the subsequent six years.

How long does it take the police? How many police hours are spent recording NCHIs? Policy Exchange published a report last November in which it concluded that the police spend 60,000 hours a year—again, that is just the police in England and Wales—investigating and recording non-crime hate incidents. If you factor in that they have been around since 2014, that means the police have spent at least 660,000 hours investigating and recording non-crimes since 2014.

What sort of incidents are we talking about? “Non-crime hate incident” sounds quite serious. I will give just a handful of examples. A man had an NCHI recorded against him after a neighbour complained that his whistling the theme tune to “Bob the Builder” was racist. A woman had an NCHI recorded against her name because she posted on X that she thought her cat was a Methodist. A nine year-old girl had an NCHI recorded against her because she called another girl in the school playground a “retard”. Two secondary school pupils had NCHIs recorded against them for saying about another girl, again in the school playground, that she smelled like fish. This is the kind of thing that the police have been spending 660,000 hours investigating and recording since 2014.

Incidentally, I know of at least one Member of this House who has had an NCHI recorded against her, and a Conservative Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, had an NCHI recorded against her because of a complaint made about the contents of her speech at a Conservative Party conference that she was addressed in her capacity as Home Secretary.

So it seems that it is not terribly difficult to make the argument that the police have been wasting a huge amount of time investigating and recording relatively trivial incidents. Again, I stress that the definition says that if it is merely “perceived”, not just by the “victim” but by any person, as being motivated by hostility or prejudice towards the “victim’s” protected characteristics, it can be recorded as an NCHI. Sometimes, when NCHIs are recorded, the person against whom the NCHI is recorded is not informed—so you might well have an NCHI recorded against you without knowing it.

All this sounds quite trivial, but having an NCHI recorded against your name can be quite serious, because chief constables, at their discretion, can disclose the fact that an NCHI has been recorded against a person when they apply for a job that requires them to do an enhanced DBS check. So, you can end up not getting a job as a teacher or a carer, or a voluntary position with a charity such as the Samaritans, because you have an NCHI recorded against your name.

I will just point out one more, I think unintended, consequence of the NCHI regime, which is that records are deleted after six years. So if you have an NCHI recorded against you at the age of 17, it remains on what is in effect your criminal record until you are 23, whereas quite serious criminal offences, if you are convicted, are spent when you reach the age of majority. The fact that you have committed a non-crime can hang about your neck like a bad smell long after you have reached the age of majority, even if it was recorded against you when you were a child. So, in some senses, not committing a crime and having that recorded against you can have more serious consequences than committing quite a serious crime and being convicted of it.

I believe that I am pushing at an open door. A report on NCHIs has been commissioned by the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council. They have published a provisional version of the report, in which they declare the NCHI regime unfit for purpose. I do not think that they have submitted the final report to the Home Secretary yet, but I know that, when they do, the Home Secretary is likely to take up the recommendations, and I think we will see the end of the NCHI regime.

I have four issues on which I hope the Minister can provide some reassurance. The first is that, as I understand it, the new regime will be that incidents are no longer recorded as non-crime hate incidents; some cases will be recorded as anti-social behaviour incidents, but they will not be logged on the police national database. I ask for the Minister’s assurance that anti-social behaviour incidents that would have been recorded as NCHIs under the old regime will not, unlike NCHIs, be recorded on the police national database.

I also ask for the Minister’s assurance that, once the new regime is in place, previous NCHIs recorded under the old regime will be deleted and will not hang around for six years as they do currently, given that there is acceptance that the regime is not fit for purpose. If the regime is not fit for purpose, I hope the Minister can assure us that existing NCHIs—it is not inconceivable that they number in the hundreds of thousands—will be deleted. Finally, I seek reassurance that these anti-social behaviour incidents will not be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks.

I hope that the review by the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council will be submitted and digested in time for the new regime to be put in place on Report. I beg to move.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment because we need to move on from the recording of non-crime hate incidents by removing them altogether from police systems.

Non-crime hate recording had an honourable start, following on from the Macpherson inquiry. There were two problems at the time. The first was that recordable crime was lower than it should have been because it was not being recorded accurately, due to misrecording and it sometimes not being recorded at all. This was linked to police performance being measured by the amount of crime in society. Therefore, the police service was incentivised to record less rather than more crime, thereby, ironically, undermining its own bid for more resourcing.

The murder of Stephen Lawrence showed us that, sometimes, before a crime is committed, there are signals that someone may be a racist, for example, and that, if we take the right action, we could prevent those crimes occurring and someone getting hurt or any other crime being committed. That system worked well at the start, because it allowed the police to collect intelligence and spot patterns—for example, by geography, suspect or victims. That relied on the basic repeat offender victim location theory, which shows that 10% of repeat offenders can account for over half of some crimes.

The problem is that the same system is now being used to police the social harms caused by causing offence. Causing offence is not a crime. The internet amplifies the problem—first, because it has a permanent record of the offensive but not criminal behaviour, and, secondly, because it allows millions of people, sometimes worldwide, to see the communication. For everybody involved, it is then very hard to ignore. This has led to some bizarre police interventions—the noble Lord, Lord Young, has already mentioned some—on issues that are not crimes or even non-crime hate. The public have juxtaposed these with significant complaints—such as shoplifting, car theft and other serious crimes—that, meanwhile, the police say they are too busy to deal with, even when a suspect is available to arrest. The two issues do not sit well together.

There is a need to record intelligence about incidents that may later become significant if crimes are committed. This can be on the police command and control log, where the incident can be given an anti-social behaviour coding, or on the criminal intelligence system. The problem arises if the name of a person who is said to have caused offence is recorded. In my view, if the police say that they will record what is being alleged because someone has called the control room and they need to log all calls—the police later denying that a call had come in would not be sensible—then it is necessary to record those incidents in the control room. However, if, on the face of what a person tells the police, they see no crime or incident, they will not investigate and will not record the name of the person the caller says has offended them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, brings great experience to this. In his initial contribution, and in these comments, he gives food for thought as to how we implement the decisions of any review and how Ministers ultimately give guidance to police, which chief constables then put in place for police officers on the ground to deal with. We will look at that. The whole purpose of the review is to simplify this procedure, looking at what is necessary and helpful, and to get the police to focus on the things that really matter. Some of the examples that have been given today are things that the police should not be focusing on because they do not matter at all.

To answer the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, it is important that we look at what the regulations and the review say. We can act administratively on much of what happens. I have no doubt that the Government will do so, once we receive the final review.

I simply ask the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, for the moment, to withdraw the amendment. He has the right to bring his amendments back on Report. We will have a clearer picture at some point in the very near future. I hope this has been a helpful debate.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his gracious response. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for co-sponsoring the amendment and for his excellent contributions to this debate. I thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their contributions. I wish the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, a speedy recovery. I thank my noble friends Lord Kempsell, Lord Jackson and Lord Blencathra.

I agree with my noble friend Lord Blencathra that the police, under very difficult circumstances, do an excellent job on the whole and I admire what they do. But I think he is right that having to record and investigate non-crime hate incidents is as unpopular with ordinary police officers on the front line as it is with free speech campaigners. They do not want to be wasting their time in this way. Many of them have reached out to me to tell me that and to support this amendment. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her contribution.

If you look at proposed new subsection (4), you will find that nothing in the amendment would prevent the police recording information they regard as relevant about a suspect’s motive in the course of an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution. I am sceptical whether the police should be allowed to record incidents that clearly do not meet the threshold of being crimes for intelligence-gathering purposes, not least because there is very little persuasive evidence that that is helpful when it comes to preventing crimes, and I am generally suspicious of the concept of pre-crime—of trying to nip potential crimes in the bud by monitoring carefully incidents that do not quite meet the threshold of criminal offences. However, I am not going to die in a ditch and say that the police should never, under any circumstances, be able to record incidents that do not meet the threshold of being a criminal offence for intelligence-gathering purposes, provided that the recording of those incidents has no adverse consequences for the people they are recorded against.

That brings me to the remarks of my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs, which, on the whole, were very welcome. I am pleased that the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council recognise that NCHIs are not fit for purpose and that the regime should be scrapped and replaced with something much better, but I want to respond briefly to two points made by my noble friend.

First, my noble friend acknowledged, I think, that the recording threshold for NCHIs is currently too low, and that when the regime is replaced by another, such as the anti-social behaviour incident regime, the threshold as to what incidents should be recorded will be higher. The implicit acknowledgement that the threshold has hitherto been too low strikes me as a persuasive argument for scrapping those incidents that have been recorded under the lower threshold. If the threshold was too low, that is an acknowledgement that the incidents should not have been recorded. That is a good argument for why they should be deleted once this system has been overhauled.

Secondly, my noble friend Lord Herbert maintains that, even though chief constables have the discretion to disclose NCHIs when responding to enhanced DBS checks, the College of Policing could not find a single example of chief constables having done that. If that is the case then there is no cost to the Home Office agreeing that, henceforth, under the new regime, anti-social behaviour incidents—if that is what we are going to call them—should not be disclosed in enhanced DBS checks. The fear that they might be—that, not having committed a crime, that is recorded against your name and could stop you getting a job or volunteering at a school or for a charity—is why the current regime has had such a chilling effect on free speech. If none has been disclosed, why not go that one small step further and say that, henceforth, they will not be disclosed?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I hope the noble Lord is coming to the end of his remarks. When responding on amendments, you are meant to be relatively brief. He has had five and a half minutes now.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

I apologise to the Committee for taking up its time. On that note, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 416E withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Young of Acton Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union.

The strongest argument for repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act is that these laws were made during an analogue era and are clearly not fit for purpose during our current digital era. That is one reason why the Law Commission of England and Wales, in its 2021 report on which communications laws should be reformed, recommended that both the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act be repealed.

That has not happened, but a good illustration of just how unfit these two laws are was alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. The Times submitted FOI requests to all 43 police forces in England and Wales, asking them how many arrests were made in England and Wales in 2023 and in previous years for online offences under the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act. Of the 43 police forces, 37 responded to the FOI request. In just those 37 police forces, in 2023 12,183 people were arrested on suspicion of having committed just one of these two offences through something they had said online. That is a huge increase on the number of people arrested in 2018—just 5,502—on suspicion of committing these two offences for things they posted online. The figure more than quadrupled in a five-year period. That boils down to 33 people being arrested every day in 2023 on suspicion of having committed just one of these two offences under the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.

That happened because of the explosion of speech which is supposedly offensive, annoying, distressing, alarming or indecent, et cetera, online on social media. This is something the framers of these laws could not possibly have anticipated, and it is causing the police to waste a colossal amount of time. In addition, the number of people who were charged—bear in mind that 12,183 people were arrested—was 1,119. The police are clearly being overzealous in responding to complaints about supposed offences under these two laws relating to things people have said online.

Another index of just how much time is being wasted is that many of the people who are not charged end up having the episode recorded as a non-crime hate incident. The Free Speech Union has estimated that, as best we can tell, something like a quarter of a million non-crime hate incidents have been recorded since the concept was introduced by the College of Policing in 2014—and that is in England and Wales alone. That is an average of around 65 a day.

One reason so many NCHIs are being recorded is that, when the police arrest someone under suspicion of having committed an offence under the Malicious Communications Act or Section 127 of the Communications Act and conclude that in fact no offence has been committed, the incident is recorded as an NCHI. As I have said before in this House, one of the penalties for having an NCHI recorded against your name is that it can show up in enhanced criminal record checks when you apply for a job as a teacher or a carer or try to volunteer for a charity such as the Samaritans. According to Policy Exchange, in a report published last year, police in the UK as a whole are spending 6,000 hours a year investigating episodes and incidents that turn out to be NCHIs and are recorded as such. That is a strong argument for repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.

I will give two examples, from the FSU’s case files, of just how absurd the police’s overzealous policing of social media has become. We went to bat for one of our members, Julian Foulkes, a former special constable in Kent. He said in a spat online with a pro-Palestinian activist that some of the pro-Palestinian marchers were once step away from heading to Heathrow and stopping people disembarking from flights from Israel. That person complained, as I understand it, and six police officers—six—turned up at Julian Foulkes’s home, arrested him, took him down to the station and would not release him until he had agreed to accept a caution. With our help, he got that caution expunged and went on to sue the police for wrongful arrest. He was given £20,000 in compensation and got an apology from the chief constable of the police force concerned. That is a good example of the kind of time-wasting that the police are being led into because of the difficulty of enforcing these analogue laws in a digital era.

The second example is Maxie Allen and Rosalind Levine, the parents of two daughters, who were arrested, again by six police officers, in front of their youngest daughter because of things they had said in a WhatsApp group that parents at their daughter’s school were members of and something they had said in an email to the head teacher of their daughter’s school. It is incredible that the police thought that six police officers were needed to take these parents into custody. Julian Foulkes was under suspicion of having committed an offence under the Malicious Communications Act. In their case, they were under suspicion of having committed an offence under Section 127 of the Communications Act. Again, in due course, no further action was taken. We helped them sue the police for wrongful arrest and they too were given compensation of £20,000.

Be in no doubt that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and my noble friend Lord Moynihan are correct when they say that the process is the punishment. Even though no action was taken and no prosecutions were made in those two cases, Julian Foulkes and those parents were caused huge anxiety and distress by what they went through before the police decided to take no further action. That is a strong case for following the Law Commission of England and Wales’s advice and repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.

Briefly, I absolutely agree with the proposal in the amendment to remove the word “insulting” from the sections of the Public Order Act in which it remains. Noble Lords will not need reminding that the word “insulting” was removed from some sections of the Public Order Act, specifically Section 5 and related provisions, by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, following a campaign by Rowan Atkinson and others which pointed out how absurd it was to criminalise insulting. In one case, a young man was arrested for insulting a police officer’s horse, as noble Lords may recall. It was an effective campaign and it resulted in the word “insulting” being removed from Section 5, but it remains in many other parts of the Public Order Act. To my mind, the same arguments forcefully made by Rowan Atkinson and others at the time for removing the word “insulting” from Section 5 equally apply to the other sections of the Public Order Act where it remains. Just as we do not have a right not to be offended, we do not have a right not to be insulted.

I close with a quote from JS Mill, which I believe is from On Liberty. Mill warned that the criminal proscription of uncivil language is intrinsically likely to protect the holders of received opinion at the expense of dissidents. He wrote:

“With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like”—


we could add the word “insulting” to that list—

“the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not only be used without general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation”.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, on his courage in raising these issues. I am going to say little more than that, other than that I was instrumental in getting a sentence added to the code of conduct for members of the Liberal Democrats, which says that no one has the right to not be offended.

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[Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. It is a really important question, and I will try to remember to keep speaking in the third person, because I do want to just talk.

Has the proliferation of legislation helped prevent hate crime? During the past two decades we often saw increases, and we would question whether those increases were a product of increased hate crime, or an increased awareness of the legislation that led people to report. I am aware that, being of my generation, I am reluctant to report. There is a part of me that thinks, “You had it coming, and you should probably have taken your tie off for that walk down that street. You brought it on yourself”, added to which I do not want to waste police time. There is a conditioning that goes on with minority communities, and it takes some changing in how we think about these things to give communities permission to say that they did not have it coming, they do not deserve it, and that they have the right to talk to the police about those incidents.

I welcome the increase in reporting. Nevertheless, there has been an overreliance on using some of this legislation for incidents that should not constitute a hate crime. What happens when those cases are brought and those complaints are made, and how they are investigated, absolutely requires examination and thought. However, that does not justify the wholesale removal of hate crime legislation, which is a disproportionate response to the problem that has been identified.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment of my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I also declare my interest as a director of the Free Speech Union. I will make three arguments against the statutory hate crime regime, and against embedding the concept of hate crime in British law. As we have heard, and as we are all aware, the concept of hate crime is inextricably bound up with protected characteristics. A hate crime is either the stirring up of hatred against the bearers of certain protected characteristics, or it is a crime that becomes a hate crime because the perpetrator is motivated by hostility towards one or more of the protected characteristics of the victim.

The number of protected characteristics in this statutory framework, however, varies from law to law. Hate crime law, on the face of it, is for that reason slightly confusing and incoherent. There are three protected characteristics in the stirring-up offences in the Public Order Act, five are referenced in the aggravated offences regime, seven in the Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act, and nine in the Equality Act. How can we rationalise this anomaly? The solution of successive Governments has been constantly to add new protected characteristics to the statute book. I dare say it is possible that, in due course, amendments will be made to the Crime and Policing Bill to add yet more protected characteristics to the criminal law.

The direction of travel is clear: the number of protected characteristics is constantly expanding, and various lobby groups are constantly petitioning parliamentarians to add ever more protected characteristics to the statute book. The end point of this process will be that every characteristic is protected; but if every characteristic is protected, then no particular characteristic will enjoy special protection and we will, in effect, be back to where we started pre-1965, before the concept of hate crime raised its head in British law.

My first argument is that, in the interests of saving us all a great deal of time and effort, can we not just short-circuit the process of getting to the point where every characteristic is protected by stripping out the concept of hate crime and protected characteristics from British law and returning to the pre-1965 status quo?

My second argument has been touched upon by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, which is that the concept of hate crime is at odds with the sacrosanct principle of equality before the law. Why should bearers of protected characteristics enjoy more robust legal protections than non-bearers? Why is a criminal offence motivated by hostility towards a victim’s transgender identity punished more severely than exactly the same crime motivated by the victim’s sex? Sex is not a protected characteristic, apart from in the Equality Act. This two-tier justice—this sense that some people, because they happen to belong to protected groups, enjoy additional legal protections—fosters grievance, breeds resentment and undermines public trust in the law and in the police in particular. In 1981, around 87% of Britons reported having confidence in the police. By 2022, that had fallen to about 67%, a substantial long-term decline. I would suggest that one of the reasons for declining public trust in the police is this sense that some groups are better protected than others because of the hate crime, protected characteristic regime.

My third argument, which is probably the strongest argument, is that the aggravated offences regime introduces the concept of thought crime into British law. We need to distinguish between mens rea and the particular thought someone is having towards the victim while committing a particular crime. I do not think, when assessing the seriousness of an offence, you could exclude motive. It would be absurd not to take motive into account, but that is different from punishing a crime more severely if a person is experiencing a particular emotion—hostility, hatred—towards a particular group that the victim of the crime belongs to. Mens rea is universal and does not discriminate, but hate crime does. It says that if you are having particular thoughts about the victim when you commit the crime—importantly, not hatred in general, but hatred based on their possession of one or more protected characteristics—you should be punished more severely.

Not only is this criminalisation of certain thoughts a hallmark of a totalitarian society, but, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan pointed out, it is very hard to prove. It is very hard for a court to determine whether the person accused of the crime had the verboten thoughts while committing the crime. To paraphrase Queen Elizabeth I, we cannot open a window and see into men’s souls.

I am perfectly aware that an amendment stripping the concept of hate crime from British law has little chance of winning a Division in this House, so let me close with some more modest proposals. Do not add any more protected characteristics to the list of aggravators. Extend Section 29J of the Public Order Act, which protects various forms of criticism of religion and makes it more difficult for people to be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred. You can criticise a religion, even quite robustly, thanks to Section 29J and not be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred.

One useful improvement to the hate crime statutory regime would be to extend Section 29J to the other stirring-up offences. For example, the Free Speech Union paid for the legal defence of a former Royal Marine called Jamie Michael. He robustly criticised illegal immigrants in a Facebook video and, as a consequence, he was prosecuted for intending to stir up racial hatred. It took a jury in Merthyr Tydfil all of 17 minutes to unanimously acquit him of that offence. He should never have been prosecuted. We need a protection in the Public Order Act whereby, if you make robust criticisms, even of legal migration, you should not be vulnerable to a charge of stirring up racial hatred.

Finally, an anomaly in the stirring-up offences is that you can be prosecuted for stirring up racial hatred if the effect of your words or behaviour is likely to stir up racial hatred, even if that is not your intention—whereas you can be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred or hatred on the basis of sexual orientation only if you intended to do that. That is an anomaly, and my recommendation would be that a two-limb test has to be satisfied before one of the stirring-up offences can be made out. To successfully prosecute someone, it should be incumbent on the Crown to show not only that what they said or did was likely to stir up hatred against the protected group in question but that they intended to as well. That would bring British law to a certain extent into line with the Brandenburg test in the US first amendment, whereby you can be prosecuted only if your words or actions are not only likely to but were intended to cause imminent lawless action.

So, accepting that this controversial proposal that my two colleagues have bravely made is unlikely to ever win enough support in this House as presently constituted to win a Division, I urge the Committee to consider those more modest reforms.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, for setting out his arguments for abolishing hate crimes. He started with the issue of freedom of speech again—I absolutely understand that that is where he and those supporting him are coming from—and, interestingly, he cited the case of Lucy Connolly. I thought it might be helpful to remind the Committee of part of Article 10 in our Human Rights Act 1998, which says:

“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression”—


we are shorthanding that to “speech”—but it goes on to say:

“The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”.


I have carefully quoted all of it, but I will focus on the part that relates to what she was convicted for.

Coming back to our debate on the previous group, the problem is that there is a lot of concern about big figurehead cases when, actually, the law, the judge and the jury—actually there was no jury because Connolly pleaded guilty—were clear that she was inciting racial hatred. She pleaded guilty of saying threatening and abusive material, which is interesting given what we debated on the last group. She said:

“set fire to all the”—

effing—

“hotels full of the bastards”.

She said that at exactly the time that people were on the streets, some of whom were trying to set fire to the hotels. The tweet was viewed 310,000 times before it was deleted, and the judge specifically cited that in his summary at the end of the case.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for accepting my intervention. I just wanted to point out that the noble Baroness did not quote Lucy Connolly’s tweet in full. She added the caveat “for all I care”, which suggested not that she was intending to encourage people to burn down asylum hotels but that she was indifferent as to whether they did so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Let what the noble Baroness has said stand. I am making the point that disability, transgender identity—in my view—sexual orientation and race are things that you have and that are part of you. If the offences proposed for removal are removed by this House, that would send a signal to society that we are happy for people to stir up hatred on the grounds of those characteristics. That is not acceptable to me and I hope the noble Lord recognises that I cannot accept those amendments today, although I accept the way they have been put.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

Surely the signal that scrapping hate crime from British law would send is not that we do not care about vulnerable groups but that we think they should enjoy the same legal protections as everyone else, and that everyone should be equal in the eyes of the law.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is a view, but not one that I share. There are protections in the Public Order Act 1986 against stirring up hatred on racial or religious grounds because, yes, I am equal under the law if I have that hatred against me, but that hatred may be generated because I happen to have a racial or religious characteristic that is subject to attack. So, we are not equal under the law, because if I did not have that racial or religious characteristic I would not have been attacked. For me, that is therefore an aggravating factor and a reason why we should maintain those offences.

I go back to what I was saying a moment ago. This would remove offences of stirring up hatred under the Racial and Religious Hatred Act. It would abolish racial and religiously aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act and delete aggravating factors of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity from the Sentencing Code. At the very time when Jewish people are being attacked for being Jewish and transgender people are being attacked for being transgender, that is not acceptable. I am not saying that either noble Lord wishes to encourage or support that type of activity—I recognise from the measured way in which they put their arguments that they do not. They have an honestly held opinion that removing that legislation would be of benefit to society. I happen to disagree and I am trying to put the reason why. If there is clear water between us, that is the nature of political life. I am not imputing any characteristics to the noble Lord for bringing this measure forward.

However, the effect of this would be to compromise the ability of the courts to reflect the greater harm—as the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green, said—to undermine deterrence and clarity for police and prosecutors and to signal that those crimes are no more serious when they are motivated by hostility toward protected characteristics, contrary to long-standing principle. It would also risk eroding public confidence, particularly among people with those protected characteristics. The underreporting that the noble Baroness mentioned would absolutely nosedive if these provisions were taken away, because people would think that society had not put that down as a benchmark by which people should be judged. I am therefore afraid that I cannot accept the amendment.

I must also give notice to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, who made a very helpful plea that we should not bring forward further protected characteristics. I regret to inform him that, on Report, I will be very proud to stand here and move an amendment which puts transgender and disability as protected characteristics, in line with the manifesto on which my party stood and won an election in July 2024. We will be bringing forward amendments in the Crime and Policing Bill on Report to give effect to this change. We can have that debate openly and honestly, but I say to the Committee that society has some basic principles of respect that it should enshrine in law. The legislation that the noble Lord is seeking to remove would undermine that principle and I will not support it.

Non-crime Hate Incidents

Lord Young of Acton Excerpts

Monday 27th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Again, I say to the noble Lord that there is a review. My right honourable friend the former Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, commissioned that review in December 2024 because, self-evidently, the non-crime hate incidents regime was not working effectively. Noble Lords who were in the House for the Second Reading of the Crime and Policing Bill will have heard the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, who chairs the College of Policing, examining that issue and saying that he would bring that review forward. There are a range of things that we need to do in the review. We should not lose sight of the fact that valuable information is gained by people reporting non-crime hate incidents, but equally we should not use it to pursue events which are fruitless when police should be focusing on real crimes.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as director of the Free Speech Union. To follow up on the noble Lord’s question, as I understand it, the Metropolitan Police is no longer going to investigate non-prime hate incidents, although it will continue to record them. That appears to be the direction of travel, so other police forces, at least in England and Wales, will take a similar position. However, if NCHIs continue to be recorded, can the Minister assure the House that they will not be disclosable in enhanced DBS checks when people apply for jobs as, let us say, teachers or carers? Given that these uninvestigated reports of involvement in non-crimes are going to be recorded, it seems indefensible that they should stop people getting jobs.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Again, I genuinely do not wish to pre-empt the review being undertaken now. The review by the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing will come forward shortly and I expect the interim findings to be published in very short order, but the point that the noble Lord made is a valid one. The Metropolitan Police has said that it will not pursue non-crime hate incidents any more but will still record information because it gives valuable information about potential disability crime, racial crime and crimes against transgender people and others. It is important that we get the balance right, and one reason why my right honourable friend the then Home Secretary ordered that review was to make sure that we do not waste police resources or take the actions that the noble Lord mentioned.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Young of Acton Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as director of the Free Speech Union.

I intend to table an amendment to the Bill scrapping non-crime hate incidents. A non-crime hate incident—NCHI—is an incident or alleged incident that involves or is alleged to involve an act that is perceived by the intended victim to be motivated wholly or partly by hostility or prejudice towards one or more of their protected characteristics. This definition is hopelessly subjective, relying as it does on the perception of the complainant.

NCHIs have been recorded against a woman who said she thought her cat was a Methodist, a man who whistled the theme tune to “Bob the Builder” and former MP Amber Rudd, who had an NCHI logged against her against after a speech at the 2016 Conservative Party conference in which she called for British jobs for British workers. She was Home Secretary at the time.

The reason the police are logging these incidents is because in 2014 the College of Policing instructed them to record all hate crime reports that, on investigation, turned out not to be crimes, as NCHIs. That explains why, according to the most conservative estimate, 130,000 NCHIs have been recorded in the last 11 years.

The police should not be put in the invidious position of having to record what are often vexatious, politically motivated complaints. As the High Court judge said in 2020 when he found for Harry Miller, an ex-policeman who challenged an NCHI that had been recorded against him:

“In this country we have never had a Cheka, a Gestapo or a Stasi”.


Noble Lords may ask why it matters if an NCHI is recorded against someone’s name. It matters because they can show up in an enhanced DBS check and stop someone getting a job as a teacher or a carer. Why should the fact that someone has committed a non-crime prevent them from getting a job?

NCHIs are a breach of a sacrosanct principle of English common law: unless something is explicitly prohibited, it is permitted. The behaviour recorded in NCHIs is, by definition, not prohibited by law; it is non-criminal, so why are people being punished for it?

Recording NCHIs is also a colossal waste of police time. In a report published last year, Policy Exchange estimated that recording NCHIs takes up 60,000 hours of police time every year.

It is not just free speech lobbyists such as me who think that NCHIs have to go. His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Sir Andy Cooke, has called for their abolition. Earlier this year he said:

“We need, at times, to allow people to speak openly without the fear that their opinion will put them on the wrong side of the law … I’m a firm believer … that … non-crime hate incidents are no longer required”.


Sir Andy is not alone among senior and ex-senior police officers in his opinion of NCHIs. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, a former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, will be co-sponsoring my amendment.

The Minister said she hoped that the Bill will restore public confidence in the criminal justice system. Scrapping NCHIs, which risk turning the police into objects of ridicule, is a vital first step.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Young of Acton Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 12th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, suggested that the effect of the Bill on palliative care would be to improve it. That is not the view of my sister, an NHS nurse who has spent much of her career working in palliative care. It is her reservations about the Bill that I want to share with your Lordships. Like many noble Lords, she is concerned about the shortage of GPs and other qualified medical practitioners to see patients who want to avail themselves of the assisted dying service, and the shortage of psychiatrists to refer those patients to if there is any doubt about their capacity.

The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, in outlining the reasons for introducing the Bill, said that this law would provide reassurance to those living with a terminal illness that this option will be available to them if the worst should happen. However, as my sister points out, not all terminally ill patients will have that option, because patients will have to self-administer the life-ending drugs. As my noble friend Lady Fraser said, some terminal patients will be unable to do this if they are suffering from a neurological illness like motor neurone disease or Parkinson’s.

My sister asks the reasonable question whether terminal patients will still be eligible for treatments designed to prolong their lives, such as oncology treatments, palliative chemo, immunotherapy and hormone treatments, if they have expressed a desire to die and have already embarked on the pathway set out in the Bill. Would those patients be reluctant to undergo treatments designed to prolong their lives if they knew that they have to secure a prognosis of having less than six months to live to be eligible for the service? How are palliative care doctors and nurses supposed to help those terminal patients who have an incentive to reject their advice?

My sister acknowledges that, at some point, most palliative care patients express a wish to die, whether because of pain, nausea or extreme fatigue, because they are anxious about dying at home without adequate care or support, or because they feel they have become a burden on their families. However, in her experience, most of those patients change their minds when help does come, solutions are proposed and symptoms are alleviated, and they are grateful for the opportunity to spend extra time with their loved ones.

It is providing terminally ill patients with these opportunities that makes the work of people in hospices so rewarding. It is why many of them do it. Their sense of vocation comes from wanting to improve the health and extend the life of their patients, not from accelerating their deaths. My sister also makes the point that many terminally ill patients have considerably less than six months to live. Would there be a statutory minimum amount of time patients are expected to live for, alongside the six-month statutory maximum? Even if there is no statutory minimum, the time it will take to jump through all the hoops before a patient is prescribed life-ending drugs will mean that there is a minimum, in effect, if not in law. What is my sister to say to those patients want to end their own lives but have no realistic chance of being approved by a panel in the time they have left?

More generally, my sister is concerned that any attempt to integrate an assisted dying service into one of the most overstretched parts of the NHS, with the inevitable bureaucracy and delays, the forms incorrectly filled in, the unreturned phone calls and the missed appointments, will end up making the lives of terminally ill patients even more miserable. She says that her job often feels like working in a war zone, and fears that the Bill, particularly as currently drafted, will only make things worse.

Public Order Act 1986: Section 5

Lord Young of Acton Excerpts

Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

What I can give the noble Lord is an assurance that the police will treat all members of the community on an equal basis before the law. Where actions have been taken by any protester—be they antisemitic, anti-Islamic, anti-Christian or anti any faith—if they cross the threshold of potential investigation/prosecution/conviction, that will be taken forward on an equal basis by the police. We keep these matters under discussion all the time. There is in my view no such thing as two-tier policing. The police do a job effectively and they will take action when matters are brought to their attention.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, as the general secretary of the Free Speech Union, I declare my interest. Together with the National Secular Society, we paid for the defence of the individual referred to and we will jointly be paying for his appeal. At 2 am on Saturday, the individual in question was woken by police officers at his safe house to inform him that the Metropolitan Police were investigating a plot to kill him. Will the Minister join me in urging the police to do their utmost to protect the individual in question? We do not want a repeat of what happened in Sweden last January, when an Iraqi refugee who had repeatedly burned copies of the Koran was murdered.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. Let me put it this way. If a potential offence—which threats to kill are—is made, the police have a duty to investigate and, if the offence proves to have validity, to take action, to prepare a case, to go to the CPS and to take potential conviction action where the court will determine whether the allegation the noble Lord has made is correct. The individual concerned is appealing. I cannot comment on the appeal; Members of this House would not expect me to comment on either the conviction to date or the potential appeal. I say to the noble Lord that, if offences are potentially being committed, it is the duty of the police to investigate and take action. I will leave it—if he will let me, in a freedom of speech way—at that.