Employment Rights Bill

Lord Young of Acton Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st May 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Young of Acton]

101B: After Clause 22, insert the following new Clause—
“Protection from discrimination on the basis of political opinion or affiliationAfter section 40A of the Equality Act 2010, insert—“40B Employees and applicants: political opinion or affiliation(1) An employer (A) must not, in relation to employment by A, discriminate against, harass or victimise (in a manner prohibited by sections 39 or 40), a person (B)—(a) who is an employee of A’s;(b) who has applied to A for employment;in relation to their political opinion of affiliation.(2) For purposes of this section—(a) “political opinion” means any political opinion and a reference to a political opinion includes a reference to a lack of a political opinion;(b) “political affiliation” means membership of any political party, group or organisation which is not excluded by subsection (2)(c);(c) political opinion or affiliation does not include any opinion or affiliation which—(i) would be unworthy of respect in a democratic society,(ii) is in conflict with the fundamental rights of others, or(iii) is affiliated with any political party, group or organisation which is proscribed for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000.””

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 101B, which seeks to amend the Equality Act 2010, I will also speak to Amendment 141A, which seeks to amend the Employment Rights Act 1996. I declare my interest as the general secretary of the Free Speech Union.

These amendments would protect job applicants and employees from being discriminated against by employers for their political opinions or affiliations, provided those opinions are not

“unworthy of respect in a democratic society”,

incompatible with

“the fundamental rights of others”,

and are not connected to a

“party, group or organisation which is proscribed for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000”.

In the Telegraph on Monday, a government spokesperson said these amendments are not necessary because:

“Any employee dismissed because of their political opinions can already bring a claim of unfair dismissal at any point”.


Well, they can. But whether they are successful or not depends on whether their political beliefs satisfy the Grainger test—a reference to a case in which an employee sued his employer, Grainger PLC, for discriminating against him because he believed in manmade climate change. It was established in that case that, in order to enjoy protected status under the Equality Act, a belief had to satisfy five separate conditions. This is the Grainger test:

“The belief must be genuinely held … It must be a belief and not … an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available”—


remember that one because I am going to come back to it.

“It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour … It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance … It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others”.


Noble Lords will notice that the test I am proposing is a simpler alternative to the Grainger test. It is, in essence, just the fifth limb of the Grainger test.

So what is wrong with the Grainger test? For one thing, it is overcomplicated and leaves too much room for the personal political views of the members of a tribunal panel to creep in. That is why it has led to some arbitrary and biased decisions. For instance, the tribunal has ruled that anti-Zionism is a protected belief, while a belief in Zionism has not been granted that status, at least not yet. A belief in manmade climate change is protected—that was the judgment handed down in Grainger plc v Nicholson—but climate scepticism is not, and that has been tested in the tribunal. A belief in democratic socialism is protected but a belief in conservatism is not, and that too has been tested. In the case of Ms K Sunderland v The Hut.com Ltd—a Free Speech Union case—the tribunal ruled that a belief in a small state, low taxes, freedom of expression and as few controls on an individual’s freedom as are consistent with human rights was not protected.

That is one reason why the Free Speech Union currently has five cases in which employees have been dismissed because of their links to Reform UK. One such case is that of Saba Poursaeedi, who is in the Gallery as I speak. He lost his job at the Hightown Housing Association because he was due to stand as a Reform candidate. He was told that Reform’s policies on immigration, net zero and housing were “in direct conflict” with the values of the Hightown Housing Association—as clear a case of discrimination against someone for their political views as you could hope for. He is taking Hightown Housing Association to the tribunal but, given the judgment in Ms K Sunderland v The Hut.com, he may not be successful. That is one reason to accept these amendments: to level the playing field so that many people with right-of-centre political beliefs enjoy the same protection as people with left-of-centre political beliefs.

Another difficulty with the Grainger test is that it disadvantages open-minded people who, as the late Lord Keynes did, change their minds when the facts change. Remember the second limb of the Grainger test:

“It must be a belief and not … an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available”.


Do we really want the Equality Act to encourage dogmatism and punish open-mindedness in this way? Why should someone’s belief be undeserving of protection if it is susceptible to changing if the facts change?

The amendments would bring the Equality Act into line with the European Convention on Human Rights. Articles 9, 10, 11 and 14 provide a higher level of protection than that granted by the Equality Act, particularly Article 10, which protects freedom of expression, including the expression of political views. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would no doubt point out if she was in the House, if there is a discrepancy between the Equality Act and the convention then its shortcomings will be corrected by the courts eventually, since, as per the Human Rights Act, our courts must interpret legislation in a way that is compatible with convention rights.

However, bringing a claim before the employment tribunal is a time-consuming process and one that can be extremely expensive. The Free Speech Union helped a man to bring a case for unfair dismissal against Lloyds Bank to the tribunal two years ago, and it cost over £85,000. Not only can it be eye-wateringly expensive but it takes a long time, given the current backlog of cases. Mr Poursaeedi’s case has been scheduled for July 2027, more than a year hence. In the meantime, he and other victims of discrimination based on their political beliefs are awaiting justice. Why not short-circuit that process, bring the Equality Act into line with the convention and ease the burden on the tribunal at the same time, as well as protect people now from being discriminated against in this way, by accepting my amendments?

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I put my name down on Amendments 101B and 141A, tackling employment discrimination on the basis of political opinions, because I wanted to probe whether the Government can see that it is a real, contemporary issue that needs to be tackled, however they do it. We know from the history of the labour movement that in the bad old days, as it were, attacking people’s employment rights, sacking them and suspending them were used by employers to discipline the workforce, and they were often focused on people who had the wrong views in the workplace. Often, the trade union organisers who were involved in left-wing parties and so on were the ones who were targeted, and we had McCarthyite-type purges, red scares and anti-trade union blacklists of individuals in workplaces—shocking, but those were the bad old days and it would not happen today, except that I think we are witnessing something similar today even if the political opinions of the victims might be very different and it might take a different form. This is an under-discussed phenomenon, and I hope the Government will see that the Bill is a way of tackling it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Monks (Lab)]

My Lords, it is commonplace for individuals who express personal views that clash with the ethos of a particular company or institution to run into some trouble. Gary Lineker is the latest and most topical example, for displaying material that is considered to be antisemitic. My first experience, age 12, was my father refusing to let me display a political poster at a general election. If I had known about the Free Speech Union, maybe I would have joined the noble Lord, Lord Young, at that stage—maybe he should send Gary Lineker a membership form.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

I have.

[Lord Monks (Lab)]

Oh, he has already done it—very good.

Let us be real about this. A lot of situations call for tact and diplomacy, and for us to be careful about the way we express difficult thing. A lot of people do not do that; they say what they like, thinking it is totally justified, and they get into difficulty. Unions spend a lot of time helping people get round those kinds of situations when they have got into trouble with their employer.

I do not think the argument coming from the other side of the Chamber is a convincing one. Let us remember a bit of common sense, and that tact and diplomacy are still required in many organisations, not just the BBC—and not just with my old dad, who did not like the fact that I had a “Vote Labour” poster in the window.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I think it would be helpful if I first clarify where the law stands on this.

On Amendment 101B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, let me make it clear that religious and philosophical beliefs are already protected by the Equality Act 2010, including in the workplace. However, political belief—in the sense of a party-political affiliation or opinion—was not included as a protected characteristic in the Equality Act 2010. The noble Lord referred to the Grainger case. That case and the definition that the noble Lord read out referred to the issue of philosophical belief, which is already protected by the Act.

In 2015-16, the Equality and Human Rights Commission reviewed whether Great Britain’s equality and human rights legal framework sufficiently protects individuals with a religion or belief and the distinction of a religion or belief organisation while balancing the rights of others protected under the Equality Act 2010. The review found that the definition of religion or belief in the Equality Act is sufficiently broad to ensure wide protection for many religions or beliefs. It recommended no change to the definition of religion or belief or to the approach that the court should take in deciding whether any particular belief is protected under the Act.

We are not convinced that a political opinion or affiliation should be specifically protected by amendment to the Equality Act 2010 in contrast to other religions or beliefs. The extent of protected beliefs has been developed in case law, and we have not been presented with strong evidence that any legislative amendment is necessary. The amendment the noble Lord is proposing would potentially cause legal uncertainty over its relationship to the protected characteristic of religion or belief in Section 10 of the Equality Act, which has a much wider application than just the workplace.

The Government frequently receive calls for new protected characteristics—there have been over 21 suggested to date. While some of these carry merit, it simply would not be practical to include these all in the legislation, which would quickly become unmanageable for employers and service providers to follow, and for courts and tribunals to process and judge.

The noble Lord referred to the European Convention on Human Rights. The courts and tribunals will always be required to balance competing rights on the facts of a particular case, including the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom of expression under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as academic freedom.

Noble Lords have referred to a number of individual cases. They will appreciate that I cannot comment on individual cases. However, I can assure them that free speech is a cornerstone of British values. We are firmly committed to upholding the right of freedom of expression, which is protected by Article 10. I also absolutely agree with my noble friend Lord Monks that, in many cases—and preferably in all cases—it is ideal for these issues to be resolved by common sense at the workplace.

Turning to Amendment 141A, I seek to reassure the noble Lord that further legislative provision on this matter is not needed. Through the Bill, the Government are creating a day one right against unfair dismissal. As the noble Lord, Lord Young, acknowledged in his explanatory statement, additional protections for employees already exist under Section 108(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which currently ensures that claims for unfair dismissal on the grounds of political opinion or affiliation are not subject to any qualification period. I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that, while dismissal on the grounds of political beliefs and affiliations is not automatically unfair, if brought to a tribunal, the tribunal could find that it was unfair based on the circumstances at hand.

As we have said, these issues will very often have to be decided by a tribunal, based on the facts of the case. This will obviously also have to apply to the noble Lord’s amendment as well. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that the delays in employment tribunals are a very real challenge that we are very conscious of, and we have already reported elsewhere in other debates on the Bill that we are taking steps to address this.

Relevant case law sets out the circumstances where political beliefs may constitute a philosophical belief for the purpose of the Equality Act 2010. In these cases, discrimination provisions could apply. Following a judgment from the European Court of Human Rights, the qualifying period for bringing a claim of unfair dismissal relating to political opinions or affiliation was removed, further strengthening employees’ access to justice in instances of unfair dismissal based on political views. The Bill ensures that claims for dismissal on this basis continue to be treated in the same way as claims for automatic unfair dismissal by carving them out in a new Section 108A from the requirement that any employee must have started work before a claim can be brought.

We regard this as the right approach. Making dismissal for political opinions automatically unfair, as this amendment seeks to do, would fundamentally change the way that free speech is considered in relation to dismissal for the holding of views or the expression of views that the employer regards as unacceptable. It could sweep up such a wide range of views as to be unworkable. As sufficient protection against dismissal for political beliefs already exists, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 101B.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who spoke in support of my amendments. I echo the tribute made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, to the journalist Patrick O’Flynn, who has just been taken from us so ahead of his time. I appreciate the remarks from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who I note did not oppose the amendments, although she was a little bit sceptical about the case I had made. I also thank my noble friend Lady Verma for her intervention.

In response to the Minister’s remarks, as she says, some political beliefs are protected by the Equality Act. The issue is that not all political beliefs are protected by the Equality Act. I gave some examples and I will give just one more: an employment tribunal decision that a belief in Scottish independence is protected, but a belief in unionism is not. There is often not much rhyme or reason to these employment tribunal decisions, because the Grainger test leaves so much room for bias, interpretation and subjective judgment. I am merely asking the Government to bring the Equality Act into line with the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 14 lists the characteristics that should be protected and includes the words “political … opinion”. That means all political opinions, not just those you disagree with.

Finally, I come to the intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Monks, and point out that Saba Poursaeedi did not lose his job at the housing association because he was tactless or undiplomatic; he lost it because he was intending to stand as a candidate for Reform UK. The association had no misgivings about his performance in his role; indeed, it promoted him. He was a model of tact and diplomacy when dealing with the residents managed by the housing association. That was not the reason he was fired. The noble Lord is, of course, welcome to join the Free Speech Union, and I hope that he does. I have reached out to Gary Lineker, not to defend him in any case he might want to bring against the BBC—which I do not think he intends—but because the police have said they may now be investigating his remarks. I reached out to him and said that, if that happens, we will provide him with a solicitor and, if necessary, a barrister.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Young of Acton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Young of Acton]

83: Clause 20, page 42, line 24, at end insert—
“(1D) In this section, the definition of “harassment” cannot include conversation or speech involving the expression of an opinion on a political, moral, religious or social matter, provided the opinion is not indecent or grossly offensive.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment means employers would not have to take all reasonable steps to protect their employees from hearing or over-hearing expressions of opinion (from either employees, or third parties) on political, moral, religious or social matters that they might find offensive or upsetting by virtue of their protected characteristics, provided the opinion is not indecent or grossly offensive.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 83 I will speak to Amendments 84 to 86 and 88 in this group. I declare my interests as the general secretary of the Free Speech Union and as an employer.

As your Lordships know, Clause 20 amends Section 40 of the Equality Act to make employers liable for the harassment of their employees by third parties. Henceforth, they will have to take all reasonable steps to protect their employees from third-party harassment, and if they fail to do so, they could be sued in the employment tribunal. Do not let the proponents of Clause 20 muddy the waters by claiming it will protect workers from sexual harassment by third parties: employers are already liable for third-party sexual harassment thanks to the Worker Protection Act 2023.

Where is the evidence that non-sexual third-party harassment is a problem in the workplace? There is none in the final-stage impact assessment. For that, we have to turn to a fact sheet produced by the Office for Equality and Opportunity and the Department for Business and Trade published last year, which says:

“For the year ending March 2024, 9.2% of people aged 16 years and over who said they had experienced non-sexual harassment in the last 12 months, reported that they had been harassed by a client or member of the public contacted through work”.

But only 5.5% of the respondents in that survey reported experiencing non-sexual harassment, and 9.2% of 5.5% is 0.51%. To be clear, only 0.51% of the respondents in this survey reported experiencing non-sexual third-party harassment in the workplace or through work in the past year.

As the Equality and Human Rights Commission said in its parliamentary briefing on this clause ahead of Second Reading:

“Evidence of the prevalence of third-party harassment in the workplace, beyond sexual harassment, is limited”.


Incidentally, that is also the opinion of the Regulatory Policy Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not think it is appropriate to talk about an individual case, but can I make it absolutely clear here that we are committed to defending free speech and upholding academic freedom? The significant penalty showed that the Office for Students will take robust action where universities fail to do so. If you go to university, you must be prepared to have your views challenged, hear contrary opinions and be exposed to uncomfortable truths. We recently announced that we are giving the OfS stronger powers on freedom of speech. The sector needs to take academic freedom and freedom of speech seriously. We hope that the OfS report and regulatory action will incentivise providers to fully comply with their freedom of speech duties.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords on all sides of the Committee who have contributed to an excellent debate. Just on the final point made by the Minister, the Government’s commitment to academic freedom and free speech and upholding them in universities was not particularly clear at the beginning of the Government’s term. Bridget Phillipson torpedoed the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act within days of getting her feet under the desk and agreed only reluctantly to implement some of the clauses that were due to be implemented last year, on 1 August, thanks to a judicial review brought by the Free Speech Union.

I am not sure that the Minister responded to the very good question that my noble friend Lady Noakes asked about whether the liability of employers for third-party harassment would extend to their employees overseas.

I would like to respond in a bit of detail to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry of Muswell Hill. One of the safeguards she mentioned against the overapplication of Clause 20 is that only an employee with the relevant protected characteristic could sue if they had been offended or upset—if they felt harassed—by virtue of that protected characteristic. But that is not quite accurate. You do not have to have the protected characteristic in question to sue your employer for failing to protect someone with that protected characteristic from being harassed, as established in the case of English v Thomas Sanderson Ltd, in which someone successfully sued their employer in the employment tribunal for not protecting a notional employee with the relevant protected characteristic, when she herself did not have that protected characteristic.

The noble Baroness also said she thought it very unlikely that an employee could sue their employer for failing to take all reasonable steps to protect them from overhearing remarks, jokes, expostulations et cetera made by customers or members of the public. But in the case of Sule v Shoosmiths in the employment tribunal, a woman did successfully sue her employer, Shoosmiths, for a conversation she overheard about immigration. She was a Nigerian lady and she overheard a conversation —not directed at her—which she found upsetting or offensive by virtue of her protected characteristic. If that woman had been employed in Downing Street and had overheard a conversation between the Prime Minister and his aides last week about the speech the Prime Minister was about to give about immigration, it may well be that she could have sued the Civil Service for not taking all reasonable steps to protect her from being harassed in that way—overhearing a conversation about immigration that she found offensive or upsetting.

If the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, sincerely believes that Clause 20 is not intended to be invoked to ban banter, why not accept Amendment 88, which would exempt employers from being sued for indirect third-party harassment? We have heard the argument over and over again on the other side of the Committee that the amendments that my noble friends and I and other noble Lords have suggested as ways of improving the Bill and clarifying exactly what steps employers would need to take to protect their employees from third-party harassment are completely unnecessary because the clause is not intended for things such as overheard conversations—banter—to be in scope. But it seems a little naive to imagine that the clause will be applied only in ways that the Government currently intend. What about unintended consequences? The noble Baroness said that she was not anti-banter, just anti-harassment. I am anti-unintended consequences. If you want to avoid those unintended consequences materialising, these vexatious complaints being brought in the employment tribunal or eccentric decisions being made by the tribunal, why not clarify exactly what the limits of employers’ liability are by accepting some of these amendments?

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, accused me of erecting a straw man and said that I was trying to generate synthetic rage about the risks I claim arise from this clause. Well, it is not synthetic—it is real. I know this because the Free Speech Union has taken on at least five cases in which people have been silenced because of a misunderstanding about the scope of the Equality Act due to a belief that the Equality Act, as it stands, requires employers to protect their employees from third-party harassment.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, mentioned that one of the likely consequences of this clause is that gender-critical feminist groups might find it difficult to book spaces in pubs and other venues for fear that trans and non-binary employees of those venues might object that merely inviting women with those views into the pub would constitute a form of harassment. That has happened three times. We have cases of gender-critical feminist groups being ejected from pubs because the managers have misunderstood what their responsibilities and legal duties are under the Equality Act. They believe that those duties extend to protecting their trans and non-binary employees from being harassed by allowing third parties to discuss views they find offensive, deeply upsetting or disagreeable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I respectfully point out that we have now had more than two hours on this group of amendments and that we have just come up to 12 minutes for the response to this long debate. A fair person would say that this is excessive free speech. I respectfully ask the noble Lord to bring his remarks to a conclusion, so that we can make some progress.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

I will bring my remarks to a conclusion. Sorry, I thought I had 15 minutes. I misunderstood.

[A noble Lord]

You do.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

Oh, I do, apparently—and there have only been 12 minutes. But I will not use my allotted time of three more minutes.

I conclude by saying that the risk of over-application of this clause—by hospitality sectors, in football grounds and in our universities—is not a straw man. We see that risk materialising due to a misunderstanding— an imagining—that third-party harassment is already part of the Equality Act, when it is not. That risk will multiply when this clause goes on the statute book. It is not a straw man or confected rage. If the Government think it is a straw man—if they are absolutely convinced that none these risks will actually materialise—at the very least they should make that clear by accepting these amendments. They are losing nothing if they think they do not rule out of scope stuff that they do not want to be in scope in any case. I urge them to accept the amendments for the sake of clarity and for the sake of employers.

I will make one final point. When the noble Baroness—

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

I think the noble Lord has misunderstood that his 10 to 15 minutes were for his earlier contribution, not for responding to the Minister. He has made some really good points a number of times now. Can we have a break, please?

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

Okay, I will wind up.

I will make just one final point. The Minister said that, in due course, the employment tribunal will make it clear that reasonable steps with respect to protecting employees from harassment will not be the same steps that employers are expected to take to protect their employees from third-party harassment, as opposed to employer-employer harassment. That may well be the case, but what that amounts to saying is that the jurisprudence in the employment tribunal, when it comes to the definition of harassment, will not be a particularly reliable guide for employers, when it comes to how they should define harassment when protecting their employees from third-party harassment. What she is saying, in effect, is that, if you cannot rely on the definition of what a reasonable step is in the ET hitherto, employers will be in the dark. They will have to chart these uncharted waters. Would it not be helpful to employers—and a boon to the beleaguered hospitality sector industry in particular—to make it clear, by accepting these amendments, what their liabilities are and are not?

Finally—

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

I was going to say the final words: I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 83 withdrawn.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Young of Acton Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 27th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Acton (Con) (Maiden Speech)]

My Lords, I would like to say how difficult my task is, because I have to follow three such excellent maiden speeches. I congratulate the noble Baronesses, Lady Berger and Lady Gray of Tottenham, and my noble friend Lady Cash. I thank my noble friend and all the noble Lords who have welcomed me with such warm words, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Burns—my fellow QPR supporter.

I asked various people for advice before thinking about what to say in my maiden speech, and I was given three quite strong pieces of advice: thank the doorkeepers, praise the people who introduced you, and keep it short. For inspiration, I looked up the maiden speech of my father, Lord Young of Dartington, who was made a life Peer by the late noble Lord, Lord Callaghan of Cardiff, in 1978, but his maiden proved not to be terribly helpful: he forgot to thank the doorkeepers, he did not praise either of the people who had introduced him, and he spoke for 18 minutes. Noble Lords will be reassured to know that, in that respect at least, I do not intend to follow in his footsteps. I thank the doorkeepers, Black Rod and her staff, the Clerk of the Parliaments and all the clerks, and all the wonderful people who work here and have gone out of their way to help me when they found me wandering lost along one of the corridors.

When I heard the expression “corridors of power”, I did not realise that there were quite so many of them. I have no sense of direction and have made various errors—schoolboy errors—trying to navigate this place. For instance, I entered the Chamber the other day, remembered to bow to the Throne, took my place with what I thought was the minimum of fuss and congratulated myself on having done it—with some élan, I thought. A moment later, I got a text message from my noble friend Lord Effingham, which read as follows: “Lord Young, on the basis that you have taken the Conservative Whip, may I please suggest that you sit on the Conservative Benches?” I then noticed I was surrounded by Labour Peers.

When my elevation was announced, I wrote an article in the Spectator in which I said that I thought I was only the second child of a life Peer to be made a life Peer—the other being the late Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville. In fact, it turns out I am not the only child of a life Peer in this House, and I take this opportunity to apologise to the following people: the noble Lords, Lord Maude of Horsham, Lord Palumbo of Southwark, Lord Prior of Brampton, Lord Soames of Fletching and Lord Wolfson of Aspley Guise, the noble Baronesses, Lady Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury, Lady Chisolm of Owlpen and Lady Jay of Paddington, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Smith of Cluny, the noble Lord, Lord Pitkeathley of Camden Town, whose mother, the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, also sits in this House, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey of Didcot.

I really should have remembered that last one because the noble Lord’s father, the late Lord Vaizey of Greenwich, was one of the two people who introduced my father in 1978—and whom he forgot to thank. I do not want to make that mistake, so I thank my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, whom I am also proud to call my close friends. I also thank my excellent mentors—like the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, I needed two—my noble friend Lady Evans of Bowes Park and, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Borwick.

As was disclosed, I am a keen QPR fan and season ticket holder. I am the editor-in-chief of the Daily Sceptic, a news publishing site I set up in 2020, and an associate editor of the Spectator, where I have written a weekly column for about 25 years. I am interested in education, having co-founded one of England’s first free schools, as well as three other free schools and the multi-academy trusts they now sit within, alongside five other schools. I am the founder and general secretary of the Free Speech Union, a mass membership public interest body that stands up for the speech rights of its members and campaigns for free speech more widely. In the past five years, with the help of our extremely able chairman, my noble friend Lord Biggar, the FSU has come to the defence of over 3,500 people, not all of whom share my political views.

The FSU really is a non-partisan organisation, and I often find myself defending people whose views I do not share. For instance, I have been a lifelong supporter of Israel, ever since my father sent me to a kibbutz when I was 17. My late father-in-law, Ivo Bondy, escaped from Prague in 1939 by the skin of his teeth. He was Jewish, and I was one of the co-founders of the British Friends of Israel shortly after 7 October. Yet, the FSU has come to the defence of several people who found themselves in trouble for their outspoken support of the Palestinian cause.

Before I sit down, I will say a few words about the Bill. One misunderstanding has arisen about the extension of liability for third-party harassment. The Bill does not extend employer liability for the sexual harassment by third parties of their employees. Employees are already protected from third-party sexual harassment by the Employment Rights Act 1996. Clause 20 extends employers’ liability for the non-sexual harassment of their employees by third parties, and I fear that that will have a chilling effect on free speech. How will the owners of hospitality businesses—publicans, for instance—protect their employees from being harassed by third parties, given that the employment tribunal has defined harassment as including indirect harassment, which includes overheard conversations that are not necessarily directed at them? How will publicans be expected to protect their employees from overhearing customers’ conversations that they may find offensive or upsetting by virtue of their protected characteristics? 

When it was suggested in the other place that pubs might have to employ “banter bouncers” to police the conversations of customers, as one of the “reasonable steps” publicans are expected to take to protect their employees from indirect harassment, it was met with derisive, dismissive laughter from the Government Benches—as being a ludicrous strawman. But I do not think it is a strawman. Before we dismiss that concern as unduly alarmist, I draw attention to a briefing published earlier this week by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, ably chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner. The EHRC pointed out that employers will have to balance the rights of third parties to express their legally protected beliefs with the rights of their employees not to be harassed. That is an extremely complicated area of law, and I do not envy publicans trying to get their heads around that.

The EHRC briefing states:

“The interaction of the third-party’s protection from discrimination and the employee’s protection from harassment is complex and is likely to be challenging for employers to navigate”.


For challenging, read “expensive”, since publicans will have to take legal advice on how to limit their liability. I wonder how many publicans will decide, in the face of all their other difficulties, that this new duty, the cost of complying with it and the additional risks entailed mean that the game is no longer worth the candle.

According to the Campaign for Real Ale, pubs are closing at the rate of 37 a week. I hope your Lordships will think carefully before approving the clause in this Bill which I fear will accelerate the erasure of such a vital part of our history and heritage: the good old British pub.