Employment Rights Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I rise with some trepidation to raise some problems with these amendments. I have to say that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, made an absolutely brilliant, compelling case for her amendments and has been amply backed up by others. However, I still think that, if you look at what these amendments would do, there is a danger here.

We have already discussed, in our debates on recent groups, mission creep in relation to the concept of harassment; we have talked about it a great deal. I am concerned about subsection (2)(a) of the proposed new clause to be inserted by Amendment 100, which relates to

“the prevention of gender-based violence and harassment of those in the workplace including the prevention of physical, emotional, and psychological abuse”.

Bringing that into the law would introduce a very wide and broad set of rules into the workplace.

I am absolutely sympathetic to taking on some of the problems that we have seen in workplaces—for example, people being stalked at their workplace or being stalked by fellow workers, as well as the kinds of domestic abuse that have been described, with the Harrods example of rape and so on—because all of those things are terrible. However, we should not shy away from the fact that it will be quite difficult to legislate on every aspect of every intervention between employees in a workplace if we are going to broaden it out to emotional and psychological issues. That is one problem: it is overly subjective.

The use of the phrase “gender-based violence” is in danger of confusing us as well, because we now know that there is a confusion between gender and biological sex. We should not shy away from the fact that that language has been confusing for some time. We need some clarity, not muddying. If we call it “gender”, this could turn workplaces into sites of perpetual ideological grievances and finger-pointing.

Let me give noble Lords an example. Proposed new subsection (3C), which would be inserted by Amendment 99, says that the aim is a “gender-responsive approach”. This, it says,

“means taking into account the various needs, interests, and experiences of people of different gender identities, including women and girls”.

I point out that women and girls are not a subsection of gender identities. Gender identities are, “Have ’em if you want ’em”, in my view. If we are serious about tackling violence against women and girls, do not throw them into this mix. We certainly cannot have gender identity created as a legal category by a well-intentioned amendment that would, in fact, undo the clarity we have recently had. These amendments completely conflict with the Supreme Court’s clarification of the distinction between biological sex as fact in law and gender identity, which is, I am afraid, often not just what people choose but part of an ideological activism that has, I would argue, been incredibly damaging to sex-based rights for women—often in the workplace.

We need to be very careful about proposed new subsection (3B) in Amendment 99. It talks of

“the duty of every employer to provide training to all employees on recognising and preventing violence and harassment in the workplace, with a focus on gender-responsive approaches”.

I get worried when the bosses are asked to provide training that is not about how you do your job, because training has become the vehicle that is often used not to protect employees from harassment but for viewpoint conformity and as an insidious form of harassment of anyone who does not conform.

We have to consider what this training consists of. I do not want to just say, “Oh yes, training, that is a good idea then”. The danger of training is that it can introduce all sorts of problems; and, in fact, training was the way that in most workplaces we now know that people misunderstood equality law. It was via training, informed by third-party organisations involved in the gender issue, that they started to adopt what has been called, by some KCs, “Stonewall law”. That is why so many organisations are now saying, “We were doing what we thought was legal”.

To finish, I will show the Committee how complicated it is. I hope noble Lords have read that incredibly moving and harrowing interview with Karen Danson, one of the eight Darlington nurses who are taking legal action against their employer, County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust, after they were forced to share a changing room with a male nurse who identifies as a woman and calls himself Rose.

As Karen explained in the interview, she had been abused as a child. She goes to work, where, as a nurse, she has to get to changed. In walks Rose, wearing only boxer shorts that are full of holes—details do matter in this instance—who keeps asking Karen why she is not getting changed. Karen, understandably, feels very disturbed. These amendments are about sexual harassment in the workplace. Karen and her colleagues go to their bosses and HR and say, “This is our changing room. We do not want to get changed in front of this man, however he identifies. What will you do about it?” What did HR say? It said that the nurses were the problem, called them transphobic and said they needed to be re-educated in trans inclusion; in other words, they were about to be sent on a training course.

I make my point that if you are the wrong kind of victim in a workplace in an ideological sense, you could be the victim of the training which tries to get you to accept “right” things, rather than protects your rights. I really admire the spirit of the way that the amendments were introduced. However, they are absolutely wrong-headed and we should reject them.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I will just say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that the greatest danger we have is that the Bill passes and yet we have groups of people in the workplace who are not in any way protected, or not sufficiently protected, either from violence or from harassment. I thought the case was brilliantly made by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, backed up by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

I say to the Minister: carpe diem. Here is an opportunity to make sure that there is not a gaping omission in the work that the whole Bill is attempting to do to provide proper protection in the workplace. I find it quite ingenious that the approach here is to try to use the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act. If the Minister has a better way of doing it, I am sure that everyone will be very eager and willing to listen. It contains within it the capacity for both investigation and enforcement. When we talked in previous groups, it was very evident that investigation and enforcement are very often the vital missing elements in the arrangements that we have set in place today. This seems to me to have been a very sensible approach to try to find an organisation that is appropriate and has the relevant kind of teeth.

I will not attempt to expand on the case as it has been made so eloquently. I am sort of filling in on this Bill when others have been called away—in this particular case to a NATO meeting. But I would have been very pleased to add my name to these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 101B, which seeks to amend the Equality Act 2010, I will also speak to Amendment 141A, which seeks to amend the Employment Rights Act 1996. I declare my interest as the general secretary of the Free Speech Union.

These amendments would protect job applicants and employees from being discriminated against by employers for their political opinions or affiliations, provided those opinions are not

“unworthy of respect in a democratic society”,

incompatible with

“the fundamental rights of others”,

and are not connected to a

“party, group or organisation which is proscribed for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000”.

In the Telegraph on Monday, a government spokesperson said these amendments are not necessary because:

“Any employee dismissed because of their political opinions can already bring a claim of unfair dismissal at any point”.


Well, they can. But whether they are successful or not depends on whether their political beliefs satisfy the Grainger test—a reference to a case in which an employee sued his employer, Grainger PLC, for discriminating against him because he believed in manmade climate change. It was established in that case that, in order to enjoy protected status under the Equality Act, a belief had to satisfy five separate conditions. This is the Grainger test:

“The belief must be genuinely held … It must be a belief and not … an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available”—


remember that one because I am going to come back to it.

“It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour … It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance … It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others”.


Noble Lords will notice that the test I am proposing is a simpler alternative to the Grainger test. It is, in essence, just the fifth limb of the Grainger test.

So what is wrong with the Grainger test? For one thing, it is overcomplicated and leaves too much room for the personal political views of the members of a tribunal panel to creep in. That is why it has led to some arbitrary and biased decisions. For instance, the tribunal has ruled that anti-Zionism is a protected belief, while a belief in Zionism has not been granted that status, at least not yet. A belief in manmade climate change is protected—that was the judgment handed down in Grainger plc v Nicholson—but climate scepticism is not, and that has been tested in the tribunal. A belief in democratic socialism is protected but a belief in conservatism is not, and that too has been tested. In the case of Ms K Sunderland v The Hut.com Ltd—a Free Speech Union case—the tribunal ruled that a belief in a small state, low taxes, freedom of expression and as few controls on an individual’s freedom as are consistent with human rights was not protected.

That is one reason why the Free Speech Union currently has five cases in which employees have been dismissed because of their links to Reform UK. One such case is that of Saba Poursaeedi, who is in the Gallery as I speak. He lost his job at the Hightown Housing Association because he was due to stand as a Reform candidate. He was told that Reform’s policies on immigration, net zero and housing were “in direct conflict” with the values of the Hightown Housing Association—as clear a case of discrimination against someone for their political views as you could hope for. He is taking Hightown Housing Association to the tribunal but, given the judgment in Ms K Sunderland v The Hut.com, he may not be successful. That is one reason to accept these amendments: to level the playing field so that many people with right-of-centre political beliefs enjoy the same protection as people with left-of-centre political beliefs.

Another difficulty with the Grainger test is that it disadvantages open-minded people who, as the late Lord Keynes did, change their minds when the facts change. Remember the second limb of the Grainger test:

“It must be a belief and not … an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available”.


Do we really want the Equality Act to encourage dogmatism and punish open-mindedness in this way? Why should someone’s belief be undeserving of protection if it is susceptible to changing if the facts change?

The amendments would bring the Equality Act into line with the European Convention on Human Rights. Articles 9, 10, 11 and 14 provide a higher level of protection than that granted by the Equality Act, particularly Article 10, which protects freedom of expression, including the expression of political views. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would no doubt point out if she was in the House, if there is a discrepancy between the Equality Act and the convention then its shortcomings will be corrected by the courts eventually, since, as per the Human Rights Act, our courts must interpret legislation in a way that is compatible with convention rights.

However, bringing a claim before the employment tribunal is a time-consuming process and one that can be extremely expensive. The Free Speech Union helped a man to bring a case for unfair dismissal against Lloyds Bank to the tribunal two years ago, and it cost over £85,000. Not only can it be eye-wateringly expensive but it takes a long time, given the current backlog of cases. Mr Poursaeedi’s case has been scheduled for July 2027, more than a year hence. In the meantime, he and other victims of discrimination based on their political beliefs are awaiting justice. Why not short-circuit that process, bring the Equality Act into line with the convention and ease the burden on the tribunal at the same time, as well as protect people now from being discriminated against in this way, by accepting my amendments?

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I put my name down on Amendments 101B and 141A, tackling employment discrimination on the basis of political opinions, because I wanted to probe whether the Government can see that it is a real, contemporary issue that needs to be tackled, however they do it. We know from the history of the labour movement that in the bad old days, as it were, attacking people’s employment rights, sacking them and suspending them were used by employers to discipline the workforce, and they were often focused on people who had the wrong views in the workplace. Often, the trade union organisers who were involved in left-wing parties and so on were the ones who were targeted, and we had McCarthyite-type purges, red scares and anti-trade union blacklists of individuals in workplaces—shocking, but those were the bad old days and it would not happen today, except that I think we are witnessing something similar today even if the political opinions of the victims might be very different and it might take a different form. This is an under-discussed phenomenon, and I hope the Government will see that the Bill is a way of tackling it.