(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hope that I can start by referring to the amendments to Part 2 before us in the most enthusiastic terms of which I am capable. I congratulate the Minister because I know that he played a significant role in ensuring that these amendments include the valuable provisions with regard to restorative justice. The provisions are substantially overdue; the evidence has been available for us to see; and in the debates in this House there has been a unanimity of view as to the positive role that it could play. All that I would caution, if I may, is the importance of ensuring that the proper groundwork is done in regard to its introduction and execution. It is first of all critical that victims see it as it is indeed intended to be—something that is meant to serve them as well as the community generally. Victims are at the centre of restorative justice and the evidence suggests that if conducted properly it provides them with real reassurance that those in authority recognise the importance of putting them at the centre of the policy to be adopted.
Turning to Part 1, I listened with great care to what was said by noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Ramsbotham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Bearing in mind the admonition of the Minister that we are treating this as a Second Reading in our approach, I should say that I strongly support what they have said. I do not know whether it is right to refer to expressions of concern or expressions of alarm, but whichever term is used it is certainly endorsed by me.
The noble Lord may be right about that. I am asking the Minister a question about the thinking. One has to recognise that there are cases where the prosecution cannot actually prove the case, or it would be enormously expensive to do so, with uncertain prospects. I can see that there may be circumstances where getting a regime that for example secures compliance for the future may be worth while. However, that is only my speculation as to why “may” is there rather than “must”, which I would have expected based on the conditional cautions.
Paragraph 5(3)(e) talks about the implementation of a “compliance programme” and I would like the noble Lord to say something about what sort of compliance programmes the Government have in mind, and whether they would include, for example, the putting in place of monitors, and whether that is something that can be sufficiently dealt with by the words here or whether it needs some specific language. As regards paragraph 6 of the code on DPAs, is it intended, as my noble friend Lord Beecham asked, for the code to be placed before Parliament—as is the code for the crown prosecutors, if my recollection serves me right? I can see that Parliament would have an interest in that.
Paragraphs 7 and 8 would require the prosecutor to apply at different stages for declarations in certain terms that entering into a DPA is likely to be,
“ in the interests of justice”—
and that the proposed terms of the DPA—
“are fair and reasonable and proportionate”.
Is it necessary to ask a court to do that? Plainly, the court must be asked to approve the solution. However, I am not sure whether one should also ask the court to make declarations as to these matters. I would like to hear from the Minister as to the thinking behind that. As I understand it, under paragraph 8, the final hearing must be in public, whereas the preliminary application would be in private. I would be grateful for confirmation as to that.
Paragraph 11 deals with discontinuance of the DPA. I am probably missing it but I looked for a clear statement that if there is a finding of non-compliance by the court, that is likely to result in criminal proceedings being instituted. Finally, I, too, would welcome hearing what the proposals are in relation to addition to this schedule and the procedure that will be adopted.
I apologise for that quite long list. This is an important provision. It is a bit difficult to see how we are going to deal with it in a second Committee stage. I am looking forward with great interest to seeing whether the Minister is actually moving the whole of the schedule now so it goes into the Bill and we then apply to amend it, but I accept his assurances that if that is what happens, we will be able to apply to amend it hereafter.
My Lords, I think that this is a very positive step and could be very valuable in the administration of justice. We should be aware that in the States there has been a risk of unattractive practices developing in this field, but as long as we have the appropriate code and safeguards, that should be able to be overcome.
I listened with care to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, on limiting this to corporate bodies and not extending it to individuals. I suggest that there is substance in his concern, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, feels may have force. The danger of not allowing individuals also to be dealt with is not the risk of them getting away with it, but of preventing an agreement being reached when it should be reached and when the very extensive powers indicated in paragraph 5(3) would be of great benefit to the public. I draw particular attention to compensating victims, donating money to charity and disgorging any profits made by P. The reality is that behind every company there are individuals. If the individuals are not going to be covered by the agreements, the agreements will be very much less attractive in practice to the corporate sector than they would if individuals could be included. Perhaps we should look at the question of whether it would not be better to enable the matter to be dealt with once and for all, for both officers of a company and the company itself.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment would allow judicial reviews of immigration and asylum cases and nationality matters to be transferred from the High Court, where judicial review is currently heard, to the Upper Tribunal, as my noble friend has explained. To many of your Lordships, this must feel like Groundhog Day. Parliament made clear its views on whether JRs should be transferred from the High Court into the tribunals once in 2007, during debate on what is now the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, and again in 2009, during debates on what is now Section 53 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. It has said no and has said so powerfully. The arguments against the Upper Tribunal being entrusted with this responsibility still hold good.
The 2007 Act established a new regime, bringing together several tribunal jurisdictions into one structure comprising the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, or UT for short. The Act allowed for the transfer of certain JR applications from the High Court to the UT but, as a result of amendments made during its passage, excluded immigration and nationality JRs from the cases that could be transferred. Parliament returned to this matter, as my noble friend has reminded us, in 2009 during debates on the then Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill and again rejected a proposal that would permit the wholesale transfer of immigration and nationality JRs.
The compromise reached was that a JR concerned with a decision on a fresh claim for asylum—that is, one made after an earlier claim and any appeals against its refusal had finally been rejected—was made transferable. Since 2009, the once separate Asylum and Immigration Tribunal has been transferred into the two-tier structure, with an immigration and asylum chamber in the First-tier Tribunal and in the UT. Meanwhile, on a case-by-case basis, the High Court has transferred a few JRs against local authorities concerning the age of separated children seeking asylum to the UT where they have ended up in the immigration and asylum chamber. However, age-dispute JRs can be transferred because they are not decisions about immigration or nationality and are therefore not affected by the 2007 Act. These cases start in the administrative court, but can be transferred to the UT on a case-by-case basis. There have been only four reported cases to date.
Fresh-claim JRs are transferred as a class. There are no reported cases yet and only one case that the tribunal was to hear. The UT has no experience of hearing JR cases so there is no way of assessing whether it is likely to cope well or badly with them. Meanwhile, although there is power to transfer fresh-claim judicial reviews from the Outer House of the Court of Session in Scotland to the UT, that power has never been exercised. I can do no better than cite the comments of the late Lord Kingsland on Report on the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill. He said,
“first, the Government have broken their promise to your Lordships’ House not to introduce primary legislation permitting the transfer of judicial review matters in asylum and immigration cases until we have sufficient evidence that the system for judicial transfers in other classes of case are working well. Secondly, the Opposition and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, would be extremely unhappy to permit such transfers unless we were satisfied that the transferred AIT single-tier regime to the Upper and Lower Tribunals did indeed have the effect of leading to much fairer and more timely decisions, thus reducing substantially the overall number of judicial review cases … Thirdly, as I have indicated, judicial review is a crucial component in the struggle to protect the individual. Many of these cases raise issues, at best, of the freedom of the individual and, at worst, of torture and death. It is vital that it remains open to someone in such cases to have the application heard by a High Court judge”.—[Official Report, 1/4/09; cols. 1126-27.]
There is no such evidence yet. Powers to transfer JRs into the UT are being sought when it has done only a handful of age assessment cases and has not built up any track record whatever in dealing with fresh-claim JRs. High Court judges have sat in the UT, but there are also judges in that chamber who were adjudicators and special adjudicators of the former Immigration Appellate Authority and its successors. They have never heard cases outside the immigration and asylum tribunal jurisdiction, but the amendment would allow them to deal with JRs on which they have zero experience.
Speaking for the then Government in 2007, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton of Upholland, accepted that JRs in immigration cases were particularly sensitive. The point was underlined by a forceful observation from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in Grand Committee in 2006. She said:
“I support my noble and learned friend Lord Lloyd of Berwick in relation to the requirement to have someone of the level of a High Court judge to hear a judicial review in the tribunal. It would be invidious for there not to be a judge of that rank dealing with it. I support my noble and learned friend very strongly”.—[Official Report, 13/12/06; col. GC 68.]
Then there was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who said at Second Reading of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill:
“If the effect ... is that the administrative court would be bound to transfer judicial review applications in all immigration cases, I would be strongly opposed to it”.—[Official Report, 11/2/09; col. 1142.]
The then Minister, the noble Lord, Lord West, winding up that debate, said that,
“the senior judiciary are very supportive of the clause”—[Official Report, 11/2/09; col. 1211.]
that is, the clause providing for the transfer—which he said was shown by the responses of the President of the Queen’s Bench Division, the Master of the Rolls and the Senior President of Tribunals to the consultation on immigration appeals. However, the Master of the Rolls had merely indicated that he supported the views of the President of the Queen’s Bench, who in turn stated that proposals for transfer of JRs in general were welcome, but emphasised that:
“Some of them are plainly suited to the Administrative Court and should remain there”.
The Senior President of the Tribunals agreed with him. The Court of Session judges did not welcome the proposal. They said that,
“any decision as to a more general transfer of judicial review jurisdiction in this area—
immigration—
“should be made only once the Upper Tribunal has gained extensive experience of implementing its proposed remit”.
No such extensive experience has been gained. Others, including the Immigration Law Practitioners Association, the Constitutional and Administrative Law Bar Association, the Glasgow Immigration Practitioners’ Group, the Law Society, the Refugee Legal Centre, the Refugee Council and individual lawyers, have expressed views similar to those of the judges of the Court of Session.
As the noble Lord has made clear, there is a considerable history here. When he is referring to the bodies that have indicated their objections, could he help the House by indicating whether the objections are indeed to the present amendment or to an earlier one?
As I understand it, my Lords, these representations and views have been expressed by the bodies that I have mentioned in response to this particular legislation. I am relying particularly on the excellent briefing that we have received from ILPA, which quotes all those authorities.
The amendment would allow for the transfer of any immigration or nationality JR by decision of the High Court, the Northern Ireland High Court or the Court of Session in the individual case, and empower the Lord Chief Justice, with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor, to direct that all immigration and nationality JRs or any specific class of these JRs must be transferred. The temptation would be to exercise the powers in an effort to reduce the load on the higher courts, but the right solution is to improve the quality of decision-making so that there are fewer litigants seeking JRs. The number is likely to fall in any case because of the LASPO Act provision that legal aid is no longer available for ordinary immigration cases.
ILPA has set out constructive suggestions for reducing the number of JR applications and indeed the burden on the appeals system as a whole. In 2009, for instance, it requested that UKBA disclose information on the number of immigration and asylum JRs that are conceded by the agency or in which the agency has agreed to make a fresh decision without the need for the process to be seen all the way through. The agency told ILPA that it was too expensive to retrieve this information, but it gave some data on the very large number of immigration JRs that are withdrawn: 1,185 cases in 2006 and 1,532 in 2007. We do not have more recent figures but I hope that my noble friend will tell us what the latest figure is for 2011, to compare with a total of some 9,000 given by my noble friend Lord McNally in his letter to the chair of the JCHR on 12 June.
As was recognised in 2006-07, immigration and asylum JRs are particularly sensitive. It remains the case that the tribunal has not demonstrated the same ability to deal with UKBA’s conduct as a litigant as has the High Court. The agency’s failures to respond in a timely manner to directions from the tribunal to disclose relevant matters or adequately to plead its case are problems that continue to beset all too many cases.
I will not try the House’s patience by going through all ILPA’s suggestions, but there is one that I think will particularly appeal to your Lordships. The Home Office could address the many hundreds of Zimbabwean cases that have contributed substantially to the workload since 2005 by reviewing and, where appropriate, conceding. Many of these cases will include findings of fact justifying a grant of refugee status in the light of the country guidance determination in RN (Zimbabwe), which has just been held not to have been overturned in JG and CM (Zimbabwe), the text of which is awaited.
In conclusion, the reasons given in your Lordships’ debates in 2007 and 2009 for not transferring more JR cases to the UT—that immigration and asylum JRs were the most sensitive cases, and the new chambers’ handling of JRs required testing first—still hold good. The number of cases going to the High Court and Court of Appeal could be reduced by other means, and restricting access to the higher courts would merely encourage or allow for poor decision-making. Decisions of the Court of Appeal on appeals from the UT show that it continues to be the higher courts, rather than the UT, that call for the UK Border Agency to account for its conduct as a litigant.
My Lords, I will say a few words in support of this amendment. In order to understand its importance, one has to take into account the matters that were so clearly outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, just before I rose to my feet. The history that he has described indicates that this is not an amendment that should be lightly accepted. Time has moved on since some of the matters to which he referred arose, and the experience so far of the quality of the tribunals, particularly the Upper Tribunal, has been particularly good.
The other important matter is the resource of High Court judges. The demands for the services of High Court judges are extensive. At present, there is the grave danger that judicial review will not be able to achieve one of its most necessary characteristics, which is to deal expeditiously with the urgent applications that come before it. This is critical because sometimes the very fact of the application for judicial review can and does delay matters of great importance—I hope am not overstepping the mark in saying matters, often, of national importance. The information that is available as to the pressure on High Court judges makes clear that they are overstrained. That is one side of the picture.
The other side of the picture is that the Upper Tribunal has huge expertise, which except in a very small number of cases is not available to High Court judges. Therefore, it is not apparent that they have the ability to deal with these cases as expeditiously and effectively as the tribunal. The danger in not accepting this amendment is that the desire for excellence could be the enemy of the good, and I urge the Committee to be sympathetic to it. It is my belief that justice can and should be ensured, as it always is in this country when these matters are dealt with by the tribunal as proposed here. I know that those who are responsible for arranging the proper dispatch of business in the different parts of the High Court attach the greatest importance to this amendment. They see it as a lifeline.
My Lords, I was not a Member of your Lordships’ House at the times when, as the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, reminded the Committee, similar matters were debated at some length. Therefore, I come to this amendment with an open mind, which creates something of a precedent in my case. I listened very carefully to the Minister’s explanation and justification of the amendment and, of course, to the critique of it from the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. Although many of us have received extensive briefings about various aspects of this Bill and other legislation, I have not received any particular briefing from any of the organisations referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, on this point.
I initially leant towards his line of argument, but am comforted in the first instance by the fact that the Lord Chief Justice’s role will be critical in initiating any further transfers, as well as by the wisdom and experience of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, of course, who commends the amendment to the Committee. Perhaps when he replies the Minister will indicate whether it is the Government’s intention to review progress at some stage, perhaps in conjunction with the Lord Chief Justice, to see whether the fears that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, enunciated are grounded in relativity, and if they are to create an opportunity for a change in policy, either slowing down the additional transfers or possibly rethinking the policy.
As we have been reminded on previous occasions, it is the Government’s policy to conduct a post-legislative review within three to five years. Perhaps an indication that that will also be the case in relation to this matter might satisfy—for the time being, at any rate—some of the doubts that have been raised. If it is necessary to step back in the light of experience, that could then happen. For the moment, I am disposed to accept the Government’s amendment and rely very heavily on the support given to it by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf.
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I agree entirely with what has been said so far about the inappropriateness of altering the Lord Chancellor’s position from that contained in the 2005 Act. I do not propose to repeat the reasons for that, since they have already been given. I will try to identify, however, one or two further reasons why the same conclusion should be reached.
The relationship between Parliament and the judiciary is central to the operation of our constitution and the Lord Chancellor’s ability in the future. I endorse what has been said about the present Lord Chancellor and I recognise his good motives, but the constitution as devised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and myself, first in the concordat and then in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, referred specifically to the role of the Lord Chancellor being limited to giving either an affirmative response or applying a veto. That was done because it needed to be clear beyond peradventure that he had the responsibility of saying no to a recommendation of the Judicial Appointments Commission, if anyone was to do so. Because of that, if he did not exercise that power, the situation would be one where it could not be said afterwards that the Government of the day had not given consent to an appointment which was in fact made.
Secondly, there is a provision in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 which provides that if the Lord Chancellor decides to exercise his veto, he has to do so openly and give reasons for it. If he is a member of the commission responsible for the appointment, the part that the Lord Chancellor plays will not be known. The experience in other jurisdictions is clear. One of the problems of having an independent appointments commission is that deals will be done. For example, if the Lord Chief Justice and the president are both up for appointment at the same time, it is only human nature for the commission to come to a decision. If the members of the commission do not all agree, they will give the Lord Chancellor either the Lord Chief Justice or the president, as long as they have the other appointment. That would be highly undesirable.
For example, it can be seen clearly in other jurisdictions that the Executive can control what the judiciary does if it can only achieve a senior judge who is sympathetic to its cause. I will cite but one example. One could assign a judge who is regarded as giving unhelpful decisions to parts of the jurisdiction that are unattractive in which to operate. So far, that has not happened here. We do not want to make it easier for it to happen than is the position at the present time.
My final point is this. The amendment must be looked at in conjunction with the amendment we considered on Monday whereby the Lord Chancellor would give up any responsibility for the appointment of the great majority of judges. We are going to have a situation where he does not exercise any powers in regard to a large number of judges and, in addition, he does not openly take an active part in the appointment of very senior judges. I suggest that such a position would be a retrograde one, and therefore the amendment is one that the Committee should look upon favourably.
My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble and learned Lord in the constitutional points that he and others have made in supporting this amendment. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, summed it up very well in his Second Reading speech when he said that if this provision in the Government’s Bill went through, the Lord Chancellor would be in a position of giving advice to himself, which in itself is anomalous, if nothing more.
As other noble Lords have made the constitutional points most effectively, I wonder whether I could raise just an administrative question with the Minister. It seems to me surprising that the Government should propose such a potentially flexibly arrangement for the Lord Chancellor in relation to these very senior appointments as it seems to be the Lord Chancellor’s personal choice whether he takes part in a selection panel or not. As far as I can make out from reading the Bill, this may mean that he decides to sit on appointment body “A” but not on appointment body “B”. A question arises about the consistency of the appointing panel’s approach. There is also the rather bizarre question about what happens if the Lord Chancellor decides that he will not be a member of that panel and the panel has been constituted, as we understand it, in the legislation. Who replaces him, how is that replacement chosen, and to whom is he responsible? For all the reasons that noble Lords have given, I suggest that this is both constitutionally and administratively inappropriate. That is why I would be very happy to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, should he ask the Committee to give an opinion on it today.
I make one further point to reinforce the point which the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, was making about the change in the Lord Chancellor’s position. This was confirmed in the hearings that the Constitution Committee held on this matter by the present office-holder himself, the right honourable Kenneth Clarke, when he said:
“I think that we will have a Lord Chancellor who is not a lawyer. The lawyers that we have, including me, will not be as senior and distinguished as they used to be ... A better understanding of my role would be to describe me as Secretary of State for Justice”.
That seems to underline the points about potential politicisation, which other noble Lords have made.
We had a very vigorous discussion about this when we had a second go in front of the Constitution Committee. Looking at those three top jobs—the presidency, the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor—I was struck by the fact that it is not just judicial excellence but a whole fingertip interrelationship that makes those three jobs work. That is why the Lord Chancellor is arguing, and I am convinced of this—it is not just a matter of me saying, “The Government believe”—that an input into the selection process at the selection board—
I speak as one of the three the Minister refers to. Does he not agree that there is a danger of those three being too cosy? That would be in a situation where they do not feel that they can take a separate line from the Lord Chancellor, who controls the resources and is particularly powerful. All I can say is that if he does take that view, he should remember that my very distinguished predecessor, on one particular occasion, refused to see the Home Secretary of the day and the Home Secretary was deeply offended. That was because he did not think much of that sort of cosiness, which I know to the Minister is very attractive. With my experience, I am bound to say that he is wrong. He should listen; there are times to be cosy and times not to be cosy. That is something that needs to be taken into account.
I shall have to take advice on that. I should have thought that he or she would come from the court of cardinals. I am not sure, but it would undoubtedly be a chairman or chairwoman of distinction and merit who had experience in these matters.
Might I suggest the former chairman of the commission, who is present here today.
I saw her shifting slightly and thought she was going to volunteer to come back to the job.
My Lords, I would like to continue the effort that I have tried to make over past days to ensure that these decisions are not made merely by the legal world itself. I find this debate very peculiar indeed. I cannot think of a business which is worth its salt that does not insist that the chief executive has a responsibility for these matters. I sit as chairman of a number of companies, and in every case I have a personal responsibility for health and safety. I think it is important and I think that I have to take that responsibility. The direct responsibility is for the chief executive.
I know that it hurts many of a traditional kind in the legal profession for me to make comparisons between the Lord Chief Justice or the Lord Chancellor and such mundane people as chairmen and managing directors. However, it seems to me not an unreasonable parallel, and therefore I find this whole debate—as I found a debate in an earlier Session—to be really peculiar indeed. It should be the other way round: one should start off by saying that there are responsibilities of this kind lying on the shoulders of those who direct the whole shebang. One should not go half way down it—I am being rude now—and say, “It does not arrive up here, it comes down somewhere here”. One can repeat it, of course. It is perfectly reasonable to say, “It is also to be done here”, particularly if one has some suspicion that it is not being done lower down quite as well as one would like. However, one really cannot in any reasonable way exclude those who set the tone from issues which are the tone.
I very much accept the noble Baroness’s comment about this not being gesture politics. It is not gesture politics, because we are saying that we need to get rid of the fundamental view that merit is an easily definable thing and that it is terribly easy to say that somebody has got half a point better than somebody else. That is not what happens in business. We all know that when one looks at a number of people, one sees that they have differing contributions to make. One can say, “Yes, I have two people here who, on balance, both have the same contribution to make, as people”. The next question is: what are they making a contribution to? One says, “Let me make an assessment of what they are contributing to”. If, in most cases, they are making a contribution to what I would call a community, a panel or a group, then I might say that they are equal, but that this particular person makes less of a contribution to the whole than the other person, who would do more for the whole. That is the argument behind these elements of the Bill.
This is not a matter of tokenism, but a matter of reality, and it should be seen as such. If it is a matter of reality, it cannot be restricted to people lower down the pecking order. It must start with people at the top. I therefore beg the Government not to come back with the usual civil servant explanation to the effect that, “These people do this anyway, they are of a very high standing. We could not imagine them thinking in any other manner and, my goodness, why could you?”. I would reply that the present Lord Chancellor is an old friend of mine and a man of impeccable standards in this way. However, he still ought to be under the law; it still ought to be part of the way we present it.
It is really important simply to say that this is not a minor matter to be applied to people lower down, but a central matter to be applied from the top, because it is too important to be particularised. The only way not to particularise it is by saying that the chaps or girls in charge must take this responsibility. I very much hope that on this occasion the Government will see that this is a very reasonable amendment, that it could be taken without any difficulty at all, and that it could in fact be seen to be valuable step.
My Lords, just for the sake of the record and having put my name on this amendment, I make it clear that I support it for the reasons so admirably given by those who have spoken, including the noble Lord, Lord Deben. If I may say so, he showed remarkable acuity as somebody who is not a lawyer in contributing to this debate.
My Lords, perhaps I may add to the debate as another non-lawyer. Indeed, I totally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and I very much hope that the Government will take this on board. I know that the Minister has himself been involved in the judicial diversity task force, of which the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor are in fact members. One of the criticisms that the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity has made since it reported two years ago is that progress by that task force has in fact been remarkably slow. Although it has met, not a great deal has happened. I know that the Minister feels much the same. It therefore seems to me all the more important that there be a statutory duty on the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, as well as on the Judicial Appointments Commission, to promote diversity. I really hope that the Government will take that on board.
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this is a relatively simple amendment. It arises from discussions with citizens advice bureaux nationally which have pointed out that the practice of there being reception staff at county courts has lapsed in many places. I understand that in many courts there is staffing available for only two hours a day. In some courts there is no staffing at all now. Given the changes in the legal aid and advice system increasingly people are going to be finding their own way, unsupported, to the courts and will find little or no help or advice available. The purpose of this amendment is simply to endeavour to require that there should be an information service accessible to people at the courts, not necessarily provided by the courts. Citizens advice bureaux and possibly other agencies might well be interested in undertaking this responsibility It is surely important, particularly for those who find the whole process of litigation difficult, as many do, to have accessible advice at the point where it is most needed—that is, at the court door, as it were. I hope that the Government will look at ways in which this might be achieved, particularly involving the voluntary sector. It would ultimately assist the efficiency of the courts because otherwise, I suspect, we are going to get increasing problems, as I have already indicated, from the number of litigants in person. At least if litigants in person can receive some advice at the outset, it might ultimately repay itself in financial and other terms quite profoundly with a reduced impact on more expensive court time, which is better deployed in determining cases. I beg to move.
My Lords, I hope that what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is proposing here is given most careful consideration. In order to obtain what we all want—access to justice for the citizen—information is critical. In Access to Justice, for which I was responsible many years ago, I hoped that we would one day reach the situation where the courts’ role changed from what it had been in the past. In the past, its purpose was to respond to the litigant’s activities and not to be proactive. I urged that the courts should become proactive and the citizen who come to the court shall receive not only the judgment, which sometimes they would be looking for, but also guidance as to the most economic and efficient way of resolving their dispute. Information provided as envisaged by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, could play a critical role in this respect. Commendably, following Access to Justice, some courts provided very good services of this nature. It is very easy, when one is forced to make the economies that the Lord Chancellor is forced to make, perhaps not immediately recognise that although the service is a modest one it pays for itself over and again. It is important to the possible litigant seeking from the court general guidance on the resolution of their dispute. I hope what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has proposed will be taken away and considered very carefully and sympathetically.
Perhaps I might develop the point as I come to it. I have no experience myself of a judge taking ill and being unable to carry on, but I do not think that that really assists the argument.
It also applies—and I say this from my own observation—at trial court level, where it is most obvious. It is a significant factor in appellate courts. No doubt in the Supreme Court many cases are quite short—two days, sometimes even less—but there are many cases, and the most important and significant cases tend to be somewhat longer. If a part-time judge is unable to sit on these for practical reasons, and cannot pull his or her weight, then that judge is downgraded in the eyes of other people to being a second-string member of the court. That is no good for anybody.
Secondly, on the practical level a part-time judge would normally need some fixity of schedule, so that the rest of the judge’s life can be arranged. That is why a person is likely to want to be a part-time judge on, let us say, Monday and Tuesday of each week. The timetable would have to be juggled to ensure that the judge is able to sit on those regular days. Obviously difficulties would arise if for various reasons an appeal needs to be listed on the other days of the week, and of course that happens, in fitting in the appeals for which that judge’s particular skills are required.
It is not as easy as turning up on fixed days and taking cases on those days. I fear that it is bound to lead to a feeling that part-time judges are not pulling their weight. This is highly detrimental to collegiality, which is of prime importance on an appellate bench. It may be viewed—however unfairly—by others that that judge is not a proper member of the court. The judge may also feel, subjectively, concern that she is not fully accepted as a full member. That, although it may not be exactly the feeling held by the others, would undermine the judicial confidence which is so necessary for high-class judicial work.
It is important that we try to find ways of accommodating this problem and of using the talents of able women, of which I am very strongly in favour myself. It is important that we can work out a way of not confining them to the junior ranks where it is easier in practice for them to carry out their functions part-time.
A suggestion has been mooted by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that one could do that by stages, for a woman. If she has family responsibilities at an earlier part of the time when she is ready for judicial life, then she could be appointed to a lower-tier court, with a clear assurance that when family circumstances change and she would be available for full-time work, she would receive proper and serious consideration for early promotion to the higher levels, and that that assurance should be fully honoured by those who are making the appointments. Paragraph 2 was a well intentioned attempt to facilitate women or other people by extending part-time appointments, but I fear that it did so in the wrong way.
My Lords, I spoke on the subject at Second Reading. What I said is on the record and I will not repeat it. However, I am most anxious that it should not be thought, as a consequence of my speaking in succession to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Lloyd and Lord Carswell, that retired members of the senior judiciary are against increasing diversity. I stress as forcefully as I can that the contrary is true. I know from the times when I was Chief Justice or held other senior offices that we did everything we could in co-operation with successive Lord Chancellors to improve the position. The message that became clear as a result of our efforts was that achievements would be brought by approaching the matter in stages.
The first step involved tackling those who were attending law schools in this jurisdiction and ensuring an egalitarian approach there. I am happy to say that if one goes now to the law schools of this country, one finds at least an equal number of women and men studying to become our lawyers and judges of the future.
The next stage is to make sure that any hurdle that can reasonably be removed is removed from the path of those who enter the legal profession. At the moment our task is to ensure that they realise that the opportunities for judicial appointments are greater today than they have ever been. The appointments system that we have will treat applicants on a totally equal basis irrespective of their sex and of any background that they might consider a possible handicap. The judiciary plays its part in ensuring that the message is heard by those entering the legal profession and by those within it.
On the issue raised by the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, to which I put my name, it is no use putting something in legislation that will have no practical effect. I refer to part-time judges for the Supreme Court, because it seems it is here where the argument seems clearest. From my knowledge of those who might seek this judicial appointment, I can conceive of nobody who could not take a full-time appointment to the Supreme Court but might be able to take part-time employment there. Having made that proposition, I point to the nature of the Supreme Court and to its role in our legal system now that it has been established. It is the highest court we have, and it has the heavy responsibility of maintaining the reputation established by generations of Supreme Court judges, who in the past were called Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. The court is looked on internationally as one of the finest law courts that there is, and its decisions are treated with the greatest respect.
We must do two things. First, we must not fall into the trap of using legislation to make gestures. To put into this legislation a provision that refers to part-time Supreme Court judges, for the purpose of trying to give a message to those who might be coming through the system that they should seek to become a Supreme Court judge, would be unrealistic if it implied that someone of mature years—probably 60—who wished to be a Supreme Court judge could apply for the highest pinnacle of our judiciary on any basis other than full-time. If there is to be an educational process, it should take place at a lower level in the system. I urge the Committee not to put into the Bill a provision that will have the effect of offering part-time employment in the Supreme Court when there is no realistic possibility that there will be any candidate for that part-time post who could be appointed in the foreseeable future.
The result will be that people will say, “Look, in 2012 Parliament specifically passed legislation that was intended to make available to a woman the possibility to sit as a part-time Supreme Court judge—but nobody has done that”. It will not happen because there has never been a candidate who could apply to be a Supreme Court judge under present circumstances.
My Lords, I have proposed the removal from the Bill of Clause 18 and Schedule 12. I make it clear that this is not done to abolish the provisions that are dealt with in Clause 18 and Schedule 12. Instead I intend to enable the Government to provide, in proceedings that are separate from the Bill, a better system for the extremely important issue of judicial appointments. The provisions included in the Bill are inadequate and unsatisfactory.
The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 was of great importance. It modified the functions of the Lord Chancellor. In fact, it not only modified the functions but completely altered them. It created a Supreme Court to replace the jurisdiction of the House of Lords. The constitutional importance of the Act was recognised by those who negotiated it and by many others. I am well aware of this because I was one of the Members of the House of Lords who negotiated the matter in detail. Others included the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who I am very pleased to see in his place and who was then the Lord Chancellor, and the late and greatly missed Conservative Lord Kingsland.
As far as I am aware, the Crime and Courts Bill is the first Bill to make significant amendments to the Constitutional Reform Act. Significant amendments appear first in Clause 18—although all that the clause does is tell us to go and look at Schedule 12, which is tucked away at the back of the Bill. It starts on page 167 and continues to page 201. It starts with the provision that enables any number of judges to be appointed to the Supreme Court provided the judges serving on the court do not permit,
“the full-time equivalent number of judges of the Court at any time to be more than 12”.
This is a very significant alteration to the 2005 Act. There should be no attempt to tuck alterations into the back of a much wider Bill such as this one. It is highly doubtful whether this particular alteration should be adopted at any time, and I agree with the proposal from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, to leave out paragraph 2.
I support the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, in what he says but, as a matter of practicality, I recognise that we have to move on. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, is much loved around the House and a genuine supporter of sensible constitutional change. He was a significant supporter of the Constitutional Reform Bill in that he allowed it to go through in circumstances where it might not otherwise have gone through, so I have a particular personal reason for believing that the noble Lord is a supporter of constitutional change. It would be worth while if he could say something in response to the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart.
We are dealing with three tiers of part-time judge: first, the High Court of England and Wales; secondly, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales; and, thirdly, the Supreme Court, which is part of the UK judiciary. The average age at which persons are appointed to the High Court of England and Wales is between 45 and about 60. In the Chamber tonight, we have two former High Court judges. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, were both appointed at the age of 45, which is at the youngest end of the range.
In appointing women between the ages of 45 and 50, it is extremely likely that they will have caring arrangements. I know that from my own experience as someone at the English Bar and as someone appointing judges. The difficulty for people is in making a choice as to what they put as their priority. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, rightly said, the current attitude is that it is “full on” if you join the High Court and there are no dilutions. The consequence of that in relation to the High Court is that a significant pool of people who would otherwise be willing to be appointed is being lost. I know that from my own experience in appointing judges.
Perhaps the noble and learned Lord will forgive me for making this point. I am sure that his experience was similar to mine. Where a case was made by an applicant who needed special assistance because of personal circumstances, the system that we have had has always been flexible enough to allow us to make those special arrangements and they worked satisfactorily. We should acknowledge that and I suspect that the noble and learned Lord will endorse what I have said. If I have understood him correctly, he was indicating the contrary, although I am sure that he did not mean to.
My Lords, I feel like sitting down. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, was quite right; when he was Lord Chancellor and put through his constitutional reforms the Liberal Democrat Benches gave him full and consistent support. The brain power behind that support was my noble friend Lord Goodhart. I was the political organiser. As the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, will attest, the triumph of ideals must be organised, so I share the pleasure in these reforms. I also think it is right—we will have lots of discussion about this—that the reforms, good as they were and are, are capable of being tweaked and improved in the light of experience. Therefore, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Lloyd and Lord Falconer, for setting the parameters of the debate, as it were.
Before I go into the detail, I wish to deal with the general point raised by my noble friend Lord Goodhart. I understand where he is coming from and the need to acknowledge the importance of constitutional reform. However, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, found from his own experience, the difficulty is getting parliamentary time to tackle this. You sometimes have to accept the necessity of putting very important issues into a broader based Bill. The Government are always faced with the dilemma—this is true of all Governments—of choosing whether to put provisions together in one Bill, as is the case here, or of delaying legislation on important and necessary reforms. We have chosen the former approach but the fact that these provisions are in Clause 18 and Schedule 12 does not for a moment diminish their importance. Wherever they sit in the Bill, I would expect your Lordships’ House to discharge its usual role in carefully scrutinising the Government’s legislative proposals. If there was any doubt about that, it should have been dismissed by the thorough way in which the House has filleted these proposals for two and a half hours this evening.
I turn to the merits of our reforms to the judicial appointments process and answer the concerns raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd. His amendments would delete from the Bill the key measures to promote diversity and flexible working in the Supreme Court. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, “flexible” is the right word, not “part time”. Of course, we must ensure that the process through which our judges are appointed is fair, open and transparent. The longer I am in this job, the more I am in awe of the quality of our senior judiciary. They are a national asset and are respected throughout the world for their quality and independence, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said. However, this does not conflict with a requirement for greater diversity in the judiciary. Diversity in the judiciary is important to enhance public confidence in the justice system. The proportion of women and members of ethnic minorities is still too low, and this is particularly the case in the higher courts.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, progress in increasing diversity in the judiciary has been woeful and inadequate. We do not believe that we can rely on trickle-up. We consider that allowing flexible working in senior courts is an important reform to increase diversity, and that it will not detract from the principle of appointment on merit. I was recently asked by a very senior member of the judiciary, “Will our judiciary still be held in the same high esteem in 20 years’ time as it is today, if your reforms go through?”. I could look him in the eye and say “Yes, I believe that it will, but it will be a more diverse judiciary”.
The arguments made by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Lloyd and Lord Carswell, and by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is that flexible working in the Supreme Court is simply not practical, and that all judges of the Supreme Court need to shoulder their fair share of the business by sitting full-time. I simply do not accept these arguments. It is a judgment call, but we have no reason to believe that it cannot work to the benefit of flexibility and diversity. Regarding the virtuoso performance by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, I can see how he earned an honest crust at that game. However, the noble and learned Lord made a good point. Flexible working will not be compulsory but will provide flexibility and, as has been pointed out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the merit test would still be there. It is not a dilution but a move to greater flexibility, which we believe will allow for greater diversity.
Many of the arguments we have heard from the sponsors of this amendment reflect an outdated view of the family. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, explained so eloquently, we need flexible working not just to enable a woman in her 30s or 40s to balance her career with her caring responsibilities, but to enable women in their 60s to carry out caring responsibilities for teenage children. Equally, such caring responsibilities can extend to grandchildren, a disabled partner or elderly parents. As my noble friend Lady Falkner pointed out, we are not just talking about women but about ethnic minorities, and some of this flexibility will also apply to men who find the present system too rigid.
We need to allow men and women of all ages to meet such caring responsibilities and balance them with flexible working patterns. The noble Baroness, Lady Jay, and others noted that such arguments were put forward in the past to oppose the introduction of flexible working in other professions. It has been shown in the medical profession and elsewhere that flexible working arrangements can be readily accommodated. As I have said in this House previously, if anybody asks me what is the biggest difference I have seen, having worked in the Foreign Office and Downing Street in the 1970s and come back to Whitehall now in 2010 to 2012, I would say that it is in the diversity of senior advisers. If our Civil Service can achieve such diversity, why can the law not achieve it?
That is not to say that there will not be challenges in implementing this, and practical issues to work through in, for example, the listing of cases. However, we agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that these issues are not insurmountable. As he has indicated, most cases in the Supreme Court require hearings of only two or three days. As has been discussed, flexible working can take many forms, such as working during term times, or for nine or 10 months of the year, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, highlighted. Can I again pay tribute to her committee, which has not simply produced a report, but has kept on the case in terms of chivvying me and the Lord Chancellor in these areas? Moreover, if we are allowing flexible working in the lower courts, including the High Court and the Court of Appeal, the absence of flexible working in the Supreme Court could potentially deny an outstanding Court of Appeal judge the ability to consider applying for the Supreme Court.
I hope that the debate has, in a way, answered the concerns of my noble friend Lord Goodhart. These are important issues that are not to be taken lightly. I do not think that the House has taken them lightly but the case against the Government’s proposals has not been made—in fact, quite the contrary. The balance of the debate has been on our side.
Before the noble Lord sits down, perhaps I should mention the position of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell. He did not want to absent himself from the later parts of the debate, but he had to return to Northern Ireland and has sent his apologies. I said that I would convey them to the House.
Hansard will note that, with the full understanding of the Committee.
Will the Minister bear in mind that it is very important that there is someone who can speak on behalf of the judiciary in Parliament? One of the changes that took place in consequence of the Constitutional Reform Act was that the right of the Lord Chief Justice, which had existed hitherto, to speak to Parliament on behalf of the judiciary on matters that affected the administration of justice went and we have this business of putting in a statement. That illustrates that the Lord Chancellor will be the spokesman who has to take parliamentary responsibility for the appointment of all judges. We know that sometimes it is very tempting for a Minister or even a very senior Minister to refer to unelected judges. It causes the judiciary grave offence that that should be said because judges may not be elected but they are appointed in accordance with the process laid down by Parliament and by Members of Parliament who, certainly in the other place, are elected. That responsibility means that Parliament is a place where in regard to these matters somebody has to be answerable. We do not want to see the Lord Chancellor no longer having responsibility for these appointments.
I have agreed with almost every word that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has said this afternoon but I am now surprised at his explanation for why he wishes to move these amendments with respect to what I think he implied was an abrogation of responsibility by the Lord Chancellor for the judiciary. I wonder whether he is familiar with those parts of the Constitution Committee’s report.
For other noble Lords who might not be, I will take just a minute or two to point those parts out. Looking at this part and pages 14 and 15, the Constitution Committee in taking its evidence found:
“This argument was supported by the previous Lord Chancellor, Jack Straw MP, who described his role in relation to the lower tiers of the judiciary as ‘ridiculous’. The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, also stressed that the Lord Chancellor ‘has no input at all to make other than to be there to look as if he is making an input ... It simply suggests there is political involvement when we have tried to get rid of it’”.
The committee goes on to make the point at paragraph 32 that,
“The Lord Chief Justice has day to day responsibility for the judiciary of England and Wales: he knows what is required of judicial office at all levels. He is therefore better placed than the Lord Chancellor to make an informed assessment of whether a nominee put forward by the JAC should be appointed. Transferring the Lord Chancellor’s power to request reconsideration or reject nominations to the Lord Chief Justice would strengthen the appointments system”.
In conclusion, the committee finds that,
“there is indeed a need for the legal framework for appointments to reflect both the extent to which the Executive should be involved in individual appointments and the reality of that involvement”.
The committee makes one point which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, made, that,
“The Government should consider whether the Lord Chief Justice will need additional support in order to take on this role”.
I think that point is well made.
In taking that message to the Lord Chancellor, will the Minister also convey the message that, with great respect to the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Chief Justice does not know all the people who will be appointed? He will know possibly a few more than the Lord Chancellor, but I suggest that just as the Lord Chancellor would have to rely on advice, so would the Lord Chief Justice.
Certainly, I will make sure that the Lord Chancellor reads today’s Hansard. The point is that it is advice that comes from the process of the Judicial Appointments Commission. Just as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, wants the Executive still involved, I am not so convinced and, even more importantly, nor is the Lord Chancellor. As I have said, we both take a view about the separation of powers of which this could and should be a useful symbol: the Lord Chancellor of the day would not be holding on to a rubber-stamping exercise, he would be leaving it with the Lord Chief Justice of the day. This has been an interesting mini-debate, which I will raise with the Lord Chancellor for further consideration.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberPerhaps it is worth pointing out that when this amendment was called, the Speaker of the House of Commons intimated that financial privilege was involved in the amendment. The reason for that is not explained as part of House of Commons procedure. Your Lordships know that I have had some difficulty in the past with references to this feature in relation to other Bills. The fact is that it is not for the Government, at the beginning, to mention this point. It is taken by the Speaker on behalf of Parliament and on behalf of the House of Commons. I have no doubt that, as Speaker Martin told us the last time, he does so on advice from the Clerk of the House of Commons. The Government then proceed from there. They could, if they wished, ask the House of Commons to support the amendment, notwithstanding that it involved financial privilege, but the basic ruling that financial privilege is involved seems to come from the Clerks of the House of Commons. I confess that their way of dealing with the matter is not something that I fully understand.
Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, perhaps he could assist me with regard to the question of financial privilege. In view of what he just said about the Government’s ability to invite the House of Commons to consider the amendment notwithstanding the point of financial privilege, does he accept that the Government could also have taken the action of saying, “We do not accept the amendment for good reasons”—which would be identified—“and, in those circumstances, we ask the House to indicate, in view of what has been said in this place, what its view is of those matters”? Financial privilege has no substance in fact. As all lawyers know, if the facts are totally inconsistent with the conclusion that is reached, that is wrong as a matter of law. An appellate court will always interfere with a fact-finding tribunal’s decision if it is wrong in law in that sense.
It is. Perhaps I may make that clear to the noble and learned Lord, whose views I respect so much. I therefore request him to assist.
My Lords, the practice of the House of Commons, as I understand it, is that when an amendment is called that involves financial privilege—in the opinion of the Speaker acting on the advice of the Clerks—this is intimated; and my understanding is that the Government would not be able to challenge that at all, just as we, as a matter of practice, do not challenge it either, although sometimes there have been occasions when some have felt there was a possible reason for challenge. However, as a matter of practice, we do not do that. It is open to the Government—notwithstanding the fact that financial privilege is involved—to invite the House of Commons to agree to an amendment that involves financial privilege. Then the Speaker has to certify in the Journal that a matter involving financial privilege has been passed by the House of Commons. The reason for that is that the House of Commons requires, generally speaking, a money resolution in respect of any expenditure involved in a Bill; and if a Bill involves expenditure, a money resolution has to be passed at some stage during the course of the Bill.
In this procedure, there is no room for a money resolution as such, because that happens earlier, but the signification made by the Speaker—in that situation where the House of Commons has decided, notwithstanding that financial privilege is involved, to agree to the amendment, in whole or in part—goes into the Journal in order to replace the need for a money resolution, and it of course authorises the Treasury to disperse money on the basis of that resolution of Parliament. That has nothing to do with the question of whether or not the amendment should be agreed, but, so far as concerns this House, if the resolution is based on financial privilege, the understanding has been—notwithstanding how difficult it might be on occasion for some of us to understand exactly how it arises—that we do not dispute that proposition.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for the avoidance of any doubt whatsoever, has made it clear beyond peradventure in the drafting of this amendment in lieu that what he and the House have sought to achieve contains no threat to the Government’s public expenditure plans. The wording makes it clear that,
“subject to the resources which the Lord Chancellor decides, in his discretion, to make available”,
the Lord Chancellor shall exercise his powers to secure that individuals have access to legal services.
For the sake of a completely illusory financial requirement, the Government propose to impair a constitutional principle of the first importance which goes back not just to 1949, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, reminded us, but to 1215. That is the principle of equality before the law. It should not be in doubt that it is the duty of the Lord Chancellor to secure equality before the law. We all recognise that there are constraints in the present very difficult circumstances of the economy, and that we face an imperfect situation. But it must be right to legislate in principle to ensure that, in normal times at the very least—I would contend at all times—it is a paramount duty of the Lord Chancellor to secure equality before the law for all our citizens. It is no use the law declaring high principles of which citizens cannot avail themselves in practice if financial constraints and the lack of support through legal aid mean that they are not able to substantiate their rights in the courts.
I praise the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for persisting in this cause. I very much hope that the House will want to support him once again in inviting the other place to think again.
My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has put before us. Doing my very best, I have found it very difficult to find any reason why this amendment should not be accepted. Attempting to rely upon what was said in the other place just does not wash. If the other place had understood the purpose of the previous amendment, I do not accept that it could have treated it in the way that it did. I do not need to go into detail about that matter because the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has, with his usual clarity, set out the position perfectly obviously. The situation is as he indicated.
In Bills of this nature, it is frequently the practice to assist those who will subsequently have to apply the legislation—or, if I may say so with feeling, interpret the legislation—by setting out the purpose of the legislation. The Bill makes that purpose clear in so far as there was any doubt about it. There cannot be said to be any financial commitment involved. I am at a loss to understand how the Lord Chancellor, having the responsibilities that he has for the administration of justice under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, can use that as an excuse for, without justification, trying to impede the proper consideration of this amendment. It reflects no credit to the way in which that office is now being handled for the Lord Chancellor to take that position. Every word that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said with regard to the four points that were taken is of substance. I hope that, even now, the Lord Chancellor will consider whether it is consistent with his responsibilities to take the position that was adopted by the other place after very brief consideration.
I remind the Lord Chancellor of the oath that he takes when he takes office, which is laid down in the Constitutional Reform Act. I ask him to consider whether the position that he has now taken is consistent with that oath. Section 17 of the Act requires him to,
“swear that in the office of Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain I will respect the rule of law … and discharge my duty to ensure the provision of resources for the efficient and effective support of the courts for which I am responsible.”
The purpose of the amendment is to give the Lord Chancellor scope to do just that.
I would have thought that the proper course was to welcome the amendment, having regard to changes in the situation that can take place in the future. Again and again, in the course of consideration of this Bill, it has been said on behalf of the Government that they are following the course that they are taking because of the financial situation in this country. That argument demands the greatest respect, but as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has indicated, this amendment does not interfere with the Lord Chancellor doing precisely that. It is said that it may lead to increased litigation. If that litigation were to take place, as far as I can foresee, it would have to be by way of judicial review and it is well known that judicial review has built-in protections to avoid the litigation process being misused. The requirement of leave would mean that proceedings which are initiated without cause would have a very short life indeed. The Government of the day would be entitled to get the assistance of the courts, which they would receive, to ensure that there was no misuse of those proceedings in these circumstances. I suggest that, if full consideration had been given to this amendment, it would not originally have been objected to or objected to now.
Given the noble and learned Lord’s huge experience in these issues, would he kindly tell the House whether he considers that this amendment does not place any Lord Chancellor in any jeopardy in respect of judicial review? If that is the case—that is what I understood the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to say—does that not make the provision toothless?
No one can anticipate what might happen with regard to the conduct of a particular Lord Chancellor in the future. However, in regard to the fears that have been expressed, there would be no possibility of those being treated as appropriate cases for an application for judicial review on the facts that could be reasonably expected to occur.
On the purpose of the legislation, I would adopt what was said by the shadow Minister in the other place: that the amendment states a purpose because the provision is a statement of legislative purpose. As to having a statement of legislative purpose, in legislation of this nature it is done frequently, not for the purpose of providing an enforceable duty but so that it is known what the legislation as a whole is intended to do.
My Lords, the noble Lord who moved the amendment as well as the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, have referred to the purpose of the amendment as the avoidance of doubt. I hope that in his reply the noble Lord will explain to the House exactly what is the doubt which the amendment is designed to remove and which, presumably, the Bill will otherwise create. If he can answer that question to my satisfaction then I might vote with him. Until that question is answered, I would be inclined to vote with the Government.
I regret that I have to disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf—I very rarely do. However, there is a statement of principle in Clause 1: it is that the Lord Chancellor must secure that legal aid is made available in accordance with this part. That is a very simple, short statement which would cause no judge any difficulty whatever in interpreting the provisions of the Bill. I said in Committee that the amendment then proposed was meaningless and added nothing to the Bill. I say precisely the same of the amendment as redrafted.
The amendment adds nothing, except this. I could be a very devious lawyer, and I might have a case for which I thought some funding was needed. So I might apply to the director of legal aid for special funding, knowing well that the case for which I am requesting funding is outside the legal aid scheme. The director of legal aid might say, “There is nothing special about this; I am refusing it”. I might then make an application by way of judicial review to the court, and I would get legal aid for that: judicial review carries legal aid. So I would get my money by making an application to the court for judicial review to say, “Look at this provision which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, argues for: it is broad; it is wide; the circumstances of the country have improved; it is only reasonable that the director of legal aid should now grant me the funding that I need, or that the category of law with which I am now concerned should be brought within scope”. That is just one case. Other cases could then be brought forward in the same way.
Will the noble Lord explain how the risk to which he has just referred would be any greater than that which already exists in the words of Clause 1(1)—that the Lord Chancellor must secure that legal aid is made available in accordance with this part?
It says in terms that it must be in accordance with this part. As the Minister has explained, the Bill as drafted says what is in scope. The Access to Justice Act 1999 set out what was not in scope.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI support the amendment, which is also in my name. Interested bodies such as Citizens Advice, Justice for All and the Law Society have all pointed out that the Government’s exceptional funding safety net does not stretch wide enough for the reasons so clearly given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I emphasise that the amendment of itself imposes no extra financial burden on the Lord Chancellor; it simply provides an opportunity for a discretion to be exercised if it is necessary—I emphasise the word “necessary”—to prevent a specific injustice occurring. If it was decided to use this power, the costs would be provided from discretionary funds made available to the director by the Lord Chancellor.
The amendment should be seen as a simple, practical and positive act of assistance to the Government, who, if they accept it, will have the flexibility to act in the circumstances provided for. Legislative opportunities for any Government are few and far between. In my view, this opportunity should be seized and the helpful amendment accepted.
My Lords, in the courts, many cases have three judges involved in determining what should be the outcome. If one judge gives a judgment on the provision which the other two judges think is totally convincing and where they have nothing useful to add, they just say, “I agree”. I agree with the speeches that have been made in support of the amendment.
My Lords, the amendment is supported by the noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Beecham, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Liverpool. I am afraid the hour is such that I am not sure that those who put their name to the amendment, apart from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, are in their places. It is a modest amendment, which has benefited considerably from the discussions that have taken place on the subject of restorative justice through the earlier stages of this Bill. Indeed, this is my third attempt to find an amendment to which the Government could not possibly object. I have had discussions with the Government and all I can say about this amendment is that I have not yet heard—although I look forward to the Minister’s speech—any reason why they can possibly take any exception whatever to the amendment.
I understand what the noble and learned Baroness is saying. As we discussed in Committee and on Report, the use of restorative justice can already be taken forward under current legislation. The question is whether further legislation is required. The noble and learned Lord and other noble Lords have made the case that restorative justice is useful, as has the noble and learned Baroness. However, as I say, RJ can already be taken forward and is being developed. We hope—
Perhaps the noble Baroness will forgive me for also interrupting her, but I should like her assistance. Am I right in assuming that she intends restorative justice still to be supported by the courts? Does she agree that there is no express reference to restorative justice in legislation setting out the power of the courts to make use of it? Although there are references to similar matters, they do not clearly permit restorative justice.
I hear what the noble and learned Lord says, and he makes his case very cogently, as he and others have done at other stages. However, he, too, will recognise that the courts can use restorative justice and are doing so. That is happening. However, the Government take seriously the need to develop this area further, and noble Lords have made that case very clearly. The consultation has been brought forward. We expect that what has been said here will be fed into that consultation, and I hope that the noble and learned Lord will feed his own experience and expertise into that process. The important thing here is to make sure that the practice is taken forward and provision is expanded. That commitment I can certainly give him. Given the consultation and the process that is being carried forward, I hope that he will withdraw his amendment but continue with his commitment, which we very much support.
I thank the Minister for the way in which she presented her case. She has said everything possible to support deferring the inclusion of the reference to restorative justice, which I think is important because it makes it clear to judges up and down the land that restorative justice is part of the purposes of sentencing. That message can then be incorporated into the process.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, for his helpful remarks. He was obviously concerned about resources. In the present situation, everyone is concerned about resources. The amendment does not require the Government to put one penny into restorative justice. It does not deal with that subject, so he need not have that concern.
I know that there is every probability that, if we do not do it now, one day this will be done, but this is an excellent opportunity to do it. There is no reason why we should not. With respect to the comments of the noble Baroness, I did not identify any reason why we should not, other than the fact that consultation is to take place, but consultation can go on irrespective of whether or not we do this. We all support the consultation process. In those circumstances, albeit that the hour is late and that we have had a long day on the Bill, I propose to divide the House.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendments 152BZZA, 152BZZB and 152BZZC all deal with restorative justice. Restorative justice is one of the areas of good news in the criminal justice system. I should have said—I do so with apologies now—that I have the considerable advantage that the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, supports what I propose in these amendments. Indeed, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Liverpool would also have supported the amendment had he been able to be present today.
The fact is that the benefits of restorative justice are now widely accepted, but its role in the criminal justice system is sadly lacking in statutory recognition. It is essential that it now receives this recognition, and the Bill would be an appropriate vehicle for that recognition to be provided.
In Committee, an amendment before the House sought to give statutory recognition, but the statutory recognition then proposed is very different from what is now being sought. I have to concede that the amendment that was put before the House then was not, even with the skills of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, capable of being tweaked to achieve the purpose needed. Following in the footsteps of the Government in relation to the amendment that we just dealt with, for which the Government should be congratulated on taking such a positive role, the present amendments were drafted at a very late stage at the end of last week. Those amendments followed a similar pattern, although there is a significant difference between restorative justice and the alcohol and monitoring requirements.
The present amendments are to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which provides the framework for sentencing that is of great importance to courts up and down the land when they come to sentence. In relation to three separate aspects of the statutory provisions they ask no more than that one of the options—one of the menus—that those statutory provisions should include is restorative justice. That is needed, and it is surprisingly lacking.
The amendments would require the Government to take no action and would require them to spend no money, but they would take into account the fact that it has been established as a result of experience that restorative justice has an important part to play in the administration of justice, not only in ensuring that offenders receive the right sentences from the court, but in protecting victims. I would like to stress that aspect of the matter, because the Ministry of Justice, in its admirable consultative paper, Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses, sets out what a significant role restorative justice can play. Paragraph 114 on page 39 of that document states:
“In partnership with the Home Office we will develop a framework for restorative justice. This will provide guidance to local practitioners and help support them to develop and deliver effective, best practice restorative justice approaches suited to local need”.
That is clearly something that is required. It follows on from the statements in the same publication that in 85 per cent of cases where there has been restorative justice,
“victims who participated in the schemes were satisfied with the experience”.
The document also states that it is estimated that there was a,
“14% reduction in the frequency of re-offending”,
as a consequence of the use of restorative justice.
If the full impact of the amendments now proposed had been delivered in a rather more timely way, there could have been consultation between myself and Ministers so that it could have been explained from the point of view of those who have the task of sentencing in courts just why these amendments are needed and appropriate at this stage. Although the matter was only put down in its current form a late stage, for which I owe the House and the Government an apology, we now have a proposal that fits in with what the Bill is trying to do. I personally can claim very little of the credit for these amendments. They are the product of excellent work by the Prison Reform Trust, of which I declare my position as chairman, the Restorative Justice Council and many others—in particular, Paul Cavadino, whose knowledge in this area is quite outstanding. If the Government cannot accept these amendments today, I urge them to give me and those who support me an opportunity to explain in detail why these amendments are very constructive and have no conceivable downside as far as I can ascertain. I hope the Government will listen and respond to what I have just said.
My Lords, it is clear from our debates in Committee that there is agreement in all parts of the House on the merits of restorative justice and the case for ensuring that it is seen as a central and fundamental part of our criminal justice system. I will make five key points. First, it has a salutary impact on many offenders by bringing home to them the impact of their offence on victims. All too often offenders minimise or simply do not think about the effect of their actions on other people. In a restorative justice process the offender has no alternative but to face up to the impact of his or her offences on those at the receiving end. Secondly, restorative justice gives victims much more satisfaction than other ways of dealing with offenders. A lot of research has been carried out on this point. It is clear that victims who have been through restorative justice express satisfaction with that process. It enables victims to tell their story, express their hurt and receive recognition in a way that no other procedure does. It helps to give victims closure, reduce trauma and reduce their fear about the future. Many victims also feel very positive about being involved in a process which can contribute more effectively to the rehabilitation of the offenders. Thirdly, restorative justice reduces reoffending. I have the Home Office research. It found that it did so by around 14 per cent. The process thereby helps to reduce the number of people in the future who would otherwise have suffered loss, distress, injury or damage as a result of crime. Fourthly, restorative justice saves money. The Restorative Justice Consortium has estimated a cost saving of £185 million over two years based on 70,000 cases and a return of £9 for every £1 spent. Finally, a wider use of restorative justice will help to increase public confidence in sentencing. An ICM poll that was carried out last year found that 88 per cent of people wanted victims to have the opportunity to inform offenders of the harm and distress they have caused.
There were a number of speeches in Committee on this matter so I will not repeat all the arguments in favour but I want to put two or three suggestions to the Minister. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, has tabled these new clauses and I think they require some discussion, even between now and Third Reading. One way is to include restorative justice in the statutory purposes of sentencing. Another is to enable courts to include restorative justice requirements in community orders. Another option that is open is to spell out that courts can use activities to require offenders to take part in restorative justice processes. Any or all of these proposals and approaches would help to keep restorative justice in the minds of sentencers and to achieve the Government’s aim of ensuring that it becomes a central part of the criminal justice system. This is not the time to look at a final outcome but I hope very much that this will open up a discussion with the Government with a view to seeing if they will move on any of these fronts. I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, in what he has said.
I thank the noble Baroness for that response and express my gratitude to others who have expressed support for the amendments. I firmly believe that they are an indication of matters that should be undertaken to take restorative justice forward as the noble Baroness just described. After the generous offer that was made for meeting with my noble friend Lord McNally, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, rightly, we have heard a lot about victims so far in this debate and, if this amendment is not accepted, we are going to create another victim—the justice system. Government after Government have struggled to find ways of curtailing the ability of those who seek to justify their presence in this country by excluding them through legislation that Parliament has passed in a series of Bills—legislation which has made the law into the state in which it is now and which has already been vividly described.
In those attempts, there is normally strong support in the other place and probably in this House because it is thought that often the legislation has popular appeal. Those who said that the Government were creating a situation which would be difficult, if not impossible, to administer and adjudicate upon were not listened to. So far as I recollect, the only occasion when a Government were forced into reverse was when it was said that the legislation they were proposing sought to prevent access to the courts. The previous Government realised that that accusation, made in various quarters, was justified. To their credit, they realised that, because of the seriousness of the criticism, they had to withdraw, as the legislation would indeed have prevented admission to the courts. Of course, the issue that we are now considering is not quite as dramatic as that but I can tell the House, based on my experience, that the consequence of removing legal aid altogether—I emphasise “altogether” because we are talking about taking it out of scope—could have very serious consequences for the administration of justice.
If you go along to the Strand, where you will find our most senior court apart from the Supreme Court, you will see that much of the time of the Royal Courts of Justice is spent dealing with the problems of immigration law. The Supreme Court, in its short existence, has found that a sizeable proportion of its diet again involves immigration. I urge the House to think about the consequences for the legal system of depriving those who desperately need legal assistance of the ability to get that assistance. Without it, the task of the courts will become even more difficult than it already is, as amply confirmed by the statements from senior courts to which the House has been referred. I urge the Government to think very seriously about this amendment because it is of great importance to the legal system of this country.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has reminded us very powerfully of the damage that can be done to our whole system of the administration of justice. Perhaps I may briefly make two wider points arising from that. One is that the Government are always telling us how they seek to play a constructive and powerful part in the deliberations of the international community in finding the solutions that matter for humanity as a whole. I can think of no more calculated way of undermining the respect in which we are held and the influence that we bring to bear than if there seems to be specific, mean action of the kind proposed. I do not want to exaggerate, as it would be quite wrong and irresponsible to do so, but I sometimes get very vexed. We all recognise the importance of joined-up government and we all recognise that we want to build a stable and secure world, but how does it help if there are increasing numbers of embittered and frustrated people having a bad experience at the hands of our legal administration in this country? How does that help to build international security and stability? I say no more.
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hesitate to add to what has already been said. I hope that I do not impose upon my colleagues if I just say a very few words on this subject.
My experience is twofold. It comes first from being a practitioner and a judge, involved daily in the sentencing process for prisoners, and secondly, since I ceased to be a judge, from my involvement with the excellent bodies we have in this country trying to promote issues within the prison and justice system as a whole. In the former, my capacity is well known. I think it is also well known that I am the current chairman of the Prison Reform Trust. I am also the president of the Butler Trust. I know from my experiences that the Prison Service works hard to address problems. I have seen prison officers behaving in the most commendable way to try to alleviate the difficulties that they are faced with.
The fact is that, in all parts of the justice system, women prisoners need a separate voice, in exactly the same way as young offenders need a separate voice. I congratulate the Government on their decision to retain the Youth Justice Board. I am sure our justice system will continue to benefit from this. There is an opportunity now to add to what I will call that small victory with the establishment of the separate body to represent women which is part of this amendment. That, I believe, would be a substantial victory, because it would be creating something new which has been long needed, as we have heard. I hope that the message of this debate can be taken by the Government and acted upon.
My Lords, I want to add my very brief words in support of these two proposals. Indeed, I hope very much that the noble Baroness, Lady Gould, and my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham will get together and work out the best framework. A women’s justice board—I hope that that title will be retained—is without doubt something that has been called for, for a long time. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, I would like to say how pleased I am that the Youth Justice Board has been retained—very wisely, if I may say so.
It is clearly a fact that women need rather different treatment, which is increasingly being recognised. There is a parallel with the kind of treatment and systems for young people, because they are a special group. Women above all have care for their young, and it is crucial that we stop the business of separating children from their parents by the systems that we have within the criminal justice system. We have been told by the noble Baroness, Lady Gould, that it costs something like £15,000 to treat a woman within the community compared with £56,000 within the prison system. Far more important, even than that cost, is to keep the family together. One of the really good things that this Government are concentrating on, I am glad to say, is community sentences. It is with an increase of confidence in community sentences that we are likely to see these sorts of programmes for women really develop.
I also want to support my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham’s demand—and it must be a demand—for someone to be in charge. He has made this point again and again. Someone must be responsible for what is happening and reporting back to Parliament on the progress made. Programmes for treatment—not just for youngsters and/or women but for many people, whatever their age, within the criminal justice system—will emerge from this, and we can learn from the report back.
That is more than enough from me, but I support this hugely important initiative and hope that it will get off the ground as soon as possible.