Baroness Hamwee
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Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years ago)
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Lord Woolf
I wondered whether anyone other than on the opposition Bench wanted to say something on this—I certainly do. I start by disclosing that I am the chairman of the Prison Reform Trust and the amendments in my name were put down with its support.
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, is absolutely right with his amendment. Whenever I get to my feet, I am conscious that as a young advocate, I appeared before a very well known judge, Mr Justice Stable, to advance an argument that my client should not be convicted of murder but manslaughter, and he said to me, “Mr Woolf, if you heed my advice, you would not water the brandy”. I fear that by getting to my feet, I may be inadvertently watering the brandy of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, because, as has been pointed out, if we get rid of the clause as a whole, we do not need to bother with the detail.
As to the detail, if it remains, I urge the House to get rid of the word “exceptional”. It has been used in legislation in the past. Wherever it has appeared, it has caused difficulties, not least because the question is: what is exceptional and what is not exceptional? That gives the advocate a difficult task; probably more importantly, it also gives a difficult task to the judge. You get into situations where judges are tempted to give an exceptionally wide meaning to the word “exceptional”. I remember a case where I did just that, because it created such an obvious nonsense that it resulted in injustice. A great judge, Lord Bingham, took a much narrower view of the meaning of that word than I did. The fact that two successive Lord Chief Justices should interpret that word in different ways illustrates my point.
With regard to the first of my tabled amendments, I urge the House to deal with the word “exceptional” if it allows this part of the schedule to survive. If it is removed, I suggest that proposed new subsection (2B) of Section 177 will have a sensible meaning. It would read:
“Subsection (2A) does not apply where there are … circumstances which … relate to the offence or to the offender … would make it unjust in all the circumstances for the court to comply with subsection (2A)(a) in the particular case, and … would make it unjust in all the circumstances for the court to impose a fine for the offence concerned”.
I do not think that the criticisms that I have made of “exceptional” apply to “unjust”. When judges are sentencing, they are trying daily to achieve a just sentence and if a sentence is unjust they will not impose it. The trouble with Section 177 is that if it is amended as set out in the schedule, it will become a vehicle for causing injustice. If you are sentencing you have lists of sentences for various offences, which you can impose. You might go down the list and decide that a community sentence is the appropriate one. Once a judge has decided that is appropriate, to say that he then has to perform an exercise to see whether that sentence is punitive—and put something else in if he comes to the conclusion that it is not—is really nonsense. It will cause him to do exactly what he has concluded is unjust. He has come to the conclusion that although the community sentence is necessary, it is not necessary to have an additional punitive penalty. From the practical point of view, that really is not a satisfactory outcome.
The other amendment with which I am involved in this group is Amendment 8. Or is that one not being spoken to yet? I apologise to the House; I will come to that later.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I was thinking about not brandy but confectionery and I do not find this fudge, if one thinks about it, as being sweet and tasty. In every other way, however, I absolutely follow what the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has said, although my remarks will cover rather narrower ground than his.
I really wonder, as others have, whether this provision is necessary. If it is only gesture politics—I say that rather bluntly—it might not be so bad, although I would still deplore it because I deplore gesture politics, but it must mean something. As the noble Lord said, every day the courts do the things that we are being told this provision is directing them to do. I do not believe it does anything but restrict sentencing choices. It imposes a requirement that may be detrimental for offenders whom one is seeking to rehabilitate. I do not need to amplify that; we have a lot to get through and these points will be made better by others throughout today.
I wonder whether Amendment 2 achieves anything. I support the sentiment behind it but changing “must” to “may” does not add anything if we accept that punishment is already one of the purposes of sentencing —which it is, under Section 142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. As I say, however, I am with that sentiment.
The letter dated 7 November that we received from the Minister said that the term “exceptional circumstances” is very tightly drawn. I had to go back and reread that, because I think “exceptional circumstances” is very widely drawn when one thinks about the context in which we are debating this. As noble Lords have so often said, and as others outside this House have reminded us, such a very high proportion of offenders suffer from mental illness, substance misuse and dependency that one could not say that there was anything exceptional about their circumstances. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, referred to debt in the context of imposing a fine. That made me think that being in very straitened financial circumstances, combined with other factors, is often a prompt or a nudge towards theft and various offences.
When we last debated this schedule, I suggested that “particular circumstances” would be a better term than “exceptional circumstances”. Discussing that with colleagues later, we wondered about “special circumstances”, and my noble friend Lady Linklater has tabled Amendment 6 to propose that term. Essentially, we are trying to suggest a number of other possible terms—not alternatives because I do not think “exceptional” is right—if the Government are insistent, as I expect they will be, on retaining this part of the schedule. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, has taken a scalpel to it and pointed us to the inconsistency between the terms “just” and “exceptional circumstances”. I am very happy to line up behind him if that is the way that the House thinks we should go if we do not get rid of this altogether.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
My Lords, I put my name to Amendment 5, but I strongly support what the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, said and his Amendment 1 to take the whole of this out. I am also happy to support Amendments 4 or 6. I shall make the very obvious point that every community order will be, for the offender, a form of punishment because it is mandatory. You do not need to use the word “punishment” because it is implicit in a community order. I am sorry to say it again, but since the Government have put a form of punishment as part of a community order, as if a community order was not a punishment, I find this extremely difficult to follow. The terms are in conflict with each other in this proposal by the Government. I had not seen it that way to quite the same extent as I did looking at this today. For goodness sake, why put it in? It is sad that the Government seem to need to use the words “punitive” and “punishment” when it is already clear that a community order is punishment because it is an order that whoever receives it will have to obey. If that particular offender does not obey a community service order, he or she will be punished for failure to obey a punishment that has already been imposed. In my view, the words “punitive” and “punishment” are unnecessary, inappropriate and profoundly unattractive. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I wonder whether this is gesture politics. I very much hope it is not, but she made a point that this House ought seriously to consider.
I do not mind whether we use the word “particular”, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, instead of “exceptional”. Preferably, perhaps, we could do what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said, which would be to take the word out altogether. The noble Baroness, Lady Linklater, has suggested using “special”. The point is that “exceptional” should not be there for the reasons that the noble and learned Lord has already given. I do not mind how it is altered but the word exceptional has to come out.
The Government have to listen to the people in this House who spoke last week and today and said that this will not do. As I think I said previously, I urgently and respectfully suggest to the Ministry of Justice that this is an unsuitable way to be going ahead. As I have already said, it is profoundly unattractive. The words “punitive”, “punishment” and “exceptional” should be taken out. The Government should recognise that a community order is a punishment. They should not just look to the lobby of the press or the public, but should do what is right.
Lord Woolf
My Lords, I think now is the appropriate time for me to deal with Amendment 8, which returns to the same problem indicated earlier. I hope I am right in assuming that the Government do not intend the provisions of Section 177 as amended to undermine the effectiveness of community sentencing. My amendment makes that clear by qualifying the requirement contained in the proposed new Subsection (2A) to exclude that provision where it is likely to reduce the effectiveness of the order in preventing reoffending by the offender. This at least gives the sentencing judge a way of not doing something that he knows will be destructive of the beneficial effect of community sentence.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord’s amendment goes to the heart of the issue. It would be ironical if what he is seeking to avoid were in fact to come about since all this should be about preventing reoffending. My Amendment 11 provides that none of this should affect the provisions of Section 142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which sets out the purposes of sentencing. I realise that it would have been better drafting if I had just referred to Section 142(1), but never mind; one can come back to that at a later stage.
I am seeking to ensure that we do not impose a hierarchy of purposes and that we leave punishment where it is as one of five principles. I am sure that the Minister understands that this is the quite simple purpose of this amendment. I hope that he can reassure the Committee that nothing here seeks to alter in any way those well established five equal partners in principle.
Lord McNally
I thank noble Lords for their contributions. Let us be clear: of course the five principles are intact but, as the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, queried earlier, why bring legislation if we do not intend to change things? We do intend to change things. The whole thrust of what we are trying to do is to use community sentencing effectively, couple it with a real drive on rehabilitation, and also—and we think we have public support in this—use the element of punishment to drive home both the rehabilitation message and the punishment message.
Part of that has come out in our debates. There are noble Lords who believe that “exceptional” covers around a third of offenders. That is exactly the problem we are trying to address because the idea that somehow a third of offenders cannot be punished is what undermines public confidence. That is why we are making the point that exceptional circumstances apply to a very narrow group and that it is possible to put a punishment element into a much wider range of sentences while giving the court the flexibility to take account of the circumstances of the person before it. However, as I said in the earlier debate, we are going to resist those who want to amend the Bill so that there is a three-lane highway of exceptions from what we are trying to do.
Amendments 3, 3A and 8 focus on ensuring that the courts,
“have regard to the need to promote rehabilitation”,
and that punishment is not imposed at the expense of rehabilitation. Amendment 9 looks at the detail of what requirements might constitute punishment for an offender, and finally, Amendment 11 looks at the impact of the changes on the purposes of sentencing as set out in Section 142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. On the issues raised by the first three amendments in this group, I am happy to reassure the Committee that it is not the Government’s intention that any of these provisions should jeopardise the prospect of rehabilitation for offenders. In fact, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, I have already made the point a number of times that I am proud that the amendments we will be debating place rehabilitation so firmly on the agenda—and I keep on reinforcing what has been commended by the Prime Minister as part of this thrust of criminal justice reform.
Lord McNally
I will take that lifeline gratefully, but if there are other matters I will write to the noble Lord. I still cannot find the exact line.
It was requirements other than unpaid work, curfews or exclusions. I am now back on track. That takes us back to the point—we are now going full circle. Obviously, the concept of punishment is more likely to mean curfews, unpaid work, exclusions et cetera but, as we discussed earlier, it may be that there are other impositions which, for that particular offender, would be seen as a punishment. The court would have that flexibility to so define them. I hope that helps and I am sorry that I lost the thread. I am assured that I am on page 8. These notes are extremely useful.
I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, for implying that he had not been an assiduous attendee. That was cheap. He asked a good question and I hope that I have now clarified it.
The point was that I was referring to the research that we had done. The consensus was that for the majority of offenders certain requirements are likely to be more punitive than others. As I said, the requirements they most commonly mentioned were curfews, other restrictions on liberty such as exclusion or prohibited activities, and unpaid work. That is why the Government expect to see an increase in those measures.
Finally, on Amendment 11, I am happy to reassure noble Lords that it is not the Government’s intention to detract from the court’s existing obligation to have regard to the five purposes of sentencing currently set out in Section 142(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. If these provisions are agreed by both Houses, courts will continue to be required to have regard to all five purposes, whether that is punishment, rehabilitation, reparation, and so on. It will continue to be a matter for courts as to what weight they place on each requirement when sentencing a particular offender.
I remind noble Lords, though, that some purposes are likely to be more relevant than others for particular sentencing powers. For example, courts’ powers to discharge offenders absolutely or conditionally are predicated on the assumption that, in the circumstances of the case, it is inexpedient to inflict punishment. Similarly, while a fine can punish and deter an offender, it may do little towards the purpose of public protection. At the other end of the scale, I am sure that noble Lords will agree that for any offender, the deprivation of liberty that results from an immediate custodial sentence remains and represents a punishment.
In these examples, the nature of the sentence being considered may draw courts’ attention to some purposes of sentencing over others, but courts are still bound to weigh the relevance of all five purposes of sentencing. The same is true of these provisions. While courts will be required to determine whether the circumstances of the offence and the offender justify imposing a requirement for the purpose of punishment, they will still have to weigh this against the relevance of other purposes when determining the overall sentence. Nothing in this requirement prevents a court imposing a single requirement that fulfils multiple purposes of sentencing or imposing multiple requirements to meet multiple purposes.
I hope I have been able to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I will of course read these debates carefully. I hope that noble Lords will read them, too, because they will find a recurring theme of flexibility and trust in the judiciary and its judgment which should deflect some of the worst fears that have been expressed about our intentions. Our intention is to carry forward a rehabilitation revolution and put effective community sentencing at the heart of that. I fully appreciate that this House, particularly in these two debates, has done its proper job of fine-toothed combing what we propose and seeking assurances about our intentions. I hope that, on reflection, noble Lords will feel that, as it will work and with the flexibility we are building in, some of their concerns are not justified. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, can my noble friend go just slightly further into Section 142? I indicated I had realised that my drafting was not what it should have been. I have only just realised that Section 142(2) says that subsection (1), which is the five principles, does not apply,
“to an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law”.
My concern is that the punitive elements imposed by the new schedule might be construed as being fixed by law and therefore override subsection (1).
My noble friend has been very good in not yet teasing me about the fact that all the arguments I made about punitive elements could be made against me on the issue of rehabilitation because they are within this schedule as well. The arguments could go both ways. I have asked my noble friend a pretty technical question that I wanted to get on the record. He seems to be getting some advice but if he feels that this needs to wait, I would be happy to do so. It is not fair of me to have bowled him so big a googly.
Lord McNally
I shall simply blame my Box advisers if there was an opportunity to tease my noble friend which they did not draw to my attention. Perhaps there will be opportunity when we get to Report. I am always in awe of the assiduity with which my noble friend approaches her task. I will have a look at the point that she has made in the cold light of Hansard. The hot message from the Box is that the punitive element will not be a sentence fixed by law, but if there is any reason to clarify or modify that, I will write to my noble friend and make the letter available to the rest of the Committee.
Baroness Hamwee
“(2C) Before including any requirement falling within subsection (2A), the court must consider whether, in the circumstances of the case, the requirement is compatible with any requirement imposed or which it determines shall be imposed pursuant to subsection (1).”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 10. This can be brief, because I think the Minister has already pretty much given me what I sought. Amendment 7 provides that before any of the new requirements are included in an order, the court must consider whether it is compatible with other requirements that it is thinking about imposing as part of a community order. I took this from Section 177(6) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, to which the Minister has already referred, and I think he has given me the acknowledgment I want. However, he will understand that I want to ensure that the punitive element is compatible with other elements of the sentence and does not undermine or negate them. As I have indicated, one might argue the same about the rehabilitative elements, but I am focused on the punitive.
Amendment 10 refers to the provision in the Coroners and Justice Act about sentencing guidelines. Section 120 provides for sentencing guidelines about certain matters and makes special arrangements for the guidelines that fall within, I think, subsection (3), including publication in draft of the guidelines and consultation, with specific consultees. In this amendment, I seek to add these new elements to that rather short list. I tabled this amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Linklater before seeing the Minister’s letter following our previous debate on the Bill. I understand that he intends to explore the sentencing guidelines with the Sentencing Council, which probably gives me as much as I can expect at this stage. I beg to move.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I had a witty response for the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, but it will have to wait. My best responses usually come about halfway home when I think, “Damn”.
This group of amendments looks at how the provisions relating to a mandatory punitive element will sit alongside existing features of the sentencing framework. Amendment 7 would require courts to consider, before imposing an element that meets the purpose of punishing an offender, whether that requirement is compatible with any other requirement that the court wishes to impose as part of the overall community order. I am happy to give an assurance that it is not the Government’s intention that these provisions result in a combination of community order requirements that are manifestly unsuitable for addressing the causes of an individual’s offending. It is clearly right that where a court imposes two or more requirements in combination, those requirements should complement each other rather than cut across each other.
That is why the Government propose to retain Section 148(2)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which provides that the “requirement or requirements” imposed as part of a community order should be those that are, in the court’s opinion, “most suitable for” that offender. I should make it clear that, as a result of these provisions, this requirement would in future be subject to the duty to impose a punitive element. However, that does not change the fact that the courts, having decided on a punitive element, will still have to ensure that, if it is combined with another requirement, that combination is the most suitable for the offender before them.
I would also draw noble Lords’ attention to Section 177(6) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which requires courts to consider, when imposing two or more community order requirements, whether they are “compatible with each other” given the circumstances of the case. Again, the Government do not intend to change that requirement. I believe that, taken together, the existing framework already provides the safeguards that my noble friend is seeking.
Amendment 10 would place an explicit duty on the Sentencing Council to prepare sentencing guidelines for courts on the execution of their duty to impose a punitive element within or alongside a community order. I fully understand the intent behind this amendment. Since its creation in 2010, the Sentencing Council has played a vital and valuable role in supporting effective and consistent sentencing by the courts. While the council is of course independent, the Government are committed to exploring with it whether the provisions in this Bill will require changes to existing sentencing guidelines. For example, the council has an existing guideline on sentencing powers in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, including community orders. The current guidelines include material defining low, medium and high intensity levels of community order.
While this and other guidelines clearly provide important guidance to the courts, I would not wish the council’s existing, wide-ranging powers to issue sentencing guidelines to become too unwieldy or complex. The current power to issue guidelines has the twin virtues of simplicity and flexibility, while allowing the Government to request that the council considers issuing guidelines on a particular topic. I am happy to make a commitment to my noble friend that the Government will discuss this and other provisions in the Bill with the Sentencing Council. I hope that, on the basis of these assurances, my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I certainly shall. I read Hansard afterwards, so I will read what the Minister said to make sure that it was as good as it sounded. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 7.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
In moving Amendment 15, I will speak also to Amendment 16. Again, I hope to be brief.
This takes us to the provisions about electronic monitoring, the first of which provides in new Section 215A(1) that there should be a code of practice relating to the processing—I stress “processing”—of
“data gathered in the course of … monitoring … offenders under electronic monitoring requirements”.
My amendment would extend this code to the use of data. I hope that it is pretty obvious what that is about. Processing is a mechanical matter. The use of data is how you apply what you have discovered. That takes us into civil liberties areas. I hope that the Minister will acknowledge that this is something more than processing and that we can find a way to cover it.
Amendment 16 provides for consultation in preparing a code. The Secretary of State will have the obligation to issue the code. I remember that in the Protection of Freedoms Act there was provision for consultation by the Secretary of State in developing a code of practice relating to camera surveillance systems. This amendment is very closely based on that provision. I have listed a number of post-holders and organisations that will have a particular point of view on what needs to be considered when electronic monitoring is to be a part of a disposal.
Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, told us that he would have to leave. I say in his absence that I am extremely flattered that he has added his name to a piece of my drafting.
Lord Clinton-Davis
If the Minister were prepared to give an assurance that consultation will be wide and effectively encompass all the organisations that are listed, would that be satisfactory?
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I would like to hear what the Minister has to say about each of the organisations. It will not take very much more of the Committee’s time. I do not know whether the noble Lord was trying to save time.
NOMS and the probation service will have views about the impact of monitoring on individual offenders who, as we know, are likely to have very different characteristics. The Lord Chief Justice has a responsibility for the work of sentencers and therefore will, I am sure, wish to make comments to the Secretary of State about how sentencers will use this tool. The police, as the law enforcers, will have a view and the Information Commissioner and the Chief Surveillance Commissioner have important civil liberties obligations and responsibilities. I will listen to what the Minister has to say and I hope to receive some assurances but it is important to put on record why I have chosen this list of candidates, together with, as I say,
“such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.
I beg to move.
Baroness Linklater of Butterstone
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Hamwee. As regards the list in Amendment 16, the probation service represents a very important element in the consultation and the setting up of the code. It is clear that supervision is appropriate only when it is coupled with other requirements, particularly probation support. In fact, it is a great mistake for electronic monitoring to be used without proper contact being established with a probation officer. That increases breach rates by 58% and higher levels of reoffending by 21%. You cannot just leave this matter to a bit of technology. It is very important that those who have direct contact with young, or not so young, people in this situation also have the support of people in the probation service who can add their skills and advice to this process.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, I speak to Amendments 15 and 16. I noted with some amusement that my noble friend Lady Linklater said that her children were in their forties, which made me feel like a mere child on the Front Bench.
Amendments 15 and 16 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee relate to the duty on the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice regarding the processing of data gathered under an electronic monitoring requirement imposed for either the purpose of monitoring compliance or monitoring whereabouts in short tracking offenders.
As my noble friend said, Amendment 15 is intended to extend the scope of the code of practice to include the use of data as well as the processing of data. In fact, the code itself would be designed to ensure such use meets the principles and obligations set out in the Data Protection Act 1998 for the processing of such data. “Processing” is defined in Section 1(1) of that Act to include the “obtaining, recording or holding” of data, including, among other things, the
“use of the information or data”.
To add the words “use of” to this provision could call into question the breadth of “processing” in relation to the code and could have the effect of narrowing the requirement, which I am sure is not the intention of my noble friend.
The code will undoubtedly cover the use of data obtained under this provision. It will fully and clearly set out the expectations, safeguards and broad responsibilities for the collection, retention, and sharing of data. For example, we envisage that the code will set out the circumstances in which it may be permissible to share data with the police to assist with crime detection.
The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, correctly pre-empted what I am going to say on Amendment 16. I am always astonished by the great wisdom in this House. Indeed, I can give the assurance that the Government fully recognise the need to consult all stakeholders during the development of the code. Accordingly, the Government intend to consult the Information Commissioner as well as all the other interested parties listed in the amendment to ensure that the framework for processing such data is transparent and lawful while being of value to organisations that are going to use it at an operational level. In the interests of simplicity and flexibility, and given the Government’s undertaking to consult key parties, I feel that this amendment is not needed. Therefore, I hope that I have been able to reassure my noble friend on both counts and that she will be willing to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am sorry that I did not do my homework adequately on the first of the amendments and I am grateful for the clarification. On the second of the amendments, will the noble Lord repeat what the Government will consult on? Although he said that the Government would consult these organisations, I was not sure that that extended to the point I made about the impact on offenders; in other words, pulling this into the whole package of taking us forward on the rehabilitative route. Towards the end of his response, the noble Lord explained what the consultation would be.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, the Government will consult on the full content of the code of practice. My noble friend listed several organisations, including the police and the Information Commissioner. All those listed in the amendment will form part of the consultation.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, Amendment 17 is a small but significant amendment and I am going to be told that the word “wants” is defined somewhere else. We now go into provisions about the disclosure of information. The amendment is to the paragraph allowing for further disclosure, once it has been disclosed through the first few parts of paragraph 27, to another relevant person, which is of course defined,
“who wants social security information or finances information”.
I suggest that “wants” is a very wide term. I can want something but I do not need it. We all know children who “need” sweeties or whatever, but they do not really: they want them. An official could want information because it makes life that much easier. “Requires” would be the proper term here. There should be an appropriate, underlying—I am struggling for a synonym —need, underlying requirement, necessity or something very close to necessity. It should not just make life a bit easier for the person who is asking for it. One might almost have referred, “to another relevant person who asks for it”. That would certainly have been too wide and “wants” is quite close to that. I beg to move.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote
My Lords, when I read the amendment I thought it absolutely appropriate to use the word that has been supplied. I very much hope that the Government will accept “requires” instead of “wants”.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, again, I assure my noble friend that the defendant would know of any such use of data. If any legal representative of the defendant wished to access that data, they would also be made available. I hope that we can clarify any other outstanding issues either before or on Report.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, it might be useful if at some point we could have a discussion whereby we can understand precisely what all the steps are. Like my noble friend Lord Marks, I am clear about the assurances that have been given, but I am not clear to what extent they are within the wording of the schedule and, even having listened to the Minister, how much they need to be there.
As regards Amendment 17, I will look at the references to the other provisions to which he pointed me when he said that there was a need for consistency. I understand that that is important so as not to suggest there is no difference in provision. I might need to ask him if he would be good enough to spend a little time with me, and perhaps my noble friend Lord Marks, to go through the steps in detail. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, the purpose of the amendment is to enable the Government to say rather more about their intentions for the future of the probation service, given that an effective and properly resourced probation service will be crucial to delivering the Government’s intentions on community sentencing, which we are discussing, and the decisions of the courts. The Minister also referred to the probation service in our debate on community sentencing on 30 October. The amendment states that any plans to reorganise the probation service must be instituted by regulations, and that those regulations shall be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure of both Houses.
We know that the Minister is a great admirer of the probation service. He told us on 30 October that:
“I am a lifelong admirer of the probation service and am in awe of the responsibilities that our probation officers take on. I cannot imagine that any future structure would not draw on the experience and ethos that makes it such an excellent service”.—[Official Report, 30/10/12; col. 549.]
On the face of it, that could be taken to mean that the probation service as we know it today has a long-term future, particularly if it is the Government’s intention to raise the profile, importance and extent of rehabilitation as the means of reducing reoffending. On the other hand, the noble Lord’s words could mean very little.
He said that he could not imagine that any future structure would not draw on the experience and ethos that make it such an excellent service. What exactly did the Minister mean when he said that? One interpretation could be that the Government are nevertheless still looking to hand over to outside contractors large parts of the work currently undertaken by the probation service, and that the experience and ethos to which the Minister referred would be drawn upon because he would expect significant numbers of existing probation staff to be transferred over to those contractors. Is that an interpretation of the Minister’s comments that he would either accept as accurate or not be prepared to exclude?
He said that he was,
“in awe of the responsibilities that our probation officers take on”.
Yet, as I understand it, the Government have indicated that 60% of probation work will be put out to competitive tender. What then were the responsibilities that the Minister had in mind when he said that, and how many of those responsibilities is it the Government’s intention that the probation service should continue to undertake? Is it all of them, as presumably it should be, bearing in mind that the noble Lord is “in awe” and regards the probation service as an excellent service, and that its work will continue to be undertaken by probation officers in the years ahead?
Are the Government looking to reorganise the probation service and, if so, with what objective in mind, and in what way? If the probation service is already excellent, as the Minister told us last month, what improvements in the service do the Government believe can be achieved without potentially putting at risk the quality of the excellent service currently being provided?
We definitely do not want to see any attempt to reduce significantly or change the role of the probation service without Parliament being fully aware of what is going on, without the opportunity for a full debate—with Ministers having to justify their proposals to Parliament—and without Parliament having to agree to those changes. The new Secretary of State seems to believe implicitly in the private sector’s ability to do just about everything better than the public sector, and he is likely to try and outsource as much as he can work that is currently undertaken by the probation service. If that is not the case, the Minister has only to stand up and give a cast-iron guarantee that the probation service will continue to undertake its current activities within the public sector.
The Minister could also say how many staff are in the probation service at the present time and how many the Government envisage there will be in the future, taking account of their proposals in the Bill on community sentencing and their declared intentions on restorative justice and on the role of rehabilitation in reducing reoffending. We will listen to the Minister’s response and the words that he chooses to use—and the ones that he chooses not to use—with interest. I hope that his response will be consistent with the effusive words he used about the probation service in his response to our debate on 30 October. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Linklater has already put on record today, for the umpteenth time in this Chamber, our admiration for the work done by the probation service. I hope that is a fair summary. I will not take up the Committee’s time by repeating that or picking up the points of acclamation made by the noble Lord. I simply want to ask him a question. His amendment would insert a provision for the affirmative resolution procedure in the 2007 Act. The significance of the date of that will not be lost on the Committee. In other words, that legislation existed before the last general election. I was hoping to understand, from his introduction of this amendment, why, as that legislation allowed for plans to reorganise the probation service—I understand that must be so from his own amendment—there was no provision included at the time for the affirmative resolution procedure. I make it clear that my question is for the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
Lord McNally
For the record, we are considering how to give effect to those parts of the Offender Management Act 2007 that open up provision of the probation service to a wider range of providers. In doing that, we will, of course, take a sensible and measured approach to any proposals introducing competition for offender management. Protection of the public will continue to be our top priority as we design our reforms.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I would not say that the noble Lord was interrupted but an explanation has been given by the Minister. I did not expect the Minister to answer my question because it was not a question for him. It was a question about why the previous Government provided for the sort of reorganisation to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred, but did not provide for the affirmative resolution procedure. I am sure he would have said, as I have, that one needs to ensure that all legislation is proof against succeeding and different governments. The noble Lord was not part of it so perhaps I am teasing him unnecessarily.
Lord Rosser
It was not our intention to do to the probation service what one suspects that this Government are contemplating doing to the probation service. Certainly, nothing that the Minister has just said will have allayed any fears or concerns about the Government’s future intentions for the probation service. We tabled an amendment to ensure that the matter is fully discussed and debated in both Houses and to point out that it requires an affirmative resolution procedure.
I am not surprised that the Minister has declined to answer any of the points that I have put forward in asking him about the Government’s intentions. He has effectively remained silent, which must add considerably to the worries and suspicion about what is intended, particularly since the consultation ended a while ago. However, I realise that I cannot force the Minister to say anything in response to questions that I ask. Therefore, I have no alternative but to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, Amendment 22 is a very low-key and minor introduction to this important new schedule about deferred prosecution agreements. It deals with the provision of certain persons to be designated as prosecutors who can enter into deferred prosecution agreements. Paragraph 3(2) states:
“A designated prosecutor must exercise personally the power to enter into a DPA”.
If I split an infinitive, it was because I was quoting. Paragraph 3(3) states that,
“if the designated prosecutor is unavailable, the power … may be exercised personally by a person authorised … by the designated prosecutor”.
This is a probing amendment. I seek to understand what is meant by “unavailable”. I assume that it would mean something more than “unavailable because he has gone to the dentist that afternoon”, and would mean unavailable because he or she is having long-term treatment for a medical problem that keeps them away from the office and away from work. The amendment specifies that the unavailability should be,
“for a period of or likely to be of more than 21 days”.
I am by no means wedded to that. As I said, this is a probing amendment, because “unavailable” could be read as meaning a very brief period where it would not be appropriate for power to be delegated. I beg to move.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, the noble Baroness raised a perfectly fair and reasonable point, to which no doubt the Minister will be able to reply. Looking again at paragraph 3, it strikes me that perhaps there are one or two other questions to ask. Paragraph 3(1) states that the prosecutor is designated by an order made by the Secretary of State. That is a very high-level appointment. It is emphasised by paragraph 3(2), which states that the designated prosecutor,
“must exercise personally the power to enter into a DPA”.
Again, it follows that this is a serious responsibility for somebody appointed at the highest level relevant to that appointment.
It would appear that the person then has a delegated power, in the circumstances which no doubt the Minister will elucidate of his or her unavailability, to appoint somebody else. There does not seem to be any procedure for that person necessarily to be one of a group approved in advance by the Secretary of State. It may be that a sort of panel system is envisaged, but that is not clear in the Bill. Presumably anybody could be designated—in theory they could be relatively junior—by the original designated prosecutor to carry out this very responsible work.
This thought had not occurred to me until the noble Baroness opened up the issue. However, it strikes me as a matter that the Minister should take back and look at. I would envisage that a panel system would apply, but surely it would be sensible to specify that that would be the case, rather than leave an untrammelled decision to the designated prosecutor in circumstances where he or she is not available to do the job. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, will take that back and look at it, in order to answer both problems that we have identified this evening.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, perhaps I can come back on this. The point is reinforced by the fact that designation under paragraph 3(1)(c) is subject to the affirmative procedure under Clause 30.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for moving her amendment. When devising the new process for deferred prosecution agreements for England and Wales, the Government sought to ensure that it aligned with key strengths and aspects of the existing criminal justice system. To that end, we provided for decision-making throughout the process to be properly guided, including by the code of practice for prosecutors, and overseen by the judiciary.
Paragraph 3 of the schedule provides that the decision to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with an organisation should be exercised personally by designated prosecutors, namely the Director of Public Prosecutions and the director of the Serious Fraud Office. This is to ensure that there is prosecutorial oversight of each DPA at the highest level. It mirrors existing requirements for such oversight, including, for example, decisions to bring proceedings under the Bribery Act 2010. Offences under the Bribery Act 2010 are among the economic and financial offences for which we propose DPAs. This process should be available, as detailed in Part 2 of Schedule 17.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked what would occur when the relevant director, whom we hope in each case will make the decision personally, is not available. In order that due process can continue without delay, we have provided the power for the relevant director, if they are going to be unavailable, to designate another prosecutor to exercise the oversight and decision-making functions. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked whether they could assign this power to anyone. I suggest that someone who is qualified and in such a senior role will assign it to an appropriate prosecutor in their relevant area.
Consistent with similar powers for personal decisions by directors, such as those under the Bribery Act 2010, we have not sought to constrain the ability to delegate the power to enter into a DPA. We are not contemplating large numbers of deferred prosecution agreements each year, and are confident that the directors are fully committed to making decisions personally, as envisaged, and would designate another person to do so only in exceptional circumstances and with good reason—and, I will add, would designate only an appropriate person.
I consider it important in the interests of openness and consistency that DPAs should align as closely as possible with existing and established law, and with the processes of our criminal justice system. That is what we have sought to achieve in paragraph 3, and indeed throughout Schedule 17. I therefore hope that with this explanation my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.
Lord Beecham
I am grateful for the Minister’s response, but he has not quite addressed the issue. There is nothing in the Bill that would require the substitute prosecutor to be a designated prosecutor; they could be anybody nominated by the original designated prosecutor. I again invite the Minister to take this back and have a look at it. It seems—and I think that the noble Baroness agrees with me—that there is a lacuna here that needs to be filled.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, of course I will look in any direction that the noble Lord points me to in considering consistency with other legislation. I think that what we are being asked to do is to rely on the good sense, and good sense of responsibility, of those who hold the posts specified in paragraph 3(1)(c). I understand that and take the point seriously but, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, at least some further thought is required in order that we can be confident that enough constraint is in place. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment