Debates between Lord West of Spithead and Lord Tunnicliffe during the 2015-2017 Parliament

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord West of Spithead and Lord Tunnicliffe
Wednesday 27th April 2016

(8 years, 7 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord West of Spithead Portrait Lord West of Spithead
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My Lords, I have a certain sympathy for the amendment of my noble friend Lord Judd but I feel that allowing people to enter the services at 16 is a good thing. I tried to join when I was 14, which was slightly too young in my mother’s and the Navy’s opinion, but I joined at 17. As my noble friend said, a number of the people who join the services at that age come from disadvantaged backgrounds, and what the military does to those people is quite remarkable. If we were able to show that, everyone would see it, but there is no need to do so. It is right that we still take people into the services at 16. They gain a great deal and it is a useful and good thing for our society, in the same way as the cadet forces add a great deal to our society.

Lord Tunnicliffe Portrait Lord Tunnicliffe
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My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 7 and 8. Whether we like it or not, this is a fundamental debate about whether young people of 16 should be recruited into the Armed Forces. We have to respect that this is a serious debate and that both sides believe with conviction that their position is right. I respect the work of Child Soldiers International and I recognise the persuasive nature of the arguments it makes. It refers to issues of morality, welfare, economic and even diplomatic issues.

But there is the other side of the debate, which is that for many young people the great start they are given in life by being recruited at 16 provides them with opportunities that no other direction would give. They have the best start to adulthood. We believe that on balance, the argument for the opportunities provided is stronger than the argument that there should be no recruitment until the age of 18. We also believe that there should be the maximum practical protection for these young people.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord West of Spithead and Lord Tunnicliffe
Tuesday 1st March 2016

(8 years, 9 months ago)

Grand Committee
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Lord West of Spithead Portrait Lord West of Spithead
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My Lords, I have considerable sympathy for Amendment 4, which stems from my view that I see the composition of the board of courts martial as much more to do with discipline and military things. Clearly with some of these very serious crimes, jurisdiction is very important. I am not clear how that could be clarified to make sure that things do not slip through the net because of it. However, the other aspect is perception. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, talked about public perceptions of courts martial. I think that there is also the perception of the military about the way in which they are put on trial. If we went down this route mitigation would have to be very clearly put, particularly when in what one might loosely call a war zone where there has been fighting and nation building, because the circumstances in which something like the Baha Mousa case happens are different from the normal civilian understanding. We would have to be absolutely certain that we were able to get that sort of proper mitigation into the civil court. However, I have great sympathy with Amendment 4, because some of these things should not generally be tried by court martial nowadays.

Lord Tunnicliffe Portrait Lord Tunnicliffe
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My Lords, as I said earlier, I see this debate as being in two parts, of which this is the second part. The development of service law in this country has been going on for several hundred years and we have seen important movements in the past 10 years with the 2006 Act and now with these proposals. I am unsympathetic to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, proposes in this area, because it goes too deep into the body of military law. There is presumably an argument that you do not need military law on any offence that is covered by an equivalent piece of civil law, but we are not there yet in the minds of either the public or the military. We are on a journey and I think that we are at the right place in that journey, so to carve these offences out of the scope of military law at this point would be wrong. I shall read with great care the speeches that have been made and listen with great care to the Minister’s response. We will ponder on those views but, as a generality, the scope of military law is probably right at this time. I repeat that we should address the courts martial system to make the judgment process analogous but leave the scope substantially as it is.

--- Later in debate ---
Lord Tunnicliffe Portrait Lord Tunnicliffe
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I wonder if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, would let me speak before him because I intend to quote him at some length and he can correct any mistakes I make. I make it clear that the Opposition would not support this amendment as set out. I am not talking about little technicalities about wording; I am talking about an erosion of the Human Rights Act. We believe that that is a proper and admirable piece of legislation and that its retention is important. No doubt this will be the basis of a major battle between the parties in the weeks to come when the legislation is published.

I turn to the specific area of the judgment. Before Second Reading, I had not heard of Smith and others v Ministry of Defence. I googled it, thinking, “This will give me the information”, only to discover that the judgment was 72 pages and 188 paragraphs long. At the very moment when I had a sense of doom, I noticed that it had been given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, whose office is some 50 metres from mine, so I tried to save myself some effort by going to see him, and I thank him for the briefing he gave me.

I looked through the 72 pages to get a wider flavour of the judgment. I will concentrate solely on the Challenger 2 event. The Snatch Land Rover issue is complicated by the fact that it was not formally a combat situation but a peacekeeping one, so while it is important to the debate, it is capable of being part a much wider debate. In my view, however, the tone of the judgment on the Challenger 2 event is straightforward. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has already quoted paragraph 76 of the judgment, but if the Committee will forgive me I shall quote a few more paragraphs. Paragraph 82 states:

“The Challenger claims proceed on the basis that there is no common law liability for negligence in respect of acts or omissions on the part of those who are actually engaged in armed combat”.

That is a pretty flat statement. It continues:

“So it has not been suggested that Lt Pinkstone or anyone else in the Black Watch battle group was negligent. Nor, as his decision to fire was taken during combat, would it have been appropriate to do so. The Challenger claimants concentrate instead on an alleged failure to ensure that the claimants’ tank and the tanks of the battle group that fired on it were properly equipped with technology and equipment that would have prevented the incident, and an alleged failure to ensure that soldiers were provided with adequate recognition training before they were deployed and also in theatre. Their case is founded entirely on failings in training and procurement”.

Its final sentence says that:

“The Ellis claim at common law also raises issues about procurement”.

If we delve further into the document, we get what is in a sense the substance of the ruling. Paragraph 95 says that:

“The same point can be made about the time when the failures are alleged to have taken place in the Challenger claimants’ case. At the stage when men are being trained, whether pre-deployment or in theatre, or decisions are being made about the fitting of equipment to tanks or other fighting vehicles, there is time to think things through, to plan and to exercise judgment. These activities are sufficiently far removed from the pressures and risks of active operations against the enemy for it to not to be unreasonable to expect a duty of care to be exercised, so long as the standard of care that is imposed has regard to the nature of these activities and to their circumstances. For this reason I would hold that the Challenger claims are not within the scope of the doctrine”—

that is, combat immunity—

“that they should not be struck out on this ground and that the MOD should not be permitted, in the case of these claims, to maintain this argument”.

Its argument was to rule that it should be struck out through the doctrine of combat immunity.

The tone of the whole judgment is summed up in paragraph 100 where the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, says:

“The sad fact is that, while members of the armed forces on active service can be given some measure of protection against death and injury, the nature of the job they do means that this can never be complete. They deserve our respect because they are willing to face these risks in the national interest, and the law will always attach importance to the protection of life and physical safety. But it is of paramount importance that the work that the armed services do in the national interest should not be impeded by having to prepare for or conduct active operations against the enemy under the threat of litigation if things … go wrong. The court must be especially careful, in their case, to have regard to the public interest, to the unpredictable nature of armed conflict and to the inevitable risks that it gives rise to when it is striking the balance as to what is fair, just and reasonable”.

In other words, over and over again in the findings as I read them—as an amateur and not as a general, although I was made acting pilot officer, and having never been a lawyer, although I was a great employer of lawyers—the noble and learned Lord seems to go out of his way to express that this is not about combat. It is about when it is reasonable and practical to do so that the MoD has a duty of care.

I come back to my question. Where is the harm in sustaining the Human Rights Act as it has been used in this case, and what are the implications? The implications are that it says that simply because the process eventually leads to combat, the Ministry of Defence cannot use the doctrine of combat immunity to avoid its duty of care. Where it is reasonable to exercise its duty of care, it has a duty to do that.

Also in my career, I worked for the Ministry of Defence as a non-executive director of defence and equipment support. As such, I was asked to look into the safety of equipment in the MoD, and I have to say that it was variable. In some areas it did not meet the highest civil standard. I do not mean silly standards; I mean the general duty that you have in civil law to reduce risk to as low as is reasonably practicable. Civil law does not say that you cannot do dangerous things and no one is suggesting that the military should not, but where you have an opportunity to reduce risk, you have a duty to take it. That cannot be an unreasonable duty. My reading of the judgment is that that is where the duty remains: where it is practicable it should be exercised, but where it is impractical, specifically in combat, then a court should not regard it.

The area of harm that does exist is what in other circumstances people would call the chill factor. The Health and Safety at Work Act has been around for so long now that most industries that are subject to it, whatever you read in the press, are mature enough to live with it. However, there are still things like the presumption of guilt—the chill factor that will stop executives from doing their job. In fact people get over it and get used to it, but if it is influencing in combat the decisions that soldiers, sailors and airmen are making, then that is wrong. That is a challenge for the MoD, not a challenge to change the law but in its training, in its teaching of the doctrine and in ensuring that the people who are making decisions fully understand that this ruling does not relate to combat and that they should continue to make their combat decisions as they have been taught to, within the rules of what I loosely call the Geneva convention, and get on with the job.

We will not support this amendment. If it comes up on Report we will oppose it, or in trying to dilute the Human Rights Act, we will oppose it.

Lord West of Spithead Portrait Lord West of Spithead
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Just before my noble friend sits down, I would like to get clarification. Is he saying that combat immunity trumps the Human Rights Act? In a European Court judgment on human rights, combat immunity will trump it—is that what is being said? That does not appear to be the case, which is one of the worries that I have with what is going on. The French and another nation, for example, have both taken their military out of that and said that they are not liable to the Human Rights Act in action. However, my noble friend seems to be saying that combat immunity trumps the Act, so this is not a problem that we should be discussing. Is that correct?

Lord Tunnicliffe Portrait Lord Tunnicliffe
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One of the reasons why I spoke when I did was so that there could be a summing-up of the law by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. My understanding of the judgment is that there is no question that the Human Rights Act applies to military personnel when they are serving overseas. It was a unanimous decision of the court and all seven judges agreed that it was true. What they then asked was, “What does the Human Rights Act require?”. People really should read the Human Rights Act. It is about three or four pages long and is a brilliant document. It refers to the European Convention on Human Rights, which is also well worth every person in our legislature having a read of. The Act is an extremely balanced document, virtually every provision of which expects you to behave reasonably.

What the court said, and I précis, is that the duty in the Human Rights Act to have care for those you are responsible for—the right to life—has to be interpreted reasonably, and the doctrine of the common law right of combat immunity holds good in a combat situation. Where there is proper opportunity to consider actions that may reduce risk then you have a duty of care to consider those actions, but not in combat and in the heat of battle.

Lord West of Spithead Portrait Lord West of Spithead
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My noble friend’s exposition explains exactly my concerns about what is going on because it is not at all clear. That is why we need this in order to have the issue clarified. What my noble friend has said has actually left me totally confused as a military commander, so we need to have this clarified. That is why I believe that this is important.