European Union Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Wallace of Saltaire
Main Page: Lord Wallace of Saltaire (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Wallace of Saltaire's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberPerhaps the noble Lord can help me. He explained that in a number of areas power had gone to Brussels by what he described as fairly dubious means. I have not had the benefit of 20 minutes’ thought about that, but I cannot, offhand, think of any such example. Can he give me a couple of examples of what is worrying him about the dubious means?
The noble Lord is speaking from the Gangway and is therefore not in order.
I would say that the setting up of the European financial stability mechanism using Article 122 of the TFEU is extremely questionable. I am deeply puzzled how that can be regarded as in accordance with the treaty, but I am sure that that matter will be raised at some point later during our proceedings.
My Lords, we have had a series of rather general debates, some of which relate to the amendment under consideration. However, I fear that several speeches have not referred at all to the amendment that we are discussing.
I first answer the broad and appropriate question that the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, posed. The Government’s case is that, under the terms of the Lisbon treaty, we now have considerable flexibility to do a great deal more within the current competencies of the European Union, some of which will be of definite advantage to this country, without needing further treaty change. The amendment seems to be based on an assumption that there is very little flexibility in the treaties, and that Britain is being pushed to the margins, stands alone, and will somehow be trapped by this. The coalition Government are making the case that we wish to make the best of our position in the European Union, but there is now a good deal of headroom and we are not cramped by current conditions. We are, as we will come to later, taking part in at least one exercise in what might become enhanced co-operation on the EU patent. The EU and Britain can work together within existing competencies for some considerable time to come.
On the previous day in Committee, I quoted David Miliband as saying clearly that, with the acceptance of the Lisbon treaty, we should now be entering a stage of consolidation in which we do not need further treaty change for some five to 10 years. If that turns out not to be the case, we will all have to deal with the situation as it then comes.
This is the most important point in the Bill. Are the Government now saying that if the Lisbon treaty says X, Y and Z, none of these clauses can in any way undermine it?
I was not aware that any of these clauses in any way undermined the Lisbon treaty. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who was much involved in the EU convention, is not here. Those of us who have read, as I have, a certain amount on the EU convention and the Lisbon treaty, which followed it, are well aware that the clauses on the emergency brake and passerelle were agreed after hard negotiations, in which it was not the United Kingdom versus all the others. Several member Governments in this now rather large and complex European Union wanted some reassurance that, as they touched on such sensitive areas as national sovereignty, law, finance and welfare provision—some of the issues covered by these emergency brake provisions—they would have, at the back, the ability to say, “No, we are not happy with what is proceeding”. That is what the emergency brake is about. It is not the case that Britain stands alone against 26 other member states that are determined to integrate further and sweep more powers into Brussels.
The United Kingdom and several others are pushing for further co-operation in a range of areas. Coalitions across the European Union differ according to each subject on which we negotiate. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, knows better than me what it looks like once you are inside government. The emergency brakes are there to reassure member states—their public and their Governments—and those who care not just about the peculiarities of English criminal law and justice but about those of Polish and Romanian criminal law and justice. I have read what the then Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, said about this when he gave evidence to the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee on the Lisbon treaty. He said that the Government hoped that the emergency brake would never have to be used, but that it was there as a reassurance to national Governments. I emphasise “Governments”; this was not just about the British.
Jack Straw went on to say to the House of Lords European Union Committee:
“So it is an additional protection and I think really rather an important one”.
Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, drafted this. Jack Straw then said:
“Again, it is quite a paradoxical point but I think the effect of it may be to provide greater confidence to British Government to get involved in opting into instruments, which is actually in principle what we want to do, and having done that then some additional surety which will get a satisfactory answer so that we do not have to apply the emergency brake”.
The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said that sometimes the arguments around all this are arcane and of mind-boggling complexity. That sentence was not the easiest to read. However, the whole purpose of the emergency brakes is precisely to reassure national Governments on sensitive issues. It is not intended that they should be regularly used. It is highly unlikely that any Government will wish to remove them in the foreseeable future. Therefore, I suggest humbly that this amendment is one of the least useful that we have to consider.
I think the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is trying to distort the position that I have put forward. I am not in favour of removing the emergency brakes. I am saying that the flexibility is there in the Lisbon treaty to do this. Those of us who have doubts about the Government’s Bill are saying that since this flexibility could be exercised only by Act of Parliament, why does it have to be done through a referendum? That is fundamentally the point. We heard the argument about what the former Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, said about the Lisbon treaty late at night in the previous session of the Committee. The point is that David Miliband recommended the Lisbon treaty to the other place on the basis of the flexibilities that it contains. However, the problem with the Bill is that it tries to tie up all those flexibilities with its wretched referendum lock.
The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is trying to cover up the fact that his party is allowing the Conservative Party a second bite at the cherry on the referendum on the Lisbon treaty that it failed to secure. That is what much of the Bill is about. It is to my great regret that the British party that has been the strongest supporter of Britain’s membership of the European Union has gone along with what the Conservatives are asking for in this case. They are after a re-run of Lisbon. The amendments that we on this side of the Committee have put forward say, “Let us take the Lisbon treaty as it is and accept that the flexibilities within it do not require referenda”.
It is my great regret that for 13 years under the previous Labour Government the balance of public opinion in this country became steadily more sceptical about the European Union and that the Government of Tony Blair and then of Gordon Brown failed to make a positive case for European Union engagement. That has left us with a very sceptical public and a deeply sceptical and antagonistic press. That is the problem with which this Bill deals. It is another problem that we have inherited from a succession of previous Governments. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, might well have tried to do something about that at the time from inside government, but unfortunately he did not succeed.
We can have academic debates about these questions in other places, and I do not want to delay the Committee. However, on the facts, there has been no great swing of British public opinion against the European Union over the past 15 years or so. It has fluctuated with circumstances over time. The Eurosceptic press was not created by the previous Government; unfortunately, it has been with us for a lot longer than that.
We on this side fundamentally object to the idea that plebiscitary democracy is the way to restore public trust. I am surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is going along with this. I do not know what the noble Lord’s views are on the current referendum campaign, but there does not seem to be a high quality of public debate on referenda, given the way in which some of the people involved in the referendum campaign have argued that we are missing out by not having these issues decided in Parliament, where there would at least be a more balanced consideration of them.
I will, of course, withdraw this amendment. However, we on this side have moved several amendments on these lines, and we see no give whatever on the Government’s part. On subsequent Committee days I will refer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, to which the Government must face up: namely, if they think that something has to be done in the national interest, would it still require a referendum, and what would be their position on that? That question is highly relevant.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Taverne and I have a difficulty. A number of speeches addressing this group of amendments have moved somewhat between the groups. There have been references to later amendments. We are not quite sure whether this debate is meant to comprise the list of things being put forward by the Front Bench of the Labour Party, including this amendment as well as the others that fall within the same general area, or whether we are supposed to limit ourselves entirely to the single market. In that case, a great many speeches have been rather close to being out of order. Perhaps the Government will indicate whether they wish this debate to be limited to the single market or to take a number of these amendments together, in which case my noble friend Lord Taverne and I both wish to say something.
As the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, recognised, and perhaps I may suggest, as this group and the groups that follow cover similar themes one might talk about this group and those that follow, which will save time later when we get to the others.
I am grateful for that, which is exactly my view. Perhaps I might refer to what the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, said. I also associate those concepts with some of the later amendments. I will not keep the House for long. The noble Lord’s good argument was made strongly on the basis of the need in some cases for urgent decisions to be made. He pointed out that the formal procedures are long-winded and slow and that therefore in some cases it would be irrelevant to the issue that had come up because it would take so long to deal with the procedures.
I now refer to a second group of amendments, which is what I might call the Canute group. What is the Canute group? Those of us who remember the early history of Britain will remember that the king at the time ordered the tide to turn back. In other words, he insisted on not seeing the world as it is. The amendments in this group are about insisting—
I understood the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, to say that as this group and the following group of amendments cover a number of similar issues he had touched on some of the broader issues behind them. It was not my intention to go into the detail on all of them as the noble Baroness has just done.
My Lords, some very important issues are raised by these amendments. If they are now to be considered and debated, I do not see how we can possibly break for dinner.
My Lords, we have been urged by the usual channels to make sure that the business is handled as effectively as possible. For those reasons I spoke to group three, which has broadly related economics based arguments. I spoke to nothing else. I was kindly reminded that I would need to move the amendment at the end and, in due course, formally move the next two amendments. However, I spoke to the economic group, group three. I hope I have now made it clear.
My Lords, in that case, perhaps I may give the Government’s response on this group. We will then be able to break for dinner and return to the others later. All afternoon this has been a rather untidy debate. I almost congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, on actually mentioning in his speech the amendment under discussion. In the previous debate he did not mention the amendment we were supposed to be discussing. We are in a Committee stage debate at the moment in which one is supposed to address one’s remarks to the Bill under discussion rather than to the state of the world, the wickedness of the EU as such and all the other things he touched on in his interventions.
The noble Lord, Lord Triesman, raised large questions about global markets and global governance. As we address these amendments, we all recognise that what the EU does in competition policy, in negotiating on world trade and so on is part of a rather complex system of different intergovernmental organisations, of which the EU is one. I remind the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, that money laundering is largely dealt with, for example, under the financial action task force, which is more closely associated with the OECD than with the EU. It does it rather well. Indeed, I have read a volume by one of the noble Baroness’s close relatives which refers to how well the financial action task force does in this respect. The EU is not responsible for all of the issues involved in managing a global market. However, it has a number of extensive powers, some of which have been discussed on this occasion.
This group of amendments and the ones that follow seem, in general, to contain a number of assumptions about the Bill, the EU and what the Government think about the EU which, I repeat, are erroneous. First, the EU has competencies in all of these areas. We are not talking about extending competencies. Opting in to the human trafficking directive does not extend competences; it merely uses the available competencies in a more effective way. The treaty of Lisbon provides ample scope for EU action in the areas cited in the amendments tabled under this group and the group that follows. The assumption that the United Kingdom is tying itself up in knots and is thus unable to act and that we are the only Government who wish to go through constitutional procedures of the kinds listed in the Bill is also erroneous. As we have said, the UK Government are in the forefront of pushing for new policies in a number of areas. As the noble Baroness said, we have just signed up to the human trafficking directive.
On the Doha round, it is not the EU that is causing the problem, as the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, knows. Incidentally, when Britain first joined the European Community as it then was, one of the first things that I and many others learnt about it was Article 113 and the 113 committee, and the exclusive competence of the European Community in external trade. I am not sure what one can provide more than exclusive competence —perhaps super-exclusive competence is needed next.
We are now negotiating on services as well. The assumption that the EU is unable to act in all of this is part of the misunderstandings that others are raising. There is also the question that if the European Union suddenly found that it lacked these powers then it could rush through a treaty change in two months. Actually, we have discovered that urgent treaty changes take somewhere between 18 and 24 months. That is part of the process we have gone through. The noble Lord, Lord Empey, rightly pointed out that in a crisis you are better off negotiating rapidly in an ad hoc framework, as we often find ourselves having to on a global level—G20 has emerged as part of this—rather than attempting to go through all of these very complicated programmes.
On competition policy, the European Union has now emerged as one of the two most important forums for competition policy in managing global multinationals. Until the EU developed its competition competence, the United States effectively managed the competition policy of multinational companies and operated through extra-territorial jurisdiction in imposing its judgments on multinationals operating elsewhere. The record of the EU in competition policy has on the whole been very good. The noble Lord, Lord Triesman, is quite right to point out that innovation constantly raises new problems. That is true for all jurisdictions and there is a constant race between one international organisation and another. So far, the EU has managed as well as the federal United States in that respect.
On the lack of competences, I have looked at what used to be Article 113 and is now Articles 206 and 207. There are two areas of reserved competence in Article 207. One is on audio-visual and cultural relations—not inserted by the British but by the French—and the other is on limitations on negotiations in health, welfare and social services—not inserted by the British but by the Germans. We are not always the ones who are hesitant about giving way on sovereignty; it is often others. On the single market and global trade agreements, the EU is well supplied with competence.
On financial regulation, the EU is one among many actors. The Bank for International Settlements, the financial action task force and the range of other bodies to which the United Kingdom belongs and in which the UK is a full participant also play a role in this area. Our EU partners play a large role as well. The Government want to see—we will stress this on all these amendments—the European Union using the tools it has under existing treaties and its now very extensive competence more effectively, bringing about the benefits that we want to see the EU delivering for the British people and everyone across the European Union. The noble Lord, Lord Mandelson, made an excellent speech on our previous Committee day precisely expressing those sentiments. Those are sentiments that the Government share. Having said all that, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, will be willing to withdraw his amendment. Then we will return to the next group on similar arguments after dinner.
I did not want to interrupt the noble Lord’s flow while he was speaking, but I have a rather important question. He referred to Article 207 and the derogation in that from the usual procedures on the common foreign policy that the council needs to act unanimously in these two matters involving, first, trade in cultural and audio-visual services, which he said was a provision put in at the demand of the French, and secondly, the field of social, education and health services, which he said was put in at the demand of the Germans. The noble Lord was really saying that here was a case when the treaty needed to be amended to accommodate the particular requirements of those two countries. They were not our requirements and we would rather have had no derogation in the common foreign trade policy. Let us suppose that the French and German were prepared to remove those two derogations or obstacles to freer international trade. Is it the case that under the Bill we would then require a referendum to allow the Germans and the French to agree to give up concessions which they had previously obtained?
I have spent a good deal of my adult life studying and teaching on the European Union. I struggle to imagine a situation in which the French Government would suddenly decide, on their own and as a single action without asking for any concessions in any other area, to give up that. Hypothetically, in a parallel universe inhabited by the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, and a number of other people, it is always possible that these things might happen. In the practical life of the way that the European Union works, that seems completely inconceivable.
I am grateful for that response which seems to reveal that there is potential for a complete absurdity, which must also exist elsewhere in the treaty. We would force a referendum on ourselves simply because some other member state was prepared to adopt more communautaire policies in the future and to withdraw concessions that previously they had insisted upon.