King’s Speech

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Thursday 25th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent, on her opening remarks, which were clear and resolute, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on his appointment as Defence Minister. In my two years in this place, I always thought him one of the most effective and persuasive speakers. So I trust that he will succeed in persuading all those who need persuading—foreign counterparts, but also colleagues in the Treasury. Warm congratulations also to the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, and the noble Lord, Lord Collins, on their ministerial appointments in the Foreign Office.

I do not come from a military or diplomatic background. But I am lucky to have been an international law professor, not in a law school but in a department of war studies. My colleagues in that department would not let me indulge in the belief that the preservation of international peace is an objective that law alone can achieve. When faced with an aggressor who has no regard for any law, our best chance to avoid war is to be strong.

Unfortunately—I echo the comments of other noble Lords and Baronesses, including every noble and gallant Lord who has spoken—we are not strengthening fast enough. In fact, we are doing considerably worse than the appeasement generation, which began to rearm within three to five years of Hitler’s rise to power. It is now more than 10 years since Putin invaded Crimea, and we have barely begun.

Another reason for our greater vulnerability is a dangerous pattern in our foreign and defence policy over the last 25 years. Faced with a new security threat, our first reaction has often been to set ambitious objectives and to declare our commitment to them to be steadfast. But too often that commitment then waned; we did not stay the course, perhaps because some of those objectives were unachievable or misguided.

Whatever the reason, we left Afghanistan to the Taliban. We ousted Gaddafi and ended up with a failed state in Libya. We set red lines for Assad, which he crossed with impunity. We said we would support Israel’s objective of destroying Hamas military infrastructure, and later added conditions that would in practice make it unattainable. A few months ago, President Biden told Iran “Don’t”—and yet, as we know, Iran did. By acting in this way, we have diminished our strategic credibility. Potential aggressors may think that, in a confrontation with us, the West would not muster the resolve and patience necessary to win, and that their will would outlast ours.

At the same time, we have been enthusiastic about expanding our strategic commitments: NATO enlargement, AUKUS and now the irreversible pathway to NATO for Ukraine, mentioned in the gracious Speech, on which both Labour and Conservatives agree. I declare my interest as counsel for Ukraine in Strasbourg in proceedings brought against the Russian Federation for human rights violations perpetrated in the war. The problem is not our enthusiasm for these new strategic commitments; the problem is the Pollyannish assumption that they will not be tested.

The strategic defence review is led by a star team. I am sure that we will get a very candid assessment of both our past failures and our current and future threats. I also hope that the strategic review will consider a specific but very important issue: the effect of differential treaty obligations within NATO, and with our potential adversaries, on our ability to fight together and win.

Britain and European countries have been decoupling from America on a number of important treaties that affect the conduct of hostilities: the ICC statute, the Ottawa treaty on anti-personnel mines, the cluster munitions convention and the Arms Trade Treaty. The US is out; Russia is out; we and the Europeans are in. We know that Russia will not comply with its treaty obligations. NATO countries will and they must, so we have to accept that there will be some asymmetry. But we must ask ourselves, as Americans have done throughout, under any Administration, whether at this point we can afford to make that asymmetry worse by voluntarily accepting further obligations, however well intentioned. We must test those obligations on a worst-case scenario and take remedial action where we can.

In Finland, for example, there is a debate on whether to withdraw from the Ottawa treaty in order to secure its border. A state cannot withdraw from that treaty in the middle of an armed conflict. So, for example, Ukraine will be bound by that treaty for the duration of the war, even though Russia is not a party. These are difficult and uncomfortable questions, but they are necessary and urgent. If we are not prepared to contemplate the worst, we will not get ready for it. If we are not ready for it, it will surely come our way.