Lord Tyler
Main Page: Lord Tyler (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [HL]
Lord Tyler Excerpts
Lord Tyler
“107BB Requirement for an elected assembly to form part of mayoral combined authority
(1) An order under section 107A must make provision for an elected assembly (“the Assembly”) to form part of any mayoral combined authority.
(2) An elected assembly provided for in an order under section 107A must, in particular, provide that—
(a) the Assembly shall consist of P members (“Assembly Members”), where P is equal to the number of constituent authorities within the area of the mayoral combined authority, multiplied by five; (b) each constituent authority shall be an Assembly constituency;(c) each Assembly constituency shall elect five Assembly Members;(d) each Assembly Member shall be a member of the combined authority.(3) Schedule 5BA (which makes further provision about Assemblies) has effect.”
Lord Tyler (LD)
My Lords, I mentioned that I currently serve on the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and I very strongly support the committee’s recommendations to the House. I think I should apologise to the Minister, and indeed to the House, by saying that, in referring to two of the paragraphs in the committee’s report that refer to affirmative and negative process, I ought also to have referred to paragraph 61, which is much more important, and to which the Minister responded. I was very grateful for that response. I think I should put before your Lordships, and on record, the recommendation in paragraph 61:
“We note that the Government have introduced the Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill, currently before this House, and that provisions in that Bill relate to the same policy area as that addressed by the LRO. It seems to us that operating in one policy area through two separate legislative vehicles, which are progressing in parallel though at different speeds, presents particular difficulties to the House in considering the combined effects of the changes proposed”.
The Minister was one step ahead of me because she responded to that point, and I am very grateful to her. But now, on record, both of us are clear as to what that issue was. I am grateful for the assurances that she gave.
It may be that, in response to the debate on this group of amendments, the Minister can give us a clear idea of the timetable for bringing together these two very important developments on comparable issues relating to devolution and local government structures.
I see from the department’s note to that committee that there are repeated and very welcome references to the need for democratic accountability. With that in mind, I hope that the Minister will therefore respond positively to our amendments, particularly Amendments 14 and 17, to which I now speak. My noble friend Lord Shipley has already referred in general terms to these amendments, and we think that they are extremely important. They deal, of course, with Clause 1, along with a new schedule, and go to the very heart of the Bill.
During Second Reading, and to some extent again today, colleagues in all parts of your Lordships’ House expressed serious concerns at what I regard as the democratic deficit inherent in concentrating powers in the hands of one person. It is that which I fear weakens the Government’s promise of improved accountability. What we seek to achieve is a level of direct democratic accountability comparable to that now enjoyed in London. I challenge Labour and Conservative Members of your Lordships’ House to argue either that the Bill provides better accountability for the people of the areas concerned than that experienced by the people of London or, alternatively, that the inhabitants of at least the first tranche of combined authority areas up in the north do not deserve the same level of democratic accountability. It is surely patronising and divisive to say that what is needed for London is not needed outside London. Certainly, that is not in the spirit of effective devolution. Our amendments are designed to adapt the now well-established governance system, bringing together citizens, boroughs, an Assembly and a mayor for London to make it appropriate for these new authorities.
Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, explained with what care and huge scrutiny and attention the legislation for London was considered. All those who have looked again, as I have, at the requirements for the Greater London Authority and for the mayor, will recognise that that was indeed an important parliamentary exercise. I certainly agree with the noble Lord that we should examine it with care.
Amendment 14 simply articulates the principle that there should be an assembly in each of the mayoral combined authorities. It provides for each local authority area that makes up the combined authority to contribute five directly elected assembly members to the total. This would mean that a combined authority with only two constituent councils would have a small assembly of only 10. A large authority would have a larger assembly. But in view of the comments made earlier, for clarity, I should explain that we have at this stage not ruled out additional representatives indirectly appointed by constituent authorities. However, this is just one option for further discussion. Each assembly member, properly elected, would be a member of the combined authority in their own right.
Amendment 17 takes the Committee through the detailed arrangements for the way in which these assemblies would work. As the Committee would expect of an amendment from these Benches, we would provide for members to be elected by the single transferable vote. It also provides that all those entitled to vote in the election for mayor would also be entitled to vote in the election for assembly members. Most critically, this new schedule seeks to mirror the accountability arrangements set out in the Greater London Authority Act for assemblies to hold mayors’ feet to the fire—to hold them effectively to account.
Members of this House who have been members of the Greater London Assembly would certainly tell us that its current functions should be strengthened. I agree, not least in relation to budgets—I know that my noble friend Lord Tope certainly takes that view, too—yet the provisions in the GLA Act are so much stronger in terms of accountability than anything the Government are currently proposing in this Bill. If the Government are at all serious about accountability, therefore, these provisions must be the starting point for holding mayors accountable for what they do on behalf of the wider community. The GLA arrangements would give statutory rights, for example, to assembly members to ask questions of the mayor and senior employees of the authority and have them answered. They would also provide for the assemblies to set up committees and these could be particularly important in relation to, for example, the PCC powers that the Government wish mayors to take on.
The Minister must have before her a brief setting out manifold technical difficulties and reasons for resisting this attempt to make a simple, easy-to-read-across between these authorities and the GLA, so I should say up front that we do not say that our drafting is the last word—of course it is not. It is merely the first word. That is why we have a parliamentary process. That is the whole point of having Committee followed by Report and Third Reading. But Sections 50 to 65 of the GLA Act should be recommended reading for all of us if we are looking for some sort of template for how to ensure that the combined authorities are accountable and therefore capable of taking on greater power. The tried and tested clearly gives a real advantage in terms of empirical evidence, compared with just simply hoping for the best.
In summary, this set of amendments seeks to give full expression to the Government’s declared intention to provide the effective exercise of new responsibilities and powers in a way which is answerable to the local population of the area concerned. It gives practical expression to the local democracy initiatives set out earlier so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine. It is surely essential to address this; otherwise, the development of the policy as set out in the Bill is not going to be popular and will fail in terms of democratic accountability. Irrespective of how the overview and scrutiny committees are constituted or chaired, they would certainly not fulfil the Government’s promise to make the combined authority,
“democratically accountable to local people”.
Without the tried and tested assembly system to provide effective accountability, we are indeed in danger of creating new one-party states, as my noble friend Lord Shipley put it earlier, with the mayor, the deputy mayor and a vast majority of indirectly appointed members of the combined authority from the constituent authorities, all of the same political persuasion. Without the safeguards in our amendments, your Lordships’ House will be conniving at the creation of new elective dictatorships—new rotten boroughs, if you like.
This solution will be particularly appropriate for areas like Norfolk, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, referred, and indeed to my erstwhile area in Cornwall. That is because if we move beyond the first tranche of combined authorities, areas such as those would expect a degree of democratic accountability. I am delighted to see the noble Lord, Lord Sherbourne, in his place, as indeed he has been throughout our debates today. He made a very important contribution in the debate on Second Reading. He referred to,
“the need for transparency and public scrutiny”.
He continued:
“the Bill could lead to a concentration of power in the hands of one political party. We have seen all too recently—I am thinking of Tower Hamlets—what can happen when too much power is put in the hands of one person without effective scrutiny.—[Official Report, 8/6/15; col. 707.]
I agree entirely, and I hope the Minister will too. She has said this evening that her aim for this legislation is strong and accountable democracy. I agree with that as well, but I do not see it in the Bill as it stands, and therefore I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for some very measured and sensible comments on these amendments. First, I turn to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, on the DPRR committee. As I indicated earlier, we will respond before the end of the Committee stage, which is next Monday. The committee has recommended that the LRO be subject to the super-affirmative resolution procedure. With this procedure, the expectation must be that the LRO will not come into force, if Parliament approves it, until late 2015. However, as I have already indicated, we are now seriously recommending including the LRO provision in the Bill—so I hope that that helps him—and it will overcome the difficulties identified by the Delegated Powers Committee.
Amendment 14 provides that an elected assembly must form part of a combined authority. It seeks to insert into the Bill new Schedule 5BA, which provides that the functions and procedure of the elected assembly are the same as those for the London Assembly. I understand the intention behind the amendment. First and foremost, I understand that those who are proposing this amendment want a bigger role for the ballot box. They see that this is provided in the London mayoral model, where there is an assembly that holds the mayor to account.
However, London is unique. Greater Manchester is unique. Greater Manchester is not London and London is not Greater Manchester. This is not in the civil servants’ notes. All of us from Greater Manchester are very clear about that point and clear that we do not want additional tiers of government. I am confident that other local areas probably feel the same. We do not want to create additional bureaucracy, which would cost the taxpayer money. The devolution of powers to areas will instead create efficiencies and allow each area to find its own creative solutions to the particular challenges it faces in securing long-term sustainable growth.
In order to hold the mayor and combined authority to account for their decisions and actions, the Bill provides that all combined authorities must have one or more overview and scrutiny committee drawn from the members of the constituent councils. Like the London Assembly, these overview and scrutiny committees can require the mayor, officers and members to attend their meetings and answer questions. I am sure that we will discuss the role of scrutiny more fully when we examine the later clauses of the Bill. We are determined to ensure that scrutiny is as strong and robust as it can be. That scrutiny provides the real protection against the fears of a one-party state, and must be seen to be effective, transparent and independent so as to maintain public confidence in the institutions and governance arrangements to which we will be devolving wide-ranging powers. I reiterate my earlier offer—because the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, was on his way out of the door when I was making it—about any suggestions that noble Lords might wish to make on how we ensure that scrutiny is as robust as possible.
However, we do not want, and I am convinced that few in our cities and counties will want, a new tier of government—a new tier of politicians. The experience of the metropolitan county councils, which my noble friend Lord Heseltine abolished through the legislation he introduced, shows the problems and weaknesses of having inevitably competing tiers of politicians. That said, I believe that with the right legislative framework for allowing areas to draw together scrutiny committees with a broad membership and strong powers, the future governance arrangements can indeed fulfil the aims of those proposing these amendments that public confidence will be maintained and, more importantly, that devolution will work, benefiting the local communities that it serves.
Amendment 17 sets out the electoral arrangements for an elected assembly, using a single transferable vote model. This is a complex electoral system that would be costly and time-consuming to implement. As noble Lords have pointed out, we would have a very confusing array of arrangements for local elections. Introducing STV for all local elections would require significant changes to existing electoral boundaries and could not be introduced, even if it were desirable, within any short timescale.
Amendments 25 and 26 would require the assembly to resolve, by a simple majority,
“for the relevant combined authority to enable the mayor to take on the functions of a police and crime commissioner for that area”.
Notwithstanding the explanations I have already given as to why we would not want there to be an elected assembly for a mayoral combined authority, we consider that there is no need to require any additional body to approve the transfer of police functions to the mayor. The transfer of police and crime commissioner functions to the mayor forms part of the devolution deal and is actually analogous to the situation in London. The Bill requires that all the appropriate authorities in an area would have to give consent before an order to transfer police and crime commissioner functions could be made. Hence we are clear that the transfer of PCC functions will be a matter on which the combined authority and/or its constituent councils must agree.
I can also reassure noble Lords that in order for the mayor of a combined authority area to take on PCC functions, the Secretary of State will be required to lay an order setting out the detail of how PCC functions will be transferred to the mayor, and Parliament will have the opportunity to fully consider this. With these explanations, I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Tyler
My Lords, I thank the Minister. I and my colleagues warmly welcome the assurance she has been giving us—she repeated what she said earlier—because we regard the way in which the Bill will provide for “robust scrutiny”, which I think was the Minister’s phrase, as absolutely critical to its success. We welcome any discussions that can take place before, during and after Report because it is critical to the Bill.
I modestly and tentatively suggest, at this time of night, that when the Minister says that she and the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Leigh, are the “we” who have decided that they do not want to have elected members looking at this, they are not all the people of Greater Manchester. We have to be careful in this House about assuming that, because there has been no attempt yet to look at this in the wider community, somehow the leaders of party groups in particular areas can speak for the whole population of that area.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I want to clarify that the point I made was that we in Greater Manchester—not me and the noble Lord, Lord Smith, but we as elected members, as I was—did not want additional layers of bureaucracy or tiers of government.
Lord Teverson
Perhaps I could intervene on that to say: but of course not. The people who tend to be involved do not like the boat being rocked, which is part of the problem. The establishment of a political area are the last people who would want greater accountability through another body. Regrettably, that is the way in which politics works: we are defensive about our own seats of power, and that is the danger of this proposal. I apologise to my noble friend Lord Tyler.
Lord Tyler
I am very grateful to my noble friend. He makes his point very well.
I say to the Minister that I think she was probably not involved in any discussions about the Greater London Authority Bill, when these sorts of arguments were also advanced by the leaders of Labour councils in the boroughs of London. They were fearful that the electorate might have other views about priorities. I also suspect that the Mayor of London would be only too pleased to have a scrutiny committee that had no democratic mandate, as it is in the Bill. The next Mayor of London may or may not have a view on that, too. I simply make the point that, if it was good enough for London, we should at least seriously examine whether these new combined authorities are going to have a sufficiently effective mechanism for holding the mayor to account. I do not believe that the Bill provides that at the moment.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and others think that we can develop that proposal and it may be that by the time the Bill has finished its passage through your Lordships’ House, we have somehow managed to give the scrutiny committees that sort of role. I have to say that, as things stand, the Bill does not provide for that. I was disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Sherbourne, was not along with me on this because he had a serious point, and I suspect that we may have some discussions and come to an agreement about how to provide this by some means. However, what really worried me was when the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Leigh, said that the combined authority would have an executive meeting function. Not so: in my mind, the mayor is the executive. If the leaders are simply there to back up the mayor, who may well be of the same persuasion politically, that will be no scrutiny. It will not be accountable.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I do not believe that the noble Lord is right on that issue. This is one of the differences between London and the combined authorities that we are talking about. The combined authorities will have members who are appointed by the constituent elected authorities, and they as well as the mayor will have functions to perform. It is not only the mayor, if there is one, who gets all these functions; it is other members of the combined authority as well. That is the situation that I do not think the noble Lord has taken into account in his analysis.
Lord Tyler
I think I am still responding; I hope that is right. I think the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, is in a major constitutional confusion on this. You cannot have both sides, the mayor and the constituent authority, exerting executive authority in some form without, in the words of the Minister, effective, accountable democracy—I think that was her phrase.
The time is late, and I am not suggesting that we have the perfect solution. I have already said that this is our first attempt to do this, and maybe we can develop a better one. However, I say to those who are opposing our proposal that, if they are seriously saying that the governance of London is somehow defective and therefore we cannot look at it as a proper model for what should go in this Bill for major conurbations in other parts of the country, and that somehow the people of the north do not deserve the same degree of democratic control over the executive, I wish them to say so publicly.
For the time being, I suggest to the Minister that we should look more carefully at the way in which a mayor is held to account. In those circumstances, and with the assurance that she has given us that we will return to this on Report, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, just before we conclude this aspect of the Bill, I confirm that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, is actually right. Secondly, to say that the London arrangements are not right for other places is not to say that those arrangements are defective but, rather, to say that what suits London does not necessarily suit other places.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, Amendment 14A is a manuscript amendment arising from the recently published report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Although it is a manuscript amendment, I did not write it myself; if I had, the Public Bill Office would not have been able to read it. It is, however, as noble Lords will see, in printed form. It embodies the position taken by the Delegated Powers Committee on the organisation of elections. The amendment derives from paragraph 6 of the report, which I quote:
“Given the importance of the functions which a mayor is able to exercise, and the emphasis placed by the Government on the democratic accountability offered by an elected mayor, we do not consider it appropriate for the Bill to delegate to subordinate legislation the ordinary length of a mayor’s term of office or the ordinary election dates”.
I say in parenthesis that that is precisely what paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the Bill, about the timing of elections, in fact sets out. The report continues:
“It seems to us that any power to provide for those things in subordinate legislation should be limited so that it can only be exercised to the extent necessary to allow synchronisation with other elections, when the office of a mayor is first established”.
Hence the provisions of Amendment 14A: that a mayor’s term of office should be four years; that elections should be held on the ordinary day of election in the election year for the relevant local authorities—I contrast that with the disastrous turnout in the elections for police commissioners, which took place in a cold dark day in November; no doubt that contributed to the minuscule turnout, though perhaps that was not the only reason—and, finally, that when the office of mayor is first established, the Secretary of State should by order make provision for the alternative arrangements for the mayor’s term of office and the date of the election to the extent necessary to allow synchronisation with other elections. That tidies up that particular area.
The other amendments are of a rather different character. Amendment 15 would allow 16 and 17 year-olds to vote in a mayoral election. For many of us, I think the only satisfying part of the referendum process in Scotland, apart from the outcome, was the very high participation rate, particularly among 16 and 17 year-olds, who were allowed to vote. In our view, it is highly desirable that young people should be encouraged to take an interest in politics from an early age. We also argue that citizenship should play a more prominent part in the education agenda—the Lord Speaker’s efforts to encourage Members of this House to address schools and young people generally are a small but important part of that process. Giving those young people the vote at an early age—after all, they are able to pay taxes, be employed and so on—seems to me to be absolutely right. We have to acknowledge that young people are not the quickest to register in any event, so the earlier we can get them into the process, the better. Their future will be very much affected by the work of combined authorities and other aspects of local services.
The final amendment, Amendment 16, would simply require any new legislation to be in force six months before it is due to be implemented, so that there will not be a great last-minute rush to sort out the physical arrangements of elections and they can be planned well in advance and with efficiency. That applies both to the electorate itself and to returning officers and the like engaged in that process. In my submission, these are sensible, tidying-up arrangements to facilitate the smooth operation of whatever process will be involved if we get to holding elections under the terms of the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Tyler
My Lords, I am pleased to support the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, on all these amendments. As he said, Amendment 14A reflects the concerns of the DPRRC, to which I referred earlier. I am sure he is right in saying that this should be in the Bill, and I hope the Minister will be prepared to accept that. It would be consistent with what has already been recommended, and I understand from what the Minister has said that she has effectively welcomed the committee’s recommendations.
So far as Amendment 15 is concerned, as your Lordships’ House will know, I have brought forward, twice now, a Bill to comprehensively reduce the age of the franchise to 16 for all elections. As the noble Lord said, it was a triumphant success in Scotland. It is now also in legislation ready for any comparable referendum in Wales, and I understand that the Prime Minister himself has said that he expects a vote in due course on a general extension of the franchise to 16 and 17 year-olds.
My only concern about Amendment 15 is that it is specific only to this one form of election. I think that is a great mistake. We on these Benches will be bringing forward a later amendment to extend this throughout local government. There has been far too much ad hocery and too many piecemeal attempts to deal with the franchise. Imagine if the extension of the franchise to women had been done on this piecemeal basis, with parts of the United Kingdom doing it in different ways to other parts. Imagine if it had been said, “Only in mayoral authority elections are we going to allow women to have the vote immediately. Others will have it at another time”.
One objection to Amendment 15 is sorted out by our Amendment 48, through which we would extend the franchise to all 16 and 17 year-olds for all local government elections.
I do not want this to sound smug, but we have been consistently in favour of this policy and very much welcome the arrival of the Labour Party in support of it. I think I am right in saying that some other party north of the border has also joined the bandwagon. Nothing should be read into that: it is simply that we take pride in the fact that the sheer advocacy of this logical extension of the franchise is now getting new recruits. In the meantime, I hope the Minister will respond positively to Amendment 14A. Perhaps she would like to keep her firepower for dealing with the wider issue of 16 and 17 year-olds for when, at the very end of consideration in Committee, we get to Amendment 48. In view of the time of night, I leave it there.
Lord Beecham
As the Minister implied, jumping on the bandwagon with the Liberal Democrats is not generally a fruitful proposition. Indeed, the concept might be an oxymoron. We are certainly adopting a somewhat Fabian approach to the extension of the franchise. I am a little surprised that the noble Lord’s broader amendment has been regarded as within the scope of the Bill, but if it has then so be it. We would certainly look to an extension of the franchise but for the purposes of what we are discussing here the amendment we have drafted is correct.