Lord McKenzie of Luton
Main Page: Lord McKenzie of Luton (Labour - Life peer)Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [HL]
Lord McKenzie of Luton Excerpts
Lord Storey (LD)
We have heard wise words from my noble friend Lord Shipley and the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine. I am very nervous of combined authorities setting up independent panels. I am nervous of their make-up. Who is going to decide their members? We are going to see differences between different combined authorities in different parts of the country. If we are going to have leadership of these combined authorities, we have to make sure that nobody feels that they cannot go forward because they are financially restrained.
I vividly remember becoming leader of Liverpool and the remuneration being considerably less than I was receiving in my professional job. I could not afford to do the job full-time because of that, so I worked in my professional job and did three days, two days, two days, three days, and it was absolutely killing. It was not the right way to lead a city. Just so nobody complains, any proportion of my leader’s allowance I gave to charity, so I was not making anything on the deal. However, that should not be the case. We should make sure that we have some mechanism, and the solution from my noble friend Lord Shipley and the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, is the way forward.
Lord McKenzie of Luton (Lab)
My Lords, this has been an interesting short debate. Our starting point is to favour the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Smith of Leigh for there to be an independent panel. I accept that there are issues. The noble Lords, Lord Shipley and Lord Heseltine, made points about making sure that it is truly independent, and there is no reason why that independence could not take account of international experience as well. A potential issue about the linkage is that the role of the mayor will not necessarily be constant and homogenous between different authorities. Sometimes the function of the mayor might be the full Monty, as it were, but sometimes it might be much less so. Therefore, we are going to have to have some form of assessment if we are going to do that fairly. It is reasonable for there to be further thinking around this.
Linking pay to the pay of the highest-paid leader of a constituent council could be a route, although in a sense what this amendment says is, “The Secretary of State decides but it must be no larger than”. That seems to put the onus back on the Secretary of State, so the principle we would support is some independent assessment, taking account of the real value of the job. I entirely accept that this would be a very powerful and important job.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Communities and Local Government (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I appreciate the intentions behind these amendments, and noble Lords have made very valid points. I have just asked for some comparator salaries for city or conurbation mayors. The London mayor earns nearly £144,000 a year, and the Bristol mayor earns nearly £66,000.
There are already statutes in place regarding independent remuneration panels and the remuneration of elected members. A combined authority’s constituent councils are required by the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 to establish and maintain independent remuneration panels which make recommendations to local authorities regarding the remuneration of elected members to which local authorities have to have regard. To take my noble friend Lord Heseltine’s point, there is nothing to stop them making international comparisons.
It would seem that to make provisions for a combined authority to establish its own independent remuneration committee merely to determine the remuneration of the elected mayor would be introducing an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and would take away some of the flexibility that this Bill offers to those areas that seek to establish a combined authority. Further legislation, the Local Transport Act 2008, enables the Secretary of State to make provisions about the remuneration of, and pensions or allowances payable to or in respect of, any member of the combined authority. That includes making provision about the remuneration—that is, the allowances—of a metro mayor, including the part to be played in setting those allowances by independent remuneration panels in the combined authority’s area. As this power already exists, we consider it unnecessary to make further regulations in connection with the remuneration of elected members. With those explanations, I hope that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Woolmer and Lord Smith for basically setting out our position on these amendments. We do not believe they are appropriate. It seems to me the key point that has been made is that you cannot draw a parallel between the London model and where we are with these combined authorities because you have members of the combined authorities—not via this election process but directly representing the constituency authorities—who are involved in holding an elected mayor to account, if there is one, through the two-thirds rule on the budget et cetera, but who collectively, as my noble friend said, have functions for which they are responsible. If you go down the route of adding to those elected members, what precisely is the role of those members in comparison with the members who are already there by virtue of the indirect arrangement? Therefore, I do not think that the model fits and it is unhelpful to try to make it fit.
There are other issues as well, perhaps of less consequence, but the proposal is for an assembly only for mayoral combined authorities. What about other combined authorities if there are no mayoral functions? They would still possibly have the same range of functions but this solution is not offered here. The assembly seems to be offered whatever level of devolution is given to the mayor. In some cases there may be full-blown powers for the mayor, including in PCC matters; in others that is not so, so to have the same arrangement in each case—or to propose it—does not seem to make sense either. However, that is not the substantive point. I think the substantive point is that made by my noble friends.
In terms of the numbers, as we heard, in Manchester’s case we could go from 11 members at the moment, including the mayor, up to 61, whereas London, as we know, has only 25. I appreciate that those figures could be adjusted but it is still a big increase. What is the role of those members who are going to come through the system on this basis? Are they just there to scrutinise? How does their role differ from that of the other combined authority members?
If you look at the number of combined authorities which may be created—some are already under way—there is Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire, Merseyside, Tyne and Wear, and South Yorkshire, and there are prospects for east Midlands, south Hampshire, Bristol and Leicester. Who else might follow? How many assemblies are we seeking to assemble here? As I said earlier, we have a proliferation of voting systems: first past the post for the council elections; a single transferable vote proposed for the assembly; and the supplementary vote for mayors. I am sure the electorate will be able to cope with that over time but it does not seem to me a great example of clarity and linking with the electorate.
Others have already mentioned the fact that there is an overview and scrutiny committee but that is not the only way that scrutiny is exercised. As we know—the Manchester agreement sets this out very clearly—combined authority members have a role of potentially restraining the mayor.
I wish to make a broad point. I can understand Liberal Democrats having a particular view on the voting system. They may think that it is unfair and that it does not produce a proportional outcome. I make no particular comment on that. However, it seems to me wrong to potentially fetter the situation that we are talking about here with a proposal just to balance up for doing something which in their eyes may seem to be a deficit in the arrangements that would otherwise be in place. It seems to me wrong to use this process for those purposes. So, for a variety of reasons, I do not think this is the right way to go and we certainly will not support it.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for some very measured and sensible comments on these amendments. First, I turn to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, on the DPRR committee. As I indicated earlier, we will respond before the end of the Committee stage, which is next Monday. The committee has recommended that the LRO be subject to the super-affirmative resolution procedure. With this procedure, the expectation must be that the LRO will not come into force, if Parliament approves it, until late 2015. However, as I have already indicated, we are now seriously recommending including the LRO provision in the Bill—so I hope that that helps him—and it will overcome the difficulties identified by the Delegated Powers Committee.
Amendment 14 provides that an elected assembly must form part of a combined authority. It seeks to insert into the Bill new Schedule 5BA, which provides that the functions and procedure of the elected assembly are the same as those for the London Assembly. I understand the intention behind the amendment. First and foremost, I understand that those who are proposing this amendment want a bigger role for the ballot box. They see that this is provided in the London mayoral model, where there is an assembly that holds the mayor to account.
However, London is unique. Greater Manchester is unique. Greater Manchester is not London and London is not Greater Manchester. This is not in the civil servants’ notes. All of us from Greater Manchester are very clear about that point and clear that we do not want additional tiers of government. I am confident that other local areas probably feel the same. We do not want to create additional bureaucracy, which would cost the taxpayer money. The devolution of powers to areas will instead create efficiencies and allow each area to find its own creative solutions to the particular challenges it faces in securing long-term sustainable growth.
In order to hold the mayor and combined authority to account for their decisions and actions, the Bill provides that all combined authorities must have one or more overview and scrutiny committee drawn from the members of the constituent councils. Like the London Assembly, these overview and scrutiny committees can require the mayor, officers and members to attend their meetings and answer questions. I am sure that we will discuss the role of scrutiny more fully when we examine the later clauses of the Bill. We are determined to ensure that scrutiny is as strong and robust as it can be. That scrutiny provides the real protection against the fears of a one-party state, and must be seen to be effective, transparent and independent so as to maintain public confidence in the institutions and governance arrangements to which we will be devolving wide-ranging powers. I reiterate my earlier offer—because the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, was on his way out of the door when I was making it—about any suggestions that noble Lords might wish to make on how we ensure that scrutiny is as robust as possible.
However, we do not want, and I am convinced that few in our cities and counties will want, a new tier of government—a new tier of politicians. The experience of the metropolitan county councils, which my noble friend Lord Heseltine abolished through the legislation he introduced, shows the problems and weaknesses of having inevitably competing tiers of politicians. That said, I believe that with the right legislative framework for allowing areas to draw together scrutiny committees with a broad membership and strong powers, the future governance arrangements can indeed fulfil the aims of those proposing these amendments that public confidence will be maintained and, more importantly, that devolution will work, benefiting the local communities that it serves.
Amendment 17 sets out the electoral arrangements for an elected assembly, using a single transferable vote model. This is a complex electoral system that would be costly and time-consuming to implement. As noble Lords have pointed out, we would have a very confusing array of arrangements for local elections. Introducing STV for all local elections would require significant changes to existing electoral boundaries and could not be introduced, even if it were desirable, within any short timescale.
Amendments 25 and 26 would require the assembly to resolve, by a simple majority,
“for the relevant combined authority to enable the mayor to take on the functions of a police and crime commissioner for that area”.
Notwithstanding the explanations I have already given as to why we would not want there to be an elected assembly for a mayoral combined authority, we consider that there is no need to require any additional body to approve the transfer of police functions to the mayor. The transfer of police and crime commissioner functions to the mayor forms part of the devolution deal and is actually analogous to the situation in London. The Bill requires that all the appropriate authorities in an area would have to give consent before an order to transfer police and crime commissioner functions could be made. Hence we are clear that the transfer of PCC functions will be a matter on which the combined authority and/or its constituent councils must agree.
I can also reassure noble Lords that in order for the mayor of a combined authority area to take on PCC functions, the Secretary of State will be required to lay an order setting out the detail of how PCC functions will be transferred to the mayor, and Parliament will have the opportunity to fully consider this. With these explanations, I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Tyler
I am very grateful to my noble friend. He makes his point very well.
I say to the Minister that I think she was probably not involved in any discussions about the Greater London Authority Bill, when these sorts of arguments were also advanced by the leaders of Labour councils in the boroughs of London. They were fearful that the electorate might have other views about priorities. I also suspect that the Mayor of London would be only too pleased to have a scrutiny committee that had no democratic mandate, as it is in the Bill. The next Mayor of London may or may not have a view on that, too. I simply make the point that, if it was good enough for London, we should at least seriously examine whether these new combined authorities are going to have a sufficiently effective mechanism for holding the mayor to account. I do not believe that the Bill provides that at the moment.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and others think that we can develop that proposal and it may be that by the time the Bill has finished its passage through your Lordships’ House, we have somehow managed to give the scrutiny committees that sort of role. I have to say that, as things stand, the Bill does not provide for that. I was disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Sherbourne, was not along with me on this because he had a serious point, and I suspect that we may have some discussions and come to an agreement about how to provide this by some means. However, what really worried me was when the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Leigh, said that the combined authority would have an executive meeting function. Not so: in my mind, the mayor is the executive. If the leaders are simply there to back up the mayor, who may well be of the same persuasion politically, that will be no scrutiny. It will not be accountable.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I do not believe that the noble Lord is right on that issue. This is one of the differences between London and the combined authorities that we are talking about. The combined authorities will have members who are appointed by the constituent elected authorities, and they as well as the mayor will have functions to perform. It is not only the mayor, if there is one, who gets all these functions; it is other members of the combined authority as well. That is the situation that I do not think the noble Lord has taken into account in his analysis.