Baroness Williams of Trafford
Main Page: Baroness Williams of Trafford (Conservative - Life peer)Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [HL]
Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts
Lord McKenzie of Luton (Lab)
My Lords, this has been an interesting short debate. Our starting point is to favour the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Smith of Leigh for there to be an independent panel. I accept that there are issues. The noble Lords, Lord Shipley and Lord Heseltine, made points about making sure that it is truly independent, and there is no reason why that independence could not take account of international experience as well. A potential issue about the linkage is that the role of the mayor will not necessarily be constant and homogenous between different authorities. Sometimes the function of the mayor might be the full Monty, as it were, but sometimes it might be much less so. Therefore, we are going to have to have some form of assessment if we are going to do that fairly. It is reasonable for there to be further thinking around this.
Linking pay to the pay of the highest-paid leader of a constituent council could be a route, although in a sense what this amendment says is, “The Secretary of State decides but it must be no larger than”. That seems to put the onus back on the Secretary of State, so the principle we would support is some independent assessment, taking account of the real value of the job. I entirely accept that this would be a very powerful and important job.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Communities and Local Government (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I appreciate the intentions behind these amendments, and noble Lords have made very valid points. I have just asked for some comparator salaries for city or conurbation mayors. The London mayor earns nearly £144,000 a year, and the Bristol mayor earns nearly £66,000.
There are already statutes in place regarding independent remuneration panels and the remuneration of elected members. A combined authority’s constituent councils are required by the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 to establish and maintain independent remuneration panels which make recommendations to local authorities regarding the remuneration of elected members to which local authorities have to have regard. To take my noble friend Lord Heseltine’s point, there is nothing to stop them making international comparisons.
It would seem that to make provisions for a combined authority to establish its own independent remuneration committee merely to determine the remuneration of the elected mayor would be introducing an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and would take away some of the flexibility that this Bill offers to those areas that seek to establish a combined authority. Further legislation, the Local Transport Act 2008, enables the Secretary of State to make provisions about the remuneration of, and pensions or allowances payable to or in respect of, any member of the combined authority. That includes making provision about the remuneration—that is, the allowances—of a metro mayor, including the part to be played in setting those allowances by independent remuneration panels in the combined authority’s area. As this power already exists, we consider it unnecessary to make further regulations in connection with the remuneration of elected members. With those explanations, I hope that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Smith of Leigh
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for contributing to this very brief debate; it is about time we hurried up a bit on the Bill.
I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, about local authorities. I decided, earlier in my career, that I would eventually become a full-time local politician and therefore I lost out on my chosen career—I probably would have been paid more money. I am sure that the noble Lord made sacrifices; if he had gone into business and used his strategic mind there, he probably would have earned a lot more money than he ever did as a Cabinet Minister or an MP. So we all make choices. It can be a dilemma, because sometimes people have to say to their families, “I really enjoy doing this job, but I’m not going to get paid as much as I might in another job”. The Minister will recall that her successor as leader of Trafford had to make that personal choice. That was a very sad loss for others, as he was making a very good contribution, but he decided that he needed to support his family more. So we make those choices.
We also need to think about the fact that the new mayor and the new combined authority’s work needs to be judged in the cockpit of public opinion. If it is perceived that people are getting overpaid, that will detract both from the reputation of the mayor and from the work of the elected members.
This is a difficult issue, and certainly we need to think about it. If we just leave it to local members to decide, as the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, said, they will be totally criticised for that, and that would be unfair. However, we also need to respect that not all those positions will be exactly the same. The theme of the Bill has been flexibility, so in a sense there needs to be flexibility there. With those comments, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, in the situation where a local authority does not consent to a combined authority adopting a mayor, the Bill requires that if the Secretary of State makes an order to enable the mayoral model to be adopted, the Secretary of State must remove the non-consenting local authority from the combined authority. Amendments 11 and 12 would change this requirement to an option that the Secretary of State could choose to take and enable a local authority in this position to make representations.
I appreciate the intention behind these amendments but, as we have said, the Government are open to discussing devolution proposals from all places. We want areas to come forward with proposals, developed and proposed by local areas. If a local authority within an existing combined authority does not want to have an elected metro mayor, we believe that it should neither be forced to do so—going back to discussions earlier—nor be able to veto the rest of that combined authority from adopting this model. This is what the Bill does.
Amendment 11 would give discretion to the Secretary of State as to whether to remove the non-consenting local authority when making an order to provide that the combined authority area has a mayor. This would in effect mean that the Secretary of State can force the local authority to remain within the combined authority, which we do not believe is appropriate.
Amendment 12 enables a local authority which has been removed from an existing combined authority, by virtue of its non-consent, to make representations. We also believe that this is not necessary. The Secretary of State must gain consent from each constituent local authority before an order can be made to enable an existing combined authority area to have a mayor. It is open to the local authorities when deciding whether to consent to make any representations they wish to.
Amendment 23 would omit new section 107D(6)(a) to remove the power of the Secretary of State by order to,
“provide for members or officers of a mayoral combined authority to assist the mayor in the exercise of general functions”.
As the Bill stands, this provision allows for the mayor to be supported in his or her executive functions, in the same way that council officers support an elected mayor or leader of a council. For example, the mayor may set the strategy for the combined authority and officers would support the mayor in drafting, preparing and publishing any necessary plans. Removing this provision risks creating arrangements that would hinder the delivery of the mayor’s executive functions and hence frustrate the very purpose of a devolution deal. Mayors will be clearly identified as the accountable figurehead and be answerable to their electorate for any function they undertake or are assisted in undertaking, so it will be clear where the responsibility lies.
With all these assurances, I hope the noble Lord will agree that the amendments are not necessary.
Lord Beecham
To respond to the first point, obviously the Minister—or those who helped to prepare her speech in response—did not take into account the case that I actually put, which was in relation to an authority, under the provisions of the Bill as it stands, being totally excluded from a relationship with the combined authority on matters that are not the subject of the deal. Perhaps the Minister will undertake to look at that aspect of it, which is really the thrust of the amendment. However, in the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Woolmer and Lord Smith for basically setting out our position on these amendments. We do not believe they are appropriate. It seems to me the key point that has been made is that you cannot draw a parallel between the London model and where we are with these combined authorities because you have members of the combined authorities—not via this election process but directly representing the constituency authorities—who are involved in holding an elected mayor to account, if there is one, through the two-thirds rule on the budget et cetera, but who collectively, as my noble friend said, have functions for which they are responsible. If you go down the route of adding to those elected members, what precisely is the role of those members in comparison with the members who are already there by virtue of the indirect arrangement? Therefore, I do not think that the model fits and it is unhelpful to try to make it fit.
There are other issues as well, perhaps of less consequence, but the proposal is for an assembly only for mayoral combined authorities. What about other combined authorities if there are no mayoral functions? They would still possibly have the same range of functions but this solution is not offered here. The assembly seems to be offered whatever level of devolution is given to the mayor. In some cases there may be full-blown powers for the mayor, including in PCC matters; in others that is not so, so to have the same arrangement in each case—or to propose it—does not seem to make sense either. However, that is not the substantive point. I think the substantive point is that made by my noble friends.
In terms of the numbers, as we heard, in Manchester’s case we could go from 11 members at the moment, including the mayor, up to 61, whereas London, as we know, has only 25. I appreciate that those figures could be adjusted but it is still a big increase. What is the role of those members who are going to come through the system on this basis? Are they just there to scrutinise? How does their role differ from that of the other combined authority members?
If you look at the number of combined authorities which may be created—some are already under way—there is Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire, Merseyside, Tyne and Wear, and South Yorkshire, and there are prospects for east Midlands, south Hampshire, Bristol and Leicester. Who else might follow? How many assemblies are we seeking to assemble here? As I said earlier, we have a proliferation of voting systems: first past the post for the council elections; a single transferable vote proposed for the assembly; and the supplementary vote for mayors. I am sure the electorate will be able to cope with that over time but it does not seem to me a great example of clarity and linking with the electorate.
Others have already mentioned the fact that there is an overview and scrutiny committee but that is not the only way that scrutiny is exercised. As we know—the Manchester agreement sets this out very clearly—combined authority members have a role of potentially restraining the mayor.
I wish to make a broad point. I can understand Liberal Democrats having a particular view on the voting system. They may think that it is unfair and that it does not produce a proportional outcome. I make no particular comment on that. However, it seems to me wrong to potentially fetter the situation that we are talking about here with a proposal just to balance up for doing something which in their eyes may seem to be a deficit in the arrangements that would otherwise be in place. It seems to me wrong to use this process for those purposes. So, for a variety of reasons, I do not think this is the right way to go and we certainly will not support it.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for some very measured and sensible comments on these amendments. First, I turn to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, on the DPRR committee. As I indicated earlier, we will respond before the end of the Committee stage, which is next Monday. The committee has recommended that the LRO be subject to the super-affirmative resolution procedure. With this procedure, the expectation must be that the LRO will not come into force, if Parliament approves it, until late 2015. However, as I have already indicated, we are now seriously recommending including the LRO provision in the Bill—so I hope that that helps him—and it will overcome the difficulties identified by the Delegated Powers Committee.
Amendment 14 provides that an elected assembly must form part of a combined authority. It seeks to insert into the Bill new Schedule 5BA, which provides that the functions and procedure of the elected assembly are the same as those for the London Assembly. I understand the intention behind the amendment. First and foremost, I understand that those who are proposing this amendment want a bigger role for the ballot box. They see that this is provided in the London mayoral model, where there is an assembly that holds the mayor to account.
However, London is unique. Greater Manchester is unique. Greater Manchester is not London and London is not Greater Manchester. This is not in the civil servants’ notes. All of us from Greater Manchester are very clear about that point and clear that we do not want additional tiers of government. I am confident that other local areas probably feel the same. We do not want to create additional bureaucracy, which would cost the taxpayer money. The devolution of powers to areas will instead create efficiencies and allow each area to find its own creative solutions to the particular challenges it faces in securing long-term sustainable growth.
In order to hold the mayor and combined authority to account for their decisions and actions, the Bill provides that all combined authorities must have one or more overview and scrutiny committee drawn from the members of the constituent councils. Like the London Assembly, these overview and scrutiny committees can require the mayor, officers and members to attend their meetings and answer questions. I am sure that we will discuss the role of scrutiny more fully when we examine the later clauses of the Bill. We are determined to ensure that scrutiny is as strong and robust as it can be. That scrutiny provides the real protection against the fears of a one-party state, and must be seen to be effective, transparent and independent so as to maintain public confidence in the institutions and governance arrangements to which we will be devolving wide-ranging powers. I reiterate my earlier offer—because the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, was on his way out of the door when I was making it—about any suggestions that noble Lords might wish to make on how we ensure that scrutiny is as robust as possible.
However, we do not want, and I am convinced that few in our cities and counties will want, a new tier of government—a new tier of politicians. The experience of the metropolitan county councils, which my noble friend Lord Heseltine abolished through the legislation he introduced, shows the problems and weaknesses of having inevitably competing tiers of politicians. That said, I believe that with the right legislative framework for allowing areas to draw together scrutiny committees with a broad membership and strong powers, the future governance arrangements can indeed fulfil the aims of those proposing these amendments that public confidence will be maintained and, more importantly, that devolution will work, benefiting the local communities that it serves.
Amendment 17 sets out the electoral arrangements for an elected assembly, using a single transferable vote model. This is a complex electoral system that would be costly and time-consuming to implement. As noble Lords have pointed out, we would have a very confusing array of arrangements for local elections. Introducing STV for all local elections would require significant changes to existing electoral boundaries and could not be introduced, even if it were desirable, within any short timescale.
Amendments 25 and 26 would require the assembly to resolve, by a simple majority,
“for the relevant combined authority to enable the mayor to take on the functions of a police and crime commissioner for that area”.
Notwithstanding the explanations I have already given as to why we would not want there to be an elected assembly for a mayoral combined authority, we consider that there is no need to require any additional body to approve the transfer of police functions to the mayor. The transfer of police and crime commissioner functions to the mayor forms part of the devolution deal and is actually analogous to the situation in London. The Bill requires that all the appropriate authorities in an area would have to give consent before an order to transfer police and crime commissioner functions could be made. Hence we are clear that the transfer of PCC functions will be a matter on which the combined authority and/or its constituent councils must agree.
I can also reassure noble Lords that in order for the mayor of a combined authority area to take on PCC functions, the Secretary of State will be required to lay an order setting out the detail of how PCC functions will be transferred to the mayor, and Parliament will have the opportunity to fully consider this. With these explanations, I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Tyler
My Lords, I thank the Minister. I and my colleagues warmly welcome the assurance she has been giving us—she repeated what she said earlier—because we regard the way in which the Bill will provide for “robust scrutiny”, which I think was the Minister’s phrase, as absolutely critical to its success. We welcome any discussions that can take place before, during and after Report because it is critical to the Bill.
I modestly and tentatively suggest, at this time of night, that when the Minister says that she and the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Leigh, are the “we” who have decided that they do not want to have elected members looking at this, they are not all the people of Greater Manchester. We have to be careful in this House about assuming that, because there has been no attempt yet to look at this in the wider community, somehow the leaders of party groups in particular areas can speak for the whole population of that area.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I want to clarify that the point I made was that we in Greater Manchester—not me and the noble Lord, Lord Smith, but we as elected members, as I was—did not want additional layers of bureaucracy or tiers of government.
Lord Teverson
Perhaps I could intervene on that to say: but of course not. The people who tend to be involved do not like the boat being rocked, which is part of the problem. The establishment of a political area are the last people who would want greater accountability through another body. Regrettably, that is the way in which politics works: we are defensive about our own seats of power, and that is the danger of this proposal. I apologise to my noble friend Lord Tyler.
Lord Tyler
I think I am still responding; I hope that is right. I think the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, is in a major constitutional confusion on this. You cannot have both sides, the mayor and the constituent authority, exerting executive authority in some form without, in the words of the Minister, effective, accountable democracy—I think that was her phrase.
The time is late, and I am not suggesting that we have the perfect solution. I have already said that this is our first attempt to do this, and maybe we can develop a better one. However, I say to those who are opposing our proposal that, if they are seriously saying that the governance of London is somehow defective and therefore we cannot look at it as a proper model for what should go in this Bill for major conurbations in other parts of the country, and that somehow the people of the north do not deserve the same degree of democratic control over the executive, I wish them to say so publicly.
For the time being, I suggest to the Minister that we should look more carefully at the way in which a mayor is held to account. In those circumstances, and with the assurance that she has given us that we will return to this on Report, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, just before we conclude this aspect of the Bill, I confirm that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, is actually right. Secondly, to say that the London arrangements are not right for other places is not to say that those arrangements are defective but, rather, to say that what suits London does not necessarily suit other places.
Lord Beecham
As the Minister implied, jumping on the bandwagon with the Liberal Democrats is not generally a fruitful proposition. Indeed, the concept might be an oxymoron. We are certainly adopting a somewhat Fabian approach to the extension of the franchise. I am a little surprised that the noble Lord’s broader amendment has been regarded as within the scope of the Bill, but if it has then so be it. We would certainly look to an extension of the franchise but for the purposes of what we are discussing here the amendment we have drafted is correct.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, as the Bill currently stands, the ability of the Secretary of State to set the timings of elections by order allows for the fact that there is no single pattern of local elections across the country with which a new mayoral election may be synchronised. It also recognises that devolution deals would be bespoke and therefore it is possible that different arrangements may be sought by and agreed with different areas. For example, an area may wish its mayoral election to be held in a year where there are no council elections while another area may wish to combine mayoral and council elections. While we expect that the majority of areas will wish the mayoral term to be four years—the same as councillors—we would not want to rule out the possibility of, say, a five-year term, the same as Parliament, if that is what a particular area wanted.
The essential point is that, whatever arrangements are adopted, they will be put in place only after this House and the other place have debated and approved them. Moreover, these provisions in the Bill replicate those for local authority mayors in the Local Government Act 2000. The 2000 Act also provides a default position so that, if the order-making power is not exercised, a mayor’s term is four years and the election takes place on the ordinary election day, the first Thursday in May in the relevant election year—that is, the election specified in the Act for different classes of councils. However, that is a default position, as indeed was recognised in the report by the DPRRC. Rather than setting out a default position, the amendment proposes a more restricted arrangement that applies in all circumstances other than when the office of mayor is first established. Given that the purpose of the Bill is to implement bespoke deals, it would be inappropriate to include such an inflexible position. However, we are prepared to look at whether to include in the Bill some genuine default provision. This would not in any way curtail the scope of the order-making powers in Schedule 5B but would be the provisions that apply if an order were not made.
Amendment 15 would change the franchise for those entitled to vote for mayor in a combined authority area to include 16 and 17 year-olds. The Bill provides that the franchise for electing these mayors, which would have been established as an integral part of an agreed package of powers to be devolved to the combined authority, should be the same as that for electing councillors in any electoral area situated within the combined authority. The voting age in those areas is 18. More broadly of course, the voting age for parliamentary elections is set at 18. Beyond that, the voting age in most democracies, including most member states of the EU, is also 18. In the EU, only Austria allows voting for 16 year-olds.
We have heard arguments for a change in the voting age. However, my concern is that that is part of a wider debate and it would not be appropriate—as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said—for any such change to be implemented in these quite specific circumstances. I have concerns as well about the administrative complexity of running an election in an area based on a register that would include 16 and 17 year-olds and running other council elections or referenda in the same area, quite likely on the same day, on a different basis with a different franchise. These are circumstances in which the risk of confusing the electorate is very real and this can only weaken, rather than strengthen, our local democracy. There is a wider national debate to be had about the electoral franchise, but I am clear that the specific circumstances of the Bill are not the place for it. Accordingly I hope that, on this basis, the noble Lord will agree to withdraw his amendment.