Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 21st March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has just said emphasises the main point I wish to make: that this applies to students just as much as to academics. The whole idea of freedom of thought is really important. We are bringing up our children to think that they must curtail their thought. I have a daughter at university at the moment and that is certainly her experience. The atmosphere of not being allowed to discuss and talk about things is prevalent. The Bill is really important in making a difference to that. I will be very interested to see what Members in the other place think of the amendments we send down to them.

We should not think that this is happening just in universities. On 8 March I received, as other noble Lords might have, an email from the parliamentary security vetting department asking us to fill in and sign a form. It said that we must not share passwords, override or undermine security measures and sensible things like that. But it then went on to say that we must not be offensive or put the reputation of Parliament at risk. I do not know how to survive in this place without doing both those things; I imagine that applies to other noble Lords too. Our freedom of speech is now to be curtailed by a directive from parliamentary security vetting without—so far as I can see; I have contacted the authorities without getting any reply—any way in which noble Lords can be involved in that process. I am not sure who will take me to task for being offensive in this place, but I find offensive the idea that I should be asked to sign saying that I will not be.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I am not sure that I am going to be offensive; I now feel that my presentation is lacking as a result. Let me at once declare an interest. I was the general secretary of the Association of University Teachers in times when the issue of—and necessity for—freedom of speech in universities was regarded as one of their paramount responsibilities.

I readily agree with the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, who said that that is fundamental to almost all of us who have been concerned with higher education. I appreciate what the Minister has said; this has been a very solid development. I also support the amendment the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, introduced, for much the same reasons as the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner.

I feel a sense of disappointment and sadness on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. It is obviously never pleasant to be invited somewhere and then told you are not going to speak, but I urge her to get over it. The truth is that when you go into academic climates and start talking to academics, you are going to find—rather like with lawyers—that a large number will agree with you and a large number will disagree. They will tell you that with all the spitefulness, generosity and so on while they do it.

I have come across a lot of academics who want to make sure that the world of universities does not automatically become subsumed in a world in which people pursue litigation against one another, rather than try to resolve things through more sensible routes. It was bound to end in a reasonable compromise, and I think the Minister put that very fairly and very well.

In welcoming these developments, the academics who have bothered to get in touch with me have told me that the kind of change we are contemplating today is the kind they would find easiest to live with. They are more and more—probably in part because of the debates we have had—sympathetic and attentive to the problems that have been created by cancel culture. I used to cancel my own culture when I was a lecturer, largely by giving very erudite lectures on obscure mathematical problems. Very few people enjoyed them. There is only so much multiple regression you can hear about before you conclude that you should take yourself home because no one is going to be that interested, but it was what I was teaching.

That is why I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that of course some people will be uncharitable and malevolent, but it is something we can get past with a sensible compromise of the kind we have seen—particularly in the light of the reservations the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, has about it.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

To clarify, as I stated earlier—this really is important—I do not have a right to a platform and I do not care if people disagree with me. I do not mind if students invite me and then disinvite me. All I care about is if students are bullied into disinviting me. It is for the students that I made the speech, not for myself. Who cares about my feelings? They are of no relevance.

My point is that many academics and students have looked to this Bill and the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Triesman, has talked to people who want the compromise. I have talked to people who think it is a fudge. Let Parliament decide—fair enough—but I do not think anyone can claim they have spoken to all the academics, and this is the only answer. I think that this is a cop out.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I just say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that strictly speaking there should not be any interventions at this stage of the Bill.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

Because we are not having that kind of iterative debate, I will refrain from making the point that I am not saying that I spoke only to academics who took the same view I might take. I am just saying that if you speak to academics, you will hear as many views as the number of academics you speak to; that is in the nature of the business.

I welcome the process we have gone through because it has alerted people to a very significant problem. A few days ago in your Lordships’ House, I heard somebody say that trigger warnings were now being attached to reading lists of some of the great classics from the English oeuvre. I was just about to embark on a re-reading of Northanger Abbey. If anybody has any advice for me about dangerous pages that I should avoid, I should be extremely grateful to hear it, because I would hate suddenly to find my entire spiritual underpinnings removed while reading Jane Austen.

This debate will leave a legacy. It will make everybody more attentive to the risks to free speech and academic freedom, and I am not at all sad that we have gone through the process if that is the outcome.

Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 7th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to echo the points made. I think the spirit of these amendments is important for the safety and success of our university system, but this should be dealt with in the codes of practice. It should not be beyond the abilities of the university authorities to distinguish between criminal activities, such as letting off flares or whatever, and the genuine heckling and expressing of strong opinions which is part of the free speech debate. It may be that the university authorities in some cases have not always succeeded in that, but even with primary legislation, if there were such failures, it is not clear that the legislation would prevent that. I think that robust codes of practice, making clear the difference between stifling free speech and merely expressing opinions, are very important.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to make a brief point, because I know that everybody wants to make progress, but free speech is also important. I could well understand a code of practice of this kind, and I too am very grateful to the Minister for discussions on this. A code of practice can make a difference to the way in which societies that are part of a student union or student unions understand what their responsibilities are. I am not sure that they always understand what the criminal law does or does not say, and it is certainly the case that some of the institutions within universities that used to play significant role, including the union of which I had the privilege of being the general secretary, do not understand it any more and do not apply it any more in an appropriate way, and that itself is a significant problem. I am horrified by that.

However, I would like to know from the Minister that the codes of practice will also tell individuals what they are or are not expected to do. By and large, we construct our law—there are lawyers here who will tell me if I am wrong—so that individuals know what their responsibilities are and do not simply say that they are hiding behind some kind of collective. It is their responsibility. Academic freedom is based around individuals understanding their duties and responsibilities just as much as any of the groups. If we want this to work, it is vital that we do not lose that distinction.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments all refer to student unions. We have been concerned about the rather heavy-handed approach to student unions in the Bill. Amendment 16, to which my noble friend Lord Wallace has added his name, seeks to ensure that student unions are fully aware of the regulations with which they must comply. We are particularly concerned in connection with further education student unions, which are likely to be very small and have very few funds available. Presumably they are included in the Bill. The regulations are complex and students will obviously be transitory in post, so simplicity of guidance is essential if they are not to find themselves caught up in unwittingly breaching the rules, as the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, has just set out. This amendment would be a very straightforward way of helping students, and it would be very easy to adopt.

Like others, we support the intention of Amendments 11, 15 and 25 but we remain unsure about how they could be implemented. As the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, said, some of these actions may well be criminal behaviour, in which case they do not need to be part of the Bill because they should be something else. I liked the tale told by the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner. There are other ways of dealing with hecklers, and ridicule is often one of the very best. We do not see that these amendments should be in the Bill, but some code of practice or regulation would probably be worth it. However, Amendment 16 is well worth government consideration.

Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, on this. He mentioned money; I wish I had some, like many other people. Let me declare an interest: I am emeritus professor at the University of Essex and the University of Sheffield.

My amendment seeks to loosen the shackles imposed by private sector research funders upon the ability of academics to publish research. Those shackles have got much tighter with the advent of the research excellence framework, which attaches weight to the external research funding that is raised by universities. Within universities, indeed, any academic these days wishing to be promoted has to show that he or she has managed to secure a lot of research funding.

This research funding comes with lots and lots of strings attached, which raises conflicts of interest. Can your Lordships imagine trying to get some research money to look into gambling or the development of weapons? It would come from the gambling industry or from British Aerospace and others. Then if you produce research which is critical, would they really let you publish it? That is really the question.

I have looked at many research contracts—some colleagues have told me about them—that include clauses which give the funders the final say on whether the research can be published. Funders can vet, and have vetted, the research questions, methodologies and methods, data analysis and the conclusions of the studies. In many cases, draft papers need to be submitted to the funders. I have experienced that myself, and their approval is needed before anything can be disseminated, perhaps at a conference—because many academics present papers at conferences before they submit them to any peer-reviewed journal—so they need to be vetted. Funders can block, delay, or demand changes to the papers because they do not like the research findings, or they may just sit on the paper for a prolonged period to make its research very stale and untimely. Again, I have experienced that, as I explained at Second Reading.

One prominent scholar told a peer-reviewed journal:

“In our commissioned research project, the commissioner’s representative interfered with both the entire study and the publication because I did not let him influence the sample. Instead of random sampling, we should have made a ‘comfort sample’.”


There is a classic example of a pharmaceutical company funding a researcher to compare its branded thyroid drug with a generic competitor’s. The researcher found that the generic products were as good as the expensive branded products. The publication of the research could have jeopardised the funder’s sales and profits so the drug company went to enormous lengths to suppress the research, including taking legal action against the researcher and her university to prevent the paper’s publication.

In the past few days, one UK academic told me that the funder vetted his paper and did not like the negative health effects associated with the consumption of processed food. The funder decided that some cases of negative effects were outliers and were to be eliminated from the paper. It is bit like saying, “Somebody has died from this disease but it is an outlier so let us ignore and suppress it”. The academic concerned refused to accommodate the changes and the paper was never presented at a conference nor published. Another academic told me:

“The funder demanded control of all the raw data relating to the negative effects of a drug. Under pressure, I agreed. Subsequently, the funder would not allow me to release the data to a peer-reviewed journal and I could not publish the study, which was less than complimentary about the funder’s products.”


Over the years, several studies have established links between passive smoking and lung cancer. Tobacco companies have a long history of trying to subvert research by framing the research questions, designing the study, collecting and providing data and even writing the final papers for academics. Industry funding and the quest for research grants have persuaded many scholars to ignore important research questions because they simply will not get funding otherwise. Indeed, in my own field, it is incredibly rare to find research that is critical of auditing or the anti-social practices of the finance industry. None is ever funded by anybody from the City or the world of accounting because that is not the kind of thing that they fund. Many academics also do not do that kind of research because it jeopardises their chances of getting research funding from the world of accounting and the City, so such issues are basically ignored.

The Government are also a culprit. Commenting on a June 2016 report by Sir Stephen Sedley, Missing Evidence: An Inquiry into the Delayed Publication of Government-Commissioned Research, Nick Ross concluded that

“expensively commissioned findings sometimes fail to see the light of day and weak rules are used to bury unwelcome evidence for long enough to make it stale.”

In November 2020, the British Medical Journal published an article, “Covid-19: Politicisation, ‘Corruption’ and Suppression of Science”, which reported four instances of the suppression of science during the pandemic. It was all to do with the government-funded research. One instance related to the suppression of the 2016 study codenamed Operation Cygnus, which documented deficiencies in the UK’s pandemic preparedness. The report was eventually released in 2020 after an outcry in the media and interventions by the freedom of information commissioner. The Government did not want to publish it; their suppression denied the public, parliamentarians and medical communities vital information. The funder of the study stifled the debate.

The BMJ reported that a Public Health England report on Covid-19 and inequalities was delayed by the Department of Health; a section on ethnic minorities was initially withheld and then, following public outcry, was published as part of a follow-up report in 2020. Authors from Public Health England were instructed not to talk to the media about it. On 15 October 2020, Richard Horton, editor of the Lancet, publicly stated that an author of a research paper, a government scientist, was being blocked by the Government from speaking to the media because of a “difficult political landscape.”

Another example relates to what the Government codenamed Operation Moonshot. The project required an immediate and wide availability of accurate, rapid diagnostic tests for Covid. This research concluded that the Government procured an antibody test, which cost £75 million, that in real-world tests fell well short of the performance claims made by its manufacturer. Researchers from Public Health England and collaborating institutions sought to publish their study findings before the Government committed to buying a million of these tests but were blocked from releasing them by the Department of Health and the Prime Minister’s office. Public Health England then unsuccessfully attempted to block the British Medical Journal’s press release about the research paper. The reason for all this was that the research was damaging to the commercial interests of the corporation involved in these tests.

I have provided only a brief glimpse of some of the ways in which academic research is subverted and suppressed and, consequently, scholars and policymakers are denied the opportunity to see the evidence, data and findings. This is damaging to academic freedoms, scholarly endeavours and society as a whole. Amendment 53 seeks to prevent funders exercising undue influence on the design, conduct and dissemination of research. After all, what kind of expertise do they have in these matters? If they had any, maybe they would be doing the research themselves. This amendment makes scholars, their communities and journal reviewers the final arbiters of the quality of research. I urge the Minister and the House to support it.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I can probably do this quite briefly. These are very helpful amendments, which illustrate an extremely important point. To work out why or how the Bill will be useful or effective, it is important to understand what academics do—what life on the ground is actually like and what having a career entails. I want to follow my noble friend Lord Smith of Finsbury’s earlier comments, but I think that is for a later debate. If academics want to pursue a career, there are facts on the ground that cannot be overlooked, and these amendments address them.

There is a longish history to this; I must confess to having my fingerprints on parts of the REF at different times in the past, so I want to acknowledge that I have probably contributed to a problem. Today, if you want to make progress, it is entirely commonplace in universities to expect that, in the last period of assessment of research, you will have produced at least three articles in reputable referee journals. If you have not done so, you will not be promoted and if you do not have tenure, you will probably not survive at all. It is imperative. It is a gating process about which this Grand Committee will do nothing, because it is not in our power, but that is how it happens.

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[Baroness Garden of Frognal (LD)]

My Lords, I will also speak to the Clause 7 stand part notice in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Wallace, who is absent. I note with interest that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, referred earlier to the HEPI report on students, which made interesting but fairly depressing reading—particularly with regard to students these days being very reluctant to discuss anything with which they disagree.

These amendments are at the requests of students and student unions, which are very concerned that provisions in this Bill could involve them in costly, time-consuming administration and litigation. Our revised Clause 3 aims to provide clarity on the responsibilities for freedom of speech in a more student-friendly manner. We were also alerted to the problems of geography. Many higher education providers have operations overseas. Does free speech “within the law” mean the law at home or away? There are many Welsh and Scottish higher education providers that have campuses in England as well. Will these duties apply to all of them?

We note that student unions are not public authorities and so are not subject to regulation in the same way. Many of them may be tiny theatre providers; they may be further education providers with a handful of higher education students. Their governing bodies may be a small group of 17 year-old students. Are the provisions in Clause 3 really appropriate for such unions?

If Clause 3 is bad, Clause 7 is even worse. We read in that clause that an individual would be able to refer their complaint to the Office for Students complaints scheme at the same time as pursuing it through a provider or the student union’s internal procedures, which would surely be the appropriate way. It could also be addressed by the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education, or a court or tribunal. How confusing and cumbersome this is. Surely such complaints should not be escalated; rather, they should be dealt with at the lowest possible level. Currently, the adjudicator considers students’ complaints only once the local process has been completed. For the Office for Students to rush in with a monetary penalty would surely be untimely and disproportionate. We really feel that this is not a reasonable use of the Office for Students’ powers.

At a later date, we shall come on to discuss the director of freedom of speech and academic freedom. It is not at all clear how that post will fit in with all these other complaints processes.

As I say, these amendments have been tabled at the request of students and student unions. On that basis, I beg to move.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, this is probably the only appropriate place to raise this point. There was a debate earlier in which my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Finsbury—he may be on the Cross Benches but he is steadfastly a friend—and the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Smith of Newnham, took part, about what the core functions of a university are and what its DNA is. I do not resile from what I said about the role of a university in the development of knowledge and the challenge to knowledge, but I would not for a moment suggest that that is the only function.

I come to the other thing that I think universities are fundamentally there for, because the students and student unions are so central to it. Universities are also the place where we see the transmission of knowledge between generations. They are the place in which we try to instil in students the methods best suited to elaborate knowledge and to challenge all spheres of knowledge, and to do so in a way that reflects the fact that it is a community. Those are also fundamental obligations of a university, and it would be very foolish if we were to neglect them.

The strength of the very word “collegiality” is that it means we believe that, in a collegial environment, people should not suppress the views of others, silence others or interfere with their individual rights. Apart from overcoming those negatives, it also cements together a community that has, if I may put it this way, a mutual obligation to proceed with respect. In my view, that is quite central to the DNA of a university.

I make these points because those frequently relatively young people—although it is a much more diverse age group now—are central to what we think about when we think about what universities do and how they should do it. Indeed, we have embodied in other legislation measures to deal with the quality of teaching to ensure that this part of what universities do is at the best standard that can be achieved, and we punish them by not letting them have gold stars or whatever if they fail to do it. Student unions are a part of that education provision, part of that community, and what we try to impose on them becomes extremely significant.

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[Earl Howe (Con)]

I take the noble Baroness’s point. Those societies will be expected to abide by a code of practice which will be promulgated to all students. While the societies will not be subjected to the full extent of the regulation that I have been talking about, expectations will be placed on them. I cannot yet tell the noble Baroness what will be contained in the code of practice but, as I have mentioned, that code will receive appropriate publicity.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

To be very clear, I have no difficulty at all with the concept that people in student unions who impede the free speech and academic freedom of others must be dealt with. For the record, I do not have a second’s question about that. I just want us to do things in this Bill that we can actually do. I wonder whether the noble Earl, Lord Howe, might discuss this offline with some of us who have helped to run these kinds of institutions in the past to see whether there is a practical solution to the problem that my noble friend has just illustrated. I do not know about the LSE, but I will lay odds that most student unions find out what their rugby clubs have done months after the event, if they find out at all.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

They might find out in the newspapers.

Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 31st October 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 2, which is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Triesman. The amendment seeks to do two things. First, it seeks to explore what the Government mean when they refer to

“freedom of speech within the law”

in new Section A1(2). Secondly, it seeks to avoid a possible inconsistency between the freedom of speech that the Bill seeks to protect and promote and the right to free expression that is protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

There is a bit of history behind this amendment. I drafted it just after the Bill received its Second Reading in the summer. At that time, the Prime Minister was Boris Johnson, the Secretary of State for Justice was Dominic Raab and the Bill of Rights had just been introduced, which I think it is right to say he particularly favoured. The point that concerned me at that time was two Bills dealing with freedom of expression or the right to freedom of speech proceeding together without any connection between the two. What happened, as we all know, is that there was a change of Prime Minister. When Liz Truss became Prime Minister, Dominic Raab was no longer the Secretary of State for Justice and it was made known that the Bill of Rights was no longer to be proceeded with. However, there has been another change: we have a new Prime Minister, Dominic Raab has come back in again as Secretary of State for Justice and it is possible that the Bill of Rights may be resurrected and create the problem that I was anticipating in the summer. I stress that one of my motivations behind this amendment was to be sure that both bits of legislation, if they are to proceed, are in communication with each other and that, when we use the expressions “freedom of expression” or “freedom of speech”, we are talking about the same thing.

I come back to the point that I mentioned at the beginning: the phrase “within the law” needs some explanation. It seems to assume that the law already tells us what the freedom amounts to. I think that most people—certainly most lawyers—would tend to look to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights as telling us what the freedom amounts to, because it spells it all out and it is suitably qualified for various reasons when you read the second part of Article 10. I should have thought that to build it into this Bill makes good sense. The amendment seeks to explain and give body to the expression “within the law”.

Those are the two reasons: first, to give greater body to the phrase “within the law”, so that everybody understands what it means and to preserve consistency with Article 10, which is part of our law; but also to avoid a possible inconsistency with the Bill of Rights, should it be reintroduced, because it would be unfortunate if that Bill, when it talks about freedom of speech, as it does, should be using a different basis for legislation. I should explain, and I am quoting now, that Clause 4 of the Bill of Rights says:

“When determining a question which has arisen in connection with the right to freedom of speech, a court must give great weight to the importance of protecting the right.”


It goes on to say:

“In this section ‘the right to freedom of speech’ means the Convention right”.


It then sets that out in full in the way that my amendment does.

My amendment is based on the wording that can be found in Clause 4(2) of the Bill of Rights as it was, and it is the best I can do to bring the two Bills into line. With great respect, I do not think that this amendment does anything to harm this Bill or in any way interfere with the basic principles which the Government are seeking to achieve by promoting this legislation. All I am trying to do is avoid misunderstandings and inconsistencies. With that background, I commend the amendment to the Committee.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I start with my declaration of interests: I still hold academic posts at Cambridge, and I was the general secretary of what was the Association of University Teachers, now UCU—it is a rather different beast these days, but none the less, it was part of my history. It is a privilege to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. I think the distinction he makes, and the way we could embody consistency between potential pieces of legislation, is very important.

Although Amendment 22 is in a different group, I will make a point now which might mean that it does not have to be repeated later. It is very important to the academic world to know exactly what we as legislators mean by the different terms used. These terms are used very widely in academic life; they always have been and so they should. They were widely defended in academic life as being fundamental to its culture. I would like to believe that they are fundamental to the culture of many other parts of life as well, but they were fundamental to that culture. One of the reasons it is so important to express these concepts in this Bill, and one of the reasons I can understand why the Government have produced it now, is that, sadly, the challenges to freedom of speech and academic freedom have become much more acute and have not been dealt with particularly effectively.

I hark back to the earlier period precisely because the sector itself would have then dealt with these things very firmly and effectively. It was the DNA of the sector. Nobody would have questioned the right of people within the law to espouse views that were unpopular, take sometimes dogmatic positions and engage in every kind of argument under the sun, and, if others wished to try to rebut those arguments, to hear those other arguments in the same spirit. That was—I hope the Committee will forgive me for repeating the point, but it seems so fundamental—the DNA of this sector. I would like to feel that, when the final draft of this Bill appears, it will contain expressions about that which will be instantly recognisable to the people who used to celebrate those values. They will then see this as theirs, not just ours—not just what legislators think is right but what the sector was committed to and always believed was right. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has done us a great favour in saying that.

I also support wholeheartedly my noble friend Lord Collins’s amendments. I want to make one brief point about the concept of “within the law”. Generally speaking, I would hope that I understand what those words mean, but there are some areas where freedom of expression arises where I am not entirely sure that I do. I want to mention those here, not because I want to restrict people’s freedom of expression but because I do not want us to do undue harm to anybody. I am thinking here of the kind of coverage given in public by some people to the murder of the children at Sandy Hook and the case, which I believe will be reported on “Panorama” this evening—goodness knows how I know, but I have heard this—to do with people making gross allegations about what happened at the Manchester Arena bombing.

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Please can we have some definitions of “member”? I beg to move.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 22. One of the things that I have inevitably observed over a long period is that the proportion of the academic and academic-related staff who are on full-time contracts of the kind that we used to describe as tenured contracts has declined significantly. In some institutions it has declined almost to the point where they are a small minority. I do not agree with why that has happened, but I understand why it has. Generally speaking, it is quite difficult to get rid of people who are tenured, and if you are in economically straitened circumstances, you are probably looking for the least protection possible for some grades of staff.

But it is also true that the number and proportion of staff, and I make the point about both, who are no longer tenured but are absolutely vital parts of the academic community and are now on part-time, hourly and short-term contracts—a whole variety of contracts that do not conform to what we would have thought of as tenured staff—are increasingly women and members of ethnic minorities. There are all sorts of reasons why that is the case. For women, it is often said that, because their careers get interrupted for various reasons, it is easier to deal with them if they are not in a tenured position. For example, you do not have to replace them for maternity leave purposes. This has had a detrimental effect on the security of employment that is also discriminatory.

I will make two points that I hope the Grand Committee will feel are not in any sense unhelpful. First, if we want to ensure that the whole of the academic community buys in effectively to these concepts and the Bill’s key propositions—I share with my noble friend Lord Hunt and many others who have spoken the belief that this is probably not the right way of going about it, but none the less we are going about it so I am going to do my best with what we have—then we need to make sure that universities understand that it means the whole of the community. I regret to say that many universities tend to think of the academic community as being the tenured staff; I fear that that is probably also true of some Cambridge and Oxford colleges, having known those colleges myself over the years. They have much less regard for whether other aspects of academic life apply to all the other academics. I am not even being particularly critical of that; I am just saying that it is one of the ways that the sector has evolved.

Secondly, as I have said, this has had a discriminatory effect. When we talk about the academic community, it would be very easy to say that we do not have exceptions in mind. As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, said just a few moments ago, we mean the whole thing, because we intend that the Bill’s impact should be on the whole of that community who are employed as academics, irrespective of the character of the contract they hold. I do not even believe that it would have any difficulty embodied in it for contractual or other purposes; it would simply be everybody who is employed to teach or research. I include in that “academic-related”, because, rather like the librarians in your Lordships’ House, there are a number of people who do background research that is fundamental to the academic conduct of an institution.

I commend this amendment without embarrassment, because either the Bill means what it says or it means it for only some people.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will address Amendment 26 and the consequential Amendment 71, which we need not look at. Amendment 26 effectively aims at much the same target as the noble Lord, Lord Triesman. It may be that the definition is different and it may be that we can discuss this, but the point is exactly the same: it is to include the whole of the academic community in the university. We must get these words right. If there is a practical difficulty with the use of “emeritus”, for example, we can look at it.

What is really necessary is that “academic staff” is made clear in the Bill and that it covers the range of people who are most vulnerable. The most vulnerable are not those on full-time contracts; they are the doctoral students, other teaching staff and researchers, and those on part-time or less secure contracts. It is vital that, if they are pushing forward ideas that happen to be unpopular in their particular community, but are legitimately doing their job well, they are not dismissed or otherwise penalised for holding those views and expressing them.

Amendment 26 was tabled at Report in the Commons, and on 13 June, the Universities Minister offered the following clarification:

“To clarify, the Bill uses the term “staff” to broaden the existing reference to employees, as not all those who work for a higher education provider have an employment contract or employee status. I can confirm that it will include those on short-term, casual contracts and PhD students undertaking teaching.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/6/22; col. 72.]


I suggest that my amendment would go a little further and make it absolutely clear that it encompasses all those who will need protection.

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[Earl Howe (Con)]

I would be happy to take this away and investigate. Once I have done so, I would be happy to write to the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Wallace.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

I would be grateful for that letter as well. I suggest to the noble Earl that one of my experiences of these colleges is that they do not go back and read anything much later than 1650—I do not mean pm—and they probably do not care. If it is has to be clarified, it is much better that it is clarified.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I wanted just to cover another question that the noble Baroness put to me about retired professors. If a retired professor is an emeritus professor, they are protected by the Bill as a member. This is important if they still have a role in the university. If they have no such role, then in practice the provider will not have to take steps to secure their freedom of speech since they will not be speaking on campus or taking part in university life.

I turn to Amendments 22, 26 and 71, which seek to define academic staff for the purpose of the Bill. We have used the term “staff” to broaden the existing reference to “employees” in the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, as not all those who work at a provider have an employment contract or employee status. This term is already used in the current definition of academic freedom in the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 so is an understood term in this context.

“Staff” includes academics who hold honorary appointments for which they are not paid, for example honorary fellows. PhD students will be considered to be academic staff, for example, in so far as they teach undergraduate students. It will be a question of fact in each case whether they are covered as staff or students. The term covers staff at all levels, whether or not they are full time or part time, permanent or temporary. Visiting staff who are perhaps working at the university for a year are also covered. They must be distinguished from visiting speakers who are academics working at another institution, who are covered by the Bill as visiting speakers, rather than as staff of the provider.

I listened with care to the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham, and his question about the way in which academic freedom interacts with academic standards. I said earlier that there is nothing in the Bill to encourage baseless or harmful claims or bad science on campus, but it is important to recognise that a provider in this context is an employer, and that its staff will have signed an employment contract and be subject to its employment policies.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, the group of amendments to Clauses 1 and 3 tabled in the name of my noble friend Lord Willetts and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, seek to give higher education providers and student unions the flexibility to move events to alternative premises but not cancel them. The noble Lord, Lord Mann, has also tabled Amendment 6 to the provisions concerning premises.

Under the Bill as drafted, providers, colleges and student unions will already be free to move events to alternative rooms, should that be appropriate. The main duty of taking reasonably practicable steps to secure freedom of speech is linked to the provisions that are the subject of these amendments—those in proposed new Section A1(3). This means that the duty is to take reasonably practicable steps to secure that the use of premises, and the terms on which such use is offered, are not based on the ideas, beliefs or views of individuals or groups. The duty to take reasonably practicable steps therefore means that there is already flexibility.

In any event, a provider, college or students’ union is not required under the Bill to allow the use of their premises at all times and in an unlimited way. It is open to them to offer particular rooms for use by event organisers at specified times. As regards Amendment 6, Section A1(3)(a) refers to “any premises” but could refer to “premises” without changing the effect. It should also be noted that the relevant body can place conditions on the use of rooms.

In this context, it might be helpful to touch specifically on the point raised at Second Reading by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Coventry regarding concerns about the use of faith spaces. I was very happy to meet him some days ago to discuss this. The example given by the noble Lord, Lord Mann, of having an anti-Israel talk right next to Jewish premises, touches on a similar point. Sections A1(3) and (4) on the use of premises essentially replicate the wording of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, referring to beliefs among other things in that context. As I said earlier, the provisions link back to the main reasonably practicable duty in subsection (1), so it is not an absolute requirement. I think that was an initial cause for concern on this point, so I am happy to clarify that. In fact, the “reasonably practicable” steps wording enables providers to continue to designate spaces for use by faith groups without any obligation for the provider to open those spaces up to other groups, whether or not they have conflicting ideologies.

Under the reasonably practicable steps duty, it would be legitimate for a provider not to offer a particular faith space to any group that wants to hold an event, but to offer another suitable space, thereby upholding the freedom of speech duties and preserving the integrity of the space set aside for the faith group. The legislation enables providers to respect the religious views of those with designated rooms, taking into account the duties under the Equality Act, while still complying with the freedom of speech duties. To pick up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, we anticipate that the Office for Students will publish guidance for providers on how to comply with the duties. We can certainly discuss this with the Office for Students to ensure that it covers this issue, which I hope will provide noble Lords with further reassurance.

I just say to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, that providers are already required under the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 to have a code of practice regarding freedom of speech. The Bill strengthens that requirement. Providers will now need to include a statement of values in their codes of practice that clearly sets out the importance of freedom of speech. Providers should be setting the tone and expectations campus-wide so that everyone is confident to express their lawful views and challenge received wisdom, even if their views are unpopular. Codes of practice will also need to set out the criteria that providers will use to make decisions about the use of their premises for events involving potentially controversial views, as well add the criteria for when exceptional circumstances may apply regarding the payment of security costs. The Bill strengthens the duty on providers already set out in the Education Act 1994 so that all students, not just those who are members of student unions, are made aware of the duties and the code. Once again, the Office for Students will give guidance on this.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

I want to go back to the noble Earl’s point on security costs. I would like to understand a little more what that might involve. My own experience, probably not wholly appropriate, comes from football. Inside many football stadia, including quite small ones, the clubs provide stewards. Sometimes, certainly outside, the police provide security, and sometimes, if it is called for, they also provide it inside. There is a huge argument about who should bear the cost of the police providing security, since it has an often quite considerable impact. In the event that internally provided security, whoever pays for it, is not adequate to the circumstances and the police are called in, who becomes responsible for the costs?

[Earl Howe (Con)]

Amendments 24 and 43, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, exactly address that set of issues, and I was about to comment on them. They concern the duty to generally bear the security costs for events. Understandably, the amendments probe how the costs of the provision of security for controversial meetings should be distributed among appropriate bodies. The duty on higher education providers, colleges and student unions is that they must not pass on some or all of the security costs to event organisers unless there are exceptional circumstances. The criteria for what are exceptional circumstances will depend on the nature of the particular body, and therefore must be set out in its code of practice, for the sake of transparency.

This element of the Bill is exceptionally important. We know that certain minority groups face serious security concerns when speaking on university campuses, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out. My right honourable friend the Minister spoke in the other place about the University of Bristol students’ union imposing a £500 security bill on a student society in order to allow the Israeli ambassador to give a talk. This is simply not right. The cost of securing events should not stand in the way of people having a voice. The Bill as currently drafted protects these groups while also giving autonomy to providers, colleges and student unions to make their own decisions about what constitute exceptional circumstances. This drafting reflects that their resources are not finite and that there may be other relevant factors specific to that institution that will need to be taken into account.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked about exceptional circumstances and when costs can be passed on. We believe it is important that providers, colleges and student unions have the right to determine what constitutes an exceptional circumstance when considering who should pay for security costs of an event, taking into account, in particular, what is reasonable given their resources and other relevant factors. It is also important that the criteria they use are transparent, so that student societies are aware of them when they are planning an event. If costs are passed on to a student society and it considers that the criteria have been wrongly applied, it will be able to complain to the OfS under the new complaints scheme. Once again, we anticipate that the OfS will publish guidance on the content of codes of practice, including on security costs.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

When the police decide to intervene, it is often not because a host organisation decides that they should or invites them to. They make a judgment, as constables, as to what would constitute a way of securing a peaceful circumstance for the event or for the premises. Nobody knows that it is going to happen unless they decide to do it, and nobody decides who is going to pay for it in advance, but happen it does, and arguments about who should then pay for it occur. How would a code of practice deal with that?

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I am not sure I accept the noble Lord’s argument. If an event is properly planned—which it should be, particularly if it is sensitive or controversial—its security implications should surely be considered in advance. If it involves a police presence, that consideration should surely encompass the cost of that police presence. It would be a very remiss institution that did not look at the effects and requirements of the event in the round before it happened.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

What we are concerned with in particular is people losing their employment, but I am happy to go further.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I wish to introduce Amendment 14. It touches on the kinds of concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has just raised and it is, in my estimation, a kind of partner clause that I want to explore with your Lordships to the one introduced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, at the very beginning.

One of the arguments I have tried to advocate to the Grand Committee is that, if this is to work at all, it must be felt to be under the ownership of the university and higher education world. For people to address a cultural problem, they need to get to grips with it. It is not about just processes and techniques—it is to do with very fundamental feelings. However many times references to academic freedom are made, if they are not made in a way which aligns with how the academic world and the academic community understand the meaning of those words, it is unlikely to take root and will not have that cultural impact.

That is why I have raised the question, which was also raised earlier by my noble friend Lord Collins, of the UNESCO normative instrument. This was a worldwide UNESCO conference, which adopted a worldwide definition of academic freedom which had been promoted by the academic world, the very people we are trying to address, as a definition to which they could all assent and which they would all defend. I make that point because, if we are to achieve success in this, we certainly want them to adhere to it and defend it.

The work was invited by UNESCO of a body that at that time I had the great honour to chair, which was the Association of Commonwealth Universities, an association of universities literally throughout the Commonwealth. It was drafted—some bits have been cited by my noble friend Lord Collins already—in the United Kingdom and Canada, and went through a very long process to try to make sure that this was the definition of academic freedom which the world of academics would feel was theirs.

If we had gone to UNESCO slightly earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, would have been the Minister. If it had been slightly later, it would have been the noble Lord, Lord Henley. As it happens, it was just after the general election of 1997 and, as a consequence, it was a Labour Minister who spoke to it. I make that point because there was never a cigarette paper—I know nothing about cigarettes, but the Committee will bear with me—of ideological difference between us about this. There were some differences around the world about it, and one or two nations—only one or two—declined to sign it, much to the annoyance of the rest of us. Saudi Arabia declined on the grounds that it covered women academics as well, and it did not accept that anything should be a right or privilege for women academics—no rights to academic freedom whatever. If we had included a clause restricting it to male academics, Saudi Arabia would probably have signed it as well. I just make the point that this was as close to universal as you could get in academic life where, believe me, getting universal agreement is very close to impossible.

The merit of that is that it provides us with a definition of academic freedom. It may be said that there are other definitions, but this provides us with one that the academic world itself formulated, adopted, approved and, with the exception of people who did not want women to be covered by it, was accepted by everybody. I should probably add that Qatar did not like it either for the same reason, but none the less, all the rest of us did. I commend it to the Government because, if the Bill is to become law—we have expressed our anxieties about whether it is the best way forward, but it may very well do; it is government-backed legislation, after all—I appeal to them to try to ensure it brings along everyone, because short of that, its prospects in practice are very poor.

That is why I provided a small history. As it turns out, it was engendered in the Commonwealth, in institutions with which we are probably all very familiar, against the background of a set of values with which we are all familiar and opposed only by people who, if I may say so without being unnecessarily unkind, do not share some of those values at all. Aside from having the assent of the academic world and being still referred to and related to by it, it establishes in a way we would all want that if people want to get up within the law to make controversial, difficult, unpopular or any other kinds of propositions and speeches in the academic world, it is a global right to do so, signed off by the first signatory to it, the United Kingdom.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I shall speak to Amendment 17 from the noble Lord, Lord Strathcarron, to which I have put my name. The amendment strenuously argues that the Bill needs to make it explicit that expressing opinions about any registered HE provider, including opinions on its “curriculum, governance, affiliations”, “teaching” and so on, will be protected by the Bill. Specifically, I want to look at a new challenge to academic freedom in relation to institutional values.

I do not know whether noble Lords saw a remarkable interview over the weekend with a couple of women, Carole Sherwood and Amy Gallagher from the Tavistock clinic. For once, this is not in relation to the gender issue and the Tavistock. One of the women had refused to accept as fact a critical race theory definition of racism as white privilege. Remarkably, the people who were teaching her in front of classes said that she would be denied her psychotherapy qualification because her views were not in line with the Tavistock’s values.

This is becoming a clearer problem that we face, because universities, or their HR and management, are signing up to third-party bodies, which then sign the universities up to values and priorities that might well be at odds with the views of academic staff. Obviously, the infamous example is Stonewall’s diversity champions scheme, but more recently it has come to light that Advance HE’s race equality charter is having the same impact. That charges universities a fee to provide advice and training to audit the university’s anti-racism strategies, themselves formulated around Advance HE’s guidance—you can get bronze and silver certificates and so on along the way. Advance HE encourages universities to highlight their race equality scores in their marketing. Arif Ahmed, lecturer at Cambridge, who has been quoted a lot today, thinks that the charter encourages what he says is virtue signalling competition between universities. I give credit to Dr Jim Butcher from Canterbury Christ Church University in Kent and the campaign group Don’t Divide Us for bringing this to light.

Obviously, we can assume that 99.9% of students and lecturers consider themselves to be anti-racist. The problem is that regardless, this is a very particular version of what constitutes anti-racism. Advance HE’s training argues that the curriculum has been corrupted by western ways of knowing; that our attitudes are shaped by whiteness. It is a version of critical race theory that says that inequality persists even in the context of formal equal rights. That is fair enough, but when it asks that question it gives some at least contentious answers, such as that unequal treatment is a product of white supremacy.

Of course academics and students should be free to hold any of those views—I am not one of those who think that critical race theory should be banned from the university, especially in the context of being a champion of academic freedom—but the problem is that when universities give CRT explicit institutional backing, that means that any academic who doubts the salience of white privilege theories or disagrees with the demand, for example, to decolonise the curriculum not only is arguing against a body of thought but ends up arguing against their employer, which puts them in a very difficult position. We have to be very clear that one should be able to argue against one’s employer or these theories, and we should not be in a situation where somebody is denied a qualification on the basis of the values of the university, which is imposed from the top down and which one is not allowed to query.

I also want to mention some qualms I have about Amendments 15 and 16, which have not been argued for. They attempt to hem in a definition of academic freedom into areas of expertise and professional responsibilities. In particular, Amendment 16 wants to remove

“and controversial or unpopular opinions”

because, as it says in the notes, they have no roots “based on evidence”. I query that, because it is very important that we have a sense of academic freedom here that is much broader than the narrow confines of one’s academic expertise. Actually, the Government did listen on this: I think they had “professional expertise” in and they have taken it out. I do not want to see it being brought back in.

Afghanistan

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Wednesday 18th August 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is hard to know where to start on an Armageddon of an event, but it is barely surprising. The repeated warnings of a power vacuum, the endless opportunities for Taliban military, social and political position-building, the final optics of the US midnight flit from Bagram and the Afghani leaders jumping ship or switching sides all propelled us to an inevitable outcome. It is pointless for our Foreign Secretary to affect surprise. The speed at which Afghani forces changed sides was amply demonstrated for us in 2001, yet we apparently learned nothing. Afghani leaders failed Afghanistan, but the sudden withdrawal of logistic, contractor and life support were huge failures for the United States and allied forces, although fully understood by all Afghanis, including, of course, the Taliban. Apparently, we have not learned the lessons of Oman about the 30 years that are needed to build an effective army. We have been short-sighted, dim and forgetful.

What now? First, we must fully honour our obligations to those we employed, used and befriended, and we must honour those in the heroic allied forces who died, to whom I too pay my deep respects. Secondly, it is imperative for all allies multilaterally to try to shape events by setting out the conditions for future aid and any possible changes in political status. The Taliban may reject all this, but the alternative is to leave behind a vacuum to be filled by the Chinese, an untrustworthy Pakistan, Russia and Iran, complex as it will be for any of them. Of course, the conditions must cover human rights, not least for women and girls, but given that we are talking about the Taliban and AQ, there is little ground for optimism. Indeed, we will now have paltry intelligence on them on the ground or on any terrorists’ intentions or those of other malign actors. Thousands of AQ terror prisoners have already been released. It would be mad to underestimate probable radicalisation and recruitment everywhere, not just by state actors. As noble Lords have pointed out, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee showed that 95% of UK street heroin comes from Afghanistan via the Taliban, the Northern Alliance, Russian intelligence and Mafia organisations, mainly co-ordinated in Brighton Beach, New York.

The bodywork of global Britain is badly dented, as is the reputation of our closest ally. The US and everywhere else worldwide will understand this, so, please, no more hyperbole about British strategy. We do not have one, and we never did, other than to give uncritical tactical aid to the United States. The integrated review is largely shredded. We need a rigorous appraisal starting with the understanding that not all wisdom resides with the Government of the day. We have been poor students across a number of Governments, not just this one. The Prime Minister today claims foresight. He actually lacked foresight, insight or even good sense. How mad to follow the lunacy of the Trump/Taliban deal surrendering a unilateral withdrawal date in exchange for nothing. How thin is the relationship with President Biden, and how true is the judgment of the noble Lord, Lord Howard, that it may be a defining moment of his presidency. Our defining moment will come only when we grasp that we have pretended omniscience when the reality has been threadbare understanding.

His Royal Highness The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Monday 12th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is a sad honour to speak today in this tribute. Like all noble Lords, I express my deepest condolences to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth and all members of the Royal Family. His Royal Highness Prince Philip is, first and foremost, a loss to Her Majesty and his family. It is a family loss above all.

It is also a huge loss to this nation and the Commonwealth. As a former Commonwealth Minister, I know how deeply he was respected through this unique family of nations. I have no doubt that many of the memories that we are sharing are personal, but they have to be seen in the setting of our collective memory. We have rightly reflected today on his contribution to national and international life, to the forces, to the protection of the natural world, to science, to intellectual life itself and to knowledge itself.

The Duke of Edinburgh’s Award somehow missed me as a teenager, unlike the many hundreds of thousands of my contemporaries who enjoyed so many new experiences. But as a keen climber and mountain walker myself, I was persuaded to take part and to observe from a suitable alpine distance a group of 16 year-olds pick their way across the icy slopes of Mont Blanc in pursuit of their gold badge. Our role was just to keep our distance and keep a weather eye on their progress without being seen. A weather eye is the right description; the weather closed in. The youngsters were fine. Those observing them from about 500 metres higher had eventually to be guided off the mountain. When I described this to His Royal Highness some years later, he found it hilarious and clear evidence that not having been an award holder in my own right had all but sealed my fate on that mountain. Kindly, he then quickly turned to me and said he wanted to know which animals I had seen apart from the humans, who were probably the least interesting.

I hugely admired his interest in higher education. His detailed knowledge of science and technology were directly integrated into his passion for a diverse group of institutions. Whether Cambridge, Edinburgh or London Guildhall, he saw no hierarchy. I recall that at all three he told audiences that the city they should most focus on was Liverpool. It was the hard-working endeavour of Liverpool which he extolled, a lesson for universities in the City of London or the huge historic institutions in Edinburgh and Cambridge.

He was always grounded, a great combination of intellect and practicality. Most of all, it is important to remember his directness, his plain dislike of pomposity and his down-to-earth personality. I do not think you find people who relate to anyone so personally and get such feedback from their warmth unless it is what they experience from the person providing it. That was Prince Philip’s way.

Allow me, if I may, to share one more memory. When President Lula of Brazil made his state visit to the United Kingdom in March 2006, there was the usual carriage parade passing a ceremonial platform in Horse Guards. The welcoming party included Prince Philip, my very good friend Charles Clarke, then the Home Secretary, and me substituting for the ailing Jack Straw on behalf of the FCO. It was bitterly cold, with flurries of icy rain. Charles and I had arrived early and thought we should not wear overcoats, so we left them in the pavilion. Prince Philip arrived really properly dressed, in the warmest coat possible, and asked us, as both of us were shivering uncontrollably, whether we were completely mad. To put it in his words, he said that he thought we were “certifiable”. We all laughed at the absurdity of this, because we were absurd, and he would not let us forget it. Whenever Charles Clarke and I had the honour and the fun of meeting His Royal Highness, he never failed to ask, among many gales of laughter, whether we had recovered yet from the pneumonia and pleurisy we must surely have as a result of our own foolishness.

Fun is not unimportant in leadership, as the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, said. Great leadership—bringing people to and through change, understanding the future, its possibilities and challenges—is so much more effective with humour, energy and straightforward irritation at anything pompous or showy. I respectfully thank him, and I am sure we will all miss him.

Syria: UK Military Action

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, like many others, if I had a vote tonight, it would be unequivocally with the Government. Of course I accept that the decision involves balance and judgment, but I would vote with the Government precisely because I want peace. The remarkable speech by the noble Lord, Lord Hague, essentially made that point. There is much consensus in this House. We agree that we are facing a barbaric force in Daesh. Daesh has murdered huge numbers of Muslims; it is an indiscriminate, vile murderer of individuals and behaves with unbelievable brutality towards women. Daesh is as dangerous on our streets as it is in Paris or Ankara and it exports violent objectives to a small fragment of our population. Our airmen are combatants over Iraq, with the consent of the Iraqi state, and for that reason are a Daesh target in Iraq. So far we cannot attack Daesh’s centre, communications or supply lines, and in effect are further endangering our airmen by that prohibition.

Our response is plainly legal under UN Article 51. Resolution 2249 confirms the point and calls unanimously on members to act to end Daesh. The UN plainly sees this as a just issue. It is extraordinary that those who always prioritised UN decisions and UN authority above all now find it inconvenient to accept the clearest of UN unanimous decisions. Here, tonight, we have no room for ducking and diving. The UN cannot be the subject of cynical manipulation in that way with a parade of excuses for endless delay and complete inaction. We have an obligation to work with our allies, not least to underscore the credible authority of the UN. It would be thoroughly demeaning for this country to turn its back on the UN decision or to place our security in this country in other hands.

Of course I respect the views of others in this debate, but I am confident that the people of the United Kingdom will never settle for a Government who will not act coherently to protect their security. People are not so foolish as to think that this is easy or that no balance of judgment is involved, but their expectation at the end of it is that they will be protected and that that responsibility is overriding. People quite rightly expect a comprehensive approach balancing the need for diplomacy, force and aid—not any one of them, but all three.

Vienna has now generated diplomatic options, but we all know from serious strategic analysis that without the willingness to project power, diplomacy is usually fatally weakened. If we believe in diplomatic effort— and I do—and its value and efficacy, then we need to strike the very best available balance. To do this to achieve the optimum balance, we must surely take the action that is set out in the Motion being debated in the House of Commons. Politics will fail without the projection of force, and force will fail without the diplomacy that is needed to achieve a settlement afterwards. Nothing will work long-term in either regard without aid, and I applaud the noble Lords, Lord Ashdown, Lord Hutton, Lord Williams of Baglan and Lord Owen, for the imagination that they have brought to possible solutions. The task of the allies is to create conditions on the ground in which local alliances can be created and have prospects of success, as we are beginning to see in northern Iraq. We must of course also assist in the work of a fundamentally different and peaceful Islamic narrative.

I support the Government. I hope that the PM will have the grace to withdraw gratuitous comments about people with whom I profoundly disagree. It is unhelpful and will become more unhelpful as time goes by and we want to hold people together. To the leadership of my party, who say that those of us who support the PM will have nowhere to hide, I say: I do not want or need anywhere to hide. There is no joy in advocating military action, but there is no credit in hiding from the conclusion that we must show that we are strong enough in our determination to protect our country.

European Union (Referendum) Bill

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Friday 31st January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I was not passing up the opportunity, I just could not believe that no one else was standing up.

The amendments present some serious options for the House to consider. There is a need for serious parliamentary analysis of the outcome of whatever referendum there may be. Let me set out the argument in these terms. It may be that, after a referendum, it is wholly clear what the people of the United Kingdom wanted—but, even in those circumstances, some things would not be wholly clear because work would still fall to be done.

I am not saying that because I would disrespect a serious majority among a large number of people voting, but just in terms of trying to work out what would need to be done and how we might set about it. The precise terms of the disengagement would need to be thought through and negotiated. Later amendments address this question, but there would need to be a consideration of what the continuing relationship would be as, many people would submit, we would not simply cut ourselves off and that would be the end of the matter; there would be a continuing relationship of some kind, and that would need to be thought through. The terms of the continuing relationship would, I submit, need to cover trade agreements and competition rules—we would not want suddenly to find that the businesses and industries of the United Kingdom were at a massive disadvantage in relation to other nations in competition terms. We would need to look with considerable attention at labour market arrangements—I know that they are among the most highly contentious things, but none the less, it is unavoidable that we would need to analyse them properly.

I will not bore the House with the whole list, but as another example, we would need to look at environmental co-operation and at all the arrangements, which have preoccupied me during parts of my career, for the relationship between higher education institutions, the movement of scholars, what we regard as comparable qualifications and so on. In all those cases, and in many other issues, we would need to consider timing. Their timing might not be identical. There would need to be a serious analysis. Parliament will have a major role in that analysis at every phase.

I made the point a few moments ago that in the case of a big majority and a very good turnout, we might be able to say that we were at least wholly clear. In those circumstances, there is what I described last Friday as an expression of the settled will. Even that has its complexities, which are also addressed in amendments. The settled will of people in Scotland or people in Wales about the EU is a significant issue, because we have already devolved a considerable amount of political authority, and I think that the people to whom that political authority has moved will want to feel that they have an objective view of what is happening and what their interests might be. So even that expression of settled will has ramifications.

However, the result may not be of that kind. Personally, I do not believe that it will be. I would like to believe that the people of the United Kingdom would wish to remain in the European Union, but let us suppose for a moment that they decided by a very marginal result, on a very small turnout, that there was a wish to leave. I completely accept that that would be a result of sorts, but just think of the set of negotiations which we would need to conduct. Those negotiations would be considerably complicated by being conducted in circumstances where there was a marginal result on a low turnout. All the counterparties in the negotiation would understand that it was a weak decision which, in that sense, would reflect that at that moment we had become a weak nation. I cannot believe that counterparties in the modern world would not take advantage of those circumstances. Those are real politics in what could be a real set of circumstances.

I have heard it said in the House that we resolve issues at general elections on simple majorities. However, this is not like a general election, where people are being voted for in a single constituency. It is not one-650th of the variance at stake; it is much more profound than that. Neither will it be changed five years further on by another election or, in an even shorter period, by a by-election. It is essentially an indelible decision and, for all those reasons, it does not have the potential to be corrected—certainly not in the short or the middle term.

I do not believe that the appeal to other kinds of votes which we have had on other matters is really a direct comparison either. The weight of this decision is quite different from that about whether someone wants to have a mayor in Tyneside, for example. That is no comment on Tyneside or its relative importance; it could be a mayor anywhere else. It is simply a different decision, and when people have said, “Well, what about all those decisions?”, I cannot believe that they would transform our constitution in so fundamental a way on the basis of those kinds of decisions setting the precedents. The length of time for which the decision would hold, as I said, would be of profound significance.

I would argue that the issues at stake are quite different. This set of decisions will be fundamental to our economy, now and in the future. The decisions will be fundamental to our relations in economic terms with North America, China, the BRIC states and the MINT states, whatever difficulties some of those states may be facing, probably temporarily. When we start thinking about the character of the economic relations that we would want with them, we will have a totally different game plan in any negotiation with them, depending on whether we are doing it within Europe or trying to do it without the rest of Europe. It is fundamental to our economy, and to political and international relations.

I ask the House to reflect on what has happened in the past weeks over Iran, the possible consequences—they are not certain by any means; it is still highly problematic—for Syria and Iraq, and the broader settlement of the Middle East conflict. The role of my noble friend Lady Ashton has been commented on, quite rightly, in this House and at some length. I believe that everybody in your Lordships’ House understands that the power and authority which she exhibited in that role was because she was speaking for a bloc of real international importance, and that she could not have achieved that result, whatever her talents, in any other way. That is a Britain operating properly in an international context to produce profound international results which may be a route—as I earnestly pray that they will be—towards a peace which has been so elusive.

Our impact, even with a permanent seat on the Security Council, is not of the same order. We are relatively small and no longer quite a power in the old sense. I believe that if we took the wrong decision, it would not be long before the argument about whether we should retain that permanent seat rose to the top of the agenda again. If I was in one of the countries that might be affected, I can tell your Lordships that it would be high on my agenda because I would know that I was speaking from strength to people who would speak only from weakness.

The reason I put all these points to the House is that my view is that the decision has to be very clear, and it is inevitable that Parliament will have to review and decide in terms of the realities on the ground. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, made the point last Friday about how people would have to deal with the realities. We already know that the decision taken in a referendum would be advisory. That has certainly given weight to the decision but it still means that there is much to do, and it will have to be done by both Houses.

[Lord Cormack]

The noble Lord has made a number of constructive and sensible speeches from the Dispatch Box. Is he speaking on behalf of the Official Opposition? If that is the case, why on earth were these points not put with such cogent lucidity in another place by those who speak for his party on these issues?

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I am speaking for myself in this House. This is a Private Member’s Bill and all I can do is to urge the House on the basis of my experience of foreign affairs. As I think I said last week to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, the decisions taken at the other end will always be decisions with which I shall not even try to interfere, knowing the way that that would be responded to. I will try to tie this up quickly. I understand why the noble Lord makes his point but I think that everyone will know that, whether sitting on government Benches or on these Benches, I have essentially argued in this way the whole of the time that I have been in your Lordships’ House. I am making these points because I think that they are the right points to make.

If the result is a narrow one on a low turnout, the terms of disengagement will appear to Parliament to be potentially quite dangerous—or very dangerous—for the United Kingdom both in economics and politics, as I have said. In those circumstances, to decide to go ahead regardless—to recognise that it is an oncoming car crash and to do nothing about that—is hardly what the people of the United Kingdom will expect of their Parliament. Few will regard it in the decades that follow as having been a heroic moment. The bell-wether moments in geopolitics are probably not all that many but I suspect that, rather like the comment that this might be the most profound decision in 60 years, if we get it wrong in terms of geopolitics it may well rank with Suez and one or two other things which have been real disasters for us internationally.

Parliament is the best judge of this. It is sensible to say that the weight of the vote will show itself either to be compelling or not, and will show whether there is a settled will. Taking the right steps to be negotiated and assessed will be a matter for Parliament. It is not in any sense disrespectful to the people of the United Kingdom for their Parliament to give coherent thought to the real circumstances—what in some circles are called the ground truths.

The only objection to this is not to do with democracy or following democratic practice. The objection is that it would get in the way of a rush to exit the EU. That is why the Bill is in the form that it is and it is reckless—a word that was used earlier in the debate. It may be that Mr Cameron does not intend this to be the outcome, but it may also be that he can no longer manage the wish of much of his party to leave the EU.

Some may have reached that decision because they have a paralysed fear of UKIP and no desire to take on UKIP and its arguments. That would be a pity. However, I suspect that many simply want to leave the EU and that is all there is to it. They are entitled to that view but this House and the other place—Parliament as a whole—are entitled to ensure that we get the whole of this right, so that we know that the will of the people of the United Kingdom is a serious expression, not a marginal one leaving us with little to say in anything that follows.

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[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I am sorry that I missed the opening remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. His brevity in speaking today is no doubt recognised by all across the Chamber. Any accusations that he could be filibustering would be absolute nonsense. However, the question raised about Gibraltar is slightly different. I understand the position that my noble friend Lord Anderson comes from, but the main thrust of my support for the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Foulkes—and my amendment, Amendment 67 —is the need to ensure that the people of Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and England know exactly where they stand on this matter.

As I indicated before in a more general debate, if there is no publication of the results for each nation, there will be speculation—and speculation could be much more damaging than facing up to the reality of whatever the result may be. I believe that, because of the importance of the economic question, to which I referred earlier, there will be a yes vote in Wales—but whatever the outcome, the people of Wales and, indeed, the people of Scotland, Northern Ireland and England, have a right to know where they stand. The overall result will no doubt be taken on a United Kingdom basis and would be the aggregation of those votes, but at least people would know where they stood, and for that reason, I support the amendment.

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, this is a fair enough amendment. Were we to have been conducting this debate 25 or 30 years ago, I suspect that everybody would have thought it wholly appropriate to take the temperature of the nation as a whole, because we would not have seen the degree of change within the United Kingdom and the extent of devolution. Of course, it will still be useful to have a United Kingdom-wide picture at the end of a referendum, and it is essential that there should be—but on its own, that will not do now.

Twenty-five years on, the home nations of the United Kingdom are sufficiently and significantly distinct. People see themselves as having very distinct interests. Some of them are to do with the individual nations and some are to do with the character of the relationship that those nations have with Europe. There are distinct issues about the development of social policy, economic interests and the trajectories of economic interests. It is not just that those factors have emerged in the overall politics of the United Kingdom, but that the experience has some depth. There is real depth of experience. It is not just a constitutional formality that these things have taken place; it represents very real experience, which people generally treasure.

As with all the issues in front of your Lordships in these debates, it is very helpful to look at this from all angles. Were there to be a vote to leave—and I have said in the House before that I profoundly hope, as many others do, that there will not be—especially if it were a narrow vote, and a strong belief persisted in Scotland and/or Wales that their electorates did not want to leave, that would create stresses within the United Kingdom that unquestionably would push those home nations towards still greater devolution or full independence. If we did it as a single country, it is likely to promote the belief that the results in effect hide the way in which people in Scotland and Wales would prefer to conduct their relationship with Europe, and the fact that they wish to do so in a way that is significantly different from the approach of England. Knowing all that, there is a very good case for believing that it would put energy into further separation.

If there is an overall vote, and if people know what the votes are in each of the home nations, that does not necessarily mean that people will say, “Actually, on our own, we might very well have chosen to leave”—but there would never be an allegation that they were caught by the fact that the vote was hidden or that there was something unreasonable, unfair or deceptive about it. That argument about process is potentially the one that is most damaging, because it can never be properly addressed. It is much better to have the votes clearly and in the open.

Noble Lords will have noted that I have not mentioned Northern Ireland in this debate, not because I do not think that there would be an interest in Northern Ireland but because I do not detect, broadly speaking, among the majority of the population of Northern Ireland, a desire to move to a still greater distance from the rest of the United Kingdom. There are always nuances in the United Kingdom and in Northern Ireland as a whole.

I express my support for the points that my noble friend Lord Anderson made about Gibraltar. It was certainly my experience when in the Foreign Office that the European Union mitigates—though not always successfully, it has to be said—the character and intensity of some of the disagreements that occur with Spain. Even when other members of the EU are supportive of Spain, it none the less damps down the intensity of the discussion. Of course, Gibraltar sometimes criticises the EU, but it is without question that Gibraltar would prefer to have the armoury of the United Kingdom around it in the discussions of those issues than to have to face them on its own. For those reasons, it is particularly helpful that my noble friend made those points.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, one of the other things that we want to seek in a referendum would be transparency, as the Electoral Commission recommends. Of course, in general elections, the public know precisely how people have voted in different parts of the country because of the constituency system. So you can tell how many people are returned from which party from the respective countries of the United Kingdom, and it is very clear. In that sense, I am rather tempted by the amendment, which would allow that level of transparency to come in, not as finely defined as that but broadly, for us to be able to tell where opinions lie in one direction or the other. It would help us to reflect on what to do next and how we might best reflect the opinions of those constituent parts of the United Kingdom, depending on the outcome of the referendum, along the lines of the amendment that we have just agreed.

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[Lord Teverson]

My Lords, I should state that I have dual Irish and British nationality. I am putting forward an argument. I do not think there is a perfect answer to this, but I would exclude purely Irish citizens under this definition. In fact, you could argue very strongly that the Republic of Ireland would be by far the most affected other EU member state and therefore perhaps you should include all Irish citizens. I do not think one could sustain that. I just want to make the point that as Britain we need to make up our mind on this area, and we need to be responsible for our decision. I do not think the argument is total, so I put forward a potential opposite view. I take a great interest in this small debate, but I do not think it is quite as straightforward as noble Lords who have spoken so far have said.

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I have been very concerned to understand how the conduct of the debate in the course of a referendum could be most useful. Noble Lords will recall that we debated parliamentary constituency boundaries at great length; it was argued that they work for parliamentary elections despite the fact that the homogeneity of almost any of the constituencies was significantly disrupted. Some of them were essentially very artificial; they were no longer built around any kind of core principle but were to meet a numerical target, which I did not agree with but I fully understood.

I make that point because, by and large, local authorities are not constructed that way. Some of the very large ones may be, but a very significant number are constructed around entities where you can see the degree of homogeneity of the economic system that applies in that part of the country. That seems to me to be very important, because I believe that one of the telling debates during any referendum would be on the balance of economic interests for us as a community. Do we see a future? Will our kids continue to want to live here? Will the economic community be capable of sustaining the sorts of schools and kinds of medical provision that we want? All those will be live issues. It is no accident that chambers of commerce and a great many other economic entities in all those communities are organised with that kind of boundary in mind. That is where many of these most telling debates will take place—they will not take place on the grounds of constituencies.

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[Lord Cormack]

I express the hope that it is not as a result of our friendly exchange this morning that the noble Lord is now speaking from the Back Benches.

[Lord Triesman]

I promise that I shall be even closer to the noble Lord later.

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, this debate has raised another set of issues that need to be properly and thoroughly addressed before we put arrangements in place for any kind of referendum on our future in the European Union. On this side of the House, Members would be very sympathetic to the principle that my noble friend Lord Kinnock set out that we should have the broadest possible vote on this fundamental issue. I know the sort of arguments that some people might make against this. One is that that it would set a precedent for voting in general elections and local elections, but I do not think that it would. An EU referendum is fundamentally different; it is certainly not a vote for a councillor, an MP or a Government. It is a vote not for eternity, perhaps, but for generations ahead. The Prime Minister’s phrase about “no return ticket” comes to mind. It is a different type of vote from any other that we are likely to have in this country in the near future, and therefore needs to be considered differently.

There is a second, more low-level political point. Even now, with the debate that we have had, I am sure that we run the risk of seeing some headline in the Daily Mail that says, “Peers demand the vote for foreigners in British EU referendum”. I can well imagine that being the headline—and I see that the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, thoroughly agrees with that proposition and thinks that such a headline would be right.

The question of EU citizens living in this country and of British citizens living in the EU has to be treated in the same breath. It is basically an issue about the people who have shaped their lives around the fact that we are members of the European Union. This referendum proposes to put at serious risk the rights to live, work, study, retire, marry, partner and do whatever else you want, which are enormous enhancers of human freedom. Let the UKIP people say how they would deal with these rights. As a simple matter of the rights of these citizens—both EU citizens here and UK citizens in the rest of the EU—this matter deserves the greatest consideration.