Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Wednesday 27th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

I say to the noble and learned Baroness that if that non-transparent process that she describes, which sounds like the old game of clubbing together to fix it all up, is indeed accurate, there should be no reason for the amendment. In that case, if it is all so chummy, why not have the Lord Chancellor sit on the panel?

The power to veto seems to contradict Section 3(6)(a) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which places a statutory duty on the Lord Chancellor to defend the independence of the judiciary. Not for the first time, one part of an Act—the duty to defend the independence of the judiciary—sits uneasily with the process as defined. Moreover, the process requires the Lord Chancellor to put his reasons in writing. I have already commented on that. It would be far better in increasing transparency and enhancing accountability for the Lord Chancellor to be a member of the selection commission —listening, participating and evaluating the candidate being questioned, without a veto over the appointment—than, after the fact, disagreeing with the selection commission.

In conclusion, I touch on the point made that either a very powerful Lord Chancellor would sit on the commission panel and influence it to go in the direction that he wanted; or, if the Government got their way, that the Lord Chancellor, having sat on the selection panel, could not persuade the panel of his views on an individual candidate and would be deeply dissatisfied because he did not carry the selection panel with him.

I argue that his potential for dissatisfaction would be greater if he had not exercised the veto and was therefore stuck with someone he found it difficult to work with. In fact, it could be said that he would take greater responsibility for working with a candidate with whom he did not entirely agree if he were on the selection panel and had been overruled. He would have been part of the decision-making, he would have been there and heard the argument why the majority of the commission wanted to go in a certain direction and would therefore have to suck it and see. On that basis, I have a lot of sympathy with the Government on the amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, going back some 25 years, I remember being warned in 1987: “You realise, don’t you, that Mrs Thatcher has never appointed anybody as a High Court judge who has been overtly political?”. I was about to stand for the 1987 election. I stood; I lost for the eighth time; but that did not dissuade me. My point is that then, how the system worked was completely opaque. You did not know what recommendations were being made. You did not know when you had scored a black mark. I recall a close colleague once seeing his file in the Lord Chancellor’s Department, which said in terms that he had fought and lost eight elections as a Liberal candidate—he was so close a colleague that he had been mixed up with me. I am sure that that held him back for a long time from obtaining the appointment that he ultimately did.

I was slightly shocked to hear that we still have a non-transparent system whereby the Lord Chancellor is consulted and becomes involved in the appointment of judges, although there is nothing formal about it. I did not know that. It is opaque. The Bill makes it absolutely transparent that the Lord Chancellor will play a part, and I think it is very good that he should. He should listen to other people who are high in the profession and to what a lay person thinks of a particular appointment. His view may change. I do not think that the Lord Chancellor would necessarily dominate such a selection committee, certainly not if he has a political angle. There may be a toing and froing of views within that committee but we will know that it is happening because he is on it. Consequently it will be a far more satisfactory system than what we have heard is happening now: the Lord Chancellor, without it being in any statute, is involved in some way. That is wrong and I think that the Bill is preferable.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I was rather appalled by the mischaracterisation by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, of what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said. My experience as Lord Chancellor, when not making the appointments, was that I remained regularly in touch with the judiciary. If I had not remained regularly in touch with the judiciary on issues such as the funding of courts and the difficulties that the judges were facing, I would have regarded myself as not performing my job as Lord Chancellor correctly. If you are a Lord Chancellor—or now, Secretary of State for Justice—who does not know the leadership of the judiciary, that would be a very bad thing. Indeed this idea expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford—that it is in some way a sort of secret-sounding basis—is wrong. I am sure that his misunderstanding was not deliberate. He was looking back to a time 20 years ago when he was looking for a position.

This side of the Committee supports the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. We earnestly ask the Government to think again about this provision. Perhaps I may explain why we take that view. The basis of the settlement reached and approved in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 was that the time had come for the appointment of judges to be clearly depoliticised. The justification for the process that then existed was that although the Lord Chancellor was Labour or Tory and appointed by the Prime Minister, he nevertheless had especial independent roles that made it possible for a political appointment to appoint the judiciary.

We in the then Government took the view, supported by the Liberal Democrats and endorsed by both Houses of Parliament, that in a period of time and a generation where people had to have complete confidence that the judiciary was not being appointed on a political basis, there needed to be a structure in which people would have confidence that you were appointed on your merits as a respected judge. That was the basis of the constitutional settlement reached. Those who considered it in detail were of the view—and I agreed with this view—that the state, the Executive, had to have a stake in the appointment of judges so that there was part of the Executive in Parliament that would defend the system and defend the appointments. That is why the Lord Chancellor has the power to veto some appointments and to reject others.

It is incredibly important for the standing of the judiciary and the separation of powers that that essential separation—that essential constitutional settlement—not be affected. The proposal made by the coalition goes right to the heart of that constitutional settlement. Bringing the Secretary of State into the process would not even have the redeeming feature of the old-style Lord Chancellors, which is that they had an independent role as a judge as well as being a politically appointed Minister. What Ken Clarke said about his role—my noble friend Lady Jay has quoted it—exactly reflects what the constitutional settlement envisaged; namely that he should be a member of the Cabinet with a particular statutory duty as imposed in Section 1, but essentially a political Minister without anything else to distinguish him from other Ministers in the Government. The two roles that we are talking about here are the president of the Supreme Court and the Lord Chief Justice. The president of the Supreme Court is probably the most important judge for the whole of the United Kingdom. The Lord Chief Justice is undoubtedly the most important judge for England and Wales.

The proposal envisages that the commission appointing the president of the Supreme Court should consist of one person who is not legally qualified, one judge of the court, one member of the Judicial Appointments Commission for England and Wales, one for Scotland and one from Northern Ireland, and, if he chooses, the Lord Chancellor. I know Ken Clarke well and admire him greatly. I have absolutely no doubt that, in a group such as that, he would have no difficulty in ensuring that his choice was obtained. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, is shaking his head, but I tell noble Lords that Ken Clarke’s choice would prevail. It would not just be a matter of appearance; it would be a matter of actuality. Go forward in time and imagine someone not of the ethical quality and standard of Ken Clarke as Lord Chancellor. For example, there is the example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws: “I don’t want the best lawyer; I want the person who is most against the Human Rights Act”. That is a perfectly conceivable position for a Lord Chancellor to take.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I think that there is a misunderstanding here. As I understand it, the noble Baroness is saying that when the veto is used it is kept secret. It is not, so there is no question of gossip. The Lord Chancellor is willing to use that veto where appropriate. I have no problem with that and it does not cause difficulty. In the proposed system, there would be no transparency about the role that the political Minister had played; indeed, it would be assumed that he or she was the person who had dominated the process. It would profoundly undermine the settlement. At the moment, I can see no benefit from it. I have not had the pleasure and privilege of reading the letter that was sent to the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. I have heard the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, which was very persuasive in many respects. However, I am unable at the moment to see the basis for departing from a constitutional settlement that is intended to ensure the sanctity of the process. It is an independent process in which one is judged on one’s merits, and it keeps politics out of it except for the exercise of a transparent veto.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Would the noble and learned Lord not agree that it was not the best moment in the appointment of the judiciary, and that it does appear that political influences were coming into the question of who was to be appointed? Would it not have been better for the difficulties and the problems between the Lord Chancellor and the appointments commission to have been sorted out in a committee, such as that proposed in this Bill?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Game, set and match to this side. As I understand it, the noble Lord is asking whether it is so wrong that people might think that political influences have been brought to bear on the appointment, because the Lord Chancellor, performing a constitutional role, says explicitly “I don’t want”, or “I am thinking of vetoing”, the choice that has been made on legal merits. As I understand it, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, are saying, “Let’s keep all the political influences secret”. The noble Lord is shaking his head; I am not sure what he has in mind.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am not saying that. I am saying that had the Lord Chancellor been able to discuss in a committee—such as that is proposed—the merits of the particular candidate, we would not have had something which did not do the judiciary any good.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

If the Lord Chancellor said “I want this candidate” and persuaded everybody, none of that would have been apparent. People would doubt the independence of the appointment from the political situation, or the political influences on the position. Do not be under any illusion; if the Lord Chancellor proceeds with this proposal, those people who have had dealings with the constitutional settlement will think that he is, without properly understanding it, going against the basis of the constitutional settlement which the noble Lord, Lord McNally, worked so hard to get through. As he said on Monday, the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, was one of the main Liberal Democrat architects of the constitutional settlement, as was, as he also acknowledged on Monday, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. What on earth is the reason for so undermining the political independence of the judiciary?

For these reasons we support the amendments that are being made. If, as I think is unlikely, they are put to the vote today, we will support them. I earnestly ask that the Minister reconsiders the Government’s position on this, and the Lord Chief Justice’s position. It would be a really bad idea if people thought that a Conservative or Labour Secretary of State for Justice, not the Lord Chancellor, had appointed the Lord Chief Justice and the president of the Supreme Court.

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[Lord McNally]

Try me. I think that the issues that have been raised are such that it would be better to have another run at them on Report.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, before the Committee sat I informed the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that I was fairly relaxed and neutral about his amendment. However, the more I have listened to the argument, the more I have come down on the Government’s side. I recall the very unseemly row when the former Lord Chancellor’s veto was exercised in relation to an appointment, and I believe that I put down a Parliamentary Question. I think that he reversed his decision before I got the Answer, but I certainly tabled a Question about it. There was a furore at the Bar and I was approached by many people to do what I could to defend the reputation of a person who was considered to be the best judge in a particular division. It was extremely unseemly and the Lord Chancellor backed down. What did that say? He had given his veto and then he withdrew it and the appointment went ahead. All these matters should have been sorted out but not in such a public way as to damage the reputation of the person concerned and damage the reputation of the Lord Chancellor, if it needed to be damaged any further. It did not resolve the situation.

I have heard the debate and, as I understand it, the Lord Chancellor does have discussions behind the scenes with the Appointments Commission. That is what was said in terms by the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. I do not think that that is right. I think we should have an open system. She said that it was open and transparent. It was not—I did not know about it, although I was sufficiently involved to put down a Parliamentary Question about the matter in issue.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

How would the discussions between the Lord Chancellor and the other members of the committee that the noble Lord envisages be transparent?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The fact that it is happening is transparent. That is where the argument can be held and not in public, which damages people’s reputations. The noble Lord said that the Lord Chancellor will always have his way. What sort of a pushover does he think these people in the commission are that they will simply bow down to a political figure? I do not believe that the chairs of the Judicial Appointments Commission in Northern Ireland, Scotland, England and Wales are going to follow a political lead because the Lord Chancellor does not like someone on political grounds. He may have some knowledge that does not involve the politics of the matter and that would persuade the other members of the commission, but I do not think that he would persuade them on political grounds, which is what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said. He nods. Perhaps he was a very persuasive Lord Chancellor in private.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Under the new system, I would have the power. That is the point.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

He had the veto, although I do not think that he ever exercised it.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I never exercised the veto, although my successor considered it and everything was open.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Why did he exercise it? We do not know. Did he say so at the time? He did not say, “For political reasons I do not want that person as the head of the division”. He did not give us his reasons. It was not discussed with anybody. He just vetoed that appointment and it was unfairly damaging to the person concerned.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the Minister, who says that he has been listening. I am sure that he has been, and I have listened to what he has said. I will certainly want to reflect, as I am sure the House will, on what the Minister described as a very important debate—and he is right. This goes to the heart of the relationship between the Executive and the judiciary. The Minister said that it is important to keep the Lord Chancellor in the process because the Lord Chancellor is responsible to Parliament and these are appointments at the very apex of the system. The Minister is right and no one disputes that the Lord Chancellor must have a role. The question is whether that role is best fulfilled as a member of the appointments commission.

The Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, emphasised that the veto is a nuclear option. There are two points to make about the Lord Chancellor’s existing powers. First, the fact that the veto is so difficult to exercise in political terms is highly material to the influence that the Lord Chancellor currently has. We need to be very careful about expanding the political role of the Lord Chancellor, or at least the political potential for involvement, through an appointments commission process. The second point, which has been made very forcefully by noble Lords who know how the system works, is that the Lord Chancellor at present does not just have a veto which is difficult to exercise. He can and does make his views known to the appointments commission during the process of consideration for appointment to these posts. There is nothing improper or secret about that. It is not a question of nudges and winks. It is called consultation. Plainly, the Lord Chancellor is entitled to be consulted by the special appointments commission that is going to appoint to these highly important posts. If the current system has defects, the alternative proposed by the Government is far worse, for all the reasons that have been pointed out, and no more transparent.

I will certainly reflect on this debate and I am sure the whole House will want to reflect on the matter and return to it on Report. I hope that the Government will reconsider this question over the summer and I am sure that if, as we have been told today for the first time, it is the Government’s intention that the Lord Chancellor will sit on the appointments commission, it is highly desirable that the Bill expressly makes that clear so that we all know what the Government intend on this matter of fundamental constitutional concern. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.

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[Baroness Bottomley of Nettlestone]

This has been a most exhilarating debate. I hope that the Minister will be able to use this experience to talk to other colleagues in government about why, for example, a non-executive director on a board has to have annual re-election once over 70. Recently, an Oxbridge college appointed a principal who is 72 and the articles of association had to be changed. I declare an interest because the late Lord Bingham’s son is the best person who works for me in my professional activity so I am, of course, brainwashed in this regard. I never thought of the Lords as pioneers of radical equality measures but I feel that this debate has great potential for professional groups across the economy and society, and certainly across government.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I support the amendment for all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, gave. However, I would suggest an alternative. If we are not going to go to 75, the alternative is to appoint judges to the Supreme Court who have not gone through the processes of the High Court, the Court of Appeal and so on. We have the power now, apparently, to appoint people to the Supreme Court who have not been in the Court of Appeal. It was interesting that, on Monday, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, said, “Of course, members of the Supreme Court will have come from the Court of Appeal”. I do not think that that is necessary. I think that the pool should be broadened. There are people in academic life and lawyers at the Bar who would be appropriate as members of the Supreme Court. The age of 70 is ridiculously low. If it is to stay at that, people should be appointed in their 50s—early 50s perhaps—to the Supreme Court without having to go through the cursus honorum required at present.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, I strongly support the amendment for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. It is an important amendment on a matter that is already causing difficulty. The loss of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Collins, from the Supreme Court was a direct result of the reduction in the retiring age. The Government now have an opportunity to do something about that, because this is a legislative opportunity.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 25th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Perhaps I may be permitted to intervene on this matter. The lifestyle of a High Court judge is of course very different from that of a circuit judge. High Court judges sit half the time in London and half the time on circuit. Circuit judges do what they are entitled to do; they sit on circuit. Looking after a family is far easier if you are a circuit judge than if you are a High Court judge.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I will not intervene on his intervention, but the noble Lord is wrong.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Wednesday 25th April 2012 Lords Chamber

I hope the Minister will be good enough to provide us with the Government’s computation of the predicted additional costs to public expenditure of the incorporation of the amendment in the legislation, and make some observations on the appropriateness of the claim by the Minister in the other place at the outset, as his leading argument, that the amendment would impinge on the financial privilege of the House of Commons. None of us here contests the principle of financial privilege, but equally there is no obligation on Governments to claim financial privilege in relation to particular amendments. It seems very surprising that an amendment that demonstrably has no implications for public expenditure should have been subject to such a claim, and—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords—

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

If I may be allowed to finish my sentence, I would be grateful if the Minister would be willing to help us understand why the Government felt it appropriate to make that claim. As I have now finished my sentence, it is with pleasure that I give way to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The noble Lord suggested that the Liberal Democrats have changed their tune. The noble Lord will recall that in Committee, on Report and on Monday I said that this amendment meant nothing and added nothing to the Bill. I was supported by my noble friend Lord Lester, who said it was just water.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

That may be the view of the noble Lord and his noble friend. It is not the view of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and those of us who supported him on two occasions in inviting the other place to think again about this matter.

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[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I also welcome the Government’s shift on this matter. I am sure it is one that will give the noble Lord, Lord McNally, considerable satisfaction, given the family dimension and his understanding of this condition. It will, I hope, be of considerable benefit to many thousands of sufferers and their families. I join in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Alton. I am aware of his campaigning ability from many years in another place. We campaigned sometimes together and sometimes on opposite sides. When one was on the opposite side, my goodness, one knew one had a contender to deal with. The diligence that he and other colleagues across parties have applied to this issue will be of considerable satisfaction to the groups of campaigners who represent sufferers and their families.

I want to raise a couple of points with the Minister. I note with interest that the definition of diffuse mesothelioma used here is the one that was incorporated in the Pneumoconiosis etc. (Workers’ Compensation) Act 1979. Another dimension of what he mentioned a moment ago is the fact that there are still people who cannot trace their employers or pinpoint which employer was responsible at the time at which the disease may have developed. That is the case for a number of diseases. The 1979 Act, as noble Lords will remember, arose largely from the position of slate quarriers, but many other workers were affected in the cotton and pottery industries and some in the steel industry.

I am not going to reopen the debate that we lost the other night. We lost that one, and so be it, but there will be some cases in which there is suffering that is not covered by any other provision. When the review is undertaken, I hope that some consideration can be given to whether there are other cases of industrial workers who have suffered loss of health, and in many cases loss of life, and do not have an avenue through which to get compensation. If they do get compensation, they should not have that compensation unreasonably eroded. I hope that can be taken on board by the DWP. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Freud, the Minister in the DWP who may be handling this, also has a good understanding of the suffering that arises from these conditions, so hopefully we can make progress.

Finally, this may be a lesson for us in this House to try and try again. We could have abandoned this the other night without insisting on the amendment that we put through to the other place. We did not and that is what enabled progress to be made on this occasion. There may be other instances when we need to be equally tenacious and determined in order to make sure that the other place gives adequate attention to a subject and that progress such as this can be made.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I add my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, on all the very hard work that he has put into this matter. I also pay tribute to the work of the Greater Manchester Asbestos Victims Support Group, in particular to Tony Whitston, who has lobbied so hard on behalf of victims; and there are other support groups, such as the Merseyside support group, which have lobbied just as hard.

I argued on Monday that success fees ought not to be claimed by solicitors in this type of case. I was pleased to hear the Minister in another place, Mr Djanogly, say yesterday:

“this is not an issue of causation. I heard Lord Thomas speak in the other place yesterday, and I very much agree with what he had to say, which was essentially that in cases in which causation is not an issue, there is—in many respects—no reason why solicitors should have a success fee for that type of work”.—[Official Report, Commons, 24/4/12; col. 831.]

I was strongly supported on Monday by my noble friend Lord Faulks, and I am grateful to him for the concern that he has shown on this issue. An objection was made by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, that it was impossible to guarantee that solicitors would not charge a success fee against their clients’ damages.

I interjected that if public opinion saw it as an abuse, no doubt the Lord Chancellor would step in to deal with it by way of regulation. There is another way in which this issue could be approached. I suggest to Mr Whitston, his excellent organisation and other similar support groups that he should draw up a list of solicitors who have indicated to him that they would not charge a success fee when, ultimately, the new regime for CFAs is introduced for mesothelioma sufferers. The support group could receive applications from solicitors to be put on an approved list and satisfy itself that firms that are accessible to victims in those industrial parts of the country where the disease is most prevalent—shall we say Newcastle, Leeds, Manchester, Birmingham, Bristol and, of course, the industrial areas of north and south Wales?—are geared up and competent in this area of work. Sufferers from mesothelioma turn to the support groups, and if they had a list of solicitors who had undertaken not to charge success fees against the damages they receive and who they are satisfied are competent, that would be a great way forward.

[Lord Wigley]

I follow the point that the noble Lord made the other night; I well understand it and have some sympathy with it. Clearly, if the sort of provision he is suggesting were to be made, it would be very helpful. Does he feel that it should be limited to mesothelioma, because there are many other cases of compensation in which it is equally unreasonable that there should be a deduction of up to 25 per cent from the compensation?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The noble Lord will recall that on Report, I referred not only to cases of mesothelioma that Mr Tony Whitston drew to our attention from the Brymbo steelworks in Wrexham but to cases of pneumoconiosis that I have known. He is a slate quarry person; I come from a colliery area and I know of the long-term suffering of those victims. With mesothelioma, that could be done now and could be extended to other diseases in due course.

The support groups would be uniquely placed to monitor the service that such firms gave to mesothelioma sufferers, who could report back on their experiences to both the support groups and their successors. That is the answer to those who say that solicitors will not do this work at all unless they are cosseted by success fees. It spreads the work around the country to areas that are particularly concerned with this disease, where experience could be built up by firms of solicitors. It may discourage any idea of focusing litigation of this type in the City of London branch offices of firms that then claim to be paid at City of London rates. Anecdotal evidence suggests that that happens in some CFA cases.

As my noble friend Lord Faulks said on Monday, there are lawyers who are dedicated to achieving the best result for their clients and not so much for their fees. I have no doubt that they would flock to be placed on an approved list and forbear charging a success fee at all. I hope that such an approach will appeal to the Minister, the Lord Chancellor and the Ministry of Justice.

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, I begin by congratulating the Minister on being a member of the luckiest Government there can ever have been in the history of Parliament. The odds against drawing three votes on crucial amendments, two on Report and one at this stage of proceedings so that the Government win the vote, as it were, must be immense. He has managed to do that and I congratulate him on it. I just hope for his sake and the Government’s that their luck does not begin to run out.

On this issue, the Minister also deserves some congratulation if, as I suspect he did, he played a part in persuading his fellow Ministers, and the right honourable and learned gentleman the Lord Chancellor, that there had to be some give or concession. If he played a part in that, I congratulate him and think that he has served the House well in that regard.

I, too, want to compliment those outside the House. As the noble Lord, Lord Alton, stressed, the co-ordinator of the Greater Manchester Asbestos Victims Support Group, Mr Tony Whitston; Mr John Flanagan, the Merseyside equivalent of that organisation; and many others outside have worked incredibly hard to make sure that people who do not always have a very loud voice have had a say in Parliament—or rather in this House of Parliament. It is absolutely clear that when these matters were raised in the House of Commons when this Bill was first taken through, they were completely dismissed. It was only when the Bill came to the House of Lords that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, with his usual courage and zeal, managed to raise these matters, with the help of the noble Lords, Lord Avebury and Lord Wigley. Eventually, at the very last minute, he got a concession from the Government.

I pay tribute, too, not only to those I have mentioned but to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and the Conservatives who abstained in the vote on Monday night. Had they not played the part that they did, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, would not have gone through. I remind the House that it won by nine votes. If it had been lost there would have been no review or concession; there would have just been rejoicing in the Ministry of Justice. It was as close as that. It is because of the bravery of those who were prepared to abstain or vote against their own Government that we are here today congratulating the Government, quite rightly I am sure, on their concession.

Seriously, it is a good concession and we know, or trust, that the review will be genuine. We look forward to playing our part in making sure that the sufferers of this terrible disease get a fair deal when the Government have had their review. Not only the noble Lord, Lord Alton, but all of us will be watching very closely to see how developments move forward in this very vexed field. As for this House, for once it can congratulate itself.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 23rd April 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, as your Lordships have heard, the amendment that noble Lords approved on Report by a majority of 45 votes would state the purpose of legal aid: to promote access to legal services within the financial resources that are made available by the Lord Chancellor and subject to the other provisions in Part 1 of the Bill. The amendment had its origins in a recommendation from your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, and was tabled by noble Lords from all sides of the House—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, the noble Lord, Lord Hart of Chilton, who is also a member of the Constitution Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, from the government Benches and, of course, me.

The amendment echoes the wording of Section 4 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, which is the current statutory provision. It is similar to the statutory provisions that have been found in earlier legislation from 1949 onwards. The other place disagreed with this amendment after a debate that was restricted to 27 minutes—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, a few moments ago. Those 27 minutes to which the other place was restricted concerned not just this amendment but two others approved in this House after Divisions and to which we will come. They concern the very important subjects of the independence of the director of legal aid and the mandatory telephone gateway, which we will discuss later this afternoon. All those subjects had to be dealt with in 27 minutes—hardly the thorough consideration that the Minister suggested in his opening remarks.

The Minister in the other place, Mr Jonathan Djanogly, and the Minister today have made four main points. The first, which was emphasised in the other place but has not been mentioned today, is that financial privilege was applied to the amendment. Your Lordships will know that financial privilege in the other place does not prevent your Lordships asking the other place to think again about an amendment. Financial privilege simply requires that the amendment be varied in this House from the original amendment. That is why the amendment now before this House is not exactly the same as that which was approved on Report.

I do not want to make this a debate about financial privilege but I hope I may be excused for saying that I know that many noble Lords were as surprised as I was that financial privilege was applied to Amendment 1. The original amendment made it very clear that access to legal services would come within the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor and in accordance with the rest of Part 1, and therefore that amendment had no financial implications whatever.

Your Lordships may also be interested to note that when I made these points to the authorities in the other place and I asked for a brief explanation of the reason for financial privilege being attached to this amendment, because neither I nor the others responsible for tabling this amendment could understand the point, I was told that no reasons are given for the decision on financial privilege. Again, I doubt that I am the only noble Lord who finds it very regrettable that this House should be told that financial privilege controversially applies to an amendment but noble Lords are not told why that is so.

However, that is a side-show. In any event, the amendment now before your Lordships responds to financial privilege, and it does so by making it clear beyond any possible doubt that the question of what financial resources to make available is a matter for the discretion of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chancellor alone. That is what the amendment says beyond any question. It also makes it clear that its terms and effect are subject to the provisions of this part—in other words, subject to the restrictions in the Bill on what topics are within the scope of legal aid.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Can the noble Lord explain what this amendment therefore adds to the provisions in the Bill? That is what puzzles me.

[Lord Pannick]

I was coming to that. If the noble Lord will have a little patience, that was the second point made in the other place. My first point, which I just want to complete, is that, with great respect, I do not accept that this amendment has any financial implications whatever.

The second point made by the Minister in the other place was that made just now by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. What is the point of this amendment? The view taken by noble Lords on Report was that now that legal aid is to be confined by this Bill, it is absolutely vital that we retain in the legislation a statement of principle that the purpose of legal aid is to promote access to justice within the available financial resources. That is important for this reason. The Government are proposing to limit legal aid by reason of current financial constraints and Parliament is accepting that. However, we all hope and expect that the economy will improve and, when it does, Clause 9(2) gives the Lord Chancellor a power to modify the substantive provisions of Part 1 to bring matters back within scope. When the economy improves, the case for relaxing the temporary limitations on legal aid should be considered by reference to principle, and the principle is that stated—I hope uncontroversially—in this amendment, which is to Clause 1 of the Bill. It is vital that this principle is not forgotten by reason of the temporary financial constraints under which we are all operating, and I can think of no better way of preserving the principle than setting it out at the beginning of the Bill. I happily give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

But is not the effect of putting this at the beginning of the Bill precisely what the Minister said—that is, it leaves it open to lawyers to bring applications for judicial review and to ask judges to determine whether the financial situation has so improved that the provisions for legal aid should be extended? Is this not just making more work for lawyers?

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I regret that I have to disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf—I very rarely do. However, there is a statement of principle in Clause 1: it is that the Lord Chancellor must secure that legal aid is made available in accordance with this part. That is a very simple, short statement which would cause no judge any difficulty whatever in interpreting the provisions of the Bill. I said in Committee that the amendment then proposed was meaningless and added nothing to the Bill. I say precisely the same of the amendment as redrafted.

The amendment adds nothing, except this. I could be a very devious lawyer, and I might have a case for which I thought some funding was needed. So I might apply to the director of legal aid for special funding, knowing well that the case for which I am requesting funding is outside the legal aid scheme. The director of legal aid might say, “There is nothing special about this; I am refusing it”. I might then make an application by way of judicial review to the court, and I would get legal aid for that: judicial review carries legal aid. So I would get my money by making an application to the court for judicial review to say, “Look at this provision which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, argues for: it is broad; it is wide; the circumstances of the country have improved; it is only reasonable that the director of legal aid should now grant me the funding that I need, or that the category of law with which I am now concerned should be brought within scope”. That is just one case. Other cases could then be brought forward in the same way.

[Lord Woolf]

Will the noble Lord explain how the risk to which he has just referred would be any greater than that which already exists in the words of Clause 1(1)—that the Lord Chancellor must secure that legal aid is made available in accordance with this part?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

It says in terms that it must be in accordance with this part. As the Minister has explained, the Bill as drafted says what is in scope. The Access to Justice Act 1999 set out what was not in scope.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

I am no expert in administrative law. However, my recollection is that that requires leave of the judge. If it is as spurious a case as the noble Lord has suggested, I would have thought that it would be likely to be rejected and that very little legal aid, if any, would be involved.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Why should one run that risk? Why should one have applications for judicial review being made based on the amendment as currently drafted? This adds nothing to the Bill. All it does is open an avenue for satellite litigation which should not be permitted.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, it would be a great disappointment to your Lordships’ House if you were to find that there was unanimity on these Benches. I am not going to disappoint your Lordships: there is not.

I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—particularly in relation to the second and third parts of his speech—and also with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. In answer to my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, I would say that Clause 1(1) contains absolutely no statement of principle whatever, whereas Amendment 1B does contain a statement of principle, albeit within the financial limits set by the Bill.

What I really wanted to do is say a few words about financial privilege. I suspect that there will be other noble Lords who were once Members of another place who, like me, have sat on the Reasons Committee. It is the Reasons Committee that drafts the reasons why the Commons do disagree with your Lordships' House. It sits in a room just behind the Speaker’s Chair. That room is known as the Reasons Room. Behind that Alice-in-Wonderland title lies an Alice-in-Wonderland process. In the Reasons Room, the Reasons Committee—which does not produce a Hansard record, or certainly did not do so in my time—produces reasons that, by and large, are presented on a piece of paper and nodded through. That seems to me to be what has happened here. The reason that is given is that,

“it would alter the financial arrangements made by the Commons”.

That is a statement of predictive certainty. What we have heard from my noble friend the Minister suggests that there might be a possibility at some stage in the future that some kind of judicial review action might, not would, have some effect on, not alter, the financial arrangements made by the Commons.

I echo the words of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about the process of judicial review. Every judicial review application goes in the first instance, on an entirely paper procedure, before a judge of the administrative court. As it happens, most applications—about 80 to 90 per cent—are refused on the papers and there is practically no expenditure upon them at all. I cannot see any circumstances in which it is more likely that judicial review proceedings would continue as a result of including this amendment in the Bill as compared with the Bill as it stands. As my noble friend Lord Thomas said, the Bill as it stands contains the potential for applications being made for judicial review against the exceptionality provisions and against a ruling that legal aid should not be given. What is proposed here hardly increases that risk.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I will give way in a moment; I shall just finish the sentence.

If the other place has got its reasons wrong then surely we are entitled to question those reasons in this House, and if the burden of the debate justifies it, to ask the other place to reconsider, on the basis that it has got its reasons wrong. I will give way to my noble friend now—but he does not want me to. I am glad that I have answered his question. I have nothing further to add.

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[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, the whole exercise of this House examining the reasons given for rejecting an amendment from this place turns on the supposition in the first instance that the other place has in a mature, reasonable and well informed way applied itself to all the relevant issues. I therefore take very much to heart the submissions made by way of preliminary argument by the Minister. It is his case that the other place has done exactly that: namely, that it has looked in a fair, reasonable and mature way and has comprehensively dealt with those issues. I think that his argument is utterly fallacious in that respect.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Before using a word such as that, does the noble Lord not agree that there is a constitutional convention that—

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

It is exactly on the question of constitutional convention that I seek to address this House now. The Minister’s case, in so far as it refers to the Government having carefully considered the situation, is amply made out. I am sure that battalions or squadrons of legal eagles have been burning the midnight oil looking carefully at every word, comma and expression in these matters. I have no doubt that that has been done thoroughly and comprehensively.

However, has the other place thoroughly and comprehensively considered this matter? There has been a double guillotine. First, there was a guillotine in dealing with the issue because it could not be raised at Second Reading, in Committee or on Report. There was a second guillotine in the meagre ration of time—27 minutes—allowed for this amendment and two or three others. You would not hang a dog on such a procedure.

Therefore, on that basis, I make no apology for raising what I consider to be a fundamental constitutional point. We are dealing with the rejection by the House of Commons of a matter on which the time taken presupposes that its consideration could not have been mature and comprehensive. In addition, we have the reason given on financial privilege. I am as sure as I am that financial privilege cannot apply to this case because the very thing that it avoids doing is increasing the burden on the public purse. If I am right—as I understand it, that has been the rule since the end of the 17th century—it is not a financial privilege matter. Therefore, we have two constitutional issues. One is the lack of time and it being ridiculously limited in the other place. The second is the reason advanced; the very basis for refusing it cannot be sustained in argument.

Perhaps I may also challenge in a respectable, and I hope friendly, way the noble Lord’s contention that those of us who have had experience—in my case, it was a very long time ago—as Members in the other place are in some way tainted and disqualified from making contributions in this House on this matter. Is he saying that we should be silent? If this House is anything at all, it is a first-class reviewing Chamber. Is he saying that, as a reviewing Chamber, this House should not comment on such matters? If it does not comment on such matters, it does not deserve to be a reviewing Chamber or a court of Parliament at all.

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[Lord Morris of Aberavon]

My Lords, I add my support to the noble Lord, Lord Alton. As constituency MPs, many of us saw cases to do with this very issue and the difficulties that some of our constituents had in establishing liability after years of contact. I added my name to the noble Lord’s original amendment and heard his speech then, which set out the case admirably. I congratulate him on continuing to expose such an injustice. At this late hour, all I wish to say is that my support continues and I hope that the noble Lord will succeed.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, why success fees should be claimed at all by lawyers in this type of case just defeats me. The problem is in identifying the insurers of a particular firm that may have exposed the sufferer to asbestos many years before. I am delighted to hear that discussions are afoot on setting up a scheme akin to the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, whereby insurers come together to meet the damages and costs of a sufferer who cannot identify a particular insurance company behind his former employer. I hope that comes to pass. If it does, it will cure a lot of problems. It is obvious when a person suffers from mesothelioma; you do not have to prove that someone is suffering from this condition.

As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision last year, it has to be shown only that an employer has exposed an individual to asbestos in the past for that individual’s claim to succeed. The statistics show that these cases settle. What does that mean? It means that the fees of the lawyer are not at risk; he will have his ordinary fees paid by the insurer. Therefore, why should he get a success fee over and above that? On Report, I proposed that there should certainly be no success fee payable if a case settles before steps are taken to bring it to trial. I ask the Minister to take this into account when regulations are drawn up under what will be Section 46. The lawyer is not at risk. He has done nothing to earn more than the fees that he can properly charge. We did not have success fees in the past. We acted for people and, if we lost, we did not charge them. When we won, we got our costs and the expenses that we had paid from the other side, properly taxed. That was how the system worked.

I hope that the Government can bring in a combination of the Motor Insurers’ Bureau scheme for this type of case and couple it with regulations that say that no success fee should be charged when a case settles. That would do a great deal to alleviate the problems of which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, speaks. He is right. I stand along with Ian Lucas, my Member of Parliament in Wrexham, who as a lawyer says, “We didn’t come into this profession in order to take money from injured people”. I think that only a heartless claimant’s solicitor would charge a success fee in cases of this nature.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I have no doubt at all about the sincerity of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, and the compassion for victims of mesothelioma that he expressed at the outset of his speech. None the less, he felt that he must advise the House to reject the amendment so powerfully moved by the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool.

I say to the Minister that there is no virtue for the Government in dogmatic consistency. I believe that they would do themselves good and, much more importantly, they would do a great deal of good for those diagnosed with mesothelioma, as well as their families and dependents, if they would agree to make an exception in this instance. If they were to do so, it would not create a permanent anomaly, and in the short term I do not believe that it would undermine the central principles of the Government’s reforms because they are absolutely secured in the legislation that Parliament will pass. In any case, the Minister need not fear because this is a category of cases that is going to reduce in number over time. Mesothelioma is, I understand, exclusively associated with exposure to asbestos. All too belatedly the terrible damage that asbestos can do to human health was recognised, and for some time due to regulations and industrial practice there has been no further exposure of people to this hazard. We can foretell with confidence that this category of cases will dwindle and, I think, disappear. Therefore, the Minister need not worry that there will be a permanent anomaly. I say to him that he does not need to persist in a doctrinaire position which runs counter to his own very real human sympathies.

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[Lord Bach]

My Lords, it is the Opposition’s view that there should be no moneys taken from victims’ damages in these cases. That is the basis of our view. So we speak in favour of the amendment that has been so well moved.

There is a great feeling across this House that we have to protect victims of industrial disease and ensure that they and their families are not victims once again of reforms that are there to deal with dodgy whiplash claims and motor insurance premiums. In another place, as we heard this evening, there was a very powerful and intelligent debate on this subject. Those who often express the view that debates in this Chamber are always of a superior nature to those of another place should read Hansard carefully and look at what took place in that very short hour towards the end of Tuesday last week. It was a very good debate.

Honourable Members on all sides of the Chamber spoke with passion, knowledge and experience about this subject. Not least was Ms Crouch, a former insurance executive, who criticised both her Minister and the Association of British Insurers for their stance on these amendments. Indeed, as I understand it, she has spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, today and has also put out a press release. I am delighted that a number of Members of Parliament on all sides who spoke in that debate are listening to our debate this evening.

I could also mention Mr Andrew Percy who represents Brigg and Goole, which noble Lords will know is famous for its historic shipbuilding past, and Mr Andrew Bingham, the MP for High Peak, an area that also has a high incidence of asbestosis. They spoke against the Minister’s proposals and, to their credit, voted in the Opposition’s Lobby. Their concern was perfectly understandable. Why on earth, with absolutely no savings to the state, are we reducing the amount of money that victims get from those who harm them, while handing that money to lawyers or insurers instead? Those Members on all sides who voted were not persuaded by the stupid assertions—if I may call them that—of the Minister in the other place that industrial disease sufferers should be treated in the same way as an organised gang faking whiplash injuries for payouts or someone lying about a slip or a trip on a pavement crack. Again and again, the other place heard stories of horrific suffering of victims—and the fact that you simply cannot fake cancer of the pleural linings, peritoneum or cardiac sheath.

The history of asbestos-induced diseases—and, indeed, general industrial diseases—is not a proud one for the insurance industry. It knew for decades that asbestos killed before it acted and only then at Parliament’s promptings. Insurers have fought cases—to the death—trying to get out of paying just awards to genuine victims. There is a long history of insurers fighting claims until after the death of the claimant. It is in part thanks to their tireless lobbying that compensation levels in England and Wales are not by any standard generous in cases of this kind. They are forensically calculated to reflect pain, suffering and loss of amenity and costs of past and future losses. They are far less than victims receive in comparable jurisdictions. For example, Mealey’s Litigation Report in 2007 maintained that the average jury award in the United States for mesothelioma was $7.5 million—the average award here is £65,000. Of course, the differences between jury and judge-calculated awards and our judicial systems apply, but there is a huge difference.

No one could argue that the damages victims of this disease receive are very great; they should certainly not be eaten into in the way that this Bill, if allowed, would permit. We start from a low baseline before we even consider docking damages to prevent these claimants coming forwards.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Does the Minister not support my argument that it is better that there should be no success fees at all, rather than that success fees should be claimed against the insurers, which is what this amendment amounts to—in other words, a continuation of the current system? Does the Minister not agree that in these cases, which are easy to prove once you establish the insurer, success fees are really irrelevant?

[Lord Bach]

I am grateful to the noble Lord again for calling me the Minister—it is a couple of years, I think, since that was the case. I take his point though; it is a serious point. I am not convinced that lawyers who take up these cases, if this Bill in its present form becomes law, will not take success fees. In fact, I am pretty certain that they will. I cannot see why they would not. It may be a shame, but in the reality of the legal world, if they are entitled to take success fees, they will do so.

[Lord Bach]

I certainly do not have the experience of the noble Lord in this area of the law, but with the greatest respect I ask whether his view is not as speculative as mine. We just do not know, but I would have thought that the history of legal proceedings of this kind is that where success fees are available they will be sought. Maybe not always up to 25 per cent, but they will be sought.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Surely it would be for the Lord Chancellor to amend the regulations that he has to make to prevent success fees being charged in these circumstances.

[Lord Bach]

That may be what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, would suggest to the Lord Chancellor that he should do, but is there any indication that that is what will be done? Will regulations be put before Parliament that say it is forbidden to take a success fee in a case of this kind? If so, will not the Lord Chancellor run into exactly the same sort of problems that critics of this amendment raise here against the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and me? Will that not be the position?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Not if there is an abuse, as the noble Lord suggests. If claimants’ solicitors in cases which are not difficult to prove start charging success fees, which the Lord Chancellor or public opinion decide is simply not acceptable, then the Lord Chancellor will have the power to stop it.

[Lord Bach]

It may not be difficult to prove, and I understand what noble Lords say about that. But there is a history, I have to say, of insurance companies taking an extremely long time to agree to settle cases of this kind. For whatever reasons—and I do not want to go though them tonight in this House—it may be that a case will take quite a considerable period of time, even if, at the end, liability is not denied. I want to stop soon and allow the Minister to respond.

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[Lord Bach]

My Lords, this House dislikes the Bill. I am referring not only to the 11 defeats and two draws that the Government sustained on Report or the defeats today but to a wider feeling that Part 1 in particular is mean-minded, picks on the poor, disabled and vulnerable and is not worthy of this country’s traditions and its legal system. This view is held virtually throughout the House. There were more than 50 speakers on Second Reading, but it is difficult to recall anyone who spoke up for Part 1.

I believe that many Conservatives are offended by the way in which the Government have picked on the poor and the vulnerable. It is against their traditions and they are unconvinced that there are any savings to be made by decimating social welfare law, particularly as the Government have consistently refused to give figures, in spite of committees asking them to do so.

I also believe that the Liberal Democrat Benches are offended by the taking out of scope debt, employment, immigration and, if the Government have their way, welfare benefit cases. If they had been in opposition now, I venture to suggest that they would have opposed Part 1 of the Bill with all their might, yet somehow, with some brave exceptions, which I will not name, they have been cajoled into voting for exactly the things with which they disagree most. The Minister is a liberal and humane man and I occasionally feel sorry for him, too. He has been obliged to put forward, particularly in relation to Part 1, nonsense after nonsense in support of his arguments.

Of course we welcome the Government’s amendment concerning upper court appeals. It was always ridiculous that claimants at an Upper-tier Tribunal—the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—should not automatically get legal aid to argue their case, which, as the Minister has just reminded us, can be only on a point of law. The Government knew all along that it was ridiculous and the Minister, to his great credit, never tried to argue seriously against it. We were always going to get this concession at some stage. I do not want to be difficult about the concession; we are grateful for it and for any part that the Minister may have had in getting it.

However, the position is still deeply unsatisfactory with regard to First-tier Tribunal appeals. Last Tuesday, in the other place, an extraordinarily unconvincing pantomime took place between the right honourable and learned gentleman the Lord Chancellor and the honourable Member Mr Tom Brake. I should explain to any noble Lords who do not know who Tom Brake is that he is the Commons equivalent of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. That is meant as a compliment to him.

The Lord Chancellor hinted tantalisingly—using expressions such as “if we can solve the problems”, “if we can find” and so on—that an arrangement might be reached whereby a lower-tier judge could certify a point of law and give legal aid to a claimant. I do not think it unfair to describe that arrangement as vague, unthought-out, superficial, strictly back-of-an-envelope stuff and, as we know, arranged very much at the last minute. Amazingly, however, it resulted in the said honourable Mr Brake immediately withdrawing an amendment that he and others had moved—not unlike my amendment today, as it happens. I am afraid that no one was fooled by this last-minute arranged minuet of an agreement. In a boxing match, it was a clear fixed fight, with Mr Brake going down to a knockout by arrangement in the second round.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

That is absolute rubbish. I say now—I would say it in a speech later—that it is not worthy of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, to attack Tom Brake in that way when he is not here to answer for himself. I am proud to be an associate of Tom Brake, who leads on legal matters in the House of Commons from the Back Benches, as I do here. He very bravely put forward that amendment and achieved a great success in getting the concession that he did, which I will develop at a later stage.

[Lord Bach]

If it was so brave, why did he not put his amendment to the vote? That would be the question that I would ask.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

We got the concession that we were seeking.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I am very pleased to welcome the government amendment in lieu, which follows very closely the amendments that the Liberal Democrats put down, both in Committee and on Report, for ensuring that there is proper legal support for appeals on a point of law to the Upper Tribunal, the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court. The Government are to be congratulated on taking that step.

The lacuna in the amendment that I moved in Committee and on Report was that legal points might arise at First-tier Tribunal hearings. It was to that end that my colleague Mr Tom Brake put down an amendment in order to clarify that, or to try to obtain a concession from the Government in relation to that, when the matter came before the Commons. A number of points have been made about it. About 80 per cent of cases, maybe more, before the First-tier Tribunal are decided on the facts: whether a person has sustained a particular injury, whether that injury disables him from doing a particular job or whatever. It covers a wide range of possibilities, but it is usually a factual issue.

However, from time to time a point of law arises. Now, there is no difficulty whatever in identifying what a point of law is. The best illustration that I can make is the famous case of Donoghue and Stevenson—the snail in the ginger beer bottle. For the purposes of coming to a conclusion on the law of negligence and how it should develop, the House of Lords, in considering that case from Scotland in the 1930s, assumed that the claimant’s facts were true; namely, that there was a snail in the ginger beer bottle that the claimant drank. Accordingly, all the argument was based upon that assumed fact. As a result, the law was clarified and developed, and is the foundation of the law of negligence to this day. When the case was remitted to the Scottish court to determine the facts, it was discovered that it was impossible to prove that there was a snail in the ginger beer bottle at all. Consequently the claim was, I think, settled, or it may have failed, but that is the distinction. A point of law is when you have a difficulty in coming to a conclusion, even if the claimant’s facts are true.

The First-tier Tribunal will frequently be faced with mixed facts and law. That is to say, it will have to determine what the facts are and, in that light, consider whether there is any legal problem in the statutory provisions—any point of law—which has to be decided as well before the claimant gets his compensation, allowance or benefit, or whatever it may happen to be. So there is no problem. Every day, in every court and tribunal, points of law are being disclosed, discovered, analysed and dealt with. Indeed, you cannot appeal from the First-tier Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal unless there is a point of law that the First-tier Tribunal identifies. Similarly, in going from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, there has to be a point of law, so there is no problem—as there appeared to be among certain minds in the other place—as to what a point of law is.

The problem that one has to face is: can an unrepresented applicant determine himself whether there is a point of law? There are two answers to that. First, any tribunal with a legally qualified chairman will perceive that there is a point of law involved in coming to a conclusion on the case, so it is in the hands of the chairman of the tribunal to determine whether a point of law arises. If it is unexpected, he can stop the case there, adjourn it and give legal aid for the case to be argued properly by a lawyer who is familiar with the statutory provisions. There is then equality on both sides. However, there is another approach. In the criminal context, if I am prosecuting and the defendant is representing himself when appearing in court, and if I as the prosecutor—the qualified lawyer—realise that a point of law arises which the unrepresented defendant has not realised, it is my professional duty to tell that defendant in a criminal case, “Look, there is a point of law in your case, which you should mention to the judge. Let’s have a discussion about it”. It is my job to bring it out.

I suggest to the Government that when it comes to tribunals, anybody representing the state—the Government or a government department—in a tribunal should be under a duty, which regulation should point out, to inform an unrepresented applicant if that state representative appreciates that a point of law arises. This is so that before they even get before the tribunal, the state representative will have told the litigant or applicant in person, “Look, my friend, you have a point of law in this case, which you must mention to the tribunal judge. If you don’t do it, I will”. That is the tradition of the legal system, and it must apply even when the state is represented not by lawyers but by representatives of the department in question. I urge upon my noble friend that he takes that on board and ensures that there is such a duty, as there is elsewhere, for lawyers to point out to the unrepresented applicant that there is a point that he should take.

I am very pleased that points of law will be properly dealt with under the government amendment. I hope that the moves that the Lord Chancellor makes to ensure that, where a point of law arises in a First-tier Tribunal, a case is either by agreement put forward for legal aid or the tribunal chairman will stop the proceedings and adjourn them until the point can be properly argued. In my view, that is the way in which all the fears that have been expressed on the position of the unrepresented applicant will be dealt with.

[Lord Low of Dalston]

My Lords, I supported the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on Report, so I have no hesitation in supporting the more limited amendment moved so fully by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, this evening. I hope that the House will ask the Commons to think further on this matter. I will say something about the substance in a minute, but I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has emphasised the question of financial privilege because I want to say another word about that, if the House can bear it.

I come at this from a slightly different angle. There has been a change in the composition of the House of Lords in the past 10 years. I am not referring to the reduction in the number of hereditaries but to one that has been rather less remarked; namely, the appointment of so-called people’s Peers by the Appointments Commission. I am not greatly enamoured of the term “people’s Peers” but, for once, it may perhaps point to a reality that is worth observing—the links that those Peers, not being just the great and the good and the beneficiaries of political patronage, have with the diversity of civil society, which is something that the Appointments Commission has been keen to foster. They have been appointed for the distinctive contribution that they make and their ability to devote sufficient time to the work of the House. That last is an expressed criterion of appointment. I would not want to make too much of this, and I certainly do not wish to disparage other Peers, but the so-called people’s Peers have been specifically appointed on merit for the time, perspective and expertise that they can bring to the work of the House, including that of scrutinising legislation, and for their ability to reach and give a voice to parts of society that are not always reached.

That is part of what makes the Lords more accessible in some ways than the Commons. It is this House and not the other place that has been widely seen as speaking for the vulnerable and dispossessed in our consideration of the Welfare Reform Bill and this Bill. The House has done itself a deal of good. This may not be election but it adds a measure of legitimacy, or at least detracts somewhat from the air of illegitimacy, which is said to attend this House. We all know that the Commons has primacy in matters of supply, but I am sure that I speak for my colleagues when I say that this blanket resort to the claim of financial privilege as a ground for the summary negation of weeks of the very work we were appointed to this House to perform sits very ill indeed with the job description on which we were appointed to this place. It seems to me that it is the Commons’ heavy-handed use of the claim of financial privilege and not the existence of the House of Lords that deserves to be likened to what is going on in Syria or an affront to democracy.

The noble Lord, Lord Martin, whom we all greatly respect, and the noble Lord, Lord McNally, whom we also respect, say that the assertion of privilege is a completely objective matter decided on impartially by the Speaker and his advisers and has nothing to do with the Government. The Speaker may be the conduit through which these claims are asserted but, with the greatest respect, as the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, has indicated, if you believe that the Government have nothing to do with it, you will believe anything.

Scholars differ about the extent of financial privilege but Dr Jeff King, a senior lecturer in law at University College London, said:

“The Lords has the clear right not to accept the Commons assertion of privilege without a protest”.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, there is something ironic in the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, to maintain legal aid for children as a child might be very much better off pursuing a claim by means of a conditional fee agreement as things stand at the moment. I shall explain.

My noble friend Lord McNally has on two separate occasions during the Bill’s passage outlined fully the Government’s intention to introduce a supplementary legal aid scheme, which was part of the Access to Justice Act 1999, passed by the party opposite, whereby there would be an automatic 25 per cent deduction from the damages recovered by a claimant who is legally aided. As things stand, if a child succeeds under legal aid in obtaining damages, 25 per cent of those damages will be taken by the state under the proposed supplementary legal aid scheme, which will be used to fund other applicants for legal aid automatically. Under a conditional fee agreement, the solicitor who acts on behalf of the child claimant will be entitled to recover his fees, if he can establish the case, from the other side. But when it comes to the success fee, under these proposals, it will be recoverable from the damages of the child and limited to 25 per cent of those damages.

A success fee cannot exceed 100 per cent of the lawyer’s normal fees that he recovers from the other side, so it may never come anywhere near the 25 per cent of the damages that the child recovers. Under a conditional fee agreement, the success fee is related to the amount of the fees, not the amount of the damages. There is not a 25 per cent deduction from the child’s damages automatically. That is just a cap to prevent a success fee from going to an extreme amount. Consequently, it may be that the legally aided child, who will have an automatic 25 per cent reduction of his damages, will be in a worse position than one under a conditional fee agreement. I do not think that that point has properly sunk in. It is for that reason that I look to the Government, perhaps not tonight but at some time if regulations come forward for the supplementary legal aid scheme, to exempt children from the 25 per cent reduction proposed under that scheme. As things stand, 25 per cent will be taken off. For those reasons, I do not think that the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, assists the children that he wishes to help.

[Lord Beecham]

If I understand the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, correctly—he is obviously more conversant with the Access to Justice Act 1999 than I am—provision is contained within that Act for regulations to be made—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

It was never implemented.

[Lord Beecham]

I was about to say precisely that. It was never implemented so it is open to the Government to lay regulations that would require that 25 per cent deduction. It is equally open to them to do what their predecessors did and not lay such regulations or make that deduction. I am entirely at one with the noble Lord in saying that that deduction should not be made, but that is the situation at the moment.

With respect to the noble Lord, I do not think that his argument takes us very far at all. The Opposition support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, despite the fact that it appears to contain a grammatical error. It refers to,

“clinical services which took place at a time when the individual was child”.

There is an indefinite article missing somewhere. However, that is a trivial point. The substantive point is one that was made effectively by the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, when we debated this on Report. In the debate on the amendment that was discussed on that occasion, she talked of the figures involved in legal aid expenditure for children. She pointed out that legal aid for clinical negligence claims involving children cost the Legal Aid Fund some £4.6 million, of which £3 million was spent on precisely the cases of neonatal injury to which the Minister referred and to which the Government have responded by restoring them within scope. Therefore, as the noble Baroness pointed out, the net saving would amount to £1.6 million for the Legal Aid Fund.

It is time to dispose of some of the shibboleths about tough decisions and the like. Apparently it is not a particularly tough decision for the Department for Communities and Local Government to spend £250 million on weekly bin collections. It seems to me and to the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, and presumably the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, a very tough decision to deny legal aid at a cost of £1.6 million to children under the age of 16 who suffer clinical negligence other than through the limited but welcome concession that the Government have made in respect of the injuries to which we have referred.

I also remind your Lordships of the view of the National Health Service Litigation Authority, which I quoted last time and will quote again. It stated:

“We have serious concerns over the proposal to withdraw legal aid from clinical negligence claims. Whilst we have seen an upsurge of claims brought under Conditional Fee Agreements … in recent years, we question whether CFAs are likely to be readily available to fund many of the more serious claims currently brought via legal aid”.

That view was about clinical negligence claims at large. Therefore, one might think that those concerns would surely apply to claims for children under the age of 16.

This does not remotely impinge on the huge problems that the Minister constantly reminds us of in relation to deficit reduction and the like. It is an almost trivial sum of money. By no conceivable stretch of the imagination could it be justified by financial privilege, which is the cover under which the Government approach this amendment. Let us be clear about financial privilege because it has been bandied around today and on previous occasions. Of course the Commons has the right to assert financial privilege, which is an objective process as far as the Clerks and the Speaker are concerned. However, it does not stop there. The Commons can waive financial privilege. If the Government wished for financial privilege to be waived, it would pass almost without opposition and frequently does. It is often waived. The Government choose not to waive it in connection with this and the other matters to which we have referred. It is a fig leaf behind which Ministers hide. I hesitate to convey an image of Ministers brandishing fig leaves; that would be an unwelcome variation on a theme. However, it is a pretty feeble and diminutive fig leaf for any Minister to hide behind. It is not an adequate defence for what they are doing.

I repeat: the figures show that the potential savings are minimal. Undoubtedly, justice will not be accessible for too many young people except in an expensive form potentially through a conditional fee agreement—even allowing for how the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, described it. I very much hope that the House will build on the Government’s welcome concession with this small additional financial burden and extend justice to those who need it.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 27th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness D'Souza)]

My Lords, I remind your Lordships that if this amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendment 2 for reasons of pre-emption.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for the amendment. He knows that we on these Benches raised this issue before Second Reading. It is necessary to have flexibility brought into the Bill for two reasons: first, because economic conditions may improve and it may be possible to revert to a more generous legal aid scheme; and, secondly, because those of us with experience of litigants in person know they can clog up the courts and that, consequently, it may be necessary for urgent amendments to Schedule 1 to introduce legal aid to enable people to be legally represented. It is not fully appreciated by the public that legal representation shortens cases and leads to justice, rather than litigants in person trying to fight their own cause.

[Lord Bach]

I thank the Minister for the concession that the Government have made today. The clause as it stands before we pass the Government’s amendments should never have been in that form when the Bill was published and was always crying out for amendment. Indeed, members of my party in the Commons did their best to ensure that that happened. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and other noble Lords for persuading the Government that the clause needed changing. I shall not, of course, press my amendment; I will not move it.

I know the Minister and all other noble Lords will agree that the House seems somewhat empty today because our noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree is not with us in our deliberations. He took an active part in all the debates on the Bill for many months and, even though we could all see that he was not in good health, insisted on coming here, speaking his mind and voting in the way his conscience told him to vote. He took a real interest in the Bill and—I know all noble Lords will agree—it was a delight and privilege to work with him. It does not seem right or just that he is not here listening and speaking his mind. Having said that, I thank the noble Lord for the concession.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, when I first looked at the Bill, I was pleased to see how much vulnerable adults and children are protected by the provisions of Schedule 1. One has only to look at the paragraph headings to see the protection that is given: for example, “Care, supervision and protection of children”, “Special educational needs”, “Abuse of a child or vulnerable adult”, “Working with children and vulnerable adults”. All these groups will remain within the scope of legal aid. Further headings comprise: “Mental health and mental capacity”, “Facilities for disabled persons”, “Inherent jurisdiction of High Court in relation to children and vulnerable adults”, “Unlawful removal of children from the United Kingdom”, “Family homes and domestic violence”, “Victims of domestic violence and family matters”, “Mediation in family disputes”, “Protection of children and family matters”, “Children who are parties to family proceedings” and “EU and international agreements concerning children”. Over and over again the emphasis is placed on keeping the needs of children and vulnerable adults within the scope of legal aid. I look forward to hearing from my noble friend what proportion those headings represent of all the cases involving children. Those children’s and vulnerable adults’ issues will continue to be within the scope of legal aid.

There is one aspect of Amendment 3 with which I entirely agree—I spoke about this in Committee and on Report—which is that legal aid should be maintained for a review or appeal on social welfare issues and for,

“civil legal services relating to an appeal to the Supreme Court”.

That is so for children, but my position is that it is important that legal aid for appellate processes should be available to all adults and children.

I listened with a great deal of sympathy to the exposition of Amendment 4 by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, but he should bear in mind that conditional fee agreements with one-way costing, which is the new way in which conditional fee agreements are to be entered into, will be available for people who are not covered by legal aid, and the new changes will be much more acceptable. For example, there will be protection against the defendant’s costs for a losing claimant—a losing child or adult. They will not have to pay those costs. We have discussed those issues at length. The noble Lord should also bear in mind that the Government have announced that if you are legally aided and you obtain damages in a personal injury case, 25 per cent of those damages will be taken for the supplementary legal aid scheme to fund other people who are deserving of legal aid. Therefore, entitlement to legal aid will not mean that a person gets their damages in full. It is probably better in many of these cases to have a conditional fee agreement as it has been refashioned than it is to receive legal aid. I am sure that that is the way in which the legal profession will go.

[Baroness Eaton]

My Lords, I speak in support of the children’s amendments moved and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and my noble friend Lord Cormack. I should like to add my thoughts on Lord Newton, who kindly supported the amendment. I know that we will all miss his integrity and compassion in all our debates, particularly around these sensitive subjects. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord McNally, because I and other noble Lords have had a number of conversations with him, and he has been most gracious in his dealings with us. However, I still find myself in the unhappy position of being unable to support the Government’s intention to remove the clear and straightforward right to legal advice for children under 18 generally, and for all children who are injured in clinical negligence cases.

The Bill as it stands draws a distinction between, on the one hand, any child who suffers brain damage as a result of medical negligence before the age of nine weeks, and, on the other, any child suffering injury of any other kind caused by medical negligence—including a child who suffers from brain damage when they are nine weeks and one day old. Let me tell noble Lords about a Plymouth boy who suffered brain damage at the age of one when doctors at the Frenchay Hospital in Bristol failed to follow up a suspected aneurysm. Months later, he suffered a devastating bleed in his brain, which would have been avoided if the correct procedure had been followed. The boy will require care for the rest of his life; he cannot talk and will never be able to work. A settlement with North Bristol NHS Trust at the High Court in November 2011 will help to provide care for the rest of the boy’s life. He is now 10. The case could not have been started without legal aid, which would not be available if the Bill were to pass unamended.

I simply do not see how children who have been injured in these often heartbreaking circumstances can be divided into two groups in this way. We would allow legal aid for a baby suffering brain damage at birth, but deny legal aid to a baby suffering brain damage in hospital at the age of one. Or we would prevent a child who has been paralysed from seeking help. Just imagine two babies at two weeks old in the same hospital. One is brain damaged and the parents can seek support on their behalf, while the other is paralysed and the parents cannot get legal aid.

Are we really saying that a brain-damaged child who can walk needs more care and support than a child who has to be carried to the bathroom and turned in bed during the night? The severe difficulties facing the child’s parents will be exactly the same in both cases. They will be desperate for help. They will want to know whether they have a legal case and, first and foremost, they will be giving their child the day-to-day care and love that all parents must, whatever the difficulties.

Are we really going to ask half of those parents to appeal to the director of legal aid casework to see whether their child qualifies for legal aid as an exceptional case—as if that would be a satisfactory way to organise legal aid for children even from the Government’s point of view? I ask noble Lords to consider the expense, bureaucracy and delay that will result from such an approach.

I have highlighted medical negligence but, as a former leader of a local authority, I could go through each subject heading and make a similar case. The simple truth is that children are defined as minors in law because they cannot represent themselves and sometimes need protection and redress from their families and from the state. It is not good enough to suggest that a social worker can apply for their legal support as an exceptional case. Social workers are not legal executives and have no legal training. Inherent in that suggestion is a misunderstanding of the nature of the legal actions that may be taken. In most cases, the child will be challenging a decision or action taken by the local authority. Do we really believe that every social worker will apply for a child to have legal aid in cases which challenge his or her decisions or those of his or her employer?

All of us in this House understand that in a healthy democracy, it must be possible to challenge the state, particularly where children are concerned. We also understand that there are lots of terrible cases where children’s voices have not been heard, which is why we need to ensure that they can take independent legal advice that is accessible directly, not via a social worker or any other arm of government.

I support the amendments because I believe that they will save an enormous amount of trouble and wasteful expenditure for the Government, whom I support. I want to help the Government to pull back from what would be a regrettable and avoidable mistake, and they will save a great deal of anxiety for parents who are already coping with more than anyone should have to bear.

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[Lord Judd]

My Lords, the noble Baroness is to be congratulated on having persevered so well and firmly with this cause, right up to Third Reading. I remember in my early days as director of Oxfam that I was in north-west Brazil where, having travelled overnight in a rickety bus, I arrived in this very poor town. Around the tower of the church, there was a banner in Portuguese which said, “Prison bars will not prevent the truth escaping”. When I, together with the field director, probed to try to find out what had happened and what was wrong, evidently a greedy land grabber had been bribing the judge with cattle and the judge had repeatedly ordered these people off their land. They had no social insurance—nothing. They had no means of surviving but to go on farming the land they traditionally farmed. In the end, because they resisted, he threw them and the local secretary of the peasants’ association into prison for good measure.

I had gone with my colleague to discuss agriculture—wells, tools, seed and irrigation—but what became very clear was that these people were preoccupied totally with justice. They wanted to have some resources to be able to go to the regional court and put their case before it. I can remember us sitting over some beer and doing some rough calculations, and reckoning that we could find a bit of money to help support them to go off to the regional court. One of my best moments in those formative years as director of Oxfam was when I heard at headquarters in Oxford that having taken their case before the regional court, the local judge was in prison and they were back on their land.

I tell this story because I have repeatedly found in my work with the Third World that what holds people back is a lack of justice and fairness, and what they are wanting is a fair crack of the whip. If this is true within the context of their own societies, when we move into a globalised society—with the vast power of the biggest international companies and the almost limitless resources that they have at their disposal for legal undertakings, cases and the rest—the case becomes even more obvious. I am very unhappy with this whole Bill, and have been from the beginning, because it is about limiting access to justice when surely a cause in a civilised society is to increase access to justice. If we have a serious commitment to the people of the Third World, as the Government keep demonstrating that they want to have, nothing is more important than ensuring that they can get access to justice. I really will be very despairing if the Government, even at this 11th hour, cannot respond to what the noble Baroness has argued.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I have huge sympathy with the claimants in the Trafigura case, who received £30 million in damages, and if I thought that access to justice for people in their position were being blocked by this Bill I would be entirely with the noble Baroness. Unfortunately, the costs in that case were £100 million, reduced on taxation to £40 million. I do not feel particularly proud of a legal system which produces such a disparity between the damages that were actually received by the claimants and the lawyers who acted on their behalf.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNally]

The noble Lord will have to wait and see. One thing is certainly true: I have made every effort to make sure that defamation is not engulfed in a tsunami from Leveson. If we really want to reform defamation and not get caught up in a much wider privacy law, what I am trying to do is the way forward. Stunts like dividing the House tonight will show that, on this Bill, the noble Lord is still more interested in short-term political gain than in making progress.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

As a member of the committee that has just reported, I should remind the noble Lord that it advised against a privacy law.

[Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve]

Before the Minister finishes winding, will he explain to the House why he does not think that these exemptions—the noble Lord, Lord Lester, may be entirely right—are the right way to go? Does he not think that two successive changes in the regime are the very worst thing for litigants in this area? In so far as we are leaving the Bill as it is, one change will happen now and another will happen down the road if there is legislation on defamation.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 20th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, I agree entirely with what the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has just said. Referral fees have for some years been a serious problem in almost all circumstances and have caused a great deal of trouble and unnecessary expense. It is not a case where, as the Labour Party has just proposed, it should be treated just as a matter where two firms are in business. This is a matter that requires to be removed.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, in my youth I appeared for insurers and unions, and I did not pay anybody to get those cases. We competed on quality. The competition was there so that unions and insurers would send their work where they thought that they would get the best service, not where they thought that they would get the largest fee. It is insidious for fees to be paid to purchase cases from any organisation, whether it is a union or even the finest charity. It is not right that unions and charities should fund themselves in this way. The noble Lord has made the case from the point of view of unions and charities being funded. One has to look at it the other way round. Why should firms of solicitors or even barristers’ chambers—I have heard rumours about this—get work on the basis of how much they pay a person referring cases to them? It is a practice which has to stop.

[Lord Monks]

My Lords, I support my noble friend in this amendment. Referral fees are one aspect of the Bill that will affect union legal services adversely, along with changes to “after the event” insurance and conditional fee agreements. These three issues will make union legal services much more difficult and expensive to operate. Inevitably, fewer cases will be taken. Last year, unions assisted something like 50,000 individuals with cases. There was no charge on the public purse for that assistance. It was done through people’s membership of the union. Many people who were very ill or injured in some way were helped considerably. When this Bill becomes law, essentially, that will become more difficult.

I have checked which unions use referral fees and which do not. Two of the major unions use them and the rest do not. The two which use them do not use them to fund the Labour Party, which is the allegation that is around. As my noble friend explained, the political fund of the unions is completely separate. A separate contribution is made to that. It is registered under the Trade Union Act 1984, which was put through by the noble Lord, Lord King. You make a voluntary donation which is separate from your union membership fee and it is separately accounted for.

The suggestion that referral fees are used by unions to fund the Labour Party is totally wrong. The whole purpose of referral fees where they are applied has been to support the expansion of union legal services to make good some of the defects elsewhere in the justice system. I hope that the House will bear that in mind when it considers this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, let me make it clear that I do not for a moment charge the Minister—or indeed the Government—with conceiving of this as in any sense aimed at trade unions. It is a by-product of policy. Let me also remind your Lordships that referral fees are only banned—certainly at the moment, under the terms of this Bill—in respect of personal injury claims. For any other kind of arrangement, referral fees are apparently acceptable—not, however, in the context of personal injury claims.

That really illustrates whence this proposal comes from. It comes from the unacceptable activities of those who have perhaps been promoting spurious claims—and we will come at the next amendment to the kind of techniques that some of these firms and outfits adopt to encourage claims in a way that fosters this myth of the compensation culture. That is the genuine motivation of the Government; what they are doing to deal with it goes too far.

I do not recall having jousted in legal terms with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, 50 years or so ago when we shared adjoining desks at the Honour School of Jurisprudence, but I will joust a little with her, if I may, this afternoon. She first of all asserts that it would be an incentive for firms not to do the job properly. I do not know what possible basis she can have for saying that. A solicitor’s job is to do his best for his client. In a sense, there are two clients when one is acting for somebody referred by an organisation. Far from it being the case that there is no incentive to do the job properly, there is a greater incentive to do the job properly when one has a connection with a potential source of work—whether there is a referral fee or not —because, of course, one does not just lose and upset one client: one potentially loses a whole stream of work. In fact, therefore, the converse of her proposition is actually true.

The second of the noble Baroness’s points which I seek to rebut is that this deprives people of choice. A union member or a member of a charitable or other organisation does not have to use the organisation that is recommended or go to one that pays a referral fee. They have the same choice as anyone else. But they may choose to rely on their own organisation, trade union or otherwise, having established from its experience that a particular firm or firms are capable of carrying out the work. The choice, however, remains with them. The noble Baroness has been on the website and discovered the Labour Party’s scheme. Let me tell her and the House how much that scheme has raised: nil, nothing, not a penny. It is about as vibrant as Monty Python’s parrot. It is redundant. It is a dead scheme. It has never been activated, so that issue need not distract your Lordships’ House.

Before I conclude, I should make one other point in relation to charitable organisations. The ones I have mentioned operate on a referral-fee basis. There are three of them and I think there may be others, although perhaps that is a little beside the point. I liken the process to another aspect which is certainly something that political parties and many charities operate, and that is an affinity card with a bank, where a percentage of one’s expenditure when using the card goes to the organisation. In precisely the same way that it could be alleged—I think wrongly—that as referral fees increase costs in the legal system, so by definition an affinity card must push up the costs in relation to financial services. It is an analogous situation.

I feel strongly about this—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, drawing on his long experience, can the noble Lord tell us when referral fees first reared their head? I do not recollect them 20 or 30 years ago. Does he know when they began?

[Lord Beecham]

To the best of my recollection, they have appeared in the past 10 to 12 years. I have not myself been heavily involved in the practice in which I was a senior partner for the past nine years, much to its relief and mine. Having had our debate and despite the pleas of the Minister, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Having read the amendment as drafted, I was confused as to whether the mistake was a technical mistake, a mistake of law or a mistake of fact of the basis upon which the order was made. It is not clear from the wording here that the latter is the proper meaning. I am heartened to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, that she has received a communication from the Ministry of Justice saying that mistake does not mean the slip rule, which is a very familiar concept to lawyers. It may not be familiar to the bailiff who is knocking on the door. It is important that my noble friend should make it quite clear that a mistake of fact is needed; in other words, that if the magistrates’ court had been aware of the particular circumstances of the individual at the time that the warrant was to be enforced, it would not have made that order. If that is what it means and the Minister says so from the Dispatch Box, I would be satisfied with that. If that is not what it means, we need to discuss the issue further.

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I speak in support of government Amendment 152ZA and also speak on behalf of my noble friend Lord Rix who unfortunately is unable to be present because of his wife’s ill health. I thank the Minister for the extremely productive meeting that we had, which has been mentioned. The points that my noble friend has asked me to raise arise out of the amendment which came after that discussion in support of what was said.

The context of this is the duty of the court to explain sentences in ordinary language, which we raised in Committee. The Minister admitted that the phrase would ensure only that most people could understand an explanation. While we welcome the amendment and believe that it has the ability to extend comprehension of the effect of a sentence on all parties concerned, which is an important development, we are still not certain that it covers the point about ordinary language. On that, we would like some clarification. We believe that the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee could offer a similar safeguard, but we are not sure about where that safeguard extends and how wide it is. Will the Minister clarify how confident she is that the committee will make rules regarding the need to go beyond ordinary language in certain circumstances? Will it actually make these rules? To what extent are the rules made by that committee binding on the court? The concern is that if the rules are merely guidance, they might not be put into practice, despite the best intentions of the Government and the committee.

Will the Minister tell us about the time scales? When will the committee be empowered to make such rules and when might they be enforced? Are we looking at something imminent? Will it depend on when the Bill is passed? Finally, what opportunities will there be for Members of both Houses to scrutinise the implementation of these measures in the future? If they are rules of the committee rather than something in the Bill, it is more difficult for us to monitor them. They have an enormous effect on the people whom we mentioned in Committee and their ability to understand the process of law.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

154YUA: Clause 120, line 9, at end insert—
“( ) The Secretary of State shall report to both Houses of Parliament every six months thereafter—
( ) the number of IPP prisoners remaining in custody after the tariff date in each case has expired,( ) the arrangements made for such prisoners to complete their courses,( ) the proportion of such prisoners who have already completed their courses, and( ) the number of outstanding applications to the Parole Board for release.”

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Amendment 154YUA would add the need for reports to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. Although I welcome the abolition of IPPs, I am still concerned about those who have served their tariff but have not been released. The best way of dealing with that is to keep a very close eye on what happens to them. Under my amendment we would know every six months the number of IPP prisoners remaining in custody after their tariff date has expired, the arrangements made for them to complete their courses, the proportion of such prisoners who have already completed their courses, and the number of outstanding applications to the parole board for release. One would hope that within a foreseeable period, perhaps two years, one would see that there was no need for a report because there were no IPP prisoners left in this category. That is the purpose of my amendment, and I look forward to my noble friend’s response.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas. He identifies a useful process and an obligation on the Government to ensure that cases are properly considered and that there is a reasonable way of reporting back on them.

Although I sympathise with the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, I do not find the content of it particularly persuasive. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to delegate the responsibility for implementing release plans without saying to whom the responsibility should be delegated. That would be odd in primary legislation. The requirement to report within a year of enactment on all cases seems to be too restrictive, given that unfortunately under the previous Government there was a backlog in working with such prisoners, and it is not at all clear how much work would be involved and what resources would be required to deal with the current numbers. It is not really acceptable for the timescale to be in the Bill in this form.

Having said that, if the noble Lord were minded to look seriously at the propositions—and I would certainly commend the thinking behind them if not necessarily the precise formulation that reaches us in the form of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham—that could be brought back for consideration at Third Reading. The direction of travel is right but the precise route is somewhat questionable. I hope that the Minister will think sympathetically about the underlying approach of the two noble Lords whose amendments are before the House.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, we return to the issue of dealing with IPP prisoners. I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that I do not think there is any doubt about the direction of travel. I am dubious about whether we need the kind of prescriptions in both amendments. Ministers are here to be questioned by Parliament. I do not think that there would be any problem in finding opportunities to check on progress, but let us see.

The Government, through the National Offender Management Service, have already made significant improvements to increase the supply of rehabilitation interventions for this group. One of the main criticisms of IPPs was that people became trapped in them in a kind of Catch-22; they had to fulfil certain requirements to be considered for release but the facilities and channels to get these qualifications, improvements and records were not there. Better use is already being made of sentence plans to prioritise interventions for existing IPPs where the need is greatest, and work is under way to ensure that programmes can be delivered more flexibly, supporting greater access and the inclusion of offenders with more complex needs such as learning difficulties.

In addition, a new specification for offender management, which will provide for the prioritisation of resources based on risk, will take effect from April 2012. Once embedded, this will result in the improved targeting of rehabilitative interventions for IPP prisoners. We are using a range of measures to improve the progression of these prisoners through their sentence, including improvements to assessment, sentence planning, and delivery and parole review processes.

I wrote to the noble Lord following Committee about the work that NOMS is doing to improve support for these prisoners, and I summarise the key points here. First, we plan to issue a prison service instruction that will require effective and realistic sentence plans to be put in place for all offenders on the new extended sentence and for IPP prisoners already in the system.

On the administration of support for IPP prisoners, there are already appropriate structures in place within NOMS to carry out this work. The Indeterminate Sentence Prisoners Co-ordination Group is the NOMS body responsible for co-ordinating the management of all indeterminate sentence prisoners—that is, lifers as well as IPPs. The group’s purpose is to develop and promote the most effective means of managing this group of offenders and to ensure that resources are directed effectively. For example, the group has mandated work to improve the speed of allocation to open prison and identify ways of increasing capacity in the open prison estate for the IPPs, and has co-ordinated the introduction of a new centralised system for organising their transfer.

On the specific amendment, I should make it clear that, as legislation currently stands, it would not be possible for the Secretary of State to produce or delegate anything other than sentence plans for these offenders that may or may not result in progress to a quick release on licence. Statutorily, only the Parole Board can actually direct the release of IPP prisoners on the basis of risk criteria. Amending that situation would be a substantial change to sentences that have already been imposed and would require primary legislation. In Committee, I made it clear that the Government do not believe that that would be appropriate. On the proposal that such plans should be delegated, I noted that it would be unusual for legislation to go into this type of detail about the administration of executive duties.

My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford proposed a requirement for the Secretary of State to report regularly to Parliament on IPP prisoner parole status and interventions. Information on the number of IPP prisoners whose tariff has expired is published in the quarterly offender management statistics published by my department. The Parole Board’s annual report publishes comprehensive data on its IPP application workload and backlog. I must resist the requirement to report on programmes in individual cases, as this would be hugely difficult to achieve. Offender managers will regularly review and update sentence plans.

Our recent research suggests that while the Parole Board will take account of the completion of accredited programmes when considering whether to direct the release of an IPP prisoner, this is only one part of the evidence that it will consider. Research shows that the parole process is targeted on the individual, and only programmes specific to the individual’s needs that are successfully completed and show some impact on the prisoner are likely to be taken as evidence of sentence progression. Simply counting completed courses will not be good evidence of how prisoners in general are progressing.

I hope that I have said enough to reassure the House that we have already put effective measures in place to support these prisoners’ progress towards release while keeping paramount our concerns for public safety. We have not introduced these reforms to the IPP system simply to see them fail. The biggest incentives for making sure that our reforms work are for the Ministers who brought them in, and we will be pleased to be judged by our results. I hope that both noble Lords will withdraw their amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I believe that I should reply first. The Minister’s response was encouraging. He said that Ministers were here to be questioned. I shall make a note in my diary to put in a Written Question every six months, asking for the information—or something like it—that I seek in the amendment. It is very important that a close eye is kept on those who remain under an IPP sentence but whose tariff has expired. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 154YUA (to Amendment 154YU) withdrawn.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Wednesday 14th March 2012 Lords Chamber

Might it be that some reforms could be adopted later than others? The answer to that question is no. To target one feature of the landscape will not work. That question and its answer are not mine; the question was posed and answered by Lord Justice Jackson himself in a recent edition of the New Law Journal. Therefore, the question that the Government must answer, should they choose to oppose this amendment, is: if they intend to implement both aspects of Lord Justice Jackson’s plans, why do they oppose an amendment that would ensure that they are implemented simultaneously? In that event, how will the Government ensure that access to justice is continuously facilitated? I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, conditional fee agreements—no-win no-fee arrangements—were first permitted by the legislation introduced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, in 1990. In the beginning they were limited to personal injury cases, insolvency cases and cases before the European Court of Human Rights. They were a radical breach with the principle that a lawyer ought not to have a financial interest in the outcome of a case, and drew at the time much opposition from Law Lords and the Law Commission. Your Lordships are familiar with the way this system now works. If the case is lost, the lawyer receives no fees and therefore he needs to win or to settle to earn a living. To recompense him for the risk of losing, he is paid a success fee when he wins, a percentage uplift of his standard fees, which in theory recompenses him for those completely unrelated cases he has taken on and lost. He recovers the standard fees, which are payable by the losing defendants, but the initial concept was that the winning claimant should pay the success fee—the uplift—out of his damages. When the scheme was initially introduced, the uplift was limited to 20 per cent of standard fees. That was increased in 1995 to 100 per cent uplift to cover the most unlikely case—that was how it was introduced—where the risk of losing was 50:50.

Under the normal costs-shifting rules, the losing claimant was open to pay the tax costs of the defendants. He was not protected, as he would have been under a legal aid certificate, from the costs that the defendants had incurred in defending the case. Under legal aid an order was very often made that a losing plaintiff—as he then was—should pay the costs of the defendant. However, it was almost never enforced, so effectively he was not at risk of paying the defendant’s costs; but if he was, he could not pay. In answer to a query from Lord Hailsham, who was concerned that defendant insurers were left out of pocket even when they won, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said:

“I understand that the Law Society is in the final stages of organising a form of insurance policy to protect clients against a costs order under a conditional fee agreement … If that is implemented it will be a complete answer to the anxiety to which my noble and learned friend has just referred”.—[Official Report, 18/7/94; col. 5.]

So “after the event” insurance was born to protect the losing claimant against the defendant’s costs.

There are further matters to which I may refer later such as caps on damages, but in 1999 the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, as Lord Chancellor, extended conditional fee agreements to all civil proceedings except family law. However, the most radical change he introduced was that the success fee and the “after the event” insurance premium should then be paid by the losing defendant. In a debate on 23 July 1998 he resisted Lord Ackner’s amendment that success fees should be capped. I said on that day:

“There has been no research as to whether solicitors overestimate the risk in order to justify an excessive uplift of the fees. There may be a doubling of fees now that 100 per cent. uplift is permitted. But the solicitor who is charging the fees, who determines that uplift, has to justify that uplift, assessing the risk himself. Is he doing it properly?”.—[Official Report, 23/7/98; col. 1112.]

Even then, in 1998 when I was speaking, the evidence suggested that the cherry picking of risk-free cases was occurring. I was a teller for Lord Ackner on that amendment, which was, unfortunately, lost. I hope that your Lordships will forgive me for quoting my own speech but it indicates that I was involved at an early stage in the discussions that were taking place in 1999.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, this may not be quite what the noble Lord was thinking about, but in some cases, as my noble friend Lord Faulks indicated, if there is a question of a claim following a bereavement, we have indicated that we intend that there should be an uplift in these cases.

On the question of why we are not introducing QOCS for judicial review claims—this may be the circumstance to which the noble Lord was referring—the responses to the consultation indicated that conditional fee agreements were less commonly used outside the area of personal injury and were not frequently used in judicial review proceedings.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I hope my noble and learned friend will forgive me for mentioning that I have tabled an amendment dealing with precisely that point. It is for debate at a later time and proposes that QOCS should apply in cases where, for example, there is a death in custody—and to other matters referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful to my noble friend. Debate on his amendment might allow a better exploration of the important point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, as another co-signatory to the letter to which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, referred, I endorse the argument so ably put forward today by the noble Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. I do not need to add anything to what they have said. The speech of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, today follows the magisterial speech that he gave in Committee. These arguments are irrefutable. To trammel the access to justice of mesothelioma sufferers would be a terrible thing to do. I am sure the Minister, as a kind and good man, will agree with that.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I add my tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for his 50-years’ celebration of Orpington. It was life-changing for me because I joined the Liberal Party a fortnight afterwards. Therefore, in a fortnight’s time it will be my 50th anniversary as a member of the party and, shortly after that, my 50th anniversary of failing to win a seat. That is how it goes.

The amendment seeks to retain the status quo in relation to one industrial disease—mesothelioma. Your Lordships will appreciate from what I said in Committee that these cases are terrible. I feel that completely. I told your Lordships about a lady who lives very close to me in Gresford. She came to this House and spoke, and no doubt a number of your Lordships will remember her vividly. Her husband died as a result of being exposed to asbestos in Brymbo steel works, which is perhaps three miles from where I live. But if you give mesothelioma a special, unique status, what about the people in my village who were in Gresford colliery—that has a certain resonance, as your Lordships may recall the disaster in 1934—or in Llay Main colliery, about two miles away, which was the deepest pit in the United Kingdom? I refer to those who suffer from pneumoconiosis, another industrial disease. How can I say, “I’m supporting that lady but I’m not supporting your claims to have the same treatment for pneumoconiosis”?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bach]

I must be under a misapprehension. I thought that this group was about the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, had so succinctly moved and about my own amendments to which I also hope to speak, perhaps even more succinctly in due course. I am listening carefully to the noble Lord, as I always do, but it seems that his amendments are part of the group that begins with his Amendment 132B. I am surprised that the noble Lord has not waited to speak to his group as it appears on the Marshalled List. Perhaps he can explain to the House why he is doing this.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am very happy to do that. I will speak to it further in due course. Frankly, I am anxious not to make the 31-minute speech that I made when we last discussed this particular issue and to relieve your Lordships of that burden. I am splitting what I intend to say, which I think is necessary to cover the whole field, so that it becomes a little more understandable. I take the noble Lord’s rebuke in good part, but let me repeat that asking for the status quo in mesothelioma cases only is not the way to go forward.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

My Lords, I would draw the noble Lord’s attention to the actual words in the amendment and indeed in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, which is in this group. We have corresponded about this and he has been good enough to share with me prior to the debate some of the points that he has made eloquently this afternoon. I am grateful for that. However, this amendment goes slightly wider than he is suggesting in his remarks today and would cover, for instance, pneumoconiosis as well.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

132B: Clause 43, page 30, line 10, after “are” insert “, subject to subsection 4C,”

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, this group of amendments sets out the refinements to the architecture of the Bill that I have previously suggested. Noble Lords heard from me at some length before and I do not propose to repeat everything I said. I would just remind your Lordships that the model I am suggesting is that lawyers’ success fees should not be paid if the case settles or liability is admitted before proceedings are commenced. The reason for that is that there is no risk to the lawyers that they will not be paid. Noble Lords will recall that I quoted from my own speech back in 1998 when I indicated then that the question of risk was important, but had never been properly assessed. That is the first limb of my argument, and it is set out in Amendment 132C.

I went on to draw attention to the significance of the point of allocation within proceedings where a case is sent to the fast track of small claims or becomes one of the multi-track cases. In the multi-track cases, I suggested that the success fee should be paid, but split 50:50 between the successful claimant and the losing defendant. While in this area, I suggested that the claimant would have an interest in the amount of the success fee and that there would be the possibility of competition. Those points are set out in Amendments 132E, 133B and 133E.

That is the point I reached when the noble Lord, Lord Bach, suggested that I had gone on for too long, and no doubt I had. It is interesting because we are supposed to have these discussions about legislation on Report. The last time I spoke on this issue, the noble Lord, Lord Newton, said that he was in a fog and someone leant across to ask, “What on earth is he talking about?”. That suggests that legislation on these detailed points should not be on the face of the Bill but should be dealt with in secondary legislation following negotiations between interested parties. This system builds in a form of solidity that it is very difficult to remove.

--- Later in debate ---

We are not persuaded that the refinements proposed by my noble friend would lead to a fair or workable solution. We believe that we have struck the right balances, abolishing the recoverability of success fees, and ATE insurance premiums will mean that claimants have an interest in the cost being curbed on their behalf, which will help to restore proportion and fairness in the current regime. We are also clear that special damages for future care and loss, which provide for necessary care and equipment, should be protected and not apportioned among those representing the claimant. I cannot accept that to change the overall package in this way at this time would lower the costs of civil litigation across the board. Against that background I urge my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I am not so much disappointed as hurt by my noble and learned friend’s reply. I am hurt that he thinks that my amendments would increase the cost. The whole purpose of tabling these amendments was to come forward with a system that squeezes the excess costs of litigation out of the system. This is one area where he is wrong to make that suggestion.

The other matter that concerns me is that the Minister should suggest that I am in some way completely wrecking the architecture of the Bill. I am not; I am trying to make it better for one reason. The one factor that was missing from his response was whether litigation solicitors and barristers will take on difficult and risky cases under the regime that is now proposed. It is not about the Jackson proposals in toto, although various things are left out. This is the issue. Only time will tell. Will solicitors take these cases on when the success fee has been squeezed down in the way that is proposed?

I was suggesting that for one level—for settlements and so on—there should not be a success fee because there is no risk. That brings down the cost of litigation as a whole. However, where there are risky cases lawyers need a proper reward. That factor was not mentioned in my noble and learned friend’s response. I hope to talk to him more about this matter before we finally dispose of the Bill but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 132B withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

133A: Clause 43, page 30, line 24, at end insert—
“( ) In section 58A of that Act, after subsection (6), insert—
“(7) A costs order may include provision requiring the payment of any fees payable under a conditional fee agreement which provides for a success fee in the following proceedings—
(a) proceedings in England and Wales by a company which is being wound up in England and Wales or Scotland;(b) proceedings by a company which has entered administration under Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986;(c) proceedings in England and Wales by a person acting in the capacity of—(i) liquidator of a company which is being wound up in England and Wales or Scotland; or(ii) trustee of a bankrupt’s estate; (d) proceedings by a person acting in the capacity of an administrator appointed pursuant to the provisions of Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986.(8) In subsections (7)(a) and (7)(c) “company” means a company within the meaning of section 1 of the Companies Act 2006 or a company which may be wound up under Part V of the Insolvency Act 1986.”.”

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I return to a subject which we addressed in Committee: proceedings brought by a liquidator of a company, the trustee of a bankrupt’s estate or an administrator appointed pursuant to the provisions of Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986 to recover the assets of a business or company which has gone into liquidation or has become financially insolvent.

The point is that insolvency practitioners who engage in that important work have to bring proceedings to recover the assets of the company, or money representing the assets of a company, from a company director or partner in the firm. They can be very expensive proceedings, because a lot of investigation has to be undertaken. Often, the director or partner who is in default has disappeared—or hopped it overseas—so it is not easy to bring those proceedings. The liquidators, and so on, cannot bring the proceedings themselves. They employ solicitors to do that and to carry out those investigations. From time to time, they are forced to go to court to try to get a court order against an individual. In so doing, a conditional fee agreement is entered into, and a success fee is part of that conditional fee agreement.

As all of us will know, one of the major creditors is Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. Consequently, it seems a little silly to employ insolvency practitioners to recover all this money and then to have a reduction, contrary to the interests of the Revenue and Customs, from whatever has been recovered in order to pay the success fee. It seems to me that the success fee, when these proceedings are successful, should be paid by the person who is in default—the person who has hopped it. That is the current situation.

I mentioned earlier today that back in 1990 when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, introduced conditional fee agreements for the first time, there were three categories: personal injuries, insolvency proceedings and applications to the European Court of Human Rights. So from the very beginning, from the inception of this type of agreement, insolvency practitioners have had this protection for the proceedings that they have to bring. From the point of view of making sure that the defaulter pays and in the interests of the Revenue and Customs and perfectly decent creditors which may be a large firm or a small firm, it seems only sensible that the amendment should succeed. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Can my noble friend tell us when these proposals will be finalised and whether it will be during the currency of this Bill?

[Lord McNally]

I am trying to work out the vaguest reply that I can give to that. Discussions are going on and, as I said, we will make an announcement as soon as possible.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am very much enlightened by my noble friend’s formulation. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, made a very good point. It is the taxpayer’s money that we are talking about here, and not just the taxpayer but the worthy creditor, the small businessman or even the large businessman who has given credit to a firm that has gone into liquidation, sometimes through fraud and sometimes through incompetence. However, the taxpayer and the businessman are going to suffer because of this provision, unless my noble friend is saying that these proceedings are never going to be brought because there is some other way of doing it. The vagueness has left us all a little in the air. However, for the moment and subject to further discussions between now and Third Reading, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 133A withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

142C: After Clause 53, insert the following new Clause—
“Third party litigation funding
(1) A third party litigation funding agreement which satisfies all of the conditions applicable to it by virtue of this section shall not be unenforceable by reason only of it being a third party litigation funding agreement; but any other third party litigation funding agreement shall be unenforceable.
(2) A third party litigation funding agreement is an agreement under which a third party (“the funder”) agrees to fund (in whole or in part) the provision of advocacy or litigation services to another person (“the litigant”) by a person other than the funder in exchange for remuneration.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), “remuneration” includes—
(a) a payment or any other transfer of value representing or calculated by reference to the value of a judgment or settlement; and(b) an assignment of the proceeds (in whole or in part) of any judgment or settlement.(4) The following conditions are applicable to a third party litigation funding agreement—
(a) it must be in writing;(b) it must not relate to—(i) proceedings which by virtue of section 58A(1) and (2) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 cannot be the subject of an enforceable conditional fee agreement;(ii) a multi-party action, representative action or any proceedings which are the subject of a group litigation order; or(iii) any other proceedings of a description prescribed by the Lord Chancellor;(c) it must comply with such requirements as shall be prescribed by the Lord Chancellor.(5) Regulations under subsection (4)(c) may—
(a) require any person which enters into a third party funding agreement with a litigant to first obtain a license from a licensing body to be designated by the Lord Chancellor; and(b) set out conditions to be satisfied in order to obtain such a license.(6) In this section “advocacy services” and “litigation services” are as defined in section 119 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.”

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, the amendment raises the issue of third party litigation funding. I made a lengthy contribution in Committee which I do not propose to repeat. The basis of the amendment is to bring under government control third party litigation funding. Your Lordships may recall that a voluntary code has been entered into by those who are concerned in third party litigation funding and I suggested in Committee, and I repeat, that it is far better that the Lord Chancellor should take a look at this and bring in something along the lines of what I have suggested in my amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Bach]

We agree with the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, I have said before that we are grateful to my noble friend for raising this issue. It is a possible problem and a number of noble and learned Lords and lawyers outside have given warning signals. At the moment we are looking at how voluntary regulation is working in the area. However, my right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor is very aware of the situation and is keeping it under review. We do not think that statutory regulation through this Bill is either the right place or the right time but we welcome the fact that my noble friend has put this issue on the political radar. Both lawyers and legislators will have to follow the matter closely to see whether we will need to return to it at some future date. In the mean time, I ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

On this occasion I am grateful to my noble friend for his reply. My purpose was to highlight the insidious advance of third party litigation funding. It is essentially an American concept that has advanced into this country. So far it has reached commercial litigation, with which I have no quarrel. It has also got into family law and I shall be extremely concerned if it were to get into personal injury cases. The fact that the Lord Chancellor now has it on his agenda and will monitor the way in which the voluntary code operates is of great comfort to me and it is on that basis that I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 142C withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

142D: After Clause 53, insert the following new Clause—
“Third party offers to settle
It shall be an offence for a third party insurance company to solicit a claimant who has a cause of action for personal injuries against its policy holder, to make an offer to settle that cause of action unless—(a) it has obtained adequate medical evidence of the personal injury and has disclosed it to the claimant; and(b) the claimant is advised when the offer is made of his right to obtain legal advice; and(c) the offer is in full and final settlement of the cause of action.”

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

This amendment concerns the third party insurance company, which approaches a prospective claimant and offers to settle without there being adequate medical evidence, without the claimant being informed that he has a right to legal advice and without the offer being in full and final settlement of the cause of action. In Committee, I hesitated to suggest that it should be a criminal offence, and suggested that the best way of dealing with the matter should be that such settlements would be void, which would enable a claimant who subsequently discovered that he was in a far worse condition than he had thought to reopen the matter and to claim damages for the injuries that he received. That is a practice that has crept in. It means that people accept settlements without proper advice or evidence of what is wrong with them and without a proper calculation of their losses. It seems to me that a lot of people are vulnerable to that type of approach. That is one side of the problem. The other side is that it encourages people with no basis for a claim at all to make one and accept a sum of money that means that, over a large range of cases, the insurance company benefits. That is just as bad as that people should be incited to put forward fraudulent claims.

My noble friend’s answer in Committee was that the FSA rules are sufficient to cover the matters of which I complain. That immediately makes me ask who enforces the FSA rules. What control is there over the employee of a third-party insurance company who, quite clandestinely, makes offers of this sort to settle cases that are perfectly valid and which he knows to be valid? So at this stage I put forward the suggestion that it should be a criminal offence for people to engage in this type of behaviour. That may be going a step further. Perhaps my original concept that the alleged settlement obtained should be void was the right way to go. But certainly there is an abuse going on and I expect the Government to do more than to refer to FSA rules when there is no one to enforce them. I beg to move.

[Lord Bach]

The Minister would be well advised to give serious consideration to the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. This is not one that he moved in Committee—he has moved it for the first time today. The House knows that he has become an expert in this field of litigation over the months that he has spoken to me about it. He may well be right that it is no good the Government taking a position that looks like it may take some time to develop. It is something that needs to be done and thought about pretty promptly. Therefore, as far as we can, we support the amendment.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Martin, who talked about the proper role of the House of Lords. Although the hour is late, my noble friend Lord Thomas has demonstrated one of the benefits of this House in bringing to the Government’s attention an area where there already is or could be a malpractice that will have to be dealt with. As he explained, this is a practice where an insurer approaches a claimant directly, usually immediately after a road traffic accident, with a view to settling the claim, where an insurer’s own policyholder is at fault in a car accident. As I understand it, claimant representatives refer to this practice as third party capture, whereas defendant representatives call it third party assistance. As I indicated in Committee, I shall continue to refer to this practice as third party contact.

Amendment 142D would make it an offence for an insurer to make such an unsolicited approach to a potential claimant in a personal injury case. The amendment also specifies those requirements which must be met before an insurer may make an offer to settle such a claim. This includes a requirement to obtain adequate medical evidence of injury and to advise the claimant of their right to obtain full legal advice before accepting the offer and making it clear to the claimant that the offer to settle is full and final.

It is unclear what my noble friend means when he says that this practice should be an offence. If he refers to this as being a criminal offence, I do not believe that a criminal sanction is appropriate or proportionate. You would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that something amounted to an unsolicited approach. As I explained in Committee, the Financial Services Authority regulates the insurance industry and requires insurers to treat their customers fairly at all times and that this covers third party claimants.

Third-party contact does not in itself cause detriment to the consumer and may be to their advantage, as a claim can often be resolved quickly. In addition, this practice can allow insurers to reduce the legal costs associated with handling a claim and this in turn reduces costs for all policyholders. However, I am aware of the concerns around the potential risk of conflict of interest and the need for the claimant to have independent legal advice before any settlement is agreed. This matter was looked at by the FSA in its review of third-party contact during 2009-10 and it did not find conclusive evidence that unrepresented third parties could have achieved higher compensation had they obtained independent legal representation.

Following the FSA’s review, the Association of British Insurers published a code of practice in June 2010. The code contains specific guidance for insurers on contacting claimants. This limits unsolicited contact. For example, and I quote:

“Insurers will not make unsolicited visits to an unrepresented claimant at their current address, including hospitals”.

The code also requires that claimants are informed of their right to seek independent legal advice and other options available for them to resolve their claim.

Most of the issues which this amendment seeks to address in respect of the handling of third-party contact claims are already covered by existing regulation. The FSA rules require that insurers fully inform third party claimants of their legal rights, including to independent legal advice and alternatives to settling directly with the insurer. The Government do not believe it is right or appropriate to introduce further sanctions or regulation in this area, especially when a scheme already exists to monitor insurers’ activities. That said, I can reassure my noble friend that if a serious concern arises in the future in this area—and we will keep it under review—we will not hesitate to take this up with the Treasury and with the FSA.

I am therefore grateful to my noble friend for raising this issue with us, but for the reasons that I have mentioned I hope that he will agree to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. I am glad that some publicity has been give to this practice which I believe to be fairly widespread and causing a great deal of concern. As long as the Government keep their eye on this area, I shall be satisfied. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 142D withdrawn.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 12th March 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

93: Clause 9, page 6, line 20, at end insert “, or
“(c) that it is in the interest of justice generally”

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, we have finally clawed our way out of Schedule 1 and back into the body of the Bill to meet immediately a difficulty—what is meant by an exceptional case determination under Clause 9. The problem that lawyers see immediately on seeing the word “exceptional” is that when it is normally used in proceedings it means that out of a cohort of cases one stands out because of some exceptional peculiarity. However, that cannot be the meaning of what we see in Clause 9, because an exceptional case determination is defined in subsection (3), which says:

“For the purposes of subsection (2), an exceptional case determination is a determination”,

and then describes what type of determination it is: first,

“that it is necessary to make the services available … because failure to do so would be a breach of … the individual’s Convention rights … or … enforceable EU rights, or”,

secondly,

“that it is appropriate to do so, in the particular circumstances of the case, having regard to any risk that failure to do so would be such a breach”.

That is it; that is what exceptional case determination is.

My mind immediately goes to the sort of issues that we discussed earlier in relation to appeals, from the First-tier Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal and beyond, where a litigant in person is seeking to cope with a government legal team that appears on the other side to argue what must necessarily be issues of law, otherwise it would not be up in that area. That immediately rings the bell of equality of arms in a very serious way, and I cannot imagine that any of these cases would not fall within the definition of an exceptional case determination as set out in Clause 9(3), which I have already read out. In one sense it is a very narrow definition, but in another it introduces all the rights that are available under the European convention. Yet there must be other cases where the European convention is not engaged.

The purpose of my amendment, and I note amendments in the name of other noble Lords, is to widen the ambit of an exceptional case determination to the point where the director of legal aid services considers,

“that it is in the interest of justice generally”.

I appreciate that is a very wide definition, but unless the director of legal aid services has a wide discretion, how can he cope with the multifarious applications that will be made to him on the basis of their being exceptional cases? I am not going to spell out any, because these things come out of the woodwork. All of a sudden a case will obviously require, in the interests of justice, to be supported by legal aid because of the wider interest that is involved or because of the public points that have been made, and so on. One can envisage all sorts of circumstances. Although the words here seem modest, they are asking for a wide discretion, and that is the purpose of my amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Avebury]

My Lords, when we were discussing the first amendment this afternoon it was said that some immigration cases are determined on straightforward questions of fact. However, what we did after that Division, unfortunately, was to lump them all together so that the routine immigration matters that were referred to in the Minister’s letter, which was quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are being integrated with issues of extreme legal complexity which, as we have heard, go all the way up to the Supreme Court. We heard the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, say that a sizeable proportion of the Supreme Court’s diet was immigration cases. It will be interesting to hear from my noble and learned friend how the person who starts off as a litigant in person and gets part way up the ladder towards the Supreme Court would be able to gain representation when it became appreciated that the case was one of extreme legal complexity; or is this litigant supposed to go all the way up to the Supreme Court dealing with the case himself?

The intention of the amendment is to provide scope for exceptional funding to be made available in these complex immigration cases. In such cases, the individual will be without legal representation by reason of the restriction on non-legal professional provision of immigration advice and services, the individual being unable to afford legal representation and the general exclusion of immigration from the scope of legal aid. The Bill removes most non-asylum immigration matters from the scope of legal aid. One of the main arguments used by the Government is that legal advice is not needed in a whole variety of cases, of which immigration cases are one example, and that instead those currently receiving advice and representation under legal aid will be able to look to general advice agencies, particularly the non-for-profit sector, for assistance, as we have heard. This rationale fails to address the provisions dealing with immigration advice and services in Part 5 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which say that only a person who is registered under the regulatory scheme run by the office of the Immigration Services Commissioner can provide those services. That scheme includes some not-for-profit organisations but very few of them are permitted to undertake work in key areas of immigration law. None is permitted to do judicial review work. Only those at the higher levels of the scheme, levels 2 and 3, are permitted to work on family reunions, appeals—representation at which is restricted to the highest level, level 3—removals and deportations, applications outside the rules, and illegal entrants and overstayers.

Level 1 advisers, who constitute the vast majority of the not-for-profit organisations, are excluded altogether from these key areas for which legal aid is currently provided but will not be provided in future, save where an asylum claim is being pursued. Therefore, the suggestion that general advisers can fill the gap left by the withdrawal of legal aid simply does not work in immigration cases because of the regulatory scheme. Yet the scheme is an important safeguard against the exploitation of migrants by unqualified persons who offer themselves as immigration advisers, of which there used to be hundreds. The scheme was introduced with support across the political parties in response to serious concerns about such exploitation.

I shall give a couple of examples of the sort of immigration cases that I envisage being far too complex for the individual to cope with. First, there is the case of a British overseas citizen of Malaysian origin, about whose plight my right honourable friend Simon Hughes and I had an interview, along with representatives of the Malaysian BOC community, with the Minister, Damian Green, a couple of weeks ago. It would not be necessary to trouble the Minister with cases that did not warrant representation by legal professionals.

My second example is of a Kuwaiti Bidoon who has indefinite leave to remain in this country but whose wife and children, having left Kuwait clandestinely, found themselves in Damascus, where there was no provision for them to establish their identity as relatives of the head of the family in England. They have been stranded there for months, separated from him, because of the difficulty in getting permission to come here. Do they not need legal aid? Is it really the case that a family reunion of this sort can be dealt with by non-professionals, or even with the assistance of Members of Parliament? As I said, we expect Members of Parliament to be deluged with requests for advice and help in such cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The noble Baroness acknowledged that I referred to some of the issues about unaccompanied children, but I will certainly draw her remarks and the point that she made about the Refugee Council to the attention of my honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, one of the comforting sayings at the Bar, which I have found over 50 years to be absolutely true, is that when one door shuts another opens. It seems to me that, if he has heard of that saying north of the border, the noble and learned Lord will be aware that he has set out in his reply the basis of innumerable applications for judicial review of the decisions made by the director of legal aid services. It is impossible for there not to be a challenge to the statement made by the noble and learned Lord because almost anything can be brought within the ECHR rules, generally speaking, if you really try. We have heard reference to Articles 2, 6, 7, 8 and 14 tonight, which gives us five articles to play with.

I can assure the noble and learned Lord that the legal profession will look forward to testing his description and the ambit of the clause for a considerable period—case after case. It would be so much simpler if a broad discretion were given to the director of legal aid services, coupled with guidance that we could look at, in order that there would be some ambit to it. If the formulation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, which was found to be so seductive last time, were adopted with guidance, that could prevent an awful lot of future litigation. With that very pleasant prospect in mind, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 93 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

105A: Clause 20, page 15, line 14, at end insert—
“( ) For the purposes of subsection (1), “financial resources” shall include all the realisable property of the individual subject to a restraint order under section 41 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (restraint orders).
( ) The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is amended as follows.
( ) In section 41, omit subsections (4) and (5) and substitute—
“(4)(a) A restraint order may be made subject to an exception for the provision of reasonable legal expenses in criminal proceedings in the Crown Court, whether or not they relate to an offence mentioned in Section 40(2) or (3), subject to conditions—(i) an application for the release of such expenses shall be made by the alleged offender to the Court where the offence for which they are required is to be tried,(ii) notice shall be given of the application to the prosecutor or the Director, (iii) the application shall be supported by a costs budget verified by the solicitor to the alleged offender,(iv) the budget shall be calculated on the basis of current legal aid rates,(b) The Court shall not make an order prejudicial to a co-defendant.(5) The Court shall supervise the course of an order made under subsection (4) above and may from time to time review the order on the application by the prosecutor or the Director, or by or on behalf of the alleged offender.””

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, Amendment 105A is in substitution for Amendment 105, which was drafted in identical terms to the amendment that I moved in Committee. As your Lordships will recall, my concern is that a person who has had his assets frozen should have those assets counted as financial resources when his application for legal aid is considered. At this time of night I do not think that a large exposition of that concept is needed, but I point to the differences between this amendment and the amendment moved in Committee. It was suggested by the Minister that you cannot easily unfreeze the assets of a person who is a criminal. I decided that I would do my best to show how simply it could be done by including in the Bill the conditions that could be applied. Amendment 105A states:

“A restraint order may be made subject to an exception for the provision of reasonable legal expenses in criminal proceedings in the Crown Court”—

I am not referring to the magistrates’ court—whether or not they relate to the offence for which the person has been arrested, subject to certain conditions. Those conditions are an application to be made to the court,

“where the offence for which they are required is to be tried”.

Further,

“notice shall be given of the application to the prosecutor or the Director”—

of Public Prosecutions—

“the application shall be supported by a costs budget verified by the solicitor to the alleged offender”.

Further,

“the budget shall be calculated on the basis of current legal aid rates”.

We are not suggesting that frozen assets should be released so that a locked-up defendant’s lawyer can drive around in a Rolls-Royce. He should receive remuneration as if it was a legal aid case but it would not come out of public funds—it would come out of the restrained assets. If such an order were made, it is very important that it should not be prejudicial to a co-defendant. One would not wish to see a defendant gaining an advantage by employing the leading Silk in the field of fraud in which he may have been engaged whereas his co-defendant was not able to do so.

Finally, the amendment states:

“The court shall supervise the course of an order … and may from time to time review the order on the application by the prosecutor or the Director, or by or on behalf of the alleged offender”.

It seems to me that this is a straightforward, simple code that could be introduced to permit the frozen assets of an alleged offender to be unfrozen for the purposes of his defence. I hope that the Government will accept this or something like it. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend for saying that, and I am pleased that there are investigations. That is nothing to do with me but perhaps more to do with a person who was named in the Evening Standard the week before last as having received £5 million in legal aid. When one considers the sort of concessions that we and certainly the Opposition have been looking for for civil legal aid, providing £5 million to one person in a criminal case, when he is living in his wife’s seven-bedroom Mayfair mansion, surely stimulates the Ministry of Justice far more than anything that I might say. I look forward to the work that the noble Lord referred to and, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 105A withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

108: Clause 22, page 17, line 41, at end insert “save that an individual shall not be required to pay a percentage of the damages he receives for the purposes of a supplementary legal aid scheme”

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I move the amendment in a probing manner. I am concerned about a statement made by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, in Committee that involves setting up a supplementary legal aid scheme with a proposed deduction of 25 per cent from the damages of people who are supported by legal aid.

So much time has been spent in the course of the Bill in fighting to get areas of litigation back into scope that it is ironic that if those efforts were to succeed and damages awarded in any particular case, they would be immediately subject to a 25 per cent deduction for the purposes of setting up a fund from which other people would receive legal aid. It is a tax on their damages.

The noble Lord, Lord McNally, said in Committee that that was in order to make it no more attractive to have legal aid than to have damages subject to a success fee payable by a successful claimant limited to 25 per cent of his damages to date of trial. There is a difference. The whole purpose of changing the success fee, the burden of payment in conditional fee agreements, from the defendant to the claimant, and for it to be a charge on his damages, was so that there would be competition between solicitors for the business of the claimant at the outset. A solicitor might say, “There will be no success fee payable with me”, or, “My success fee will be limited to 12.5 per cent of the damages, not 25 per cent”. That is a better position than that of a legally aided person, who will have a whole 25 per cent taken out of his damages in any event. When is the supplementary legal aid scheme likely to come into being? I know that there was similar provision in the Access to Justice Act 1999, but under the previous Government it was never brought into effect.

The other matter that concerns me is that the provision could be brought in by secondary legislation under the negative procedure. That would mean that it would be subject to no or very little debate in Parliament and imposed on us. My second concern is to ensure that if such a scheme is to be introduced in future, it should properly be brought under the affirmative procedure so that we have a chance to debate and consider it before it comes before the House for approval.

Those are the reasons why I have tabled the amendment, and I await enlightenment. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, this is another case of déjà vu. In Committee, I congratulated the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, on his amendment. He was absolutely right then; he is absolutely right tonight. I hope that, having heard the noble Lord again, the Minister will acknowledge that he has made a very powerful case on both limbs—the principle and the procedure to which his amendments are addressed. I hope that the Minister can give a satisfactory reply that will not lead to those deductions being made, still less by the defective procedure, which, as the noble Lord has amply demonstrated, would be quite inappropriate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNally]

Very good. On the specific issue at hand, we hope to bring in the scheme with the rest of the Bill in 2013 and it will be subject to the affirmative order, so my noble friend will have other opportunities to discuss this matter. As he has now acknowledged, the Explanatory Notes to the Bill make it clear that we intend to use the power in subsection (3) to establish a supplementary legal aid scheme. The scheme will apply to damages cases where the successful party has been legally aided.

As we also said in our response to the consultation on legal aid reform, under the regulations that we will make, 25 per cent of certain damages successfully claimed by legally aided parties will be recovered by the Legal Aid Fund. The relevant damages are all those other than damages for future care and loss. I had better stop there and say that I have just had a message that the procedure will be negative, not affirmative.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

It is negative in the Bill. My amendment would make it affirmative.

[Lord McNally]

It will remain negative.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

That was a quick decision, if I may respectfully say so.

[Lord McNally]

The noble Lord did say that we were allowed to change our mind.

The power at subsection (3) is not new. Section 10(2)(c) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 explicitly allows for regulations to provide that a legally aided person can make a payment exceeding the cost of the services received. When we consulted on the legal aid reforms, we specifically consulted on introducing such a supplementary legal aid scheme.

As well as creating an additional source of funding for civil legal aid, the supplementary legal aid scheme will address the interrelationship between legal aid and the proposed reforms to the costs of civil litigation put forward by Lord Justice Jackson, which are reflected in Part 2 of the Bill. We want to ensure that as far possible the recovery level of damages by the supplementary legal aid scheme complements the Jackson reforms so that conditional fee agreements are no less attractive than legal aid. The recovery level of 25 per cent of all damages, other than those for future care and loss, is therefore based on the success fee cap for a conditional fee agreement in a personal injury case.

Under the Jackson proposals, there will also be an increase of 10 per cent in non-pecuniary general damages, such as damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity in tort cases. This will help claimants to pay their conditional fee agreement success fee or a 25 per cent portion of the relevant damages, if legally aided.

There has been a suggestion that it is unfair for successful claimants to be asked to help to underwrite the cost of the legal aid scheme in the way proposed. We do not see it as unfair. A claimant who wishes to proceed in a civil action with the aid of public funding is asking the taxpayer to take a risk on his or her behalf. Where that risk bears fruit in the form of what may be a very substantial sum of money, it is perfectly reasonable for a share of that to go back into the public pot so that the continued taking of such risks can more easily be sustained.

In sum, the power to make a supplementary legal aid scheme has now been sought by successive Governments. It has previously been approved by Parliament. Financial constraints are now such that we believe that it would be wrong not to exercise it in the way that we have clearly proposed and consulted on. Omitting to do so would also be out of step with the wider reforms to civil litigation that we are making. In light of my explanation, I hope that the noble Lord will agree to withdraw the amendment.

I now turn to Amendment 130, which would make any regulations made under Clause 22 subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, necessitating a debate and approval of a resolution by both Houses before the regulations could be made. We believe that this amendment is specifically related to Clause 22(3), although it goes much wider. As I have explained, we intend to use the power in Clause 22(3) to make regulations to establish a supplementary legal aid scheme. We believe that this amendment is aimed at ensuring that the details of the supplementary legal aid scheme are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. An equivalent regulation-making power is contained at Section 10(2)(c) of the Access to Justice Act 1999. That power is subject to the negative resolution procedure. Our starting point is therefore, why should that change?

I am aware that there has been some suggestion that the Government have not been sufficiently clear about their intentions with regard to the use to which they intend to put the power in Clause 22(3). Nothing could be further from the truth. The proposal to introduce a supplementary legal aid scheme was clearly stated in the,

“Summary of the legal aid reform programme”,

contained in Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales: The Government Response. That paper also contained a five-page annex explaining the proposal in the light of the response to the preceding consultation.

Paragraph 168 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill also made our intended use of the Clause 22(3) power perfectly clear. Both Houses have now had an opportunity to debate the clause in the light of explanations that we have given. Clause 22(3) was specifically debated both in Committee in the other place and in Committee in your Lordships’ House. We believe that all that, combined with the negative resolution procedure in respect of the regulations, allows adequate public and parliamentary scrutiny in relation to the supplementary legal aid scheme.

The Delegated Powers Committee of the House considered the delegated powers of this Bill and did not comment on the application of the negative resolution procedure in relation to Clause 22(3). The Government’s memorandum to the committee explicitly highlighted our intended use of Clause 22(3). This amendment is therefore unnecessary.

I should also point out that the amendment goes much wider than just Clause 22(3) and would require the affirmative resolution procedure for any regulations under Clause 22. That would be undesirable and disproportionate. The powers under Clause 22 are those that will be used to set out the detailed rules regarding payment of contributions and case costs in respect of both criminal and civil legal aid. The negative resolution procedure is clearly the most appropriate for the type of highly detailed and technical provisions envisaged here, which will require variation from time to time. In those circumstances, I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment. I regret the confusion in my note reading halfway through that explanation.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I think it was Champerty rather than maintenance where a third party takes a chunk of the damages that a litigant obtains in court. It is curious how far we have come to defeat these very ancient principles of English law. You can see the Magna Carta barons around the Chamber looking down on us; you can see them trembling as they listen to my noble friend putting forward this proposition. It is true that it was in the Access to Justice Act, but I do not believe that it was ever brought into force. It is also true that it was mentioned in the consultation document, which I read. In a document of some 150 pages, it covered one-third of a page; one paragraph related to it. It certainly was not highlighted either in the House of Commons or in this House that there should be such a deduction from the damages that are obtained by a legally aided person. I regret that.

A supplementary legal aid scheme could have been an alternative to support for conditional fee agreements—an argument that was made a long time ago—and it is true that a supplementary legal aid scheme has been adopted successfully in Hong Kong for people who do not qualify for legal aid. However, to have it in addition to the other provisions of the Bill is regrettable. For the moment—well, for all time—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 108 withdrawn.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Wednesday 7th March 2012 Lords Chamber

Finally, I should mention the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, myself and others. I was asked to say something about it at this juncture so I shall very briefly. The amendment deals with the question of a review of clinical negligence. The range of the arguments and the difficulties that have been outlined in the course of this debate show how important it will be to see the effect of any changes brought about by this legislation. In due course, I hope that that will produce a positive response from the Minister.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and the noble Lord, Lord Newton, will appreciate the importance of the concessions which the Liberal Democrats have negotiated—namely, that there should be a power in the Lord Chancellor to put areas of law back into scope because they may very well be right. It may be that these alterations will be more expensive than the Government think at this time. I very much welcome Amendment 68 which keeps birth injuries within the scope of legal aid. The reason for being concerned about cases claiming damages for personal injury arising out of medical negligence is that they currently receive legal aid as an exception to the previous Government’s removal of legal aid in personal injury cases.

Of course, four out of five claims fail or are withdrawn. Unlike a car accident or a factory accident, it is very difficult to appreciate negligence where negligence happens without the highly specialised and expensive investigation to which my noble friend Lord Faulks has referred. Although I have some experience of medical negligence cases, I defer to his very great experience and expertise. He raises the question, which I think is on everyone's mind: if you make an exception for birth injuries, what about the rest? It does not mean that claimants will be denied access to justice. If at the moment 80 per cent of clinical negligence cases are handled by conditional fee agreements, a greater proportion of these cases will simply be added to that route for funding.

In the course of the reforms that are set out in this Bill, it is essential that one-way cost shifting occurs in relation to cases that are brought under conditional fee agreements. That means that, win or lose, the defendant insurers will pay their own costs. The reason for the huge rise in insurance premiums, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, referred, is the huge increase in the costs of the defendants. If four out of five claims fail, a claimant is very much without insurance; after-the-event insurance is very much at risk of being ruined by bringing an action. If, as the Government propose, one-way cost shifting is applied in this area, the unsuccessful claimant will have to carry only the costs of the disbursements. In medical negligence cases, as has been pointed out, such costs can be very high. It was for that reason that, in the Commons, the Government, recognising the problem, amended the Bill so that the cost of the premium of ensuring the disbursements, the costs of the medical expert reports, will be passed over to an unsuccessful defendant and will be absorbed, in the usual way, by the insurance company if the claim does not succeed. The insurance premium, instead of being at the dramatic size that it is at the moment, will be very much reduced and the risks under conditional fee agreements of unsuccessful claimants paying a great deal of money will be very much reduced.

The whole area of medical negligence needs to be looked at. Although we have been talking about high-cost cases, in fact the majority of these cases attract damages of less than £20,000. They are for negligent treatment for minor injuries perhaps. We are not always talking about catastrophic injuries in relation to medical negligence. Therefore, I have been arguing for an NHS redress scheme, such as that which was introduced in Wales within the past two years. The Government have said that they regard that scheme, which deals with cases up to a value of £20,000, as a pilot and, depending on how the scheme goes, will consider introducing it into England.

But the power already exists. The previous Government passed the NHS Redress Act in 2006 and Wales grasped the opportunity, as did Scotland. They grasped the opportunity of introducing a scheme with fixed fees for lawyers and fixed fees for expert reports to satisfy the problem that exists with low-value medical negligence cases. If we could progress that a little further in England, it would do a great deal to relieve the concerns that have been expressed here today.

I hope that my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace will be able to make some favourable noises in relation to an NHS redress scheme. The Opposition could not object: they brought in the Act in 2006, though they never thought that the people of England deserved it being implemented. On the other hand, the people of Wales took a different view. All reports so far on how its scheme is going suggest that it works well, reduces legal fees and provides solutions for people who have been injured. I hope that the Minister will tell us that something along those lines will be considered in this very difficult area.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, perhaps I may ask a short supplementary question following the queries made by my noble friend Lord Carlile about Clause 9. I was intending to raise it on a later amendment but will do so now if my noble friend is going to deal with it.

The natural meaning of “exceptional cases” suggests to me something very unusual about either the claim or the claimant. I am troubled that claimants might fall foul by virtue of being part of a cohort. Can the Minister help me with what is meant by “enforceable EU rights”, which, along with convention rights, bring one within the exceptional determination provision?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Although the organisation questions, it is hardly saying something that is contrary to what I have said. I have said that if everything went wrong and worst-case scenarios arose, the amendment accepted by the Government, which would permit bringing these matters back into scope, would be extremely important.

[Lord Beecham]

It would be extremely important if the Government acted on it. We do not know that they will. While the noble Lord claims credit for the amendment, he was not quite so enthusiastic when it was being debated in Committee at the instigation of this side, but that is a little beside the point. The litigation authority states clearly:

“Overall, we are strongly in favour of retaining legal aid for clinical negligence cases using current eligibility criteria”.

In that phraseology, it echoes the words of Lord Justice Jackson.

Welcome as the government amendment is, they anticipated some discussion about it because they also questioned whether the scheme would cover only cases of the most severe brain damage or whether it would extend also to claims for moderate brain damage and shoulder dystocia, or to children whose mental faculties are spared but who have serious physical disabilities. We know that we are dealing only with a limited number of perinatal cases, as movingly explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton. Again, it would seem that, on balance, the litigation authority, although it welcomes no doubt the progress made so far, would not be content with leaving the situation as it stands.

Of course, the case of Sophie Tyler was very moving. It is interesting that her solicitor said:

“This is an important case which has allowed our client to access justice and secure the lifetime of future care she needs but it would not have been possible without the support of legal aid”.

That is a very important observation. However, there are many other kinds of claim which arise out of different types of clinical negligence and with different effects. While the number of adverse incidents has now risen to 1.15 million, there are some 2,500 clinical negligence claims in what is a called a “serious category”. Of those, 12.5 per cent result in death; 17 per cent lead to unnecessary operations or amputations; 8 per cent lead to damages to nerves or senses; and 2.9 per cent lead to cancer. So 50 per cent of six major categories overall are not of the kind that would be covered by the government amendment.

In these circumstances, it is quite clear that a substantial number of people will not be able to access legal aid. Despite the assertions of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, it must be questioned whether the conditional fee system would be an answer to that and, in particular, whether that would not in itself increase the costs to the National Health Service.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Perhaps I may point out to the noble Lord, and my noble friend the Minister will confirm this, that I raised the issue of increasing the powers of the Lord Chancellor before Second Reading. If he would like to consult the record, he will see that my amendment, to bring areas back into scope, was tabled on the very first day that amendments could be put down. The amendments put down by the Labour Party were many days after that.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, some nerve damage is being sustained by the noble Lord. Let us, however, concentrate on the issue, which is rather more important than claiming credit for amendments; namely, the future of patients who undergo clinical negligence and who have claims. We have heard much talk about equality of arms in litigation. I fear that what the Sophies of this world may face is more akin to a farewell to arms. That is the danger we face if legal aid is not extended.

There is a hierarchy of amendments before us tonight. Of course I endorse the Government’s amendment, as far as it goes. Equally, we support the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd. However, for us the best amendment—because it effectively embraces both the others—is that tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. We wish her well should she decide to test the opinion of the House at an appropriate moment.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 5th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I am sorry that yet another lawyer is speaking, but I want to make a very brief point. In 1215, King John was persuaded to put his name to the Magna Carta, which had a very clear definition of access to justice. We have now, in 2012, nearly reached another centenary of Magna Carta. It would be helpful if current legislation made the definition equally clear. The provision, as it stands in Clause 1, lacks the clarity of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I cannot understand why, in these straitened times, the Government think that this measure will cost them any more money. It would act as a beacon and a pointer to what should be done in less straitened times when money is available to make this provision. I support the amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I am surprised to hear the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, suggest that the Bill should abolish Magna Carta.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

I did not say that.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Perhaps that is putting it a little too high. However, ever since Magna Carta, access to justice has been a fundamental constitutional principle, and the Bill has nothing to do with changing that principle. My objection to the amendment is simply that it is completely otiose and unnecessary to have statements of principle that have been with us since 1215 restated in this way. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that he does not intend to trump Part 1 and asked whether a statement of legislative purpose was necessary. The noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, said that she was against vague statements of principle at the beginning of a Bill, but seemed to suggest that this Bill was a different case. The Bill is not about abolishing access to justice but about rebalancing it in certain ways.

I have been involved in the legal profession for nearly 50 years and in my experience the greatest change to legal aid occurred when the previous Government abolished it for personal injury cases, and against the principles of maintenance and champerty, about which I have bored your Lordships many times, decided to introduce conditional fee agreements with associated insurance. The Bill follows that line by emphasising the ability of litigants to take what is now a well used way—I accept that—of obtaining access to justice. Nothing in the Bill stops people bringing actions. Legal aid may not be available but the Bill makes it clear that there are other ways of approaching the court.

The success fees introduced in 1999, which have no relation whatever to the risk solicitors run in taking on no-win no-fee cases, have increased, along with the dreadful increase in the size of ATE premiums. When the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, who I am pleased to see in his place, introduced the concept in 1999, he was talking about ATE insurance premiums of £100 or £300—I have seen that in Hansard—as opposed to today’s £50,000, £80,000 or £100,000 premiums. The cost of litigation in this country has escalated to a disgraceful level. The Bill increases access to justice by squeezing out of the system unnecessary costs and expense, which have gone to lawyers and insurance companies. We will debate in detail the respective provisions and where we can do better. However, it must be recognised that even at this stage the Government have made significant and substantial concessions to improve various aspects of the Bill. I am sure that they will continue to do so in responding to some of the amendments for which we on these Benches will argue. Therefore, I regard this amendment as a statement not of principle but of unnecessary verbosity that should not enter the statute.

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, there is very little left for me to say from the opposition Front Bench, except that we are, as we were in Committee, completely in favour of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It adds considerably to the Bill and is a very important statement of principle that should be there.

I have to say that I was surprised by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. There was a change in his attitude between Committee and this stage. I remember very well—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

No, that is not the case. As the noble Lord will recall, I opposed this amendment in Committee in very much the same terms.

[Lord Bach]

Not quite in the same terms. As I understood it, the noble Lord and some others in Committee opposed it on the basis that it did not go far enough, not that it was unnecessary. I recall very well the noble Lord saying:

“I entirely agree. I think that the Government are making a mistake in welfare law and that cutting legal advice and assistance for people at the bottom end of society will cause more problems than it solves; it will not achieve the savings that the Government think it will”.—[Official Report, 20/12/11; col. 1708.]

I should be interested to see whether the noble Lord repeats those comments when we come to a later stage. All that I can say is that it is my feeling—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The comments were not said in the context of Amendment 1, and we will deal with the other matters when we come to them.

[Lord Bach]

Indeed—I fully concede that; but I have to say that I do not concede the point that I am about to make, which is that if the noble Lord were in opposition and a Bill such as this was brought in by a Government whose party was not his party, he would oppose the Bill with all the great force and passion that he could and support the amendment 100 per cent.

Some noble Lords in Committee thought that the amendment did not go far enough and did not follow the words of the Constitution Committee. This is a very modest amendment that could have gone further. We think that it catches the right note, does not try to go further than it should and is very much in the context of Part 1. If it is the position of some noble Lords that the amendment does not go far enough, that is surely an argument in the context of this debate to vote for the amendment, because its position is closer to their position than if they were against it. If the view is that the Bill should reflect the Constitution Committee’s opinion and nothing else, this is certainly the amendment to vote for.

There is nothing wrong at all with this statement of principle occurring at the start of a major Bill that if passed in its present form will transform the legal aid system, particularly as it affects the very poorest, who rely on civil justice in order to get their rights. It is therefore important that we set off in the right way. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Exeter—if I may say so, with respect—caught the mood absolutely correctly when he talked about the function of the law, which is to look at worst-case scenarios. He is absolutely right; the Bill does not do that. It takes a very rosy view of what will happen when, for example, there is no legal aid for social welfare law. What will happen then? I know that we will debate that in the days ahead, but it is a matter that we should consider in relation to the amendment.

I have gone on for longer than I had intended. We support the amendment completely and we very much hope that the House will, too.

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These provisions are yet another example of how Her Majesty's Government's policies disproportionately affect women and in particular black and ethnic-minority women. Subject to what other noble Lords may say, I will invite Members of the House to follow me through the Lobby if the Minister does not feel able to concede on this issue. All these amendments are consequential one on the other. Perhaps I am always overoptimistic, but even now I hesitate, to allow the Minister to rise to his feet and put himself and his Government out of certain misery.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My name is on this amendment so perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, will permit me to speak after the noble and learned Baroness. I will speak briefly to underline the points because she made them so well that it is not necessary for me to speak at any length.

I know very well that the Government recognise the seriousness of the impact of domestic violence, which as we all know is a serious scourge in family life. It is worth remembering that it is not only a serious scourge for the victims, because so many of these women and men—and there certainly are some men—have children. It is the children who probably suffer most, not only short term but long term, in their ability to cope with life. Consequently, if the women—it is mainly women—are unable to get to court with the appropriate help, they are not the only ones who suffer, because their children suffer also. I find it difficult to understand why the Minister cannot accept the ACPO definition. There is not much wrong with the Government’s definition but it is not quite as broad as the ACPO one. I have never understood the police to be unduly generous or overenthusiastic in their approach to these issues.

I underline what the noble and learned Baroness said on Amendment 43. If Amendment 43 is not accepted, either by the Minister or this House, a large number of victims will fall through the net. I find it hard to understand why that would be in circumstances where a doctor identifies domestic abuse or a judge or magistrate have found it by, for instance, the perpetrator admitting it and giving an undertaking that he will not do it again, so there is not a court order. I have professional experience of endless cases of domestic violence where it was much easier to get the man—usually the man—to promise not to do it again and to leave the house rather than having a battle over the individual events which he was not prepared to accept. It was absolutely understood in the court that he had done it, yet that will not now be acceptable for receiving legal aid.

There is also no shortage of credible witnesses suggested under new sub-paragraph (k), proposed in Amendment 43,

“from a counsellor, midwife, school or witness”.

That credible, documentary evidence from a responsible person would be acceptable to a court but will not initiate that particular victim getting the help that he or she deserves. I ask the Minister to look again at this absolutely effective group of circumstances in which victims tell their story. It should get to court with the appropriate help.

My last point, briefly, is on the 12 months. Again, as the noble and learned Baroness said, a lot of women take a very long time—some men take even longer—to get to the point of disclosing what happened. Sometimes they get away and do not disclose it until after 12 months. That does not mean that it does not exist or that they are not at risk. To have this arbitrary period of 12 months is, for those who do not get there before then, another real obstruction to the Government’s declared objective to try to stamp out domestic violence. For those reasons, I strongly support the noble and learned Baroness.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, Amendment 39 is in the names of my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven and me. I am very sorry that he is not able to be with us at this particular point because he made a thoughtful and memorable speech in Committee that those who were present will recall. It was based upon his experience. As I recall it, the thrust of his speech was that we need to get up to date on the issues of domestic violence and not deal with them as we did 10 years ago.

I very much welcome Amendment 42 in the name of my noble friend Lord McNally. It has been criticised as being a narrower definition than that in the name of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland. I do not see it that way. What is omitted is,

“any incident or repeated incidents of threatening behaviour”.

The simpler and more concise words “threatening behaviour” are there instead. Anybody knows that just one incident of threatening behaviour could, for example, land someone in court. The other words that are omitted are,

“and including acts of neglect, maltreatment, exploitation or acts of omission”,

which must surely come within the definition of abuse of an emotional kind.

I turn to our Amendment 39, as opposed to Amendment 43 tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland. There are certain differences between the two; for example, my noble friend Lord Macdonald and I suggest that domestic violence,

“will be presumed on an application for civil legal services”.

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[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am sure that I am not the only one who wonders about the point eloquently made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about informal undertakings given in magistrates’ courts, for example. Can I presume that that is covered in heading (iv) of his Amendment 39?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Yes, that is certainly the case.

[The Lord Bishop of Exeter]

As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, indicated, my friend the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester has his name down to amendments in this group and regrets that he cannot be in his place because of other duties in connection with your Lordships' House. His views have been fully set out, together with those of other leaders of faith communities, in a letter that has been circulated to your Lordships. For that reason, I do not want to repeat everything that has been said there—but for the record, it is worth quoting from the heart of that letter. It says:

“Legal aid is nothing short of essential for many victims of domestic abuse to escape the horrendous circumstances that they face. Without this support they would be unable to secure recourse in relation to fundamental issues such as injunctions, housing or access to children, potentially trapping them in a cycle of mistreatment and fear. It is clear that legal aid frequently allows for the resolution of domestic abuse cases before they escalate, in some cases avoiding serious injuries or even loss of life. We welcome the government’s decision, reflected in the Bill, to protect the provision of legal aid in many cases where domestic abuse is involved. Yet, by deviating from the standard definition of domestic abuse utilised across government departments and police forces, the Bill risks restricting the overall number of cases entitled to support, and consequently causing harm to many individuals and families. Similarly the proposed list of ‘objective evidence of domestic violence’, required in order to qualify for legal aid, appears restrictively narrow”.

At heart, this group of amendments is about the balance of risk. I fully understand that the Government are concerned with the risk of abuse of the legal aid system and the risk that people will make false claims under the guise of domestic violence claims, but there is an opposing risk of harm—indeed, possibly of death—to the victims of domestic violence. Were even one or two people to be harmed or to lose their lives as the result of not being able to access legal aid through there being an inadequate agreed definition and because of a too narrow evidential base, that would be unacceptable. I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. I welcome the amendment that stands in his name, and if push comes to shove I would probably support it, but Amendments 41 and 43 really are to be preferred.

I spoke earlier today about a basic principle in legal drafting being to spot worst-case scenarios well ahead of time. That point comes into play here but there is another important principle in working out the impact and the implications of any fully enacted law: it should defend the weak against the misuse of power by the strong. I am not convinced that, without the kind of definitions and evidential base that these two amendments call for, we would have got that entirely right. I am looking to the Minister to give some very strong comfort in that direction.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Does the noble and learned Baroness accept that my noble friend Lord Macdonald tabled Amendment 39? Paragraph (b) of that amendment is wider than her definition because it can include matters other than the circumstances that she has set out, which are suitable for immigration matters and can include matters that come to the Lord Chancellor’s notice at a later date that could easily be inserted into these regulations, if appropriate. Does she accept, with that presumption and that wider ambit, that my amendment, which, as the Minister has said, will be the template for these regulations, is a better amendment than her own?

[Baroness Scotland of Asthal]

I regret that I do not. Let me explain why. The framework included in our amendments is the framework that currently works and is in use by all practitioners. If the Minister wished to add a provision that could add to those criteria, I would be more than happy. As it stands, I hope the noble Lord will accept that our amendment is broader in terms than his and has the degree of specificity that enables victims to have the assurance that that which is currently used as the evidential base can still be used as the evidential base in future.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

It is the specificity of her amendment that I complain about because it puts into the Bill in stone what is required, whereas the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Macdonald, given what he said in his speech, which the noble and learned Baroness quoted with approval, is wider in that it leaves open other circumstances to be considered.

[Baroness Scotland of Asthal]

My Lords, I do not accept that. I accept that it sets in stone the minimum criteria and that additional matters can be added. I am looking at the minimum. I say that because today UKBA uses this definition. It has used it since 2004, and there has been no suggestion in the eight years that it has been applied that it has been improperly used or does not meet the needs of the case. My contention is that if it ain’t broke, why are we seeking to fix it?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The noble and learned Baroness—

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

I think the noble Lord knows what I was about say. We are on Report.