(13 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to speak to the amendment tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Tonge. Like the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, I will abbreviate my remarks in view of the opening comments by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, with which I wholly concur. Indeed, my amendment differs from his and from that in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and my noble friends Lord Lester and Lady Tonge, in only one particular respect. The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, allows—indeed, requires—a justice of the peace to get the advice of the DPP on the advisability of granting a warrant. The amendment tabled in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and others would allow the court to receive advice from the DPP. I am adamant that any advice given with regard to these matters, which are intrinsically important, must be in open court. It is for the DPP to take the opportunity which is available under both those amendments, I think, to go to the court and argue the matter in open court, not by way of written private advice.
I think that the status quo is perfectly satisfactory and that meddling with citizens’ rights in the age of the overmighty state is extremely dangerous. Like the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, I drafted my amendment and put it down before I saw the evidence submitted by Justice, Liberty and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It is worth putting on the record not only that the Joint Committee argued long, fully and with conviction that the arrangements in this Bill are wrong in principle and in practice and ended up, I am happy to say, taking exactly the line that the amendment tabled in my name takes. The same was true of Liberty. Justice simply wanted Clause 154 removed alltogether, leaving things entirely with the status quo.
At least my amendment will give further strength to the procedure if that is needed. I do not think that it is but I put it forward in a conciliatory way. As has been said, it is worth briefly repeating that we already have judicial oversight under existing law. It is already the practice to deal with these extremely difficult applications for warrant only before a district judge—who we used to call a stipendiary—who is not only a professional judge but also, because they are heard before the City of Westminster Bench, is a specialist in matters of this type. The district judges concerned deal, for example, with terrorism extradition cases. The judge, whoever he or she is, must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds that the offence has been committed and that there is admissible evidence which, if uncontradicted, could establish the elements of the offence.
There is also of course state immunity. State immunity was exercised in the case of General Mofaz in February 2004 when he was saved from the issue of a warrant on the grounds of state immunity. Let us not forget that the Attorney-General has the right to intervene and issue a nolle prosequi, which puts an end to it. The Attorney-General will do that on grounds of public interest. As I have said, this is a misguided provision. Perhaps I may quickly read the conclusion of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is extremely clear in explaining the difference between the Bill and my amendment. It states that “The difference between notification” of the DPP “and consent” of the DPP,
“would be significant. On notification, even if the DPP applied the general prosecutorial test in determining whether to intervene in an application, the ultimate decision on whether to issue an arrest warrant would lie with the Magistrate on the test applied at the present. By contrast, if consent is a precursor, then the determinative decision will in practice be that of the DPP”.
Finally, it is relevant to say that, in the Gourier case, Lord Wilberforce said that the right of the private citizen to apply for a warrant and to take a prosecution is,
“a valuable corrective against the inertia or partiality on the part of authority”.
On another occasion, Lord Diplock made comparable remarks. For those reasons, it would be a retrograde step to approve the Bill as it stands.
I shall speak to the amendment in the names of my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, who cannot be here this evening, and myself. From the position of practitioners with hands-on experience of the criminal courts throughout our legal careers, we believe that the existing system works perfectly adequately. I concur with the views that have already been expressed in that way. Few applications are made and, of those that are, most are rejected by the magistrate who is the highly experienced person. Why then is there a need to move away from the current position? We are told that it is because there are people who feel that if they come to this country they may be subject to a private prosecution and to arrest.
Those who feel that way in foreign countries simply do not understand the practice and procedure of our courts. It is strange to amend our law not because of a real problem but because there are people abroad who believe that a problem exists when it does not. We are moving from the position that if the Government want to introduce the question of the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, it should be made equally clear at the same time that the tests to be applied are those which would be applied in an ordinary criminal case in this country. No special tests will be needed for those from abroad and who face allegations of offences of universal jurisdiction.
We feel that the tests that are to be applied are those of the existing discretions of the Director of Public Prosecutions. I have been approached today by my noble friend Lord Carlile in his usual genial and understated way to point out that the tests applied by the DPP are in fact subject to change. The guidance has changed in some ways. My noble friend tells me that we are now on the seventh version of guidance issued to public prosecutors. If that is the case, it is perfectly simple to redraft on Report the amendment that we have put forward so that we put in a broader way that the same tests which apply to citizens of this country will also apply in the case of people who come to this country.
But there is a difference with private prosecutions. Let me say that no practising criminal lawyer has any time for private prosecutions. They generally fail, and generally they cause great harm and trouble to people. We feel that prosecution should be in the hands of people charged with those duties; namely, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Prosecution Service, which acts under the director. The distinction is that the arrest warrant in a private prosecution leads to trial. When the police arrest someone, there is an arrest, and then there is a consideration of evidence that is obtained between arrest and charge. The charge is brought on the advice of the CPS only where there is sufficient evidence for the case to go forward. At that intermediate stage, the charge does not exist in private prosecutions, and therefore the issuing of an arrest warrant leads, as I have said, straight to trial. We believe that safeguards are needed.
We start from the basis that there is no need to amend the existing position.
I wonder if the noble Lord could help me on one point. As an experienced criminal practitioner, as he rightly describes himself, he is well aware that there are two elements in the code for Crown prosecutors. One is the test as to the adequacy of the evidence and the second is the public interest. Both have to be satisfied before a prosecution takes place. I note that in the amendment tabled in his name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, there are two parts to this test. One part of the test, in proposed new subsection (4AA)(a), applies when there is enough evidence to be satisfied that there is a realistic prospect, so in that case there needs to be a consideration of the public interest. In the second test, in proposed new paragraph (b), which is where there is not enough evidence, there is no reference to the public interest at all. That is probably the most likely situation—that there is not enough evidence at that stage to know if there is a realistic prospect—so why does the public interest not come into his amendment at all, even though he has been addressing it on the basis that it is to replicate the current system, which requires the public interest to be considered?
The noble and learned Lord makes a very valid point and I accept that of course it is intended that the public interest test should apply in the second of the two instances as well, although it is not stated in the amendment. As the noble Lord said, we are seeking a solution that will ameliorate the decision of the Government to make it an essential prerequisite for the commencement of a private prosecution that the director consents. We simply seek to make it absolutely clear that the director will not apply a different test to people who come to this country. I hope that that answers the noble and learned Lord.
Does the noble Lord agree that in those circumstances it would be wrong for the House to accept the amendment as it is put forward?
I do not propose to ask the House to agree to this amendment tonight. This is the Committee stage. We shall consider the issue further. As I have already said, the criticisms so gently advanced to me by my noble friend have led me to believe that we might consider how to rephrase it in a way that would be more acceptable to the House.
My Lords, we are proceeding in the usual orderly way of your Lordships’ House and there remain two amendments that have not yet been spoken to. The first of those is the new clause proposed in Amendment 246, which is in my name and those of other noble Lords, who have been very helpful in our approach to it. Then there is an amendment to that new clause in the name of my noble friend Lady Tonge. I say at the outset that I accept entirely her amendment to my proposed new clause. It seems eminently sensible. The proposed new clause is about giving an account to Parliament of the progress in war crimes cases. I hope the House will indulge me for a few minutes in speaking to this. I shall then say a few words about the matters that have been discussed hitherto. However, unlike my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, I shall not give further details of what was designated by him to be a private conversation that took place earlier in the Bishops’ Bar.
There is a specialist war crimes team within the UK Border Agency, which is a very good thing. However, unlike many European and other countries, there is no specialist war crimes unit in either the police or the prosecution services. Other noble Lords and I were involved in all-party and non-party negotiations with the previous Government to expand the universal jurisdiction. Those negotiations were successful. However, they were successful subject to the insistence of the previous Government that what is in Clause 154 should be inserted into the law. All those involved in those negotiations accepted that at the time as being a realistic argument.
As I have said, there is no specialist war crimes unit in either the police or the prosecution service in any part of the United Kingdom. Instead, in England and Wales responsibility for war crimes is shared by SO15—Counter Terrorism Command in the Metropolitan Police—and the equivalent section, headed by Sue Hemming OBE, in the Crown Prosecution Service. The police team responsible for war crimes is also tasked with counterterrorism policing relating to dissident republican groups from Ireland. It therefore has an enormous amount of work to do and deals with a fast-moving scene, irrespective of war crimes.
What does the proposed new clause seek to do? It requires the Government to report annually on all legal action taken against suspected war criminals in the United Kingdom, and on the assistance given to other states and international criminal tribunals. I should argue to your Lordships that it is entirely reasonable and proper that the public and Parliament should be able to take stock of progress in war crimes on a regular basis. Taking stock in that way—having accountability of that kind—will ensure that the Government bestow on the relevant police section the resources that are needed to prosecute war crimes. There have been no prosecutions for war crimes since the prosecution in 2005 of an Afghan warlord who was found living in south London. However, a Peruvian was arrested in Tiverton in Devon in March 2011. He is accused of torture and crimes against humanity for his alleged role in more than 100 killings as a member of a death squad, and is currently on police bail. We hope to see some progress in that case within, of course, the usual legal proceedings.
It is remarkable, given the number of war criminals who are believed to be living in the United Kingdom, that there have been no other prosecutions since 2005. It suggests that insufficient resources are being given to the task. After all, one should bear in mind that, since 2005, the UK Border Agency has taken immigration action against 360 suspected war criminals, while the Metropolitan Police is currently pursuing 29 viable lines of inquiry. The 360 suspects come from a number of countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia. The UK has also received extradition requests for four subjects from Rwanda who won their extradition proceedings and remain in the United Kingdom.
In addition to the 360, I was visited this afternoon by a representative of an organisation in Bangladesh, which is not included in the list that I enumerated as 360 cases. It is believed that there are several Bangladeshis who have been able to take refuge in this country who committed vast atrocities during the 1971 war in that country. They, too, should be the subject of investigation.
In sum, the purpose of the proposed new clause is to ensure that the necessary progress is maintained in dealing with war crimes and crimes against humanity. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will give some encouragement to myself and others who they put their names to the amendment in the hope that we will see more action promised and in due course taken on this front.
I now turn to the amendments proposed to Clause 154. Despite the eloquence of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, I am disappointed that my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven was not here to speak to his amendment this afternoon. I know that he has a busy diary and I am sure that he is doing something very important. But I am glad that we have the wisdom of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, who will inform the House of their experience.
The importance of my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven and his potential contribution is that he is the immediate past Director of Public Prosecutions. I am working on the assumption that he has not consulted his successor, because what is proposed in his amendment, spoken to by my noble friend Lord Thomas, is inconsistent with what has been said very cogently to parliamentary committees by the current Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer QC.
I would say this to my noble friend if he were here, but were he still the Director of Public Prosecutions I do not believe that he would be prepared to support an amendment of this kind. It is quite simple in my view—I seem to be the only one from the Liberal Democrat Benches who is supporting our Government on this matter this evening—but the simplicity needs to be stated. The Director of Public Prosecutions and his senior staff make charging decisions every single day of the week. That is what they do a lot of the time and it is done at the most senior level. The suggestion that there would be a delay is a canard.
I do not think that I have to declare an interest—indeed, it would be sexist to do so—when I say that my wife works in a senior position for the Crown Prosecution Service, but living with a shared telephone I am well aware of the urgent decisions that are considered in great depth and taken at all kinds of unsocial hours and on all matters of urgency. The suggestion that there would be a delay is simply quite wrong. Furthermore, the Director of Public Prosecutions and his senior staff have enormous experience in making charging decisions. They make all the important charging decisions that take place in this country—or almost all; they should make all, if they are referred to them by their junior staff. In so doing, they apply the Crown Prosecution Service code.
These amendments, particularly that spoken to by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, attempt to fix in statutory stone something that is much more evolutionary—and needs to be. The Crown Prosecution Service code has gone through many changes. It is reviewed and changed regularly. Since Keir Starmer QC became DPP, it has been changed again and there may be good reasons for changing it in future. Furthermore I hope, and indeed apprehend, that the Director of Public Prosecutions would want to consult widely on the universal jurisdiction and might well wish to issue a code of practice. That might involve some changes to the current code. After all, the Crown Prosecution Service has a special code for dealing with rape cases which is non-statutory. It would be extremely foolish to make it statutory because it would be prevented from change. The same applies to the universal jurisdiction.
I say to my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, in the kindest possible way, that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, with a single kick scored a hat trick when he demonstrated that the amendment put forward by my noble friend, and indeed by my noble friend the former Director of Public Prosecutions, is fundamentally flawed in its text. It shows exactly the danger of attempting to put into tablets of stone this sort of provision, even when it has been drafted by lawyers as distinguished as they.
I say to noble Lords who have tabled amendments to Clause 154 that we have a responsible Crown Prosecution Service, that we have a responsible and able Director of Public Prosecutions, and that it has been decided that this should be done not by the Attorney-General but by the Director of Public Prosecutions, who is a completely apolitical figure. It seems that the Government have got this exactly right. I hope that the Minister will not budge in his determination that Clause 154 should be unamended.
I am grateful to the noble Lord. It is of course the experience of all those who have held the sensitive and difficult office of Director of Public Prosecutions and Attorney-General—we are fortunate to have two former Attorney-Generals here—that they have to address these sensitive and difficult questions. There is nothing unusual about this area that singles it out from the problems that are faced, if not on a daily basis then I am sure on a weekly or monthly basis, by those who hold that office. I am sure that they will be able to assist the House regarding this matter.
My point is that the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to give an advisory role to the DPP in relation to a matter that the magistrate simply has no role under existing law to determine. I suggest with respect that that is not a sensible way to proceed, nor would it be sensible to confer on the magistrate a new role, which the magistrate has never had, of having to consider the criteria in the code for Crown prosecutors of whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction or whether the public interest justifies a decision being taken.
The other amendment, Amendment 245AA, would include in the legislation criteria that told the DPP how to exercise his discretion. It would be quite unprecedented for Parliament to tell the DPP what criteria to adopt in exercising his functions, nor do the courts do so. Indeed, it was highly controversial that the Appellate Committee of this House decided in July 2009 to require the DPP even to publish guidelines on whether he would prosecute for assisting a suicide. I declare an interest as counsel for Mrs Purdy in that case. Parliament and the courts have, for good reason, preferred to leave the DPP to develop his own criteria in the code for Crown prosecutors. Amendment 246 raises very different issues—
Does the noble Lord agree that it would surely be right that the DPP should apply the same standards when he is considering one of these cases that come from abroad as he would for a person within the domestic jurisdiction?
I certainly agree that the DPP should apply the same standards in the sense that he asks whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction and whether the public interest justifies a prosecution. The application of those principles, though, will inevitably depend on all the facts and circumstances of the individual case. It would be unprecedented for Parliament to tell the DPP in detail how to apply his discretion, and there is nothing in what the DPP said to the Public Bill Committee that should cause concern to noble Lords about the manner in which he proposes to exercise this new power if he is given it.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I will make my second point, about what the existing system is. With respect, there is a misunderstanding among some of the Committee as to what the existing system is. In a moment, I will take the opportunity to say something about that on the basis of my experience, particularly from when I was Her Majesty’s Attorney-General.
First, in fundamental agreement with my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, the principle of universal jurisdiction is extremely important. I strongly support that principle. I was a Back-Bencher on the Labour Benches led by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell, who pushed the Government into passing an effective form of the International Criminal Court Act 2001, which meant that we could prosecute people who were not permanently established here. I was the Attorney-General who consented to the prosecution of Zardad the Afghan warlord; I actually led for the prosecution in that case. As the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, said, he was convicted, by a British jury, of hostage taking and torture. He was sentenced to 20 years, which he is still serving.
Just so that noble Lords do not think that my favouring of universal jurisdiction is limited to particular countries, I mention Israel. I publically indicated that I was going to call for the extradition of an Israeli solider when I was concerned that the Israeli authorities were not properly investigating and dealing with an allegation that a British citizen, James Miller, had been killed in Gaza by Israeli fire. I did not do that because I was being pushed by some group. I went and talked to the Israeli investigators, looked at their files, cross-examined them, and called for the Metropolitan Police to carry out its own investigations into evidence which the Israelis said demonstrated that it was not Israeli gunfire, but which demonstrated that it almost certainly was.
In the end the Israelis did not go quite as far as I would have liked, but they did more than they had done as they were threatened with a prosecution. Indeed, they thankfully paid significant compensation to the family of this poor young man. Therefore, I am very much in favour of universal jurisdiction. It is important that we have a robust and effective system. However—this is the second point—there is an anomaly in the existing system, which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has rightly identified; namely, that the prosecution cannot take place without the consent of the Attorney-General. This is the debate that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, had.
I know that memories fade and that it is a number of years since I did this job, but my recollection is that every single one of the universal jurisdiction offences requires the consent of the Attorney-General to a prosecution. Of course, the Attorney-General can always issue a nolle prosequi, but that is different. In these cases, Parliament has taken the view that a prosecution of this sort has such a public element to it that it should not proceed without the consent of the Attorney-General. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, the consequence of that is that we have this anomaly. A private group or a private individual, no doubt for good reasons but sometimes perhaps not—I will come back to that—can have an individual arrested even though, when the matter goes to the Attorney-General, the prosecution will not take place.
I first came across the practical problem to which this matter gives rise in the case of Major General Almog, which has been referred to. The first that I knew of an application to arrest Major General Almog was when we received a call from the relevant court to ask me whether I wanted to say anything about it. I could not say anything about it as I had no role at that stage; my role would come later. I could not do anything. I make this point also because one of the briefings that I have seen on this issue suggests that there is no evidence that in that case there was no prior notice given to the Attorney-General of the intended application. I know that there was not in that case because it took place on my watch. From that moment I have considered how you deal with the anomaly that you can have somebody arrested but ultimately there will be no prosecution. That gives rise to a number of problems. First, it gives rise obviously to the problem that someone may be detained, deprived of their liberty and certainly restricted in their movements for a period before the papers reach the Attorney-General and a decision can be made. That is not good for the individual. Secondly, it is not good for the people who have, as it were, promoted the prosecution in the first place. They will be disappointed that, having got somebody arrested, the matter does not proceed.
There is a question of the public funds involved—perhaps it is for your Lordships to decide how important this is—but there is also the consideration that such action will in certain circumstances exacerbate relations with what may be a friendly state if, for good reason—I will come back to what that may be—an Attorney-General says no to a prosecution but somebody has been locked up for a period of time, or at least prevented from going about their business. That will do nothing for good relations and there may be circumstances—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to such a circumstance, hypothetically, at least—where that could be very damaging to a wider interest.
For a long time I believed that it was necessary to deal with the anomaly. One comes back to the difference between noble Lords’ amendments and the Government’s amendment. Fundamentally, the difference comes down to this: other noble Lords’ amendments say that you should notify the DPP and he should have an advisory role. The Government say that this process cannot happen without his consent. What is the difference between those stances? It is not the difference of timing because if you are going to notify the DPP and ask him to give an advisory view, you need to give the man or woman time to consider it. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about the ability of the CPS to move swiftly. I have also heard it said that one of the problems is that there may not be enough time. In the cases that I have seen, the groups that have wanted a prosecution have known for some time that they would like to see that particular individual prosecuted. They may not have known that he or she was travelling on a particular day but they have been assembling their evidence. I see no reason at all—I understand that the DPP has offered this—why there cannot be a system under which they present their material to the DPP so that he and his staff have a reasonable opportunity to consider it and can form a view as to whether or not they will give their consent.
I see real dangers in the present system. It is an anomaly. It leads to dangers to the individual and risk to the people who promote this. It risks relations. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that he knows of cases—indeed, he has advised on cases—of people who are frightened to come to this country. I have heard this as well. The Government will know better, and if that is the case, it is a bad thing. It is a bad thing if in fact they are being deterred from coming where ultimately there have been no prosecutions.
Does the noble and learned Lord agree that it would be quite wrong for the DPP to give in advance immunity to someone coming to this country?
I am really not sure that I agree with the noble Lord. It is not an immunity, but if the question arose and the DPP had seen the material that was going to be produced, had examined it and, having regard to the evidential test and the public interest test, he was of the view that he would not consent to a prosecution, I do not see why he should not say that. That would not be done in a broadcast, but if there were a legitimate reason to know the answer, so that someone can, for example, come to attend an important meeting with Her Majesty's Government, why not? In that respect, what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, said about the DPP having an opportunity to consult a policy statement about this was very wise. That is exactly what I would expect this particular DPP to do; and he would look to what all the interests were. That would, no doubt, be one of the questions that he would consider—to what extent is it right? He would want to make sure that he is not bounced into making wrong decisions and that he has an adequate opportunity to decide. That is important.
That takes me to where I was going when the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, intervened—the amendment in his name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. There are two points about that. The first is the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. Neither this DDP nor, I hope, any DPP needs the straightjacket of being told by Parliament how to do his or her job. They can be trusted to do that without that sort of straightjacket.
Let me just make this point and of course I will give way to the noble Lord. I made the point about that amendment not just because it is surprising that he is putting it forward on the basis that it is intended to restate the law as it stands, because it patently does not do that, but because, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, it demonstrates the dangers of trying to be prescriptive as to exactly what the tests should be.
I think that the noble and learned Lord misunderstands the purpose behind our amendment, which is not to put a straightjacket around the director, but to give assurance to people who want to come to this country that they will be treated in exactly the same way as a resident or a British citizen would be treated. I should have thought that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would welcome that assurance for the purposes of advising his clients.
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, can I express my sense of shame at hearing the language that has been used in this Statement? It is precisely the sort of thing that we attacked for years when we were in opposition and I am very sorry to hear that this headline-grabbing language is being used again. Like the noble Baroness, I simply do not understand why applications for the removal of a name from the register should not be made in an open and transparent way before a court. After all, it is the court that imposes the sentence of 30 months, which is the threshold when a person is placed upon the register for life. I see no principle—I see nothing—in this Statement that would assuage my feelings about it.
The noble Lord has certainly made his point. I fear there is very little that I can add to what I have already said, by way of explanation to the House, on why the Government have taken the view that they have about the right place to take this decision.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hope that I have just indicated what we are doing. We think that we need some expert advice, so we have asked Sir Scott Baker to look at the operation of the European arrest warrant. He is due to report in September of this year and the Government will take action in the light of his report.
Does not the Minister agree that habeas corpus is a process and not a principle? It is designed to make sure that a person who is in custody is there legally. If a European arrest warrant has been issued improperly, a writ of habeas corpus will succeed and, if not, it will fail. It is a simple issue and there is no conflict between the principles.
My Lords, in this House of legal eagles I hesitate, as a non-lawyer, to get on to the grounds, but I understand that the principle of habeas corpus is indeed a legal remedy against unlawful detention. It is therefore right to say that the European arrest warrant in principle is compliant. I accept entirely, however, that there is dissatisfaction with the warrant’s operation, which is what the Government have asked Sir Scott Baker to look into.
(14 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I can give the House that assurance. I hope that noble Lords will also accept that, in Linda Carty’s interests, we need to be able to judge the appropriate methodology. Therefore, the fact that we do not necessarily hear a lot all the time does not mean that we are not trying to take the most effective action that we can.
Is the Minister aware that Mexico and Germany took the United States to the International Court of Justice and obtained a ruling that under international law it was illegal to execute a person who had not had the benefit of consular protection? Is the Minister aware that the lawyer who acted for Miss Carty did not obtain such protection? Will this Government take a step similar to that taken by Mexico and Germany in respect of their nationals?
My Lords, my noble friend is right to say that part of the problem in this case was that we were not notified by the Texas authorities, as should have been the case. That is one reason why our ability to help Miss Carty has come rather late in the day. As for the approach to the International Court of Justice, I am aware of that precedent. Our current advice is that it is not necessarily particularly helpful, but I certainly do not rule out pursuing that route if we have grounds to believe that it will help.