Criminal Finances Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 9th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Bill generally but in particular the provision in Clause 15, which inserts a new Section 303Z5 into POCA, giving the court the power to release frozen funds to pay legal expenses. That was a matter I argued many times in this Chamber, particularly during the coalition Government when there was a reduction in legal aid generally. At about that time I had a wealthy client whose assets were frozen and consequently he had legal aid. At the end of the trial, when he was acquitted, he was awarded his costs but, as legal aid had paid his legal team, all he had to pay for were the parking charges for his Rolls-Royce, which he had parked a mile away from the court in case it influenced the jury.

Money-laundering legislation has had a major impact—for business, the cost and time of introducing systems; for individuals, the struggle to prove identity. It is quite something when you have to produce a utility bill not less than a month old to prove who you are to a bank where you have been a customer since the age of 15. You wonder where all this information goes. What happens to it? Who deals with it? Yet, at the same time, as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, pointed out, there is a general feeling that prosecutions do not match the considerable efforts and discomforts that we have to suffer. As the noble Lord, Lord Flight, pointed out, compliance is not cheap—£5 billion annually is the cost assessed by the British Bankers’ Association for the way in which banks have to deal with core financial crime.

My experience of the POCA proceedings which occur when a trial is over has not been satisfactory because they are lengthy and complex. I have not been involved in many because, as usual, experts jumped up to capture the market in such proceedings. The reversal of the burden of proof, with the defendant having to prove where the assets came from, was not satisfactory because the trial judge was almost certainly bound by the view of the jury of the facts and the veracity of the defendant. So, from that point of view, it is not a fair procedure.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Haywood, and the noble Lords, Lord Flight and Lord Hodgson, have pointed out, the figures are not very satisfactory for recovery. They have commented on various years and I will comment on 2014-15 for additional reasons, which I shall point out. In that year, the agency collected £155 million; the National Audit Office reckoned that the cost of collection was £100 million; but—this is the important figure—the confiscation orders made by the courts that were outstanding was £1.61 billion. I call that failure, and the Bill may go a long way towards rectifying the failure that has existed so far.

I was pleased to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, who is a distinguished member of the board of Transparency International. A task force examined the efficacy of money-laundering controls in this country in May 2015 and it came up with important and key findings: first, that the levels of asset recovery in the UK are small compared with the likely amounts of corrupt wealth being laundered; secondly, that only a small minority of suspicious activity reports, SARs, relating to grand corruption are acted on by law enforcement agencies; and, thirdly, that the timeframe moratorium period of 31 days for responding to SARs is generally inadequate to investigate and achieve asset restraint for grand corruption cases.

In July 2016 the Home Affairs Committee was shocked when it heard oral evidence from Robert Barrington, the executive director of Transparency International UK, who said that,

“it seems likely that in terms of money laundering going through the UK system every year, it is at least £100 billion”.

We are always talking about the corruption in Panama, but the committee pointed out that in Panama £100 billion is twice the size of its entire economy. So, given the amount of money passing through the UK system, we are much more involved in money laundering than Panama.

A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, my noble friend Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Watson, a moment ago, underlined another of Transparency International’s conclusions. Mr Barrington said:

“Clearly one of the things that makes the UK attractive as a centre for money laundering is its historic links with the Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, because you can move money very quickly to jurisdictions that are very well-linked and for whom your bank of lawyers and accountants will have very close connections and can easily set up shell companies and so on”.


I was interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said about that. He believes that legislation is going through the Crown dependencies but I wonder what is happening with the overseas territories.

On the question of corporate liability, the Government are following Section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010. I was involved in the Select Committee that looked at that Bill and afterwards when the legislation went through. I was later asked to give a talk in the premises of a well-known firm of solicitors to some very important clients about the effects of the Bribery Act. I was so shocked to hear other speakers winding up these companies about the amount of compliance that would be required that I thought it necessary to say, “Look, you are not all going to go to prison immediately”. Indeed, of course, under the Bribery Act there is not such a liability as they were saying at that time.

I was at a dinner last night in Threadneedle Street—not a place I go to frequently—where I was sitting next to a young lady who is involved in asset management. She said that the department in her company that is expanding without any obvious horizon is the compliance department. I can see that compliance departments will expand in all these companies and that lawyers will have a new industry of advising people on this Bill which is an effect of the Bill that I would not like to see.

There is much to discuss. The thrust of the Bill is right and I hope that we can refine it in certain important areas.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Codes C, D and H) Order 2016

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Thursday 19th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, may I say how much I support the revision of the code of practice? I cannot emphasise enough how welcome these codes were when they were introduced in 1984. Before that, a great deal of time was taken up in the criminal courts with what was called the voir dire—a trial within a trial—to determine the admissibility of police interviews and alleged confessions, and the content of what was said.

I recall, some years after these codes had come into practice and were commonplace in this country, being in Hong Kong, where a confession was produced. I was told by my client that in order to sign it, the interviewing officer had stamped on his hand. I said, “Tell me another one”, and he then pointed to his signature at the beginning of the statement, where he had simply signed in characters, and the very squiggly, spidery signature that appeared at the end. There was a great deal of truth in what he had said, perhaps assisted by the fact that the interviewing officer had committed suicide between taking the statement and the actual trial.

Noble Lords can see that what goes on in the police station is extremely important. The codes of practice that were introduced were an excellent way of making sure there was fairness all round. I am grateful to the Government for continuing to update them and to look at how technology can help protect both the suspect and, of course, the interviewing police officers, against whom allegations of all sorts were made in the past. We very much welcome this.

[Viscount Simon (Lab)]

My Lords, I have just one brief question. Suspects under the age of 18 are to be looked after by the local authority. What security measures will be taken to ensure that they are safe and do not get away?

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, many concerns have been expressed in this debate—by my noble friend Lord Paddick and the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, in particular—about personal privacy and the right to maintain a private life. However, I want to concentrate on legal professional privilege. It has been analysed brilliantly by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friends Lord Lester and Lord Macdonald, and I want to put some sort of colour to it.

Legal professional privilege is concerned with the public interest, not personal privacy, and it has been recognised as such since the 16th century. In criminal law, the individual is set up against the state. We prosecute from time to time and we are familiar with the power of the state to exercise surveillance and intrusion in the interests of arriving at the truth. On the other hand, defence lawyers are equally concerned with arriving at the truth. Something that some lay people fail to realise is that you do not win cases by putting forward defences based on lies. The immediate role of the defence lawyer is to impress upon his client the value of telling the truth, thereby building trust between him and that client.

What a defendant says at the beginning following his arrest may be completely untrue. Sometimes what he says has been suggested to him by other inmates in the prison where he is held on remand, or sometimes he will not tell the truth because of fear and sometimes because of guilt. When talking to defendants, I frequently say that if I were a doctor it would be no use if they had a pain in the head to tell me that they had a pain in their foot. I need to know the truth so that I can do the best for them. My noble friend Lord Lester was absolutely right when he said that defence lawyers might not know of a possible defence, and therefore the court and, particularly in a criminal case, a jury will not know that defence because the defendant, for reasons of his own, has not told his lawyer.

To illustrate that, I vividly recall a case in which I was involved in which the defendant—my client—was alleged to have shot somebody outside a nightclub in the presence of his friend. When, six days later, his friend was discovered also shot and my client had absconded and left the country, he was in trouble. His defence was that he knew that the friends of the person he had shot in the first instance were coming after him and they had shot the wrong person—they had shot his friend instead of him. The trial went ahead and he denied both the attempted manslaughter and the murder. He was convicted of both. We appealed because I did not think the conviction for murder was right. We failed and then, when I went to see him in the cells after the appeal, he told me, “Well, now I’ll tell you what really happened”. And for the first time I received from him an account that was completely consistent and believable. However, rather like a referendum, you cannot have a trial over again. That was it; that was the end of the case. He served a life sentence—and possibly is still serving it—for murder.

I am more familiar with the problems of client confidentiality in other jurisdictions. I recall one case in particular in a foreign jurisdiction, where the state was the other party, when we felt it was necessary to have our consultations and conferences standing in the middle of the swimming pool at the hotel in which we were staying because it was almost certain that our conversations were being bugged. Even in this country, involving a political issue in a foreign country, I recall that we talked to the wall as though there were people listening when the team met to discuss their tactics—for example, what inquiries were to be made and how we could support our client in the position that he was at that time.

So I am entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in saying that when the commissioner is considering exceptional and compelling circumstances, the warrant must require—it must be shown—that there is a probable cause for belief in iniquity. Obviously, if a lawyer is colluding with his client in some shady business, that cannot be subject to legal professional privilege. I recall, in a very far-flung foreign jurisdiction, advising clients in a situation where the previous legal team had been arrested for attempting to bribe the prosecuting officers of that jurisdiction. We felt a little uncomfortable in the first place, but when something equivalent to half a million pounds in cash was put on the table in front of us in a plastic bag, we thought it was time to leave. So iniquity does happen; it is sometimes a temptation that is put in the way of lawyers.

I do not wish to carry on with further legal language such as “I once had a case”, so I will draw my remarks to a conclusion. However, I think the provisions in the Bill for legal professional privilege require considerable examination.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, if the Minister is not prepared to accept Amendment 15B, can he assure the House that a direction that has been issued would be subject to judicial review and, in the consideration of the judicial review, that the court would bear very much in mind whether a proper opportunity had been given to the university concerned to consider the complaint and to make representations about it? If that were an assurance from the Dispatch Box, I think that the amendment would no longer be necessary.

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

My Lords, I have one short point, which has not been raised before, to add to this part of the debate. We now have in this country approaching 100,000 overseas students, a high proportion of whom—about one-third—come from China. A directive from a Minister to a university, as perceived by an overseas student from China, would be very close to being a government censure on that university. The amendment moved by my noble friend at least gives an opportunity for a university to set out why it has refused to take the action that the Secretary of State has enjoined it to, and to explain whether this is a relatively minor aberration or a serious defiance of the directions that the university has been given. That really could be quite important in terms of the attraction to students coming from overseas countries, especially those that have—shall we put it like this?—rather coercive Governments.

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I am pleased to see that the Minister has recognised the independent reviewer’s need for additional resources. I am sure that if he were to amend his Amendment 16 to include our Amendment 16A it would not require many additional resources.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I will not follow my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, on Amendment 16A but will turn to Amendments 18 and 19 in this group.

The Minister may recall that in Committee I asked what the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board was for and I think that Amendment 19, particularly in paragraph (b), is a rather elegant solution to the question I posed in that, obviously, the board will be chaired by the independent reviewer and he can decide in which direction he wishes to take the board and to what degree it should cover the ground that he feels to be necessary. I welcome Amendments 18 and 19 and thank the Government for thinking again on these issues.

There is only one outstanding issue—the degree to which the board would have access to sensitive material. That will have to await another day when, no doubt, the independent reviewer will be able to transfer to the Minister concerned at the appropriate time the degree to which he feels the board requires access and is inhibited by the fact that it does not see the same papers as he will see. The board would clearly be much more efficient if it was cleared for security purposes to the same degree as the independent reviewer.

The issue in Committee was whether the board was for oversight or support. That question has been soundly answered. Clearly the board is there to support the independent reviewer and I am grateful to the Minister for making that clear.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, I too am grateful for the consideration that the Government have given to this matter and, in particular, to the powers of the independent reviewer. I am also grateful to the Minister for the frankness of his speech and for the way he has reported the reactions of the independent reviewer, which are obviously not an absolutely wholehearted welcome. I think it is excellent that the powers have been extended in the way that they have been.

I have an open mind on the amendment of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee, Lady O’Loan and Lady Ludford. I think that it would be good if the independent reviewer had the power—not the sole responsibility—to look at any provision of immigration and nationality law to the extent that it is used for counterterrorism purposes. That is clearly within his remit. The Minister himself said that it might very well be that Mr Anderson will be asked to be the person to report on the operation of the closed procedures in Part 2 of the Justice and Security Act. Therefore, I am rather sympathetic to those amendments and I do not think it would be very difficult for the Government to accept them.

However, I am sympathetic to the Government’s wish not to have too much duplication in this area. As a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which also roams over this area, I would like to say that we, too, have no problem with Mr Anderson. His co-operation with us is very good. We have no difficulty with the fact that we are looking at things which he is also looking at.

On his reservation about access to secret material, I am afraid that this intensifies my concerns about the very existence of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. I think it is an improvement that Mr Anderson is to be consulted on and will have influence over the appointment of the members of the board and that it is there to support him. He has asked that he should have a written assurance that he should have access to all the secret material that he wants. I am sure that the Government would not have the slightest difficulty in giving Mr Anderson that assurance. But it complicates his relationship with the board, because, as the noble Lord has just said, the Government might well have reservations about that very secret material—the freedom to have the most secret material there is extended to the members of the board. I think that may be unnecessary. Clearly it would be difficult for Mr Anderson if he has access to material and the board has not.

All this leaves me with doubts about the utility of the board. I am glad that it is there to support Mr Anderson. I know that he needs more support. In responding to this, can the Minister say whether it is intended that the secretariat of the board should be the extra support that Mr Anderson needs? I do think that he needs extra support, but I would like to see the support there without the existence of the board, the utility of which I greatly doubt.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have Amendments 118G and 118K in this group but I want to say on Amendment 118J that I take the noble Baroness’s point about the impact on communities. The point has been raised with me as well and rightly so.

The first of my amendments in fact builds on the consultation paper. Under the section headed “What would the … Board do?”, it sets out in bullet-point form a number of core objectives. In most of the cases it uses the terminology that the subject of the consideration is,

“sufficient to meet the threat and adequately take account of privacy and civil liberties concerns”.

I think that I would prefer to see the word “properly” rather than “adequately” take account of privacy and civil liberties concerns. It is essential that that aspect is set out in the consultation paper, and I would hope to see it spelled out in the remit for the board in the statute as well. If it is not there, it is not there, and it will be difficult for the board to pursue that. My amendment is quite mild in that it seeks to provide advice to Ministers on that aspect of legislation. I have used the word “adequately” to reflect the consultation paper, although, as I said, I would prefer proper account to be taken of those concerns by that clear purpose being put on the face of the Bill.

My other amendment is about the chairmanship of the board, to which the noble Baroness referred. My amendment would give flexibility around whether the independent reviewer should chair the board. Mr Anderson has made his views clear about this being a possible diversion of his time and energy. I have a lot of sympathy with that, and the JCHR also took the point. The independent reviewer could still have an extremely central role in determining membership and the work programme without being the chair. I am not saying in this amendment that he—or, in future, she—should not chair the board; I am leaving it open for further consideration.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

I have an amendment in this group. It may be a miserable little amendment suitably to be looked at at 11.20 pm. It says simply that any regulations under the clause should be by way of affirmative resolution.

Perhaps I may say something a little more widely about the group. When I looked at Clause 36, the first question that came to my mind was: what is it for? You do not get very much out of the wording. It seeks to provide advice and assistance to the independent reviewer. Why and for what purpose? Then we look at what the regulations are to contain. They may include provision about,

“particular things that the board may or must do”.

This lack of clarification about the purpose of the clause is reflected in the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee.

I was quite interested in Amendment 118F because it contains provisions which I think would have shocked to the core the Home Secretary in the previous Government—the thought that these wide-sounding provisions should be given to a board. On the other hand, my noble friend stresses that this should be about privacy and civil liberty concerns. I think that if it were about privacy and civil liberty concerns, we would understand a little more about it. However, as it is, the lack of clarity about what it is for means that we are about to have the anvil dropped from a large height by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile. I trust that we will hear a little more in clarification from the noble Lord in reply.

[Lord Pannick]

From a modest height, I am very concerned that Clause 36 will undermine the essential role of the independent reviewer. The current holder of the post, David Anderson, and his predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, have achieved a remarkable degree of success. They have commanded the confidence of the public and of the NGOs that have expertise in this area. They have also commanded the confidence of the intelligence services and the Government. To command the confidence and, indeed, the respect of all these different constituencies is a deeply impressive achievement. However, that confidence and respect have necessarily depended on the personal independence, integrity and judgment of those who have performed this role. The job cannot be done by a committee. The clause is silent on whether the independent reviewer will share all the secret information with the board. If so, there is a real danger that he will not, in practice, be given such free access to confidential information in the future. If he is not to share the information with the board, I cannot see how it can do much to advise and assist him.

My other concern is that Mr Anderson, as has already been mentioned, has limited time to devote to the primary task of reviewing counterterrorism legislation. The very last thing that he needs is a committee structure that will inevitably use up his finite time which would be far better spent on the front line on essential activities of reviewing the operation of the relevant legislation. For all the reasons that have already been given and for these reasons, Clause 36, certainly in its current form, is a very bad idea. I hope that the Government will fundamentally reconsider it in the limited time before Report next Wednesday.

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[Lord Bates]

Perhaps I was thinking of the aphorism that a camel is a horse designed by committee.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

May I ask if it is apposite to call the independent reviewer a donkey?

[Lord Bates]

Indeed, not a donkey, nor a camel, though he certainly does more than the work of both, which I guess is the point which is being made to all of us here—that is a serious point about how we support a highly effective individual in a highly effective office to do his duties more effectively. I will seek to address some of the specific points on my way through, but I give notice that part of my instructions, should I race past it on page 11 of my speaking notes, is that we will be returning to this on Report. I hope that that will provide some comfort to noble Lords as they consider what to do with their amendments at this stage.

Clause 36 is a very important clause, as it should be. It is right that as the legislative landscape changes, we pause to consider the safeguards and oversight arrangements we have in place for counterterrorism laws, to ensure that we are getting the balance right between responding to these threats and the protection of civil liberties.

Few would question the exemplary job David Anderson QC is currently doing as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, or the contribution of his predecessor. I totally take on board my noble friend’s injunction to make haste slowly and the fact that we should ensure that there is a robust independent scrutiny of some of our most far-reaching counterterrorism powers. We should be proud of the long-standing, very effective and transparent system of independent oversight that we have in the UK, but we should not rest on our laurels.

Clause 36 provides for the creation of a board which will support the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. As our legislative armoury necessarily increases, there is also an increasing demand for the review of particular aspects of counterterrorism legislation, and that this is a substantial task for one individual to undertake. David Anderson has himself made clear that he is operating at the very limit of his capacity and that there is a need to reform the independent reviewer’s role. It is intended that the board will provide support in the discharge of the independent reviewer’s statutory responsibilities, but also that the board will produce reports and advice to the independent reviewer, expanding the capacity and breadth of experience available to our oversight arrangements, and enabling a greater range of matters to be subject to review.

It may be helpful at this point to deal with Amendments 118F to 118J which go to the heart of a very important issue, in the same way as other amendments, in seeking to set out particular matters on which the board will report.

Clause 36 provides for regulations to be made which will be subject to the affirmative procedure and which would set out the precise detail of the board. Among other matters, these regulations will make provision about the appointment, membership and particular functions of the board. I fully expect that a number of the issues covered within these amendments may be appropriately dealt with in those regulations.

We are approaching the end of the public consultation period on 30 January, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, pointed out. The Government will consider carefully the outcome of that consultation prior to bringing forward the regulations setting out the details on how the board will operate. Of course, it is important that the comments of your Lordships in this debate and at other stages of consideration are also considered as part of that consultation.

However, I am mindful that a number of views which have been expressed in this House—

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends Lady Hamwee, Lord Thomas and Lady Ludford for tabling Amendment 5 and for providing advance notice of their amendments. The debate on this group has also concerned Amendment 16, tabled by the Opposition, and to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has spoken. I will seek to address the issues that both amendments raise.

Amendment 5 would amend the definition of a passport to exclude,

“a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom”.

It would prevent police officers and designated Border Force officers exercising the power against individuals travelling on a foreign passport. This would mean that the police could not use this power to disrupt the travel of foreign nationals they reasonably suspected to be travelling overseas for terrorist-related activity. In the case of British citizens with dual nationality, the amendment would have the effect that the person’s British passport could be seized but their foreign passport could not. I accept the probing nature of the amendment, and I am sure that my noble friend is aware of that point but is seeking to elicit further information and reassurances.

The increasing number of people leaving the UK and Europe for the purpose of engaging in terrorism-related activity overseas—and returning with enhanced terrorist-related capabilities—means that we need proportionate powers to counter the real threat that we face from terrorism at home and abroad. This power will send out a robust message to anyone considering travelling to and from the UK for the purpose of involvement in terrorist activities.

It would not be appropriate—indeed, it may unlawfully discriminate against British citizens—if the police were able to use this power against British citizens suspected to be travelling overseas for terrorist-related activity but unable to use this power to disrupt the travel of foreign nationals. The power therefore applies to British citizens and foreign nationals, including European Economic Area nationals. Databases at a port would be updated to disrupt any further attempts at travel for the period in which the travel documents have been retained.

Passports are the property of the issuing authority—my noble friend sought clarification on this—and it is an International Civil Aviation Organisation, ICAO, standard for the issuing authority to be shown on the passport. There is no legal requirement to inform other issuing authorities when passports are seized or surrendered in other circumstances, such as to meet bail conditions. That would be the same for a British national in another country subject to similar actions.

Amendment 16 would require the police to inform the relevant embassy or high commission if the police exercised the power at Schedule 1 against their country’s citizens. If a foreign travel document is seized under this power, we will consider whether to notify the Government concerned on a case-by-case basis. In some cases, there could be concerns about the consequences for an individual if information like that is made available. Individuals affected can, of course, if they choose, seek consular assistance from their Government’s representatives here.

Foreign Governments are not routinely notified when their passports are seized or surrendered in other circumstances, such as under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, when a passport can be held for up to seven days for examination purposes, or when an individual subject to a terrorism prevention and investigation measure is prohibited from possessing a travel document.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked about the definition of travel documents. Our definition is anything that is or appears to be a passport, ticket or another document that permits a person to make a journey by any means from within the UK to outside the UK. It would include, for example, a boarding pass. A passport means a UK passport or a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation or a document that can be used in some or all circumstances instead of a passport.

I was asked whether the power applied to diplomatic passports. Under international law and treaty diplomats may enjoy certain immunities. This power cannot be used to breach one of those. I think that is fairly clear.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether we would return a foreign national’s passport to their country, if it was requested. Passports are the property of the issuing authority, as I have already mentioned. There is no legal requirement to inform issuing authorities when passports are seized or surrendered. If the issuing authority requested it to be returned, we would consider whether it was appropriate to do so. In most circumstances we would expect to return it unless it was required, for example, as evidence in connection with a prosecution.

I have tried to answer the points of what I know were probing amendments. I hope with those bits of explanation and justification my noble friend will feel free to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

I wonder whether the Minister can help me. It just occurred to me, as I was listening to him, about a foreign national who is in transit through this country. Is this power exercisable to remove the passport of a foreign national who is simply passing through this country with a view to going to a further destination?

[Lord Bates]

I will check this, because it is a very important matter, but intuitively my belief would be that the answer is yes, because they would be in the United Kingdom and they would be reasonably suspected by the authorities or the police of intending to travel overseas from this country for terrorist-related activities. I will check on that and if it is not the case I will write to the noble Lord.

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[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, in relation to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, concerned with the giving of reasons, and in relation to the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I suggest that the answer is the one given by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, from paragraphs 230 to 233. The obligation in the Bill should surely be that there is a duty to give the gist of the reasons. No one would suggest that all detailed reasons must be given, but if someone is told that their passport is being taken away they should be told the essence of the reasons why if this power is to be acceptable and not criticised as obviously unfair. It may be necessary to write in an exception. There may be security reasons why not even the gist can be given. It is fundamental that if you exercise a power of this sort you give the gist of the reasons for doing so.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I wonder if the Minister could consider a concrete and perhaps not too remote example. Let us suppose the authorities in the United States were to send an e-mail to the authorities in this country, saying that X should be stopped; he is passing in transit through the UK and going to Ukraine— for instance—for terrorism purposes. Would that be reasonable grounds for stopping him and removing his passport? I would like the Minister to consider that. There would be no evidence or intelligence in the hands of the British authorities. A reason given to the passenger could, I suppose, be that their country says that their passport must be taken away; but would that be reasonable grounds? Could that possibly be the basis of the decision by the policeman or immigration officer?

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[Lord Harris of Haringey]

I do not want to get into an extended dialogue. I understand exactly the point, but it is a fine balancing act and there is a real issue. If we are saying that one of the concerns is the extent to which these powers are exercised proportionately, given not only that it is extremely important for the entire community and entire society that these powers are exercised and that they exist but at the same time we are trying to avoid a situation in which there is a backlash, these matters need to be considered. I am sure that the Government have considered them and perhaps the Minister will give us an indication as to how they have tried to strike that balance, not in the circumstances where the powers have been used incorrectly or inappropriately but simply when this has happened.

I do not want to go back to the numbers question, but if for example we found that these powers were exercised quite widely because there was a real concern about people going overseas for terrorist purposes but necessarily because of those concerns there were a large number of false positives, the backlash in the communities concerned would be extremely great. It is just the same argument that arises about a very large number of stops and searches taking place—not that compensation arose there—simply to deter a small number of people.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Accepting the view of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that we should not give a course of action to someone who has had their passport removed, if the Minister were to give an assurance that the state will be open to ex gratia payments in appropriate cases, the fears expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, would be met. Ex gratia payments are frequently made in circumstances where there has been a degree of injustice. One cannot imagine any greater sense of injustice than to have one’s flight removed and the cost of a hotel imposed without any possibility whatever of being recompensed.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Sympathetic though one may be to how individual people may feel, perhaps I may respectfully say that my noble friend Lord Pannick is absolutely right.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, in the year 1219, some four years after King John put his seal to Magna Carta at Runnymede, Ghengis Khan, through his armies, invaded Persia. Their tactics were to create terror. Prisoners were executed, or even used as body shields by Mongol warriors as they charged against their enemies. If a city refused to surrender, diseased bodies were thrown over the walls to spread plague and disease—an early example of biological warfare to which the noble Lords, Lord Judd and Lord Jopling, referred. On the fall of the city, women and children were raped and slaughtered and, through terror, the Persians capitulated and the country was held down with relatively few Mongol forces. It is thought that the population of the area was reduced from 2.5 million to 250,000.

In the past year, we have seen such terror tactics used again across the same lands. Essentially, a war exists between two competing sects of the same religion of peace and it is a conflict that has lasted for more than a millennium. The army of Iraq, trained by the West and with far superior equipment, melted away rather than face the barbarity of ISIL forces. The United States and the United Kingdom have been dragged into the conflict by the barbaric execution of our citizens and by the fall of Mosul and the capture of the Haditha Dam. The polity that we sought to create in Iraq is in danger of collapse. We and other western countries—Canada, France, Australia and others—are now engaged in an asymmetric war in which we attack the enemy by the most technologically advanced means of drones and air strikes. Against them, the forces of terror have no defence. But the price we pay for warfare directed from secure and remote bunkers in our homelands is that we significantly increase the risk of a strike on our own civilian population. The war is brought home to us, as happened in Greenwich, in Canada, in Australia and, only last week, in France.

There is a further significant dynamic to which some noble Lords have referred: the volunteering or recruitment of radicalised young Muslims, born in this country, to fight on the terrorist side in Syria or Iraq. This is the context in which this counterterrorism Bill is brought forward. I believe that the citizens of this country are at greater risk now than when we had armies in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan. The point of balance between the safety of British people and civil liberties has shifted.

However, civil liberties are not abolished. Where there is sufficient evidence of a breach of the criminal law, all would agree that an individual should be investigated, arrested and tried in a judicial process where all the safeguards against injustice are in place. The problem we must examine is where there is not sufficient evidence for such processes and administrative powers are used as an alternative to prosecution. This Bill builds on a past of difficult legislations, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, mentioned.

Clause 1 proposes the seizure by police or other authorised persons of a passport where a person is suspected of intending to leave this country in connection with terrorism-related activity. The clause includes ancillary powers of searching and for the use of reasonable force. We have to ask ourselves whether this is a proportionate and necessary interference with an individual’s rights serving a legitimate aim.

First, there is already a power for a policeman to arrest without warrant a person he reasonably suspects to be concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. What is the distinction between the exercise of that power and this new power to take away a passport? Is it possible to have a different evidential base for the suspicion necessary to trigger the existing power of arrest and the suspicion necessary for the new power to take away a passport? The draft code of practice says in terms that a reasonable suspicion cannot be formed on the basis of racial stereotypes. Obviously, there must be a stop list that causes someone at an airport or port to remove an individual’s passport. What is the basis of it? It surely cannot be the hunch of the policeman or the officer who happens to be on duty on the particular day, and yet, as the Bill is currently drafted, although someone is on a stop list, no reasons for the seizure have to be given. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, pointed out the difficulties of the limitations of judicial review. Without any reasons having to be given, the remedy of judicial review is further stultified.

Secondly, what happens to the individual whose passport has been removed? Is he simply sent back home or is he made subject to a TPIM order with a travel restriction? What happens to him?

Thirdly, as to the limited judicial oversight contained within the clause, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, argued that judges should not be able to overrule Ministers. However, it is not the judges who overrule Ministers at their whim; it is the rule of law that controls the way in which a Minister behaves.

Why is there to be no judicial consideration of the officer’s decision unless an extension of the seizure beyond 14 days is contemplated? Why, even then, does the court have no power to examine the merits of the exercise of the power or to consider the evidential base of the original officer’s decision? The limited power of the court to examine whether the process has been carried out diligently and expeditiously is presumably modelled on the unsatisfactory power of a judge on an application to extend the custody time limits of a person held on remand in an ordinary criminal case. However, in applications in criminal cases the court has already considered the merits. Why cannot the court consider the merits of a decision under Clause 1?

Clause 2 gives power to the Secretary of State, on reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism-related activity outside the United Kingdom, to cancel the passport of a British citizen administratively and, again, without any judicial process. It is said to be a temporary order but it may last for up to two years, and then it may be extended or renewed without any time limit. It is surely wrong for the Government to contend in their human rights memorandum that the Human Rights Act 1998, which is engaged, and the United Kingdom’s obligation under the European convention, do not apply to the removal of citizenship from a person simply because he is out of the jurisdiction. That was the previous Government’s mistake in connection with the activities of troops serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it took the Supreme Court to put it right.

I shall support amendments for which the Joint Committee on Human Rights has argued, which would substitute an exclusion order with a “notification of return” order. The questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, as to the effect of the temporary exclusion order on foreign jurisdictions must be answered. I do not regard this as a weak self-notification, as suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones; I think it is the way forward.

Relocation under a TPIM order re-emerges in Clause 12. The independent reviewer told the Joint Committee on Human Rights in November that relocation was more effective than the power merely to exclude TPIM subjects from particular locations. We are not told why. Undoubtedly relocation has a down side: it has the most damaging effects on family life. As the highly experienced solicitor Gareth Peirce put it:

“This may affect only a small group of people but in terms of its contribution to what one might call the folklore of injustice, it is colossal”.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said that we must keep the Muslim community onside. He is right because that community is the source of co-operation and intelligence that will defeat terrorism.

In the other place, in answer to the right honourable Kenneth Clarke, the Minister sought to justify relocation by reason of,

“the changing nature of the threat picture”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/12/14; col. 800.]

What does that mean? Can the Minister explain specifically how relocation lessens the threat posed to the security of this country by returnees from Syria and Iraq? Is not a programme of reintegration within the community to be preferred? What will we do, for example, with the Cardiff jihadis who appeared in that clip that we saw? Will we house them separately in a completely alien society in Carlisle or Newcastle? Will we put them in a hostel for returnees so that they can be subjected to programmes of reintegration in, for example, Welsh-speaking Bala in Merionethshire? I refer to Bala for a particular reason. The authorities deemed it right in 1916, after the Easter Rising in Dublin, to place 1,800 Irish republican prisoners in an internment camp at Frongoch just outside the town. It became known as the Sinn Fein university, where republican leaders such as Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith gave lectures to inmates in guerrilla warfare. If banishment to Wales did not lessen the tension in Ireland, how does relocation lessen the threat today?

I want finally to refer to the proposed Privacy and Civil Liberties Board in Part 7. I support the broad concept that there should be a specific independent body that can act as a counterweight to the cadre within the Home Office, largely of ex-Security Service personnel, who have exerted such pressure on successive Home Secretaries and—dare I say it?—on the independent reviewer. I do not, of course, suggest that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, or the current independent reviewer has given way to that pressure. The Bill, however, has only an outline of the membership, purpose and functions of the board. It might be right to leave the details to secondary legislation, but we are entitled to know now how its members are to be appointed and by whom; whether certain classes of people, such as human rights activists, will be excluded; and how it will relate to the work of the independent reviewer. Will the board have access to classified material and, if so, to what extent? It might well be of great assistance to the independent reviewer to have a body of experienced, independent people with whom he can discuss the issues that concern him and who will back him publicly; but a board that is designed to oversee or interfere with his powers, without knowledge of the material on which his conclusions are based, would be a total waste of resources.

This Bill is being put through this House under the fast-track procedure. We must be careful to ensure that these and many other issues are thoroughly discussed and ventilated before we give it our consent.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 28th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Cohen of Pimlico (Lab)]

My Lords, I also rise to support the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, spoke about the need to align PACE and RIPA and thereby to protect journalism. I agree that journalistic material needs to be protected from police officers using RIPA provisions, which were designed originally to get at something completely different. It is equally important, though very much less a subject of public debate, to protect items subject to legal prejudice, which this amendment, if it became law, would do.

I am a solicitor—it is probably my only declarable interest—and, like all solicitors, a solicitor of the Supreme Court, which I would like everybody to remember as a statement. I have been consulted by people anxious about fraud, bribery and commercial organisations who are naturally seeking a safe and effective way of making their concerns known. They are whistleblowers. Any solicitor would make a file note, and it is not a happy thought that a police officer, solely on his own authority, could seek access to that note and thus to the relationship of confidentiality with our clients that we lawyers have been brought up to believe is a vital foundation.

It may also fall to any practising solicitor to be consulted by someone seeking, as for example in the Jimmy Savile saga, to allege that serving police officers were complicit in abuse, and then to be approached by a police officer, perhaps seeking to head off trouble at the pass, being able to access information via RIPA without ever having to explain to a judge what evil it was he was specifically seeking to expose. I accept—of course, I do—that client confidentiality can and must be breached in extremis and with the issue of a warrant or authorisation by a judge, but it should not be possible for police officers to avoid the PACE rules or to go round them and get at the principle of client confidentiality by using legislation that was never intended to do that.

We solicitors are all members of the Supreme Court. We are bound to assist it, but we are bound to assist judges. We are not meant to be a branch of the Executive and, as such, we ought to be subject—and all legally applicable documents ought to be subject—to the power of the courts and not to the power of the police, or indeed, if push came to shove, to the Secretary of State. I commend the amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Cohen of Pimlico, and to make the same point from the point of view of the Bar. I do not think that legal professional privilege is fully understood. Certainly in the criminal field, there may be a perception that defence barristers get together with their client and cook up some story, and if only the police could have access to the instructions of the barrister or the solicitor, all would be revealed. The contrary is the truth.

If I can bowdlerise a little bit, when I see a client for the first time, I say to him, “Will you please not tell me any bull? I want to know the truth. Unless you tell me the truth, I am not able to help you. I am not able to give you proper advice, just as though you went to the doctor saying that you had a pain in your toe when in fact the pain was in your head. Tell me the truth”. It very often happens that the client will then come out with a story which you can then check against the other evidence in the prosecution case, and go back to him and say, “You did tell me a lot of bull. I really need to know the truth if I am to represent you properly”. He will change his story in some instances and will tell the truth. With that truth, you can win cases or you can mitigate the just punishment that will ultimately be imposed on him and advise him to plead guilty if that is the right thing to do.

It is an extremely delicate relationship between the client and the barrister or solicitor—I have been in the solicitor position as well—that many people do not understand. A judge understands it. If a judge, on a proper application being made to him, decides that it is in the public interest that this relationship should be investigated, and if there is something about the way in which the case is being conducted that gives rise to suspicion so that prying into the papers of the defence is an appropriate thing to do, the judge from all his experience—all judges will have been through the mill themselves and will know precisely how these things should be approached—will give the ultimate permission for the file or the papers to be looked at. Generally speaking, though, he will not do so, and it is quite wrong if the police use RIPA powers—legislation that was intended for a completely different purpose—to break into that very delicate relationship and break it up.

That is the importance of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and I support it entirely.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, I can be fairly brief in this debate because I think the Minister will have heard the very real and deep concerns across the House on this. It is not the first time that concerns have been raised about the use or misuse of RIPA. In this instance we are talking about the rights of journalists obtaining information from confidential sources to retain that confidentiality without which some information may never come to light. Previously, there had been anecdotal reports of local authorities using the legislation, which the noble Lord, Lord Black, mentioned, including identifying whether parents were living in a school catchment area. These issues raise serious concerns and have serious implications for individuals and for issues of collective privacy.

I will say something about the wider and serious implications of misuse of the legislation, but I want to address the specific role of journalists’ sources. In effect, we are discussing how new technology has brought with it new challenges for a free press and for personal privacy. Thirty years ago, if the police wanted access to journalists’ sources, they would have to go to a court to obtain their notes. There were no mobile phone records they could access at that time. Similarly, we would not have seen journalists illegally hacking into private phone calls, as shamefully came to light more recently.

Over the weekend, like other noble Lords, I read some of the obituaries of Ben Bradlee, and this amendment came to mind as I was reading about his editorship of the Washington Post. I also watched “All the President’s Men”, which is one of my favourite films. The main people portrayed in that film—Bob Woodward, Carl Bernstein and Ben Bradlee—uncovered the most serious corruption at the highest level of government. I might tag this amendment as “the Watergate amendment” because, although the jurisdictions are entirely different, the principle is the same. Would that story, with all the implications for democracy and secrecy, ever have been told if the Nixon Administration had been able to identify the Deep Throat source or access the records of the journalists he was speaking to? If Nixon had been able to obtain mobile phone records in secret, would we ever have found out what was going on? There will be parallels in the UK, although perhaps they will not be so dramatic. That underlines the value and importance of serious investigative journalism. I am not talking about sensationalist stories about people that most of us have never heard of, but about the best kind of journalism, which I hugely admire, acting in the public interest, not just on what is of public interest.

Noble Lords will recall that, when the Government brought in new powers into the DRIP Act by fast-track legislation to deal with serious and organised crime, including terrorism, we were highly critical of the way in which they acted and of the need to use the fast-track process. Part of our demands in supporting that legislation was that there should be a complete, thorough and independent view of RIPA. We have said for some time that it is becoming increasingly clear and obvious that RIPA is out of date and does not have the right kind of framework or the safeguards we need. Recent reports that RIPA has been used to access journalists’ sources reinforce that. It is right that the Interception Commissioner is looking at it, but in addition it is essential that we get a clear guarantee from the Minister today that this issue will be included as part of the comprehensive review of RIPA led by David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, that was agreed by the Government during the debates on DRIPA.

For many, the world seems less safe today. We must be vigilant against organised and serious crime and terrorism. I believe that the public understand and support the need for measures that the Government must put in place to deal with these threats to our safety. In order to have and maintain that public support, it is vital that such powers are only ever used for the purpose for which they were intended. If those powers are abused, whether by government, police or local authorities, it undermines public confidence in the very measures needed for the most serious issues, and that puts us all at risk.

Of course, journalists are not above the law. Like anyone else, they need to be investigated if they have committed a serious crime, and I do not think anybody is arguing otherwise. As noble Lords have pointed out, there is already an independent judicial process with prior jurisdiction needed by which the police can apply for access to journalists’ information, but we have a long tradition of additional safeguards in law to recognise the role of a free press in a democracy and to protect whistleblowers, and this should not be compromised.

That is why we need the RIPA legislation to be examined in its entirety, including in context and in application, to ensure that the legal framework enables the police to access the data they need to solve serious crimes and to ensure that it does not have a chilling effect on free speech and the free press on which our democracy depends. The Government must ensure that David Anderson’s review is ambitious enough in scope to resolve these problems and to respond positively to the issue before us now. We seek an assurance from the Minister that this matter will be considered in the review. In addition, the Government must make it clear by whatever means are appropriate that such legislation must only ever be used for the purpose for which it was intended.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Wednesday 8th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The greater test will always include the lesser, but areas that may or may not be considered by a court to get over that hurdle may be profoundly distressing in the non-technical sense to the individual but may not be regarded as sufficiently distressing to come within the definition. There is inevitably a degree of vagueness about any definition, whether you choose the one that the Government choose or the one proposed in the amendment. But I fear that the test is too low.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

Could my noble friend deal with a major objection? An order can be obtained on hearsay evidence, so the judge does not have to hear from somebody who says, “I’ve been distressed or annoyed”; it would be sufficient for someone to say, “I’ve heard someone else describe himself as annoyed because of the behaviour in question”.

[Lord Faulks]

The question of hearsay evidence is important, and I am glad that my noble friend raised it. One difficulty about the orders is that individuals are often terrified of those who are responsible for the anti-social behaviour. They are terrified of being identified as the source of the complaint. If they have to give evidence, they will not want to do so. They therefore provide their perfectly bona fide complaint to an agency. Hard-pressed agencies will have to assess whether this is de minimis or of sufficient gravity before deciding whether to proceed.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Is my noble friend saying that the procedure can be based on an anonymous complaint?

[Lord Faulks]

It can be on the basis of an anonymous complaint, though a judge will need to be satisfied of its substantiality. There are individuals who simply would not seek an injunction if they thought that they could be clearly identified as the source of the procedure. Of course, judges are used to weighing up hearsay evidence, which has less weight than direct evidence. A judge is unlikely to make an order if they think that it is double-hearsay or comes from an unreliable source.

Before making an order, a judge also has to decide that it is proportionate and necessary, in accordance with the Human Rights Act. As I submitted, it is no light thing for the agencies to assemble the evidence necessary to satisfy a judge. The Law Society has carefully considered the arguments against Clause 1. Although more than happy to criticise government legislation—and even this Bill, in some respects—it remains absolutely firm in its support of the existence of the power described in Clause 1, fearing otherwise that the hurdle would be too high and that the power to prevent anti-social behaviour would be damaged.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Thursday 9th May 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I am not a dog but I do not think that introducing identity cards is going to solve the problems that the noble Lord has just outlined. I am sorry to hear voices raised in favour of identity cards—we thought the Labour Party had lost its desire to control which it exhibited during 13 years in government.

Turning to something quite different, I very much regret that there is nothing in the gracious Speech that would permit parliamentary scrutiny of proposals which seem to be designed to destroy access to justice in criminal cases. The Ministry of Justice’s current consultation is for a scheme of “competitive tendering” for criminal legal aid, which will not require primary legislation.

The consultation is a sham, as Ministers have already decided that they are in favour of such a scheme in principle and, regardless of the consultation, competitive tendering will be introduced within months. The only question posed in the consultation is the precise model. The model proposed by the Government could have been brought forward only by Ministers and their advisers, who have not the slightest experience of the way criminal courts operate or of the professional values, ethics and practices of the legal profession.

The key parts of the consultation document are chapter 4, on introducing competition in the criminal legal aid market, and chapter 5, on reforming fees in criminal legal aid. Chapter 4 is about introducing price-competitive tendering. Those proposals will be the death of the high street solicitor. The intention is to remove competition on quality and replace it with competition on price alone. In each of the contract areas, which will match the 41 police areas, there will be a set number of contracts. In my own immediate vicinity, there will be four in north Wales, four in Cheshire and some 37 in Manchester. Contracts will be awarded on a three-year basis. Successful bidders will receive a guaranteed equal share of the criminal work in that area. To achieve equality, work will be allocated by a central agency on neutral criteria; for example, by surname alone. The explicit intention is therefore to abolish client choice. A solicitor will be appointed by a central agency to act for a defendant. The reputation and good will which solicitors have built up within their area disappear. The skills of firms which have built up particular specialisms—for example, in fraud, terrorism or mentally disordered offenders—will count for nothing. In cities such as Manchester, the skills of firms which have a client base within particular ethnic communities or with particular language skills—for example, Urdu or Polish—are of no value because work is to be allocated on random criteria. As for my home territory, Welsh language provision is seriously compromised.

The contracts will be one size fits all. There is a Goldilocks problem about this: most firms are too small to bid at all and, ironically, many others are too big to bid. In Manchester there are a couple of firms which have 10% to 15% of the market but which under the new system of equality would be restricted to one-37th of the market, or 2.7%. There may be a handful of firms, or networks of firms, which are just the right size to bid. However, these contracts will go mostly to service companies which have the capital to create a national network with contracts in every area; for example, G4S, Serco, Tesco and the Co-op. Perhaps the most aggressive is the newly arrived Stobart Barristers, an offshoot of Eddie Stobart truckers. Its legal director, Trevor Howarth, confirmed that the firm would bid for the new criminal defence contracts. He said:

“We can deliver the service at a cost that’s palatable for the taxpayer … Our business model was developed with this in mind. We at Stobart are well known for taking out the waste and the waste here is the duplication of solicitors going to the courtroom. At the moment there are 1,600 legal aid firms; in future there will be 400. At Stobart, we wouldn’t use 10 trucks to deliver one product”.

I think that, like the Ministry of Justice, he regards people in trouble with the criminal law as units and justice as a common product to be delivered like a load of bricks. Mr Howarth is, I believe, currently on trial himself for contempt of court for allegedly lying in court. I say no more about it.

From a business perspective, however, the changes do not make sense. The companies which win the contracts will be monolithic, national firms. The government agenda generally is supposed to be to support SMEs—small and medium enterprises—but the effect of these proposals will be to send the existing providers, the high street firms, to the wall. There will be mass bankruptcies and redundancies. The new providers, the big companies, will bid low to start with, but once they have destroyed the competition from existing solicitors, inevitably prices will rise, with the profits going to the big boys.

If the Government’s proposed model is adopted, quality is to be driven down to minimum standards. The single determining factor for success will be price. Practitioners will be valued and rewarded for producing the highest turnover of work at the lowest cost. Literally and intentionally, no value will be attached to quality of representation. If the professions are dumbed down, it will impact ultimately on the judiciary. Someone has already said that, if you have Tesco-grade lawyers, within 10 years you will have to start appointing Tesco-grade judges because they will be the only people to have experience in this field.

The complaint about the chapter 4 proposals is that they represent the intentional dumbing-down of the criminal justice system. Quite explicitly, the intention is to reduce the quality of representation to a set of minimum standards. No value will be attached to quality of representation. The explicit abolition of client choice will erode confidence in the system.

The proposals in chapter 5 are about the reform of fee structures. There is opposition to the reduction in fees, which are cutting to levels which are unsustainable, but that is not the main thrust of opposition. The concern is that the new structures are unworkable, the most obvious being the proposals to cut trial fees. In many cases, the advocate will be paid the same for a guilty plea as he or she would get for a trial. In more complex cases, refreshers would be paid on a reducing scale so that, in some cases, they might fall to £14 a day, without expenses.

The intention is presumably to add to the incentives to defendants to plead guilty. The effect of that is to create conflicts of interest between the advocate and his/her client. The advocate is punished financially if the client pleads not guilty and goes to trial. Not only is that wrong in principle, it is counterproductive: if defendants know that the advocate has a conflicting financial incentive, they will not listen to him when he tells them to plead guilty, because it will be in his financial interest to do precisely that. Hence, there will be more trials, at greater expense.

The proposals will mean fundamental changes, but there is to be no pilot scheme. One of the most dangerous aspects of the price competitive tendering proposal is the compete lack of modelling or trialling. The Attorney-General, Dominic Grieve QC, gave the explicit assurance before the general election that the Tories would not introduce tendering without full trials first. Why has the one person in this Government with practical experience been overruled?

The proposals are to be brought in nationwide, commencing this autumn, without any trial period. They will be irreversible, because once the existing providers have gone, they will never come back. It was made clear in Tuesday’s Law Society Gazette that most of the significant current providers regard the scheme as unworkable and will not tender.

On the subject of minimum quality standards, there is a link to a separate set of proposals to introduce a quality assurance scheme for advocates. I will not go into that at this stage. Suffice it to say that solicitor advocates can presently obtain higher level grades on the basis of attending a course and giving a good performance in role-play exercises. They are not judged on their actual performance in real cases at a lower level.

I am a former solicitor, so I have no axe to grind, but a very experienced Crown Court judge, who was also a solicitor, told me recently that the quality of advocacy in the Crown Court is, unhappily, appalling. He faces the dilemma that if he, as the judge, steps in to the arena too often to correct a solicitor advocate who is making a hash of the case before him, it quickly gives the appearance of bias. He was also concerned that in very serious cases, where two advocates are required to represent an accused, the fees structure is such that solicitor advocates now frequently seize the role of junior to themselves. However, he told me, if the lead counsel has to be elsewhere—for example in the Court of Appeal—far from the junior taking over, as has been the tradition at the Bar for ever, the solicitor advocate immediately applies for an adjournment. He can not carry the weight or responsibility of the hands-on conduct of the case. That judge told me that he was in despair.

I have to say that no one with experience of the criminal courts could ever advise a young person starting his career to take up the role of a criminal advocate. Centuries of experience have created the system in which a team of solicitor and counsel work to high ethical standards to ensure that justice is done. I shall be sad if liberals of any political party or none in this House assist in its destruction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Plymouth. I thank my noble friend Lord Smith very much for that vital piece of accuracy. I rather get the impression that the turnout throughout the country was hovering at around 30%, on average. If you consider that among voters aged under 30, of whom fewer than one in four turned out at the previous general election, possibly only one in 10 cast their votes last week. I do not think that anyone sitting here believes that we are in our prime as a democracy or a Parliament.

We should never forget that the expenses scandal is not a thing of the past. I did a bit of canvassing this time; and the expenses scandal has marked the mind of the British public much more deeply than we would wish, I fear. We all know well about the Leveson inquiry and what it showed in terms of the press, the police and so on. All in all, we are in a dangerous phase, particularly given the continuing crisis in the financial and banking sectors.

A significant element in this disillusion relates to the astonishing amount of complex law that we churn out from this place, year after year. It may also surprise your Lordships that our Library does not stock a complete set of statutes from this side of 2009. You cannot even obtain loose-leafed copies of statutory instruments from 2010, for example. However, those from 2009 are available. In that year, this place produced in excess of 16,000 pages of new statute law; the split was roughly one-quarter Acts of Parliament and three-quarters statutory instruments.

There are a number of lawyers here; all of us, I suppose, are lawyers of a sort because we legislate this stuff. However, we know very well how extraordinarily complex legislation has become because of the extent to which any new law has to fit into existing law. The situation becomes overwhelming, and I have noticed that in the course of our deliberations on Bills there has been a marked reduction in the number of Peers who sit here trying to grapple with amendments that tax the wisdom of Jove.

For example, since 1984, we have passed more than 100 criminal justice Acts of one sort or another and have brought into existence more than 4,000 criminal offences. I suspect that that represents rather more than were created in the whole of our previous history. EU law finds reference in 10% of our legislation, and on top of that we gold-plate EU legislation to an astonishing extent. These are not my statistics; they come from the fine document by the parliamentary draftsmen to which I referred. They provide an example of directive 2002/42, which consisted of 1,167 words in the English text issued from Brussels. By the time we had ploughed it into our own legislation, it had gone from 1,167 to 27,000 words. What is it about this Chamber, using God’s own language, English, that we manage to produce this—I am tempted to use a very rude word—excess of legislation? So far as the people of this country are concerned, it is oppressive, distancing, expensive, disillusioning, disengaging, centralising and dependency-making—you name it.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Incomprehensible.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Incomprehensible, as my noble friend says—to lawyers, inter alia. There are a number of senior judges sitting here and I am sure that they would be able to relate wonderful tales about the stuff that has come before them. I heard from one justice of the Supreme Court the other day that they were about to give judgment when one of them suddenly thought, “Hey, wasn’t something passed in 1995?”. When they went back to look, sure enough there was, and they rewrote their judgment. I shall not name names.

The truth is that this state of affairs is brought about by a combination of circumstances, one important aspect of which the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, recently referred to—the production-line legislation in the other place and the guillotining Motions that render much of the legislation there not merely inadequately considered but not considered at all. Large chunks of legislation come here never having been debated. Added to that, there is the manifesto theory of government—that if it is in your manifesto, you are entitled to legislate for it. The fact that nobody reads or buys the manifesto is neither here nor there. In the 1945 election, the manifesto for the Attlee Government was, I think, 15 pages long, whereas for the current Government it is 115 pages, but that is apparently of no importance.

Incidentally, the Queen’s Speech talks about bringing in 15 new statutes, and I believe that we have five carry-over Bills. I hope that under the health and safety legislation, which we are going to simplify, we will be allowed to have back the brushes in our gentlemen’s toilets. Noble Lords may not have noticed but they have been withdrawn on health and safety grounds. Therefore, one major improvement will be coming our way, God willing.

As I said, all this creates confusion in the minds of the public because we are endlessly changing things. We are not content to leave a law in place for 10 or 20 years. A new Minister in a new Administration says, “I’d like a new Education Act”, or whatever it might be. The poor old public are punch drunk. I repeat that there is a degree of resentment at what, too often, are seen as impositions by us. What is more, they are careless and unnecessary impositions. One sometimes has the feeling that some of this legislation is trophy stuff that Ministers can paste to their lavatory walls back home.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Or use it.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Indeed, or use it. There is a serious issue of demoralisation in a literal sense—de-moralisation. The more law you have, the more you take from the citizens of the state, in whatever situation, the need to reach their own decisions or to think through the consequences of acting in this way or that. In effect, you provide a rule that all must abide by, and too often the statutory rule is the rule. As I said, it discourages businesses, societies and organisations from taking responsibility for their own affairs, and all that has had an indirect impact on the public service ethos. I do not think it is at all contentious to remark that in this age community life is under severe attack. There is a real dilution of the strength of communities throughout our land, and those communities are the building blocks of a good society—I do not think that anybody disputes that. Consider today how few of what one might call the natural elite are engaged in their communities. My own profession which used to be the classic pillar of local communities is today far less engaged in community life than it has ever been—to the great loss of community life and lawyers as a group because there is huge fulfilment and respect to be gained. It is not just lawyers, but everyone. This is a deep matter.

I shall finalise by quoting from When Laws Become Too Complex. Its conclusion is headed:

“Conclusions and a Vision for Good Law … Mitigating causes of complex legislation”.

It states that,

“there needs to be a shared ownership of, and pride in, our legislation”.

How I agree. Consultation today is too often superficial, if not insincere. Too often Governments of all persuasions make their minds up and at the last toss of the dice say, “We’ll consult”. They do and vast numbers of people reply, but nothing changes and the legislation goes on. We have consulted ha, ha. The conclusion continues:

“There also needs to be a stronger incentive on all involved in the process to avoid generating excessively complex law, or to act positively to promote accessibility, ease of navigation, and simplification”.

That is from the parliamentary draftsmen who too often are blamed in this House and the other place for the state of our Bills when more often than not it is our fault, not theirs. Despite those unanswerable recommendations by the draftsmen, we need to look much more at implementation and enforcement of the laws that we have. It seems to me that we legislate because we have not implemented what is already there, or implemented it fairly, effectively or comprehensively.

Education in citizenship is not a voluntary or optional extra in our schools. If we have created a society of such barbaric complexity that very often we ourselves cannot understand quite where things are, how can we expect ordinary, decent young kids to feel part of this enterprise, to feel ownership of it or to feel responsible for it, if we do not equip them with the basic amount of information, knowledge and understanding to grapple with it and develop a will to be citizens? It is not just a name. I hope that in our deliberations over the next few years we will try always to think how Bills will impact on the good, ordinary citizens of this country and how we can improve.

Lastly, I must say a word about enforcement on legal aid. I shall not labour the point as my noble friend Lord McNally has had enough of it. He and the Government have said that they are committed to looking carefully at the impact of the legal aid changes that we have made. I think that after a year there is a commitment to look at sensitive aspects, and I hope that we will do that. To have all this law, which is not voluntary or optional, and then not provide citizens in most need with legal help, and without which the rights we legislate for them are cynical, is the worst of all worlds.