Professional Qualifications Bill [HL]

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 9th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I asked the Government Whips’ Office to order the speakers as is normal in the Chamber when we do not have lists—that is to say, those who have tabled amendments are allowed to speak before those who simply wish to comment on them. I was advised that the list was issued late this morning.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, may recall that I do not like purpose clauses. I believe that a Bill should be written in clear language and that its scope and impact should be readily understandable on its own terms. This Bill fails to meet that test, but I do not think that a purpose clause is the answer. Instead, we should focus on making sure that the Bill itself is fit for purpose. We have tabled a number of amendments aimed at doing this.

I also have a minor quibble with the drafting of Amendment 1. Subsection (2) refers to

“the independent process of defining the accreditation processes of the regulators.”

I believe that the independent processes which this Bill should protect go beyond mere definition of accreditation processes. We do not want any form of interference in the independent processes of regulators. This should be an enabling Bill which should unblock legal impediments to the recognition of overseas qualifications. It must steer clear of all the processes operated by regulators, not just of those defining accreditation.

I put my name down to speak because I recognised the Institute of Chartered Accountants’ provenance of Amendment 12 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill. That is why I was keen for him to speak first. Amendment 9 in my name, in a later group, is slightly simpler, but on the same basic point. I realised a little too late that perhaps I should have asked to add my amendment to this group. The essence of Amendment 12 is to ensure that inappropriate burdens are not placed on regulators, as the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, has explained. I will not repeat those arguments. I will explain my own amendment when we reach it later.

This is a very real issue. The Government need to look at it again to ensure that their approach is reasonable in the context of what regulators could be compelled to do by the provisions of this Bill. As far as we can, we should seek to avoid any possibility that they could be compelled to do anything unreasonable, burdensome or otherwise inappropriate to their profession.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly in support of Amendment 1. Subject to the clear statement of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, it would be desirable to try to focus much more of this wide-ranging Bill. If that is not done, a provision to make clear that the independence of regulators is not in any way affected is of vital concern. The regulation of professions should be set by the structure ordained by Parliament—not by the Executive and then left to the regulators. If more precise provisions cannot be incorporated, Amendment 1 would have this vital effect of making clear the independence of the regulators.

In the case of the legal profession, it is convenient at this stage to raise two points about independence. First, the independence of the courts depends on the independence of lawyers, with their ability to challenge the powerful, particularly the Government. This can only be safeguarded by independent regulation within a structure set by Parliament. Given the position of the Executive in relation to the courts and the legal profession, it should not be the Lord Chancellor’s role to be involved in this in any shape or form. It is difficult to see, given the scope of the Legal Services Act, why these wide-ranging powers need to be given to the Lord Chancellor.

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Amendment 57 is long and complex. It may need some tightening up on Report. I am pleased that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, is following me. He might well be able to explain in further detail how he thinks it could be improved. There are other issues to be discussed because the Senedd’s legislative competence does not always coincide with the executive powers of Ministers, which are sometimes wider. Importantly, if the Secretary of State is legislating on a UK-wide basis on an issue that involves devolved competence, there should be provision in the Bill for a requirement to obtain the consent of the devolved Administrations first. I hope that the Minister will agree that there needs to be discussion across the House and with the devolved Administrations to make substantial improvements on these issues before Report.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I shall speak to all the amendments in this group. I do not wish to say anything further about the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, save to say that I warmly support them, as I do the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes.

I come to the principal issue on which I wish to speak. Amendment 57 and Clause 14 demonstrate that there are two significant issues before this Parliament. The first is the extent to which we have framework legislation with Henry VIII powers—and with a vague statement that these are needed—while knowing that there is no opportunity for proper scrutiny and amendment of the powers that will be exercised in subsequent regulation. The second problem is what I would describe as the chipping away—because this is what it is becoming—of the devolution arrangements. This is being done without the consent of the devolved Governments and without putting in place a proper framework for joint agreement on how to move forward where there is a necessity for a UK solution. I fear that these issues will bedevil this Session of Parliament. They come to a head in Clause 14.

Clause 14 gives the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State power to make regulations in devolved areas. It is immensely concerning that Henry VIII powers are being used without any indication as to precisely how this is to be done and no real argument as to why they are necessary. It is difficult to understand why this area needs to be chipped away. What is the benefit for the future of the union? It would be useful if the Minister could say what he sees as the benefits and acknowledge the costs of the damage to the union.

I warmly support Amendment 57, subject to one matter I shall mention later. It is difficult to see why this problem cannot be dealt with by Amendment 57. This would leave the devolved Ministers to make decisions within their areas of devolved competence. Something like a common framework or some structure for common policy-making could then be used to resolve the differences. Using the twin devices of framework legislation and Henry VIII powers is quite the wrong way to go about our constitutional arrangements. I hope the Minister will be prepared to discuss these issues in much greater detail.

The noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, has already touched on the point I wish to make about Amendment 57. Its proposed new subsection (5) is taken from Clause 14 of the Bill as it stands, and seems a wholly unnecessary irritant. It is not constitutionally necessary. I do not understand why this Government wish to irritate people by further constraining the powers of the Welsh Ministers in a way that is wholly unnecessary. Again, a cost-benefit analysis, thinking what we are doing this for, would be a great step forward.

I hope that the difficulties inherent in the combination of the Henry VIII powers and the chipping away of devolution can be seriously discussed between those in the devolved Administrations, together with this House and the Government. I would welcome such discussions before Report to avoid what it seems is a further significant strengthening of those who wish to oppose the union for very little benefit in return.

[Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, particularly Amendments 13, 41, 42 and 57, which look to formal consultation with the devolved Administrations and, in the case of Amendment 41, the consent—under certain conditions—of the devolved Administrations to any regulations made under this section.

As all speakers on this group and in the debates on previous amendments have said, the Bill involves wide-ranging powers and Henry VIII clauses. These are apparently justified on the grounds that what may be required cannot be anticipated, and therefore cannot be legislated for in advance. This seems a dangerous and spurious catch-all which, of itself, is sufficient justification for requiring formal consultation with the devolved Administrations.

This all relates to trade deals yet to be negotiated. It will hinge on areas of skills shortages across and within the UK, as well as the opportunity for UK professionals to practise abroad. Professional regulation must surely be founded on ensuring that any professional is safely and properly qualified and experienced to practise in all or part of the UK. Yet this Bill and the powers within it are specifically linked to trade deals, and there is a risk that deals involving reciprocity could lead to standards being compromised. This concern has been identified by the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of this House.

Also, given that skills shortages vary across the UK, and by time and sector, if a devolved Administration identify a skill shortage, will the Immigration Rules also be taken into account, not just the professional qualifications regulations? Clearly, that will be necessary.

The Government have stated that they would,

“not normally make regulations under these powers in devolved areas without the agreement of the relevant devolved authority”.

Right from the very beginning of the Brexit debate, however, we have debated what “normally” means. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has pointed out, it looks like a shifting definition, and one that is not to the benefit of the devolved Administrations—or indeed to the professions in the devolved areas.

In this context we should also consider the role of the assistance centre, whose staff should surely all be thoroughly conversant with all regulators, including in the devolved Administrations. The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, would be a helpful contribution to that, because the assistance centre is a welcome recommendation, but only if it is properly qualified and its staff fully appreciate what goes on across all aspects of the UK. In areas as complex and specific as professional qualifications, that is a big ask, which must be answered. The scale and diversity of the professions that we are discussing, and the regulators that engage with them, absolutely require that any changes should be carried out only after consultation and, wherever possible, consent.

As an example of this, Scotland has long had an all-graduate teaching profession. It is sad that Scotland’s education performance has fallen down the international scale; however, that is not the fault of the teaching profession but of a curriculum and examinations set-up that is simply not fit for purpose, yet whose reform is not being tackled. We are not short of qualified teachers. Many are unable to find permanent employment, which in itself is a scandal. We certainly need to tackle education reform in Scotland. In that context there may be a role for teachers from other countries to make a contribution, but it would be regrettable if standards were compromised in a trade deal, and if those teachers were recruited while well-qualified teachers in Scotland were unable to get employment in the profession, which is where we are currently.

The UK Government say that they are working with the devolved authorities on a number of common frameworks. I also have the T-shirt as a member of the Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee, as do five noble Lords contributing to this group of amendments. The Government say that they are working on common frameworks to help co-ordinate policy development between UK nations where powers have returned from the EU and intersect with devolved competencies. This includes the mutual recognition of professional qualifications: the MRPQ framework.

In an update covering 26 September to December 2020, the Cabinet Office said that discussions on the framework made progress during that period but that development timelines should be extended. It went on:

“Agreement was reached between the UK Government and the devolved administrations that both MRPQ and Services should be developed over extended timelines to allow for more work to be done. All administrations remain committed to working to develop and agree these frameworks.”


That is all welcome, but I hope the Minister will agree that, as I have pointed out, the range and complexity of the regulation of professional qualifications, and uncertainty over the changes that may be needed, require formal consultation to be carried out and consent secured. How will this happen if we are operating on different timelines? The Government may be out there desperately trying to negotiate trade deals while all these procedures are in the process of a long, drawn-out common frameworks negotiation. As we know, the common frameworks are well behind the schedule originally hoped for and planned.

They have clearly set out the mechanism and an arrangement—which those of us on the committee feel has much to commend it—that seeks the maximum amount of co-operation and consent, looks to have fair and balanced dispute resolution mechanisms and ought to be the model for how the interconnection and co-operation between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations is carried through going forward. It would be good if Ministers acknowledged that so much has been learned in this process that it should be applied not just to those areas that were historically part of the transition out of the EU but to all future ways of working, and the principles on which the common frameworks have been founded and developed.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 9th December 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

At end insert “and do propose Amendments 48B, and 48C to the words restored to the Bill by the Commons disagreement to Amendment 48—

48B: Clause 48, after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) The powers in subsection (1) may only be exercised—
(a) after consultation with the relevant authority on the principles under which financial assistance may be provided by a Minister of the Crown;
(b) after publication of such principles; and
(c) with the consent of the relevant authority where the financial assistance is assistance that could be given by a relevant authority.”

48C: Clause 48, in subsection (2), after the definition of “providing” insert—
““relevant authority” means the Welsh Ministers in respect of Wales, the Scottish Ministers in respect of Scotland, and the Northern Ireland Executive in respect of Northern Ireland.””

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I thank the Minister for the opportunity to discuss this matter with her. In light of what she said about wishing to set up a governance structure, I am sure that progress could be made. However, there are five short reasons why I hope the House will accept the compromise I have offered in Motion K1, which I now seek to move. First, the Commons reasons were, as has been stated by the Minister, to do with financial primacy. With the utmost respect, they are not correct. Powers to spend in devolved matters are powers of the devolved Governments, not the UK Government. Most of what is covered in this clause are matters that are devolved. Secondly, the clause therefore seeks to change the devolution settlements to enable the UK Government to override the devolution settlements. The clause is therefore a constitutional and not a financial issue.

My second reason is that, at present, funds provided by the EU for regional aid for matters within devolved powers are provided to the devolved Governments, who have to agree how the funds are to be spent. The amended clause would continue this architecture for the shared prosperity fund, the successor fund to that. Under the amendment, the UK Government would agree with the devolved Governments the way in which the funds would be spent where the funds were for matters within the devolved competences—roads, health, education and the like. This would combine the benefit of an overall strategy for the UK with the benefit of devolved Governments agreeing how funds were to be expended in the areas for which they and they alone were responsible.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, the Government made a number of commitments on the shared prosperity fund in the manifesto, both about the overall quantum of the fund and the funding that different parts of the UK can expect to receive. We set out in the spending review that that would ramp up to £1.5 billion per year as the structural funds tail off. Our approach will be guided by that but, as I say, more detail will be set out in advance of the operation of the fund in spring next year, with the multiyear settlement coming in the following year.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short but interesting debate. I will deal with the Minister’s points in turn.

First, it seems clear that these powers—the Minister actually said this in Committee—were being taken to give the UK Government power to spend across the United Kingdom. These powers would plainly not be needed unless they were encroaching on devolved powers. City deals can be done without them; the Government can spend without them. I say respectfully to the Minister and to those who say this is a financial matter that it is not. When powers are devolved, the spending power goes with them. The reason of financial privilege is not correct.

Secondly, on how the funding works, I find it difficult to understand why, in light of what the Minister has said, she cannot agree to the very short amendment I have put forward. It spells out the principles, deals with consultation and ensures that, within the areas of devolved spending only—the amendment is clear on this—there should be agreement so that funds are spent together. With respect, the importance of this amendment is to show that, as we go forward, we do so as a United Kingdom with the central UK Government and the devolved Governments working closely together. Putting this provision in the Bill, particularly the structure under which this is to be done in this area, would be an enormous reassurance. It would strengthen the union, not imperil it, by enabling inconsistent spending to occur in devolved areas. Having listened to the debate and heard what all noble Lords have said, I seek to take the opinion of the House on this issue.

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[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

I now call the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, to speak to, but not at this point move, Motion L2.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I am grateful to the Minister for the opportunity to discuss this clause with him. I hope that there is a basis on which we can move forward to agree this. I will explain the purpose of the amendment in five short reasons. First, it has always been the position that there must be a competition regime that must apply to the whole of the UK. The issue is how we get there in a way that preserves and strengthens the union.

The position at the moment is that there is no agreed new competition policy. We will be operating, subject to anything that may be agreed with the EU, under the WTO regime, which devolved Governments are bound to apply under the existing devolution settlements. There is therefore time to set about this constructively. It is clear that, in devising a competition regime for the control of subsidies, a lot of things need to be ironed out. What is the role of the CMA to be? Is it to be an independent adjudicator or merely advisory? If so, whom does it advise? What does control over subsidies mean? These issues need to be examined carefully.

There are two ways forward. Way one—what I would call the UK Government’s way—is, first, to change the devolution settlements. This is a change to the devolution settlements because they operate on the basis that, if a power is not reserved, it is devolved—and there is no reservation in respect of this matter. It is therefore plainly devolved, and the purpose of this amendment is to change the devolution settlement. Having changed the settlement for a policy that they have not yet devised, the Government then wish simply to consult—and I am grateful for the clauses that affirm that they will at least do that—and then announce their decision. That is what I would call “way one”—the UK Government way.

But there is a better way, which is to do it by agreement but with a backstop. I think that there are good prospects of agreement. The Welsh Government offered unequivocally, in a letter sent on 24 November—the day before the Report stage of the Bill—to try to agree a common framework, but what I do not think many have appreciated the significance of is that the Scottish Government committed themselves to joining in that. I am not sure the extent to which that might have been appreciated at the highest levels of government, but if we simply reject this offer by the Scottish Government, that will, in my view, have very serious consequences.

Therefore, the amendment seeks to build on the progress that we have been able to make and to provide that an attempt should be made to agree a common framework—which is a regime that can govern the control of subsidies. However, if one is not agreed in the specified period of time—I have suggested three years—this clause would then take effect. If there is a view that that period is too long, obviously that is a matter that can be discussed.

The vital question is that the amendment, I respectfully urge, would allow for a further strengthening of the union, with an agreed way forward and the UK Government and the devolved Governments working together to achieve a regime applicable across the UK under the mechanism of consensus through a common framework. This would achieve what the Government want by consensus, not simply consultation. To reject the amendment and restore Clause 50 would be to impose unilaterally a change in the devolution settlement by reserving a power that is not reserved. This would be a gratuitous present to those who say that the union does not work.

There is an offer to work together from the Scottish and Welsh Governments. This House should not allow the Government simply to reject a consensual solution, as there is a time limit for that consensual process. In due course, I will move my Motion and seek t test the opinion of the House.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

My Lords, the following noble Lords have indicated that they wish to speak: the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Liddle. I call the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

Leave out “Amendment 50B” and insert “Amendments 50B and 50C—

50C: Clause 50, before subsection (1) insert—
“(A1) Subsections (1), (2) and (3) shall take effect when the Welsh Ministers, the Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Executive have agreed with the Secretary of State a common framework applicable to the United Kingdom to regulate the provision of subsidies by a public authority to persons supplying goods or services in the course of a business or, if agreement cannot be reached, three years after the passing of this Act.””

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all who have taken part in this very interesting and difficult debate. The points may seem obtuse, in that they concern state subsidies, but there are very real issues of principle involved. In the first place, it is quite clear, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, pointed out earlier in this debate, that the state subsidies are devolved. For example, Schedule 5, Part III, paragraph 4(1) of the Scotland Act says:

“This Schedule does not reserve giving financial assistance to commercial activities for the purpose of promoting or sustaining economic development or employment.”


When one then looks at the amendment that is brought in by Clause 50, it speaks of:

“Regulation of the provision of subsidies which are or may be distortive or harmful … to persons supplying goods or services.”


There can obviously therefore be an argument, as any subsidy may be distortive, that the whole of the power is subsumed in what the Government are seeking to do through their Amendment 50.

Where we have got to is an almost Alice in Wonderland situation: they want to change the devolution settlement first, in this way, which cuts right across agreed provisions, quite apart from the general reservation, and then work out the policy second. Surely, the better way to do this is to work out the policy first, and to do it in consultation with the devolved Governments. The amendment I have put forward gives a way of doing that and, most importantly of all, apart from these technical issues, to take away power—express power in the devolution agreements—because all these powers are not reserved. The Government would not need this change. Not having a clear idea that you can explain and work out how this works with the devolution settlement in my view is a gift to those who say, “The union will not work. We offered to co-operate and they won’t”. I therefore want to test the opinion of the House on this amendment, which is a compromise to try to secure the future of our union, in which so many of us have such faith.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th November 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

64: Clause 42, leave out Clause 42
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to remove the provision for a Minister of the Crown to provide financial assistance for economic development etc. anywhere in the United Kingdom.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I rise to move this amendment to remove Clause 42 of the Bill. This amendment and Amendment 69, to which we shall come later and which stands in my name, deals with two clauses that are in some ways closely related. This clause authorises the UK Government to spend funds on the huge area of government expenditure—indeed, almost any aspect of government expenditure. Clause 44 deals with the quite separate question of state aid, and it is very important to keep them distinct. I make it clear in moving this amendment that I intend to press this to a Division.

First, I shall say a little bit about the clause. What is it for? The Conservative manifesto spoke of a shared prosperity fund which was intended to be a successor to the European Union regional structural funds. I looked on it as something that would strengthen the union by sharing the prosperity of our four nations. However, because it wore the word “shared”, it carried with it the connotation that the Governments of the four parts of the United Kingdom would share in the way in which it was distributed in accordance with the constitutional arrangements in place.

That such a fund would be greatly welcomed does not need to be stated. There are parts of the UK—and being here in Wales it is evident—that are far poorer than other parts of the United Kingdom, and investment is needed. Of course, we need to look carefully and in a structured way at how they are to be dealt with. I think we have—and I shall come to this later—some guidance published this afternoon in the Red Book, at box 3.1 on page 37. It is convenient for me to deal with that when I come to deal with the role of the devolved Governments.

There is one thing I ought to say—and I hate that this is something that will not come to pass. In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, drew our attention to another term. She pointed out that in the European Union there were rules about funds allocated for the remediation of poverty and for equalling people up which had been made available to parts of the United Kingdom, including Wales. She pointed out that there would be detailed rules, and that Europe operated detailed rules. However, this shared prosperity fund still has no detailed rules, despite what is said in box 3.1, to which I have referred. She pointed out that the Americans have a term, pork barrelling, for this kind of fund. I would like to continue to call it a shared prosperity fund, because I believe in the union and in sharing the way our country is governed, and I hope that we will never have this aspect of American politics brought into our way of doing things but, plainly, there are dangers along those lines.

This clause is best analysed by asking eight questions. The first is why it is included in the Bill? As it stands, it is wholly separate from the other provisions we have been debating, which are to do with the internal market. The Bill is not concerned with the allocation of government powers to spend money between the devolved Governments and the Government of the United Kingdom with England. Secondly, what is its aim? I have addressed that: as was stated in the Government’s manifesto and now in box 3.1, it is intended to level up the divisions of society within the union and to help.

One immediately has to ask why this clause is needed. The Government have done city deals and have provided money, perfectly property, under our existing constitutional arrangements. Why do they need this power? If they were to provide the funds through the existing constitutional arrangements, this power would not be needed. The devolved Governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland would be involved and the spending programmes would go along the way they have always gone along, this fund being an additional fund provided from moneys no longer remitted to the European Union. Indeed, if it were to follow the lines of the city deals or its predecessors in the European Union, the Government would negotiate the other Governments, in the case of the devolved nations, or, in the case of England, the various regions and cities, what they felt the money should be spent on, consider it and make a decision. That is all perfectly feasible. So, yes, it is a very good idea to have a shared prosperity fund, and it needs no legislation.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

The Government are seeking the power under this Bill to spend across the whole of the United Kingdom in the areas set out in the Bill. The operation of the £220 million announced at the spending review will start from the next financial year and the full shared prosperity fund will begin the year after. More detail on how that will operate will be set out in due course.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this interesting debate. I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for referring to the document published today as the Red Book instead of its true colour which, as one sees on the screen, is blue. I was misled by the heading Google has for it, which is the Red Book.

However, Google had another use because it took up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, and alerted me to the fact that the great and late Senator McCain had a member of staff who would go through Bills before Congress and find where there were pork-barrel provisions. He was known as the ferret, so ferrets do have great uses in politics.

To return to the points made, it is clear from the debate that we all share a number of objectives: first, to have a more prosperous United Kingdom; secondly, to spend the money wisely; and thirdly, to spend it in a way that is effective and goes to those areas that need it. We all believe that such spending and levelling up will benefit the union. However, there is profound disagreement as to the way in which this should work with our devolution settlement. It seems to me from the response given to my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed and from the Minister’s speech that only one conclusion can be drawn from what the Minister is saying and that these powers are needed not to spend the money outside the areas of devolved competence but to spend it in the areas of devolved competence. That is the aspect that fundamentally divides us and is fundamentally wrong about this clause. It seems to me that, given the Minister’s position and the clarity that comes through her statements, this is a direct attack on devolution under the guise of some other words. Therefore, I seek to press to a Division the amendment that I tabled to remove this clause, which is so destructive of our union.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

69: Clause 44, leave out Clause 44
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to remove provisions changing the legislative competence of the devolved legislatures to prevent devolved Acts making provision about the regulation of the provision of certain subsidies by public authorities.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, in a way this issue is much simpler because Clause 44 has been put in with one purpose only: to alter the devolution scheme. I intend to move that it be removed from the Bill and, if necessary, I will press this to a Division.

I ought to say from the outset that the regime of state aid is plainly necessary, and it is necessary to have one for the whole of the UK, as I will explain in a moment. It is necessary first to say a little about the background. Until relatively recently, the British Government’s stated position had been to retain the EU regime and put in place an independent body, such as the CMA, that would police it. Whether it was like the Commission or whether it was advisory was something to be worked out. Obviously, that would not have required any change to the devolution scheme because we would have been proceeding as we had during our membership of the EU.

However, the present Government decided to change that, and they intend to use Henry VIII powers to do so by statutory instrument. That instrument has been drafted and is no doubt to be debated soon. It has been considered by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which has concluded, and I think it important that noble Lords hear its conclusion:

“The House will be aware of the Committee’s concern, raised on several previous occasions, that secondary legislation is being used to introduce policy changes about important issues which should more properly be the subject of primary legislation, thus affording a higher degree of parliamentary scrutiny. This is another such occasion and one on a subject that appears central to the UK’s negotiation position with the EU. We take the view that it is neither a welcome nor indeed acceptable use of secondary legislation”.


That is a clear intimation that we should look at this in a proper debate on state aid.

Obviously, that is for another occasion, but if that instrument is passed and the EU regime is revoked, the Government’s position is very simple, and we will live under this regime for the next several months—that is, the World Trade Organization rules will apply. We, as the United Kingdom, are bound by them as a matter of treaty obligations and the devolved Governments are bound to follow World Trade Organization rules in relation to subsidies. Of course, it will be without any direct policing authority, but that is the course that has been decided on, so there is no urgency about this issue and I will return to that in a moment. Of course, the position could change.

I very much hope that there will be a deal with the EU, and no doubt there is a prospect that a deal may deal with the subsidy regime, but at the moment we have to proceed on the assumption that, first, the current regime will be withdrawn, and that we will move to the WTO regime. That is the background.

Secondly, I emphasise again that this is not an amendment suggesting that the UK does not needed a regime. It is perfectly obvious that any internal market has to have a state aid regime, just as world trade has to have a set of state aid rules, weak though the WTO rules are on this issue. One cannot see a stronger argument for a properly thought through regime of state aid than in the recently published paper of the Institute for Government Beyond State Aid. It explains why it is necessary, how it should be done, what should be done before it is established and that it should be widely consulted on. Of course, there has been a lot of time to do this, but nothing has been done.

I think it must be accepted that the Government desire to proceed. Why they want to do so now is unclear, but they believe that they have hit a snag, which is the fact that for the time of our membership of the European Union we lived with the devolved Governments dealing with all these issues and, as I outlined in the previous debate, this competence is not reserved. Therefore, unashamedly, the Government want to use this legislation to alter the devolution settlements. Whereas in other parts of the Bill I have been critical of the fact that the Government are trying to do something by stealth, here what they are trying to do is much clearer. What they are trying to do is, if I may say so, not open dealing or being straightforward. They are trying to make state aid a reserved matter by the device of expanding or extending the competition policy reservation. If they wanted to do this properly, one would have expected it to be dealt with in a much more straightforward manner.

The real issue is how should we now proceed, and there are three alternatives. The first, obviously, is to leave this clause in the Bill. I will come back to that in a moment. The second is to work out a policy and enact it by primary legislation. The third is to use the common frameworks. I shall deal with the second of those suggestions first.

If there is to be a state aid policy, it cannot be denied that it would need widespread consultation. If we were to go down this route, the Government would need to carefully craft legislation and bring it before Parliament. If, in such legislation, there is a need to change the devolution settlements, that can be in the Bill so that we know what is required and how it can be dealt with. That is one solution. There is absolutely no reason why we cannot do that, because we will be living under a World Trade Organization regime in the interim and the devolved Governments will be bound by that.

Secondly, to my mind a much more attractive way forward is to use a common framework. I regret that this matter came up in Committee very late on a night when, as the Minister will remember, we were all fairly exhausted at the end of the debate on Part 5. I hope he will recall that I then suggested that maybe one way forward was a common framework.

Having the privilege of being a member of the Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee, I raised the question of a common framework with the Counsel General for Wales, Mr Jeremy Miles, and the Cabinet Secretary for the Constitution, Europe and External Affairs in the Scottish Government, Mr Michael Russell. They expressed a view that this was a way forward. Last night the Counsel General wrote in very clear terms, and I hope that the letter has safely reached the Minister and many others. He made it clear that state aid had always featured on the list of common frameworks but there had been no progression. He continued:

“The Welsh Government has been clear that it would wish there to be a single state aid subsidy control regime for the whole of the United Kingdom, or at least for Great Britain if the Northern Irish protocol makes this impossible, provided it is co-designed by all the Governments which have to implement it. I therefore wish to make a clear and unequivocal offer on behalf of the Welsh Government. If the Government will remove Clause 44 and agree without prejudice to its legal position to participate in discussions on a legislative framework on state subsidy control, we will commit in good faith to work intensively on such a framework on a tight timetable to reach agreement within three months of the Government tabling a proposal, or in any event by 31 March next year. In the meantime, we will commit to not put forward any primary or secondary legislation to the Senedd which in any way touches on the regulation of state aid subsidies until these discussions have concluded.”


So there is a plain offer of a way forward on the table. That is the second alternative.

The third alternative is to proceed with this clause. I urge noble Lords to take the view that it would be quite wrong to do so. At this stage there is no clear knowledge of what the policy will be. It is not clear what changes, if any, need making to the devolution settlements. The appropriate time to make such a change would be with the policy properly devised and the powers that are needed.

I urge noble Lords to take the view that tackling all this now, with this proposal to change the devolution settlements without a policy by this back-door device of altering the competition reservation, is wrong. It would be better by far to work out what is needed and, if possible, to proceed by a common framework, because that will produce a legal regime with no doubt proper enforcement powers across the UK. We should not put this in at the tail end of a Bill without proper thought as to the context. There is time to do this: the WTO regime will tide matters over until a common framework is agreed or until there is legislation. I therefore move the amendment and I will be prepared to test the opinion of the House on this matter.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I am not sure whether that was a question or a speech in the wrong place—but I take the noble Lord’s point. I think he is getting issues conflated. The common frameworks programme of course is a programme of work with diffuse levels of power and ultimately it is not clear where regulation lies. To resolve those matters on a cross-UK basis, there is no doubt in our mind where the proper operation of these powers is—state aid, or rather subsidy control, is a reserved matter for the UK Government. However, we have said that we want to work collaboratively. We want to work with the devolved Administrations and of course, as we have said, we will consult closely with them on any new policy that we develop and indeed on whether legislation is necessary. But, given my general support for the framework and the Government’s support for the framework programme, I do not believe that it is appropriate for this matter to be included in the framework programme.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I will be brief, as obviously it would be very unfair if the Welsh were totally to outnumber everyone else in the number of speeches delivered this evening. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to an interesting, though short, debate.

First, it is very encouraging that there is complete consensus on the need for a single subsidy regime for the internal market. There is no doubt about that. Secondly, there must be a consensus that at the moment this is not something that the UK Government have power over—otherwise this clause would be unnecessary. It is not a reserved matter and therefore under the devolution schemes it is a matter for all the devolved Governments. Thirdly, it is clear that there is no uncertainty. The Government are taking us out of the EU regime, assuming the instrument is passed, and we will go into the WTO regime—so that is the regime for the foreseeable future.

The real question is: are we going to go forward by diktat from Whitehall and Westminster or are we going to go forward by consensus? An obvious way of going forward is a common framework. I regret to say that I cannot agree with the Minister that a common framework is inappropriate. It is absolutely appropriate, because it will cater for the kind of divergence that will be allowed in the subsidy regimes. This is a matter of acute importance to people such as fishermen and those involved in agriculture. We need to know what level of divergence is permissible and negotiate that.

Finally, a decision has to be made on the role of the CMA. I moved amendments earlier this week in relation to the CMA simply because I imagine it will have to be the policeman of this regime. But what is it to be? Is it to be an adviser? Is it to have a central role? Or are things to be laid out in a common framework?

I therefore say that this clause ought to be removed. Get the policy right first. Try it by common framework and let us go forward on that basis. Therefore, I want to take the opinion of the House on the appropriate means of going forward—and the appropriate means is taking this clause out of this Bill.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, noble Lords will have noticed that we have listened carefully to the many constructive points put forward in Committee as well as from the devolved Administrations on the provisions in the Bill to establish the office for the internal market, tasked with overseeing the smooth operation of the internal market. As set out in my recent letter to colleagues on government amendments for Report, we have made a number of important changes throughout Part 4 to make it clear in statute that the OIM will work in the interests of all parts of the United Kingdom and for all Administrations on an equal basis. I believe that these changes take into careful consideration the points raised in Committee and put beyond any doubt concerns around the consumer focus of the OIM—I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, will welcome this—and the devolved Administrations’ involvement in the OIM’s governance arrangements.

Amendments 56 and 57 ensure that there is an enhanced role for the devolved Administrations in OIM appointments, requiring Ministers to seek consent with all Administrations within a one-month timeframe. This builds on the model proposal developed by the Welsh Government and tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, previously. We believe that this strikes a delicate balance by ensuring that the OIM can operate independently and that all Administrations can have a meaningful input in the appointments process. At the same time, we have been clear that it is essential that the OIM operates independently and at arm’s length from Ministers from all Administrations. Therefore, we do not believe that reserving the right for each Administration to make appointments to the CMA board as set out in Amendment 54 is the correct way forward. Likewise, it is important that appointments are made through fair and open competition, which is what our amendments ensure.

We believe that Amendment 57 and our changes made to Schedule 3 ensure a fair, independent and equitable process for all Administrations. It will ensure that consensus is always a first preference, but recognises that, if it is not reached, appointments can still proceed after an appropriate time has elapsed. This represents a pragmatic way forward and avoids the risk of prolonged deadlock over appointments that would prevent the OIM fulfilling its duties under the Bill.

We agree with previous arguments in Committee that all OIM appointees should reflect a range of expertise from all parts of the United Kingdom. That is why we have tabled Amendment 55, which clarifies this in the Bill, making clear the desirability that panel members have a variety of skills, knowledge and expertise. It is important to remember that the OIM will be a neutral custodian of the UK internal market through its non-binding reporting, advisory and monitoring functions. If there are potential concerns in future about how the OIM conducts its duties, Amendment 61 ensures that the CMA’s annual plans, proposals and performance reports are laid before the devolved legislatures as well as Parliament, ensuring equal scrutiny and oversight of these developments, which can be discussed between Ministers from all Administrations where that is appropriate.

Finally, I am aware that there has been considerable interest in this House in ensuring that the OIM operates in the interests of consumers. We have listened carefully to these discussions and are confident that our amendments throughout Part 4 resolve the concerns expressed and put it beyond all doubt that the OIM will operate in the interests of UK consumers.

For all the reasons I have set out, I hope that noble Lords can accept the Government’s amendments and consequently will not press their own. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I shall speak to Amendment 54 but, before doing so, I thank the Minister for the substantial progress that has been made in relation to the office for the internal market, and for the recognition that it is necessary for the strength of the union and for equality and fairness between the people of the four nations of the United Kingdom that that office has representations from all four nations. However, the purpose of Amendment 54 is that that principle should be applied to the Competition and Markets Authority. This is a non-ministerial department with very substantial powers, which it has exercised since its creation in 2013, but Part 4 of the Bill gives it further and more substantial powers and a role in the operation of the internal market. What precise form those powers will take may ultimately depend on further changes to the Bill, but there can be no doubt that the powers are substantial.

Amendment 54 is therefore a modest amendment, seeking to build upon what the Government have agreed to in relation to the office for the internal market. At present, the Competition and Markets Authority has its chair and members appointed by the Secretary of State and the panels under the Act. But it seems that there is no reason at all why the principles that have been brought to bear for the office for the internal market should not be applied to the CMA itself. As I shall try to explain in a moment, it is essential that the CMA should have representatives of each of the four nations.

It was said at a previous sitting that this would be politicising the body. That is not so. First, the CMA is an independent, non-ministerial department, and people appointed by the Secretary of State, including its chair, are independent. The persons under this provision would be independent in exactly the same way. They are not going to be representatives of the devolved Governments in exactly the same way that the persons appointed by the Secretary of State are not representatives of Her Majesty’s Government but independent people.

Secondly, it is very important to ensure that now that the CMA will have an important role in the internal market, it will have at least one member from each of the nations who understands the issues in the internal market as it affects that nation. Thirdly, the amendment will not politicise the position in any way because the appointment will be by an independent public appointment process, in the same way that the chair and members appointed by the Secretary of State are appointed by an independent appointments process. That is the purpose of the first amendment.

Amendment 58, which is also in this group, is now covered by government Amendment 57 if Amendment 54 is agreed to. Amendment 59 is agreed to be consequential on Amendment 54. Before explaining briefly my reasons for tabling Amendment 54, I wish to make it clear that at the appropriate time this evening, unless the Minister is prepared to come forward with some alternative proposals, I propose to take this amendment to a Division.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

54: Schedule 3, page 47, line 26, at end insert—
“(2A) After sub-paragraph (1)(b) insert—“(c) one person appointed to membership of the CMA Board by each of— (i) the Scottish Ministers,(ii) the Welsh Ministers, and(iii) the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for each of the devolved administrations to appoint a member to the CMA Board.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

59: Schedule 3, page 48, line 28, at end insert—
“(2A) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—“(2A) Sub-paragraph (2) applies to a member of the CMA Board appointed under paragraph 1(1)(c) as if the reference to the Secretary of State were a reference to whichever of the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers or the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland appointed the person.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment means that, if a CMA Board member appointed by one of the devolved administrations wishes to resign from membership, they must do so by giving notice to the devolved administration in question.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 18th November 2020 Lords Chamber

As it stands, the Bill severs all incentive for the development of best practice and stops innovation in its tracks, not just within the devolved nations but, by read across, in England as well, because there is no compulsion or incentive to raise standards. In the words of the Aldersgate Group, the Government’s proposals will “stifle innovation”. That is a long way from the world-beating post-Brexit economy of the Government’s imagination. At the same time, this Bill strikes quite deliberately at the whole basis of devolution. It is designed to roll back devolution, and I warn the Government, as several noble Lords have done already, that their tactics are dangerous, not clever, and that they are playing with fire.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

It is a very great privilege to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, and the many other noble Lords who have spoken in support of these amendments, and in particular Amendment 1. I strongly support that amendment in the names of my noble and learned friends Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and the noble Lord, Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth.

It is a great shame that these issues were not addressed some time ago in the House, after the promising steps taken in the withdrawal Act. It was obvious that there had to be arrangements to deal with a common approach to standards and—a matter to which we will come later—state subsidies, and any other matters that are essential to the operation of any internal market. We are where we are, but this Government cannot say that we have to continue to proceed along the lines of the Act without thinking through the consequences of passing it—particularly passing it unamended.

Some have said that people must be sick of points being raised about devolution. But it is important to point out that the provisions of the Act and the ones we are considering not only affect the devolution settlements and the positions of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, but should be as much a concern for England. We are concerned with standards that can apply to an internal market across the UK and can be enforced in England, as in other places. Sometimes, we forget the effect this could have on England.

I will take two examples. In its current form, this Bill would prevent the operation of one of the nations that wished to produce a product that was beneficial to the environment. I will take Wales as a country that would want to do that as it innovated in the case of plastic bags. I will take the example of selling ketchup in single-use plastic bottles and Wales being the first in the UK to think of introducing legislation banning that sale. In the other nations the regulations that may have to be complied with would say nothing about that, so manufacturers there would be able to sell ketchup in single-use plastic bottles. If a common framework were agreed that Wales was allowed to diverge and ban the use of ketchup in single-use plastic bottles, Wales could then proceed and make such a regulation. The effect of this Bill would be that the Welsh regulation could not be enforced in Wales against the sale of ketchup in single-use plastic bottles manufactured in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland or imported into England, Scotland or Northern Ireland. The Welsh regulation would have been rendered nugatory.

Of course, if the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is accepted, it would prevent that result. It would allow the Welsh regulation to be enforced and it would be a provision that gives effect to a decision to diverge from the common framework process—and while the common framework was under discussion it would prevent the principles in the Bill applying. That has the wholly beneficial effect of driving up standards. I will put the converse example and substitute for a beneficial aim an example where one of the Governments decided to pursue an aim that was not in the results beneficial: for example, if a Government decided to allow a manufacturer to make and sell a product in packaging that was harmful to the environment.

It is not difficult to envisage this happening when a Government bow—as they do, regrettably—to pressure from a manufacturer to allow such packaging, as it would provide much-needed employment and, at the same time, play down the harmful effects. As it currently stands, the Bill would allow that manufacturer not only to sell the packaging in the nation that was prepared to permit this, but in all the other nations. Without this amendment, the Bill would have the effect of driving down standards. These two examples show, therefore, that this is a matter of concern for the Governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and for the Government of the UK in its capacity as the Government of England. However, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hope has so eloquently explained, deeper issues are involved. Will the Government stick with their commitments to respect the devolution arrangements or will they undermine them? Alternatively, do they wish to achieve an internal market by consensus and with proper discussion?

I do not need to say again that, without the amendment, these provisions demonstrate a desire to undermine the devolution settlements for, without this amendment, common frameworks are pointless. However, it is worth thinking a little further. As the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, has tried to explain, dealing with an internal market is a complex matter, and it would be much better if there was time for proper debate. Taking the second of my examples, it is easy to see how the consequences that I have outlined would undermine a proper approach to an internal market and bring about a result that no Government would want. Surely the better way of proceeding is to allow this amendment, to allow the common frameworks to develop, and to think again about how we deal with these issues of standards—as we come later in the debates to deal with the issue of subsidies—so that we create an internal market which is thought through, works, is achieved by consensus and will build the prosperity that I, like the Government, wish to see come out of this process.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 9th November 2020 Lords Chamber

Leon Brittan was our United Kingdom commissioner in charge at the time. He did a magnificent job. We worked together for the United Kingdom on the distortion of French and Italian bids hiding behind state aid to our disadvantage. We abided by the rules but we lost. Cossor Electronics, a UK company in Harlow, was bidding for the air traffic control contract for the Hong Kong airport. We suspected that their bids went through research and development projects; make of it as you will, it was wrong. At this instance, we felt the hideous effects of distorted competition when the EU integration process had hardly begun. That is why I ask your Lordships to support these amendments: to have research and development incorporated into this Bill now, regardless of our EU position, to safeguard unfair state aid in any future international contracts. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I speak to oppose the inclusion of Clause 50 in the Bill. It is important to distinguish between what I spoke about on the last occasion the Bill was before the House: under Clause 48, what regime is to govern EU structural funds in future. This clause deals with state aid.

Both clauses have one thing in common: they seek to alter the devolution schemes as they stand, for economic development powers are devolved. For example, in respect of Scotland, paragraph 4(1) of Part 3 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act makes that clear. The position at present, therefore, is that it is for Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers and Ministers in Northern Ireland to determine what financial assistance is provided, in the same way as they determine how the structural funds are dealt with.

State aid is of obvious, considerable importance. It can help to address market failures and provide incentives for research and development, of which the noble Baroness, whom it is a privilege to follow, has spoken. They also deal with areas where the Government want to deal with strategic objectives, such as promoting the use of green technologies or promoting more sustainable agriculture.

Of course, state aid can be harmful if it is not directed in the same way; that is why there must be some form of regime in respect of state aid. The present position on state aid is, as we remain part of the European Union regime, that the devolved Governments make the decisions within the EU regime. In consequence—and it has been during the whole period of devolution—state aid is not a reserved matter. It is devolved.

The British Government’s stated position had been to retain the EU regime and put in place an independent body to police it in place of the Commission, as has happened in respect of other parts of the regime that still governs us but will not do so for much longer. That obviously would not have required any change to the devolution scheme. However, the present Government have decided to change this. They intend to use their Henry VIII powers to do so by statutory instrument. However, they have not consulted on what they want to put in its place, and seek agreement and the views of industry and others, in particular the devolved Governments. As in the other parts of this Bill, the UK Government want to do so without reference to working with the devolved Governments within the devolution schemes. However, in this case, they have hit the snag to which I have referred: they lack the power to do so. State aid and schemes are not reserved.

Clause 50, therefore, seeks to make state aid a reserved matter by what I regret to call a “device” of extending the competition reservation so that it can be used, in effect, to direct policy on state aid. This is not the way to proceed. A regime for state aid subsidies is needed unless, within the current negotiations, we agree to some arrangement that mirrors those of the EU. As is clear from the recently published IfG paper, Beyond State Aid, there are many reasons why a state aid regime is essential, but we need a properly thought-through regime before we legislate, including thinking through the role of the regulator. Such proposals should have been set out before we considered such a clause as this. They should have been consulted on and agreed with all the relevant interests—businesses, universities and others.

Furthermore, the regime to be put in place would have to command the confidence of the devolved Governments, who are responsible, under the devolution schemes, for economic development. Bodies within England also have economic development responsibility. After all that consultation, it should have been determined how this would best be implemented. One way of proceeding would be a common framework with an independent regulator such as the CMA, but a decision would have to be made on the kind of regulator wanted. Would it be the kind of light-touch regulator that some have suggested, with an advisory role, or one with policing powers? If it was a light-touch regulator, to whom would it report—to the UK Government only or to the devolved Governments as well?

Tackling all of this without a policy and through the back door is wrong, as I see it. That course of action also has long-term implications. Proceeding in this way will set policy on the legal basis that it is designed to avoid anti-competitive practices. It will not be based on a forward and positive way of setting out a policy based on looking for economic development.

Therefore, in opposing the inclusion of this clause in the Bill, in short, it is wrong to change the devolution arrangements in this way and without any consultation about the future regime, let alone agreement on it having been reached. I have no doubt that we need a competition regime and that it will need some kind of advisory or other independent policing body. However, we should do this in the proper way and not rush to do it by putting a clause such as this in the Bill. It should not stand part of the Bill.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Alderdice) (LD)]

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, has withdrawn, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 2nd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Randerson (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in this group to which I have added my name: Amendments 117 and 118, and Amendments 120 to 124. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, have also signed these amendments, which have been put forward with the agreement of the Welsh Government.

Clauses 28 to 40 of this Bill establish a new Office for the Internal Market, within the CMA, as other noble Lords have already noted. The OIM will have reporting, monitoring and advisory functions and information-gathering powers; it will monitor the health of the internal market and provide advice on the economic impact of proposals and regulations, including their impact on trade, investment and competition. It will publish reports available to stakeholders and devolved Administrations. The problem is that all this is to be provided within the existing structure of the CMA, which is a body established and designed to work within the UK Government structure.

These amendments relate to the status, role and membership of the CMA, which was established in 2013 as a non-ministerial government department, accountable to Parliament via its sponsor department, which at the moment is BEIS. Although the CMA works at arm’s length from the Government, BEIS gives it a strategic steer that outlines the Government’s strategic priorities. The Secretary of State appoints, or removes, the chair and board of the CMA, and it produces an annual report for the Secretary of State. It is the CMA which represents the UK Government abroad on relevant issues.

The CMA was designed to deal with purely reserved matters, whereas the Office for the Internal Market is designed to have functions in relation to the devolved Administrations as well. The OIM is therefore a mismatched limb, grafted on to the CMA. For instance, Schedule 3 includes measures to establish an OIM panel and task groups. The Secretary of State must simply consult the devolved Administrations before these appointments. That is inadequate, as it provides no guarantees of agreement from the devolved Administrations before appointments are made and no guarantees of balanced representation.

These amendments seek to address these problems and to be fully respectful of devolution, including requiring the Secretary of State to get the consent of the devolved Administrations to appointments, although with the provision that they must respond within one month so they cannot unreasonably hold up the work of the OIM. Importantly, these amendments would also adjust the structure and relationship of the CMA so that it will no longer be a purely UK Government and parliamentary vehicle. The DAs would each be able to appoint and remove a CMA board member, subject to the usual five-year term and the CMA’s annual plan and annual report would be laid before the devolved legislatures as well as Parliament. Thus the parent organisation, the CMA, is structured to ensure that its offshoot, the Office for the Internal Market, works genuinely for all parts of the UK.

I spoke in an earlier debate about the hybrid role of UK Ministers, who are expected by this Bill to operate at one moment as English Ministers, acting in the specific interests of England, then to switch hats into their UK role and act as impartial arbiters between the interests of the four nations. This Bill requires a similar constitutional contortion from the CMA in relation to its baby, the Office for the Internal Market. There is a reason why the referees in Saturday’s rugby internationals did not come from either of the nations represented on the field—and we all know that. You cannot guarantee an even-handed approach unless you have the structures in place to ensure that, and it has to be built into and throughout the appointments of the organisation, into its remit and reporting processes.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

As the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, has very carefully explained the purpose of these amendments, I can be much briefer than I had intended.

The amendments are directed at the CMA and the Office for the Internal Market as set out in the Bill, but the principles behind these amendments would apply to any different structure that emerged, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, envisaged. It seems to me that the critical point for this House to consider is that whatever structure is established must command the confidence of all the nations of the United Kingdom. Secondly, it is obvious that there will have to be a body that exercises independent powers and makes judgments that may go against one part of the United Kingdom or another part of it.

Thus, it is important to ensure, as these amendments seek to do, that the appointments both to the Competition and Markets Authority and to the office for the internal market take into account the change in the CMA’s role and cater for the new role of the OIM—assuming that these roles will be given to them when the Bill emerges from Parliament.

It seems to me that there is one useful analogy to make. Because the CMA has certain quasi-judicial and independent functions, it must be set up in such a way that those who are affected by its decisions know that those appointed to it have their confidence. They must also have a proper knowledge of the different constituent parts of the UK. When this House enacted the Constitutional Reform Act in 2005, a statutory provision was included that there had to be judges from Scotland and Northern Ireland; Wales was dealt with as part of England, and I will say nothing about that today. But recent experience of devolution legislation has shown how important it is for a body such as the Supreme Court—and for this body—to have representatives who know and understand the position in each of the constituent nations.

I need not elaborate on the detail of how this provision will work. I stress that the body must comprise those who understand the different nations of the UK and are able to provide it with confidence in its decision-making. It must address the point to which the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, referred—namely that, more and more, Ministers are seen not simply as UK Ministers but as Ministers of England.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendments 116, 127 and 130, to which I have added my name. I agree with the arguments put forward by my noble friend Lady Bowles, who put it much better than I can.

The aim of the amendments is to seek to bring some clarity to the office for the internal market. Gosh, it needs some clarity. I am unsure that we even require this quango. If it stays in the Bill, then please let us flesh out how it could work. Does the Minister accept that, if the office for the internal market remains, there is still much ambiguity in this Bill? It is not even constructive ambiguity; it is ambiguity pure and simple. Can he explain it?

Amendment 116 seeks to add a clause which should be the bed-rock of the Bill. There has to be an understanding agreed between the Secretary of State, Welsh and Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland department in order to make the internal market work, be transparent and involve all the devolved authorities.

Amendments 127 and 130 underline the need for transparency and representation. I hope the Minister can accept that the amendments seek to clarify and flesh out what the Bill means in respect of the office of the internal market and to get rid of any ambiguity. Amendments 116, 127 and 130 seek to do that.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise; I should have reminded noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate and anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division should make that clear in debate.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, for explaining the place of this in the Bill and for his proposal to try and make something of the provision. As it stands, it seems wholly separate from the other provisions of this Bill. It should not be there, and it is profoundly undemocratic. Its only connection with the rest of the Bill is that it seems part of an attack on the scheme of devolution. I therefore seek to argue that Clause 48 should not, in its current form, stand part of the Bill.

The Bill is concerned with the internal market; it is not concerned with the allocation of government powers to spend money between the devolved Governments and the United Kingdom or English Government. It authorises the UK Government, as it stands, to spend funds in devolved areas—education, roads—and, giving Clause 48 (1)(a) and (b) their ordinary meaning, almost any aspect of government spending, including hospitals.

Therefore, I have a question for the Minister: why is this in the Bill? How is it going to work? Let me put forward some ideas as to why it may be there. First, the Government might, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, has suggested, have the noble aim of investing additional resources into the devolved nations and the other regions of England. If that were the case, they might be doing the work alongside the Governments of the devolved nations and doing it as the English Government in their capacity as the UK Government. If so, why do they need these powers? They have done city deals and dealt with expenditure of this kind without specific statutory versions. If that is the noble aim of this Bill, it seems unnecessary.

There may be a different aim, which again has been foreshadowed by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson: that the UK Government see themselves as taking over the role of the EU Commission, steering the use of such funding. If the Commission did it, so the argument goes, why should not the UK Government? In other words, it is an example of this Government doing something the EU has done rather well, but which they will never give it credit for. If that is the Government’s aim, it is fair to point out that the European legislation provided for the European Commission to set overall very high-level objectives for funding, and then to negotiate with the devolved Governments of Wales and Scotland as to how these objectives should be reflected in the programmes the devolved Governments designed. The European Commission, at the end of the day, had the veto, but it negotiated with the elected authorities in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, rather than bypassing them in the way the Bill would enable it to.

There may be a third aim, which is that the United Kingdom Government, the Government of England, know far better how to direct spending and cannot trust the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Governments to spend wisely. Nor, if that is their reason, can they trust the people of Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland to choose the Government they want, as that entails the choice between different manifestos regarding the way in which money is to be spent on areas of devolved competence.

As it stands, the clause strikes at that democratic choice and the devolution schemes. It will enable the UK Government to spend funds in ways that the UK/English Government think best, but which the people of Wales, for example, may have rejected. That is not democracy. In effect, it would give legislative underpinning to the now discredited principle that the Government in Westminster know best and the people of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, which have Governments with devolved competences, are not to be trusted to spend money wisely in areas of devolved competence.

In short, I can see no justification for these powers which is compatible with the commitment to the integrity of the devolution schemes. Last week, Ministers were asked repeatedly to confirm whether they supported the devolved institutions’ powers to tailor their policies and spending needs to the wishes of the people of the devolved nations. I understand that no such assurances were given. If Ministers wish to overturn the devolution settlements, let them say so. Let them show that the devolution schemes do not work and, in the light of recent experience, that we would all be better off in the devolved nations if only the UK Government could take spending decisions on matters that have been devolved, in place of the Governments in Cardiff, Edinburgh and Belfast.

As it stands, therefore, the clause should not be in the Bill. If there are constraints on how this is to operate, they should be set out in the Bill, or a proposal of the kind made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, should be put in its place.

[Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]]

The Bill appears to invite a clutch of ironic metaphors. In moving the Bill at Second Reading in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister drew inspiration from Adam Smith’s invisible hand but, by contrast, the Bill delivers a clunking great fist, and the Prime Minister’s oven-ready deal is at best not even half baked. The Government assert that substantial powers are coming to the devolved Administrations and, on the surface, that is true. However, the lack of reference to common frameworks, which we have debated, and the subordination of the proposed office of the internal market, on which previous amendments have focused, to the Competition and Markets Authority, all points to a centralising agenda. The state aid and financial powers clauses of the Bill—which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, do not appear relevant to the Bill’s stated purpose of regulating the internal market—raise serious questions, providing sweeping powers for the UK Government to intervene directly on a wide range of policy areas without even consulting the devolved Administrations, let alone securing consent and agreement.

At a time when relations between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations are at rock bottom, and with elections for the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Senedd only six months away, this is absurdly provocative and, frankly, foolhardy. Following the shambolic communication of the emerging lockdown in England over the weekend, confusion reigns today over furlough provision in Scotland. On the one hand, the furlough extension is UK-wide, which is welcome. On the other, it appears that if Scotland goes into lockdown at a later date, comparable support to that being provided in England is not assured. Scottish Conservative leader, Douglas Ross MP, is at odds with the Government over this. It raises the question of whether the Government are trying to force Scotland into a similar lockdown at the same time as England, not because the measures currently being applied north of the border are not working—it is too early to judge that—but just to secure funding for any lockdown. That is not the way to promote trust or make rational, balanced and objective decisions.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, has withdrawn, so I now call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I can be very brief in speaking to Amendments 151 and 152, which stand in my name. They relate to matters that were discussed earlier. The first deals with the need to insert into the Bill provisions to ensure that the Competition and Markets Authority—if indeed it is to be the body that plays a central role in the Bill—consults the devolved Administrations in relation to its policy for enforcement.

The second amendment deals with penalties. The Minister has a regulating power and the amendment proposes that the penalties are made with the consent of the devolved Governments. That is obviously in line with what I hope will be the approach of the Government —that is, to work with the devolved Administrations. The reasons were set out earlier and I need not repeat them.

[Baroness Randerson (LD) [V]]

My Lords, like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, I will be very brief. I have added my name to his amendments, which simply reiterate the need for the CMA to consult the devolved Administrations, as well as the Secretary of State, and to obtain consent. They emphasise the importance of respecting devolution. I say to the Government that small things count. They guarantee good and fair government. It is important that the Government take note of the tone of the debates this evening and pay that respect to devolution in the terms in which the CMA operates in the future.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Lords Chamber

As a former Chief Whip, I accept that it is understandable that my noble friend the Minister could not have come forward today with something like Amendment 88, given the limited time his department would have had for consideration of the Select Committee’s report. Even though the Select Committee worked at tremendous pace in this world of fast-tracked legislation, the report was not available until last Wednesday afternoon. It is certainly one of the problems that the Government will face when they present any fast-tracked legislation, but they have time to rethink their plans on Henry VIII powers, in particular the ones that are the subject of Amendments 87 and 88. Whatever the Government decide to be the right route ahead, it has to be the right route to ensure that the legislation will deliver the policy that businesses need around the country, but in a way that the Constitution Committee too can describe as appropriate. Whatever happens, I am sure that we will return to these issues on Report.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on the rulemaking powers. I first draw attention to my interests in the register, in particular that I am chairman of the Financial Markets Law Committee, which is interested in clarifying and making certain the law.

It seems that there is a clear dilemma. The Bill is needed very urgently. It is sensible to make the changes to insolvency law that have been consulted on for some time and to provide for a new form of reconstruction, but these are needed now and they cannot sensibly be left to a later time. However, the Bill is of such complexity and, in some areas, of such novelty that more time is needed to sort out the many technical points that continue to arise, despite all that is being done by the Minister, his department and the insolvency services.

Points are being identified all the time. I will give just one example that possibly illustrates the interrelationship between new points and the scope of the delegated powers. It is unclear whether financial service creditors with super-priority have a claim on assets charged to secure debts without super-priority. The Minister might say that these can be dealt with under new Section 174A(3) to the Insolvency Act on page 108 of the Bill, but it is not clear that that power is wide enough. I take that illustration because it shows two points: first, that areas of uncertainty remain, and, secondly, that it is not clear that the delegated powers are drafted in wide enough terms.

Normally, I would absolutely deprecate extensive Henry VIII powers, but I really feel that these are needed in the circumstances of the Bill. It is absolutely essential that uncertain points can be clarified, I hope while the Bill goes through its remaining stages over the next week, but if not by swift rulemaking changes or regulatory changes to it. Points will go on being spotted—some have already been spotted and not rectified—but certainty is essential if we are to weather the problems that will undoubtedly arise over the coming months. We obviously need safeguards. I do not wish to add to the length of what I wish to say by going through the various solutions put forward by the Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee, so ably explained by my noble friends Lady Taylor and Lord Blencathra.

However, I will emphasise that we cannot escape the need for delegated powers, we cannot escape the need for speed and we should make sure, because it is the reality, that we can iron out points of uncertainty as quickly as possible.

We might say that the courts can do this. I have no doubt that they can, but there are two things that one should say. First, there are issues of policy here which ought to be decided either in this House or by the Executive, and, secondly, there are bound to be mistakes which it is not possible for the courts to rectify.

The courts will of course have extra work, as people have acknowledged, and they may require additional resources. Amendment 62 suggests that there be a report on how the courts are managing and whether training is under way. My understanding is that a significant amount of training has taken place, but the adequacy and the scope of it is under the Constitutional Reform Act a matter for the judiciary and not for the Executive or for this House.

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, as a fellow member of the Constitution Committee, I am delighted to follow my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton, the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness. I also endorse warmly the powerful points made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover.

Amendment 66 would enable Parliament to “keep … under review”—a phrase we hear endlessly—the manner in which the Secretary of State keeps under review the use of the very broad Henry VIII powers to change the law on corporate insolvency by regulations which Clause 18 empowers him to make. As many noble Lords have said, if we are to have Henry VIII powers, which are in principle constitutionally offensive, a special and convincing case must always be made for their creation by the Government. If they are to be legislated for, they should be as narrow as possible to meet their specific purpose and they should not last a minute longer than—as far as this legislation is concerned —the emergency requires.

As has been noted, the powers in Clause 18 expire on 30 April 2021, but regulations already made under that power can be extended. Moreover, the Henry VIII power itself can be extended by regulations under Clause 22 for another year, and again and again thereafter. That being so, these clauses give the Government a blank cheque. So Amendment 70, which sets a final expiry date, is the very least that is required.

I am very attracted to the robust and no-nonsense approach of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe: simply abolish the clause. Clause 39, to which she spoke, is a wicked piece of legislation in constitutional terms. It creates a power for the Secretary of State to change the duration of temporary provisions and to keep on doing so, ad infinitum. It is the most self-indulgent of Henry VIII powers. It is constitutionally offensive, and it really should not stand part of the Bill.

I accept, as do members of the Constitution Committee and, I think, all other noble Lords, that there is an emergency which needs urgent legislative action and that, as long as the emergency persists, we will need provisions in place to protect as far as we can businesses that are vulnerable to the coronavirus crisis and of course the jobs of those employed by them or dependent on them indirectly. However, as has been noted also by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, in an emergency—and this applies especially in a prolonged emergency—the more important it becomes for Parliament also to be vigilant and to protect the principles of the constitution.

The Bill, which the Government are fast-tracking, is huge. It has 47 clauses, 14 schedules and 234 pages. Like Henry VIII clauses, fast-tracked legislation should be rare. It should be specifically and convincingly justified and its scope should not extend beyond the minimum necessary to achieve its purposes, although the scale of this legislation makes even more questionable the appropriateness of the fast-track process.

The Government are tracking the Bill so fast that the House of Commons barely saw it. Its Second Reading and remaining stages all took place on the same day; the remaining stages were transacted in half an hour. The Bill was gone in a blink and the House of Commons did not perform its proper responsibility, I regret to say, of scrutinising it. If the House of Lords steps in where the House of Commons fears or has failed to tread, and if we seek to advise and to do so by way of passing amendments, Ministers and even Back-Bench Members of Parliament are wont to express some resentment. But we have a responsibility to scrutinise and improve important legislation. What else is Parliament for? Noble Lords have made a large number of important observations and criticisms of flaws in the Bill today, particularly in the very long debate on the first group. What we need to do, I suggest, is to separate policy for the emergency from policy for the long term.

This brings me to my second objection, beyond the inappropriate fast-tracking of some of this legislation. As many noble Lords have noted, the Government should not smuggle in permanent changes to policy and law via fast-track emergency legislation. There are three sets of permanent changes, as I understand it, in the Bill. There is a procedure for a new moratorium on enforcement action against companies in financial distress, even though this procedure may be detrimental to creditors and investors, and therefore be potentially as damaging as allowing the debtor companies to go to the wall. The Bill also provides for permanent new arrangements for restructuring companies that are in financial distress, and for restrictions on contractual supplier termination clauses.

In winding up on the first debate the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, argued that the Government had previously consulted on the permanent measures. Indeed they did, but that is no excuse for seeking to bypass full parliamentary scrutiny of important changes to the law on insolvency. We are not making a fuss about the dignity of Parliament. We are complaining about the Government outflanking a process which actually enables them to get difficult changes right and give democratic legitimacy to changes in the law. In another context, the Minister was very keen to restore full law-making rights to this Parliament. I wonder how he justifies what I would regard as this two-fold abuse of Parliament: fast-tracking such a vast law and using emergency legislation to enact permanent changes.

If the Covid-19 effects should, unfortunately, persist in a very damaging form, Parliament should return in new primary legislation to the question of what emergency powers the Government should continue to be able to exercise. I was attracted by the proposal made earlier by my noble friend Lord Liddle: that there should be post-legislative scrutiny of the Bill. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, put it to us that delegated powers are essential in the emergency. Yes, they may be, but there should be proper sunset clauses attached to all the powers that the Bill creates, and especially the ones that are intended to be permanent, which should never have been in a Bill creating powers for an emergency. At the least, as the DPRRC has recommended, these powers should be amended to limit their use to a period only so long as the Secretary of State judges that the effects of Covid-19 require them.

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[Lord Adonis [V]]

I have nothing to add on this group.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd [V]]

I put my name down to speak on these amendments because of the very wide terms in which they were drafted. From the perspective of legal certainty and the importance of the London financial markets, it seemed that the Government’s overall policy of excluding financial service contracts was completely the right one, and the suggestion of these amendments was to remove part or all of that protection. However, from what has been said in this debate, it is clear—at least, I hope it is clear—that what gives rise to the concern really relates to the position of pension funds. It seems to me that this is a much narrower subject and it turns on the question of the priorities that will need to be clearly spelt out in the event of an insolvency.

Earlier, I raised the rather difficult issues that relate to priorities. This debate seems to underline the importance of that. I hope the Minister will have the opportunity to clarify precisely the way in which the priorities as between financial service contracts and a pension fund are to be resolved in the event of an insolvency.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow many speakers with great experience in the pensions world. As the Minister said in speaking to the first group of amendments, the objective of moratoriums in this legislation is that they will succeed and that companies with a hope of surviving will do so. But that will not always be the case. Insolvencies or other arrangements may follow. The moratorium structure rewards those who continue to supply, with an enhanced priority in a subsequent insolvency. It rewards financial institutions in a particular way that is identified as giving priority to creditors, including those who would have just ranked alongside pensions as unsecured creditors but are promoted above them.

As has already been mentioned, the Minister said in responding to the first group of amendments that some change will be made to exclude accelerated debt from super-protection. That does not sound like even as much as was covered in the group 1 amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, which I signed, but it is a start. Nevertheless, I am still concerned that it elevates all financial debt above pensions, as explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake. If I heard the Minister correctly, he implied that without being given priority, in return for none of the things that bind other companies, banks would not play ball—I paraphrase what was actually said. The reason why the banks will play ball is to get benefits. That still means that they will make greater demands and ask for bigger fees. They will still accelerate payments even if they do not get priority, but that will still suck funds out, because banks do not have a payment holiday.

I am attracted somewhat to what the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, said on whether the PPF will survive. I note that having to stand behind pensions actually comes from European legislation. I believe the UK was taken to court on this subject. Do the Government still stand behind legislation protecting pension benefits, or is that a piece of EU legislation headed for the dustbin of broken promises?

Like other noble Lords, I think that the Government need to think further about the legislation’s effects on pensioners, the Pension Protection Fund, the Pensions Regulator, pension trustees, companies contributing to the PPF, which will face elevated contributions, and those self-same companies facing deficit repayment schedules that will need to be greater to compensate for the actions in this legislation, as well as the fact that many schemes are much further in deficit because of the current crisis situation that we are in.

Also, what does this blackmail change—I call it “blackmail” because that is what it sounded like when the Minister explained it—to the insolvency waterfall say about the stability of legal agreements and contracts in the UK, if securities that have been pledged to pension funds can be sold from under them through a retrospective law change made without any warning or notice? That is what this priority change is. “Moratorium” might have been trailed, but “moratorium” means delay, not a change of priorities and the inclusion of financial institutions in special arrangements for no consideration—for that is what it is: no consideration. It is more than simply consequential to the running of a moratorium.

Various amendments in the group aim to prevent harm to pensions, and my probing Amendment 118 suggests that the PPF should be consulted in any compromise arrangement. It could or probably should be made stronger and require consent, but then I do not really need to speak to it because the noble Baronesses, Lady Drake and Lady Altmann, have come up with extremely sound, detailed amendments. I support them and commend them to the Government.

I realise that the Minister indicated in his email last night that some movement in this direction will happen. He has also said that the Government will give creditor rights, which is the issue covered by Amendments 63 and 64 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, but the extent and effect of those rights is important. I therefore remain concerned. Changing the ranking of creditors also opens up questions about, “Why just that change?” There are arguments, with which I have a lot of sympathy, that say pension deficits should have a higher ranking in insolvency anyway, given their origin as deferred pay. We will come to other provisions on that in the next group.

I am now quite glad that we have not finished the pensions Bill because, if these new priorities are enacted, they will take a wrecking ball to the difficult consensus that was being reached on the speed of paying down deficits, and other provisions coming from the regulator regarding its powers and what it would do to make sure that deficits were paid down. We will certainly have to take into account these new circumstances in this Bill and seek follow-on protections if it proceeds largely in the format it is in at the moment.

In summary, this group has four sensible proposals, independently made from across the House, that have significant overlap: scrap the financial institution priority, which weakens the position of pensions; ensure that pledged securities are not sold without the consent of the PPF; amend the Pensions Act 2004 so that a moratorium is an insolvency event and triggers a PPF assessment period; and have the PPF involved, with vetoes, in restructuring arrangements. I commend a composite of those arrangements to the Minister and I hope that productive discussions can follow because, welcome though the moves already flagged are on the PPF having creditor rights, we need to make sure that they fit the bill and that pension deficits do not still face significant losses.

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[Lord Mendelsohn [V]]

My Lords, I am encouraged by the Minister’s indication during the debate that the Government are open to amendments and it is useful to hear that they have published material relating to insolvency practitioners, even though I am yet to find out where we can get hold of it. However, I am not entirely satisfied by the Government’s assurance that they appreciate how to deal with some of the complexities that they have put forward. That is not least the case in this group of amendments. I would like to understand not the entire effect but the assumption of which particular cases and how many of them these amendments are likely to affect, and whether they are just technical or do in fact change some of the current core financing arrangements for larger companies.

While I welcome the progress towards a more flexible insolvency regime and appreciate the need for temporary arrangements to help to navigate the current emergency, this legislation, as necessary as it may be, ends up asking a lot more questions than it answers. The truncated process is of course, as many noble Lords have mentioned, wholly unsatisfactory not just for scrutiny but to allow the Government to consider these matters and others as they should. It defies logic that the process was done fully in one day in the other place.

It is not just that the impact assessment is based on out-of-date data and contradictory calculations; the permanent provisions were consulted on, although in their previous form they were never going to be implemented in such a piecemeal fashion. It appears to be widely accepted that it is not just the flaws but the time required to adjust this regime that will be complicated. The permanent measures will take longer to implement, and it will take time for people to get used to how they operate. The temporary measures are a bit too limited to operate in their own guise.

However, the Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot claim that these measures are to get things working in an emergency and at the same time widen the number of options, the required skills, the number of participants and the variety of arrangements required where practitioners or courts will need to be trained or practised in. And, of course, this omits some of the most significant elements that will still need to be addressed, such as whether HMRC will have a preference or take an active role in this, as well as the role of the pre-pack regime and others. It is not just a question of all the delegated powers that noble Lords have spoken so eloquently and raised such meaningful and compelling objections and warnings about. It is also that the regulatory regime is weak and unclear, and so much of this should be in the Bill.

However, we are where we are, and the Government are going to do this whatever we say. Bluntly, this is not this House’s first rodeo, but it is our job to be realistic. This legislation will require further regulation and change, and much work is already taking place in a number of the agencies or in other places that is likely to lead to measures being added to the legislation at a later date. Therefore, we should address how this will work best in the future.

The most important element here is to receive proper reassurance from the Minister of an enhanced process to deal with the implementation, review, secondary legislation and regulation of this legislation, so any clear statements and undertakings in this regard would be important, whether given here or on Report. Will the Government create a post-legislative scrutiny process or, for example, would they be keen for this House to establish a process or a committee that could provide a meaningful role? Will the provision of information be sufficient, and what sort of information will be provided to this House? What will be measured by government, so that we can properly evaluate the operation of the legislation?

What other reviews or agencies, from the professional bodies to the Insolvency Service or the courts, are currently being consulted? What part of these discussions can we be told now, and what will be made available in the future to help resolve concerns or help us to have a debate prior to legislation or regulation being brought forward? Can clearer statements be made by Ministers about how they expect it to work, so that the courts have a clear indication on what to make rulings on and how they should do so? I suspect that the courts will be slightly busier than the Minister anticipates, not least because financial indemnity insurance will provide a very adequate target for people to exercise some degree of accountability in the courts.

Of course, the affirmative procedure for regulation is all that we have, but will the Government look at how this process can be enhanced with a greater provision of information, and possibly consultation, prior to the regulations being tabled? Any such assurances on how we will deal with where we are, and how we might deal with what might evolve into a better and more robust system, would be gratefully received.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd [V]]

In view of the course that the debate has taken and the statements by the Minister, I can be very brief. I welcome Amendments 92, 104 and 106, which ensure that unsecured bonds are caught by the exclusions of the moratorium and ipso facto provisions. However, there are many other technical issues to address, and I very much hope that this can be done by further government amendments before Report. That would certainly be preferable to making changes and correcting errors through the regulation-making powers. I welcome what the Minister has said so far and very much look forward to seeing the further amendments dealing with these technical problems.

[Lord Fox]

My Lords, the belated arrival of these amendments is further indication of the half-baked nature of this Bill. We were assured that the insurance for the permanent parts of this Bill was that they had already been through an extensive consultation period, which I guess they have. However, these important amendments have arrived in a lump afterwards, so that consultation process must have been flawed. I was looking forward to the Minister’s piece-by-piece description of each one. I can understand perhaps why he has decided not to do that, but at the very least, to paraphrase what was said earlier, we need to know how Her Majesty’s Government view these measures working. What problem are they intended to solve and what was the process by which these amendments arrived in the Government’s purview?

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I draw attention to my interests as set out in the register. I thank the Minister for his clear exposition of the Bill, and in particular thank the officials of his department in the Insolvency Service for their close consultation with the judiciary. It is important to recall that the judiciary will have the job of making the Bill work when it becomes law, and will have to deal with the additional burdens that it plainly will place upon them. The co-operation that seems to have occurred is an admirable example of what should be done between government and judiciary, each acting within their respective spheres and respecting their respective roles.

My second point relates to the realism with which we must approach the Bill. It is, obviously, urgently needed. It is not going to be easy at all, given the current circumstances, to look at amending or clarifying the many provisions about which concern has been raised, both in this debate and outside, such as those relating to priorities, definitions, exemptions, the role and qualification of monitors and what they are to be allowed and not allowed to do; and to the question of the exit from the emergency provisions or their extension. There is also the obvious risk of error in a Bill that is necessarily being taken through at such speed. Therefore, perhaps unusually, I welcome the provisions in the Bill to permit changes by regulation. For example, on page 11, which inserts new Section A18 into the Insolvency Act, there is a very useful power to change the debts that are to be exempted. Can the Minister say whether there are sufficient powers by way of regulation, with the appropriate safeguards, to enable changes that may need to be made at great speed to be accommodated, bearing in mind the heavy legislative load that will be before Parliament over the coming months? We must realistically look at this, and of course we would welcome the views of the Delegated Legislation Committee.

Finally, I welcome Chapter 11, or the UK equivalent of that. As this is a longer-term form, is sufficient time being allowed for the introduction of that, bearing in mind all the other matters that those who have to deal with this legislation will also have to address?