(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, during the Bill’s progress through Parliament, we have engaged extensively to ensure that it, and the Office for the Internal Market in particular, work for all parts of this country. We have always been clear that the Competition and Markets Authority will ensure the devolved Administrations are consulted on all important matters relating to the OIM. Following significant discussions with our devolved counterparts and noble Lords, we are pleased to introduce these two amendments, which will underscore the importance of the devolved Administrations in the operation of the OIM. The Government have emphasised throughout the introduction of the Bill that the UK internal market needs to work for all parts of this country, and these amendments are a testimony to this aim.
Amendment 62 ensures the CMA must consult the devolved Administrations when preparing or revising its policy on enforcing information-gathering notices. Alongside this, Amendment 63 will require the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations over the level of fines that can be placed on bodies that do not comply with a CMA request for information. Both amendments give the devolved Administrations a significant say in the key operations of the OIM. These amendments will put beyond doubt this Government’s commitment to ensuring that the interests of the devolved Administrations are reflected in the governance of the OIM and that the OIM will continue to meet the interests of all parts of the United Kingdom.
I turn now to Amendments 62A, 63A and 63B, which seek to alter the CMA’s ability to effectively gather information. I reassure the House that, as highlighted in previous debates on the Bill, these penalty powers in Part 4 will not be commenced unless there is a clear and credible need for them—for example, to ensure that the OIM can gather credible and accurate information for its reporting and monitoring purposes. I believe this goes some way to addressing many of the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, regarding the design of the information-gathering and enforcement regime. This will ensure that such a regime will be well considered, based on clear evidence of need and proportionate to fulfil the OIM’s duties. I emphasise that the need for accurate, and up-to-date information is essential to ensure that the OIM’s reports and advice are credible, evidence-based and meaningfully capture the UK internal market landscape.
I thank all noble Lords for their interventions on this subject; I understand the sincerity with which Peers have addressed it. However, as I said in my opening remarks, the amendments on which we have been able to get agreement put beyond doubt that the OIM will closely consult and work with the devolved Administrations on an equal basis, in the interests of all parts of the United Kingdom. These important changes ensure that the OIM’s policy on information-gathering and enforcement, including the level of penalties, will be carefully considered in consultation with the devolved Administrations. This will ensure greater transparency in decision-making and will help ensure that the OIM will be able to gather the accurate information it needs to independently assess and monitor the UK internal market. Of course, the Government have made it clear that reports carried out by the OIM each year will be made available both to this Parliament and to the devolved legislatures.
I reiterate a point I made in previous debates: to be clear, the penalty powers in Part 4 will not come into effect unless there is clear evidence that there is a need to do so in order for the CMA to fulfil its internal market functions. I believe that this provides the necessary assurances that any penalties regime will be proportionate and transparent.
In addressing some of the points made in the debate, I turn first to those made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on precedent. I can certainly reassure noble Lords that the Bill sets out clearly the maximum limits to the level of financial penalties in Clause 40(6). They do not exceed those which the CMA can currently impose. Penalties and the enforcement regime are based on precedent, as set out in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. As I mentioned in my opening speech, the justification for these powers is that, without such a deterrent in place, there is an incentive not to comply with information-gathering requests, and that runs the risk of not having completely accurate information supplied to the OIM.
My noble friend Lady Altmann gave the example of the Pensions Regulator. I can say that excluding an entire class of business from information-gathering requirements such as these does not have as firm a standing in precedent as the she suggests. The CMA acting as a reasonable public body will, of course, in all cases, take into account all relevant factors, whether on the face of the Bill or not, in considering how to act and whether to pursue penalties, if they have been commenced at all.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh asked about reasonable excuses. I am not sure whether it was she who asked me a similar question on Report on Monday, but as I said then, the CMA would set out in its statement of policy the clear steps and procedures regarding the enforcement of its information-gathering regime. The penalties will not be commenced until there is evidence that they are called for, and even then they will not be used except as a last resort, whatever the size of the business. The CMA will consult all relevant persons regarding its statement of policy. I am happy to confirm to my noble friend Lady Noakes that, as I said in Committee, the CMA will not be able to issue a financial penalty against—I am pleased to say—either this Government or any UK Government, or indeed the devolved Administrations.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh mentioned consultations. The Bill requires that Ministers should consult as a matter of fact before they exercise their delegated powers. As is normal for such legislation, it does not spell out in great detail how this must be achieved, but we will engage with the devolved Administrations as part of the process of normal policy development, by, for example, sharing draft SIs and publications, and co-operating on public-facing events wherever that is possible, and, in any case, more formally before a decision is made.
For all of the reasons that I have set out, I hope that noble Lords will accept the amendments that I have tabled and that the noble Baroness will not press hers. However, for the benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and to be absolutely clear and to put the matter beyond doubt, I am afraid that I have gone as far as I can go on these matters and I will not be reflecting further before Third Reading. Therefore, if the noble Baroness wants to test the opinion of the House, she should do so now.
My Lords, I have received no request to ask the Minister a short question. I shall therefore put the Question.
I am going to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Fox, as I will not go through my arguments at length, because they have been made so well by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. I put on record my absolute support for the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Neville-Rolfe, who, while they have comments about the detail of the amendment, support the principle of it. I am grateful to them for that.
It is a simple proposition: the internal market must work and be seen to work for all and, therefore, must have buy-in and support from all. It should not favour one geographical area or country over another. It is important that we do not upset the balance struck in the CMA and its functions. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is right that there may be an adverse impact on the CMA, if it is forced to take on something that is not its primary purpose. Thirdly, the devolved Administrations need to be part of the organisation, its process and appointments.
There are reservations about proposed new subsections (3) and (4) in the amendment. It is beyond our hopes, but perhaps the Minister will consider bringing forward an agreed amendment at Third Reading. If he did, we would support it but, if he will not do that, we will support the noble Baroness if she tests the opinion of the House.
I thank noble Lords who participated in the debate, particularly for their brevity. This is, I suspect, a simple difference of opinion, but I will give it a go anyway.
In previous groupings we have discussed the detail of how the office for the internal market would be governed, including the composition of its board, and so noble Lords will be delighted that I am not going to go through all that again. I have set out consistently in this House why the CMA was chosen as, in our view, the most appropriate body to undertake the new UK internal market oversight functions. The CMA has an outstanding international reputation as an independent regulator and is already equipped with highly relevant economic expertise, necessary to undertake its new functions in the context of the operation of the UK market. Moreover, the CMA has well-established relationships with all the Administrations, with offices in London, Edinburgh, Belfast and Cardiff. This UK-wide presence will help ensure that the OIM will work in the interests of all parts of the United Kingdom.
However, we have made it clear that some bespoke arrangements for the OIM will be necessary, in recognition of the focus on devolved matters. As provided for in the Bill, the OIM will be able to benefit from the CMA’s existing expertise and operate within its overall framework, while having its own functions and powers, including distinct governance arrangements such as the OIM panel and task groups. The Government have recognised that some degree of separation is vital and have developed proposals for the OIM accordingly. I wish to strongly emphasise that the distinct statutory objective for the OIM, and for the targeted adaptation in the Bill of the CMA’s statutory framework, enshrines this separation from the outset.
On Monday, we had a good debate on the composition of the board and the role of the devolved Administrations in appointments. The Government have taken a number of reasonable and pragmatic steps to secure the appropriate balance between ensuring that the devolved Administrations have a real say and that the appointment process is not held up unduly—that would, of course, be risked by the amendment.
Finally, I would like to discuss in a little more detail how this amendment would seek to propose a new role for the OIM regarding subsidy control. I recognise that the amendment reflects a desire for reassurance on the enforcement of any future UK subsidy control regime. However, we believe that it risks undermining and prejudging the outcome of the forthcoming consultation that we have announced. This consultation will inform our future approach to subsidy control, including the role of oversight and enforcement.
The Government have been clear that the UK will have its own approach to subsidy control; we want a modern system for supporting British business in a way that fulfils our interests. The amendment is therefore premature, as it seeks to confer specific regulatory functions on the OIM in respect of subsidies before the wider details of any legislative UK domestic subsidy control regime, including the appropriate mechanism for oversight and enforcement, have been developed and brought before this House or the other place.
On another point that we will discuss in more depth in our next debate, the Government’s view is that state aid—the EU’s approach to subsidy control—is a reserved matter. Therefore, the effect of the amendment’s provisions for consent from the DAs would be to create unacceptable uncertainty over the extent to which subsidy control is a reserved or devolved competence. As an issue of national importance, it should be treated in the same way as other nationally significant areas of economic policy, which are reserved. Having a single unified approach to subsidy control across the United Kingdom is vital to ensure that we continue to have fair and open competition across our internal market.
Finally, proposed new subsection (4) would require a review of the OIM’s competences within two or three years after Clause 30 enters into force. I recognise the need to ensure that the CMA’s new functions are undertaken effectively, but the broadness of this proposed review is unprecedented and unhelpful.
For the reasons that I have set out, therefore, I am obviously unable to support this amendment. I ask—perhaps more in hope than in expectation—the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I agree with the case that has been made so well by the previous speakers. I put my name to the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and we would support him if he chooses to divide the House.
It is very simple: we agree that there has to be a UK-wide policy on state aid—or subsidy, if that is what it is to be called. The question that hangs around but never seems to get answered is: why has it not yet been articulated what this policy would be? It cannot be a question of timing. This suggests yet another shroud of mystery that surrounds this increasingly perplexing Bill.
It is certainly a novel way of developing policy for a Government to remove policy that is in force and that everybody knows and understands, increasing the uncertainty and making it more difficult for businesses. However, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said in his opening speech, the statutory instrument removing the current rules—taking us out of the current system that has been operating for a great number of years—has already been laid and will be debated next week, and we will not be able to stop it.
We therefore seem to be heading towards WTO rules, which are not well respected and do not seem to be applied properly, and there is no policing or organisational structure in which they can be dealt with properly. If that is where we are, we would at least have a period of stability during which we can sort out how we want to set up the rules that will apply to the internal market and how, if necessary, they are to be policed. This could all be part of the yet-to-be-announced deal with the EU—and it may be that is the case, because it is clear that this is a significant area of interest within the negotiations. But without any further detail on that, it is hard for us to speculate.
However, as others have said, the Welsh Government have come forward with an extraordinarily generous offer to expedite work on a common framework that relates to state aid and make a voluntary agreement to pause any legislation that would impinge on that in the intervening period. That is almost too good an offer, and I hope that the Minister has an adequate response to it.
I thank noble Lords who have contributed to another admirably brief debate. We are making good progress this afternoon.
As I outlined in Committee, Clause 44 reserves to the UK Parliament the exclusive ability to legislate for a UK-wide subsidy control regime. I greatly enjoyed the many contributions on this matter. I particularly liked the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that I should take defeats as a silver lining, which prompts the obvious response that the Liberal Democrats have been defeated in the last three general elections and therefore have some experience of that.
Our debate in Committee on this clause served to highlight that, while some noble Lords might disagree on the approach taken, we all recognise the importance of ensuring that the UK continues to take a clear and consistent approach to subsidy control as we move away from EU state aid rules. The Government have always been clear in their view that the regulation of state aid—the EU’s approach to subsidy control—is a reserved matter. The Government are clear that they want to maximise the economic opportunities available to us when we are no longer bound by EU state aid rules. To achieve this economic ambition, it is important that, as now, we take a coherent approach to the system that governs how public authorities subsidise businesses across the United Kingdom. Reserving subsidy control is the best way in which to guarantee that a single, unified subsidy control regime could be legislated for in future.
In previous debates, there has sometimes been a misplaced conflation between the devolved spending powers and the systems that regulate the potentially harmful and distortive effects of this spending. To be clear, these are two distinct and separate responsibilities. Although the devolved Administrations can and should make spending decisions on subsidies, the wider rules in which they operate are, and should continue to be, consistent across the whole nation. In response to the intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, I reiterate that the reservation does not change the devolved Administrations’ position in practice. They have never previously been able to set their own subsidy control regime, as this was covered by the EU state aid framework, but they will continue to make their own spending decisions on subsidies as they do currently.
The effect of the amendment would be to create unacceptable uncertainty regarding the extent to which subsidy control is a reserved or devolved competence. That would potentially give rise to inconsistency if there were different regimes to regulate subsidies across the UK. Ultimately, it could undermine fair and open competition across our internal market and inevitably discourage investment in the United Kingdom, bringing additional costs to supply chains and consumers.
The reservation will enable the UK to design a bespoke subsidy control regime that meets the needs of the UK economy. The Government have been clear that any future domestic regime will operate in a way that works best for all UK businesses, workers and consumers. In the coming months, as I said in Committee, we intend to publish a consultation on whether we should go further than our World Trade Organization and international commitments, including whether further legislation on this subject is necessary.
Can the Minister reflect a bit more on what he has just said about treating this issue as a matter for common frameworks? It sounded as though he wanted a co-operative solution to this problem, one that would bring all the devolved Administrations into a common framework. However, at the end, he said that it is not appropriate—but why not? He has not given a satisfactory answer to that question. I remember challenging the noble Lord, Lord True, in an earlier debate at Report, on whether the Government had changed their policy on common frameworks and were no longer taking them seriously. I got a very vigorous shaking of the head from the noble Lord, Lord True. Would this not be a perfect example of how common frameworks were still being taken seriously by the Government, and would it not resolve a real problem that the Government have had?
The Minister talked about unacceptable uncertainty, but frankly, the unacceptable uncertainty about state aid has come from this Government. Mr Dominic Cummings had one view of state aid, as against the traditional Conservative view. That is where the uncertainty came from. Now that he has gone and now that he is out, thank goodness, we have an opportunity to create a sensible common policy. There is a need for balance, and it must be sensible. The best way is through a common framework in co-operation with the devolved Administrations.
I am not sure whether that was a question or a speech in the wrong place—but I take the noble Lord’s point. I think he is getting issues conflated. The common frameworks programme of course is a programme of work with diffuse levels of power and ultimately it is not clear where regulation lies. To resolve those matters on a cross-UK basis, there is no doubt in our mind where the proper operation of these powers is—state aid, or rather subsidy control, is a reserved matter for the UK Government. However, we have said that we want to work collaboratively. We want to work with the devolved Administrations and of course, as we have said, we will consult closely with them on any new policy that we develop and indeed on whether legislation is necessary. But, given my general support for the framework and the Government’s support for the framework programme, I do not believe that it is appropriate for this matter to be included in the framework programme.
I will be brief, as obviously it would be very unfair if the Welsh were totally to outnumber everyone else in the number of speeches delivered this evening. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to an interesting, though short, debate.
First, it is very encouraging that there is complete consensus on the need for a single subsidy regime for the internal market. There is no doubt about that. Secondly, there must be a consensus that at the moment this is not something that the UK Government have power over—otherwise this clause would be unnecessary. It is not a reserved matter and therefore under the devolution schemes it is a matter for all the devolved Governments. Thirdly, it is clear that there is no uncertainty. The Government are taking us out of the EU regime, assuming the instrument is passed, and we will go into the WTO regime—so that is the regime for the foreseeable future.
The real question is: are we going to go forward by diktat from Whitehall and Westminster or are we going to go forward by consensus? An obvious way of going forward is a common framework. I regret to say that I cannot agree with the Minister that a common framework is inappropriate. It is absolutely appropriate, because it will cater for the kind of divergence that will be allowed in the subsidy regimes. This is a matter of acute importance to people such as fishermen and those involved in agriculture. We need to know what level of divergence is permissible and negotiate that.
Finally, a decision has to be made on the role of the CMA. I moved amendments earlier this week in relation to the CMA simply because I imagine it will have to be the policeman of this regime. But what is it to be? Is it to be an adviser? Is it to have a central role? Or are things to be laid out in a common framework?
I therefore say that this clause ought to be removed. Get the policy right first. Try it by common framework and let us go forward on that basis. Therefore, I want to take the opinion of the House on the appropriate means of going forward—and the appropriate means is taking this clause out of this Bill.
My Lords, I must say that any computer that tries to silence my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern should be carried to the top of the Old Man of Hoy and dropped from a very great height, hopefully with destructive power—unless any environmentalist thinks that that is a serious suggestion; it is a figure of speech. Those who are not familiar with the Old Man of Hoy should understand that it is an extremely high stack in a very beautiful part of the country. It is very hard to climb, too; I have never attempted it—you only have to look at me to see that.
These amendments have difficulties because they would all introduce, in our judgment, a serious risk of the internal market system not being in place at the end of the transition period. That is a serious consideration in our contention. I agree with my noble friend Lord Trenchard, with his great experience of business—indeed, of business with Japan—that a secure, stable and functioning market is part of the bedrock of our union. It is a unionist principle that we should have a common functioning market; I think that that is assented to by almost all of those who have spoken in our debates. Of course, I repeat my personal commitment and this Government’s commitment to the union. My party has always been a unionist party, and we remain as such.
Coming back to the amendments, in our judgment, a considerable delay would undermine business certainty and consumer confidence at a time when it is vital that the economy is able to bounce back in the Covid recovery phrase, about which my right honourable friend the Chancellor spoke so eloquently earlier today.
Amendment 73, as others have said, absolutely underscores the honourable intent of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. We have had a meeting of minds on that. I am grateful for his kind words; I can certainly assure him that he has been a great influence in securing constructive change, as have other noble Lords in the course of these debates. I can affirm that the union will remain at the heart of the Government’s objectives. I am grateful for his withdrawing the amendment with the comments and, indeed, warnings that he set around that withdrawal because of the clear limitations—I will come on to these—of linking any proposal to the Joint Ministerial Committee.
For that reason, I will move on to Amendment 75, which specifies a process of debate and consent that must be achieved with the devolved Administrations through the joint ministerial council before the market access principles can take effect. This process would add an unacceptable delay to the implementation of the market access principles when the very reason for the Bill that we are here to discuss is to provide certainty to businesses from 1 January 2021, when the European structure falls away. The objective to provide certainty as powers flow back from the European Union is not new or rushed; indeed, efforts have been made to discuss this over a lengthy period. I must remind your Lordships that, sadly, the Scottish Government walked away from the internal market project in spring 2019. However, there has been continuing, positive and helpful engagement at official, and indeed ministerial, level since then. I do not share the pessimism, suspicion or doubt of a number of your Lordships that our union cannot prosper with this internal market after January 2021.
There is a valid question on how governance and disputes relating to the internal market should be dealt with through intergovernmental machinery; my noble friend the Duke of Montrose alluded to our earlier discussions on this. As I updated your Lordships earlier in these discussions, the Government are looking with the devolved Administrations at reforms to the Joint Ministerial Committee structure. The intent is to move on through the joint intergovernmental relations review.
This review will deliver the overarching architecture to support the delivery of improved and effective engagement with the devolved Administrations at all levels of government—as my noble friend the Duke of Montrose alluded to—from officials upwards and, if necessary, the consideration of cross-cutting issues above departmental level. I repeat what I said earlier: this is not complete, but work is progressing positively in this respect. I think that all the various Administrations would accept that. We welcome further discussions with the DAs on finalising the format of these engagement structures, including to complement those relating to the internal market, and I look forward to reporting back to this House on our finalised governance structures when we have concluded the review, which, as I have said, we aim to do by the end of the year.
In addition, as set out in my letter to colleagues prior to Report, the Government propose that a meeting be held in the new year with devolved counterparts once the Bill becomes law to agree a programme of official and ministerial-level engagement on the—my brief says “operationalisation”; can you imagine such a thing?—implementation and operation of the Bill. This includes determining the practical arrangements to deliver our commitment to meet Ministers in the devolved Administrations annually, as undertaken on this Bill, to review the operation of the UK internal market as supported by Parts 1 to 4 of the Bill, including new developments that might require the use of such delegated powers. This annual meeting will be just one of the regular intergovernmental meetings between BEIS Ministers and officials on other portfolio matters, such as the Covid-19 response.
On Amendment 76, I do not mean to disparage the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Purvis of Tweed; indeed, I thank them for their openness and engagement in the process so far. I was going on to thank the Labour Party for its engagement, and I never want to give unintended offence to anyone in your Lordships’ House.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for what he said; I am grateful for the engagement and discussions that we have had on this and the common frameworks programme. His amendment seeks to create a link between the common frameworks programme and the market access principles. While it is true that the internal market provisions and common frameworks programme are complementary, as we have tried to persuade your Lordships—that is how the Government see it—it is not appropriate to create a link with the common frameworks programme in that specific way in this amendment. I will not go on at length because the noble Lord has said that he does not intend to press it, but I underline that I appreciate the strength of feeling in the House on common frameworks, which I and other Ministers continue to reflect on. In saying that, I will not undertake to come back to this House on Third Reading, so if any noble Lords wish to test the opinion of the House on this issue, it would have to be at this point.
I assure noble Lords that the Government remain committed to the common frameworks programme. The processes established in it will work with future intergovernmental relations machinery. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, pointed out, with the inclusion of the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—although the Government did not and do not accept it—your Lordships have ensured that common frameworks will be discussed in another place; no doubt we will have opportunities to consider it further. I think that was the spirit in which the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, was withdrawing his amendment. I appreciate that and offer him those words of assurance.
The process proposed in his amendment and Amendment 75 undermines the purpose of the market access principles, which are designed to provide underpinning certainty that the UK internal market will continue to function in all circumstances. These amendments would create uncertainty about whether and when the market access principles would apply. Leaving businesses to manage this uncertainty and friction is not acceptable. Indeed, it undermines the core purpose of the Bill of providing businesses with certainty that they can continue to trade across the UK at the end of the transition period. For these reasons, the Government cannot support these amendments and I hope the noble and learned Lord will withdraw his amendment.
I have received no requests to speak after the Minister. I now call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern.