EU and Sudan: EUC Report

Lord Teverson Excerpts

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Grand Committee

Moved By

[Lord Teverson]

To move that the Grand Committee do consider the report of the European Union Committee on The EU and Sudan: on the Brink of Change (18th Report, HL Paper 160).

[Lord Shutt of Greetland]

My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, speaks, I am told that an earlier person who sat in this chair said that there were 15 speakers signed up for the first debate and nine signed up for the second debate this afternoon. If all contributions, other than those of the openers and the winders, are kept to seven minutes, it should allow the Grand Committee to adjourn at 7.45 pm.

[Lord Teverson]

I thank the noble Lord for his contribution. I would say to him that of all the committees I have ever chaired, this is one that does not do what it is told the most, but it may be that on this occasion it might actually listen.

The story of South Sudan could, in many ways, be described as the best of fairy tales. We had the independence of Sudan back in 1956 and civil war started almost immediately and lasted up until 1972. Then we had a few years of peace and resolution, followed from 1983 right the way through to 2005 by a second civil war in this very sad, war-torn nation—the largest of the African nations. Yet, with 2 million people having perished and some 5 million having been displaced, and despite all that grief and pain which afflicted that nation during those 40 or so years, we had through the hard work, mostly of the United States, a comprehensive peace agreement. A very plain agenda was set out in 2005 and peace broke out. Most importantly, at the beginning of this year, there was a referendum of the people of South Sudan. Perhaps unexpectedly for those who feel pessimistic about Africa as a continent that in the past has not always been able to deliver democracy, the referendum went ahead very effectively. It was praised for the way in which it was handled and declared, with 98 per cent saying yes to independence. That result was respected by the Sudanese Government in Khartoum. Earlier this year, on 9 July, independence was declared with the blessing of Khartoum and the Sudanese Government—in fact, President al-Bashir was there and was respectfully received. We had in that moment the only instance in Africa of a constitutionally arranged division of a state and of a new state being born. That is quite something when we think about the history of that nation and those peoples.

Already at that time, there were great challenges. One of the things that I remember most about this inquiry, as I am sure will my fellow members of the sub-committee, is taking evidence from what were effectively two ambassadors, the head of mission of South Sudan, yet to be an independent state at that time, and the ambassador of Sudan. I meet them in Peers’ Entrance. They were chums. They were slapping each other’s backs, and it was excellent to see them together. They came up to the committee and there was great bonhomie as they started, but as we asked them questions, there was greater division and disagreement on key issues. I remember, as an example of an issue still to be resolved, the ambassador of Sudan saying to the head of mission of South Sudan, “Well, you’ve had $9.5 billion of oil revenues since the CPA in 2005. What has happened to that money?”. I am afraid that there was little answer. That was one of the problems and hazards mentioned in the report. It was a matter not so much of corruption, although that clearly exists, as of the use and disbursement of public and state funds in South Sudan. As is so often the case where there has been a liberation army, there is an army that still has to be paid and takes up a huge amount of the public exchequer. Security sector reform, therefore, is still a major area of concern.

Demarcation is another. There is no proper demarcation of boundaries between north and South Sudan. There are issues of citizenship. Neither South Sudan nor Sudan will allow dual citizenship of both states, so people have to decide. Once they have decided, there is great pressure for them to migrate back to the state where they have citizenship. That leads to a severe mismatch of skills and job opportunities throughout those two nations. There is a challenge of development. South Sudan has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. It has no tarmaced roads outside Juba, its capital, and it has decided even now to move that capital from Juba to a more central location. It has hardly any schools and an illiteracy rate of some 75 per cent.

There is, of course, the continuing problem of oil. The only way that South Sudanese oil—80 per cent of the old country’s oil—can be exported, used and turned into revenue for the Government is through Port Sudan. There has to be an arrangement between the two countries. There was no agreement about the cost of transporting that oil or any such fiscal arrangements. Both countries depend absolutely on that revenue. For South Sudan, it accounts for some 98 per cent of government income.

The other challenge is the province of Abyei. I should explain that under the comprehensive peace agreement, Abyei was not allocated between the two states. How that should happen was to be agreed by the time of independence through consultation with its citizens or by referendum. That did not happen. At around the time of independence, more Sudanese forces occupied Abyei, and there was a very difficult military situation. All those challenges have reached the great situation of a new member state of the world community.

What has happened since then? We have an agreement that Ethiopian troops should come in and be peacekeepers and that the north Sudanese and South Sudanese militias should withdraw. The Ethiopian troops are there; that is the good side. However, neither of the Sudanese nations have withdrawn their own troops. In Sudan itself there are continuing problems in North Kordofan and the Blue Nile province. Unfortunately, there has been no Arab spring in Sudan, and there is little sign of it as yet.

South Sudan, too, suffers from internal violence to do with the unity of the state. There is also a situation with provincial governors, particularly Mr George Athor, one of the generals not appointed to be the governor of a state, who has taken on resistance within South Sudan. Violence in South Sudan is of great importance as well. Oil production in the south has gone down by 25 per cent, and there have been continuing disputes, many difficulties and no prices agreed. Most recently, there have been interruptions of supply. Trade between the two countries has declined in other ways and has sometimes been severed.

One of the other big problems, particularly at the Sudanese level, is a lack of trust in the world community to help deliver the solution that maybe Khartoum was looking for. One thing has not happened for good reasons, as those of us who see the violence, difficulties and human rights record of north Sudan will know. Part of the deal was that Sudan would be let back into the international community and would no longer be listed as a terrorist state by the United States. That has not happened.

However, there has been some good news. There is no war at the moment. The United Nations high-level implementation panel continues to do its good work. The transitional Government of Salva Kiir in South Sudan has some diversity in terms of gender balance and of bringing in members of other tribes. It is not completely dominated by the Dinka. Ironically, because oil reserves in South Sudan are not infinite and plans for pipelines through Uganda or Kenya to the coast are not feasible, the two nations are locked together and, in a way, have to resolve the dispute on oil for them both to survive fiscally. So there is good news out there and there is still, at the moment, world attention.

Those are the challenges within Sudan and South Sudan. I very much welcomed the government response, mainly because it almost completely agreed with our report. It is very difficult to see how we should move forward. We found the response from the European Union high representative more difficult. One of the key areas dealt with the European Union, particularly the External Action Service, having been very slow in setting up a delegation in Juba and in delivering what we would expect the European Union to be able to do. We did not receive a proper response from the high representative on that. We still look forward to it, and I am sure it will come in due course.

I was asked before this debate what I wanted to get out of it. I always saw that what we want to avoid is South Sudan, the world’s newest state, becoming one of its failed states. I want this debate to be a part of that. However, we need a stable north Sudan as well. It also has its challenges; it has lost 50 per cent of its oil revenue. We need stability in north Sudan for this part of the world to succeed. The other thing that I want to come from this debate is for South Sudan not to decline into obscurity and be forgotten as we deal with other issues in the world. If this part of Africa does not succeed and does not manage to turn around and deliver the promises of the comprehensive agreement, the world will come to regret it. What should the EU do? It is quite clear to me. The EU will not be a lead player but it is important in delivering justice, security reform, education and health structures—everything that makes a society work and gives optimism that a society can be successful.

Lastly, it is very important that other players play their full part as well. I should love to see a way for the United States to re-engage in this. We understand that it is very difficult for the US because of the situation with Sudan and the al-Bashir Government. However, the US has real leverage in this area. The other country that has leverage is the customer for that oil: China. China intervened in the disputes over oil when it stopped being delivered. I hope it will use its leverage further with the troika of the UK, the United States and Norway. Both Europe and the United Kingdom should work closely with China to make sure that South Sudan becomes the success that we always hoped it would be. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kinnock of Holyhead]

No? Good. This was not in the report but I was told that in an exchange she was made to feel that there was some criticism of her on that score. Clearly, if that was not the case—

[Lord Teverson]

Perhaps I can make it clear that that was absolutely not the case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Teverson]

My Lords, my noble friend the Minister should not be quite so downbeat about her contribution. There can be very few debates where she is asked so many questions about so many issues, some of which I had not come across previously. I am sure that, for the areas that have not been completely covered, there will be an opportunity to write to noble Lords.

I conclude by thanking all noble Lords for their contributions. A broad range of issues have been brought up that were not necessarily covered by the report. I thank particularly the noble Lords, Lord Chidgey and Lord Alton, for their insights and their practical experience. I thank also the noble Baroness, Lady Kinnock, for her giving us much of her experience and an in-depth view of the European Union side of this issue—we are a European Union Committee at the end of the day. I am slightly less pessimistic about Europe’s role than some of my noble friends.

We were very pleased indeed to have Dame Rosalind Marsden as a witness. We welcomed her appointment and we hope that she will be part of making sure that the EU’s role is delivered.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Elton, for sitting through the debate. His brief contribution did not get an answer, but I was pleased to read that the Kenyan Government have made it quite clear recently that if President al-Bashir landed on Kenyan soil, he would be whisked away to the International Criminal Court. The Kenyan ambassador was banished from Khartoum as a result, but that is the right way forward.

I thank lastly the clerk of the Committee, Kathryn Colvin, and our secretary, Bina Sudra. If the Grand Committee would indulge me, I would like to thank also our policy analyst, Oliver Fox, who has provided excellent service to this sub-committee during the number of years that he has worked in that role for us. He has now left to join the External Action Service. Although he is dealing only with Switzerland at the moment, he will hopefully have an opportunity to fix South Sudan in the future as well.

Motion agreed.