(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI have not seen the report but I would be very interested to look at it, and I thank the noble Baroness. In my former life as a private-sector employer in the retail industry, we had many veterans working for us. As their term of duty comes to an end, service personnel must look forward and think about opportunities. The discipline that they learn in the Army, and so many skills, can bring great things to the workforce.
My Lords, homelessness among veterans is not an isolated issue; very often it is connected with other problems, such as mental health challenges. These are challenges that often present years after veterans have left service. What action are the Government taking to ensure that these various aspects of the problem are being dealt with in a holistic way and not just in stovepipes?
I certainly agree. We try to be as holistic as possible in the help we provide. On mental health in particular, we invest £17 million a year in an amazing scheme called Op Courage. We have had 30,000 referrals, which shows the scale of the issue, and we are working now with NHS England on a public awareness campaign to promote Op Courage and what we can do in places such as GP surgeries and trusts in the way that the noble and gallant Lord has suggested.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis is not a contract that I have had anything to do with. The noble Lord always asks very good questions on contingency planning. I will look into it and get back to him.
My Lords, the response to any serious emergency hinges a very great deal upon the emergency services. What impact does the Minister think the incorporation of Chinese technology and components into police force equipment is likely to have on our own resilience?
The noble and gallant Lord will be aware that we made a Statement before Christmas about the use of Chinese technology in cameras and so on. Obviously, we are putting a lot more resources into security. This is one of the issues that is under careful consideration, and it has of course been discussed during the passage of the Procurement Bill in recent times. I draw noble Lords’ attention to the steps that we have already taken and the way we keep a careful eye on these matters.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI agree with my noble friend. In a sense, his question balances with opportunity the question of risk, to which attention was rightly drawn in the previous question. Technology brings advantages for the delivery of critical services, as my noble friend said. The rapid development of the job retention scheme, with its online portal by HMRC, is a good example of how technology can bring advantages to all levels in a time of need. However, we are also aware that there are risks associated with reliance on technology.
My Lords, in its first report last May, the National Infrastructure Commission acknowledged that security was a question not just of preventing attacks but of how well we could respond to them. It therefore recommended an architecture that would enable us to anticipate challenges and to resist, absorb and recover from attacks and adapt accordingly. Can the Minister tell the House what progress is being made on implementing that recommendation?
My Lords, the NIC made some very important recommendations, as the noble and gallant Lord quite rightly says. It is an independent executive agency of the Treasury. A responsive approach is already in place following the May 2020 report. The Government have up to a year to formally respond to the NIC’s recommendations, but I assure the noble and gallant Lord that they will be given the most careful attention.
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am sorry to disappoint my noble friend so far as the timing is concerned. However, it is not possible to comment on an ongoing process. What I can say in relation to the other matter he has raised is that he will know that they are separate legal proceedings and that, unfortunately, I cannot comment on ongoing legal proceedings either.
My Lords, given the difference in their respective roles, it is not at all unusual for tensions to arise from time to time between Ministers and officials. Indeed, this is healthy if kept within reasonable bounds. Can the Minister assure the House that, whatever the outcome of the current case, the Government will foster between Ministers and officials a culture of robust debate carried out with courtesy and respect on both sides? Does he agree that such a culture is not advanced by the airing of differences in the media?
My Lords, I agree with much of what the noble and gallant Lord has said, in particular that all civil servants must feel free to give independent and open advice, and that Ministers should respect all those who give such advice.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, during the referendum campaign I argued and voted for the UK to remain a member of the European Union. I still believe that to have been the better choice, but I and those who think as I do were outvoted, and I must accept that. However, the fact that we are leaving the EU leads me to certain general conclusions about the way ahead. I will touch upon these briefly, as they have been raised in this debate already and are relevant to my approach to the Bill before us today.
I start from the proposition that no one, not one single person on this planet, whatever their political persuasion, can be trusted with power. Of course some people have to hold power and wield it if systems are to work and society is to function effectively—but they should never be trusted while they hold it. Our constitutional solution to this conundrum is to ensure that qualifying citizens have the undoubted and frequently exercised right to throw out those who have the ultimate power to make the laws under which we live and by which we are governed—that is, Members of the other place.
The need for such a check on power is what makes me believe, with regret but very firmly, that, transitional arrangements aside, we cannot both leave the EU and remain within the single market and the customs union as they are currently structured. To do so would leave us exposed to the power of those who govern those institutions and subject to the costs which they would levy upon us, with no opportunity to influence their decisions or to hold them to account. We would be left in a position that in many respects would be similar to that which caused such distress to the American colonists in the 1760s and 1770s.
Equally, it is the need for a check on power that leaves me so very uneasy about several things that are proposed in the Bill. It would give the Government the authority to create laws without parliamentary authority and without adequate scrutiny. That already happens to a degree, but it is the unprecedented scale of the executive power now being sought that is of such concern to me. The Government will say that they need the ability to operate free of parliamentary constraint if they are to cope in a timely fashion with the unexpected twists and turns that they will encounter on the road to Brexit. I accept that argument to a point—but only to a point. Whatever the practical considerations may be, the kind of unfettered powers envisaged in the Bill are dangerous both in principle and in practice.
The stated purpose of the Bill is to ensure that the UK has a functioning statute book the day that it leaves the EU. Very well—that is of course important. But the statute book also has to contain laws that have been arrived at through due process. Nobody could reasonably argue against the requirement for effective laws, but that requirement by itself is insufficient. Effective laws are not necessarily good laws. The Government will perhaps argue that they have already conceded a degree of parliamentary scrutiny through amendments passed in the other place—but these are little more than a broken reed. They give Parliament no real power in the matter.
Having had experience of both sides of the divide, I know that government departments often view parliamentary oversight as a nuisance. They believe that it creates a lot of work over issues that are not of great moment. That can in some cases be true, but it is no reason for weakening such oversight. Like many other noble Lords, I suspect, I have seen a number of occasions when Ministers have used scrutiny override powers, citing the pressure of time. Sometimes the excuse has been valid, but sometimes just a little effort would have avoided the need for such an override. The pre-emption of parliamentary scrutiny has sometimes been a matter of departmental convenience rather than true force majeure.
With this in mind, I am forced to conclude that parliamentary scrutiny is of value only if it has real muscle—certainly much more than is proposed in the Bill. I entirely accept that it is all a question of balance. The trouble is that the proposals before us today are grossly unbalanced and imperil an important control within our democracy. I do not expect the Government automatically to do the wrong thing, but neither do I trust them always to do the right thing. I urge the Minister to think very carefully about the fundamental issues involved here rather than just about the short-term practicalities.
I will support no amendment to the proposed legislation that attempts to derail the Brexit process, but I will be inclined very strongly to favour any amendment that is intended to constrain the largely unfettered power with which the Executive have so unwisely sought to clothe themselves through the provisions in the Bill.
(9 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, and his committee on an excellent report, and on the customary eloquence with which the noble Lord introduced it. There are many issues worthy of exploration here but I should like to start by taking a step or two back from the detail.
Some 2,500 years ago, during the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians forced the unwilling islanders of Melos to join their side in the conflict against Sparta. In doing so, they told the Melians that,
“the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”.
That may seem like a rather brutal assertion of the principle that might is right, except for two things. First, the Athenians of course lost the war in the end and, secondly, might—or, as we are discussing it today, power—is a complex and multifaceted thing. The Athenians were right, however, in considering power to be necessary in delivering strategic outcomes. Today’s debate is therefore both important and timely. However, in focusing on soft power, it highlights only one part of a much wider issue: the nature, use and utility of power in contemporary international relations. What part does soft power play in this calculus?
Given my background, you might expect me to argue for the importance of military capability—and, indeed, I do. But that by itself, even when exercised in alliance or partnership with others, is insufficient. The military instrument, important though it is, depends in turn on other forms of power. It must rest on a bedrock of economic strength, clear political purpose and moral authority.
The power that we seek is the power to achieve strategic ends that would not otherwise occur; in other words, the freedom to do things ourselves or the ability to persuade, dissuade or compel others. These are outcomes that depend on complex calculations of cost and benefit by various nations and groups which often tend to see the world in many different ways. We have to know what will sway them, but we also need to possess the necessary means.
It is clear that, without economic strength, we cannot afford much in the way of power, whether soft or hard, and for this reason alone our GDP and rates of growth are important. But a powerful economy is also a crucial factor in its own right. International trade and finance can significantly influence the actions of others, so economic strength is essential if we are to be wealthier, but also if we are to be safer.
The exercise of power also needs a clear political purpose. Since politics is generally regarded as the flow of power and authority between groups and individuals, it follows that our strategic ends will be essentially political in nature. If we have no clear political purpose, anything we do, with either soft or hard power, is simply activity in search of a plan. Of course, this does not mean that we have to set political objectives at the outset and never change them. We should not confuse firmness of purpose with stubborn inflexibility—although it can sometimes be difficult to tell them apart. The course of events and the unexpected may require us to alter our judgments and to reset our objectives, but we should do so consciously, having thought through the consequences.
That brings me to the need for moral authority. If we seek to influence the actions of others, we can, of course, compel them against their will, but this is an inefficient approach that is difficult to sustain. It should generally be considered only as a last resort and as a transitory phase en route to a more lasting solution. So we seek, where possible, to persuade or dissuade rather than to compel. That suasion will, as I have suggested, depend on a complex calculation of cost and benefit, but it will also depend on the value that others attach to our judgments. It is not about trying to impose our particular mores on others; rather, it is about the force and the means of our arguments. Are we seen as fair and consistent in our assessments or are we partial and erratic? Can others rely on our word or are we merely fair-weather friends? Would they buy a used car from us?
In the end, this has to be a question of balance. In such a complex world, we are often faced with hard choices, and you cannot please everybody. But I do not seek to pit ethics against hard-headed national interest—quite the contrary, in fact. I believe that being seen as broadly honest, reliable and fair serves our national interests in the long run. It is therefore important that we use international structures and organisations where we can and ignore them at our peril. We should be careful about the application of international law, even though this can be a very grey area. Above all, we should understand that, in seeking to influence others, we are of necessity engaged in a never-ceasing battle of ideas.
This is an area where, as the committee points out in its report, we have many potential strengths, if only we could work out how to use them to best effect. We are a diverse nation with a great political, legal and cultural heritage. We have a marvellous asset in our membership of the Commonwealth. We are the wellspring of an international language. The BBC has been a source of inspiration to many around the world and through the years. These and the others enumerated by the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, have been our strengths in the past. We need to ensure that they remain our strengths in the future and that we add to them. We have, as a nation, to commit ourselves wholeheartedly to this battle of ideas.
Nevertheless, when all else fails and the ends are important enough, we need the capability to use physical force in the pursuit of our interests. We need armed forces that, in concert with allies and partners, have the capacity to coerce those who threaten our security. This is not an option that is separate or distinct from the other elements of power that I have talked about. There has been much discussion about the use of hard and soft power but I am not sure that such a distinction is particularly helpful. Even at the far right of the operational spectrum, in full-blown war fighting, economics, politics and ideas play a crucial role. In situations short of violent conflict, armed forces have an important part to play in diplomacy and development.
To be fully effective, a nation needs to be able to exercise power flexibly, across the spectrum of possibilities, so it needs both the tools and the skill to employ them properly. When, to what degree and how to use these tools will, of course, depend upon circumstances. This is where our crystal ball traditionally breaks down. I have no wish today to add to the list of failed forecasts, so let me end where I began, with the Melian dialogue. The Melians were weak and they suffered for it—there is an important lesson in this—but the possession of power did not in the long run guarantee success for Athens. Power is necessary but it must be applied in a way that is consistent with and contributes towards our strategic objectives. Power, whether soft or hard, provides ways and means but it cannot provide coherent ends.
The committee rightly calls on the Government to provide a clear vision for the country, but that vision must be one with which the majority can and does identify. It is not therefore simply a matter of issuing statements or making speeches. Formulating the right vision is, in itself, a major undertaking and a significant challenge. That, though, is perhaps a matter for another debate and for another day.
(9 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, in the few moments available to me I will focus on just two issues. The first is the question of recognition. In his very powerful speech, much of which I agreed with, my noble friend Lord Luce argued that we should recognise the state of Palestine immediately. My concern is that it seems to assume that the only obstruction to the peace process is the Israeli political position. Of course, it is a massive obstruction, and, of course, settlements are an enormously controversial and difficult issue—I find that my Israeli friends have great difficulty in explaining to me the rationale behind this policy—but there are also problems on the Palestinian side, including their unwillingness, for internal political reasons, to address the key question of right of return, for example, and their unwillingness to address seriously the key question of security on the West Bank. The last thing that the Jordanians, let alone the Israelis, need is a fragile and insecure state on their border. These questions have to be addressed and we have to be sure, before we go through a process of formal recognition, that there are sufficient levers on the Palestinian side as well as the Israeli side to force the two sides to the appropriate compromises.
My second point is on the two-state solution itself. I think that pretty much everyone agrees that this is still the only reasonable and viable way forward. However, in considering the two-state solution, I ask that there be a degree of flexibility in the application of the Clinton parameters. Clearly, in broad terms these must be right, but the post-1918 settlement in the Middle East has unravelled almost totally, and borders in so many parts of that region are in question. We should look at a broader approach to this whole question of the two-state solution and in particular we should seek to draw Egypt and Jordan into a four-way negotiation so that the borders can be created in a way that produces a viable Palestinian state and will meet the needs of the Israelis, the Palestinians and their nearest neighbours who are most closely concerned—Egypt and Jordan.
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, of course we should recognise the state of Palestine—when that state exists. It patently does not exist at the moment, so what is the purpose of recognising an unreality? The resolution in the other place suggests that it would be to contribute to the achievement of a negotiated two-state solution—in other words, to help the process rather than to circumvent it. If that is the case, one has to ask: what are the current obstacles to such a solution, and would recognition help to overcome those obstacles?
There are certainly obstacles on both sides of the argument, and it is undoubtedly true that a number of these have been created by the Government of Israel. This has naturally led to immense frustration and to a sense that something must be done to change the thinking of the leadership in that country. I agree, but will recognition of an as yet barely embryonic Palestinian state achieve that aim? The noble Lord, Lord Steel of Aikwood, has rightly talked about signals, but we need to think about the sum total of the signals that we send.
The majority of people in Israel still support a two-state solution, and many of them are frustrated by the actions of their own Government. However, they are also frustrated by the lack of vision and leadership among the Palestinians. They understand that a negotiated settlement requires political courage, and they see little of that on either side. That is why, despite supporting a settlement, most of them are pessimistic about the prospect of one being achieved in the near term. What is likely to be the reaction of these people to international recognition of a Palestinian state? We can judge this from their response to the parliamentary Motions already passed. They acknowledge the mistakes of their own Government, but they feel that the international community is acting partially and unfairly towards Israel.
In the context of the aim of this Motion, it does not matter whether that is a fair judgment. What matters is the perception of Israeli citizens, citizens who are also, at this critical moment, Israeli voters. International recognition of a Palestinian state, when the foundations of that state—most critically, the long-term security arrangements—are left unresolved, plays straight into the hands of those in Israel who argue against concessions to the Palestinians. It will make the Israeli Government more, rather than less, intransigent.
On the Palestinian side, it will make the leadership less willing to address seriously the difficult concessions that they will have to make if there is to be a lasting two-state solution. They have already shown a marked reluctance to face up to these issues. If they believe that, more and more, the international community will press their case for them, I fear that the chances of their summoning the necessary political will and courage to take on the rejectionists in their own community will become vanishingly remote.
For these and other reasons which I regret I cannot adequately cover in four minutes, I do not think that the timing of this resolution is helpful—indeed, quite the opposite. But I do not wish to end on that negative note. The plight of young Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is too serious for that, not to mention the wider implications for international security. So I will respond to the challenge thrown out by the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi.
We do not have to, and nor should we, simply sit here and cry into our beer over the failure of the Kerry initiative. There are things that the international community can and should be doing to move the situation forward, short of a full settlement—things in which I believe this country can play a major role. There is no opportunity to discuss them today, but on 5 March, my noble friend Lord Luce, who could not be in his place this afternoon, has secured a debate in Grand Committee on the two-state solution. I hope that we can take that opportunity to look in detail at the further initiatives that Her Majesty’s Government might pursue in this very difficult and very sad case.
(10 years ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I rise briefly to speak to this amendment, as I am also concerned about the effect that it might have upon the provision of lifetime home standards within new buildings. The noble Lord, Lord Best, made all the key points with his customary eloquence and I do not intend to repeat them. There is a supposed requirement to meet the test of need. The need is surely very clear. The English housing survey found that only around 5% of properties can be visited by disabled people and, as a result, one in six disabled people and more than half of disabled children live in accommodation that is not suitable for their needs.
I am very sympathetic to the cause of deregulation and I therefore support the intent behind the Bill, but, as ever, when the water disappears through the window we must ensure that the baby remains in the bath. There seems to me a slight danger that in attempting to reduce red tape we may, in this instance, be achieving the reverse. We seem to be increasing the requirement on those who want to provide homes that are suitable for those with a variety of disabilities, making it more difficult for them, increasing the evidentiary burden and, instead of reducing red tape, doing the reverse—and, in this instance, increasing it. I am sure that that is not the intent and, equally, I am sure that it is not the intent of the Government to reduce the stock of housing that is built to the lifetime home standards.
I close by remarking that, in addition to the tremendous need that already existed throughout the country, we have, of course, very sadly, over the past 10 years or so, added to the number of disabled people in this country through veterans with severe muscular-skeletal damage as a result of operations. These people already face a challenge with their lives and the challenge will grow greater as they age. We saw, a couple of days ago, a very worrying report about the extent to which the military covenant is already under stress with regard to provision within the National Health Service for this group. I am sure we do not wish to see any further regression in the undertaking that the Government gave, within the military covenant, to care for that group of people, among the much larger group of disabled people within our community. I therefore ask the Minister to pay particular attention to this baby and make sure, either through this amendment or through some other means, that it is properly safeguarded in the future.
My Lords, I, too, rise to support the amendment, brilliantly moved, as usual, by the noble Lord, Lord Best, who asked fundamental, awkward questions about the impact that this will have on standards in the future. I want to make some general points about what the Bill signals about the Government’s strategic approach to housing for an ageing population.
The noble Lord, Lord Tope, has already pointed out that establishing lifetime home standards in the first place was an extremely long and very challenging process, but it is accepted and the best developers take it as a matter of course. In fact, we have tried to learn from the mistakes of the past, when we assumed that people would not want to age in place. Part of the crisis that we have at the moment in finding homes of sufficient quality and appropriateness for an elderly and frail population is because in the past we simply did not understand that this would be necessary.
What troubles me about the standards review, for which the noble Lord, Lord Best, made a very good case, is that there is a real paradox in the language that the review uses in one respect. It is concerned with local authorities not pursuing standards which are simply nice to know, but standards which are strictly necessary. The point is that in building for an ageing population with disabilities, we should be building every home across the piece to lifetime standards which are strictly necessary. It is a misreading of the situation we are in and the challenge of the future.
I also see a real paradox in the situation that the Government has posed in this clause. It is a paradox in logic. To make lifetime homes standards and other accessible standards statutory, and yet to make higher standards optional, simply does not make logical sense. If we are assuming that we all want the highest standards and to maintain the highest standards, why is there an optional extra? Good developers and local authorities are already pursuing the best and highest standards and are doing so with conviction. Is it a question, for example, of the Government trying to obtain the moral credit while making it more difficult in practice for local authorities to enforce? We have to ask about the unintended consequences. We know that local authorities are strained and strapped for cash, resources and expertise. When developers approach these second-level standards, who will advise the developers and implement the standards?
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Grand Committee
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of prospects for progress towards an agreement between Israel and Palestine on a two-state solution.
My Lords, before we start, two speakers have scratched. This would allow us to stretch to four minutes for the other speakers, if that huge addition to the length of their speeches might please noble Lords.
My Lords, I am most grateful for this opportunity to discuss the current status of the Middle East peace process, and I am particularly grateful that so many eminent and knowledgeable noble Lords will be lending their expertise to the subject over the next hour.
An hour is of course far too short a time in which to do justice to the importance and complexity of the issues involved. Nor would I expect the Minister to disclose the detailed nature and status of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, even if the UK was aware of them, which I rather doubt. We must trust that the US Secretary of State and his team will do their utmost to secure a successful outcome, recognising that we have little direct influence on the process.
However, if that is so, then what purpose might we set ourselves in this debate here today? We could, of course, remind ourselves of the many difficulties involved: the delineation of boundaries, the settlements, the status of Jerusalem, the right of return and so on. For my part, however, I will focus on three issues where I think we could and should go beyond just enthusiastic support for Secretary Kerry, where UK intellectual effort, advocacy and, in some cases, practical involvement might add value to the whole endeavour.
The first of these issues concerns the fundamental proposition that there should be a two-state solution. This has been questioned in the past, and there continue to be voices, perhaps increasing in number, arguing against it. The Foreign Secretary has himself suggested that time may be running out for a two-state solution. That must of course raise the question of what happens if time does indeed run out: what comes next? Some suggest that the time for such a solution is in fact long past—that some sort of single-state solution is the only realistic way forward. Many of these voices, although by no means all, are in Israel. But is it conceivable that an Israeli state that incorporated the present Occupied Territories could remain both Jewish and democratic?
If the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their previous homes is a device to undermine the state of Israel through demographics, as some would argue, then surely a one-state solution would achieve the same end, perhaps even more decisively. The UK Government remain committed to a negotiated two-state solution. This leads me to two conclusions. The first is that the UK needs to engage intellectually with those who argue against such a proposition. We should add our voices to a continuing international effort in this regard, rather than just assuming that the argument has been won for good and all. The second is that we need to do all we can to ensure that the window for a two-state solution remains open for as long as is necessary. While of course we want to engender a sense of urgency, we should be careful about suggesting the existence of cliff edges—or closed windows, if you prefer—lest we paint ourselves into an intellectual corner.
We all hope that something substantive emerges from the current negotiations, but long years of weary experience counsel us to rein in our expectations. In situations such as this, one has to combine long-term optimism with a grimly realistic short-term outlook. However, if the UK view is truly that the window for a two-state solution will soon close, then long-term optimism becomes Panglossian, and we should therefore be thinking now about alternatives, unpalatable though they might be. Is this truly the ground on which we wish to stand? I rather doubt it, and I certainly doubt the wisdom of even hinting at such a thing. The lessons of history suggest that, in cases such as this, one must never give up, never despair, no matter how dark the road might become.
The UK’s position, and therefore its message to others, should surely be that no matter how long it takes, no matter the setbacks, the international community must and will keep coming back to the issue, will keep bringing the parties back together, and will keep banging their heads against the brick wall until the wall one day starts to crumble.
The second issue that I want to raise concerns an important precondition for any enduring agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In political negotiations such as these, it is not sufficient for the leaders to agree upon the terms of a solution. They have to be able to carry with them sufficient of their constituents to enable them to turn any agreement into political reality on the ground. They will never convince everyone, but they need sufficient popular support to sustain them through what will no doubt be difficult and controversial times.
Much of this task will of course fall to the politicians on either side, but I suspect that they will need all the help they can get. So we should think hard about which international actors could wield the kind of influence necessary to condition the debates within both Israel and Palestine. The United States certainly has a role to play here. However, it no longer, I suggest, has quite the economic and moral strength that in old days might have helped it move heaven and earth. The UK is certainly no better placed in terms of direct influence; but perhaps our influence with third parties might be of some use in such an endeavour.
The contribution of the Arab League nations, even when somewhat divided, was an important factor in the recent resumption of talks. They and other countries in the region will continue to be important in the development, and particularly in the acceptance, of any solution. We have many friends among these countries with whom we might constructively engage over the coming months, in support of both the peace process itself and the means by which any agreement might be implemented.
With regard to the Israelis, I regret that we have even less direct influence than with the Palestinians. We seem to have allowed relations between our two countries to enter a sort of limbo. Indeed, it took me most of my tenure as Chief of the Defence Staff to persuade the Foreign Office that I should be allowed even to visit my Israeli counterpart.
I am pleased to say that things have improved somewhat in recent years but we are still playing catch-up, and we are seeing today the difficulties that playing catch-up presents for us when we seek to influence invents within the world. We do, though, have many individuals in the UK who maintain important contacts within Israel. Perhaps we need to think about mobilising this community in support of the current process, and exploring how it might contribute to the debate in Israel. This is no doubt already happening in an ad hoc fashion, but is there not some way we can mobilise this important resource to make up, at least in part, for our lack of direct national influence?
The third issue that I want to touch on is the question of security. One does not have to be a military genius to understand that Israel’s pre-1967 borders were a strategic nightmare. If we were simply to return to this situation, give or take elements of land swap, without providing a greater degree of defensive depth for Israel, then we would be putting in place an inherently unstable arrangement—one that in time would be highly likely to fail. On the other hand, Israel’s demand to exercise unilateral control over Palestinian airspace and in the Jordan Valley does not sit comfortably with the notion of Palestinian sovereignty.
Some have suggested that the answer is to involve NATO. However, the Israelis are very sceptical about such an arrangement. They view with an understandably jaundiced eye the international community’s record in the Lebanon, and would be loath to put their security in the hands of such a force in the Jordan Valley. I believe that the question of airspace control can be worked out relatively easily. There are many examples of allies—which is what Israel and Palestine would have to be—pooling responsibility for air defence and putting in place the necessary arrangements for unified airspace.
With regard to the Jordan Valley, only a degree of international involvement is likely to soothe Palestinian sensitivities. However, international involvement has to be what the Israelis are prepared to accept, even if reluctantly. This is an issue on which General Allen, the previous Commander of US Central Command, is currently working for Secretary Kerry. It is also an issue in which the UK has great expertise and to which it might make a significant long-term contribution. With that in mind, has the Ministry of Defence undertaken any discussions on the subject with the Pentagon? Has the ministry begun any assessment of the likely contribution that the UK might make to an international force? Of course these are early days, and we would not want to get ahead of ourselves, let alone of the negotiations. However, it is an area where some preliminary analysis could be of value, and certainly it is an issue on which we should be liaising closely with the Americans.
There is much else to be said about the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, but I will close with a wider observation. We seem to be witnessing—finally—the unravelling of the San Remo decisions and of the other attempts to tidy away the detritus of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. The UK played a major role in that process. Although we may now be somewhat diminished on the international stage, we have an obligation to do all in our power to help address the consequent problems. Practical support for a continuing and enduring effort to resolve the Israel-Palestine issue must surely be the cornerstone of such efforts.