Ukraine (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate the members of the International Relations and Defence Committee on this excellent report. It is usually a matter of great regret that we are not able to debate such Select Committee reports until long after they are published, but in this case the delay is a positive advantage. Why? To echo the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, it is because, if the war in Ukraine was a wake-up call for us and our European partners in NATO, surely the events of the past few weeks in Munich and Washington have served to tip us entirely out of our cosy collective bed on to the cold, hard floor. The recommendations made in the report are based on a forensic analysis of the evidence and are well judged. I support them all. However, the context has clearly changed—and not for the better.

We all want NATO to survive and to continue the invaluable work it has done over so many decades to guard our collective security. The United States has been at the core of that endeavour, and we wish American involvement to continue. I believe that it will, but we can no longer expect it to be on the scale that it has been in the past. This goes beyond the vagaries of one President or any sense of growing American isolationism. Senior officials in Washington, both civilian and military, have made it clear that, despite their enduring commitment to NATO, they are substantially shifting their weight of effort from Europe to the Pacific. This should not surprise us. This development has been under way and slowly building in momentum over many years. That the American shift now coincides with a dramatically increased risk to our security has just served to open European eyes that, for too long, have remained resolutely shut.

It is now starkly apparent that if we in Europe do not provide adequately for our own security, no one else will. It is also clear that shouldering this responsibility is the surest way of retaining American involvement in NATO. For too long, we and our European partners have scrabbled around in the smallest margins of public expenditure to fund our defence. It was inappropriate in the past; it would be utter folly now. There is a growing acknowledgement by many political leaders in Europe that we are in an era of rearmament. This is right, but we need to define and follow through on what that means. Europe’s militaries, including our own, are too small as fighting units, inadequately armed and lacking in key strategic capabilities. Rearmament means making good these deficiencies. That will take two things: time and money. We have the first, but none to waste.

Russia’s military capability, particularly in its ground forces, is depleted after three years of gruelling combat in Ukraine. This will take time to rebuild, but it can and will be rebuilt. Meanwhile, Russia has learned some important operational and tactical lessons from its early failures in the war, and its nuclear, aviation and maritime capabilities remain largely untouched. So, in one sense, we are in an arms race with Russia, and we cannot afford to fall behind.

This brings me to the cost of rearmament: it will be considerably greater than the Government have yet acknowledged. It is worth reflecting that, at the time of the first Gulf War—the last time we fielded a full armoured division for high-intensity conflict alongside an extended air campaign—we were spending 4% of GDP on defence. Even then, we had to cannibalise the whole of the British Army of the Rhine in order to field that armoured division. So the Prime Minister’s commitment to raise defence spending to 2.5% of GDP in the financial year 2027-28 is clearly inadequate; 2.5% of GDP would merely close the gap between the current level of resource and the cost of the existing programme, and there are two years before even that happens. As things stand, it seems that defence will actually receive less cash next year than it will in this. I cannot imagine quite how the Minister will defend this in the House.

So what is the cost? SACEUR has set out a defensive posture that, in his view, would deter Russian aggression —something the inquiry report rightly identifies as the overriding requirement. SACEUR has also identified the contribution that he needs from the UK. This should be costed and a plan drawn up to achieve the necessary force levels and sustainability as soon as possible. I cannot put an accurate price on this, but it will be well north of 3% of GDP so, to put us on the right path, we need 2.5% immediately and we need to pass 3% before the end of the decade.

Of course, the money should be spent wisely. Other noble Lords have commented and will comment on this, but I identify two important issues that need to figure prominently in our plans. The first is the requirement for continuing technological innovation and rapid capability development. This will involve a much closer and more flexible use of SMEs than has been normal in our procurement system to date. The second is the importance of well-trained and equipped reservists. With this in mind, I echo the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, in opposing any suggestion that this crucial part of our capability be put under a non-departmental body. That would be a bad idea at any time but folly today.

The Prime Minister has said that Europe must do the heavy lifting in Ukraine, but heavy lifting requires muscle. We have allowed our military muscle to atrophy for far too many years; we now need substantially to rebuild it and to rebuild it quickly, before it is too late.