Defence Policy (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 30th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, as I did for a significant part of my military career. The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, who so ably led the International Relations and Defence Committee on which I have the privilege to serve, has very clearly set out the background to the report we are debating today.

Inevitably, given the delay in considering Select Committee findings, things have moved on. We have a refreshed integrated review, and we are still expecting an updated version of the Defence Command Paper. Nevertheless, a number of the key issues highlighted in the report remain both relevant and urgent, in light of the present international situation. I want to focus on just two of them today.

The first concerns a problem that has bedevilled all defence reviews: the balance between ambition and resource. This was of course a central element in the inquiry and is reflected in its subtitle, “From aspiration to reality”. The first version of the integrated review sought to draw attention to the growing strategic importance to the UK of the Indo-Pacific region—the so-called “Tilt”—and it was right to do so. Indeed, the International Relations and Defence Committee’s previous report, The UK and China’s Security and Trade Relationship, made that very point.

However, the extent to which such a tilt involves UK military capability is another matter entirely. Defence certainly has a role to play, not least through the AUKUS agreement and Japan’s welcome involvement in the global combat air programme. But the resources allocated to our Armed Forces simply do not allow them to make significant contributions in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

In his evidence to our inquiry, the Defence Secretary made it clear that our military focus must remain on Europe and the north Atlantic. That is a welcome clarification, not least given the current events in Ukraine. No matter how that conflict ends, or perhaps freezes, we in Europe will continue to face an unpredictable and resentful Russia—a Russia that will certainly have suffered some significant losses in Ukraine, but a Russia whose nuclear, maritime and long-range air forces will have remained largely untouched.

The central importance of Europe in purely military terms must be reflected in the balance of defence investment, and the evidence on this score is not good. Our ability to defend our own airspace, to achieve air superiority over the battle space and to contribute effectively to the defence and, if necessary, restoration of NATO territory is all at risk. Our bases and infrastructure in the UK—including our undersea infrastructure—are vulnerable to long-range attack, and the concentration of our forces in fewer locations means that we lack the resilience we once had.

Meanwhile, the course of the current conflict in Ukraine has underscored the importance of air superiority: fail to achieve it, and you risk something resembling a First World War battlefield on the ground. Our inability to field an armoured division that can fight effectively and enduringly in high-intensity conflict has become something of a national embarrassment as well as a strategic weakness.

All three services have some good equipment, but they lack many key enablers and, most importantly, adequate stocks of the appropriate weapons to fight intensively for anything other than a very brief period. The Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force are all too small, but enabling our current force structure to undertake sustained operations must be our highest priority for investment.

This is not just a matter of more money for the defence budget. We must also strengthen and expand the Western defence industries that we have allowed to atrophy over the many years of budgetary cuts and on which we and the rest of NATO rely for our sustainability. However, if we are to secure the necessary private sector investment in those industries, we will need more predictable, longer-range procurement plans. The frequent changes currently made in response to short-term budgetary pressures are simply not designed to inspire the necessary investor confidence.

The usual official response to these kinds of criticisms—I expect to hear it again today—is to assert that the Government have recently delivered the largest increase in defence spending since the end of the Cold War. That may be true, but it follows, and only partly ameliorates, some of the largest cuts, made by the same Government. It is rather like pushing someone into a river and then claiming credit for helping them to keep their head temporarily above water. We need serious, sustained and increased investment in our military capability and sustainability, and it must be focused on our ability to fight and win in Europe and northern waters.

The other issue I will touch on is the emphasis the Defence Command Paper places on technology and innovation. It sees these as a substitute, at least in part, for mass. In a sense, this is right. Throughout history, there are many examples of smaller but more capable forces succeeding against larger opponents. Once again, Ukraine has shown the advantage to be gained from innovation and novel uses of technology, civilian as well as military. Effects are what matter, but those effects need to be created in enough places and on a sufficiently enduring basis to achieve the desired ends, so size does matter.

Beyond this, though, we need to ensure that novel ideas make it through to front-line capability. A great deal of innovation comes from small, high-technology enterprises rather than large defence contractors. The very size of the latter, and their resultant bureaucratic processes, often robs them of the agility and independence of thought necessary for solutions that fall outside the box.

Fortunately, we have no shortage of such small, imaginative enterprises in this country. Unfortunately, those smaller companies face enormous obstacles in translating their ideas into marketable products—or, in defence terms, into front-line capability. For them, there exists something called the valley of death, where good ideas go to die. This is not a new phenomenon. How often have we seen something invented in this country, only for commercial exploitation and the associated economic benefits to move elsewhere? I see insufficient evidence that this problem is being addressed.

There are some welcome initiatives in the Defence Command Paper to develop unconventional thinking, but unless there are mechanisms and processes to encourage substantial private capital investment in new technology and innovative ideas, defence is unlikely to realise their benefits. This goes beyond the Ministry of Defence and requires a wider government focus, but it is one of the biggest risks in the Defence Command Paper, and therefore should be a very high priority for action.

Finally, with war raging in Europe and all the dangers to this country’s security, I am deeply disappointed that a debate on the UK’s defence policy has been tucked away on a Friday afternoon. The Whips will no doubt pray in aid the pressure of government business. The defence of this country and its people is government business; it is the Government’s most important business and it deserves much better than it has received in the scheduling of this debate.