Ukraine

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Friday 25th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, I am usually put last on the speakers’ list in any debate on this topic, but I treat that as a badge of honour. I welcome the opportunity we have been given to take note. I have been taking note of the Government’s position on Ukraine for over two years now. It is unchanging: the promise, endlessly repeated, to support Ukraine “up to the hilt”—to do “whatever it takes”. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has simply repeated this with his usual eloquence.

What Ukraine thinks it takes is shown by President Zelensky’s latest victory plan: the Russian army must be driven out of Crimea and Donbass. However, who now believes that Ukraine can achieve this kind of victory at the present level of western support? Rather, there is growing agreement that without expanded western support, Ukraine, despite its courage and determination, faces defeat. This was always likely once Russia started to mobilise on a larger scale.

The demographics alone indicate this: you have a country of 36 million fighting one of 147 million. In the last four years, Ukraine’s population has shrunk by 20% while Russia’s has grown. A population the size of London has simply disappeared through war and migration; that is the reality on the ground. Of course, North Korean involvement has added a new front in this debate, but we must not delude ourselves that Russia needs North Korean troops to go on fighting. So the question arises: what more must we do to do what it takes?

There are two basic answers. The first is to tighten economic sanctions, for example by confiscating seized Russian assets. The idea that economic sanctions will cripple Putin’s war machine lingers on in the face of much evidence to the contrary. Since sanctions were imposed, Russia’s economy has boomed, Ukraine’s has slumped and the EU’s has stagnated. I hope that Treasury officials will expand on the lesson given by my noble friend Lord Desai as to why this has happened and persuade their sanctions-addicted colleagues at the Foreign Office to ease up on their enthusiasm for this approach.

I want to repeat the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, which was also referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Balfe. Have the Government taken note of the two-day BRICS summit in Kazan, where Putin hosted a meeting of 36 countries including India and China? It was also attended by UN Secretary-General António Guterres. One wants to ask: in this evolving world order, who is the pariah?

The other notion going around is that we should give Ukraine permission to use long-range missiles and navigation systems, supplied by us and other NATO countries, to strike targets deep in Russia. Do the Government support this? It is crucial, because without that support their strategy collapses. Ukraine needs something else. Are the Government prepared to provide that long-range ability to strike deep into Russian territory?

The victory at any price school relies on two exceedingly dangerous fallacies. The first is that defeating Russia in Ukraine is the key to the security of Europe. For understandable reasons, Ukraine presents itself as Europe’s shield against Russia, and many noble Lords have endorsed this. The argument goes: “If you do not defeat the Russians in Ukraine, they will keep on coming at you. Who next—the Baltics, Georgia, Poland or Moldova? Where will a maniac like Putin stop?” I call this the Munich reflex. It affects the thinking of all British elites because Britain, by its surrender to Hitler at Munich, unleashed him on the rest of Europe. They feel guilty about it and say: “We must not repeat that mistake”. But this is contextually blind. As Owen Matthews pertinently pointed out,

“the supposedly mighty Russian army has been fought to a standstill not by Nato—which, as Zelensky joked … ‘hasn’t turned up yet’—but by Ukraine’s once-tiny military”.

The second conceptual flaw is the discounting of Russian retaliation. That is very dangerous. Putin has already said that Russia would be prepared to use nuclear weapons in response to any massive air and space attack over Russia’s border by a non-nuclear power. Is it the Government’s view that he is bluffing?

Is there a way to bring the fighting to an end? The most hopeful recent development in this deadly game of chicken has been a statement by President Zelensky reported in the Financial Times two days ago:

“Russia putting an end to aerial attacks on Ukrainian energy targets and cargo ships could pave the way for negotiations to end the war”.


At last, there is a breakthrough to realism. Will the Government seize this opportunity to start some serious diplomacy? I mourn those who have died. What now moves me above all else is the thought of the thousands more young men, women and children yet to die if this war is not quickly brought to an end. I beg the Government to play their part in bringing the killing and destruction to a close.

King’s Speech

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Thursday 25th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the new Front Bench. I know the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, as an eloquent speaker and a doughty defender of the good fight—if he is allowed to.

I believe the Starmer era will be defined by its handling of foreign affairs. As many noble Lords have pointed out, the world is very dangerous place. There are three powder kegs: in the Far East, in the Middle East and in Ukraine. Each is capable of igniting a world war. I concentrate on Ukraine because it is on the outcome of this conflict that our Government can hope to have their biggest influence.

The gracious Speech says—the noble Lord, Lord Moore, also quoted this—that:

“My Government will continue to give its full support to Ukraine and its people and it will endeavour to play a leading role in providing Ukraine with a clear path to NATO membership”.


The new Foreign Secretary spelt it out in even more detail, saying that

“the British government must leave the Kremlin with no doubt that it will support Kyiv for as long as it takes to achieve victory. Once Ukraine has prevailed, the United Kingdom should play a leading role in securing Ukraine’s place in NATO”.

The two propositions in David Lammy’s article are of course linked: victory as defined by Kyiv and NATO means the expulsion of the Russians from Crimea and the Donbass region. Without such a victory, there can be no clear path to NATO membership.

My first question to the Government is this: do they support President Zelensky’s request to use western-supplied missiles against targets deep in Russia? Most noble Lords who have spoken on this believe that the Government should give the necessary permission but, to my mind, giving Ukraine permission to use our missiles for offensive operations deep in Russia comes perilously close to turning a proxy war into an actual war by NATO against the most heavily armed nuclear power in the world. Can we be assured that the Government will weigh properly the risk of such a deadly escalation before giving Ukraine any such permission, and bring those risks to the attention of their NATO allies, some of which are disturbingly trigger happy?

Those such as the noble Lords, Lord Hague and Lord Dannatt, who advocate arming Ukraine to carry the war to Russia, seem unconcerned with the danger of escalation. They never properly face up to the question of what the net gain to Ukraine would be of extending the war in this way. Perhaps the Minister will repair this omission.

I am concerned by the statement of General Sir Roland Walker, Chief of the General Staff, that Britain has three years to prepare for war against the “axis of upheaval”: Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. It is surely not the job of serving officers of the Crown to define British foreign policy, so I urge the Government to tell the general not to be so free with his public words.

My final concern is with economic sanctions. The Bell, which is by far the most reliable source of information on Russia, has tirelessly pointed out that instead of weakening the Russian economy, sanctions against individual Russians have brought about the repatriation of Russian capital into Russia to boost Putin’s war chest. Why do the Government believe that such sanctions will help bring about a Ukrainian victory?

I start from a different position: I do not believe that either side can defeat the other, short of a dangerous escalation. That is why I favour a negotiated peace as soon as possible. This means two things: recognising that Ukraine has already won its most important victory for independence, and recognising that postponement of negotiations will make Ukraine’s position worse and not better. We may supply Ukraine with more and deadlier weapons, but Russia will continue to turn itself into a totally militarised economy, capable of even more deadly retaliation.

I finish up where I started: what is the Government’s road map to peace in Ukraine? I hope the Minister will tell me where I have gone wrong in my argument. If the Government cannot fault it, I beg them to rethink their policy, because we are talking about the life and death of thousands and perhaps millions.

Ukraine

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Thursday 21st September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Government for giving this all too rare opportunity to discuss the most fateful foreign policy issue of our day. I see that I have been bracketed with one or two other notable troublemakers; I am very happy to be speaking after the noble Lord, Lord Balfe.

I feel more isolated in this House when I speak on foreign policy than on any other subject, despite my strong feeling that what I am saying urgently needs to be said. I was one of a handful of Peers who opposed NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The three main parties supported both policies. I managed to avoid speaking about Afghanistan in this House, though not writing an article in the Guardian headed “Seven pointless years in Afghanistan”, in which I argued that a negotiated settlement with the Taliban was the only way to bring an unwinnable war to an end. I clearly have an excellent track record in what my noble friend Lord Owen calls appeasement.

Before staking out my distinctive position on Ukraine, let me emphasise one point on which I think we are all agreed: that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 was an act of aggression against an independent state contrary to the UN charter and fully deserving of the condemnation it received in this country and around the world. I would go further and say that it was worse than a crime; it was a blunder, since it achieved the exact reverse of what Putin intended, alienating Ukraine irretrievably from Russia. As I said a year ago, you do not call Ukrainians your brothers and then try to bomb them into submission. That is common ground.

Where I deviate from the consensus is in rejecting the possibility of a Ukrainian military victory at the present level of economic and military deployment. This leaves three alternatives: economic and military escalation, a long stalemate—a period of frozen war—or negotiations to end the war as quickly as possible. I favour the last. Supporters of the present policy are committed to the first option, a complete defeat of Russia, which means escalation, or they are resigned to a continuation of the present position. Let us be clear about this: driving the Russians out of all the territory lost since 2014, plus reparations for all the damage they have caused, is Zelensky’s war aim, and it is the stated objective of our Government as well. They are very cagey about it if one asks what the end game or the condition for ending is, but it is clear what it is. As James Cleverly stated on 23 August:

“Be in no doubt, the UK and the international community will never recognise Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, or any Ukrainian territory, and will stand with you for as long as it takes”.


That is the Government’s official position.

Complete victory, in this sense, is the key to what all supporters of the present policy want—such as the Nuremberg court, suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, which depended, as she knows, on the complete defeat and occupation of Germany—reparations by Russia for its aggression and, of course, regime change in Russia and an end to the Putin system. Short of a complete defeat of Russa, I do not see how any of these goals of holding Russia to account can be achieved. They are the necessary premise of the policy, and it is not surprising that this is the official policy. A lot of the moral force behind it depends on viewing the Russian action in Ukraine as unprovoked—“brutal and unprovoked aggression” is the commonly used term. Yet, how can you take the notion of unprovoked aggression seriously? As the noble Lord, Lord Owen, and I noted in a co-signed letter published in the Financial Times soon after the outbreak of the war, Russian hostility to NATO expansion has been constant since 1991. We wrote:

“NATO Governments have rightly said they are willing to address Russia’s security concerns, but then say in the same breath that Russia has no legitimate security concerns because NATO is a purely defensive alliance”.


This has been the contradiction at the heart of Western policy on Russia and, in my view, eventually provoked a Russian response.

To say that the Russian attack was provoked is not to say it was justified; that is an important distinction for clear thinking about peace prospects. The only point I make is that a careful look at the background to the war is needed to judge the scale of Putin’s ambition, to judge whether he is a Hitler—an increasingly common comparison—and therefore what a justifiable endgame might be like.

There is evidence that our Government have not only endorsed President Zelensky’s war aims but helped define them. There is so much that we do not know about this and so much misinformation on both sides. I agree that there is much more misinformation on the other side than on our side, but there is a hell of a lot of misinformation on our side as well. Is it true, for example, that on a visit to Kyiv in April 2022, Boris Johnson strongly advised Zelensky not to sign any peace agreement, assuring him of continuing western support, come what may? I do not know, but it has been widely said that it aborted what were then promising peace negotiations.

Behind the Government’s reluctance even to whisper the language of peace is their failure to recognise the extent of Ukraine’s victory. Ukraine has fought for its independence and won, much as Finland did in 1939-40, although Finland’s independence did come at the cost of some territory. If we could think of the Ukrainian achievement in these terms, we would be much less hung up on defining victory in terms of the reconquest of every inch of territory it has lost since 2014.

Apart from these general considerations, the war aims espoused by our Government are unachievable. Ukraine is not in a position to fight the kind of war it can win. Its overhyped counteroffensive has stalled, and most military experts believe that inconclusive trench warfare will be the order of the day for months to come. In those circumstances, there will be a strong temptation on our side to break the stalemate by progressive scaling up of warfare. Escalation has already started. At his meeting with Zelensky at Chequers in July, our Prime Minister confirmed that we have provided Ukraine with long-range cruise missiles and attack drones with a range of 200 kilometres. The longer the war goes on in its stalemated form, the greater the temptation to supply Ukraine with longer-range weaponry that could hit targets deep inside Russia and involve NATO military forces in direct attacks on Russian military positions.

I and others have warned about the danger of nuclear escalation. We all hope that China’s veto on the use of nuclear weapons will be binding on Russia, but it would be very imprudent to expect it to hold in the event that the Russians face a catastrophic military defeat or failure on the ground as a result of NATO support for Ukraine. An important contribution by the defence analyst Charles Knight argues that the Ukraine war presents a greater nuclear risk than the Cuban missile crisis, calling for careful rationality and restraint by Russia and the United States. Can the Minister assure us that the Government have not broken off all contact with Russia’s leaders and that behind official policy façades and smokescreens, Putin and other Russian leaders know that there are feasible endgames that avoid either total Russian defeat and humiliation or inexorable progress to Armageddon?

My dream is of a congress of London to bring peace to Ukraine as the Congress of Berlin pacified the Balkans in 1878, but we await our Disraeli.