Arrests and Prison Capacity

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 22nd May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, public safety must at all times be our primary concern. The fact that we now have a shortage of prison spaces and that these contingency measures were even considered is worrying. The Government have said they have not put the measures in place this time, but of course this shortage of prison spaces has been building for a long time and is having a knock-on effect throughout the criminal justice system. I agree with the need for contingency planning, even when the outcome is worrying. Can the Minister tell me, within contingency planning, what would be the priorities for the arrest or non-arrest of suspects?

In conclusion, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for the assiduous and courteous way in which he has dealt with many questions, debates and lots of legislation. He must be one of the most hard-working Members of this House, and we appreciate it.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord very much indeed for those remarks. They are very kind, and I am very grateful for them.

Obviously, public safety is the Government’s priority. We fully expect the police to arrest anyone who has committed a serious crime and poses a risk to the public. Police chiefs have been very clear today that officers will arrest anyone they need to in order to keep the public safe. The NPCC has suggested that, to its knowledge from daily engagement with forces, no arrests have been delayed because of the impact of Operation Early Dawn.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his acknowledgement that contingency planning is obviously a necessity. Frankly, any serious organisation should prepare for contingencies all the time. There were some strange remarks relating to that in the House of Commons. I think it is odd that was perhaps highlighted as a thing.

I acknowledge the comments about prison capacity, but we have made significant progress with regards to building capacity, which I am happy to talk about.

Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) (Amendment) Order 2024

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Tuesday 7th May 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support the order as well, and I thank the Minister for introducing this SI. Currently, pre-settled status lapses when somebody is outside the UK for a period of two years or more continuously; settled status lapses after five years of absence.

A court ruling, referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, found in late 2022 that, first, applicants granted pre-settled status should not lose their rights of residence if they do not make an application for settled status. This was on the basis that the wording of Article 13(4) of the withdrawal agreement makes it clear that a right of residence can be lost only in very specific circumstances. The expiry of the status was not among them. Secondly, the consequence of the above is that settled status rights accrue automatically once the conditions of such status have been satisfied by the individual without the need for a second application.

As we have heard from the Minister, this SI aligns the law with this ruling in ensuring that pre-settled status can lapse only after five years’ absence. The Government also announced last year that some pre-settled status holders will be automatically changed to being settled status holders this year.

Can the Minister confirm how many people have applied to switch from pre-settled to settled status but are currently waiting for a decision on their applications? We know that there is still a backlog. Will he tell us what information the Home Office has on the number of people who currently meet the eligibility criteria to switch from pre-settled to settled status but have not yet submitted an application to do so?

In July 2023, the Home Office said that its intention was to take steps to automatically convert as many eligible pre-settled status holders as possible to settled status once they are eligible for it, without them needing to make an application. Can the Minister update us on the progress of those plans? As he has acknowledged, the draft order seeks to implement a change to current legislation that is required as a result of the court’s decision. We approve of the order but I would be interested in the answers to those questions. They are actually the same questions that were asked in the other place when this matter was considered.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their contributions to this relatively short debate. It is worth saying to start that the EU settlement scheme has been a great success—and I shall come on to the numbers in a second. We have gone above and beyond our obligations under the citizens’ rights agreements and are pleased that so many families, friends and neighbours have obtained the status that they need to remain in the UK.

To respond to the various points, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me about facts and figures. This also answers a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made. There is no complacency here: as of 31 December 2023, 7.7 million applications were made to the scheme by an estimated 6.2 million people, of whom 5.7 million have obtained a grant of status. We have received 1.7 million applications since 30 June 2021, of which 38% were late applications; 39% were repeat applications, including those moving from pre-settled to settled status; 23% were joining family members; and 1% were from derivative rights applicants—please do not ask me what that means, because I do not know.

Nearly 1.6 million of the applications received since 30 June have been concluded; 746,000 people have moved from pre-settled to settled status, which represents more than half of repeat applications, and contributes to settled status outcomes being proportionately high when looking at the monthly outcome figures in the quarterly statistics. Application intake has remained high—the average monthly intake for the final quarter of 2023 was approximately 51,000. However, we continue to conclude more applications than we receive, concluding on average more than 57,000 applications a month.

Finally, there are 121,830 pending applications, compared to 142,430 in the previous data released to 30 September 202, which is a 14% reduction. I appreciate that that was a lot of numbers. It might be helpful if I commit those to paper and send them to both noble Lords.

The order is not retrospective, in answer to a question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. If the leave of a pre-settled status holder lapses before the coming into force of this order and they have not obtained a withdrawal agreement right of permanent residence, they will have lost their immigration permission to enter or remain in the UK. That is consistent with the citizens’ rights agreements, because the point at which pre-settled status currently lapses, after more than two years of absence, is more generous than any of the periods of absence permitted under the agreements.

On why we have not given pre-settled status holders a more generous permitted absence period in line with the draft order, the current provisions already allow pre-settled status holders significant periods of absence while maintaining their status. We have gone further than required by the citizens’ rights agreements. There are no plans to take a more generous domestic approach to permitted absence periods for pre-settled status holders than those set out in the agreements. Pre-settled status is a route to settlement, and we expect an individual to show a level of commitment to the UK. Not only are these absence periods well established under previous immigration arrangements with the EU; it would be unfair on UK nationals in EU member states who would not benefit from such greater flexibility.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked me why we were slow to implement the judgment. By virtue of UK domestic law, the withdrawal agreement as interpreted by the judgment is directly effective, which means that the rights are, and always have been, available to citizens. Our implementation is therefore focused on ensuring that it continues to be easy for citizens, government departments and third parties, such as employers and landlords, to evidence rights or check that they are in place. Some of that work is not straightforward and necessarily takes time. No guidance on the order has been published, but it will be shortly.

Finally, I thank the noble Baroness for submitting her specific question, which was about confirming that the GOV.UK web pages make it clear that the change made by the SI will not benefit a holder of pre-settled status who does not have permanent resident rights. The change will benefit pre-settled status holders who have not acquired a withdrawal agreement right of permanent residence by extending the five-year lapsing provision to all EUSS status holders. I can confirm that the GOV.UK pages will be amended to clarify the position for leave that has lapsed before and after the order comes into force. The position remains that the easiest way for a pre-settled status holder to prove their right to live permanently in the UK is to apply for settled status.

I hope that that addresses all the points raised today. I appreciate that this is a particularly complicated subject. In conclusion, the draft order upholds the judgment of the High Court; it ensures consistency in the legal framework and does so in a simple, practical and workable way. I thank noble Lords for their support and commend the order to the Committee.

Ukraine: Small Boats

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 1st May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My reply would be that we should look into the appropriate sorts of boats that we should send as part of our aid. Again, to remind noble Lords about the type of aid, since the start of the conflict the UK has sent almost 400 different types of capabilities to Ukraine. If the Ukrainians asked for boats, we would certainly look at providing them, but not these.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I visited Western Jet Foil just over a year ago, and I agree with Minister. I saw oversized rubber tyres which looked extremely dangerous, so I support the Minister in what he just said. I want to ask the Minister about the seizure of Russian assets. We have had the same answer from the Government on this question for a long time now. Will the Minister outline what concrete steps the Government are taking to access those assets for the benefit of the Ukrainian people?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his support for the Government’s position regarding the boats. On the seizure of Russian assets, I am afraid I am not more aware of the discussions than he will be from having read in the papers about what is going on at a very high level among the international community. I am sure that as soon as there is more to say on the subject, we will be back at the Dispatch Box.

Care Worker Visa Regime

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Tuesday 23rd April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with my noble friend on that. We remain committed to developing the domestic workforce. We are doing that by investing in retention—there is a high churn rate in this sector, as is well understood—through better workforce training, recognition and career progression. A new career structure is being launched for care workers so that all staff can build their careers and more experienced care workers are recognised for their skills. We are creating new qualifications and a digital skills record to reduce the need for retraining costs. We are increasing funding for learning and development. The Government have made available up to £8.6 billion in additional funding over the financial years 2023-24 and 2024-25 to support adult social care and discharge. I trust that all noble Lords will support the PM’s valiant efforts to mobilise those who are not currently engaged with the domestic workforce.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister spoke of fraudulent sponsors and exploitative agents. What assessment have the Government made of the need to tighten up repayment clauses for relocation and visa costs, and requiring compliance with Department of Health and Social Care rules on international recruitment as a condition of gaining a sponsor licence?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord develops on a theme explored earlier, in a question I could not entirely answer. I will come back to him with a better answer in due course.

Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment, Surrender and Compensation) Order 2024

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Thursday 18th April 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we too welcome this SI. I will start with some questions for the Minister, then comment on other noble Lords’ contributions to the short debate.

First, what are the Government doing to increase prosecution rates for knife crime? Currently, fewer than half of those who come to police attention are actually prosecuted. Do the Government have any plans to introduce a new serious violence strategy, given that the existing strategy is five years old? What assessment have the Government made of the threat of so-called “ninja swords” and why are they not covered by this legislation? The Government, as we heard, have tried to ban zombie knives before but the retailers have adapted their designs to get past the laws. Are the Government confident that they have done enough to stop the same thing happening again this time?

Further, online knife sales represent a serious issue in terms of lack of supervision by the websites and the lack of regulation over online marketplaces hosting illegal knife sales, particularly when these websites are hosted overseas. Can the Minister say something about buying these types of knives from overseas websites, how they may be intercepted and the obligations put on the people running those websites?

I also want to acknowledge that I understand this is a difficult problem and do not want to score political points on this issue, but there is a wider strategy to be developed and adopted to try to cut down this scourge in our society. The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, made an extremely good point when she drew the comparison between the cuts in youth services and the corresponding increase in knife crime. That really points to one of the sources of the problem that we have seen in recent years.

As an aside, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, that I am glad he made the points that he did. I agreed with those points and many families, including mine, have historical pieces which would certainly be illegal if they were sold nowadays in shops—so I thank him for that.

The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, raised some detailed questions, which I thought were very interesting, about the practical steps that police forces can take to track down sales and do some proactive policing to see what has happened to the knives that have been sold legitimately over the last few years. Of course, a huge number have been sold illegitimately, but we understand that point.

In conclusion, I want to talk slightly more generally. As noble Lords may know, I sit as a youth magistrate and regularly see knife crime-related charges in both youth and adult courts. One of the things I always do in the youth court is make sure that the parent, responsible adult or elder sibling sees the knife, because very often the person who accompanies the young person in court does not really know the extent of the danger which may have been posed through carrying that knife. Whether it is the physical knife itself, which we sometimes see in court, or a picture of it, I always make sure that the responsible adult sitting next to the young person sees that object, so that they know what we are talking about.

The other thing I always do with the young person, however serious the knife-related offence is, is say to them that their own lives are in danger. What we regularly see in court is young people being attacked with their own knives when fights break out. Twice in the last five years, I have had young people not turning up to court for a knife offence because they themselves have been killed. This is why I say that to the young people in front of me; one can only hope that it drives the message home.

We need to say that it is gang-related or drug-related, of course, but a lot of these people will say that they carry these knives for their own defence. They are more frightened of the harm posed to them by other people carrying knives than they are by what the court can do to them by way of sanction. This is not to argue for higher sanctions, but it is to argue for education and better youth services, and for a wider intervention through schools and other youth programmes to try to bear down on this scourge.

The final point I want to make is that people often ask questions about racial disproportionality, with young black men attacking each other. In this House and elsewhere, you hear of people saying that the police are disproportionate in their response to this and in stopping and search young black people. I have certainly been in more than one meeting with black mothers who have said to me and to the people with me, “You’re not doing enough to protect our sons”. So we need to do more to protect their sons and we need a holistic approach to do that, but, as far as this SI goes, I support it.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this relatively short debate. I thank in particular the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his personal insights from his courtroom; they made a great deal of sense and, in some cases, were very disturbing. I have had similar conversations with some of those mothers; they are particularly relevant in the context of some of the debates on stop and search that we have had in this House. Perhaps we need to do more to publicise the results of some of these conversations.

I will do my utmost to address the questions asked of me. I will start by talking about the serious violence duty, which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me about, because that obviously informs the entire debate. In 2023-24, the Government allocated £13.1 million to continue the implementation and delivery of the serious violence duty; that followed a commitment made in January 2023. The noble Lord will remember that, through the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the serious violence duty requires a range of specified authorities—such as the police, local government, youth offending teams and health and probation services —to work collaboratively and put in place plans to prevent and reduce serious violence in their local communities, enabled by new powers to share both data and information. Of course, that Act also contains measures such as serious violence reduction orders as well as other things; it is probably a little too soon to tell precisely how effective those are but, obviously, they are in train.

Local areas have the flexibility to determine the geographical extent of their partnerships. We are encouraging local areas to use multiagency partnerships where possible. The point was made by both the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that educational institutions, prisons and youth custodial institutions—known as “the relevant authorities”—are under separate duties. We expect them to co-operate with the core duty holders when asked as well. We also require partnerships to consult such institutions in their areas.

The fact is that this is a societal issue. We are not going to solve it this afternoon, but I have heard the points made and, of course, I will make sure that they are shared round the relevant parts of government—that is, most of government and most of society.

Both the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me about ninja swords and other types of bladed articles that are used in crime. Concerns have been raised during the passage of the Criminal Justice Bill through Parliament in relation to swords, in particular so-called ninja swords. Those that have the features set out in this legislation will be banned; however, those that do not have those features will not be, because we have focused our efforts on the types of weapons that the National Police Chiefs’ Council has raised as being of particular concern.

As my noble friend Lord Lucas mentioned, many members of the public legitimately own antique swords and swords of historical interest. People also own modern swords as collectible items, and there are those who own swords for activities such as martial arts, fencing and re-enactment. Many British military swords have straight blades and are treasured by service personnel when they serve, as well as by their family members when they are passed on. These articles are generally owned and used responsibly, obviously.

The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is quite right about blunt blades. Something that is blunt can be sharpened. However, we have provided the defence of blunt items, which would enable collectors of fantasy knives to purchase for display items that would otherwise be prohibited. We are taking the opportunity to extend this defence to curved swords, as I have mentioned, but it is important to note that, if an item were sharpened, it would become illegal. If this comes to the attention of the police, they will be able to make a charge for unlawful possession of a bladed article if the blade is sharpened.

I also point out to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that the unfortunate and awful crime in Croydon that she mentioned was actually committed with a kitchen knife.

The statistics are not quite as bleak as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, suggested. I am always a bit nervous talking about statistics in relation to what are individually horrific circumstances, so please bear that in mind when I mention them. The latest provisional admissions data for NHS hospitals in England and Wales showed a decrease in the number of admissions for assault with a sharp object in the year ending September 2023. The figure was 4% lower than in the year ending September 2022. We should also bear in mind that many of the comparisons that we make are with the years of Covid, when many people were locked up—metaphorically speaking—so they are not direct comparisons. If we compare like for like, the numbers are improving. That is not to say that they are not still awful, as I said, and obviously we have to do much more about that.

EU Borders: Hand and Face Scanning

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 17th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Baroness will appreciate that, as a Home Office Minister, I am not party to those discussions, but I will go back to the relevant department and find out, and make sure that she is made aware of the discussions and their substance.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I do not think so. The Minister will note that there is an air of scepticism in the House about the implementation of these new procedures. Will transitional measures be in place to enable the new system to bed in while the existing system carries on working?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No, I do not believe that there will. As I say, this system is being operated and introduced by the European Union, so we have limited say in whether there should be transitional arrangements. Having said that, I do not think that the start date has been made public yet. I know there is a target start date, but I would imagine that there is no obligation to start on the date that has already been published if things are not yet ready.

Police: Joe Anderson

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 15th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I do not agree with that. It depends very much on the complexity of the individual investigation. As I have said, the Merseyside police have confirmed that they intend to conclude it as expeditiously as possible. Beyond that, I can go no further.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, it is fitting that we are discussing police conduct today, 35 years, almost to the hour, since the Hillsborough disaster that killed 97 people. Today, the Labour Party has confirmed that it would introduce a Hillsborough law to ensure public authority accountability. Does the Minister agree that there is much more that we can do to achieve justice for those killed and to ensure that such a disaster never happens again?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I join the noble Lord in honouring those who died, of course; 35 years have passed since the tragedy and the impact continues to be devastating for many. The families have my sympathy. The families of the 97 have shown tremendous courage and determination and obviously their loved ones will not be forgotten. In his Statement to the other place on 6 December, the Lord Chancellor committed to a debate later this year on the Government’s response to the Bishop Jones report. It would be unwise of me to pre-empt that debate, so I shall say no more at this point.

Asylum Claims

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 25th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have to say to the noble Lord that his question is best directed to the MoD, but he will know that it is also an ongoing discussion we are still having in the context of the Bill.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, can the Minister update the House on returns agreements with safe countries? In particular, I am thinking of Egypt, as well as other safe Middle Eastern countries.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, I am afraid that is rather outside this department’s remit, but I will endeavour to find out the current status and come back to the noble Lord.

Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Amendment of List of Safe States) Regulations 2024

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Tuesday 19th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, these regulations mark a step towards the implementation of the few parts of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 that have come into force since it received Royal Assent. The key sections on the duty to detain and remove asylum seekers arriving by small boat, among other provisions, have apparently been accepted as unworkable by the Government, at least for the time being.

The current list of safe countries of origin from which it is expected that, in general, people will not have grounds for asylum in the UK is set out in Section 80AA of the 2002 Act, as amended by Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act, as was explained by the Minister. Historically, during the time in which the UK was part of the EU, the designation of safe countries of origin applied mostly to other EU and European Economic Area member states. Those countries remain on the list, with the more recent addition of Albania, and with Georgia and India now marking the first significant expansion of that list beyond the EU and the EEA.

We support these changes in principle, notwithstanding a few important questions. It is right that the Government go into some detail about how these changes would work in practice and how Indian and Georgian nationals, who under exceptional circumstances face harm or death, can still seek refuge in our country. The grant rate for Indian asylum seekers has stayed at under 10% in recent years, but for Georgia it has swayed between 15% and 30%. I understand that there are fewer applications from Georgia in numerical terms, but it would be useful to hear from the Minister how those successful applications translate into appropriate cases of exceptional circumstances in the future.

There is little detail on how exceptional circumstances would apply. The example tests for exceptional circumstances set out in the 2002 Act will not apply to India and only one—the ECHR test—will apply to Georgia. The Government have stated to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee that guidance will be published to caseworkers in due course. Do the Government mean to say that the guidance does not currently exist? How are decisions made now, before that guidance is in place?

As others, including the noble Lord, Lord German, have pointed out, given that the Home Office’s own policy notes on India speak of the existence of serious human rights abuses, including rape, torture and death—and, for Georgia, they note politically motivated prosecutions —it is vital that discretion can be exercised for individuals in those countries in appropriate circumstances.

I hope that the Minister can outline today how this guidance will work, whether it will be in place when these regulations come into force and whether it will be published. Can he also outline what is being done to improve returns rates for both Indian and Georgian nationals? The UK has migration returns agreements with both countries, but the current returns rate of Indian nationals seeking asylum stood at less than 7% in the year to September 2022. Can he outline what the returns rate is so far for Georgia, given that it has been a year since the bilateral returns agreement was signed? Depending on his answer to that question, and given the low rate of Indian national returns, can he outline what the Government are doing to improve returns rates for both countries? Finally, can he say how the introduction of this list impacts outstanding claims? Will it apply simply to new claims, or will it be retrospective? I look forward to his replies.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this relatively short debate. These regulations, by themselves, do not introduce a new process or policy. It is not for us to debate today the safe country of origin inadmissibility provisions; those provisions have been a long-standing part of our asylum laws and have been expanded via the Illegal Migration Act 2023. These regulations seek to expand this list further to incorporate Georgia and India as generally safe. I acknowledge that, in considering whether it is appropriate to do so, questions have been asked today about how the list will be used.

The inadmissibility of asylum and human rights claims from nationals of safe countries aims to deter abuse of our asylum system from those who would seek to abuse it and do not need to seek protection in the UK. It will reduce pressure on the asylum system and allow us to focus on those most in need of protection. Treating asylum claims from EU nationals in this way is not new: it has been a long-standing process in the UK asylum system that is also employed by EU states. But EU states are not the only countries that are safe countries; therefore, it is right that these provisions have been expanded through the Illegal Migration Act 2023.

Once commenced, Section 59 of the 2023 Act introduces the new Section 80AA(1) safe countries of origin list, so that these provisions would apply not only to EU nationals but, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, to those from the other EEA states of Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, as well as Switzerland and Albania.

For a country to be added to the list of safe countries of origin, it must be assessed as safe as per the criteria set out in the new Section 80AA(3) of the 2002 Act, as inserted by Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act. The test sets out that a country may be added to the list if

“(a) there is in general … no serious risk of persecution”

there for nationals of that country,

“and (b) removal … of nationals of that”

country

“will not in general contravene the United Kingdom’s obligations under the”

European Convention on Human Rights.

We do not draw conclusions on the general safety of a country based on information from single sources or isolated examples. Whether a country is safe for the purposes of inclusion in Section 80AA(1) is an assessment of whether the country in general is considered safe. Our assessments of the situation in the respective countries are set out in the relevant country policy and information notes, which I will come back to in more detail. Those are available on the GOV.UK website and are kept under constant review and updated periodically.

Strikes (Minimum Service Levels: Fire and Rescue Services) (England) Regulations 2024

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Tuesday 19th March 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument and join him in paying tribute to all those who work in this area.

As the Minister said, on 8 February this year, the Government published their minimum service levels for fire and rescue services in England. These new laws will restrict the ability of firefighters and emergency control staff to take lawful strike action. We believe that the new laws are unnecessary. The FBU has always negotiated a major incidents agreement with fire employers before national strikes. Last year, collective bargaining between the FBU and fire employers meant that there were no fire strikes. An acceptable pay agreement was reached and endorsed by the firefighters.

The minimum service level regulations state that fire and rescue control rooms must function during industrial action as if it were a non-strike day. All calls have to be answered, assessed and a response mobilised. Requiring the same standards as a non-strike day is in effect a ban on control staff taking industrial action, despite repeated assurances that it is not a strike ban.

The regulations for minimum service levels of firefighting functions dictate that 73% of appliances usually deployable on a non-strike day must be deployable on days when industrial action is taking place. My noble friend Lord Hendy gave the example of his local fire station, which has three appliances, so it is in effect a strike ban on that station. How many firefighters will be forced to work if a work notice is issued? What is to stop chief fire officers abusing the work notice and forcing all firefighters to work? Ministers have failed to explain how work notices will affect retained firefighters since retained firefighters cannot be compelled to work on strike days; I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on that.

The minimum service level regulations state that national resilience assets, such as high-volume pumps, must be capable of being deployed as if the strike were not taking place that day. This is in effect a strike ban for firefighters deployed on national resilience assets. I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on that.

Ministers claim that these laws are needed because the Army no longer provides cover. The last time the Army was deployed during fire strikes was in 2003. After the coalition Government attacked firefighters’ pensions between 2010 and 2015, the FBU organised 50 separate firefighter strikes in England. The FBU has always signed a major incident agreement with fire employers before national strikes, with provisions to recall firefighters in the event of a major emergency.

Government guidance makes it clear that the liability for work notices lies with fire authorities. Fire employers in England are rightly unhappy with these regulations. Many will not impose work notices because of the impact on industrial relations. Fire Ministers in Scotland and Northern Ireland have refused to implement these laws. It is unclear how these regulations can or will be applied in operation. It is a risk, both legal and reputational, on fire service employers who choose to issue work notices.

The guidance is clear that it is not statutory and that, ultimately, the courts will interpret the law. This places a risk on employers that is compounded by the additional difficulties that are unique to the fire and rescue service. Failure to comply with these unworkable measures exposes individual firefighters to the risk of the sack, while the FBU could also face financial penalties.

The regulations before us today are an example of the Government’s failed approach to industrial relations. No one wishes to see the public disrupted by industrial action. We all wish to see minimum standards of service in our public services but these regulations will not achieve what the Government want them to. They will poison relations when what is needed is a constructive working agreement between management and unions. The Labour Party opposes attacks on working people’s freedoms. That is why we would repeal the 2023 Act and why we oppose the regulations before us today.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for all the contributions to this relatively short debate. As I outlined in my opening remarks, the Government believe that these regulations are vital to ensure that there is sufficient cover to respond to fire and rescue-related emergencies on strike days. They will help protect the public and provide people who call 999 with reassurance that firefighters will be able to respond quickly to reduce the risk to life and property. Fires can spread quickly and present a serious threat to life and limb; it is vital that such services are available to the public during strike action. Demand for fire and rescue services fluctuates depending on the season, weather patterns and the time of day. As we saw in the tragic fire at Grenfell, without warning, fire can quickly spread, develop into a major incident and cause an unspeakable tragedy that will devastate a community.

I want to be clear that fire and rescue services perform a critical role in our society. It is only right that they respond to incidents that could pose an immediate risk to the public. I say to all noble Lords that we of course recognise the importance of the ability to strike, which is protected by law. We are striving to maintain a balance between the ability of workers to strike and the rights of the public to access the emergency services when they need them.

The noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Twycross, emphasised that we are challenging the right to strike. I stress again that we are not banning the ability to strike. These regulations focus on maintaining fire and rescue services’ capacity to respond to emergency incidents that posed an immediate risk to the public. Fire and rescue services will be able temporarily to suspend more routine duties that they would normally carry out if such action were not taking place.

West Midlands Combined Authority (Transfer of Police and Crime Commissioner Functions) Order 2024

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 13th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we on this side of the House consistently support directly elected mayors. We also support them having police and crime powers when boundaries make this appropriate. However, it is not a remarkable point to make that we also believe that, first, the Government should act within the rules set out for them and by them; secondly, that local leaders should be brought along with any proposed changes; and, thirdly, that due and democratic processes should be respected and that consultations should be entered into in good faith, with the intention of listening and reporting back to Parliament in a transparent manner.

It is right that the Government explain not only the initial oversight in terms of the statutory duty but the manner in which the consultation took place. I request that the Government outline how they plan to make this right with local leaders in the region to make it clear to everyone where they now stand, and what will happen to regain the confidence of the people of the West Midlands. Will the Minister commit to further consultation? More widely, and with more regulations to come, I ask the Minister to outline how he will ensure that this approach will not be repeated.

Proper devolution demands that the Government work with local communities and bring on widespread support to produce outcomes that are right for their areas. It also demands that government acts effectively across departments when issues cross Whitehall boundaries. How will the Government ensure that this is done in future?

Of course, we will support my noble friend. He gave a devastating speech when he introduced his amendment. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. I will do my best to address as many of the points that have been raised as possible.

It is worth recognising the support from the Government and the Opposition in the other place for the policy of enabling more directly elected mayors to exercise PCC functions, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, just noted. As I outlined in my opening remarks, the exercise of PCC functions by the Mayor of the West Midlands will be a significant step forward to realising the Government’s ambitions, as set out in the levelling up White Paper, for more combined authority mayors to take on PCC functions, as is already the case in Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire, and will be the case in York and North Yorkshire from this May. We have also introduced a draft order to achieve this outcome in South Yorkshire.

It is the Government’s view that bringing public safety functions under the leadership of a combined authority mayor, where it is possible to do so, has the potential to offer wider levers and a more joined-up approach to preventing crime. It places the PCC model and functions at the heart of a wider set of responsibilities for improving public services, exercised by an individual who will be directly answerable to the community that will elect them. It not only preserves the democratic accountability that underpins the PCC model but with an expanded role for the mayor comes a higher public profile, increased visibility and a greater ability to bring about local change.

The fundamental aim of the order is to incorporate the PCC model within the role of the mayor, maintaining the core principles of governance and accountability. The Government want to seize the opportunity to bring together in one elected role the responsibility for public safety and local regeneration for the people of the West Midlands.

In areas where there is a PCC and a mayor, both elected separately by the same constituency, it can confuse democratic mandates and create barriers to joined-up delivery across a range of public services for those communities. The statistics the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, cited do not take into account local circumstances and, therefore, comparisons have limited utility. None of this means that the West Midlands could not still be safer and have less crime under the new proposed system. Incorporating the PCC functions in the office of mayor creates an opportunity to clarify and enhance the mandate of that elected individual to make a greater impact across a range of public services.

As I set out in my introductory speech, the Home Office ran a public consultation on the proposal to transfer the PCC functions. The purpose of the consultation was to provide the Home Secretary with information to help his decision on whether to proceed with the legislation before us now. While the numbers for and against the transfer were taken into account by the Home Secretary, the most helpful aspect of the consultation, for the purposes of making the decision, was the information provided in the responses. The Home Secretary’s decision was informed, but not bound by, the responses to the consultation. In making his decision, the Home Secretary also had regard to information concerning the statutory tests and duties relevant to his decision. Ultimately, the Home Secretary is satisfied that the making of this order meets the statutory tests required of him. I say to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that this was not a referendum. He took note of all the information and made his decision; the information is not binding.

The Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, specifically Section 62, has come up. That amended the consent requirements for the transfer of PCC functions to existing combined authority mayors and, instead of the previously required consent of the mayor, the constituent authorities and the combined authority, only the consent of the existing mayor is required to make an order enabling the transfer of the functions. This was decided by Parliament.

The Government have been clear that the PCC functions may transfer to a mayor only at the point of a mayoral election; this ensures that mayors are elected on the basis that they will be exercising PCC functions, maintaining the democratic principles of the PCC model. If this legislation is approved by both Houses, both the incumbent mayor and the PCC would complete their existing terms of office, and on 2 May the West Midlands electorate will select a mayor on the basis of them exercising PCC functions, providing them with a democratic mandate. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, asserted that Mr Street will be the PCC, and I sincerely hope the noble Lord is right, but he will have to make his case to the electorate and they will determine “who is mates with who”, to quote—I forget who.

It may already be known to this House—I think the noble Lord, Lord Bach, referred to it—that the judicial review launched by the West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner on the public consultation and subsequent decision to transfer the PCC functions to the mayor was heard by the courts yesterday. Judgment will be reserved until next week, so I cannot prejudice those ongoing proceedings, but the Government strongly defended the claim made by the PCC. We are confident that the public consultation was robust and the Home Secretary’s decision to enable the transfer was lawful.

Regarding the extent to which this transfer upholds democracy, the Government have always been clear that PCC functions can transfer to a mayor only at the point of the mayoral elections, as I have just said. The way this order enables the transfer is no different; the first mayor to exercise the functions will not do so until the May 2024 elections have taken place and they have taken office—I believe on 7 May. The West Midlands electorate still has the ability to decide who they wish to see exercise these PCC functions. The Mayor of the West Midlands will be elected in May on the basis of exercising those.

A number of noble Lords raised concerns that a mayor may—I use the word “may” carefully—appoint a deputy mayor to support them in the exercise of the PCC functions. It was argued that this might be a dilution of the mandate and accountability of the role. At this point, I note that the current PCC has appointed two assistant PCCs. Mayors who exercise PCC functions can appoint a deputy mayor for policing and crime, but this is something that PCCs may also do, as I have just said. The ability to appoint a deputy does not shield mayors from scrutiny at the ballot box; the mayor will be held to account for the performance of a deputy they may appoint to support them. Also, not all PCC functions can be delegated to the deputy PCC; by statute, certain key strategic functions, such as the issuing of the police and crime plan, the appointment and suspension of a chief constable, and calculation of a budget requirement, may exercised only by the mayor themself.

All noble Lords noted the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee report on this order, and the concerns raised in that report. I know the committee has written to the Policing Minister and the Permanent Secretary to express its concerns. I understand that both the Minister and Permanent Secretary have responded to those letters. The committee raised concerns about what it considered to be the “selective reporting” within the Explanatory Memorandum that accompanies this order, and I know that the Policing Minister has responded to address these concerns directly. But I would like to make it clear that the Explanatory Memorandum did not deliberately withhold information in any sort of attempt to selectively report the responses to the consultation and the views of stakeholders. As is best practice, the documents clearly outline the views raised as part of the consultation process, both in support of the transfer and those that raised concerns. The document also signposts readers to the Government’s response to the consultation, which has been published on GOV.UK. It goes into further detail on the concerns raised by respondents to the consultation and the Government’s response to those concerns.

As regards to the timing of the order, raised by the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Sahota, I would like to address those points, particularly in relation to the Gould principle of electoral management, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Sahota. Where possible, government aims to ensure that any legislative changes to elections are introduced at least six months in advance of those elections, to give all those involved appropriate notice. In the case of the West Midlands, government was not able to lay the order six months in advance of the May 2024 elections. Every step has been taken to lay as early as possible, and I know officials have been closely engaged with partners in the West Midlands Combined Authority and the office of the PCC throughout the process, to keep them informed as much as possible. I hope noble Lords will support the order, so we can get one step closer to providing clarity to the local area, and enable it to deliver orderly elections in May. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, noted, as long as that is done by 21 March, all is in order.

A question has been raised about why the Home Secretary took the original decision to proceed with the transfer before the statutory requirements were met. As soon as the Home Secretary became aware of the statutory requirements of the 2023 Act, he launched a public consultation and made it clear that he would retake his decision after he had had due regard to the responses and after he had considered whether the making of the order would meet the statutory tests. The order was therefore not laid before Parliament until the Home Secretary was satisfied that the statutory requirements of the 2023 Act had been met. I hope I have dealt with the key points that have been raised. Again, I thank all those who participated. I beg to move.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Report stage
Wednesday 6th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, said that the Government were making tough decisions by their current policy to make a deterrent. I think that was the gist of the argument she used. As I have said in previous debates, I sit as a magistrate and occasionally I am put in the situation of having to make a decision on somebody’s age. It is usually a very unfortunate circumstance, but it is something I am sometimes called to do. In answer to the noble Baroness’s point, what we want to do on this side of the House is make accurate determinations so that the right decision is made, which defends our reputation as a country which observes domestic and international law and does the best for the children we find in our care. That is the purpose of these amendments, and I support my noble friend on Amendment 34.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. Amendment 34, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, would mean that when a decision is made to remove someone to Rwanda under the Illegal Migration Act 2023, Section 57 of that Act would not apply if there was a decision on age.

Ukrainians: Visas and Further Support

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 4th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord raises a very good point. Of course, it is not for this Government to judge the certainty of conflict situations, which are very difficult to manage. However, I have no doubt that the Government will do whatever is necessary to maintain the current sanctuary that this country proudly offers.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I too pay tribute to all the families who have taken Ukrainians into their homes. Under the new changes to the Ukraine family scheme, unaccompanied children will no longer be able to join their parents in Britain automatically. Does the Minister think that restricting family rights at a time when Ukrainian troops are under heavy fire in Donetsk sends the right message to the people of Ukraine about our willingness to stand by them?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I rather regret the tone of that question if I am honest. Ultimately, of course we would like to see families reunited in a safe Ukraine. The UK’s Ukraine schemes are not family reunification pathways. They are designed to provide temporary sanctuary in the UK for Ukrainians fleeing war. Ukrainian nationals who would have qualified under the Ukraine family scheme will still be able to apply under Homes for Ukraine. The Home Secretary will obviously consider any compelling and compassionate grounds that are presented on a case-by-case basis; for example, where families will be separated from young children. Plenty of routes still exist for family reunification in the UK, even though, as I said earlier, they are not reunification pathways.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Report stage
Monday 4th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I wonder whether the Minister would care to comment on whether he agrees with the analysis from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, of the status of this Bill we are debating. The noble Lord said it was inconceivable that there would be any refoulement and that it is okay to proceed without the various recommendations in place. In the longer term, they would need to be in place—because it was in the longer term, I think, that he was suggesting that there might be justification in the suspicions that have been raised. I think that was the point the noble Lord was making.

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for tabling these amendments and for his constructive communication before doing so. In Committee there was clear interest in developing a mechanism to ensure that the terms of the treaty are and continue to be adhered to. I hope the House will see that there is value in how he has integrated these ideas into these amendments. Amendments 4 and 7 together provide a clear framework for ensuring the ongoing safety of Rwanda, rooted in the terms of the treaty the Government have negotiated. I will not say any more, because the noble and learned Lord set out the terms of his amendments very clearly.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. The partnership between the UK and Rwanda is rooted in a shared commitment to develop new ways of managing flows of irregular migration by promoting durable solutions, thereby breaking the existing incentives that result in people embarking on perilous journeys to the UK. We saw again only last week how perilous those journeys are, as my noble friend Lord Hodgson noted. The UK and Rwanda share a vision on the need for the global community to provide better international protection for asylum seekers and refugees, emphasising the importance of effective and functioning systems and safeguards that provide protection to those in most need.

Noble Lords will know that Rwanda has a long history of supporting and integrating asylum seekers and refugees in the region, for example through its work with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to host the emergency transit mechanism. It has also been internationally recognised for its general safety and stability, strong governance, low corruption and gender equality. My noble friend Lord Hodgson noted this, and my noble friend Lady Meyer gave her very welcome perspective on her recent visit. I say gently to the noble Lord, Lord German, that I heard a great deal in her comments about structures and systems.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, has explained, these amendments seek to allow Parliament to deem Rwanda to be safe only so long as the arrangements provided for in the Rwanda treaty have been fully implemented and are being adhered to in practice. The UK Government and the Government of Rwanda have agreed and begun to implement assurances and commitments to strengthen Rwanda’s asylum system. In advance of agreeing the treaty, we worked with the Government of Rwanda to respond to the findings of the courts by evidencing Rwanda’s existing asylum procedures and practice in standard operating procedures relating to and reflecting the current refugee status determination and appeals process.

Amendment 7 imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to obtain a statement from the independent monitoring committee confirming that the objectives specified in Article 2 of the treaty have been secured. This is unnecessary; the Government will ratify the treaty in the UK only once we agree with Rwanda that all necessary implementation is in place for both countries to comply with the obligations under the treaty. We have assurances from the Government of Rwanda that the implementation of all measures in the treaty will be expedited, and we continue to work with the Rwandans on this. The legislation required for Rwanda to ratify the treaty passed the lower house of the Rwandan Parliament on 28 February and it will now go to the upper house, as my noble friend Lord Murray noted in the debate on the previous group. Once ratified, the treaty will become law in Rwanda. It follows that the Government of Rwanda would then be required to give effect to the terms of the treaty in accordance with its domestic law as well as international law.

The Bill’s provisions come into force when the treaty enters into force. The treaty enters into force when the parties have completed their internal procedures. These amendments therefore confuse the process for implementing the treaty with what is required for the Bill’s provisions to come into force. The Bill builds on the treaty between the UK and the Government of Rwanda signed on 5 December 2023. It reflects the strength of the Government of Rwanda’s protections and commitments given in the treaty to people transferred to Rwanda in accordance with the treaty. Alongside the evidence of changes in Rwanda since summer 2022, published this January, the treaty will enable Parliament to conclude that Rwanda is safe and the Bill provides Parliament with the opportunity to do so. I say to my noble friend Lord Deben that that is the truth.

Shamima Begum

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Tuesday 27th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am grateful that the noble Baroness brought up SIAC—the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. It ruled that the legislation should be construed as requiring the Secretary of State to seek prior representations from an individual, but that in Begum’s case the failure to do so did not change the outcome or invalidate the deprivation decision. The Court of Appeal has ruled that, in fact, the legislation does not require the Secretary of State to seek representations prior to making a deprivation decision. I take the noble Baroness’s point, but SIAC’s ruling was clear.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I wish to ask about the counter-extremism strategy. One in five people arrested for terrorism-related offences are now under 18, up from one in 25 in 2019. That is a worrying trend. The Government have failed to update their counter-extremism strategy for eight years now. Will they now commit to updating that cross-governmental strategy, with particular focus on preventing extremism in young people?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, we discussed that subject at some length last week, when talking about anti-Semitism, and of course the situation has evolved somewhat since then. I take the noble Lord’s points, but refer to some of the things that have been done and put in place by the Government on youth engagement and schools and education. For now, I will take his points back to the Home Office, but I cannot update him further.

Knife Crime: Violence Reduction Units

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Tuesday 20th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes, again, the noble Baroness raises a very good point. She is right, of course, that London has particular problems in this area. The activities of certain violence reduction units have absolutely influenced the way that the whole programme has been established across England and Wales—and indeed taking a lot of the lead from Scotland.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, knife crime is up by 70% since 2015 and, according to the YMCA, youth services were cut by 71% in the decade after 2010. Does the noble Lord think these two statistics are linked? Does he also believe that, building on the work of the VRUs, local youth services should be introduced and backed in a way to try to prevent further knife crime?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

On the noble Lord’s latter point, I agree, which is one of the reasons the Home Office has invested £200 million in the youth endowment fund, to which I have already referred. As regards knife crime across the country, the rise is driven largely by the situation in London. For police-recorded offences involving knives or sharp instruments, there was a 5% increase year-on-year nationally, but the increase in London was 22%. If London was taken out of those figures, the natural trend would be a 1% reduction.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this group is concerned with members of specific social groups. I welcome the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton: the Government have repeatedly put forward plans in legislation which appear to ignore the very real danger posed to members of certain social groups, including LGBT+ people, in many countries around the world including Rwanda. It again raises the issue of refoulement and the danger it poses; my noble friend Lord Coaker has already spoken about refoulement and has tabled amendments that would address this concern.

I also welcome the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Dubs and spoken to by my noble friend Lord Cashman who, alongside Humanists UK, has pointed out the dangers posed to the religious minorities or those who have no religion in Rwanda.

This group has been interesting. It has been a relatively short debate but has focused on the core issues raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti about the false dichotomy between individuals and groups in general. I think it was my noble and learned friend who said that the effect of the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord would be that the Minister is not tied to the Government’s stated view that Rwanda is a safe country; rather, it would be for the courts to decide that in individual cases where, for example, someone may be gay.

Surely involving our courts in the decision-making process goes to the very heart of the absurdity of the Government making a blanket decision that Rwanda is a safe country. It is doing no more than dipping our toe into the court system by asking it to review individuals who are particularly vulnerable. The amendment is not in any way driving a coach and horses through the legislation; it is trying to reflect concerns for vulnerable individuals through well-established practices within our courts. We support it.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, as we have previously set out, the purpose of the Bill is to stop the boats and end the perilous journeys being made across the channel as it is the busiest shipping lane in the world. These journeys are overwhelmingly made by young, fit men in search of better job opportunities, who are travelling from a safe country. Males represented 88% of small boat arrivals in the year ending September 2023. This is a similar proportion as each year from 2018 to 2021.

Since January 2018, 75% of small boat arrivals have been adult males aged 18 and over. We need a strong deterrent to stop illegal migration and measures to prevent removals being frustrated; we have therefore taken bold steps. However, to ensure that we are meeting our international obligations, Clause 4 provides that a Home Office decision-maker or a court or tribunal can consider a claim that Rwanda is unsafe based on compelling evidence relating specifically to a person’s individual circumstances.

As the Government have set out, since the partnership was announced, UK officials have worked closely with the Government of Rwanda to ensure that individuals relocated under the agreement will be safe and that their rights will be protected. The Government’s legal position, published on 11 December 2023, further sets out that the treaty, and the evidence pack, provide for compliance with the Government’s substantive obligations under international law. Therefore, no one will be removed to Rwanda if they face a real risk of serious and irreversible harm.

I turn to Amendments 38, 40, 43, 45 and 51 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and Amendment 41 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, as spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. These proposed amendments to Clause 4 would undermine one of the principles that the Bill is seeking to address; namely, to limit the challenges that can be brought against the general safety of Rwanda, even with the signed treaty and updated evidence presented by the Government.

The legislation is clear and affords the appropriate safeguards to ensure that decision makers make a decision about the particular circumstances of each case. The Bill already allows decision-makers and the courts to consider certain claims that Rwanda is unsafe for an individual person due to their particular circumstances, despite the safeguards in the treaty, if there is compelling evidence to that effect.

I of course entirely understand the desire of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, to get clarity and certainty on this issue. For people who identify as LGBT+, that consideration would include any assessment of any compelling evidence reviewed in line with the principles outlined in HJ (Iran)—as referenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—that being LGBT+ would mean that Rwanda was not safe for them in their particular circumstances.

As in all cases under the provisions of the Bill, individuals will be given the opportunity to provide that compelling evidence that they would be at risk in their particular circumstances if they were relocated to Rwanda. That would include any alleged harm as a result of an individual’s gender or sexuality. As I say, any such claims would be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and in the case of LGBT+ claims, that would include any assessment in line with the principles outlined in HJ (Iran).

I make it clear that the Rwandan penal code does not punish homosexuality or relations between people of the same sex. The constitution of Rwanda includes a broad prohibition of discrimination and does not criminalise or discriminate against sexual orientation in law or policy. As regards the FCDO advice, which I was asked about, paragraphs 173 and 174 of the policy statement deal with this, stating:

“As experts on the bilateral relationship between the UK and Rwanda and its development over the past thirty years, FCDO officials based in the relevant geographic and thematic departments working closely with colleagues in the British High Commission in Kigali have liaised with the Home Office throughout the production of this Policy Statement … Information drawn from their institutional expertise as to the in-country situation in Rwanda, and Rwanda’s history of compliance with its international obligations is reflected as appropriate throughout”.


The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, raised concerns about the unequal treatment of women in Rwanda during Monday’s debate. The Rwanda country report refers to the National Commission for Human Rights, or NCHR, which is a constitutional commission provided for by the Rwandan constitution. The NCHR is made up of seven commissioners. Each of them has a specific area of focus, including the rights of women. There is a commissioner who is a focal person for or who is in charge of those rights.

The country report concludes that the general treatment of women is good. Women and children’s rights, among those the NCHR monitors, have seen an improvement since the creation of the NCHR. That is reflected in the laws and the constitution, which provides for specific groups’ rights; for example, women, children, and the disabled. The situation is the same for women as for those who are disabled. They are allowed to be elected, and at each administrative level at least 30% of representatives have to be women. In Parliament, more than 60% of representatives are women; the current Rwandan cabinet is 50% women, and five out of the seven commissioners in the NCHR are women.

Women’s rights are respected in every area. Although the NCHR receives some complaints about rights to property, Rwandan family law was amended to allow women to inherit from parents in 1999. The country information note also refers to the police response to victims of gender-based violence and the Gender Monitoring Office, which considers specific issues relating to gender-based violence. The National Women’s Council is represented from village level and at every level above and is a channel for sharing information on anything regarding gender-based violence. It is the responsibility of local leaders to ensure that there are no gender-based violence issues in their area of control. Police monitor what is going on; they can investigate and come up with a report or action.

Furthermore, the rule of law index, which ranks countries on indicators including equal treatment and the absence of discrimination, ranks Rwanda 26th out of 142 countries worldwide and first out of 34 countries in the region. That is a measure of whether individuals are free from discrimination—based on socioeconomic status, gender, ethnicity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation or gender identity—with respect to public services, employment, court proceedings and the justice system. I add that the 2022 US State Department human rights practices report on Rwanda noted:

“Women have the same legal status and are entitled to the same rights as men, including under family, labor, nationality, and inheritance laws. … The law requires equal pay for equal work and prohibits discrimination in hiring decisions”.


As I indicated at the start, this clause provides the foundations for the Bill as a whole; it is fundamental to the effective operation of the scheme, and the amendments put forward would serve only to weaken its effectiveness. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this group has been about children. We spoke at length during the passage of the then Illegal Migration Bill about the danger posed to children by the changes in that legislation. To open, I have a couple of questions for the Government. Can the Government give an update on the number of children who have previously been identified as adults but have later been identified as children? How many of them would have been on the list to be moved to Rwanda had the scheme been working?

It is clear that the asylum system is failing, and failing vulnerable children. Beyond the risk of children being sent to Rwanda before their age has been identified, there have been ongoing reports about missing children, children exposed to assault, and children waiting potentially years for a decision on their protections claims. Given this, how can we trust the Government to make the correct decisions for children when it comes to Rwanda?

My noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett said that it was cruel for children who come in under the age of 18 and live here for a number of years to be sent to Rwanda when they get to 18. She rightly said that this provides an incentive for children to disappear when they know that birth date is arriving. The noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, talked about the age-old issue of age assessment. I know that very well because, as a youth magistrate, one of the first bits of training I did was on age assessment. Despite all the processes which are rightly in place, sometimes you are bounced into making those decisions, both as an adult magistrate and as a youth magistrate. I am very conscious of the difficulty in making those decisions. I think it was last week that somebody referred to Luke Littler, the darts player, and how he does not look like a 16 year-old boy.

All noble Lords have set out the case very well, and I will not go over the same points that they have raised. I will raise a different point, which I have raised in previous debates. This arises out of a trip with my noble friend Lord Coaker to RAF Manston about a year ago, facilitated by the noble Lord, Lord Murray. At that trip, it became evident to me from talking to the officials there that there is a reasonably large cohort of young people who identify as adults. I have debated this with the Minister—the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe—before, and he has written me a letter about it. They identify as adults because they want to work when they get here. They may well have been working in their own countries since they were about 14 years old. They identify as adults, they may look like adults, and they move into an economy—maybe an underground economy—because they want to work. It seems to me that by having the provisions within the Bill, they will have no incentive to identify as an adult. That will be taken away from them. They would prefer to identify as a youth. Have the Government made any assessment of the increase in people likely to identify as youths when they are coming irregularly into the country? I suspect it is not an insignificant figure and that it is actually quite a large figure.

Nevertheless, this is a very important group of amendments, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate, which, as we have heard, brings us on to the relocation of unaccompanied children and the subject of age assessments.

Amendment 54 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, would reinstate the statutory duty to consult the independent family returns panel in circumstances where we would seek to remove families with children under 18, who fall within the remit of the Illegal Migration Act, to the Republic of Rwanda. This amendment would effectively undo Parliament’s previously agreed position in relation to the removal of families to Rwanda, taking them out of line with those being removed to any other destination, either a safe third country or their home country where it is safe to do so.

I reassure noble Lords that the welfare of a family will continue to be at the forefront of decisions to detain and remove them, regardless of the proposed destination, and we remain in open dialogue with the independent family returns panel about the role that it will have in the removal of families under the Illegal Migration Act.

The intended effect of Amendment 55 is not clear, as the Bill is an additional legislative provision that will apply to removals under the 2023 Act. However, I consider that the amendment is intended to mean that when a decision is made to remove someone under the 2023 Act to Rwanda, Section 57 of the 2023 Act will not apply if there is a decision on age.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for Amendment 76, which inserts a new clause on age assessments. The intended effect of this amendment is that when a decision is made to relocate someone to Rwanda under the Illegal Migration Act 2023, Section 57 of that Act will not apply if there is an outstanding decision on age. It also seeks to prevent the removal of an age-disputed person from the UK to Rwanda if they are awaiting an age assessment decision under Sections 50 or 51 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 or have received a negative decision under these sections and are awaiting a final determination of either an appeal under Section 54 of the 2022 Act or a judicial review application.

It is important that the Government take steps to deter adults from claiming to be children, and to avoid lengthy legal challenges to age assessment decisions preventing the removal of those who have been assessed to be adults. Assessing age is inherently difficult, as all noble Lords have noted. However, it is crucial that we disincentivise adults from knowingly misrepresenting themselves as children. Receiving care and services reserved for children also incurs costs and reduces accessibility of these services for genuine children who need them.

Accordingly, Section 57(2) of the 2023 Act disapplies the yet to be commenced right of appeal for age assessments that was established in Section 54 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, for those who meet the four conditions in Section 2 of the 2023 Act. Instead, under Section 57(4) of the 2023 Act, those wishing to challenge a decision on age will be able to do so through judicial review, which will not suspend removal and can continue from outside the UK after they have been removed.

Section 57(5) of the 2023 Act also provides the basis on which a court can consider a decision relating to a person’s age in judicial review proceedings for those who meet the four conditions in Section 2 of the 2023 Act. It provides that a court can grant relief only on the basis that it was wrong in law and must not on the basis that it was wrong as a matter of fact, distinguishing from the position of the Supreme Court in the 2009 judgment in R (A) v Croydon London Borough Council, UKSC 8. The intention is to ensure that the court cannot make its own determination on age, which should properly be reserved for those qualified and trained to assess age, but instead consider a decision on age only on conventional judicial review principles.

In the scenario whereby the Home Office has doubts over a person’s age, they would not be subject to the duty to remove until such time as a final decision on age has been made by the relevant authority referred to in Section 57(6) of the 2023 Act. We consider that those provisions are entirely necessary to safeguard genuine children and guard against those who seek to game the system by purporting to be adults. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me whether we have looked into the opposite. The honest answer is that I do not know, but I will find out and come back to him if we make any assessment of that.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, in this Bill we are discussing many of the same issues we discussed during the passage of the Illegal Migration Bill. Given the importance of the issues that were raised and the strength of the arguments, it is unfortunate that we are here, not even a year later, asking the Government to ensure protections for vulnerable people, children, those trafficked or sold into slavery and those who have proven themselves friends and allies of our country in Afghanistan in the face of great personal danger. It is disappointing that the Government did not listen on that previous occasion and I hope the Minister has listened to the arguments put forward by noble Lords in Committee today and will respond fully to those concerns.

As the noble Lord, Lord Randall, said, this has essentially been a debate about exceptions. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, introduced her amendments about exceptions for those who may be victims under the Modern Slavery Act and, as she pointed out, there is a process to go through to make those sorts of assessments. She talked about, first, the referral, then the reasonable grounds submission and the final positive grounds submission. As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said, the whole purpose of that Act, an Act which the whole of Parliament is proud of, introduced in 2017, is to stop double victims, and that is one category of people who, we argue, through the amendments, should be exempt from the provisions of the Bill.

My noble friend Lord Browne, in his Amendment 75, gave particular focus to this when he gave those open-source examples of three Afghans who arrived irregularly here on UK shores and who face deportation to Rwanda. His amendments seek to make an exception for those cases as well. I have to say that I think my noble friend’s amendment should be very difficult for the Back Benches of the party opposite to resist. I thought the contribution from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, was particularly supportive when he said that the number one objective is to be seen as a trustworthy country.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Horam, because he was the noble Lord who most clearly articulated the purpose of the Bill as drafted. He said that there needs to be a sharpness and narrowness of definition to achieve the ends and facilitate the removals of people to Rwanda. That was a very clear statement of what is indeed the object of the Bill, but we are talking here about exceptions, about people who may be victims of modern slavery or may have served our country in Afghanistan or elsewhere. The power of the debate is where the moral authority lies. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, made an interesting point. Of course, he is a loyal member of his own party, but he urged the Minister to look for alternative ways to achieve the same ends, and I will listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say to that challenge.

I conclude by saying that this has been an extraordinary debate. It goes to the very heart of what our country stands for. It is about integrity, about moral authority and about the rule of law and how our rule of law is viewed by other countries, which are probably watching our debate as we are having it right now. It is in that spirit that I will listen very carefully to the answer of the Minister.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this very thoughtful debate. I reassure noble Lords that my noble and learned friend and I have paid very close attention to all the points that have been made.

As we have heard, these amendments relate to the position of potential and confirmed victims of modern slavery, and exempting people from being relocated to Rwanda, including those who have supported His Majesty’s Armed Forces or the UK Government overseas in certain circumstances.

Of course, we greatly value the contribution of those who have supported us and our Armed Forces overseas, and we have accepted our moral obligation. That is why there are legal routes for them to come to the UK. For example, all those who enlist and serve in His Majesty’s Armed Forces are exempt from immigration control until they are discharged from regular service. After that, non-UK HM Armed Forces personnel can apply for settlement under the Immigration Rules on discharge, when their exemption from immigration control ends. There are also provisions for family members of HM Armed Forces personnel to come to the UK legally. Anyone eligible for the Afghan relocations and assistance policy and Afghan citizens resettlement scheme should apply to come to the UK legally under those routes. As regards the specific case of British Council personnel, they are qualified under the third pathway of the ACRS and places are offered to them. To correct the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, these are not Home Office-run programmes, they are run by the MoD and the Foreign Office.

I have no doubt that, with regard to Amendment 75, the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, would agree with me that we need to deter people from making dangerous and unnecessary journeys to the UK. A person who arrives in the UK illegally should not be able to make the UK their home and eventually settle here. Regardless of the contribution they have previously made, a person who chooses to come to the UK illegally, particularly if they have a safe and legal route available to them, should be liable for removal to a safe country. Having said that, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, know that service- men are a subject of considerable personal importance to me. If they have any particular instances of personnel struggling to access one of those safe and legal routes, I ask them to raise them with me directly.

Computer Systems: Independent Testing

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend raises a very good point. If I may, I will look into the specifics of her question and write to her.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Article 40 of the French criminal procedure code provides for cybersecurity specialists who are acting in good faith and solely in the national interest to be protected from prosecution. Does the Minister believe that a similar provision would be suitable here?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, we are always interested in learning from the approaches taken by other countries and jurisdictions. We speak with our international counterparts, including all our major allies, to understand how they approach the issue of whether there should be defences to these types of offences. But the majority of our like-minded partners do not have statutory defences and are instead in favour of prosecutorial guidance. For example, the US Department of Justice introduced guidance for prosecutors on when to prosecute instances of potential breaches of its Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support the introduction of the Government’s amendments. I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said about the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and I look forward to the Government’s response on that point.

I would also be interested to hear what the Government have to say about my noble friend Lord West’s amendments. He has taken a keen interest in this part of the Bill, and I hope the Government will be able to answer the questions, in particular on data disclosure powers, as I think they can give a more detailed response to the expansion of disclosure powers to regulatory bodies than was given in the original legislation. It is also very likely to be further analysed and looked at as the Bill moves down to the other end of the Corridor. Nevertheless, we support the amendments as they are currently.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for this short debate and the scrutiny on these important issues. First, I will address Amendments 15 and 16 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, which seek to remove Clause 13 and the Schedule from the Bill. We have covered some of the same ground as we did in Committee, and I am afraid that much of my response will make similar points to those I made then. However, I can appreciate why he has raised the points he made about these provisions, and I hope that I can still provide him with assurance on why these measures are needed and proportionate.

As the Government have been clear, the purpose of Clause 13 is to ensure that bodies with regulatory or supervisory functions are not inhibited from performing the roles expected of them by Parliament. It restores their pre-existing statutory powers to acquire CD in support of those functions. When the IPA was passed in 2016—under the expert stewardship of the noble Lord’s fellow ISC member in the other place, the right honourable Member for South Holland and The Deepings—it made specific provision, at Section 61(7)(f) and (j) respectively, for the acquisition of CD for the purposes of taxation and oversight of financial services, markets and financial stability. The noble Lord and his fellow committee members have queried whether we are “unmaking” these measures in the 2016 Act through Clause 13 of the Bill. I would therefore like to put beyond doubt what has happened since then to lead us to this point of needing to refine rather than unmake these provisions.

Following the Tele2 and Watson judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2016, the Government took the opportunity to streamline the statute book, including but not limited to some changes in response to that judgment. This streamlining included the removal of the regulatory provisions contained in the IPA because, at that time, those public authorities with regulatory or supervisory functions were able to acquire the data they needed using their own information-gathering powers, and Section 12 of the IPA had not yet been commenced, removing many of those powers. The relevant data was outside of the provisions of the IPA at this time and therefore not considered to come within the definition of CD.

Since then, businesses have operated their services more and more online. This has meant that many have become, in part at least, telecommunications operators as defined by the IPA. As a consequence, growing amounts of the data that they collect—which regulatory and supervisory bodies would have previously been able to access using their own information-gathering powers—now fall within the IPA’s definition of CD. The effect of this is that public authorities are increasingly unable to acquire the CD that they need to perform their statutory civil or regulatory functions.

In summary, the IPA has been changed since it was commenced in 2016 to remove tax-related and financial stability-related powers to acquire CD and to introduce the serious crime threshold. Technology and society have moved on, with the result that more relevant data amounts to CD. Section 12 of the IPA has been commenced to remove general information powers. The combination of these changes has meant that public authorities are experiencing increased difficulty in carrying out their statutory functions. For example, the Financial Conduct Authority, His Majesty’s Revenue & Customs and the Treasury are all examples of public authorities that already have the power to acquire CD using a Part 3 request but that may be unable to do so in the exercise of some of their functions as a result of the issue I have just set out.

These bodies perform a range of vital statutory functions using CD, including tackling breaches of sanctions regimes, enforcing the minimum wage and providing oversight of banking and financial markets. Schedule 4 to the IPA provides a list of public authorities that can acquire CD under Part 3 of the Act. The new definition of public authorities inserted by this clause will apply in the context of the sharing of CD between public authorities. This will include government departments and their arm’s-length bodies, and executive agencies administering public services. While data sharing between government entities is covered under other legislation including the Data Protection Act and GDPR, or under separate data-sharing agreements, its sharing for legitimate purposes should not be discouraged or prevented by the IPA.

Clause 13 is needed to ensure that such bodies can continue to fulfil these existing statutory duties in the context of a world that takes place increasingly online. It strikes an appropriate balance between necessity and proportionality. In particular, I re-emphasise that it makes clear that the acquisition by these regulatory bodies should be only in support of their civil and regulatory functions, and not used in support of criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, the Government have retained the serious crime threshold that applies when acquiring CD for the purposes of a criminal prosecution.

The codes of practice will also provide additional safeguards and clarity on how this should work in practice. The Government published these in draft ahead of Committee to illustrate this. Any changes to the existing codes will be subject to statutory consultation before being made and will require approval from Parliament under the affirmative procedure. I am therefore confident that the changes will be subject to a high level of scrutiny. To be clear, this applies to a limited cadre of public authorities with the necessary statutory powers conferred on them by Parliament and only specifically when in support of regulatory and supervisory functions—it is not creating a way to circumvent the safeguards in the IPA. It ensures that the acquisition routes and associated strong oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner are reserved for those areas where it is most essential and has the most serious potential consequences in terms of criminal prosecutions.

I am happy to provide the reassurance—or I hope I am—that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, sought. I am grateful to him for his comments regarding government Amendment 14, for engaging with officials to work through the concerns they raised and for his generous comments about the officials.

Our view is that the amended Clause 12 will be narrower in scope than the original drafting, which carried a risk of permitting access beyond the “who” and “where” of an entity. I assure noble Lords that the codes of practice will set out the further safeguards and details on the practical effect of Clause 12 so that operational partners are clear on the lawful basis of CD acquisition. It is appropriate that the technical detail is set out in this way rather than in primary legislation. The codes of practice will be subject to a full public consultation and will be laid in Parliament under cover of an SI, via the affirmative procedure. I reassure the noble Lord that we will consult with partners and the regulators of the IPA to ensure that the high standards of the CD acquisition regime remain world leading. I am happy to continue this conversation, and for my officials to continue with the extensive engagement already undertaken with the users of the CD powers, to see whether any further refinement is needed.

Finally, I confirm that the intention behind the amendment is to include the type of subscriber data that is necessary to register for, or maintain access to, an online account or telecommunication service. Examples of such data would include name, address and email address. It is not intended to include all types of data that an individual might give a telecommunication service that is not necessary for the purpose of maintaining or initiating access to that service.

I turn to Amendments 17, 19 and 20 on internet connection records, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord West. Much of the argument I have heard relies on a perception that the new condition D is inherently more intrusive than the existing conditions B and C. I will set out why this is not the case.

The safeguards for the new condition D replicate the well-established and extensive safeguards already in place for CD authorisations. The authorisation process for CD varies according to the purpose for which the data is being sought and the type of CD to be acquired. This regime works effectively and has been considered by the Court of Appeal and found to be lawful.

The purpose of new condition D is to enable ICRs to be used for target detection, which is currently not possible under existing Part 3 authorisations. The level of appropriate oversight and safeguards is linked to the sensitivity of the data to be disclosed and the impact that disclosure may have on the subject of interest.

As I have said, the Government do not believe that condition D is inherently more intrusive than conditions B or C. Conditions B and C authorise “target development” work, and as such enable the applicant to request data on a known individual’s internet connections. As an example, this means that the NCA could request records of the connections a known subject of interest has made in a given time period, provided that request was judged to be both necessary and proportionate by the Office for Communications Data Authorisations. In comparison, condition A enables the requesting agency to request who or what device has made a specific connection to an internet service.

Similarly, condition D would enable an agency to request details about who has used one or more specified internet services in a specified timeframe, provided it was necessary and proportionate—for example, accessing a website that solely provides child sexual abuse imagery. The actual data returned with condition D will most likely constitute a list of IP addresses or customer names and addresses. No information concerning any wider browsing that those individuals may have conducted will be provided. Information about that wider activity would be available only under a further condition B or C authorisation. Condition D is therefore no more intrusive than conditions B and C in terms of what data is actually disclosed. As such, we see no benefit or logic to imposing a different authorisation route for condition D when the existing safeguards have proven sufficient in terms of ICRs applications under conditions A, B and C.

I use this opportunity to remind all noble Lords of the importance of this new condition D and how it will support investigations into some of the most serious crimes, as well as supporting the critical work against both state and cyber threats. ICRs could be used to detect foreign state cyber activity. For examples, ICRs could be used to illuminate connections between overseas state actors and likely compromised UK infra- structure. We understand that these actors have an intent to target UK-based individuals and organisations, including government and critical national infrastructure, from within UK infrastructure, which we typically would not see. The ICR data returned from TOs would be highly indicative of the extent of malicious infrastructure and could assist with victim exposure. Furthermore, improved access to ICR data would enable the National Cyber Security Centre to detect such activity more effectively and in turn inform incident management and victims of compromises. Using data to flag suspicious behaviour in this way can lead to action to protect potential UK victims of foreign espionage and attacks.

I now turn specifically to the ability of the intelligence agencies and the NCA to internally authorise condition D applications. The intelligence agencies and the NCA must obtain approval from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for ICR applications for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, other than in urgent circumstances. In urgent circumstances, such as threat to life or serious harm to an individual, the intelligence agencies and the NCA are able to obtain CD authorisations from internal designated senior officers in the same way that police forces are. In practice, the volumes of non-urgent requests are such that the IPC delegates responsibility for the authorisation of ICR and other CD requests to the OCDA.

In terms of oversight, the IPC could, if he wished to, consider specific types of CD authorisations himself. The IPC also has the power to directly inspect any part of the CD regime. If he wishes to focus attention on condition D applications, he has the necessary powers to do so. The approach we have adopted for condition D authorisations is therefore consistent with the wider CD regime and gives the IPC flexibility in how he exercises his powers and resources.

As is also consistent with the wider CD regime, condition D applications relating to national security will be authorised by a designated senior officer within the intelligence agencies. The CD codes of practice state that the designated senior officer must be independent of the operation and not in the line management chain of the applicant. This independence is declared within each application, and each designated senior officer completes training prior to taking up this role. Furthermore, each agency has one or more single point of contact officer, accredited by the Home Office and the College of Policing, who facilitates lawful acquisition of CD.

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2024

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Tuesday 16th January 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we too welcome the amendments in this instrument. I will start with two specific questions and then make some more general comments.

First, beyond adding the specific substances which the Minister referred to in his speech and in the document, what more are the Government doing to address the risks posed to our communities from drugs more generally? The second question is about a particular drug, xylazine, a non-opioid veterinary anaesthetic that is being used in combination with synthetic opioids to devastating effect. I understand that the Minister for Crime wrote to the ACMD in June to ask it to consider the harms of this drug and that he is still waiting for a response. How long should the Minister for Crime expect to wait before he gets either action or a response to his letter about this drug?

Those are my two particular questions. More generally, I want to use the same structure as the noble Lord, Lord Allan. The first question he asked was about monitoring the prevalence and usage of synthetic opioids. As I mentioned in other speeches, including in the King’s Speech debate, I travelled to North America in the summer and went to Portland, Oregon. I also went to Seattle in Washington state. I was shocked by the amount of drug use on the streets. I saw hundreds if not thousands of people sleeping rough on the streets of those two cities. I saw people shooting up in front of me in the middle of those cities—and I had young children with me. It was a truly shocking sight.

While I was there, I visited a court that dealt with drug issues. I also had breakfast with a district attorney who is an elected prosecutor. We spoke about the way their current drug policy is working. What was interesting and depressing to me was the uniform agreement across the political spectrum that it was a disaster, yet they did not agree on the solution to that disaster; there was an ongoing political debate on it. The district attorney also said to me—it is relevant to this debate—that there is a strong suspicion, or belief, that synthetic opioids are getting into prescribed drugs. He told me that he had gone on holiday to Mexico but had forgotten some of his normal prescription drugs, so he had to go and buy the drugs while in Mexico. He became aware that synthetic opioids are illegitimately getting into prescribed drugs. This is a very worrying development; it is all over the internet in that part of the world. It is something that we should be aware of as a possible problem over here as well. It really is a huge issue. I am sure that the Minister is aware of it, but it would be good to hear what is being done to monitor the scale of this problem, which is potentially coming our way.

The second point made by the noble Lord, Lord Allan, was about treatment services and more drugs being brought into scope. I am quite worried about the experiments being carried out in Glasgow. I suppose that would be a good question for the Minister to answer: what monitoring are the UK Government doing on the experiments being done around drug treatment centres in Glasgow? I will leave it there.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. I take on board the personal experience of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in the States; his observations are obviously extremely interesting. Perhaps it is worth pointing out that just under half of all drug poisoning deaths registered in this country in 2022 already involved an opiate of some sort. The noble Lord made some acute points; of course, the Government remain aware of the situation overseas and continue to monitor that as much as they monitor the situation here.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me a specific question about xylazine. The ACMD is independent, so I cannot comment on its timeframes, but we are hoping for its response on this particular drug in early 2024. Obviously, we will come back to this as and when we have its response.

The noble Lord, Lord Allan, asked about monitoring and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, backed that up. As I said, UK agencies are highly alert to the threat from synthetic drugs, including synthetic opioids such as fentanyl as well as synthetic cannabinoids and benzo- diazepines, which have been linked to drug-related deaths in this country. Along with law enforcement partners, the UK Government stand ready to respond to the threat from synthetic drugs. They have established a cross-government task force to monitor that threat and to lead and co-ordinate the government response to the risk from these synthetic opioids in the UK. The aim of the task force is to consider evidence-based policy; programmatic and legislative decisions in response to the level of risk; and the nature of synthetic opioids. Members of the task force include the Home Office, the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities, the Ministry of Justice, the National Crime Agency, HM Prison and Probation Service, Border Force and the police.

Through the UK’s drugs strategy, which was published in December 2021, we are implementing an end-to-end plan to disrupt the supply of all drugs at every stage of the supply chain from a source to the street. As part of that strategy, we have provided additional resources to the international networks of the NCA and the Home Office in key source and transit countries; this is for them to work with other Governments in identifying and disrupting cartels that seek to exploit the UK, as well as to seize drugs before and during their journey to the UK and the EU.

Also outlined in the strategy, we have increased the availability of naloxone, including naloxone nasal spray, to prevent drug-related deaths, and have committed to supporting local provision of a broader range of medicines, including newer medicines such as long-acting buprenorphine injection. We believe firmly in the importance of engaging with experts and delivery partners to respond swiftly to the evidence of emerging drug threats, including learning from international partners through international fora such as the US-led Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

On the health situation that was brought up by both noble Lords, FRANK, the Government’s free drugs advice service, contains information on synthetic opioids, synthetic cannabinoids and benzodiazepines, which will be updated to reflect the changes when this legislation comes into force. The Department for Education has also worked with the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities to make sure that good-quality teaching resources are available for teachers providing drug, alcohol and tobacco education, and lesson plans on drugs, alcohol and tobacco are available on the PSHE Association website.

We are of course concerned that banning these substances will discourage people from access to treatment services, but the Government’s drugs strategy, From Harm to Hope, published in December 2021, is clear about the Government’s ambition to achieve stigma-free treatment, providing the full, positive impact of treatment services for those seeking help. But, noting the potential harms associated with misuse of these substances, we believe it is necessary to take action to restrict access to these drugs and reduce their misuse. Through the drugs strategy, we are investing more than £2.8 billion over three years to support people through treatment and recovery, which includes support for those who have used a range of drugs and suffered various health harms.

Of course, key to all this is reducing the demand for drugs. We are committed to reversing the rising trend of drug use in society, to protect vulnerable people from harm and exploitation. It enables us to keep our communities safe and we must therefore reduce the demand for drugs, which fuel violence and exploitative criminal markets. Around 3 million people in England and Wales report using drugs each year, putting themselves at risk and driving a violent and exploitative supply chain, including through so-called recreational drug use. Through programmes announced as part of the drugs strategy, such as drug testing on arrest, and our plans to roll out pilots to change behaviour and attitudes towards drug use, we will provide the powers and access to appropriate interventions and support. We also know that we need to step up action in addressing the visible forms of drug use within our communities, so we will work with our enforcement partners to see what more we can do to tackle this, while ensuring that those who need treatment and support are diverted into the appropriate services.

The noble Lord, Lord Allan, asked a very specific question about remimazolam. There are no known established legitimate uses for any of these substances except remimazolam. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that that in particular remains available for legitimate and lawful purposes, so in line with the recommendations from the ACMD, remimazolam will be placed in part 1 of Schedule 4 to the 2001 regulations, as I said in my opening remarks. That will enable lawful access in healthcare settings, subject to the requirements of the 2001 regulations. The remaining 19 substances will be placed in Schedule 1, as I mentioned, and access will therefore be permitted only under a Home Office-controlled drug licence. That will ensure that organisations can still lawfully undertake research with these substances, should they choose to do so.

On the specific question about paramedics, that is a Department for Health situation: it would have to request that paramedics be able to prescribe or use this drug in the appropriate way. I hope that answers the questions that I have been asked and, again, I thank both noble Lords for their participation in this debate. These are dangerous substances with the potential to cause significant harm, and they should therefore be subject to the strict controls under the 1971 Act. With that, I commend this order to the Committee.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I specifically asked about the Glasgow drug consumption rooms and whether there is a UK oversight of the way they are operating, rather than just a Scottish Government oversight.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

With apologies, I forgot that question and, as it happens, I also do not know the answer—so I will have to find out and write to the noble Lord.

Refugees: Homelessness

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 13th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes, I think so, because the refugee will have been processed under a legacy asylum case and will therefore have been in that accommodation for a very long time—over a year. They would have had ample time to learn English and embed themselves to some extent into British society. An extra month is perfectly generous.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, some of those in Home Office asylum care will be under 18. How confident is the Minister that none of those under-18s will ever be made homeless and that they will find their way into some form of social care provided by local authorities?

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Committee stage
Monday 11th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the three previous speakers in the short debate on this group. There are no opposition amendments in it, so I shall set out some more general questions that arise out of the amendments spoken to.

Why have the Government brought forward the widening powers to obtain communications data when the original Bill did the opposite? Can the Government provide an exhaustive list of the bodies that will be able to use these communications data collection powers? Why are they not in the Bill or the Explanatory Notes? Giving bodies such powers during any criminal investigation appears out of step with the rest of the Bill, which covers investigatory powers for national security or serious crime reasons. Why is this power so broad as to cover any criminal investigation? Given that the double lock exists for most of the powers in the Bill, why have the Government given wide-ranging powers for intelligence authorities and the NCA to self-authorise accessing internet connection records while undertaking subject discovery work? How does this compare to the powers for conditions A, B and C, which cover access to ICRs, for more restrictive purposes? Finally, what will the role of the IPC and the ISC be in monitoring how the new powers are used?

I was particularly interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said when he was commenting on the two other speakers in this short group. I, too, will listen with great interest to what the Minister has to say on this, but this is all done in the spirit of exploration, as my noble friend Lord Coaker said. I look forward to the Minister's comments.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this group. I will first speak to Amendment 20, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which would amend Clause 11. I want first to make it clear that Clause 11 does not enable any new activity under the Investigatory Powers Act but places into primary legislation the existing position set out at paragraph 15.11 of the Communications Data Code of Practice.

Paragraph 15.11 clearly sets out that it is not an offence to obtain communications data where it is made publicly or commercially available by the telecommunications operator or postal operator or otherwise, where that body freely consents to its disclosure. In such circumstances, the consent of the operator provides the lawful authority for the obtaining of the data on which public authorities can rely. Making this position explicit within primary legislation will provide clarity that acquiring communications data in this way will amount to lawful authority for the purposes of the offence in Section 11. As such, there will be no doubt that acquiring communications data in this way means that an offence will not be committed in such circumstances.

The purpose of new subsection (3A)(e) is not permitting so-called surveillance, as the noble Lord’s amendment asserts. Rather, it is about clarifying the basis for lawful access to material which has already been published and should not require additional authority for its disclosure by a telecommunications operator, with the consent of that operator, to a public authority. I can assure noble Lords that telecommunications and postal operators will still need to satisfy themselves that any communications data disclosure is in accordance with the Data Protection Act, and any subsequent processing by public authorities must also be compliant.

The inclusion of this paragraph in the definition of “lawful authority” in the IPA will provide reassurance to public authorities on the basis for which they have lawful authority to acquire communications data where this authority falls outside the IPA itself. Inserting a definition of lawful authority does not remove the offence of knowing or recklessly obtaining communications data without lawful authority; it is still possible to commit this offence if the disclosure by the telecommunications operator is not lawful or if the public authority knowingly or recklessly acquires the communications data without lawful authority. The inclusion of this definition of lawful authority will encourage public authorities to ensure that they have lawful authority before they acquire communications data. I therefore respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

I turn to Clause 13 and the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord West, to remove this provision and the associated schedule from the Bill. The purpose of Clause 13 is to ensure that bodies with regulatory or supervisory functions are not inhibited in performing the roles expected of them by Parliament. It restores their important pre-existing statutory powers to acquire communications data in support of those functions. When the IPA was passed in 2016, it made specific provision, at Section 61(7)(f) and (j), for acquisition of communications data for the purposes of taxation and oversight of financial services, markets and financial stability.

As a result of the Tele2 and Watson judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2016, a number of changes were then made to the IPA. Crucially, not all the changes made at that time were a direct response to the judgment itself, but instead the opportunity was taken to streamline the statute book. This included the removal of the regulatory provisions contained in the IPA because, at that time, those public authorities with regulatory or supervisory functions were able to acquire the data they needed using their own information-gathering powers. At that point, much of the relevant data fell outside the definition of communications data and therefore outside the provisions of the IPA. However, as businesses increasingly move their services online, so many have become, in part at least, telecommunications operators under the definition in the IPA. Therefore, more of the data they collect, and which regulatory and supervisory bodies would have previously been able to access using their own information-gathering powers, now falls within the IPA’s definition of communications data, and regulatory and supervisory bodies are, inadvertently, unable to acquire it.

The Financial Conduct Authority, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Border Force are all examples of public authorities in Schedule 4 to the IPA and already have the power to acquire communications data using a Part 3 request. However, many of the matters that these bodies regulate or supervise fall short of serious crime, as defined in the Investigatory Powers Act at both Section 263(1) and Section 86(2A), which means that they are unable to acquire a Part 3 authorisation to get the data they need to perform the statutory functions expected of them.

The UK is not alone on this issue; European colleagues have identified similar issues for their equivalent bodies with regulatory and supervisory functions. The functions these bodies perform on behalf of the UK are simply too important to let this situation continue. They go to the heart of our safety in preventing terrorist funding, seeking to ensure financial stability, and the oversight of banking and financial markets, among other matters. For example, the Financial Conduct Authority has responsibility for supervising some 50,000 regulated firms to ensure they have systems and controls in place concerning the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017. Border Force has the responsibility of quickly identifying from the huge volumes of packages crossing our borders each day, those that may contain illegal items such as drugs, firearms and other illicit goods that present a risk to the UK. It is vitally important that these bodies are not inhibited in carrying out their core functions because of the way the world has changed since 2016.

The changes to the IPA brought about by Clause 13 strike an appropriate balance between necessity and proportionality, making clear as it does that the acquisition by these regulatory bodies should only be in support of their civil functions and not used in support of criminal prosecutions. Additional safeguards are provided for within codes of practice governing how this should work in practice. To be clear, this applies to a relatively small cadre of public authorities in support of specific regulatory and supervisory functions; it is not creating a way to circumvent the safeguards of the IPA. It instead ensures that the acquisition routes and associated strong oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner are reserved for those areas where it is most essential.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will briefly speak to the five amendments in this group in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker. Amendments 35 and 37 would introduce a double-lock process to notices given under the notification of proposed changes to telecommunications services, bringing it in line with the procedure for the three existing types of notices that can be issued to telecommunications operators. Amendment 36 would add a further factor that the Secretary of State must consider when deciding to give a notice under this section, bringing this type of notice into line with the three existing types of notices that can be issued to telecommunications operators. Amendments 38 and 39, along with the others in my noble friend’s name, would introduce a potential double-lock process to the variation of notices given under the notification of proposed changes to telecommunications services, bringing it in line with the procedure for variation of the three existing types of notices that can be issued to telecommunications operators.

In introducing this group, the noble Lord, Lord Fox, set out very comprehensively the concerns of the various tech companies. I have read the same briefings that he has. He was right to see this as an opportunity for the Minister to address those concerns.

I have a few questions arising out of these amendments. First, why have the Government not included a double-lock structure of approval to this new type of notice, given that the three other types of notices that telecom companies can be issued have the same structure, along with many of the provisions in this Bill and the IPA? Further, why does it not have the same review structure as the other notices? What will companies be able to do to challenge this decision? New Section 258A states that companies must respond within “a reasonable time”. What would the Government consider a reasonable time to be in this regard? What assessment has been made of what other companies are doing to ensure they are aware of changes that would potentially impact national security? Finally, can the Government be more specific about the types of changes that would be considered relevant for this new notification of the proposed changes?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, once again, I thank noble Lords for their amendments and the points they have raised in this debate. I will do my very best to answer the questions that have been asked. Again, I am afraid I am going to do so in some detail.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, has proposed removing Clause 16 from the Bill in its entirety. Clause 16 concerns the extraterritorial enforcement of retention notices. Under subsections (9) to (11) of Section 255 of the IPA, any technical capability notice—TCN—is already enforceable by civil proceedings against a person in the UK. Only TCNs that provide for interception and targeted communications data acquisition capabilities are enforceable against a person overseas. Section 95 of the IPA also provides that a data retention notice—DRN—is enforceable by civil proceedings against a person in the UK. DRNs already have extraterritorial applicability within the IPA, meaning that they can already be given to a person outside the UK. However, unlike TCNs, the current legislation does not permit the enforcement of a DRN against a person outside the UK.

Clause 16 therefore seeks to amend Sections 95 and 97 of the IPA to allow extraterritorial enforcement of DRNs to strengthen policy options and the legal levers available when addressing emerging technology, bringing them in line with TCNs. As technology advances, data is increasingly held overseas. The clause will ensure that, if required, there is a further legal lever to protect and maintain investigatory powers capabilities overseas. This will ensure that law enforcement and the intelligence agencies have access to the communications-related data that they need to tackle serious crime and protect national security. It will also ensure consistency across the regime.

Asylum Seekers: Deportation from France

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 4th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I think it would be wise for me to restate what the Prime Minister has said, which is that he is taking

“the extraordinary step of introducing emergency legislation”.

He made that point on 15 November. He went on to say that he does not believe that

“anyone thinks the founding aim of the European Convention on Human Rights was to stop a sovereign Parliament removing illegal migrants to a country deemed to be safe in Parliamentary statute and binding international law. I do not believe we are alone in that interpretation”.

So I say to my noble friend that I look forward to informed discussion on the recent French decision.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I have a simple question for the Minister: have either the new Home Secretary or the new Foreign Secretary met the French Interior Minister?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid I do not know.

Windrush Generation

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Tuesday 28th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I said in my earlier answer, and as stated by the former Home Secretary following the final meeting of the Windrush working group, we are proud of what has been achieved so far but our commitment does not end here. We will continue with unwavering focus to see further improvements so that all those affected receive compensation. I hope it will reassure my noble friend to know that, in its last meeting, there were productive discussions on topics such as an update on future engagement and outreach with the Windrush community. Since February 2023, the Windrush compensation scheme engagement team has attended more than 19 events nationwide, including in the West Midlands, Bristol, Nottinghamshire, Yorkshire, Lancashire, Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire, Bedfordshire and London. I hope that gives my noble friend some of the reassurance he seeks.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, how many have actually received compensation, how many are waiting for compensation and how many have died while waiting for it? What is the time estimate for clearing the backlog?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, as of September 2023, over £71 million has been paid across 1,932 claims. Over 75% of claims have received a final decision. As I mentioned in an earlier answer, the time to allocate a claim for substantive casework consideration has dropped from 18 months to under five months. To be clear, that five-month period includes all essential eligibility checks and a preliminary assessment to make an initial payment of £10,000 wherever possible. I will have to write to the noble Lord on his more detailed questions.

Justification Decision (Scientific Age Imaging) Regulations 2023

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 27th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will discard most of my speech because all the points I was going to make have been made articulately. We will support the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, if she chooses to test the opinion of the House and I thank her for the thoroughness with which she introduced her amendment to the Motion. I agree with her that this SI is not yet ready to be put on the statute book.

The Minister set out the figures, which have been repeated a number of times as the debate has progressed. A number of questions were put to him about the issue of consent, the state of the European Convention on Human Rights, and answering the questions put by the Children’s Commissioner and other bodies which have expressed their extreme concern about the measures being put forward by the Government.

The noble Lord, Lord Murray, just intervened, giving examples of European countries which do some form of tested age assessment. However, this is of course a contested area in many European countries; we are not unique in this being a politically contested issue.

Noble Lords also made a point about the review mechanism that the Government propose to put in place so that, as this progresses—if indeed it does progress—the Government can keep an open mind about how effective it is and whether further changes in assessment methods need to be made. However, I want to conclude on a different point which no other noble Lord has made, and to talk slightly wider than the SIs themselves.

Last May, with my noble friend Lord Coaker, I visited the old RAF Manston airfield and the landing site, Western Jet Foil, in Dover harbour. I repeat my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Murray, for facilitating that visit. What became apparent to me then is that all the political debate, including today’s debate, is about the vast majority of young men who are potentially claiming to be under 18, and the impact that has on them. That is the totality of the political debate. However, there is another group of young men, which was drawn to my attention, who appear to the officials to be under 18 but are claiming to be adults. They are doing that because they want to work, either legally or illegally. Many of them will have started working in their home countries when they were 14, and they will have had a few years work under their belt and are coming here to better their prospects.

What tracking is there of those young men? I have raised this issue with the noble Lord, Lord Murray, and as far as I am aware, there is no tracking of them. Whether they are more likely to abscond once they go into the adult system or whether the Home Office tracks them at all, it is a significant, not an insignificant cohort. It was drawn to my attention when I made that visit and I will be very interested to hear the noble Lord’s answer, maybe by letter, on how those young men are tracked.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this interesting and insightful debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her regret amendment, which I will obviously refute, because the introduction of scientific methods of age assessment is an innovative approach for the UK. It is entirely right that the Government take action to disincentivise individuals from deliberately misrepresenting their age in order to game the system, as well as to safeguard and promote the welfare of genuine children, who have a need to access children’s services. Scientific methods provide additional evidence and create a more consistent system, and there is nothing inhumane about those objectives. I hope that noble Lords will consider each regulation on its merits, and I will do my best to answer all the questions. If I miss any, I will endeavour to write.

The question of accuracy has come up. Determining the age of a young person is an inherently difficult task. The Home Office is aware that there is no current single age-assessment method, scientific or not, that can determine an individual’s age with precision. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord German, there is a risk of harm to both the age-disputed individual and to the public interest through misclassifying children as adults, or adults as children, which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, referred to—I will come back to this. That is why the UK Government are taking steps to improve the robustness of the age-assessment process. Scientific age assessment will be completed alongside the current Merton-compliant age assessment, and the age-assessment process will remain a holistic assessment. The well-being of the individual will continue to be at the forefront. I am happy to say categorically to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, that scientific methods will not replace, but will be used alongside, Merton. The noble Lord, Lord Winston, asked me how accurate these methods are. For X-rays, I do not know—I will find out—but for teeth X-rays it is two years either side. I will come back to this in more detail in a second.

On international comparators, to which my noble friend referred, the Home Office believes that the negative credibility inference in respect of someone’s claimed age is necessary, logical and proportionate where a person refuses to undergo a scientific age assessment without good reason. It is important to note that negative consequences, such as automatic assumptions, are applied with variations by a number of ECHR signatories, including the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The UK is an outlier as one of the very few European countries that do not currently employ scientific methods such as X-rays as part of age assessments.

On our plans for operationalisation, the Home Office wants to specify these methods as soon as possible to pave the way for the introduction of scientific age assessments. The increasing number of age-disputed young people presents safeguarding challenges and puts additional pressure on children’s services, which should be accessed only by genuine children. This is a new and complex process that the Government need to get right. The full plans for integrating scientific age assessments into the existing processes will be set out in good time, and full guidance and assessments will be provided. For now, the Home Office has welcomed the report from the Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee and is making clear steps to proceed with the recommendations and consider others.

Consent was raised by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Lister, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London. To address the concerns regarding consent, I assure all that no X-ray or MRI image can or will be taken without informed consent from the individual. The Home Office will ensure that the individual has capacity, fully understands the process and is communicated to in a child-friendly and clear way. Interpreters will be available to assist with understanding information, and documents will be translated into a language the individual understands. If the individual refuses to consent to a scientific age assessment, they will continue to proceed with the current Merton-compliant age assessment. Those who are clearly children will be identified as part of the initial age assessment and not included in the cohort for an age assessment.

It is the Home Office’s policy to refer individuals for an age assessment only when there is some doubt about their age—specifically, where that individual’s physical appearance and demeanour do not very strongly suggest that they are significantly over 18. This threshold is set purposefully high to ensure that individuals can be given the benefit of the doubt. As a result, only those whose ages are in genuine doubt would be referred for this scientific age assessment.

Pakistan: Evacuation of Afghans

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Thursday 9th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, in response to the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban, the UK rightfully offered resettlement to those who had shown support and loyalty to British aims. For many who have made it here—some have come in small boats—this means being put into hotels and potentially facing homelessness. Reportedly, others who have been granted resettlement in Britain are stuck in Pakistan, facing deportation back into the hands of the Taliban. I have a number of questions for the Minister. Why have there been such delays in settling people under the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme? Has he confirmed whether any of those about to be expelled from Pakistan to Afghanistan are eligible for the ACRS? What assurances has he received from the Pakistani Government that those eligible for the ACRS will be allowed to remain in Pakistan until chartered flights can be completed? Finally, what measures is he taking to ensure that our asylum backlog is cleared and that suitable accommodation is secured for those applicants?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

The noble Lord is right: the Government have reacted decisively and swiftly to relocate people to safety in the United Kingdom following the collapse of Afghanistan the year before last. The Government remain committed to relocating eligible Afghans and their families under the ARAP scheme and the ACRS—we continue to honour this promise. The Government’s policy was to ensure that eligible Afghan families had secured accommodation in the UK before travel was facilitated for their relocation but, as a result of changing conditions on the ground, we are changing that policy. The Ministry of Defence has worked hard to stand up a total of over 700 service family accommodations for mixed purposes, or transitory and settled accommodation. I pay tribute to my friend in the other place, the Minister for Armed Forces, for his work on this. Our new plans will see approximately 2,800 ARAP-entitled personnel move from Pakistan to the UK by the end of December 2023.

The answer to the question on deportations is: not as far as we are aware. On conversations with the authorities in Pakistan, the British high commission is obviously monitoring the situation closely and is in frequent contact with the Pakistani authorities to ensure that no eligible ARAP or ACRS individuals are negatively affected while they await relocation to the UK—we are seeking assurances to that effect. On 27 October, the Foreign Secretary received assurances from Foreign Minister Jilani that they would be safe.

The noble Lord asked about the backlog. We referred to this in the humble Address debate yesterday to some extent. I will not go over old ground but, as he knows, we have increased the recruitment of decision-makers and committed to dealing with the backlog by the end of the year.

Metropolitan Police: Operational Independence

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Thursday 9th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the Home Secretary’s article in today’s Times newspaper brands the Metropolitan Police as biased over pro-Palestinian protests, and she reportedly refused to tone down her article at the request of the Prime Minister’s office. It is extremely unusual for the Prime Minister’s official spokesman to say that the article was not cleared by their office and air their dirty washing in public. Does the Minister believe that the Metropolitan Police is biased? Does he believe that the Home Secretary’s article breaks the policing protocol? Does it constitute improper political interference? Does the Minister agree with me that the police must be given proper support to facilitate remembrance events, to continue to provide protection and reassurance to communities facing the threats of hate and extremism, and to maintain order at peaceful protests? Stoking division and undermining the police will not achieve these ends.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord has raised operational independence—in effect, therefore, the policing protocol—and I shall go into that in some detail. The police are operationally independent, but the concept of operational independence is not defined by statute. However, it remains a fundamental principle of British policing. The Policing Protocol Order 2023 sets out how the various actors in the system—the Home Secretary, PCCs, mayors with PCC functions and chief constables—should exercise their roles and responsibilities. It seeks to clarify the operational independence of chief constables, noting that operational decisions on the deployment of police officers are matters for chief constables. The order also makes it clear that:

“The Home Secretary is ultimately accountable to Parliament and charged with ensuring the maintenance of the King’s Peace within all force areas, safeguarding the public and protecting our national borders and security”.


There are no plans to change the policing protocol; that is incredibly clear. I of course agree with the noble Lord that protecting our communities and keeping them safe should be the primary responsibility of the police, and it is incumbent on all of us to give them the support they need. However, we must also acknowledge that operational independence does not provide a blanket exemption from criticism about broader policing issues.

Sir Edward Heath: Operation Conifer

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Tuesday 24th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I have said repeatedly, I of course understand my noble friend’s concerns. But the fact is that the Government are of the opinion that the original investigation has been scrutinised to a very high degree and that no further government action is therefore necessary.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government have made it clear that they do not propose to have an investigation into the allegations against the former Prime Minister. However, there is a wider question which remains, which is how the wider system allowed Mike Veale to continue within policing and the wider policing family, despite two separate sets of allegations against him. There are also questions about the accountability of our PCCs and how they dealt with that particular situation. Does the Minister think there is a case for looking at the way disciplinary actions are expedited and sometimes abused, to maintain the public’s faith in the police force and the PCCs?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I would say to the noble Lord that of course we have arrived at a situation where Mr Veale has been held to account, so the public should therefore have faith. It perhaps took too long, but he was appropriately investigated along the way. In November 2017, the PCC in Wiltshire referred two matters concerning Mr Veale to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The investigation related partly to an allegation that a mobile belonging to Wiltshire police was deliberately damaged. He was subject to a management action plan—that was felt to be appropriate after the investigation by the various authorities. So I think it is unfair to say that nothing happened to Mr Veale, but perhaps it did take too long to reach a conclusion. As noble Lords might appreciate, I would certainly agree with that.

Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

3rd reading
Monday 18th September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I wholeheartedly endorse the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has summarised the Bill which he has piloted through this House and congratulate him on it. He was right to remind us that its genesis was with the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, in her previous incarnation and in an earlier Bill. Nevertheless, there has been cross-party support for it, which I am happy to reiterate.

It is worth reminding ourselves that 71% of women of all ages in the UK have experienced some form of sexual harassment in public. That rises to 86% of all 18 to 24 year-old young women. I have one question which I hope the Minister can comment on when summing up the Government’s position. How will the impact of this Bill be monitored going forward? It is a very specific and quite controversial Bill, even though it has had cross-party support; the Government should see the monitoring of its impact as a proper part of its enactment, so that we can measure its benefit.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this Bill reminds us of the very real damage caused by public sexual harassment, a terrible crime that is far too widespread. The Bill’s cross-Chamber and cross-party support has been a real indication of our shared determination to make our streets safer for everyone.

I put on record my congratulations to all those involved in the passage of this Bill. First, it is fitting that we pay tribute to its sponsors: Greg Clark MP in the other place for bringing the Bill forward and so ably championing the experience of his constituents on the issue and my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar in this Chamber for picking up the baton to see it through to Royal Assent. I also recognise my ministerial colleagues—in particular my noble friend Lord Evans for his work in responding to the Bill on behalf of the Government—and the officials who supported them in doing so. My thanks also go to all other Members of both Houses who have provided careful scrutiny of the Bill and spoken so thoughtfully and respectfully on this sensitive topic. In doing so, they have not only worked together to make it stronger but played a key part in helping to raise awareness of public sexual harassment.

As with any new criminal justice legislation, an implementation period will be necessary to ensure that all processes, systems and guidance are updated. That includes drawing up the necessary statutory guidance. We therefore cannot give a timescale now for when we expect the offence to be implemented, but we will ensure that the legislation comes into force as quickly as reasonably possible. I think that goes some way to answering the question of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on how it will be monitored. The guidance needs to be carefully drawn up first, and then I am sure we will return to the subject.

I end on the most important thank you of them all: to those who relentlessly campaigned for this change. The Bill is a testament to the hard work and passion of the organisations and many individuals who bravely shared their experiences. I join my noble friend Lord Wolfson in saying to them that their efforts have made a real difference in the pursuit of making our streets safer for women and girls.

Police Act 1997 (Criminal Record Certificates: Relevant Matter) (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 2023

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 24th July 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this appears to be a sensible SI. No concerns were raised by the SLSC, nor was the instrument reported by the JCSI. It will align the separate rules which determine what criminal record information is automatically disclosed on a basic DBS check, on the one hand, and what is disclosed on the higher-level standard and enhanced DBS checks, on the other, so that higher-level checks will never disclose less criminal information than is disclosed on a basic DBS check. The Explanatory Memorandum states:

“The Home Office is working with DBS to ensure that this change and the timing for this to come into effect, is widely understood by those it may affect”.


The example that the Minister gave of the 17 year-old working in a supermarket and then also applying to work with children was a very good one, and one which I have actually seen myself in youth courts. I had not realised that there was this anomaly, and I am glad that this SI is rectifying it.

This morning, I sent the Minister a particular conundrum I had, which is actually outside the strict remit of this statutory instrument. I will just run through that scenario, and I hope the Minister will be able to answer the question it raised with me. I was recently sitting as a magistrate to hear domestic violence protection order applications. Of course, these are civil orders. The applicant was a young mother, who was represented by a lawyer who happened also to be a part-time judge. The respondent, the former boyfriend, was unrepresented. The applicant’s lawyer suggested that the best way to deal with this matter was to not find any facts and just put an order in place for a relatively short time, and everyone could continue living their lives separately and the matter could be disposed of in that way quite quickly. I explained to the respondent that, if he were to breach that order, it would be a criminal offence and he needed to be aware of that. The respondent said to me that he was employed as a primary school teacher, and he was in a much more serious situation than seemed to be realised by the court. He would have to tell his headteacher if the DVPO had been put in place. So I put it off for a contested hearing and advised the young man to get a lawyer.

Subsequently, I talked about this case with a legal adviser, and she said that, as a solicitor, she would not have to disclose whether she had any equivalent civil order put in place. She would not have to tell the Solicitors Regulation Authority, so she doubted whether this primary school teacher would have to do so in his case. I did not know the answer to that question. I suspect there may well be more stringent regulations for teachers, particularly primary school teachers, and there is of course the wider question of all these—really quite a lot of—civil orders which magistrates now put in place, for the reasons we have often debated, and whether there are any guidelines for the various professional organisations about what the requirements for disclosure are and whether that is a ramification which may be taken into account within the whole DBS system.

Also this morning, I went on to the website of the charity Unlock, which deals with people who have left prison and who have had community sentences and that sort of thing. It has a number of worked examples about when things are declarable and when they are not, and at what stage of the job application process matters are declarable. It is an extremely complex picture. It is something which people often fall foul of, and the rules are not clear at all. Can the Minister say anything in a wider sense about how these checking procedures are being reviewed and simplified, from the point of view both of employers and of those people who do have criminal records, so that a system which is better understood can be operational, which would be to the benefit of both sides?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank both noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I am glad that they both agree that this instrument is necessary to align the two sets of rules that determine disclosure of criminal records on basic certificates, on the one hand, and the standard and enhanced certificates on the other. This will ensure that on all occasions the levels of disclosure on criminal record certificates align with the levels of risk and vulnerability inherent in particular roles.

Perhaps if I go into a bit more detail, it will answer all or most of the noble Lord’s questions. I shall come back to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on his specific example towards the end. It is worth pointing out that the circumstances in which this might occur are very limited, which suggests that the practical impact is likely to be fairly low. The nature of the offences involved also reduces the impact of this anomaly. The DBS has had regular contact with employers regarding criminal record checks across a range of sectors, and we are not aware of any evidence that this lack of alignment between the two sets of rules has had any significant real-world impact. It is worth stating that. Although we believe this impact to be low in practice, it makes sense to rectify the situation.

To go into more of the sort of detail that the noble Lord, Lord German, asked for about the types of convictions or cautions that are currently not disclosed on standard and enhanced certificates, we believe that the practical impact of this lack of alignment is low. However, as mentioned earlier, with youth conditional cautions, which are only unspent and disclosed on a basic DBS check from three months of issue, it will apply only to those youth conditional cautions because they are immediately spent—so youth cautions will not be automatically disclosed. I hope that that answers that point.

Some of the other things that would be disclosed include earlier convictions in a string of repeat convictions. In that circumstance, there is likely to be a clear standard or enhanced DBS certificate. Then there are relevant orders, which include restraining orders and care orders—that sort of thing—if they relate to convictions that are old or less serious and if they have unlimited, indefinite or “until further order” end dates. As I said, we believe that the impact of this will be relatively low, but I hope that that gives an example of the sort of thing that we are dealing with here.

The noble Lord, Lord German, asked what cautions are not disclosed on standard and enhanced certificates for the relevant matter, and asked whether this was not a safeguarding risk. We believe, as I have said a number of times, that the impact is likely to be low, given the limited circumstances in which it can occur, and the nature of the offences involved. I have gone through them to some extent: I have talked about the youth conditional cautions, the early convictions and relative orders, so I think that that generally answers the relevant question that the noble Lord asked me.

To go back to the specific question from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on the case that came before him as a magistrate, this is not a complete answer—we will have to do some consultations with the Department for Education as well—so I hope that he will be content to leave that with me, and I shall return when I have concluded those discussions. From the perspective of the disclosure and barring regime, the domestic violence prevention order, if not handed down as part of a conviction, does not need to be disclosed by an individual to an employer, nor will it be automatically disclosed on any kind of DBS check. It is possible that a civil order such as this might be included as additional information on an enhanced check, but only if the police consider it to be relevant and proportionate to disclose. Teachers are subject to regular DBS enhanced checks, with children’s barred list checks. If there is a conviction, either due to a breach of the order or its attachment to a conviction, it would be disclosed on an enhanced DBS check. If asked by his employer, the teacher would be obliged to tell them of the conviction and the order.

I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that this is somewhat complicated—he makes a very good point about that. The Disclosure and Barring Service ensures that applicants and employers have guidance to explain the changes and the impact that they may have in any particular circumstances. It goes to both noble Lords’ questions as well as to the external bodies that have been consulted. We have certainly engaged with Unlock; whether it approves of this measure, I really could not say, but I would imagine so because it brings clarity to this situation. But we have certainly engaged with it and other interested stakeholders on a regular basis.

I should also say that existing guidance makes it clear that, where an employer is aware of a conviction, it should not be an automatic bar to employment. We urge employers to exercise a balanced judgment and take into account factors such as the person’s age at the time of the offence, how long ago the offence took place, the nature of the offence and its relevance to the individual’s role. All of those deserve to be restated. I will take the suggestions of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about simplifying the guidance, or the regime that delivers the guidance, and making it a little easier for people to understand.

With that, I think I have answered the questions. I thank both noble Lords for their contributions and once again commend this draft instrument to the Committee.

Equipment Theft (Prevention) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

3rd reading
Friday 14th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, has given fulsome thanks to all the people involved in the passage of this Bill. He has played a prominent role in it. As he summed up, it is about stopping manufacturers having Mickey Mouse locks on their equipment. I certainly know from my own experience that the newer locks on equipment—whether construction or general rural equipment—are far more sophisticated, as they involve satellite links and all sorts of other technology. This means they are really difficult to break. Nevertheless, eternal vigilance is needed on this front because the people who seek to steal such equipment will be moving their technology forward as well. This Bill is a welcome step in the right direction. I congratulate the noble Lord on seeing it through this House.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Blencathra for taking this Private Member’s Bill through the House—his efforts were far from inconsequential. I welcome the support the Bill has received in this House and in the other place, and join my noble friend in paying tribute to Greg Smith MP.

The Bill has received cross-party support from the outset, and the Government have wholeheartedly supported it. The Government are determined to make our cities, towns, villages and rural areas safer. As we have heard during debates on this Bill, thefts of agricultural machinery, and in particular all-terrain vehicles, are of great concern. The Government recognise the significant impact these thefts have on our rural communities and businesses, and it is essential we ensure that they are adequately protected. These thefts are preventable: fitting immobilisers and forensic markings as standard is inexpensive and the tools to do so are readily available. The Government expect manufacturers to play their part in protecting items from theft, which is why the Government are taking action by supporting this Bill. The Bill is a great example of government, law enforcement and industry working together to protect hard-working people from theft.

As my noble friend noted, the Bill includes a power for the Secretary of State to extend its provisions to other types of machinery via secondary legislation. During the Commons stages the Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire committed to considering the extension of the provisions to other equipment designed or adapted primarily for use in agricultural or commercial activities and tradespeople’s tools. Minister Philp recognised that the regulations would require careful consideration to ensure that the technical detail is correct. To that end, the Home Office has undertaken a call for evidence, seeking views on these detailed matters. The call for evidence closed yesterday, and the responses will be carefully considered before secondary legislation is laid before both Houses and debated in due course.

I reiterate my thanks to my noble friend Lord Blencathra, and echo his thanks to the National Farmers’ Union and to the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for construction and agricultural machinery theft, Superintendent Andy Huddleston, for his work in developing the measures in this Bill. I also echo my noble friend’s praise for the police sergeant and detective sergeant he mentioned. I hope to see the Bill receive Royal Assent, as I believe it can have a significant impact on these thefts. The Government are in full support of it.

Support for Migrant Victims

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 12th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I say to the noble Earl that we ratified the convention and that was the point behind the reservation: we would have been unable to ratify if we had not laid a reservation against Article 59. I also say that in most respects we go further that, or are at least fully compliant with, all the other aspects of the Istanbul convention. We go further, for example, on issues like FGM and stalking protection orders. So I do not really accept the noble Earl’s premise, I am afraid.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, last year the Domestic Abuse Commissioner stated that it is likely that 32,000 victims who have no recourse to public funds will require support each year. As the noble Lord has just said, the Government announced a further £1.4 million to extend support for migrant victims in the coming year. How many people does the Minister think that will support? For his information, I will be seeing the Domestic Abuse Commissioner next Tuesday, so it would be very good to be able to supply her with the answer to my question.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I know that the pilot helped 425 victims and, since the ongoing scheme has been extended, 950 in total—including those 425—have been helped. Those are the main figures that I have at the moment. The “no recourse to public funds” policy is based on the principle that access to state support should reflect a migrant’s strength of connection to the UK. Immigration policy is clear that migrants coming to the UK should be able to provide for themselves financially without relying on benefits from the state. Access to public funds is normally granted only to those who have been given indefinite leave to remain. However, other support is available to migrants who have suffered domestic abuse through destitute domestic violence concessions—three months’ crisis support through which individuals can access safe accommodation and public funds—and through the domestic violence indefinite leave to remain route.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Report stage
Tuesday 27th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I reiterate what the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, have said: there has been a co-operative approach to this Bill, which I think will make it a better Bill. I was going to make exactly the points that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has just made about the need to build in a way of feeding back to Parliament, particularly given that crypto assets are a very turbulent technology; it is a very turbulent industry. We know about the criminality endemic within these types of so-called assets. The point has been made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that Parliament needs to find a way, through flexibility and feedback, to make sure that the appropriate regulations are kept in place.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their brief points in this debate. Broadly speaking, I agree with all the points that have been made. It is important to maintain a high level of flexibility, because this is a very fast-moving space technologically as well as with regard to the use of these assets in the broader economy and for other purposes. I agree with everything that has been said. Obviously, these amendments allow us to maintain a high degree of flexibility, so I ask noble Lords to support them. There is not much point in saying anything else at this point.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (Extraction of information from electronic devices) (Amendment of Schedule 3) Regulations 2023

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 22nd May 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, this is a straightforward piece of secondary legislation, adding the Royal Military Police, the Royal Air Force Police and the Royal Navy Police to the list of people who can exercise extraction of information powers under Section 41 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.

First, I declare what may be a tangential interest: I have a son-in-law who flies jets for the RAF. I would never have thought about it, but it is possible that his and my family would be affected if Section 41 powers were to be used in the event of his untimely death, if that were to happen.

I have two questions to ask the Minister. They relate to the guidance in the extraction of information code of practice, which was provided in relation to the Act and as a result of the words of the Information Commissioner, who believed that this was necessary. I am pleased that it is provided.

My first question relates to paragraph 69 of the guidance, which talks about the use of a mobile phone device “around the time of” the death of the person concerned. It uses the words “the user”. Earlier, in relation to Section 37 of the Act, the code of practice talks about where people are not necessarily the owner of the phone or mobile device. It distinguishes clearly people who own a phone from people who have a phone which is owned by somebody else—something we parliamentarians know because we have a parliamentarian phone that is not our property but is used for all sorts of communication, as well as for the business of Parliament. I do not expect the Minister to have an answer yet, but could there be some clarification of paragraph 69 that refers back to the earlier information given in the code of practice to say exactly what it means about a shared-user phone?

My second question is about paragraph 90 of the code and current practice among police forces to keep up to date with technology in order to separate personal information from necessary information related to the event being investigated—the death, criminal event or whatever. Does the Minister have any information about whether police forces of all sorts are using similar technology? The real problem, which is quite obvious, is that there is a variety of technological options available to police forces and they may all be using different ones. That means that they may not necessarily be able to do what is required in the code of practice and keep up to date with

“the technology options available in their organisations”.

There may be a question here—again, the Minister may not be able to answer it now—about whether the technology available to police forces is of sufficient robustness to allow them to be ahead of the game and whether there is one piece of software that is recommended for police forces to use.

With those two questions, I am perfectly satisfied that this is a sensible piece of legislation.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I too am happy to say that this is a straightforward statutory instrument, and we are happy to support it from the Labour Party’s point of view. The SI adds members of the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police to those given the power to extract information from a device after a user of that device has died, as part of an investigation or inquest into the death, to investigate crime and to safeguard others.

I think it is fair to ask the Minister why these police forces were left out of the original Bill. Was there a particular reason, or was the consultation process not complete?

The Labour Party tabled a series of amendments to the PCSC Bill creating new checks on police powers to extract data from electronic devices. This was due to concerns about vulnerable people and the intrusive nature of these searches—in particular, for rape and sexual abuse victims, who can feel that requests for information, including digital information taken from their phone, can be overly invasive and collect highly personal information that is not relevant to the inquiry. It may make people more reluctant to come forward to the police if they know that they will get this interrogation of their phones.

I understand that this SI covers something different—cases in which the owner of the device has died—and we are happy to support this amendment. However, I would still like to ask the Minister what assurance he can give about how devices and information taken from them will be handled sensitively so as not to discourage potential victims and witnesses from coming forward.

There have also been serious concerns about digital resources and the use of digital information by the police, outlined in the report last year from His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. Can the Minister give any update on what action is being taken and whether any specific concerns have been raised about the use of digital items by the forces being given additional powers today? That is a more general question; the two questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord German, are very pertinent, so I shall be interested to hear the Minister’s response on shared-user phones and what impact the measure would have on them, as well as on the interoperability of different technologies and different police forces, as I am sure that that will be a tripping block. I am sure that it is not the intention to create any problems but it is always difficult, in my experience, to get different sources of technology to work together in a seamless way. That seems to be a challenge facing businesses, police forces and everybody battling with new digital technologies. However, overall, we support this SI.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords who have spoken in this very short debate. I shall address all the questions asked of me shortly. Before I do that, I make the general point that the introduction of extraction of information powers in the 2022 Act and its code of practice are just the start of changes being made to improve the experiences of victims involved in the criminal justice system. These specific powers were introduced to ensure that victims and witnesses who report crime can be confident that their personal information will be handled appropriately and that their privacy rights will be respected.

As has been discussed, the amendment relates to the extraction of information from electronic devices when the device user is deceased, so some of the issues debated during the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill are not available there.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked why it was not introduced with regard to these police forces in the original iteration. As I said in my opening remarks, at the time it was not agreed that the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police had a sufficient investigative requirement to use Section 41 powers or that their investigative needs could not be met with other existing powers. We have now taken the time thoroughly to consider their case and are in agreement with those police forces that their investigative duties meet the requirements for the use of the powers. In short, it is about ensuring that giving those police forces those powers is indeed the proportionate and correct thing to do, which is why it has taken a little bit of time.

On some of the more technical questions asked of me by the noble Lord, Lord German, there is a broader debate here about whether extraction of information from a personal device is always necessary, given the risks to privacy. Of course, there is a balance to be struck, which must be achieved when undertaking any investigation. All reasonable lines of inquiry must be followed to guarantee a fair trial with the right to privacy. As I said in my opening remarks, it is vital that victims and witnesses feel confident to come forward, but it is equally important that police and other agencies have access to the evidence that they need—I accept that there is no disagreement about this—including mobile data, to fully investigate crime and guarantee a fair trial.

Where information is being extracted from a deceased person’s device, the authorised person must have reasonable belief that the information on that device is relevant to an investigation or inquest into that person’s death, and be satisfied that extracting the information is necessary and proportionate. In answer to the specific question about “the device”—whether it is the owner’s own or one that just happens to be in use—I think it is any device that happens to be in the deceased’s possession. If I am wrong on that, I will of course come back and clarify. By the way, I sincerely hope that it is never a personal matter.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister again, but the acronym RASSO stands for rape and serious sexual offences.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord very much for that.

On the progress being made on recommendation 5 of the HMICFRS report, which relates to budgets and the funding of digital forensics, we have also set up a commissioning board, jointly led by policing and the Home Office, to enable joint decision-making around prioritisation and to increase the transparency of funding decisions, including those in digital forensics, in line with that recommendation. In addition, we are investing £11 million into providing forces with technology that will enhance their capability to carry out rape investigations quickly and to provide a better service to victims.

I thank noble Lords very much for their questions. I hope I have answered them; I think I have. In closing, I repeat my thanks for the time taken to discuss and consider these issues. I once again commend the regulations to the Committee.

Vagrancy Act 1824

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 17th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I cannot specifically answer as regards all prison leavers. I know that a lot of work is being done with the rehabilitation of drug addicts in an effort to prevent recidivism. I will come back to the right reverend Prelate with more detail, if I can find it.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the 1824 Act makes reference to “idle and disorderly” persons, “rogues and vagabonds”. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that this is not a reference to Conservative Peers. The 2019 manifesto committed the party opposite to ending rough sleeping by 2024, yet it continues to rise. It is up by 74% in the last 10 years and may be up by a quarter in the last year. What do the Government intend to do to reverse this trend?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord is a magistrate. I will not comment on his first point, other to say that I am sure most of my colleagues would prefer not to appear in front of him. The statistics he gives are not quite as bad as he made them sound. The numbers are much lower than when homelessness peaked in 2017. Although there was a slight spike last year, they are significantly below previous peak levels.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th May 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate; it is the first debate in which we have spoken on a more international level. As we heard in our earlier debates, a large proportion of the quantity of money involved in fraud—well over 90%; probably 99%—has an international element; that is at the core of so much of the fraud with which we are dealing.

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Oates, on the way in which he introduced this group. I found his introduction rich and compelling. He set out things very fully. The other noble Lords who have spoken have talked about the aspirational nature of this amendment. I do not think that that is a criticism. It is good to hear about the other countries that are already taking a lead in trying to get the IACC set up.

From the Labour Party’s point of view, I have looked at what David Lammy has said on this matter. He has spoken about working internationally—I know that my noble friend Lord Hain led the work on that when he was a Foreign Office Minister—and promised that an incoming Labour Government would fight against dirty money in the UK by creating a transatlantic anti-corruption council alongside the US, EU and other allies. That is a different model from the one proposed in these amendments.

I do not want to stand here as an opposition spokesman saying that we are against what the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, are proposing but there are other potential models for bearing down on corruption. I listened with some interest to what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said about the practicalities of doing this and using legislation such as this to do everything we can on a domestic level, and internationally where we already have direct interest, to bear down on this huge level of corruption. Nevertheless, I thank the noble Lord for introducing this amendment.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hain, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for their amendments in this group. I also thank all noble Lords for speaking in this debate.

I turn first to Amendment 103, which was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, but spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Oates. If I may, I associate myself with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby: the noble Lord, Lord Oates, made an incredibly powerful and eloquent case in moving this amendment 103, which also spoken to by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Wheatcroft. Ensuring that those who are responsible for the most egregious acts of corruption are held to account is obviously vital. There should be no tolerance towards those who steal from the public to satisfy personal greed. The Government wholeheartedly endorse the premise that this amendment seeks to advance. The international community can and must do more to deter and punish acts of corruption.

The Government are taking robust action to ensure that the UK leads by example. That is why, in March, we published the second public-private economic crime plan, to which I referred in our debate on the previous group of amendments, which outlines ambitious actions to prevent the UK’s open economy being exploited by criminals and corrupt actors. The Government are also developing a new UK anti-corruption strategy to build on the progress made by the previous strategy and outline a refreshed approach to tackling corruption and illicit finance both in the UK and internationally.

The recently published fraud strategy also sets out the Government’s commitment to raise the priority of fraud on the international stage. We will drive forward global action through developing stronger relationships with international partners, culminating in a global fraud summit chaired by the Home Secretary and held in the UK next year. The summit will bring together leaders from Governments, law enforcement and the private sector to announce the ambition to deliver a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach to tackling fraud over the next five years.

The Government have consistently invested in efforts to bring those responsible for corruption to justice. The international corruption unit in the National Crime Agency is a specialist capability that investigates corruption cases with UK links.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I support this amendment. As the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, said when he introduced it, cost exposure for prosecuting authorities can pose a real hurdle to their pursuing those prosecutions. As he also said, the Rubicon has been crossed in allowing cost capping, which the Government did in March 2022. This amendment has real legs—if I can use that phrase—and I hope the noble Lord presses the matter further, perhaps at later stages of the Bill.

I too was at the briefing with Bill Browder. I am currently reading his second book, having read his first, and it is compelling reading. He is a very brave man. I also agree with the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I think she said: the precedent and the need are there, and the solution is here. I agree with those sentiments.

Finally, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, who set out, interestingly, that some judges in the civil courts have developed their own law on this matter regarding the enforcement agencies not necessarily having to bear all their costs. He gave an interesting example of a further precedent, if you like. I too will be interested to hear the Minister’s response to that. The matter will be considered very carefully with regard to the later stages of the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Agnew for tabling this amendment and all noble Lords for the points they have raised in this debate. Again, I reassure the Committee that the Government take economic crime very seriously and are taking the necessary steps to ensure that enforcement agencies can tackle illicit financial activities while upholding the fundamental principles that govern our entire civil justice system.

In civil legal proceedings the loser generally pays the legal costs of the winning party, as has been acknowledged. The “loser pays” principle is a fundamental pillar on which the whole basis of civil litigation operates. It helps to ensure that only stronger cases are brought and that the winning party is able to recover reasonable costs of vindicating their case, save for in exceptional circumstances, to ensure access to justice for individuals with very limited resources. While important, civil recovery proceedings brought by enforcement agencies are not so exceptional as to warrant undermining the “loser pays” principle.

Several noble Lords have raised with me, and during this debate, the changes made to the unexplained wealth order regime by the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. These amended provisions in the Proceeds of Crime Act—POCA—introduce “costs protection” for enforcement agencies in cases of UWOs, unless they act unreasonably. This aimed to remove barriers to the use of UWO powers by relevant law enforcement teams. This was done on the basis that they were exceptional and likely to be low in volume in comparison to other types of civil recovery and, furthermore, that the relevant cost rules would be positioned as a novel and unique proposal, thereby maintaining the overall integrity of the “loser pays” principle in all other civil recovery proceedings. In the last five years, agencies with civil recovery powers—the Crown Prosecution Service, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office, the Financial Conduct Authority and HM Revenue and Customs—have not paid any adverse costs for civil recovery proceedings.

There is also no guarantee that the introduction of further costs protection would lead to enforcement agencies pursuing more cases, as they report that each case must be assessed on its own merits considering numerous factors independent of costs liability, including gathering sufficient evidence to pursue a case and internal resourcing capability.

It is also worth bearing in mind that the Civil Procedure Rules, which guide the courts in procedural matters—I think this goes some way to answering the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Oates—

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th April 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the comments that have already been made. As the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, has said, he is really asking the Government to triage the SARs, for some way of managing the overwhelming amount of data which is reported. The only little glimpse of this I have in my other role as a magistrate is that we deal with proceeds of crime applications at magistrates’ court level, and it is not that unusual—I have dealt with it myself—where you are talking about potentially billions of pounds. But we are just seeing one very small snapshot of that in the particular application that we see in the magistrates’ courts. I am very well aware that these are immensely complicated situations to deal with, but just from listening to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, I think he is, as he said, really just pushing the Government to try and get on with their own plan. It would be very useful for this Committee to hear what the Government are planning to do and to come up with a timetable to try and impact on this problem. Other than that, I support the amendments.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I once again thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I have listened with considerable interest to the points that have been raised. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for going against his natural instinct and supporting the Government.

I thank my noble friend Lord Agnew of Oulton for his Amendment 86, which would create a requirement for risk rating for submissions of suspicious activity reports, known as SARs. As my noble friend acknowledges, SARs intelligence is a critical tool in our ability to identify, disrupt and recover the hundreds of millions of pounds which underpin the most serious and organised crime in the UK. However, it is often not possible for reporters of SARs to assess the level of risk related to a SAR, or the underlying offence associated with the report, when it is submitted to the National Crime Agency. That is because the reporter may not have a complete picture of information on which to make such a rating. This could lead to potentially inaccurate information being submitted to the NCA if this were a requirement, as well as additional burdens on reporters that would distract resources from tackling economic crime.

Furthermore, the NCA already has procedures in place to enable reporters to alert specific concerns. It has issued an online guidance of glossary codes to reporters, which can be included in their reports and which allow them to label a SAR with a specific concern. These glossary codes can, for example, relate to suspicions of vulnerable children, human trafficking, or firearms offences, and enable the National Crime Agency to triage the reports so they can be allocated appropriately.

In addition, the SARs reform programme is delivering major reforms to the legacy SARs IT, to enable better analysis and exploitation of SARs intelligence to deliver law enforcement outcomes to disrupt criminals. As my noble friend has gone into more detail on this subject, I will answer in more detail generally about resource allocation and what have you.

We are increasing capacity within law enforcement to analyse and act on SARs intelligence. This will include 75 additional officers in the NCA, which will almost double capacity. Some 45 of these officers are already in post, and the milestone for recruiting the remaining 30 is the end of this financial year 2022-23. The programme has also provided more than 20 new financial investigators in the regional organised crime units dedicated to SARs analysis. These new staff are already delivering operational results from SARs intelligence, including the recovery of criminal assets—£380,000 to date this year, with approximately another £1 million frozen; I will come back on to some numbers in a second—and also identification and arrest of previously unknown organised crime group members.

In terms of the IT systems, a new SARs digital service, including data analytics, which will replace legacy IT implemented more than 20 years ago, is on its way. The first elements of the new SARs IT systems, which are for bulk reporter submission, were delivered in early 2021, to enable organisations to submit large volumes of SARs—bulk reporters—to begin testing the new systems. To ensure consistency of service, de-risk delivery and ensure the protection of the public, the end-to-end SARs digital service will be delivered in stages. The new SARs online portal and bulk submission system is shortly due to go live. This will be followed by further releases, which will replace the current SARs IT used by the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, law enforcement agencies and other government departments. My noble friend was quite right to bring up the subject, and I hope that provides some clarity as to what is being planned.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, asked about the additional number of SARs. The NCA received and processed 573,085 SARs in 2019-20. The number of SARs submitted increases significantly every year. Action taken as a result of these SARs saw £191,637,824 denied to criminals in 2019-20, which is an increase of about 46% on the previous year’s figure. SARs are analysed by the NCA for priority risks and then actioned accordingly. The majority of the reports are also made available to more than 75 law enforcement agencies and used in a variety of ways. This was recognised in the Financial Action Task Force’s mutual evaluation of the UK in 2018. We recognise that we could do more and are committed to the SARs reform programme, which aims to improve our ability to analyse SARs and for law enforcement to take action on them when appropriate.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, also asked why Amendment 78E is being tabled now. The original draft used a definition of money laundering based on a global standard from FATF—the Financial Action Task Force. The new definition ensures that the definition of money laundering is consistent with the rest of POCA. A predicate offence in the context of money laundering is an offence that leads to proceeds of crime being generated which then become the subject of a money laundering offence. The inclusion of these offences in the definition of money laundering in this clause would effectively include any criminal activity, thereby broadening the scope of the clause beyond its intended purpose. The exclusion of predicate offences from the definition does not affect law enforcement’s ability to investigate or pursue cases of money laundering.

I believe that I have answered all the specific questions. Once again, I thank all noble Lords who participated in this short debate. I ask my noble friend Lord Agnew not to press his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with all the points that have been made by noble Lords. When on the previous group the Minister read out the figures recovered, they were derisory compared to the amount of dirty money that it is speculated is washing around the systems for which we are responsible. The whole thing is extremely important. The noble Lord, Lord Agnew, speaks with great authority on this matter. He is an insider and, as the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Vaux, said, this is a way of getting proper enforcement into the Bill so it has proper teeth and so that HMRC can reprioritise not just tax generation but its work against money laundering. We support the amendment.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, once again I thank all noble Lords who have spoken, and I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Agnew for his amendment. While the Government agree whole- heartedly on the critical role that supervision must play in tackling economic crime, we cannot support the proposed new clause. HMRC already has an anti-money laundering supervisory function, and it takes its responsibilities very seriously. HMRC supervises nine sectors and is already the default supervisor for trust or company service providers when they are not already subject to supervision by the Financial Conduct Authority or one of the 22 professional body supervisors. The proposed amendment would duplicate these provisions and to that extent it is unnecessary. Furthermore, it could make HMRC responsible for all anti-money laundering supervision, potentially cutting across existing regulatory relationships, such as that between the major banks and the FCA. HMRC takes its money laundering supervisory responsibilities very seriously.

My noble friend raised a number of issues regarding face-to-face compliance and so on. He said that the number of face-to-face compliance visits dropped from 1,265 in 2018-19 to just 289 in 2021-22, but these figures are misleading because the overall number of interventions was greater, with the total number increasing from 1,396 in 2018-19 to 3,725 in 2021-22. Although these figures include a mass-targeted exercise checking for business risk assessments and other key documents in 2021-22, the total would still have increased from 1,396 to 2,329 without that. A range of factors caused the variation in face-to-face intervention levels from 2018-19 levels including, as my noble friend noted, pandemic issues, the impact of recruiting and training —I will come on to that in a second—with a large number of new officers and differing resource levels needed to support different types of interventions. In 2022-23, HMRC carried out more than 3,000 interventions, of which more than 900 were face-to-face. It also issued more than 750 penalties to non-compliant businesses and refused more than 400 applications to register. HMRC’s anti-money laundering function is carried out by its fraud investigation service and works alongside other teams in this section and across government and law enforcement to maximise its impact.

My noble friend asked whether it is true that HMRC is failing to meet a legal requirement to register businesses within 45 days of application, with a reduction from 78% to 70% meaning that nearly one-third are operating outside the scope of supervision. Nearly one-third of applicants are outside the scope of supervision while their applications are being determined. Businesses are under supervisory scrutiny during the application process, and HMRC’s risk-based approach means that businesses from the highest risk sectors are prioritised. The highest-risk sectors are money services businesses and TCSPs, which cannot begin carrying out relevant activity until HMRC has determined that they are fit and proper. There are some cases where it is not possible to process an application within 45 days, for example, if waiting for important information from an overseas agency. However, there have been particular challenges that caused delays that HMRC regrets, including issues with its computer system, but I understand that significant progress has been made recently and that HMRC is now much closer to achieving the 45-day turnaround for all but the most tricky cases.

The Government are clear that further reform of the anti-money laundering supervision system is needed, but the best scale and type of reform to improve effectiveness and solve the problems that have been identified is not yet clear. His Majesty’s Treasury will issue a formal consultation on the possible options by the end of June 2023. Implementation timelines will depend on the outcome of this consultation.

My noble friend Lord Agnew and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, asked about HMRC’s performance as a supervisor. A senior manager independent of the supervision team carries out a robust annual assessment of HMRC’s supervision against OPBAS standards. The process currently under way to deliver the next self-assessment has also involved an assurance team from HMRC’s customer compliance group to add a further layer of scrutiny and independence to the process. This assessment must necessarily highlight any problems and areas where HMRC can improve its supervision. Those issues include needing to recruit and train large numbers of new officers—again, to address the question from my noble friend—and some inconsistencies in performance across the unit. However, the 2021-22 assessment judged that HMRC is effective and compliant in its obligations under the money laundering regulations and as set out in the OPBAS sourcebook, driving up performance despite the pandemic. The assessment also highlighted numerous strengths, including well-structured risk assessments, use of multiple supervisory tools in a risk-based approach and a robust registration process. On recruitment, HMRC’s supervision team is larger than it has ever been now, totalling more than 400 staff.

All this will ensure that the risks and implications of each option are fully understood before the Government commit to any particular model of supervision. Pre-empting this through an amendment of this type risks generating exactly the type of confusion over responsibilities that I think my noble friend seeks to avoid. I therefore hope that he is able to withdraw his amendment.

Hate Crime

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 24th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend asks an interesting question. I referred earlier to the Law Commission, which we asked to undertake a wide-ranging review into hate crime legislation. On the specific question, the Law Commission found that adding sex and gender to hate crime legislation could have made it more difficult to prosecute the most serious crimes that harm women and girls, including rape and domestic abuse. It would also treat sex unequally to other characteristics in scope of relevant hate crime laws, such as race or religion. So, while I cannot necessarily specifically answer my noble friend’s point, I would say that it is an incredibly complex area that needs very careful thought.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the Question from the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, asked why hate crime statistics are not disaggregated by sex. But the question could equally be asked about why the data is not disaggregated by the age of the victim and the perpetrator. I well remember, when I sat on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee for the Domestic Abuse Bill, we had a lot of lobbying about violent acts against older people by younger people. Does the Minister agree that reporting the interaction of these characteristics, both sex and age, would allow resources to be better allocated for the victims and to prevent these types of crimes?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, the noble Lord raises an interesting point. He will be aware that age is not one of the five protected characteristics—as I get older, I am beginning to think that that is a mistake. I cannot answer his question in greater detail than that at the moment but I will certainly take it back to the department.

Chinese Police Stations in the UK

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Thursday 20th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, yesterday in the Times newspaper there was a report into a Chinese businessman with links to an alleged Chinese secret police station in Croydon. This report raises serious questions about national security. This businessman, who has attended Chinese Communist Party political conferences, has also attended organised Conservative Party fundraising dinners and other events involving former Conservative Prime Ministers. Although we have raised this issue here before, after police stations were reportedly uncovered in Hendon, Glasgow and Croydon, we have received no update. Meanwhile, operations in New York and the Netherlands have taken action against Chinese police operations, and the Canadian and German Governments have expressed concern about operations in their countries.

Here, we have to contend with the additional dimension that one individual who has been linked to an operation here has links with the Conservative Party and has met Ministers. We know that the director-general of MI5 has warned that Chinese authorities are attempting to exert influence over our political system. Can the Minister tell us the extent of the contact this individual has had with Ministers? What action are the Government taking to look into this role within the Conservative Party and the involvement he has had with the Government? Have any other individuals connected with these operations been identified, and are their similar concerns about them seeking to influence British politics?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I share the noble Lord’s concern about this threat to our democracy, but as the Security Minister said in a previous Statement on this matter in November last year, investigations are still ongoing and it would be inappropriate for me to comment any further on operational matters, as to do so could obviously jeopardise future prosecutions.

However, I take this opportunity to reassure the House of the Government’s resolve to protect every community in this country from transnational repression. As regards the internal party aspects of this, it is my understanding—and if I am wrong, I will obviously come back to correct myself—that this individual was prominent in a particular Chinese organisation within the Cities of London and Westminster. Beyond that, I do not think he had any involvement or contact with Ministers, and, as all noble Lords around the House know, prominent politicians are featured in photographs with very many people, most of whom they will not know.

Anti-social Behaviour Action Plan

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 29th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord German, for their remarks. Since taking up office, the Prime Minister has been clear that the people’s priorities are his priorities. That is why, in delivering on his five promises, he is determined to build stronger communities and create a better future for people across the country.

For too long, anti-social behaviour has blighted our neighbourhoods, making people’s lives a misery and stopping businesses and individuals from flourishing. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said, this is not just low-level or petty crime, or kids being kids; it is an attack on the very heart of our communities. It threatens people’s sense of safety and security and, as the noble Lord rightly observed, it is a source of anxiety to many members of the public. That is why we have launched this plan to crack down on anti-social behaviour: to restore people’s confidence that these crimes will be quickly and visibly punished. That means treating it with the urgency it deserves.

I will answer as many of the questions as I can. As ever, if I miss any, I will commit to write, having read Hansard properly. We are on track and on time in recruiting 20,000 additional police officers by March 2023. All the funding within this program is additional to that uplift. Assuming we are successful, that will take us to over 148,000 officers across England and Wales. That will be the highest number of officers on record.

Since 2019, the Government have invested over £3 billion, including additional funding each year, and that rolled into government grants to recruit and support the additional 20,000 officers. We are providing police and crime commissioners with £22 million next year, and £90 million in 2024-25, to support an enhanced response to areas most affected by anti-social behaviour and to roll out immediate justice pilots.

However, as the action plan sets out, local authorities and other local agencies will also have a key role to play. We expect local partners to work together to deliver a multiagency approach to tackling anti-social behaviour and delivering the proposals set out in the action plan. I feel I should remind noble Lords that operational policing is a matter for chief constables, and they set operational priorities in their local areas in association and consultation with the police and crime commissioners. Questions about local policing are obviously better directed to those people who are locally accountable.

This plan is backed by over £160 million of funding. Up to £60 million will fund increased police and other uniformed presence to clamp down on this behaviour, including targeting the hotspots, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord German. Although he did not ask me, I reassure him that this will not impinge on any of the spending that currently goes into the pilot areas for things such as violence reduction units and GRIPs. This method of policing has been proven to work in other areas, and we expect success from the hotspot areas that we will pilot. The intention is for it to go to 10 police force areas.

I move on to the subject of immediate justice. We are planning on investing £50 million to support the provision of immediate justice by issuing out-of-court disposals with conditions to swiftly repair any damage. The aim will be for them to start within 48 hours of the offence. This will start in 10 initial trail-blazer police force areas and be rolled out nationally in 2024.

I heard what the noble Lord, Lord German, had to say on the subject of making this efficient. The Government are aware of all of his concerns. There is no denying that the delivery of this program will be complex, but it is definitely worth doing. It is aimed at diverting offenders away from the criminal justice system and will make them undertake practical, reparative activity to make good the loss or damage sustained by victims. It will be rolled out to all police force areas in 2024-25. The focus will be on reparative activity, but that may be undertaken alongside rehabilitative and restorative services that foster connection with the local community, and educational interventions. It will apply primarily to adults and young people in receipt of conditional cautions for ASB-related offences under the out-of-court disposal framework. I am quite sure that all noble Lords will agree that keeping people out of the criminal justice system as far as possible is a desirable outcome.

The noble Lord, Lord German, asked about banning nitrous oxide and pointed out that, in its recent report, the ACMD did not recommend that we criminalise this. That is true, but we take the broader context into account. There are health concerns with young people using nitrous oxide. As I said at the Dispatch Box a couple of weeks ago, it was an offence under the Psychoactive Substances Act to supply knowing that it would be used for these purposes. This gives the police the opportunity to confiscate or take possession of the drugs. I do not think that there is a particular intention to criminalise the lots of young people who use it. I reassure the noble Lord that his balloons will not be banned—there will be exceptions for legitimate users. We talked about some of those the other week, and they include medical, dental and apparently whipped cream producers—which amused me at the time but did not seem to amuse the House. Everybody should be reassured that this is the right thing to do. I note that the only other country to have criminalised this so far is Holland. The Dutch did so because they discovered that it was having a fairly significant impact on drug-driving. There are good reasons for doing what the Government have chosen to do, despite the advice—which I might add did not say that we should not do it—of the ACMD.

There was a good deal of discussion about youth services, and I will go into a little more detail on some of the things that we are doing. As part of the national youth guarantee, we will invest over £500 million to provide high-quality local youth services so that, by 2025, every young person will have access to regular clubs and activities, adventures away from home and opportunities to volunteer. That directly reflects young people’s priorities, and includes up to 300 new and refurbished youth spaces delivered through the Youth Investment Fund. We are also giving councils the resources they need to deliver important local services, with an additional £3.7 billion, which will not be ring-fenced, made available for things such as youth services. I could say more on this subject, and I am sure that I will be asked more on it.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord German, asked me about the fact that he could not find any funding dedicated to rough sleeping and high streets. As I said in my opening remarks, this is a multiagency approach and there are many ways to tackle these problems. The high street in particular, and things such as the empty dwellings Act and the tenant Act, do not really require vast amounts of investment; they just require some new thinking, and that is what the Government are doing.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I have a question. When he talked about out-of-court disposals, which we approve of in principle, he used three words: reparative, rehabilitative and restorative. Traditionally, those three things are managed by probation, YOTs, charities or NGOs. On the reparative activity in particular, which, from what the Minister said, is hoped to be done within 48 hours, who will manage that part of the process? It is different from what that group of agencies does at the moment.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord asks a very good question. I note that none of those three words is easy to pronounce, particularly not at the Dispatch Box. As I said in my answer about the high streets and so on, it is a multiagency approach. A number of different agencies will be involved on a case-by-case basis. It depends on the circumstances of the case. It may be that there are opportunities for drug referrals or maybe other things. I cannot be more specific at this point, but I am sure I will be able to update him in due course on the more precise details.

Black and Minority-ethnic Children: Police Strip-searches

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 27th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that. I am extremely happy to pay tribute to Dame Rachel de Souza for her report, which strikes me as very comprehensive—although I confess to having read only part of it so far. I agree with some of her conclusions, as I have just said, and I think that the one about schools is an entirely appropriate conclusion to have reached. In my opinion, strip-searches should be conducted only in very safe and secure places.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, one of the report’s conclusions was that there were widely differing practices in stop and search and strip-searches across the country. Does the Minister believe that there are good examples of stop and search and strip-search, and what can the Government use from those examples? Is it not right that particular communities—I am talking about young black men—have very little trust in the police service, and that it does not take much for things to kick off and for the police to use further interventions which are wholly undesirable as a result of the original police intervention?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I certainly agree with the noble Lord’s last point; that is a significant issue for the police and for us all. It relates to so many other issues that we deal with on a daily basis regarding the police, including things that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has brought up in previous debates, such as recruitment and so on. Regarding strip-search, I argue that, where the rules are followed, which are pretty clear and rigorous, it could be appropriate under certain circumstances. However, there needs to be an appropriate adult present, and there are complications around that, including making sure that there are enough of them. The other rules and safeguards that are already in place need to be followed.

Police and Crime Commissioners

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 20th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I agree up to a point. The Government are taking a central role, not least through the review into the dismissal process that I have talked about before. I have little doubt that that will become a topical subject within the next 24 hours. That will look into the composition of misconduct panels, including the impact of the role of legally qualified chairs; more broadly, it will look at things such as the appeals mechanism and the effectiveness of the performance system, including for officers who have failed vetting. That review was launched on 17 January and was said to take about four months to conclude. We are getting towards the end of that process, so there will be more to be said.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister said he has no powers to intervene. He also said there is a judicial process in which he does not want to intervene. Can he give the House a date by which that judicial process will start?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I cannot.

Nitrous Oxide

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 15th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend makes a very good point but the advisory council did not actually recommend that. It said that nitrous oxide should be kept subject to the provisions in the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016. However, as I said earlier, we are considering all the recommendations of the report, and the Home Secretary has a duty to consider advice on whether to pursue control under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, does the Minister accept that nitrous oxide is a gateway drug and may well lead to young people in particular moving on to other drugs which are even more harmful? Does he also accept that the courts and the police force find it difficult to deal with the multitude of available drugs, which are constantly changing, so there needs to be huge vigilance to try to understand the range of drugs available to our young people?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not have any personal knowledge of whether it is a gateway drug, but the evidence that I have seen certainly suggests that to be the case; I believe it is the third most common drug in England and Wales after cannabis and cocaine, so I suspect that the noble Lord is right. As regards vigilance, I agree; obviously we have a long-term drugs strategy to take the challenge of drug misuse very seriously. It is a 10-year strategy, significant funds have been dedicated towards it, and it includes investing significant amounts of money in an ambitious programme of drug treatment and recovery.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 14th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, again, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their thoughtful and considered contributions to this debate. As I have already detailed, the Government listened carefully to your Lordships’ concerns regarding the serious disruption prevention order measures. Orders will now be applied only where individuals have been convicted of protest-related offences or breaches of protest-related injunctions on at least two occasions.

The noble Lord, Lord German, argued that serious disruption prevention orders contravene the European Convention on Human Rights. They do not. The right to protest is fundamental and despite sensationalist claims such as that, that will not change. These orders will ensure that individuals who deliberately cause serious disruption more than twice will face justice. Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR set out that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, assembly and association. However, these rights are not absolute and must be balanced with the rights and freedoms of others.

I hope your Lordships will be satisfied that the Government have responded with a very significant offer that addresses the key concerns expressed throughout the passage of this Bill. The Bill will better balance the rights of protesters with the rights of individuals to go about their daily lives free from disruption and address the ever-evolving protest tactics we have seen employed by a selfish minority of protesters. Blocking motorways and slow walking in roads delays our life-saving emergency services, stops people getting to work and drains police resources. The British people are rightly fed up with it and are demanding action from their lawmakers.

It is time for this Bill to become law. I thank the noble Lord for saying that he will withdraw his Motion.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Report stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the enhanced tier of FIRS requires the registration of arrangements to carry out any activity in the UK, or for future activities to be carried out in the UK, at the direction of a specified foreign power or entity. It also requires activities carried out by specified entities to be registered. I too am grateful for how the Government have responded, following concerns that this tier could deter legitimate activities. The Minister has introduced a series of concessions, as he mentioned in opening, which we welcome. There are outstanding issues, which I would be grateful if he could amplify in his answers.

On his Amendment 106, the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, spoke about the need for regular reviews, which may highlight barriers to international collaboration. He gave examples from his family—particularly his son, who is no doubt doing important research work up at Edinburgh University. The purpose of this is to ensure that the enhanced scheme does not make the same mistakes as other schemes around the world. I draw the Australian scheme to the Minister’s attention, which I understand is currently being reviewed, given some high-profile concerns about how it is working. I look forward to his answer.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this short but constructive discussion. I will turn straight to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire.

Amendment 91 seeks to ensure that registration under FIRS is not required when the arrangement is registered under other legislative requirements. However, somewhat contrary to the noble Lord’s assertion, I think there is a clear difference between FIRS and the National Security and Investment Act, the academic technology approval scheme and the export control regime. The Government are clear that FIRS fills a gap in our toolkit. It is worth highlighting that the focus of this enhanced tier is to provide scrutiny to UK activities directed by specified foreign powers—it is worth emphasising this; we are talking about the enhanced tier—and foreign power-controlled entities.

We consider that there will be limited circumstances where there is a risk of duplication, but we will work closely across government departments and potential registrants to keep the burden of registration to a minimum and inform our approach to using this tier of the scheme. The Government do not want to impose unnecessary burdens. We have committed to a consultation on the guidance ahead of bringing the scheme into force. If that process identifies risks of duplication, the power to target what arrangements and activities will need to be registered can be used to reduce unnecessary duplication. This will be considered on a case-by-case basis when specifying foreign powers and entities.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Report stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall be very brief. I thank the Minister for his explanation of the Government’s amendments. We recognise that they have come a long way since Committee. The amendments in this group seek to address the unintended consequences of offences for journalists and NGOs. Concerns have been raised throughout the Bill that the legitimate activities of journalists, such as the possession of leaked information, could lead to their prosecution. The main focus of today’s debate is Amendment 18 from the noble Lord, Lord Black. It aims to give a specific offence, whereas our Amendment 79B calls for an assessment of the impact of this group.

Given the significant concessions made by the Government, I will not divide the House on Amendment 79B and we will abstain on Amendments 18 and 72 if they are moved to a vote. However, I understand the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, when she said that she would listen to the Minister, deliberate and see what will be done. I do not know whether the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, will press Amendment 18 to a vote even if the noble Lord, Lord Black, chooses not to. Either way, the Labour Party will abstain on those votes.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate for their very warm words. The strength of opinion highlights how important journalistic freedom is, and the Government take it extremely seriously. Whistleblowing will be dealt with in the next group, so if the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, allows, I will not deal with it in my response.

I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Black for his amendment and for his general comments in support of this Bill. As I have said, we have listened to concerns raised by the media sector and noble Lords. The Government’s amendments are a direct response to them. I will endeavour to provide the clarity that my noble friend Lady Stowell asked for.

On my noble friend Lord Black’s amendment, the Government cannot accept a defence linked to the definition of a recognised news publisher. Rather than taking activity out of scope, the defence would act as a way for foreign powers, particularly those seeking to cause the UK harm, to avoid prosecution under this clause and engage in harmful espionage activity. If a journalist is deliberately colluding with a foreign intelligence service in relation to their UK-related activities, such as by revealing intelligence capabilities that could be exploited by that intelligence service, it is absolutely right that they should face criminal sanction.

I acknowledge that the amendment seeks to provide a targeted protection for journalists by referencing “a recognised news publisher”. The Government have serious concerns that any individuals working under the cover of journalism in foreign media organisations operating in the UK would be able to abuse this provision. Even if hostile state actors did not currently use journalistic cover to engage in espionage, having a defence such as this would almost certainly encourage them to do so. This defence would apply even if the conduct in question was probably against the public interest. This is simply not acceptable; it would give foreign states a back door to commit espionage. Accordingly, the Government cannot accept this amendment and I ask my noble friend not to move it.

However, I want to reassure the media sector that publication of an article that was critical of the UK Government, and which might incidentally be capable of assisting a foreign intelligence service, would not fall within the scope of this offence; nor would the handling of materials in the course of genuine journalistic activities, nor likely the other offences in this Bill. For an offence to be committed under Clause 3, an individual would need to engage in conduct intending

“to materially assist a foreign intelligence service”,

or know, or should have known given the information they had at the time, that it was likely that such conduct would do so.

The Government may profoundly disagree with the conclusions of some journalists, but we will not hide behind the criminal law to suppress genuine competing views and it is almost inconceivable that genuine journalism will be caught within the threshold for criminal activity. My noble friend raised some specific examples and there are many—for example, those relating Snatch Land Rovers a few years ago—but the Government do not consider that the publication of an article that was critical of the UK Government, and which incidentally might be capable of assisting a foreign intelligence service, would fall within the scope of this offence. I think it is worth repeating that.

Many of the examples that have been provided in various articles are stories which relate to terrorism. No journalist has been prosecuted for an offence under terrorism legislation. Even where examples are relevant to state threats activity, no journalist has been prosecuted for an offence under the Official Secrets Act. This Bill will be no different and the Government do not accept the view that it criminalises the activity described in the media.

The test of material assistance is key. To be “material”, the assistance to the foreign intelligence service must be important, considerable or in a significant way. As with all criminal offences, it is the specific circumstances of the case that will be important and will be a matter for the prosecuting authorities, but we would expect prosecutions to involve those with known links to foreign intelligence services, including evidence of a relationship, tasking or payment. Absent these links, the Government struggle to envisage even the most provocative piece of journalism meeting the threshold for the offence.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, noted the Statement made last week on Iran International, and many noble Lords will have read it; it highlighted the potentially lethal operations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps taking place in the UK. Far from criminalising the important work of journalists, this offence is intended to protect Iran International, and others who live and work here, from such direct attacks on our people and values.

I turn to amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, with regards to security or defence interests under Clauses 1, 3, 4, 8, 12 and 14. These amendments seek to narrow the definition of “interests of the UK” to ensure a focus on the protection of national security and defence interests, alongside economic security interests. Similar amendments were tabled in Committee, so I will reiterate the concerns the Government continue to have with these changes, as they remain relevant. Narrowing the interest element to cover only security or defence interests significantly moves away from the “safety or interests of the UK” test that already exists and is understood within current espionage legislation. I am afraid these amendments move away from the status quo by creating a test with an unduly narrow focus on national security. While the noble Lord importantly made specific reference to interests pertaining to the UK in its economic security, these amendments continue to not include other critical UK interests relating to public health or, for example, the preservation of our democracy.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to the case of Chandler v DPP, as did his colleague the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. “Safety or interests of the UK” has been considered by the courts to mean the objects of state policy, determined by the Crown, on the advice of Ministers. We expect this interpretation to carry forward to the new legislation and there are safeguards in place to prevent the Government using this legislation inappropriately—for example, by deciding that somebody is acting against government policy but where there is no national security impact.

Each offence under this legislation includes a test that must be met in order for the offences to be committed. For example, for a person to commit a Clause 1 offence, they must obtain or disclose information that is protected for a purpose

“that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”

and the activity must be conducted for, on behalf of or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. This limits the type of conduct capable of being caught under this offence, and in particular the foreign power condition ensures that there is a state link. Designing the offence in this way clearly focuses the offence on harmful state threats activity.

I now turn to Amendment 72, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and signed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The most concerning consequence of this amendment is that where a state threats actor, acting under a proxy, has been engaged in harmful activity, which was an offence under the Bill, they would not commit an offence even if it could be shown that they were receiving specific funding in relation to that activity from a foreign power. The House will note the references to “state threats”, “foreign powers” and “national security”. Much as the amorous adventures of Matt Hancock may be of interest, clearly none of those falls in the scope of this offence.

It is no secret that those with hostile intent try to hide their activities through genuine means, and through this amendment there is a real risk that they could operate through proxies in order to make it more difficult to be prosecuted. It is therefore clear to see that narrowing the scope of the foreign power condition will have a damaging impact across the Bill. The Government considers this amendment would create unnecessary loopholes for state actors to exploit.

I would like to remind the House that the Government amended Clause 31(2)(c) in the other place to put it beyond doubt that there needs to be a clear link between the conduct and any assistance or funding from a foreign power for the condition to be met. It is the Government’s view that this puts the focus on the foreign power, ensuring that financial or other assistance from the foreign power is caught only when it is provided to enable the person to carry out the conduct, not when it is just any financial or other assistance.

I would also like to make it clear that Clause 31(2)(d), which concerns activity carried out in collaboration with, or with the agreement of, a foreign power, requires the foreign power to be actively involved in that collaboration or agreement; it does not cover cases where a person’s activities align with state objectives. The Government therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, not to press her amendment.

To conclude, as all speakers have noted, the Government have moved a very long way in ensuring that journalistic freedoms are not being unduly encroached in this Bill, so I hope noble Lords will accept our amendments and withdraw or not press theirs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a more wide-ranging debate than I was anticipating. The definition of a foreign power is an important issue. It was covered by the Minister in Committee, and I look forward to him expanding on what he said and particularly to address the points made by my noble friend Lady Hayter in her Amendment 74. I think I will leave it there because we have other business to deal with, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, and I will do my best to clarify all the points and answer all the questions that have been raised. First, I turn to government Amendment 76, which addresses concerns raised in Committee and in the report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the drafting of the third limb of the foreign power threat activity provision. This provision is a key part of the Bill which ensures that police have the powers they need in supporting investigations into state threats offences. The concerns raised were that support or assistance unrelated to the harmful conduct covered by foreign power threat activity under Clause 33(3) risked being caught under Clause 33(1)(c). That is not the Government’s intention, and this amendment puts it beyond doubt that the support or assistance must be in relation to the conduct covered by Clause 33(1)(a) rather than unrelated activity. I hope that addresses the concerns helpfully put forward by noble Lords in Committee and that this amendment is welcomed.

This group also includes Amendment 74 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and it relates to the meaning of a “foreign power”. The amendment seeks to remove

“a political party which is a governing political party of a foreign government”

from the definition. I would very much like to thank the noble Baroness for the constructive engagement we have had on this issue. I know her principal concern is with the effect of this clause on the foreign influence registration scheme, which of course we will be debating next week.

The foreign power condition applies right across the Bill and is crucial in order that the new offences in it, such as espionage, theft of trade secrets and sabotage, work effectively. Removing it here would remove it from those other offences too. The Government’s position, as the noble Baroness is aware, is that the inclusion of governing political parties addresses situations where there is a dominant political party, or parties, within a country, to such extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities have been carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

3rd reading
Tuesday 21st February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we too support all the amendments today. I open by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for all her work on this matter; I know that she has worked tirelessly between both Houses and both sides of this House. I am glad that we have reached this point and, to that extent, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cormack.

I reiterate what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said: plenty of Christians support the amendments and there are a number I know who would take exception to people describing them as somehow not as good Christians as those who wish to protest by praying within 150 metres of an abortion clinic. It is perfectly clear that you can pray wherever you like, but outside 150 metres of an abortion clinic.

I would like to reinforce the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who talked about the strength of the votes at earlier stages of the Bill. He highlighted stop and search and SDPOs, and the strength of support from across the Cross Benches, including from many very senior former judges. I hope that when the Minister wraps up, at this stage or the next, he says something or gives us some hint about how far the Government will go in recognising the concerns that this House has expressed.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, subsequent to Report and ahead of today’s Third Reading, the Government have brought a number of clarificatory technical amendments.

First, during the debate on Report on 7 February, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked for clarification, as he has referred to, that a second or subsequent serious disruption prevention order made in respect of the same person could not be founded on trigger events that had already been taken into account for the purposes of a previous order. I confirmed that that was indeed the Government’s intention. In this spirit, the Government have today brought an amendment clarifying that position within the legislation. I hope noble Lords are satisfied with that legal clarity and I thank the noble Lord for his remarks.

Finally, on Report, your Lordships voted to remove from the Bill Clause 11 on suspicionless stop and search, and Clause 20 on serious disruption prevention orders made otherwise than on conviction. As a result, the Government have brought tidying amendments that are consequential to those amendments. I will not speculate further on what may happen later.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Report stage
Tuesday 7th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, to be clear at the outset, we will support Amendment 56 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and I will not divide the House on Amendment 59. I shall speak to Amendment 63, which is tabled in my name and has cross-party and Cross-Bench support.

I welcome the positive move that the Government have made on SDPOs, particularly removing electronic monitoring and limiting an SDPO’s renewal to only once to take into account some of the concerns raised in this House and the other place. Despite this, it remains my view that it is necessary to pursue the wholesale removal of Clause 20. It is simply not proportionate, necessary, Human Rights Act-compliant or good value for money to introduce a power to allow serious disruption prevention orders to be given without a conviction being made.

This is not just my view. The Joint Committee on Human Rights agrees that Clause 20 would interfere

“with legitimate peaceful exercise of Article 10 and 11 rights”

and that:

“The police already have powers to impose conditions on protests and to arrest those who breach them.”


Amnesty International also agrees, saying that Clause 20 is “wholly disproportionate”, restricting

“the exercise of a fundamental right of peaceful assembly based on past conduct and there is no requirement that the past conduct be of a serious nature.”

The Metropolitan Police Commissioner also agrees, confirming this week that “policing is not asking for new powers to constrain protests”.

Experts agree that, since the police already have the powers they need and since this new power would threaten the fundamental right to assemble peacefully, the Government would be wise to think again on this matter. The UK cannot condemn authoritarian regimes cracking down on protests and at the same time celebrate the bravery of protests such as the umbrella movement or the white paper protesters. I will divide the House on Amendment 63, and I hope the Government will use this opportunity to remove this harmful provision.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this shortish debate. This group contains notices to oppose, so I will start with those amendments which take issue with serious disruption prevention orders as a whole. The feeling expressed by noble Lords when speaking to these amendments is clear, but I do not support the full removal of these provisions, and it is important that I make clear the reasons why.

Peaceful protest is a fundamental part of our democracy, but causing serious disruption under the guise of a protest is not. Why should protesters who are determined repeatedly to inflict serious disruption continue to be allowed to do so, especially when their actions impact those who simply wish to go about their daily lives, and potentially risk the safety of our emergency services? SDPOs will give the police and the courts the powers that they need proactively to prevent protesters causing serious disruption, time and again. Those protesters found in breach of an SDPO will be liable for arrest, meaning that the police will not need to stand by until an act of protest-related serious disruption has already taken place before they can act.

Some will argue that many of these protesters are already arrested, but a small group of individuals who have been arrested during disruptive protest action have reoffended soon after. To deter this small group of individuals, SDPOs provide an alternative, non-custodial route to prevent those who have a track record of causing serious disruption in the name of protest. SDPOs will prevent protesters causing harm by subjecting them to proportionate and necessary restrictions or requirements. Such restrictions might involve stopping a protester who has previously locked on carrying an item that would assist them doing so again or require a protester, for example, to report to a police officer at the time when a planned protest is due to take place. I should make it clear that it will be up to the courts to consider what measures are put in place on a case-by-case basis to ensure that they are both proportionate and necessary.

In Committee, concerns were raised that SDPOs are a harsh and intrusive way of preventing serious disruption. However, it is important to make it clear that a prohibition or requirement of a preventive order is much less intrusive than a prison sentence, which is a potential consequence of some of the protest-related offences that can lead to an SDPO.

Many noble Lords have asked whether anybody at a protest could be subject to an SDPO. As I hope I made clear in Committee, only those who have committed protest-related offences, breached a protest-related injunction or caused or contributed to protest-related activities on at least two occasions would be considered for an SDPO. It is for the courts to decide whether someone’s actions caused or contributed to serious disruption at a protest and meet the threshold of an SDPO.

In answer to my noble friend Lord Hailsham’s question, I say that the person potentially subject to an order may present evidence so, yes, the court may consider evidence from the person potentially subject to an SDPO and may adjourn proceedings if the person does not appear for any reason. I should also clarify that Clause 20(6) states:

“On making a serious disruption prevention order the court must in ordinary language explain to P the effects of the order.”


Therefore the person would need to be present.

Police Misconduct Cases

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 6th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid that I will have to go over old ground. The arrangements for the misconduct hearing of the former chief constable Mike Veale are a matter for the Cleveland police and crime commissioner, and the management of the hearing itself is the responsibility of the independent legally qualified chair appointed to it. My noble friend is right that legally qualified chairs must commence a hearing within 100 days of an officer being provided with a notice referring them to proceedings, but this period may be extended when a legally qualified chair considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so. I am afraid that I will have to repeat the old mantra that it would be inappropriate to comment further while these proceedings remain ongoing.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, given that the Leicestershire PCC, Mr Matthews, refused the chair of the panel’s request for Mr Veale to be interviewed by the panel, as the law demands he should be, what is HMG’s view of Mr Veale’s resignation last week from his post as interim chief executive officer of the OPCC?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the appointment of staff is a matter for police and crime commissioners but, as the noble Lord is right to point out, they are required by legislation to seek the views of their police and crime panel when appointing to senior positions within their office. I note Mr Veale’s resignation but the Home Office has no role in such appointments and it would therefore be inappropriate for me to comment on this matter directly.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Code H) Order 2023

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Tuesday 31st January 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support this statutory instrument, which revises the PACE code of practice H to reflect the introduction of a new power of urgent arrest by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. As the Minister outlined, this power enables the police to arrest without warrant and detain a previous terrorism or terrorism-connected offender who is suspected of presenting a further terrorism risk to the public. It also updates Code H to reflect changes made by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.

As the noble Lord said, the horror of the attack at Fishmongers’ Hall in 2019 and a subsequent attack in Streatham is a reminder of the harm that terrorist-risk offenders are capable of. Following these attacks, the Government commissioned the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, to review MAPPA, which is used to supervise such terrorist and terrorist-risk offenders. The creation of the power of urgent arrest was recommended as part of this review.

We supported the introduction of this power during the passage of the PCSC Act and we support it now. We believe it is vital to have the right safeguards in place. With the introduction of such powers comes the possibility of unintended consequences or missed opportunities. I look forward to the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation considering the effect of the introduction of these powers, as well as the other new powers introduced to improve the management of terrorist offenders on licence, and the 2019 powers that Code H now includes.

I was just reflecting on my memory of the attack in Streatham, which is not that far from where I live. I have no inside information on it other than what I read, but I read in the papers various bits of speculation about the officers who were tracking that terrorist offender, who was out on licence; they observed a crime being committed and intervened, and the offender was killed. The speculation I read in the press was about how that process was managed and the huge resource-intensiveness of tracking such people when they are out on licence. Can the Minister say anything about whether this change to the codes of practice within Code H is partly a result of the large resource implications of tracking such offenders when they are out on licence? However, we support the changes.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their contributions.

The noble Lord, Lord German, asked me, first, in essence, where is the guidance for the police pre arrest? Of course, the guidance is operational in nature, so it will be issued by Counter Terrorism Policing and the College of Policing, which will issue it internally. Any guidance for officers is of a highly tactical and operational nature and will therefore obviously have to sit within the police’s own guidance rather than a government-issued code of practice.

On how to determine whether an individual is on licence for a terrorist offence, this will be understood through close working by Counter Terrorism Policing and the Prison and Probation Service, which will include information-sharing and briefing about terrorist offenders on licence. If they breach their licence and are recalled, a warrant will be out for their arrest. Obviously, policemen can find out whether an offender is out on licence by checking their details on the police national computer, which will flag it.

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about potential operational constraints on the police because of potentially large numbers involved, obviously, I hope that there will not be a large number of people subject to these powers, but I am quite sure that if Counter Terrorism Policing and more routine and—shall we say, traditional?—policing come up against capacity issues, we will certainly hear about it and come back to debate this in further detail. I fear that I cannot supply any better detail than that at this point. However, I will have a dig and, if I can find anything, I shall come back to the noble Lord in writing, if that is acceptable.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Report stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a wide-ranging and fascinating debate, and some would say that this may be the House of Lords at its best.

I shall first address the amendments moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey. She has come late to the party, and I have to say that I think that her amendments have suffered for that reason. Her amendments have not been tested against the Human Rights Act in any way; we do not know what the House of Commons would think about them, and we do not know what the Supreme Court would think about them. Of course, that is in contrast to Amendment 45, where we have a good view of the House of Commons’ likely view, as well as that of the Supreme Court, and as far as we know it is HRA compliant. So I think the noble Baroness has difficulties with her amendments.

The noble Lord, Lord Farmer, spoke to his Amendment 44 and spoke about the lack of use of public space protection orders. I thought that we heard very effectively from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about how public space protection orders had not in practice been put to any great use. In fact, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, in his speech also explained why they were not suitable for protecting individuals, as opposed to the rights of groups. But I have to say that I think that the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, betrayed himself at the end of his speech when he spoke about the lack of evidence of public disorder, which he prayed in aid for having a review. I have to say that I am not thinking about public order —I am thinking about the individual women who are going to get these services and are being intimidated through cruel protest, in many ways.

I turn to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, to which I also have my name. I pay tribute to her for all the work that she has done on this matter; I know that she has been in constant discussion with Members of the other place and the Government, and this really is as good a chance as we have to get something on the statute books in good time. As I say, I pay tribute to her. I am also pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, has welcomed these efforts.

One of the most influential speeches was from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who talked about the practicalities of policing a 150-metre zone and local authorities being reluctant to put in place public space protection orders. He also talked about the ingenuity of protesters potentially being able to get around the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Morrisey. That was perhaps one of the most influential contributions this evening. I hope that the noble Baroness tests the opinion of the House and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I echo other noble Lords who said that this has been a wide-ranging and fascinating debate. As has been referenced and as noble Lords will be aware, through a free vote in the other place, Clause 9, which establishes buffer zones outside abortion clinics in England and Wales, was added to the Bill by 297 votes to 110. I said during the Second Reading of the Bill and in Committee that the Government will respect the will of the House of Commons.

At the time of introducing this Bill in the House of Lords, I signed a Section 19(1)(b) statement under the Human Rights Act 1998. This was because, at the time, we believed it was more likely than not that Clause 9 would be found to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. We have considered this again following the Supreme Court’s judgment in relation to the Abortion Services (Safe Access Zones) Bill in Northern Ireland. We now believe that Clause 9 is more likely than not to be compatible with the convention. However, we must be clear that while we can draw some parallels between Clause 9 and the Bill in Northern Ireland in relation to the balance of rights, they are not directly comparable. In particular, the threat levels from protests are different in Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Bill does not cover private property. It is also worth noting that the legislation in Northern Ireland is not yet in force. There have been no prosecutions, so it is difficult to make any assessment regarding enforceability of the Bill in Northern Ireland.

Clause 9 was described at the time in the other place as a “blunt instrument”, as others have noted. There is always a balance to be struck between the rights of protesters and the rights of others to go about their daily business free from harassment and disruption, as we have heard debated in relation to many of the other clauses of this Bill. People’s rights to gather, express their views and practise their religious beliefs are protected under Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. People’s rights to privacy in accessing healthcare services are protected under Article 8. All these rights are qualified, and it can be appropriate to infringe on them sometimes—for example, to protect other rights or prevent crime.

The Government committed to work with noble Lords across both sides of this debate to make Clause 9 clearer and more enforceable. I thank those noble Lords who took the time to meet me and discuss this issue, and I can assure them that all views were taken into careful consideration and constructive conversations were had on all sides.

The Government have decided to step back and will take a neutral stance during this debate. I committed, as I said earlier, at this Dispatch Box to respect the will of the House of Commons, and I think the best way to do that is to allow the House of Lords to express its will. This clause will undoubtedly be tested in the courts. But this evening, we are offering a free vote to noble Lords on the Government Benches—although I cannot speak for the other Benches—so that noble Lords can vote with their conscience on where the balance of rights should lie.

The Government believe that all the amendments on the Order Paper today would more likely than not be found to be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. With that, it is now for the House to decide which amendment, if any, they wish to support.

Police and Crime Commissioners: Accountability Arrangements

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 25th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have to say—and it will not please my noble friend—that the misconduct hearing of Mike Veale, who is, as noted, the former chief constable of Cleveland, is a matter for the Cleveland police and crime commissioner, and the management of the hearing itself is the responsibility of the independent, legally qualified chair appointed to it. It would be inappropriate to comment further while those proceedings are ongoing. As to why this has lasted longer than the normal 100 days of an officer being provided with a notice, it can be extended when the legally qualified chair considers it is in the interest of justice to do so, and I believe that is the case here.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, on 21 December in response to an earlier question by the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, described the situation as very concerning. That was in respect of the issue which the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has just reminded the House about. Since then in the press it has become evident that the Leicestershire PCC has paid out £56,000 in compensation after an ethics group claimed it had been dismissed unfairly, so does the Minister believe that recall legislation should be considered for PCCs?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the potential benefits and disbenefits of a recall mechanism were considered by the two-part review that I referenced in my Answer. It was decided that that would be to create a whole new body of bureaucracy and unnecessarily expensive. Ultimately, the public have the right of the ballot box, if you will, to determine the outcome of the PCC.

Rape: Operation Soteria

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Monday 23rd January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, we have put a lot of funding into the police, as the noble Baroness will know. The Ministry of Justice has allocated significant funds towards victims’ groups, and so on and so forth. In the year ending June 2022—and this comes off the back of the last rape review—the police recorded an increase in rape offences of about 20% compared to March 2020. Eighteen months into implementing the rape review action plan, we have seen some improvements: the number of adult rape cases referred by the police to the CPS was up 96%; the volume of adult rape cases charged by the CPS was up about two-thirds; and the number of adult rape cases reaching court was up 91%. Progress is being made—not quick enough, I agree.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, for the Minister’s information, Professor Betsy Stanko wrote the Operation Soteria report. One of the things she recommended in that report was the improvement of data quality. It may sound mundane, but it is at the heart of improving police force quality and the response to sex and rape allegations. One of the central points she made was that the data was unevenly recorded across the country. Does the Minister agree that this should be seen as a priority to try to do better for victims, who are not getting the justice they deserve?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with the noble Lord and thank him for the clarification—the professor predated me, obviously. Operation Soteria is bringing together all aspects of policing and CPS work with regards to rape cases. It is elevating the status of the victims above those of the suspects, which I would argue is long overdue. As part of that, and in order to validate the work of the operation, it is clear that data collection has to be uniform across the country. It will be available to be rolled out in June, as I say, across all police forces, but it is showing signs of improvement.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Committee stage
Monday 16th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this group responds to the amendments tabled in relation to the political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme and separate amendments tabled regarding guidance on the scheme, impacts of the enhanced tier on the higher education sector and the exemption for legal activities. In addition, it introduces a number of minor government amendments to the scheme, which I will cover shortly.

Before I address the amendments and clauses specifically, let me say that we are not yet able to publish a policy statement relating to the power taken in Clause 77(1), which we committed to do in the Bill’s delegated powers memorandum. The Government are in the process of carefully considering feedback from industry and the important scrutiny in this House. As such, we believe that publishing a policy statement now would only muddy the waters when the Government’s focus is rightly on listening to Peers’ concerns.

It is the first duty of government to protect its people, the country they live in and the integrity of their democratic institutions. The political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme will play an important role in delivering on this agenda. Dialogue between policymakers and the rest of society is an essential feature of our democratic system. It provides parliamentarians and Ministers with important information and expert analysis, helping us to become more informed. It allows decision-makers and the public to be exposed to diverse opinions and voices, including from the international business sector. It can be a positive contribution to healthy and robust public debate, and will continue to be welcome in the UK.

However, when communications or disbursements are not transparent, it can lead to corruption or give certain groups an unfair advantage. It can be seen as a way for powerful interests to exert excessive influence on political and governmental processes, potentially at the expense of the British public. It is particularly important to be able to identify foreign influence. The UK Government and the British people are entitled to know when foreign interests seek to influence public policy and public opinion. We should be able to identify foreign influence and evaluate those contributions properly, including the aggregate impact over time. Some foreign lobbying presents risks to national security. Members of the Committee will have heard Ken McCallum, in his annual threat speech in November, discussing the challenge from state threats. He said:

“The West is in a contest in which our security, values and democratic institutions are at stake.”


The Intelligence and Security Committee discussed political influence and state threats in its 2020 Russia report, calling for a scheme like the one delivered through the political influence tier of FIRS, which we are debating here today. The political influence tier of FIRS will play a role in strengthening openness and transparency in those processes, with the additional aim of deterring foreign powers that wish to pursue their aims covertly through agents and proxies. Noble Lords will be aware that some foreign states increasingly seek to influence how we think, vote and feel. Such states view themselves as being in a long-term contest with the West and take a much broader view of what they are interested in than simply national security matters. Covert political influence from state actors can damage our democratic processes, institutions and wider societal cohesion.

The foreign influence registration scheme will require those acting covertly with malign intent to make a conscious choice between registering their activity and publicly declaring their provenance, or not registering and risking prosecution. This raises the cost of conducting such activity and will be a significant deterrent to those who seek to harm our democracy.

Before we move on to the main debate, I will very briefly explain the government amendments in this group. Amendments 82, 89, 99, 100, 101 and 102 make minor technical changes to ensure consistency in the use of “arrangement” and “agreement” across the foreign influence registration scheme provisions. These amendments will assist with the clarity and understanding of the scheme.

Government Amendment 92 amends the existing provisions regarding public communications in the political influence tier of FIRS. This amendment provides that where a public communication is reasonably clear that it is being made by a foreign principal on its own behalf, it will not need to be registered. The Bill already provides an existing exclusion from registration requirements where it is reasonably clear that the public communication is made at the direction of a foreign principal. This is in keeping with our commitment to ensure that the scheme is proportionate and does not impose any unnecessary burdens.

During the last day in Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, raised a number of questions regarding the foreign power condition, which we dealt with at some length last week, and the foreign influence registration scheme. I thank her for her letter and will deal with the core of her questions now, to ensure that this is on the record. On the question of whether a member of this House will need to register when entering arrangements, the responsibility to register under the political influence tier of FIRS will lie with the foreign principal carrying out the activity in the United Kingdom, or with the person in an arrangement with the foreign principal to carry out activities in the United Kingdom. There will be no requirement on the person whom the foreign principal is seeking to influence to register activities. As such, Members of this House would be required to register only if they entered into arrangements with foreign principals to carry out political influence activities in the United Kingdom. This applies equally for arrangements with any foreign entity, including political parties in government or in opposition.

There was also a question in relation to the foreign power condition of why “a governing political party” has been included in the meaning of “a foreign power”. It addresses situations where there is a dominant political party or parties within a country to such an extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities have been carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government. The noble Baroness posed the question of what constitutes a governing political party. It is right that this will vary in different countries. Clearly we cannot legislate for every different administrative structure. Rather, in criminal proceedings where this was an issue, the prosecution would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a political party was the governing political party based on the facts of the case. Therefore, any political party with no members holding posts in the Government would not be in scope. The definition in Clause 30(2) means that a political party is a governing party only if individuals within that party hold posts in the Government or part of the Government. For example, the Democratic Party runs the US Administration and sets the direction of government policy. It is therefore the governing political party in the US.

To omit Clause 30(1)(e) as the noble Baroness suggested and to rely entirely on the other aspects of the definition of “a foreign power” risks creating a loophole whereby sophisticated state actors could claim to act on behalf of the ruling party but not the Government. To be clear, foreign powers, including governing political parties of a foreign Government or their members acting in their capacity as a member, do not have to register their own activities. However, those in arrangements with foreign entities—including governing political parties—to carry out political influence activities in the UK will need to register those arrangements.

I will be listening very carefully to the remarks made on this group and will respond to the amendments directly in my closing comments. I look forward to this important debate.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, in his opening statement, the noble Lord said that the Government plan to publish a policy statement and that the reason they were not doing so now, in anticipation of Committee, was that they did not want to muddy the waters. Can I ask the noble Lord whether he plans to publish that policy statement and make it available before Report?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is certainly my intention, yes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 83 provides that the Government must lay secondary legislation to define “specified persons” within 60 days of Royal Assent. A specified person under this Bill is a person who engages another for foreign activity arrangements. The purpose of the amendment is to probe who that could involve and whether they must be representative of a national Government or state. This amendment is further intended to probe the unintended consequences of the FIRS scheme and to illustrate that the legislation as drafted creates uncertainty as to who it applies to.

The Government have also tabled amendments as part of this group to clarify that activities being carried out must be registered at the time that they are carried out. A separate government amendment in this group limits the circumstances when affirmative procedures must be used in relation to defining “specified persons”, removing a layer of scrutiny. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, government Amendments 85, 86, 87, 94, 95 and 96 are minor and technical amendments that will make it clear that a current—rather than a previous—registration, is required to meet the registration requirements of either tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. This will mean that, where previously registered activities are resumed, a current registration will be required rather than a person within scope of the scheme being able to rely on the fact that the activities had previously been registered. This will support the need for the register to remain accurate and up to date, providing the best possible insight into the scale of foreign political influence activities, and activities of specified entities.

Government Amendment 121 ensures that that the clauses are as clear as possible and accurately reflect our intent. To specify an entity on the enhanced tier, the Secretary of State will have a regulatory making power as per Clause 63. Under subsections (5) and (6) of Clause 92, this power to specify will be subject to an affirmative procedure. The amendment adds wording to clarify that the affirmative procedure applies where a new entity is being specified. Where an entity is being de-specified, or an already specified entity is being re-specified—for example, because it has changed its name—a negative procedure will apply, under Clause 92(4). This will ensure that both the specifying and removal of entities from the enhanced tier will be subject to the necessary level of parliamentary scrutiny.

Amendment 83 seeks to require the Secretary of State to define “specified persons” within 60 days of this Act being passed. “Specified persons” are defined within Clause 63 of the Bill; I therefore interpret this amendment as being intended to set a requirement on the Government to specify any entities to which the enhanced tier will apply within 60 days of the Act being passed. The specification of a person will mean that individuals or entities will have to register any arrangements with the specified person to carry out activities in the UK. It will also set a requirement for specified entities themselves to register their own activities. I am sure the House will recognise that these are far-reaching requirements, and it is therefore vital that the designation of a specified entity is done following appropriate consideration and on the basis of circumstances that exist at the time, and the most up-to-date and comprehensive evidence. A blanket requirement to designate all specified entities within 60 days would impede the careful case-by-case basis consideration that is required and would be a disproportionate approach to the specification of persons under this tier. I therefore do not believe that this amendment is necessary, and I encourage the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

No; I cannot respond to that gallantly, can I? I will plough on.

Interestingly, my son recently completed a master’s in journalism at City, University of London. He told me that the public interest part of the journalism course was the least attended, partly because there are fewer jobs in it, which I thought was interesting and worth reflecting on. It is a very important part of any journalist’s work, but it is not where the majority of students choose to study. I thought that was an interesting observation.

The amendments in this group relate to defining a foreign power for the purposes of its activity in the UK. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, moved her Amendment 66A, which would ensure that journalists and civil society are not wrongly included. This debate could have spread over to the group we will discuss on Monday on the foreign influence registration scheme and how that affects businesses, universities and political parties. In a sense, we will revisit a lot of these issues. Nevertheless, noble Lords have made points that will bear repeating, because they can be repeated in that context.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, tabled similar amendments to create exclusions in certain instances. Amendments 67 and 69 would expand the definition to include corporations working on the behalf of foreign Governments. It is worth reflecting on the Government’s previous inconsistent approach to Huawei in 5G networks, and their lack of understanding of the risks. I believe that this underlines a need for a more coherent strategy. Serious questions remain following the 2020 announcement that Huawei would be removed from UK 5G networks, which we believe was long overdue, about why it was given the go-ahead in the first place. The Huawei case was sadly illustrative of how, in the past decade, the Government have allowed our national security to become an afterthought, creating risks to it. We on this side of the House believe that the Government need to invest in homegrown alternatives to end our national dependence on high-risk vendors.

My noble friend Lady Hayter made a number of very interesting points about political parties, which were picked up by other noble Lords in the debate. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s answer to the points she raised.

The noble Lord, Lord Black, referred to the letter in the Times today to which he was a co-signatory. The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, also spoke about the potential chilling effect of the Bill’s provisions as they are currently drafted. They both spoke about the importance of a public interest journalism.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, made a point that I think will be repeated on Monday but is well worth repeating. It is the problem of overreporting. That is a theme that has run through all the briefings which I have received and that I am sure all noble Lord have received. It a fear in the university sector, the business sector and political parties, and literally hundreds of NGOs are also concerned about this matter—but that is something that can be talked about on Monday, as I have just mentioned.

When the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, summed up, he put his finger on the main problem with this section of the Bill, which is defining the anomalies of political parties, whether they are in government or not, or are part of coalitions or are opposition parties, and the many sorts of relationships which all political parties have internationally and how that works with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Black, about the importance of public interest journalism, and how that is a very international approach, often dealing with leaked information and illegal information, and how journalists are to be protected in pursuing that valuable work. So this is a complex area. I am sure the Minister will, as usual, be very careful in his answer, but I hope he retains an open mind, as he did on the previous group when we were considering issues raised in this Committee.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I again thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. Amendment 66A seeks to exclude journalism and civil society activity from the foreign power condition unless the conduct is instigated by or is under the direction or control of a foreign power. I acknowledge the intention of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to protect legitimate activity from being criminalised under the Bill with this amendment. However, the Government do not believe that the Bill criminalises legitimate activity and, as such, it is our view that this amendment is unnecessary.

The Committee will be aware that the foreign power condition provides a single and consistent means by which a link between a person’s activities and a foreign state can be drawn. Meeting the foreign power condition is not in itself wrong. It becomes relevant when the other elements of the offences to which it applies are met. As such, the Government do not believe there is a risk to those who engage in legitimate acts, such as journalism or forms of civil society activity.

Turning to the specifics of the amendment, we know that those with hostile intent seek to hide their activities under the appearance of legitimacy, and this amendment could therefore create a gap in our ability to prosecute such individuals. This amendment would mean that an activity carried out with the financial or other assistance of, in collaboration with, or with the agreement of a foreign power would not meet the requirements of the foreign power condition. As a consequence, where a state threat actor posing as a journalist has been engaged in harmful activity which is an offence under the Bill, they would not commit an offence even if we could show that they were receiving specific funding in relation to that activity from a foreign power. This would produce an unwelcome effect whereby those seeking to cause harm to the UK could pose as journalists or members of civil society groups or operate through proxies in order to make it more difficult to be prosecuted.

The Government understand that journalists and those conducting civil society activity can be acting wholly legitimately when receiving funding from a foreign power or working in collaboration with it. However, the other requirements for offences to be committed mean that those legitimate acts would not be captured. In answer to my noble friend Lord Black, I can be clear that this Bill targets wrongful activity from states, not whistleblowing —but we will be coming back to whistleblowing later in today’s session. I also hope that those comments reassure my noble friends Lord Black and Lady Stowell and, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.

I now turn to Amendments 67 to 71 on the meaning of foreign power, which were tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley on Thames and Lord Purvis of Tweed. The noble Lords have tabled an amendment to remove from the definition a political party which is the governing political party of foreign Government. The inclusion of governing political parties addresses situations where there is a dominant political party or parties within a country to such an extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities are being carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government. We know all too well that states seeking to exert their influence or cause harm to the United Kingdom will do so through a number of different vectors, and we do not wish to create a gap in our legislation which state actors could exploit.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this is another JCHR-recommended amendment, ably spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Its effect is to narrow the definition of foreign power threat activity by removing giving support and assistance to a person involved in offences under the Bill. The reason for the amendment is that the support and assistance become illegal if unrelated to espionage activity. As the noble Lord explained, its effect does not alter the lines which include facilitating such offending under subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of the relevant clause. His objection to paragraph (c) was that it does not make sense and is too vague. I take on board the legal points and his examination of the English in that paragraph, but the real point of this is to provoke a debate and discussion, to narrow the definition and encourage the Minister to explain more fully what is meant by the definitions set down in the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 72 seeks to narrow the definition of foreign power threat activity by removing the conduct of those who give support or assistance to individuals, as has been noted.

The definition of foreign power threat activity is a vital part of the Bill, ensuring that the police have the powers they need in support of investigations into state threats offences. It is important that foreign power threat activity has sufficient breadth to allow our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to act where a threat is posed to the safety of the United Kingdom.

There will inevitably be overlap between facilitating on the one hand and assisting or supporting individuals on the other to carry out certain harmful activity under the Bill. However, it is important to retain both elements as they serve distinct purposes. We do not wish to create a gap in the legislation that prevents us being able to act against persons who assist individuals involved in harmful activity, and therefore we cannot accept this amendment.

Both noble Lords implied that it is casting the net too broadly to say that it is not necessary to identify a specific offence or act. However, given the harm that can arise from state threats activity, it is right that the Government can act to disrupt individuals during the early stages of their conduct. Therefore, it will not always be possible to determine the end goal of their conduct. Indeed, in some cases an individual may not have even decided the precise outcome they seek to bring about but, none the less, they have an intention to engage in state threats activity. We therefore want to ensure that the provisions are robust enough to catch criminals in these cases. Waiting until we have a full picture of the act they wish to commit could mean that we have to wait until the act itself is committed.

Additionally, I reassure the House that the reference to

“conduct which gives support or assistance”

under Clause 31(1)(c) relates specifically to conduct falling under Clause 31(1)(a), as is made explicit through the reference to paragraph (a). The Government’s view is that it is implicit that the conduct in question must be support in relation to acts or threats under Clause 31(1)(a), rather than support in relation to any unrelated activity. Thus, the provision does not risk bringing activity wholly unrelated to state threats activity into scope.

Police: Appointments in PCC Offices

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for her perspective. Of course, I will take those points back, but I will again robustly defend the process that she put in place: I think it is working.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government cannot continue to sit on the sidelines on this issue. The noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has repeatedly raised his concerns and the Government have chosen to sit on their hands. The Minister said that the regulations exist and are being followed, but is he satisfied with them? The current situation undermines the police in Leicestershire and the position of PCCs in general. Does he think the regulations need to be changed?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I certainly agree with the noble Lord that the current set of circumstances surrounding this individual case are absolutely disturbing. However, the regulations are still being followed and it would be entirely inappropriate of me to comment on an individual case.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I found this a fascinating short debate. It caused me to reflect on my time in this House, which has been a few decades now. Over 20 years ago, I remember sitting in on debates on treason in the Council of Europe, covering the way it would be addressed and the appropriateness of the death penalty within council member states. There were similar debates, although the debates regarding treason have evolved over those decades.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, for raising this issue. He referenced the Policy Exchange paper; obviously, thinking is developing in this area, so it is appropriate to have this debate here in Committee. I want to pick up the last point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, about the impact of the word “treason” and whether that actually deflects from the purpose of trying to fill the gap in the legislation identified by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

I listened to all noble Lords who spoke so interestingly in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made a point about the labels put on particular words and how that may influence juries, as in the example he gave. It caused me to reflect on when, as a magistrate, I was asked to convict somebody of a terrorism offence, which does not happen very often in magistrates’ courts. This particular terrorism offence charge was for graffiti on the Tube. The words used caused me and my colleagues to reflect on the appropriateness of that charge. I think the defendant pleaded guilty to that offence, so all we were doing was sentencing, but we had exactly that discussion about the appropriateness of words in particular contexts. I can see the argument that “treason” is so emotive that it could indeed affect juries’ likelihood of getting convictions.

As I said, this has been a very interesting debate. I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, that some very serious points have been made against his amendment. Nevertheless, there is sympathy that there is a gap in the legislation, which may be filled in other ways.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that this has been a fascinating debate on a fascinating subject. I thank my noble friend Lord Bethell for introducing Amendment 37A on treason in his name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I will now explain why the Government cannot accept the inclusion of this new clause in the Bill.

As noble Lords who are interested in this subject will have noted, the Government are looking closely at the issue of treason, as stated by the Secretary of State at Second Reading in the other place. The Government have been reviewing the case for and against reform of the UK’s treason laws and that review has not yet concluded. What we can say is that the UK has extensive terrorism laws—the “bristling arsenal” mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—which protect the safety of the UK and its citizens from forms of terrorism which might be considered treasonous. However, it would be correct to assert that treason law is outdated and in need of reform in light of the growing threats from foreign state actors. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the Bill provides a suite of measures for where somebody assists an enemy; it just would not be called treason.

I understand the significant history regarding the evolution of treason in the UK. Because of this, arguments have been made in this House and outside that an offence of treason goes further than criminal offences in relation to terrorism and state threats. Treason acknowledges the duty that a citizen has not to betray their state and many consider that a reformed, modernised treason offence would stress the importance of this through a specific criminal offence, reaffirming the bonds of citizenship that we have to the UK and to each other.

This amendment and others relating to treason have been proposed in previous Bills, but considering the role of treason in modern society is a substantial undertaking and one that we are looking at very closely. I acknowledge that this amendment and others seek to address concerns regarding the lack of a usable modern treason offence in the UK, so we welcome debate on this important topic.

Obviously, I reassure the noble Lords, Lord Bethell and Lord Faulks, and others that the Government do take this issue seriously and will listen carefully to the views offered by all noble Lords. However, as noble Lords may know, the Government are currently considering options for a formal review of this issue, including the possibility of the Law Commission conducting a review in this area. This area is complex, as the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Purvis, so eloquently explained.

I therefore thank my noble friend once again for his amendment but ask him to withdraw Amendment 37A while the Government’s review is ongoing.

Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2022

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Tuesday 20th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his opening comments. He has outlined what the statutory instrument does. These changes come as a result of the High Court ruling in June this year in the case of Liberty v the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for the FCDO.

This SI will allow for the internal authorisation of the acquisition of communications data solely for serious crime purposes in urgent situations, as prescribed by Section 61A of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. I understand that parts of the wider case were dismissed. However, the High Court ruled in favour of Liberty on one key point—namely, deeming it to be unlawful for the security services to obtain individuals’ communications data from telecom providers without having prior independent authorisation in certain circumstances.

In preparing for this debate, I read the blog of Neil Brown, who says he is an internet, telecoms and tech lawyer. He commented:

“I suspect, absent an appeal, there will be a tweak to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, to provide for independent authorisation of requests by security or intelligence agencies before obtaining communications data, retained under Part 4 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, for the applicable crime purpose.”


This SI is indeed the tweak he refers to. He goes on:

“While important, this decision is unlikely to have a material impact on telecommunications operators, whether it applies to all communications data or only communications data retained by a telecommunications operator under Part 4. This is because it relates to what happens ‘behind the scenes’ before a Part 3 authorisation or notice is served on a telecommunications operator. The impact of a Part 3 authorisation or notice has not changed, nor has the obligation to provide data in response to a notice. I suppose that it might have an impact in the short term on the volume of requests, if OCDA”—


the Office for Communications Data Authorisations—

“is to have an increased workload—presumably, if that is the case, there would be a plan to increase OCDA’s staffing.”

My questions for the Minister arising from those comments are, first, does he believe that Neil Brown is accurate in his assessment that there is likely to be a lack of impact on the telecommunication operators through this SI? Secondly, is there a plan to increase the OCDA’s staffing if necessary?

We welcome the Government’s corrective action through this SI. We recognise that there needs to be an appropriate balance between our civil liberties and the fast-changing threats posed by serious and organised crime.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who participated in this short debate for their considered views on the regulations. To go back to where I started, it is vital that the public have confidence in the discharge of the important powers contained in the investigatory powers regime and that these organisations can carry out their statutory duties to keep us all safe.

The noble Lord, Lord German, asked me about the relevant pieces of retained EU legislation or case law that pertain to the High Court decision. These particular pieces of law are: the Parliament and Council directives—I shall not go into the numbers as there are a lot of them—as implemented in the UK by Parliament in the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003; Privacy International v the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Secretary of State for the Home Department —again, a load of numbers which I will not bother repeating; and a third one which is in French, and I am afraid my pronunciation powers prevent me having a go.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Purvis, intend to tighten the scope of offences in Clauses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 15 and 29. This is achieved in these amendments by leaving out

“or ought reasonably to know”

from the relevant clauses, meaning that an offence is committed under these clauses only if the person

“knows … that to be the case.”

The practical effect of these amendments is therefore that offences are committed only when a person knows that their actions are damaging. Given that the offences in the Bill could carry significant sentences, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, the Committee is right to probe to what extent a person must know that they are committing such an offence, especially as it will otherwise be up to the courts to determine whether a person ought reasonably to have known that they were committing the offence.

However, it is not unusual for offences to be committed when a person ought reasonably to know. There is a recent example of this, which includes the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. I was recently googling it, and it seems that the Act was passed by the coalition Government.

Further to this, if an offence is committed only when a person knows it to be the case that their actions are damaging, it could be difficult to get a successful prosecution. None the less, it is right and helpful that the Committee should ask the Minister to expand on the points we have heard in this short debate.

As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, juries often decide on the state of somebody’s mind when an action is committed, and the decision as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty can easily turn on their perception of the state of the person’s mind. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, spoke about the difference between knowledge and imputed knowledge. As he said, it would indeed be helpful if the Minister could expand on the level of imputed knowledge that may be expected to secure a conviction.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, reminded us of the complexity of dealing with “grey space”, as he referred to it. This is an opportunity for the Minister to try to clarify the situation so that prosecutions can be appropriately brought and reasonably thought to have secured an appropriate conviction.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their broad support for the Bill and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for introducing these amendments.

The test that a person

“knows, or ought reasonably to know”

the effect of their conduct recurs throughout the offences and measures in Part 1 of the Bill. Failing to include an element of objectivity in this test would risk seriously undermining the offences and not criminalising behaviour for which we consider individuals should be culpable. Those conducting state threats activity are likely to be skilled at their tradecraft and will be adept at hiding their activities from our intelligence and law enforcement agencies. It is important that we do not hinder our ability to prosecute in these cases.

We consider that knowledge is an appropriate threshold for these offences and the foreign power condition. However, we believe it is also right to include constructive knowledge in these provisions. Given the seriousness of the offences to which this test applies, it is essential that an element of objectivity is included to ensure that offences can still be prosecuted where individuals are unjustly claiming not to have known the relevant consequences or circumstances. It is, of course, right that those who could not have seen those consequences or circumstances should not be criminally liable under these offences.

I think it is helpful at this point to draw noble Lords’ attention back to the 1911 Official Secrets Act, which we are replacing with this Bill. The offences under that legislation cover certain actions, such as obtaining information, by a person

“for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests”

of the United Kingdom. Those offences require a no-fault element to be proved in relation to the prejudice to the safety or interests of the state. The proposed amendments to Clauses 1, 4 and 12 contain the same requirement for prejudice to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, but, importantly, and as recommended by the Law Commission, introduce a subjective fault element. We agree with the Law Commission that these offences should contain a subjective fault element. Crucially, the offences would not capture a person who genuinely could not reasonably have known the effect or nature of their conduct.

Perhaps I might provide a hypothetical scenario of how the proposed amendment could affect the foreign power condition in Clause 29. It is possible that an individual is unaware that they are working for an undercover foreign agent. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, made a very good point about the grey area in which much of this activity takes place. Let us imagine that the security services tell that individual that the person they are working for is, in fact, a foreign agent but the individual refuses to believe it despite clear warnings. At this point, it would be reasonable to make that individual culpable should they continue activities at the behest of the foreign agent, whereas it might prove difficult to successfully prosecute the individual if knowledge had to be proved.

To be clear, the individual in this example would still need to meet all the other tests in any given offence to be charged with that offence. Meeting the foreign power condition is not in itself wrongdoing.

The same logic applies to other amendments tabled. In Clauses 3 and 15, I am sure the whole House would agree that it is not right that an individual should escape liability when they reasonably should have known that their conduct could assist a foreign intelligence service or that they were receiving a benefit from a foreign intelligence service. A purely subjective test would make these offences very difficult to successfully prosecute.

Constructive knowledge is applied by the courts in other circumstances and the Government are confident that this test is appropriate. There will be a range of culpability between those who have actual knowledge and those who should have known, but that is something that is appropriate for sentencing rather than conviction. I hope that goes some way to answering the question put by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—ah, apparently not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned, there should be a second amendment to go with Amendment 13. There is only one amendment in this group.

Clause 3 means that for the first time it will be a criminal offence to be a covert foreign agent and engage in activity that assists a foreign intelligence service. While the clause currently states that an offence is committed when a person engages in conduct that

“it is reasonably possible … may materially assist a foreign intelligence service”,

this amendment would mean instead that an offence is committed only if it is likely materially to assist a foreign intelligence service. The impact of the amendment is that it increases the threshold for the likelihood of whether an action assists a foreign intelligence service, reflecting concerns raised by the JCHR. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, this would be punishable by up to 14 years’ imprisonment, so we look forward to the Minister clarifying why the offence is not more tightly drawn.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, raised a very interesting question about the large group of consultants with experience of the security services and forces who provide training to any number of actors across the world, and how they may be caught by this provision. I look forward to the Minister’s answer.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 13 seeks to narrow the scope of the offence provided for in Clause 3(2). For brevity, I will refer to a foreign intelligence service as a FIS.

The Government reject this amendment because we do not consider it to be necessary. Clause 3(2) provides for an offence where a person engages in conduct which it is reasonably possible may materially assist a FIS in carrying out UK-related activities. Amendment 13 seeks to change this to “likely materially to” assist a FIS. We do not consider there to be a difference between the two terms. I recognise the spirit in which this amendment has been made, to raise the bar for this offence being conducted, but I assure noble Lords that for this offence to apply, a person not only needs to engage in the conduct that it is reasonably possible may assist a FIS but must know, or ought reasonably to know, that it will assist a FIS in carrying out UK-related activities.

To ensure that we do not capture legitimate activity, there are defences in Clause 3(7). Not only will we not criminalise activity conducted in accordance with an agreement to which we are a party—such as agreements with our Five Eyes partners based in the UK—but we will exclude law enforcement and others who are legally obliged under UK law to assist a FIS. That goes some way to answering the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. Additionally, where someone with public functions—

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I open by echoing what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said: all the arguments in all the amendments could become redundant if we support not putting Clauses 19 and 20 in the Bill. The strength of feeling demonstrated through this short debate leads me to believe that that may well be what we vote on when we come to Report.

I forget whether it was my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti or the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, who referred to this as copy-and-paste legislation. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, who gave the analogy of chicken coops being moved around to replicate these civil injunctions. But perhaps the most powerful speech we have heard was from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who gave six examples of SDPOs being tougher than TPIMs, which really caused me to sit back and reflect on the meat of what we are dealing with here today.

My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said she has always been against what she called quasi-injunctive orders—civil orders—going all the way back to ASBOs. This caused me to reflect, as a magistrate, on which of those orders I deal with when I sit in courts. I deal with some of them: football banning orders, knife crime prevention orders and domestic violence protection orders—I think most noble Lords who have taken part in this debate think DVPOs are an appropriate use of civil orders. But, of course, the list goes on. That is really the point my noble friend makes: there are a growing number of these civil orders that, if breached, result in criminal convictions.

To repeat what I said, here we are meeting a very extreme situation in which people planning to get involved in protest or to help people do so can potentially be criminalised for that activity. The nature of the potential offence being committed is different.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, went through in detail, for which I thank him, the nature of the injunctions in Clauses 19 and 20, so I will not go through all that again, but I will make one point that he did not make. We are concerned that there does not seem to be any requirement for the person involved to have knowledge that the protest activities were going to cause serious disruption. That lack of a requirement of knowledge is a source of concern for us.

In the debate on the previous group, my noble friend Lord Rooker and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, spoke about the comments of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and my noble friend quoted from them. The noble Lord, Lord Beith, spoke about the Secretary of State issuing guidance to chief police officers and how that could go down a road whose potential political implications, in a sense, I prefer not to think about.

I will quote briefly from other committees which have reflected on this legislation. First, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has said:

“Serious Disruption Prevention Orders represent a disproportionate response to the disruption caused by protest. They are likely to result in interference with legitimate peaceful exercise of Article 10 and 11 rights. The police already have powers to impose conditions on protests and to arrest those who breach them. Other provisions of this Bill, if passed, will provide the police with even greater powers to restrict or prevent disruptive protest.”


Another committee, the Constitution Committee, said:

“The purposes for which a Serious Disruption Prevention Order can be issued are broad. They can be issued not only to prevent a person committing a protest-related offence but also to prevent a person from carrying out activities related to a protest. Such a protest need cause, or be likely to cause, serious disruption to only two people. This gives the orders a pre-emptive or preventative role. Furthermore, ‘protest-related’ offence is not adequately defined in this part of the Bill nor … is ‘serious disruption’. This undermines legal certainty. We recommend that the meaning of ‘protest-related offence’ is clarified more precisely.”


The Minister has a big job on his hands to try to convince any Member of this Committee that he is on the right track. The amendments in my name—the clause stand part amendments—are the quickest way to put this part of the Bill out of its misery.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, there are notices to oppose within this group, so it may help if I start by addressing serious disruption prevention orders as a whole, before turning to amendments to the clause. SDPOs will target protestors who are determined to repeatedly inflict disruption on the public or those who simply wish to go about their daily lives. Our experience at recent protests has shown that many police are encountering the same individuals, who are determined repeatedly to inflict disruption on the public.

It cannot be right that a small group of individuals repeatedly trample on the rights of the public without let or hindrance. Yes, many are arrested, but after paying small fines or serving short or suspended sentences, they are free to reoffend. This measure would, following the consideration and permission of the courts, allow for proportionate and necessary restriction or requirements to be placed on individuals to prevent them causing harm.

Additionally, in some cases, individuals choose to not get their hands dirty. They go around the country speaking to young people who are determined to make the world a better place—not to encourage them to study and seek out a career to better the planet, or even to enter politics to enact change; instead, they encourage them to commit criminal offences, alienate the public from their cause and jeopardise their opportunity for a career that will actually make a difference. Why should these individuals, who contribute to serious disruption, be permitted to behave as they do without consequence?

This is why SDPOs are needed, as drafted. They will provide an alternative, non-custodial route to prevent those who have a track record of trampling on the rights of others from doing so. The threshold for the imposition of these orders is appropriately high and I trust our courts to impose them only where necessary.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about the HMICFRS conclusion. The report from the policing inspectorate considered only orders which would always ban an individual from protesting. SDPOs grant the courts discretion to impose any prohibitions and requirements necessary to protect the public from protest-related crimes and serious disruption. Depending on the individual circumstances, this may mean that the court will not consider it necessary to stop individuals attending protests.

Amendments 128, 129 and 130 would raise the evidential threshold for SDPOs to the criminal standard. I am sure that many who support these amendments also support the civil courts approving injunctions against protesters. These are made on the civil burden of proof against large numbers of people, including “persons unknown”. SDPOs are made against single known individuals.

A number of noble Lords asked why SDPOs can be granted using a civil standard of proof, including the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Skidelsky, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford, among others. The use of the civil standard of proof is not a novel concept for preventive orders. Football banning orders, for example, use the same standard of proof to help prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches. By using a civil standard of proof, courts will be allowed, following due consideration, to place prohibitions or requirements they consider necessary to prevent an individual causing disruption.

Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) (Threshold Amount) Order 2022

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Thursday 24th November 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support this order as well. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick said, it seems a reasonable increase and some organisations would have gone to £3,000. However, there were other respondents to the consultation who were against the increase to £1,000; they wanted to keep it at the lower limit. Can the Minister say what their concerns were? Although I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that £1,000 seems reasonable, other people thought it should have stayed at its original level: does the Minister know why they thought that? He indicates that he does not know why—okay.

I have some of the same figures that the Minister quoted. The Explanatory Memorandum states that the volume of DAMLs is rising steeply and gave those figures. The question is: what percentage of those 105,000 referrals were over the new £1,000 threshold—what difference will increasing the threshold to £1,000 make?

On the further figures that the Minister quoted, he said that only 2% of all DAMLs were refused consent in 2019-20, of which only 1,062 progressed towards asset denial. The question is, of that 2%, how many of those DAMLs were for amounts over £1,000 and so would still be caught? Both those questions are about how much the amount of work will be reduced by increasing this limit, although we of course approve of the objective.

One of the main benefits suggested by the Government, with which we agree, is that this measure should free up law enforcement to pursue other activities. We welcome that in itself. We heard from the current Home Secretary’s predecessor that the National Crime Agency has been asked to make staffing cuts of up to 20%. Can the Minister say anything about whether that previous expectation is still in place or has now been ruled out?

The Explanatory Memorandum states:

“A full Impact Assessment has been published alongside the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which considers the impact of the changes in this instrument.”


One of our key concerns about that Bill is its failure to tackle fraud and economic crime, with falling rates of enforcement and prosecution. I understand that this change is intended to reduce the number of ineffective DAMLs, but what action is being taken alongside that to try to increase the prosecution rate? It is a huge problem and it is very time-intensive to secure successful prosecutions—I understand that—so although we support this SI I would be grateful if the Minister could set out in a slightly broader context how he will try to increase the possibility of getting successful convictions.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their support. In answer to the detailed statistical questions from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, the National Crime Agency has yet to publish its report into 2020-21 or 2021-22. The details will be in there; I will be happy to share that report as soon as it is published, if that is acceptable.

The noble Lord also asked me about staffing at the National Crime Agency. I cannot answer his specific question and do not wish to stray there, but I can say that we are increasing capacity in law enforcement to analyse and act on suspicious activity report intelligence. That includes 75 additional officers in the UKFIU, which will almost double capacity. Some 45 of those officers are already in post, and the milestone for recruiting the remaining 30 is the end of this financial year, 2022-23. I will not go beyond that at the moment but we all share the noble Lord’s concerns, particularly about financial crime, which, as we know, is a pressing problem.

However, we should also salute the news stories I heard this morning about the Metropolitan Police apparently busting a fairly sizeable scamming organisation. Well done them; let us hope that that results in a large number of successful prosecutions.

I will stop there. Once again, I thank both noble Lords for their support. We believe that this intelligence is a critical tool in our ability to identify, disrupt and recover the hundreds of millions of pounds that underpin the most serious organised crime in the UK. That intelligence will be preserved through this adjustment and the requirement to submit intelligence-only SARs even when businesses are using the threshold exemption. Increasing the threshold is a measure supported by industry and law enforcement. I am sorry, I do not know who did not support the rise; I will try to find out.

Setting the threshold at a more appropriate level to reflect the current landscape is an important step towards improving the performance of the anti-money laundering system to better disrupt money laundering, terrorist financing and high-harm offences.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall open by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for setting the scene and the background to this group of amendments. I agree with the way that he set out the history of this group of amendments. I also thank my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for the way she set out her amendments and commented on the other amendments. I agree with her assessment that the Bill, as drafted, is vague and broad—and that it is vague and broad in a dangerous way. I agree with those central points.

Throughout the Bill, a number of clauses state that it is a defence for a person charged with an offence under the clause to

“prove that they had a reasonable excuse”

for their actions. As we have heard, the JCHR flagged this as a reverse of the burden of proof, so that rather than the prosecution having to prove that a person’s actions were done without a reasonable excuse and so were unlawful, it is for the defendant to prove, after they have been charged, that they had a reasonable excuse for their actions. This is in contrast to an offence such as obstruction of the highway, which we have just heard about, where the prosecution must prove that the defendant did not have lawful authority or excuse for their actions. For the new locking-on offence, the burden of proof would be on the defendant to show that he or she had a reasonable excuse.

Such a reverse burden of proof may be inconsistent not only with Articles 10 and 11 but with the presumption of innocence—a central principle of criminal justice and an aspect of Article 6 of the ECHR and the right to a fair trial. This is because requiring the defendant to prove something, even on the balance of probabilities, may result in a conviction despite there being an element of doubt, and it is hard to see why a reverse burden is necessary or appropriate in this case. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, gave the example of a bladed article and the reverse burden of proof in that context. It is of course a defence I am very familiar with as a sitting magistrate in London. It is of course right that the court will take its own view on whether the reverse burden of proof is reasonable in these circumstances.

I agree with the point made by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that the better situation is that a police officer, when considering whether to charge, at that point takes into account whether there is a reasonable excuse, rather than it being subsequently resolved in a court case—although I also acknowledge the legal point made by the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Anderson, that it is not always simple to distinguish between the two. Nevertheless, the point is that the police officer should take into account a potential reasonable excuse defence before deciding whether to charge.

To summarise this debate, two noble Lords made points that I thought were particularly resonant. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked whether this was speciality legislation for ever more exotic offences that can be extremely annoying to the general public. As many noble Lords have said in this debate, there is existing legislation to deal with those offences, and there is scepticism that the police are feeling able to use the legislation that is already within their power. The noble Lord, Lord McDonald, challenged the Minister to give examples of the gaps in the existing laws: in fact, he defied the Minister to go ahead and give those examples.

I also want to comment briefly on my noble friend Lady Blower’s speech on Amendment 60, which of course I agreed with. I also agreed with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, that in the case of industrial action it should not be a reasonable excuse. The offences should never be charged in the first place. It is the same point, in a sense, that the potential use of a reasonable excuse should be taken into account right at the beginning of the process rather than once you get to a court case.

Although the amendments focus on particular detailed provisions in this Bill, I think a challenge has been laid down to the Minister to give examples and to say why this is necessary when we have a plethora of laws which are being used. The demonstrators on the M25 have moved on partly because of the sentences that have been given to them, so what is the necessity of pursuing this legislation?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, to which I have listened carefully. Before I turn to the specific amendments in the group, I shall start by setting out the case for Clauses 1 to 8 and why I disagree with the general thrust of many of the amendments that we are going to discuss today that seek to make these offences less effective.

Before I do that, I shall go on to a couple of general points. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said that this House had already rejected these measures, but one of the main criticisms that noble Lords made during the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill was that the measures had not been debated in the House of Commons. The elected House has now had an opportunity to scrutinise this legislation and vote on the Government’s proposals and has supported its move into the House of Lords.

A number of noble Lords mentioned compatibility with the ECHR. I reaffirm that it is the Government’s view that the measures in this Bill are compatible with the ECHR, namely the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association. However, these rights are not absolute. They do not extend to wreaking havoc on the lives of others. Of course, however, as with all existing public order powers, the police will absolutely need to act compatibly with the human rights of protesters when using those powers.

Football Spectators (Relevant Offences) Regulations 2022

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Thursday 3rd November 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument, which we support. I declare an interest as a sitting magistrate who has fairly regularly put in place football banning orders for various reasons. As the noble Lord said, this is about adding the possession or supply of class A drugs at football matches as a reason for giving a football banning order.

We welcome the work that the police have done with the football authorities to reduce violence and drug-fuelled behaviour at games, although I note the figures that the Minister and my noble friend Lord Faulkner gave about the deteriorating situation in recent years. As my noble friend said, it used to be so much worse back in the 1990s.

When was this matter first raised? Was it really as a result of the European final that it came starkly to the attention of Ministers, or were there concerns before that? Also, is there any evidence of similar concerns or problems with other major sports, such as cricket or rugby? Obviously we are talking about football banning orders, but how wide does this problem go?

Has there been any wider work done on why these problems seem to be worsening? Is it because of drug use, or are there other problems behind it? Is this being investigated by the Home Office? Is it that drugs are more generally available? There has been an increase in drug-related deaths in England and Wales in recent years, and we know that communities and children’s lives are being blighted by county lines gangs. What is being done to tackle the supply of drugs reaching fans and to ensure that police forces have the resources to support specialist drug enforcement teams and take action on recognising child criminal exploitation?

A football match should be a safe, accessible, enjoyable experience for fans of all ages, so what wider work is being done by the Home Office to encourage safe and positive environments for sports fans? We of course support the statutory instrument, but my questions go a bit wider, to other sports and to how this impacts on drug policy as a whole. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken and particularly note the widespread support for this measure, which is as it should be. I am sure we all agree that there is no place for class A drugs or the disorder they give rise to at football matches. This simple, practical measure to tighten the law will ensure that the football banning order regime properly encompasses those who commit drug offences related to football. I take particular note of the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on the dangers of cocaine misuse.

I will try to address some of the specific points that your Lordships raised. The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, quoted the statistics; I will go into a little more detail on those. Official statistics for the 2021-22 season show that there were 2,198 football-related arrests, which is a substantial increase—59%—on the last complete pre-Covid season. It is important to note that football-related arrests had previously been on a long-term down trend, reducing by some 50% since the 2010-11 season to record lows. Last season’s arrests total was comparable with the 2013-14 season. There were also 170 dedicated football officer-related incidents of supporter drug use during the 2021-22 season.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, also referred to the Channel 4 documentary on Italia 90. I have not seen it—I am still mentally scarred by our loss to Germany, of course—but I will definitely watch it.

Alcohol Licensing (Coronavirus) (Regulatory Easements) (Amendment) Regulations 2022

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Thursday 3rd November 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for introducing these regulations. I understand that many people were very concerned about going to on-licensed premises—going to the pub—because of their concerns about catching coronavirus. My personal experience of socialising in central London—very limited, because I am always here doing work—is that most restaurants and pubs seem to be very busy. I am not sure whether the Minister can tell the Committee whether that is universal or a phenomenon just in central London, but that is my experience.

My understanding of the previous regulations is that they were to try to compensate pubs that had only an on-licence for that lack of trade so that people who were anxious about catching Covid could instead get their alcohol to take away—they could take it home or even, when the weather was more clement than it has been for the last few days, drink it outside. The only thing I would ask is this. Why do the Government think that that particular Covid support, which is what these regulations are about, should continue? What evidence is there that people are still nervous about socialising in an enclosed space and that it is therefore necessary for on-licensed premises to be able to sell to people to take away?

If this provision is simply for other reasons—the noble Lord mentioned increased energy prices having an impact on on-licensed premises in particular, but there is also the cost of living crisis, with people feeling that they cannot socialise as much as they did in the past because of the pressure on household budgets—why not have an alternative measure? The noble Lord talked about consultation on more permanent measures, but, bearing in mind that the police say that there has been no adverse impact on giving on-licensed premises the ability to sell alcohol to take away, why has a permanent change not been brought forward, rather than what appears to be the rather spurious extension of coronavirus-specific regulations that we have before us?

I appreciate that civil servants, particularly in the Home Office, have been very busy with other things in recent months, and it may be that the easy route was simply to extend the coronavirus regulations, but we need to move on from the impact of the pandemic and the virus and be more honest. If we think that this is a good thing in the long term, we should have a permanent change in the law. I know the Minister said a consultation is being conducted on it. That would be more honest than extending coronavirus regulations that, by this time, should have come to an end.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

One of my principal questions was going to be whether this is the easy route, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, put it, and whether there is a long-term review of the law. It may be appropriate to keep the changes in some cases and not in others, so I would be grateful if the Minister will respond to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

We support this change. We have been told that, as far as the NPCC is concerned, there has been no increase in anti-social behaviour as a result of these measures. Did the consultation go beyond the NPCC? Were local police forces consulted? Are there variations in different parts of the country?

I too have experience of occasionally going to social events in central London, and it is true that the bars and restaurants seem to be extremely busy. However, in other parts of the country or other parts of London, many restaurants and pubs are shut because of the impact of the pandemic, as well as changing habits. How much variation across the country have the Government seen? Is this blanket approach appropriate and how should it be looked at over the longer term? Does the Minister have any updated information on the impact of Covid on the hospitality sector and its recovery? One reads extensively of the hospitality sector still struggling because, in spite of our experiences in central London, the numbers are not back to where they were, and this is proving a problem.

Have any local authorities raised any concerns about extending these changes? Are there any extra costs or burdens on local authorities? Finally, were any local communities consulted? Did they have views on the extension of these licences?

The central question is that asked by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about how this temporary change, which we approve of, fits into a wider review of provisions that were brought in during the pandemic, some of which may continue while others do not.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who contributed. I am thankful for their general support for this measure and their recognition that we should be looking to support our hospitality industry, which has suffered a tumultuous few years and continues to feel the after-effects of the pandemic; I will come on to that in a second.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, questioned the fact that this a temporary measure and asked why it is not being made permanent, since it extends the off-sales provision only until next September. Let me go into some detail regarding what has happened since the pandemic.

Public Spaces Protection Orders

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Thursday 27th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Well, I have read the Manifesto report to which the noble Baroness refers—all 48 pages of it. I am afraid that I did not necessarily agree with all the conclusions, some of which required—shall we say?—a bout of syllogistic gymnastics to arrive at. I did look at some of the named councils’ websites and found limited public outrage—maybe I was looking in the wrong place. However, I do think that no one should be terrorised in the way described by the noble Baroness.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Members of the House of Commons voted in a free vote last week to provide nationwide protection for medical premises providing abortion from disruptive and harassing protests and behaviour. Rather than requiring each locality to apply for an individual public space protection order, will the Minister work with Members across the House to ensure that the provision is supported as the Public Order Bill makes its way through this House?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am very happy to commit to the noble Lord to do that. Indeed, such discussions are ongoing.

Rwanda Asylum Partnership

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 19th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his two questions. First, he mentioned the risk of suicide. It is worth pointing out that the health and welfare of those in immigration detention is of the utmost importance. We have a dedicated welfare team on site at each immigration removal centre which is responsible for identifying vulnerable individuals and providing assistance to support an individual’s needs. I remind noble Lords that decisions will be taken on a case-by-case basis and nobody will be relocated if it is unsafe or inappropriate for them. With regard to the terms governing this, which was his second question, he will not be surprised to hear me answer that this is slightly above my pay grade, but I will happily take it back to the department.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, in a Written Answer on 13 October, a Home Office Minister revealed that, as well as the £120 million down payment on this policy, there was

“a £20m upfront payment to the Government of Rwanda to support initial set up costs.”

Is the Minister able to give clarity to the House on the full cost per person of this scheme and to say whether there will be further up-front payments?

Metropolitan Police: Misconduct

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Wednesday 19th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I could not agree more with my noble friend and I am grateful for the opportunity to pay tribute to the vast majority of our police men and women in the Met and indeed across the whole country. They do a very difficult and often thankless job in often very difficult conditions, and they do it to a very high standard. I thank my noble friend for the opportunity to say that, and I thank those officers. I am sure that they are equally upset by this report’s findings.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, it may well be that the problems identified in the Casey report go beyond the Metropolitan Police. On this side of the House, we believe that the Home Secretary needs to personally take action. Will she now require all police forces to produce data and analysis of their misconduct systems in the same level of detail as in the Casey report, so that we can know what is happening in every police force in England and Wales?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes some sensible suggestions and I refer back to the review that I referenced in my Answer to the original Question. I will quote the Statement made by the Minister of State for Crime, Policing and Fire:

“The Government will work closely with key policing stakeholders to examine evidence of the effectiveness of the system to remove those who are not fit to serve the public. As well as examining the overall effectiveness of dismissal arrangements”,


he expects the review to consider

“the impact of the introduction of Legally Qualified Chairs to decide misconduct cases; whether decisions made by Misconduct Panels are consistent across all 43 forces in England and Wales; and whether forces are making effective use of their powers to dismiss officers on probation. This focused review will be launched shortly and will be conducted swiftly.”—[Official Report, Commons, 18/10/22; col. 22WS.]

Banks: Forgery

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Thursday 30th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I do not think it is just about officials; it is also about legislation. Obviously, we passed one Act earlier this year at speed. The noble Lord will be aware that there is another economic crime and corporate transparency Bill on its way which deals with many of the unresolved issues from those debates and that Act.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, yesterday’s Times newspaper reported that money lost to scams had risen by more than £160 million in a year, from £420 million to £583 million, which is a huge increase. Can the Minister say when we might expect the financial services and markets Bill to come before Parliament and whether that Bill will be directed to tackling fraud?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I cannot answer that question; I will try to find out and write to the noble Lord.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I too agree that the noble Baroness made a compelling speech, with which a lot of people who live in London will have a lot of sympathy. I also agree with my noble friend Lord Berkeley, who raised the issues of cycles for freight, insurance and how the very rapid development of small electric vehicles and bicycles expanding their remit in London is a wider problem that needs to be addressed. The noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, also made that point.

As I have said to the Committee before, I sit as a magistrate in London, very often in Westminster. I remember dealing with pedicabs a number of years ago. Those offences were brought to our attention by Westminster City Council. From memory—this is a number of years ago—it was usually to do with pedicabs being parked on pavements, with the police bringing people to court through the council and impounding some vehicles. I have not seen those offences for several years now. I do not quite know what has changed—perhaps Westminster City Council does not feel it has the power to do that anymore, I do not know; it is a moving target. Nevertheless, I think the central point of the noble Baroness’s amendment is powerful.

I do not know whether there are any practical problems with harmonising the regulations with the rest of England and Wales, so I look forward to what the Minister says on that point.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Stowell for comprehensively setting out the case for these amendments, which relate to the regulation of pedicabs. As she pointed out, Clause 66 relates to motor vehicles which are defined as “mechanically propelled”. They are the most dangerous and cause the most harm, so it is logical that they are the focus of this clause.

The noble Lords, Lord Berkeley and Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, mentioned other types of similar vehicle that might be caught by this, so it is perhaps worth mentioning what the Government are doing on cycling offences. In 2018, we held a consultation to consider cycling offences causing serious injury or death, as well as reviewing existing cycling offences. The Government feel that any new offences applicable to cyclists, with or without a trailer, are best legislated for as a package, rather than piecemeal. Moreover, we believe that there should be a separate framework of cycling offences, as compared with motoring offences, as it may not be proportionate to apply to cyclists offences intended for drivers of motor vehicles and their corresponding penalties. The response to the consultation will be published in due course—I hope before the end of this year, but early next year at the latest.

The wider question of the regulation of pedicabs, including that of noise nuisance caused by sound systems located on pedicabs—which I agree from experience can be ear-splitting—is not a straightforward issue. In England, pedicabs generally fall under the taxi and private hire vehicle licensing regime, as various noble Lords have mentioned, in that they can be regulated as a hackney carriage—a taxi. The exception to this is London, where, as my noble friend Lady Stowell explained, they fall outside the existing taxi legislation. It should also be noted that taxi and private hire vehicle legislation is a devolved matter in Scotland and Wales, although the legislation that applies in Wales is the same as that which applies in England.

The Government are aware of the long-standing concerns that pedicabs contribute to safety and traffic-related issues in central London. The current situation in London means that there are few existing powers to control pedicab operations effectively. This has meant that pedicab operators, drivers and their vehicles are not licensed, there are no requirements for drivers to undergo criminal record or right-to-work checks, as there are in other industries, and there is no fare control. And there may very well be insurance issues, as the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, mentioned.

The Government agree that it is in the interest of safety and fairness to passengers to fix this legal anomaly and, as my noble friend Lady Stowell noted, a Private Member’s Bill that would enable Transport for London to regulate pedicabs in London is currently being taken forward by Nickie Aiken MP—the Pedicabs (London) Bill. I am pleased to confirm that the Government intend to join the very long list pointed out by my noble friend and support this Bill. I am therefore happy to offer her a meeting with the Minister, my noble friend Lady Vere, to discuss this further, if she would like. I commend my noble friend for raising this issue. We agree that it needs to be addressed, and I hope she is reassured that the Department for Transport is on the case. For now, I hope my noble friend feels free to withdraw her amendment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we too want to protect shopkeepers. I endorse the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, backed up by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, made an interesting point when she said it was not necessarily a mistake of law but in the application of the law that this problem has emerged.

I too received the briefing from the British Independent Retailers Association; its figures are stark. I also have the previous statements by Kit Malthouse, the relevant Minister. He has said that he is happy to look at the data to see what it tells us about the operation of the policy, now that we are four or five years in. I do not think there is any problem with us reviewing the data internally, deciding whether the policy is working and then promulgating some kind of best practice. However, in January 2021, in response to a Written Question on when the Government was planning to review the operation of Section 176, the Minister said that it would be part of a wider, post-legislative review of the Act but that no date had yet been set.

The point I want to make to the Minister is that there is some urgency on this. The system does not seem to be working very well. From my own experience as a magistrate sitting in London, I cannot remember the last time I saw a youth come to court for shoplifting—they never come to court for shoplifting; we see them for much more serious offences. I am not saying that they should be brought to court for shoplifting but that they are being dealt with in another way and it is questionable whether that alternative is appropriate. We do see low-level shoplifting in adult magistrates’ courts, but it tends to be by multiple, repeat offenders, who are part of a gang. We see that element of shoplifting, but we do not see occasional, low-level shoplifters in court very much. They are being dealt with in other ways, and this may be part of the problem.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, for tabling his amendment and for explaining it in considerable detail.

I start by expressing my support and respect for all those who work in the retail sector. Shops are the lifeblood of our communities and neighbourhoods. As the noble Lord pointed out, that fact was perhaps amplified by the pandemic. It is important that businesses should be free to trade without fear of crime or disorder. I recognise the significant impact that shoplifting can have, not only on businesses but on the wider community and consumers. It is vital that perpetrators are brought to justice. As the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, pointed out, it is not a victimless crime.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 27th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has made it clear that these are probing amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Beith, has just expressed scepticism about the number of initiatives which the Government have put forward in this section of the Bill.

Having said that, we support this part of the Bill on offensive weapons homicide reviews. Amendment 75 raises the question of what happens if a death is already covered by an existing review mechanism, and not duplicating reviews. When this question was raised in the other place, the Minister said:

“To avoid duplication of work, the Bill provides that these new offensive weapons homicide reviews will be required only where there is not an existing statutory requirement to review the homicide”.—[Official Report, Commons Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Committee, 27/5/21; col. 268.]


Clause 23(5) provides that a review is not required under this chapter if a review of the death is already taking place under different arrangements. If I understand it correctly, I think this meets one of the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in his amendment.

Amendment 76 deals with data protection. It would prevent data being shared for these reviews if it breaches an obligation of confidence or any other restriction other than the Data Protection Act. These issues were debated in detail on Monday in relation to the serious violence reduction duty. Obviously, data sharing is absolutely key to a homicide review to allow us to identify and learn lessons from the death, and to decide on actions to take in response. However, as raised in the earlier debate, we must know how this is to be balanced with safeguards.

Clause 29 provides that a person may not be required to disclose information under this chapter that they could not be compelled to disclose in High Court proceedings. It would be helpful if the Minister could talk us through the specific provision of potential High Court proceedings.

Amendment 77 is based on a recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The DPRRC has said that guidance on this chapter of the Bill provided by Clause 31 should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and done through a statutory instrument subject to the negative procedure. We support the committee’s suggestion and call on the Government to look carefully at all the committee’s recommendations.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining his amendments to the provisions in the Bill which establish offensive weapons homicide reviews. Before I turn to the specifics of the amendments, it may assist the Committee if I first set out the context and rationale for the introduction of these reviews. Noble Lords asked a lot of questions and I will do my best to get to all of them. If I have missed any, I will write to noble Lords.

Every homicide is a tragedy and the Government are committed to doing all they can to prevent the senseless loss of life and tackle serious violence. We are naturally disturbed by data showing that homicide has risen by about a third in England and Wales between 2014-15 and 2018-19. We have also seen that homicides involving offensive weapons now make up a large and growing proportion of all homicides—approximately 354 out of 732 in 2019. Homicide is now the fourth leading cause of death for men aged 20 to 34, behind suicide, drug overdoses and car accidents. Yet there is currently no legal requirement to formally review the circumstances around the majority of homicides involving an offensive weapon.

This provision will require local agencies to consider the circumstances of both the victims and perpetrators during an offensive weapons homicide review, and identify lessons that could help prevent future deaths. By deepening our local and national understanding of homicide and serious violence, together we can improve our response and ultimately save lives.

The amendment would change the definition of a “qualifying homicide” whereby, alongside the other requirements already set out in Clause 23, an offensive weapons homicide review would be applicable only if no other mechanism is available to review or hold an investigation or inquiry into the death. We agree with the sentiment of the amendment that it would not be necessary or proportionate to require the review partners to conduct an offensive weapons homicide review where the homicide already meets the conditions for an existing review—for example, a domestic homicide review—as this would involve duplication of work and create an unnecessary burden on the review partners, yet produce the same outcomes. However, we do not consider the amendment necessary as Clause 25 already provides for the relationship between offensive weapons homicide reviews and other review requirements to avoid duplication of effort, including disapplying the duty to conduct an offensive weapons review in certain cases.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, cited coroners’ inquests as an example of existing reviews that would preclude a homicide from qualifying for a review under Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Bill. We should remember that inquests are designed for a different purpose. They are legal inquiries into the cause and circumstances of a death, and are limited to the four statutory questions of who, where, when and how or by what means a person came about their death. Further to this, in many homicides where an offensive weapon is used, there will not be an inquest because the criminal trial will answer the statutory questions and an inquest will not need to take place.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also asked if consultation with coroners had taken place at an official level. It has and that will continue during the design phase.