(3 weeks, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, these amendments, proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Woodley, are I think as people have outlined. I have been on the wrong end of that legislation on a number of events—official strikes, unofficial strikes and secondary picketing. As a shop steward you are responsible for taking those actions for a company; there are consequences and I have suffered consequences from that.
It is not that I agree with the rights being taken away, but I think times have changed and unions have moved on now. The right of anybody to remove their labour, if they are pushed to it, should be a universal right, but it should be used very sparingly and in very special circumstances. It is all very well rushing to legislation and quoting the European Court, but we live in the real world and when things happen to people at work and people are treated badly, sometimes we have not got time to go and contact the KC and get case law. We just do the things that we used to do and take that action straight away. Sometimes that resolves the matter fairly quickly, because a reasonable employer will see the action you have taken as a direct result of another manager doing something that was not in agreement. So I get the thrust of this.
I have had notes typed and I have been writing my own notes, but I think the top and bottom for me is the amendment is seeking to restore a trade union’s flexibility in choosing which members to ballot and removing some procedural requirements and obligations to notify employees in advance of ballots. I think that time has gone as well.
Reinstating rights for prison officers, the group currently subject to significant legal limitations, is one I would like to slightly explore. The intent behind these amendments is to strengthen trade union rights and promote collective bargaining. The concern is potentially around impact, industrial relations and public safety, especially with the actions of prison officers. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and to the Government that the way to protect prison officers is not to enshrine the right to strike but to remove the reasons why they would want to strike. That really is about improving the Victorian conditions that we have in 2025 prison systems, where people go into prison and come out worse criminals or nine out of 10 as drug addicts or whatever.
Governments, instead of trying to give extra law for prison officers, should be looking at the root cause. I know there is a prison plan being built and we are trying to get more education into prisons—if you want to speak to the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, he can give you chapter and verse on that, as I have listened to him doing. I hear why it is being done, I understand why it is being done and I know that it is not got a hope in somewhere else of getting through. But I thank the noble Lord for bringing it forward, because sometimes it is good to realise that things that we used to do are perhaps today not even politically correct to do. Human rights and the rights of people who go every day to work, to earn a living and support their family, need airing and need protecting. I know this is a probing amendment, but I thank the noble Lord for bringing it because it is interesting. Now and again it is good to be reminded of how it used to be and how it can be now.
My Lords, I join the general thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy. I thought it was a most interesting introduction and I learned a great deal. I particularly liked the phrase “constitutional benediction”, which I am planning to nick—although not in this context, because I rise to join the Minister and express my clear and firm opposition to the proposed new clause after Clause 64. It seeks to enshrine in statute a so-called positive right to strike even in breach of contract, as opposed—if I follow the noble Lord’s arguments correctly—to the freedom to strike. It strikes me as somewhat semantic in terms of the practical outcome, which I suspect is an argument we will hear again.
Let us be absolutely frank about what the amendment would entail. It would insert into the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 a wholly unprecedented and therefore dangerously broad provision that every worker shall have the right to take industrial action, whether or not it is in breach of any contract. It would not be subject to employer agreement or tethered to lawful procedures but would be an absolute statutory right to break contract terms and withdraw labour.
Industrial action, particularly strike action, is obviously a serious matter, and I think everybody would agree on that. It affects not only the employer but the public, the economy and, critically, the most vulnerable in society, who rely on public services. That is why we believe our existing legal framework strikes a careful balance. It protects the right to strike but does so within clear procedures and obligations: balloting requirements, notice periods and protections against unlawful disruption. This amendment would ride roughshod over all that.
What does it mean to have a right to breach your contract, regardless of process or proportionality? Surely, that is not a right; that is just carte blanche. This provision would displace the carefully constructed framework that governs how industrial action can be taken lawfully and responsibly. It would empower disruption without accountability. The purpose of employment law is not to tilt the playing field in one direction or another but to ensure that fairness, order and mutual obligations between employers and workers are respected. The right to withdraw labour must remain conditional on lawful procedures and not granted in the abstract, regardless of impact or legality.
Moreover, the proposed amendment would likely bring the UK into direct conflict with established contract law and create endless legal uncertainty. If workers are told that they have a statutory right to strike, even in breach of a contract, what does that mean for essential services, public safety, or the ability of schools, hospitals and transport systems to function with any consistency?
I do not think we should be mistaken. This amendment is not some minor clarification; it is a fundamental rewrite of the basis of workplace relations. It would undermine the principle that contracts entered into freely carry obligations and it would sweep away the balance between rights and responsibilities. I also have to ask: once a principle of contract breaking is established, how long before that is used as precedent in other contractual disputes?
Nobody denies that workers must be able to organise, speak up, bargain collectively and act where necessary. That is already protected in the legal framework. This amendment would take a sledgehammer to that balance. It would replace legal clarity, we believe, with legal radicalism, and accountability with absolutism. For those reasons, I urge the Government to reject the amendment.
(4 weeks, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberI will speak briefly to this amendment, which proposes to prohibit unpaid trial shifts by ensuring that those who undertake such shifts are paid at least the national minimum wage. This issue echoes concerns raised in earlier debates on unpaid work experience.
The amendment seeks to clarify that shift trials, defined as work undertaken in the hope of securing a temporary or permanent position, should be fairly compensated. This would address that potential gap in existing legislation and offer clearer protection for workers, ensuring that their time and labour are respect and valued. Such clarity is important for both workers seeking fair treatment and employers, and in maintaining transparent and ethical recruitment practices.
At the same time, it is important to consider the practical implications for employers who may rely on trial shifts as part of their recruitment process. I therefore invite the Minister to consider carefully whether this amendment strikes the right balance between protecting workers’ rights from exploitation and allowing employers reasonable flexibility in assessing candidates.
I look forward to the Government’s view on the best way to achieve a proportionate and effective approach that serves the interests of all parties involved.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this relatively brief group. I agree with my noble friend Lady Coffey. At first glance, the idea of banning unpaid trials seems fair, because no one wants to see people, especially young people, exploited under the guise of a try-out, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, pointed out when she was introducing the amendment.
However, we also need to be honest about the likely effect of the change, particularly for those very people it is trying to protect. In many sectors—in particular hospitality, retail and care—trial shifts are often the only realistic way for somebody without a formal CV to show that they can do the job. Trial shifts can therefore open doors for young people, school leavers and those coming back into work.
If we start requiring every short work trial to be paid at minimum wage then the reality is that many of them simply will not happen at all. Employers, especially small ones, may decide that they are just too risky or costly. The obvious result will be fewer opportunities and fewer chances for somebody to get in front of an employer to show what they can do. I worry that this amendment, although well intentioned, could have the opposite effect: closing off relatively informal routes into work for those who need them most. The measures in the Bill already create the wrong incentives, and we do not need any more of them.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberI will reply to that. Yes, it is a technical question, and perhaps that wording sits there, but any person with an ounce of common sense who sees the Bill can see what the Government are trying to do. I do not think that the Bill, with over 300 amendments to it, is geared to do what the noble Baroness is intimating. That is cheap political point-scoring, and I think it is beneath her.
I have carefully considered the amendments put forward by noble Lords in this group, particularly those seeking to remove Clause 23 and Schedule 3, including Amendments 23 and 334 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, the series of amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and others relating to probationary periods, including Amendments 105 to 112. While I am not persuaded by those amendments or the case for removing the provisions or fundamentally changing the Bill, I recognise the need for greater clarity on probationary periods. Given the Bill’s current drafting, which relies heavily on future regulation, it is essential that the Government provide clear and firm guidance on how the provisions will operate in practice, especially for small businesses, which will find ambiguity challenging in difficult times.
Amendment 107A from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, which proposes a default initial employment period but would allow the Secretary of State flexibility to amend that through regulation, offers a balanced concept that could be helpful in providing certainty while retaining adaptability. Likewise, Amendment 334 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which calls for a retention of the current qualifying period until suitable regulations are in place, reflects concerns about the smooth transition, and that deserves attention. However, I am less convinced by the calls for further impact assessments or reviews of the proposals in Amendments 103 and 123, which I believe risk delaying the necessary reforms without providing clarity.
In light of those amendments, I urge the Government to seize this opportunity to give definition and definite practical guidance on the provisions that the Bill will implement. It would be better if the Minister could say in absolute terms the length of time for which probationary periods will be set in future regulation after the passage of the Bill. That would be particularly important for smaller employers that need certainty to comply. Providing that clarity would help to ensure that the reform worked as intended, and it would help to strike the right balance between protecting employees’ rights and allowing employers the flexibility to manage probationary employments effectively. On that basis, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Lucas for their amendments and their thoughtful contributions in this group. It has been a most interesting debate. I will speak to my Amendments 103, 113 and 123.
I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that it would be much better to get this right now rather than pursuing Amendment 103 in particular, which returns to the Government’s insufficient impact assessment. The assessment that has been produced states that this provision will have one of the highest impacts, yet, as we have mentioned before, the Regulatory Policy Committee has given the Government’s analysis in this section a red rating. The RPC’s critique is not a matter of minor technicalities because it identifies serious deficiencies in the Government’s case for intervention in the options that they have considered and in the justification for the policy that they propose. The Government’s impact assessment admits that it lacks robust data on dismissal rates for employees with under two years’ service. To answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, there is no evidence for that. It proceeds regardless, however, with only superficial reference to “asymmetric information” and without any substantive analysis of any market failure.
The RPC highlights the impact assessment’s failure to consider how long-serving employees might view the equalisation of rights for new joiners—an issue of fairness and workplace cohesion that the Government have ignored. The impact assessment itself mentions that options such as reducing the qualifying period to 18 months or one year were considered and rejected without detailed assessment. No real exploration of probation periods was provided. That is not a balanced appraisal of possible alternatives; it is a justification for a predetermined decision.
On the justification of the preferred option, the impact assessment is again found lacking. The RPC calls for clarity on the costs to businesses—the costs of managing performance, handling disputes and the increased settlements to avoid tribunal risks. It also questions whether the Government have considered evidence from existing unfair dismissal claims and how risks might vary across sectors or job types, particularly in roles where reputational damage from a claim might deter employers from hiring at all.
More significantly, the Government have not addressed indirect and dynamic labour impacts, such as whether day-one rights might lead to more cautious hiring, greater use of temporary contracts or weaker overall job security. These are not abstract concerns as they go to the heart of how this policy might reshape employment relationships across the country. Noble Lords might be interested in a real example. I was talking this morning to a senior executive at a FTSE 100 company. It is an exemplary employer in every way; for example, offering many day-one rights. But this year—partly as a result of the jobs tax but also in anticipation of the Bill—it has reduced its hiring by 84%. I repeat that for the record: 84%. This is not abstract or theoretical. This is real, this is now.
It is important to note that these likely labour market impacts are not accounted for in the £5 billion cost to businesses, so the real cost is likely to be significantly higher. The result is a policy with high ambition but little practical clarity, as the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, has just noted. How will unfair dismissal rights interact with a statutory probationary period? Will employers still have access to the same set of fair reasons for dismissal? Will there be a different threshold for acting reasonably during probation? Can probation be extended if needed? None of those questions has been clearly answered.
The noble Lord, Lord Leong, reminded us of the light-touch, nine-month proposal, but what does that mean in practice? My noble friend Lady Meyer asked that. At the same time, the Government’s own analysis predicts that granting day-one rights for unfair dismissal alone will result in a 15% increase in employment tribunal claims. Using the statistics given by the noble Lord, Lord Barber, that is an additional 750 claims per year, on top of the 50,000 backlog already waiting 18 months to two years. The noble Lord argued that this is, in effect, a statistical irrelevance, but it is not to the 750 business owners who are being dragged through courts. That is a substantial impact. It represents direct costs to businesses in terms of time, legal risk and, of course, the chilling effect on recruitment.
The tribunal system itself needs to be looked at. Without significant new investment it is hard to see how the system will cope with this 15% increase. The result could be longer delays, greater costs and justice deferred for all parties. In an earlier group we heard about a case that is going to take more than two years to come before a tribunal. Yet the Government intend to bring these changes into force in 2026. On what basis? There is nothing in the impact assessment that explains why 2026 has been chosen or how the system will be ready by then. Businesses will need time to revise contracts, restructure probation processes and train managers on the new rules. What assessment has been made of whether 2026 is realistic, with all those things in mind? What engagement has been carried out with employers, particularly SMEs, about what implementation will require?
It is not unreasonable to ask the Government to explain how the timeline was determined and whether it is genuinely achievable, given the lack of clarity in both the policy detail and the supporting evidence. We all agree that employees deserve fair treatment, particularly in the vulnerable early stages of employment, but employers must also have a reasonable opportunity to assess performance, capability and suitability without the immediate threat of litigation.
We have established that there is no evidence for any of this clause. In fact, when the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, was arguing his point, he said that it is very difficult anyway for employees to take a case to an employment tribunal. The noble Lord, Lord Barber, as I just mentioned, said it is, in effect, a statistical irrelevance. If there is no evidence, it is too difficult and it is a statistical irrelevance, why are we bothering at all?
I want to raise a final point that others, particularly my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Noakes, have referred to. It is not just about the policy itself; it is a more troubling concern. The policy will create unintended incentives, but for whom? It is not just about employers scaling back hiring overall but about who they stop hiring. If we remove the qualifying period for unfair dismissal and provide no workable probationary mechanism, we tilt the hiring incentives away from risk-taking, as we have heard. It will, in effect, stop employers taking a punt.
Right now, a small business owner might be willing to take that chance on someone with no formal qualifications, or from a non-traditional background, or re-entering the workforce after a time away. That chance exists because the employer has a short window to assess their suitability—and vice versa, of course—before facing the full weight of employment litigation risk. If that safety net is removed and exposure begins from day one and the probationary period lacks clarity or legal protection, that same employer will think twice. They will play it safe.
Noble Lords opposite should pay attention to those of us who have employed people. It is a simple fact. Who is going to suffer? It is not the already advantaged candidate with a polished CV. It is the young person with gaps in education, the career switcher with no references, the working parent returning after years out of the labour market, or the person coming back to work after a long period of illness. Noble Lords opposite should reread the speech given by my noble friend Lord Elliott, with his experience of the Jobs Foundation. He explained this much more eloquently than I just have. Those are the people who benefit from flexibility and second chances and who may now find those doors quietly closed.
This goes to the heart of social mobility and genuine workplace diversity. I would like to ask the Government a rhetorical question: have they considered the incentives this policy creates? If they have not—both common-sense experience of real working life in the private sector and, indeed, the RPC suggest that they have not—we risk designing a policy that sounds progressive but, in practice, reduces opportunity for the very groups that we should be helping the most. We need a decent impact assessment, and my amendment would allow for it.