Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Bassam of Brighton

Committee stage
Monday 15th April 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, we have heard some fine words from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in putting the case for his Amendments 135A, 135B, 135C and 135D, which are grouped with the clause stand part debates. As he explained, they seek to test and probe why the Government have sought to extend the ability of the security and intelligence services to disapply basic data protection principles.

The new Government-drafted clause essentially, as well as disapplying current provisions, disapplies the rights of data subjects and the obligations placed on competent authorities and processors. The Explanatory Notes say that this is to create a regime that

“ensures that there is consistency in approach”.

Section 29 is designed to facilitate joint processing by the various agencies with a common regime. Like the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I well understand why they might want to do that. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has done the Committee a service in tabling these amendments because, as he said, during the passage of the 2018 Act assurances were given that law enforcement would always abide by basic data protection principles. On the face of it, that assurance no longer applies. Is this because it is inconvenient for the security and intelligence services? What are the Government seeking to do here?

Can the Minister explain from the Government’s perspective what has changed since 2018 that has led Ministers to conclude that those critical principles should be compromised? The amendments also seek to assert the importance of proportionality considerations when deciding whether national security exemptions apply. This principle is again raised in relation to the issuing of a national security certificate.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, with Amendment 135E effectively poses the question of where the balance of oversight should rest. Should it be with the Secretary of State or the commissioner? All that new Clause 29 does is oblige the Secretary of State to consult the commissioner with the expectation that the commissioner then makes public a record of designation orders. However, it strips out quite a lot of the commissioner’s current roles and responsibilities. We should surely have something more convincing than that to guarantee transparency in the process. We on these Benches will take some convincing that the Government have got the right balance in regard to the interests of national security and the security services. Why, for instance, is Parliament being sidelined in the exercise of the Secretary of State’s powers? Did Ministers give any consideration to reporting duties and obligations so far as Parliament is concerned? If not, why not?

Labour does not want to see national security compromised in any way, nor do we want to undermine the essential and vital work that our intelligence services have to perform to protect us all. However, we must also ensure that we build confidence in our security and intelligence services by making them properly accountable, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, argued, and that the checks and balances are sufficient and the right ones.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, got it right in questioning the change of language, and I want to better understand from the Minister what that really means. But why extend the range of exemptions? We could do with some specific reasons as to why that is being changed and why that is the case. Why has the Information Commissioner’s role been so fundamentally changed with regard to these clauses and the exemptions?

We will, as always, listen carefully to the Minister’s reply before we give further thought to this framework on Report, but we are very unhappy with the changes that are taking away some of the fundamental protections that were in place before, and we will need quite a lot of convincing on these government changes.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendments and thank the other noble Lords who spoke in this short debate. These amendments seek to remove Clauses 28, 29 and 30 in their entirety, or, as an alternative, to make amendments to Clauses 28 and 29. I will first speak to Clause 28, and if I fail to answer any questions I will of course guarantee to write.

Clause 28 replaces the current provision under the law enforcement regime for the protection of national security data, with a revised version that mirrors the existing exemptions available to organisations operating under the UK GDPR and intelligence services regimes. It is also similar to what was available to law enforcement agencies under the 1998 Data Protection Act. It is essential that law enforcement agencies can properly protect data where required for national security reasons, and they should certainly be able to apply the same protections that are available to other organisations.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked whether the exemption was in breach of a person’s Article 8 rights, but the national security exemption will permit law enforcement agencies to apply an exemption to the need to comply with certain parts of the law enforcement data protection regime, such as the data protection principles or the rights of the data subject. It is not a blanket exemption and it will be able to be applied only where this is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security—for instance, in order to prevent the tipping-off of a terror suspect. It can be applied only on a case-by-case basis. We do not, therefore, believe that the exemption breaches the right to privacy.

In terms of the Government taking away the right to lodge a complaint with the commissioner, that is not the case—the Government are not removing that right. Those rights are being consolidated under Clause 44 of this DPDI Bill. We are omitting Article 77 as Clause 44 will introduce provisions that allow a data subject to lodge a complaint with a controller.

In terms of how the subject themselves will know how to complain to the Information Commissioner, all organisations, including law enforcement agencies, are required to provide certain information to individuals, including their right to make a complaint to the Information Commissioner and, where applicable, the contact details of the organisation’s data protection officer or, in line with other amendments under the Bill, the organisation’s senior responsible individual, if they suspect that their personal information is being process unlawfully.

Amendments 135A and 135D seek to introduce a proportionality test in relation to the application of the national security exemption and the issuing of a ministerial certificate for law enforcement agencies operating under Part 3 of the Data Protection Act. The approach we propose is consistent with the similar exemptions for the UK GDPR and intelligence services, which all require a controller to evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether an exemption from a provision is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

Amendment 135B will remove the ability for law enforcement agencies to apply the national security exemption to data protection principles, whereas the approach we propose is consistent with the other data protection regimes and will provide for exemption from the data protection principles in Chapter 2—where required and on a case-by-case basis—but not from the requirement for processing to be lawful and the safeguards which apply to sensitive data.

The ability to disapply certain principles laid out in Chapter 2 is crucial for the efficacy of the national security exemption. This is evident in the UK GDPR and Part 4 exemption which disapplies similar principles. To remove the ability to apply the national security exemption to any of the data protection principles for law enforcement agencies only would undermine their ability to offer the same protections as those processing under the other data protection regimes.

Not all the principles laid out in Chapter 2 can be exempted from; for example, law enforcement agencies are still required to ensure that all processing is lawful and cannot exempt from the safeguards that apply to sensitive data. There are safeguards in place to ensure that the exemption is used correctly by law enforcement agencies. Where a data subject feels that the national security exemption has not been applied correctly, the legislation allows them to complain to the Information Commissioner and, ultimately, to the courts. Additionally, the reforms require law enforcement agencies to appoint a senior responsible individual whose tasks include monitoring compliance with the legislation.

Amendment 135C would make it a mandatory requirement for a certificate to be sought from and approved by a judicial commissioner whenever the national security exemption is to be invoked by law enforcement agencies only. This bureaucratic process does not apply to organisations processing under the other data protection regimes; forcing law enforcement agencies to apply for a certificate every time they need to apply the exemption would be unworkable as it would remove their ability to act quickly in relation to matters of national security. For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will not press his amendments.

On Clauses 29 and 30 of the Bill, currently, only the intelligence services can operate under Part 4 of the Data Protection Act. This means that, even when working together, the intelligence services and law enforcement cannot work on a single shared dataset but must instead transfer data back and forth, applying the provisions of their applicable data protection regimes, which creates significant friction. Removing barriers to joint working was flagged as a recommendation following the Manchester Arena inquiry, as was noted by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and following Fishmongers’ Hall, which also recommended closer working.

Clauses 29 and 30 enable qualifying competent authorities and an intelligence service jointly to process data under a single data protection regime in authorised, specific circumstances to safeguard national security. In order to jointly process data in this manner, the Secretary of State must issue a designation notice to authorise it. A notice can be granted only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the processing is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security and following consultation with the ICO.

Amendment 135E would make the ICO the final arbiter of whether a designation notice is granted by requiring it to—

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

May I just intrude on the Minister’s flow? As I understand it, there is a possibility that relatives of the families affected by the Manchester Arena bombing will take to court matters relating to the operation of the security services, including relating to intelligence that it is felt they may have had prior to the bombing. How will this new regime, as set out in the Bill, affect the rights of those who may seek to hold the security services to account in the courts? Will their legal advisers ever be able to discover materials that might otherwise be exempt from public view?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is a very good question but the noble Lord will understand that I am somewhat reluctant to pontificate about a potential forthcoming court case. I cannot really answer the question, I am afraid.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

But understanding the impact on people’s rights is important in the context of this legislation.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I say, it is a good question but I cannot comment further on that one. I will see whether there is anything that we can commit to in writing and have a further chat about this subject but I will leave it for now, if I may.

Amendment 135E would make the ICO the final arbiter of whether a designation notice is granted by requiring it to judge whether the notice is required for the purposes of the safeguarding of national security. It would be wholly inappropriate for the ICO to act as a judge of national security; that is not a function of the ICO in its capacity as regulator and should be reserved to the Secretary of State. As is generally the case with decisions by public bodies, the decision of the Secretary of State to grant a designation notice can be challenged legally; this is expressly provided for under new Section 82E, as is proposed to be included in the DPA by Clause 29.

On the subject of how a data subject is supposed to exercise their rights if they do not know that their data is being processed under a notice subject to Part 4, the ICO will publish designation notices as soon as is reasonably practical. Privacy information notices will also be updated if necessary to enable data subjects to identify a single point of contact should they wish to exercise their rights in relation to data that might be processed under a designation notice. This single point of contact will ease the process of exercising their data rights.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked which law enforcement agencies this will apply to. That will be set out separately in the subsequent affirmative SI. I cannot be more precise than that at the moment.

For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for that. It is a lawyerly question and, as he knows, I am not a lawyer. With respect, I will endeavour to write and clarify on that point, as well as on his other good point about the sorts of authorities that we are talking about.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

Perhaps the same correspondence could cover the point I raised as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, we should be very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, for her amendment. I listened very carefully to her line of argument and find much that we can support in the approach. In that context, we should also thank the Police Federation of England and Wales for a particularly useful and enlightening briefing paper.

We may well be suffering under the law of unintended consequences in this context; it seems to have hit quite hard and acted as a barrier to the sensible processing and transfer of data between two parts of the law enforcement machinery. It is quite interesting coming off the back of the previous debate, when we were discussing making the transfer of information and intelligence between different agencies easier and having a common approach. It is a very relevant discussion to have.

I do not think that the legislation, when it was originally drafted, could ever have been intended to work in the way the Police Federation has set out. The implementation of the Data Protection Act 2018, in so far as law enforcement agencies are concerned, is supposed to be guided by recital 4, which the noble Baroness read into the record and which makes good sense.

As the noble Baroness explained, the Police Federation’s argument that the DPA makes no provisions at all that are designed to facilitate, in effect, the free flow of information, that it should be able to hold all the relevant data prior to the charging decision being made by the CPS, and that redaction should take place only after a decision on charging has been made seems quite a sensible approach. As she argued, it would significantly lighten the burden on police investigating teams and enable the decision on charging to be more broadly informed.

So this is a piece of simplification that we can all support. The case has been made very well. If it helps speed up charging and policing processes, which I know the Government are very concerned about, as all Governments should be, it seems a sensible move—but this is the Home Office. We do not always expect the most sensible things to be delivered by that department, but we hope that they are.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords for their contributions—I think. I thank my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes for her amendment and for raising what is an important issue. Amendment 137 seeks to permit the police and the Crown Prosecution Service to share unredacted data with one another when making a charging decision. Perhaps to the surprise of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, we agree: we must reduce the burden of redaction on the police. As my noble friend noted, this is very substantial and costly.

We welcome the intent of the amendment. However, as my noble friend has noted, we do not believe that, as drafted, it would achieve the stated aim. To fully remove it would require the amendment of more than just the Data Protection Act.

However, the Government are committed to reducing the burden on the police, but it is important that we get it right and that the solution is comprehensive. We consider that the objective which my noble friend is seeking would be better achieved through other means, including improved technology and new, simplified guidance to prevent overredaction, as all speakers, including the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, noted.

The Home Office provided £960,000 of funding for text and audio-visual multimedia redaction in the 2023-24 financial year. Thanks to that funding, police forces have been able to procure automated text redaction tools, the trials of which have demonstrated that they could save up 80% of the time spent by the police on this redaction. Furthermore, in the latest Budget, the Chancellor announced an additional £230 million of funding for technology to boost police productivity. This will be used to develop, test and roll out automated audio-visual redaction tools, saving thousands more hours of police time. I would say to my noble friend that, as the technology improves, we hope that the need for it to be supervised by individuals will diminish.

I can also tell your Lordships’ House that officials from the Home Office have consulted with the Information Commissioner’s Office and have agreed that a significant proportion of the burden caused by existing pre-charge redaction processes could be reduced safely and lawfully within the current data protection framework in a way that will maintain standards and protections for individuals. We are, therefore, actively working to tackle this issue in the most appropriate way by exploring how we can significantly reduce the redaction burden at the pre-charge stage through process change within the existing legislative framework. This will involve creating simplified guidance and, obviously, the use of better technology.

Metropolitan Police: Crime and Misconduct

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Bassam of Brighton

Thursday 1st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions and I congratulate my noble friend Lord Lexden on securing this important debate.

Public confidence is, as all speakers have noted, a precious commodity for policing. When it is lost or damaged, the impact is significant and profound. Every time a high-profile incident occurs or a scathing report is published, that trust is placed in jeopardy. The truth is that recently this has happened all too often. I agree with my noble friend Lord Lexden that I could and perhaps should have used a much stronger word than “worrying” in my letter to him. However, I also take this opportunity to join the noble Lords, Lord Blair and Lord Bassam, in praising the “heroic, determined” majority—to use Sir Mark’s words, which were echoed by my noble friend Lord Lexden.

Things have to improve. Standards have to be raised and cultures reset. The Home Secretary has been clear that it is vital that the police act to restore trust, return to common-sense “back to basics” policing and treat the public and victims with the respect that they deserve. As the largest police force in England and Wales, with responsibilities extending beyond the vast task of policing and protecting the capital, the Metropolitan Police Service has a central role to play. The Government are committed to working with the Met Commissioner, Sir Mark Rowley, and the whole of his organisation. Their task is clear: to get the basics right, drive down and tackle crime, and rebuild public trust.

Many noble Lords have referred to the interim report of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. Under the commissioner’s leadership, as I have just said, the Met must get back to basics—and get those basics right—and provide the first-class service expected of it. The report of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, pointed out, contained many disturbing things, including: allegations of discrimination or sexual misconduct; issues of racial disparity, as referenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence; and a lack of confidence internally that such allegations will be taken seriously.

The commissioner has already set out a plan for his first 100 days to, in his words,

“renew policing by consent … to bring more trust, less crime and high standards”

and, obviously, to deal with some of the findings of the Casey report. As part of that process, and going beyond those 100 days, Sir Mark Rowley attends the police performance oversight group, run by HMICFRS. The group brings together system leaders from across policing to offer constructive challenge and practical support to chief constables of engaged forces. I will go into this in some detail, with noble Lords’ indulgence. This body is chaired by the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Andy Cooke, who has a clear remit to ensure that forces have realistic and clear improvement plans in place to address the serious concerns about performance that HMICFRS inspections have identified.

Members of this group include His Majesty’s inspectors, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners performance leads, the College of Policing, the Home Office, represented by the policing policy director, the chief constables themselves, of course, and the PCCs or mayors. It is worth restating, as referenced by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, that the primary accountability body for the Metropolitan Police Service remains the Mayor of London and the London Assembly.

Sir Mark attended his first iteration of this group on 13 October and it met again today in order to review some of the performance measures he has outlined. The members scrutinise the improvement plans and provide expert and constructive challenge—one hopes—where needed and regularly review the progress that is made. The mayor and deputy mayor are also invited, as I said, and attend to ensure that they understand the issues and underlying causes of the failures that have been identified and can therefore more effectively monitor, scrutinise and support their chiefs.

The Home Office attends to provide Ministers with the assurance that sufficient and urgent improvement action is under way. Where appropriate, the department considers what additional support it may be able to offer to accelerate progress towards that improvement. Ultimately, officials consider whether the Home Secretary may need advice on using her backstop powers, but I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, that the Home Secretary does, of course, meet the police commissioner on a regular basis.

In addition to the police performance oversight group, Sir Mark has also established governance to ensure that the Metropolitan Police Service is challenged and supported on its plans for improvement. These arrangements include the Deputy Mayor and the relevant director-general for public safety from the Home Office—I believe that is called a “turnaround board”.

As for other things the Home Office has done, we have set out clear priorities for all policing through the national crime and policing measures outlined in the Beating Crime Plan, which was published in July 2021. The plan sets out the Government’s strategic approach to cutting crime and restoring confidence in the criminal justice system more generally, but also includes a focus on reducing homicide, serious violence and neighbourhood crime. To allow effective performance management, the Home Office has developed the digital crime and performance pack, which provides published and unpublished data on the Met’s performance relative to other forces and nationally. This has been made available to all chiefs and PCCs.

Most noble Lords raised the subject of police vetting. Following the tragic events surrounding the death of Sarah Everard, the previous Home Secretary commissioned an inspection into police vetting, countercorruption capabilities, misogyny and predatory behaviour. That report, which was published on 2 November, highlighted that policing must do more to safeguard the integrity of the police workforce. Previous inspections also highlighted risks that can arise with poor vetting practice. The NPCC has committed to addressing the recommendations in the report in full. Three recommendations have also been made to the Home Office, and we will be addressing those. Following the HMICFRS report on vetting, misconduct and misogyny, it plans to dip-sample force decision-making on vetting as part of its regular inspections, so that there is ongoing scrutiny of decisions, including forces’ risk appetite.

I was asked whether our unprecedented drive to recruit has perhaps been driving perverse behaviours or causing forces to cut corners. The honest answer is no. Meeting the commitment to recruit the additional 20,000 has not been and will never be at the expense of public safety. The various process improvements and substantial funding provided by the programme means that policing has the tools and ability to recruit in greater volumes while maintaining standards. I go back to the point I just made: the HMICFRS is introducing regular dip-sampling to make sure that that remains the case.

On police misconduct and the discipline system, which of course includes dismissal reviews, the Government announced a review in response to the interim report of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, into the process of police officer dismissals, with the aim of ensuring that the system is fair and effective at removing those who are not fit to serve their communities. The Home Office is responsible for the regulatory framework. This follows significant reforms to the disciplinary system in recent years, including the introduction of independent, legally qualified chairs; public misconduct hearings; the ability to bring misconduct proceedings for former police officers; and the introduction of the police barred list. The Home Office is going to work closely with police partners, including the Metropolitan Police, as part of the review, and the terms of reference will be published in the very near future.

The Government are aware of the commissioner’s concerns around the number of officers not fully deployable but, ultimately, decisions on whether to suspend an officer or place them on restricted duties are a matter for chief constables. I have some data on this for the House. It probably does not entirely accord with Sir Mark’s comments in the newspaper report the other day—it was a snapshot taken at the end of March—but I think it is useful for context.

As of March 2022, the police workforce statistics showed that the Met has 780 officers on recuperative duties—about 2.3% of the workforce, compared with 4.5% nationally. Some 2,718 officers were on restricted or adjusted duties. “Adjusted duties” is worth defining. It is where an officer fails to recover from recuperative duties or another medical issue is identified, but where it is agreed that the officer, with reasonable adjustments, is able to discharge a substantive police role without unreasonable detriment to the overall force effectiveness or resilience, as judged by the chief officer. I am sorry that that is a bit of a mouthful, but it is worth defining. Unfortunately, we do not split the 2,718 into the various categories.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

That is 10% of the Met’s active force. Are any other forces in the UK operating with that degree of handicap?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The average is 4.7%, and it is actually 8% of the Met’s workforce—but I agree that it is a heavier number than we would see nationally. As was referenced earlier, seven officers are currently suspended—0.02% of the workforce, compared with 0.15% nationally. I accept that those numbers are not particularly reassuring: obviously, much needs to be done to fix this problem.

As I said earlier, decisions on whether to suspend an officer or place them on restricted duties are a matter for chief constables. It is also at chief constables’ discretion to place officers on adjusted duties, as the guidance sets out fairly clearly. Where officers’ performance is unsatisfactory or they commit an act of gross incompetence, there are existing mechanisms to be able to dismiss them from the force. The Home Office will continue to work with forces to ensure that there is an effective regulatory framework in place. Whether we end up with legislative change or not, as suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Blair, I really cannot predict.

My noble friend Lord Lexden referred to Operation Midland, which we have discussed many times in this House. As ever, his points were well made. On the remarks made by the former Home Secretary that he referred to, in which she stated that profound concerns existed about the handling of this operation, the Independent Office for Police Conduct responded to criticism of its handling in a letter sent to Sir Richard Henriques on 31 March 2021. That is available on the government website. The IOPC publishes further information on its performance and plans on its website. As announced by the former Home Secretary on 15 June 2021, an independent review of the IOPC—another review, I am afraid—is due to start this year. This will consider the organisation’s effectiveness and efficiency, including its decision-making processes.

I regret that I am running out of time. In closing, I repeat my earlier thanks to my noble friend Lord Lexden for securing this debate. I am grateful too to all other noble Lords who have contributed today. These are issues of the utmost importance, not only in relation to the way our capital city is policed but for British policing as a whole. The Metropolitan Police has a unique status within our policing system. Under the commissioner’s leadership, the force must step up to the task of driving down crime, upholding high standards and securing public trust. I commend the work that Sir Mark Rowley has done so far and look forward to seeing the rest of it concluded successfully. That is what the Government expect, and we will continue challenging the Met and the whole of policing to achieve it.

Scammers

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Bassam of Brighton

Tuesday 15th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have slightly different figures for the number of victims who were reimbursed. I am told that up to the year ending June 2022, 71% of victims got fully reimbursed. On the code to which the noble Lord referred, in 2021 the Payment Systems Regulator consulted on further measures to combat APP fraud. It proposed that all payment service providers must reimburse victims of APP scams where the victim is found not to have been grossly negligent. It is also worth pointing out some other legislative activity. In November 2021, the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury announced that the Government would remove any legislative barriers through the Financial Services and Markets Bill to enable the regulator to act to make reimbursement mandatory. That Bill is currently in Committee, and the PSR is currently consulting further on the mechanism for reimbursement.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, this really is not good enough. The National Audit Office issued a helpful report five years ago on fraudulent scammers, which has been ignored by successive Ministers and Secretaries of State. This second devastating report, which my noble friend Lord Browne referred to, has found “limited” action taken by the Home Office to tackle a crime that is profoundly impactful on nearly 4 million people every year at a cost of £4.7 billion. Fewer than 5,000 prosecutions were launched last year. Many of the victims of this terrible crime are elderly. When is the Home Office going to re-examine its priorities and come up with a proper and effective plan that genuinely protects people from scammers, which our party and the National Audit Office have been demanding for the past seven years?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I have already said, the National Audit Office report is going to inform the new fraud strategy. I reassure noble Lords that this is taken incredibly seriously. Alongside the fraud strategy that is due to be published shortly, we are providing more than £10 million to the City of London Police to upgrade Action Fraud, which has come under some criticism in the past. Next year, a new user-friendly and accessible reporting tool and website will be launched, offering an improved experience for victims and simpler pathways to access further support and guidance. Overall, £400 million is being allocated to economic crime, of which £100 million is being spent on the prevention of fraud.

Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Bassam of Brighton

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Wednesday 29th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If my noble friend will permit, I will come to the points she raises on consultation shortly.

Clause 72 will allow the Secretary of State to amend the Communications (Access to Infrastructure) Regulations 2016. Sharing infrastructure in the concentration of gigabit-capable networks can greatly reduce the cost and increase the pace of deploying networks, and can reduce the need to dig up streets, preventing unnecessary disruption to the local population and reducing carbon emissions. The 2016 regulations enable sharing of information about access to physical infrastructure across the utility, transport and communications sectors. They also include the right to access that infrastructure on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions. The Government published our response to the call for evidence on a review of these regulations last year. We set out that there may be some areas where they could be made easier to use and to understand.

In addition, we said we would legislate to allow future changes to the regulations via secondary legislation rather than relying on primary legislation. That legislation would be subject to further consultation with Ofcom and other appropriate parties. To expand on that a little, Clause 72 makes clear that

“the Secretary of State must consult … OFCOM; … such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”

before making such regulations. I cannot conceive of a set of circumstances where the landowner would not be one of the other persons that the Secretary of State considers appropriate—obviously, if I have that wrong I will write to noble Lords. In addition, any regulations made using this power will still be scrutinised as part of the affirmative resolution procedure. Clause 72 therefore grants to the Secretary of State a narrow power to make provision, through regulations, conferring rights on network providers in relation to infrastructure for the purpose of developing communications networks. These provisions include the power to amend, revoke or replace the 2016 regulations.

Finally, my noble friend Lord Vaizey raised some useful points about operator behaviour, which I think we may discuss in more detail in later amendments in group 6 on the Ofcom code of practice. I will leave it till then to address those, if that is acceptable.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am somewhat reluctant to let this go, I must confess. The emergency services in this country have a very difficult job to do, and I think they require better treatment than this.

I am not satisfied with the noble Lord’s explanation. I can envisage a time when an engineer turns up on the basic premise that the task they have to complete is smallish, but it turns out to be a rather larger problem—a bit like when you get a plumber in and they suddenly discover that there is something more fundamentally wrong with your boiler than the dial not working properly, and that it needs repressurising and a part needs to be brought up. This is a practical consideration, as it could cause considerable disruption to a service.

I was thinking of something that recently happened quite close to where I live. The road immediately in front of the local fire station was dug up; I cannot believe that the highways authority was not in contact with the fire station concerned, but I am not entirely sure that it was. I know that the people working in the fire station were put out for the period of time in which their ability freely to come and go in an emergency situation was seriously impacted.

For the purposes of Committee, I will withdraw this amendment, but the Government need to give this further thought. These behaviours can be highly disruptive. They can impact quite adversely on people’s personal security and safety; obviously, we want to make sure that there is a reasonably sensible way for providers to exercise their rights to repair, renew and so on, but we need to get the balance right and the Government need to think about this again. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 19.

Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Bassam of Brighton

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Wednesday 29th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, this was a brief debate. I turn first to Amendment 43. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, for raising this important subject.

The Government are committed to delivering policy which helps rollout for everyone, and support the entire telecommunications sector in delivering connectivity. Ensuring that local authorities are ready to facilitate rollout as quickly as possible is a key part of this. It will benefit people across the UK in receiving the best possible service and ensure that all operators are able to compete to provide that service.

Local authorities should have autonomy to serve their communities in the way that they see fit. The difficulties faced by urban communities are likely to be very different from those faced in the highlands, for example. The Government believe that local authorities are best placed to decide how to lead and foster digital rollout in their local area.

Mandating local authorities to designate a particular officer responsible for digital connectivity would be too prescriptive. However, we recognise the considerable benefits of having a dedicated lead on digital infrastructure in local and regional authorities, which is why we strongly recommend this approach in our digital connectivity portal, DCMS’s official guidance for local authorities concerning connectivity. The portal provides a huge amount of practical information for local authorities—for instance, on debunking myths around 5G, making assets available for hosting equipment, and the application of the Electronic Communications Code and planning regulations. The digital connectivity portal is a vital enabler for local authorities to facilitate digital infrastructure deployment.

In May last year, the then Minister for Digital Infrastructure also wrote to all chief executives of local authorities to encourage them to appoint a digital champion and to engage with DCMS. I understand that as many as 80 authorities have responded and officials have been able to offer support to them. We have also provided £4 million of funding for the Digital Connectivity Infrastructure Accelerator programme, designed to foster increased collaboration between local authorities and the telecommunications industry. Local authorities can take advantage of these tools and funds to take the steps most appropriate in their area to encourage and facilitate rollout. I hope that gives reassurance on how seriously the Government take local authority engagement, and that the amendments will not be pressed.

If I might anticipate a possible comeback, it sounds like we very much agree with the noble Lord, so to be consistent about my inconsistency, we are not going further and mandating this because the Government seek to balance the national objective of accelerating digital infrastructure rollout with the need to allow local authorities to make the best choices for their communities. Each local authority will have a different approach to its specific local challenges. We feel that further imposition of rules from central government in these spaces risks disrupting environments that are already encouraging investment in infrastructure rollout.

Amendment 46 asks whether the Government intend to introduce a streamlined subsidy scheme for telecommunications infrastructure to reduce administrative burdens on public authorities. To provide some context, the new Subsidy Control Act, which has not yet fully come into force, gives the Government the ability to create streamlined subsidy schemes for all public authorities to use. The streamlined schemes are intended to provide a way of granting subsidies quickly, with little administrative burden, while also providing legal certainty to both the public authority awarding the subsidy and the beneficiary of the subsidy. The Government intend that these should facilitate the award of low-risk and uncontentious subsidies in areas of policy that are strategically important to the United Kingdom. Streamlined subsidy schemes will be considered for categories of subsidy where they will add clarity for public authorities and make the assessment of compliance simpler.

Although the Government currently have no plans to create a streamlined subsidy scheme for the installation of telecommunications infrastructure, we remain committed to delivering and supporting the rollout of such infrastructure as soon as possible. BDUK’s Project Gigabit is delivering gigabit-capable broadband across the UK, working closely with public authorities, including the devolved Administrations and local authorities, to help refine procurement boundaries, validate the market’s local investment plans and stimulate demand for gigabit vouchers.

The work we have undertaken so far has shown that the model is effective at responding to changing market conditions by refining or combining procurement boundaries to reach efficient scale and secure value for money for public subsidy. DCMS will continue to engage and consider how to support public authorities as best as possible to reduce administrative burdens, including on any considerations on subsidy control or future streamlined subsidy schemes.

I hope that explains why the Government consider that a streamlined subsidy scheme for telecoms infrastructure is not needed at this time. However, this will be kept under review. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, local government is always a question of discretion and flexibility versus providing a more rigorous approach to getting local authorities to deliver and perform. I accept the parameters of the argument. There is some merit in central government doing more to encourage local authorities to appoint a specific officer to help manage the rollout of digital. I think we are fairly in agreement on that point; 80 authorities out of 360-odd is not a lot but it is progress. Perhaps the Government could, or should, reinvigorate their drive to get authorities to come up with an identified official, particularly for the planning authorities.

I was very interested in what the Minister had to say about the second amendment. It seems that there is the emergence of a plan. I will read very carefully what the noble Lord had to say in Hansard and we will reflect further, but for now, I am more than happy to withdraw our probing amendment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Bassam of Brighton

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Monday 10th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I will have to write to him to clarify that point.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his comments and his agreement to take that away. For our part, we would very much welcome a discussion on that with him and his officials, if that is at all possible. We are some way off from the Third Reading, and, clearly, we would be in a position to bring forward an amendment if that would help.

It would be for the good if we could have some cross-party agreement on this, because it is an issue on which we can have a shared view. That shared view adds extra emphasis and import to the progress that we make. We would very much welcome the Minister facilitating that discussion, and obviously we would be delighted if the Government were to concede and bring forward amendments which cover all other sports as well.

Qatar: Football World Cup 2022

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Bassam of Brighton

Tuesday 30th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend is right to raise the importance of constructive engagement. The UK has a strong history of promoting our values globally. We believe that the best approach is to engage with Governments and work with international partners and civil society organisations to promote and defend those universal freedoms. The relationship between the UK and countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the wider MENA region is historic and enduring. But we should also recognise that this is a region with distinct cultures and differing political systems.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Addington, I have received the letter from the chargé d’affaires of the embassy of Qatar yesterday, claiming that Qatar

“leads the region on advancing labour rights protection”

and has made it clear that

“labour law and human rights violations will not be tolerated”.

Does the Minister recognise that assessment as accurate, given the continued high level of construction-related injuries, with over 300 last year, and fatalities, with over 50 last year? Does he agree with the statement from the chargé d'affaires that Qatar’s

“track record on media freedoms speaks for itself”?

What further action do the Government believe is necessary to improve human rights and end construction-related fatalities and injuries in Qatar state?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think that question was answered earlier, but I take the noble Lord’s point. On media freedom, we continue to engage, as I also said earlier, regarding the number of fatalities. There is some disagreement and difficulty with data collection and precise numbers, but on all those matters, we continue to engage.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Bassam of Brighton

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

Before the noble Lord moves on to the next amendment, thinking back to 2000, the football riots took place in Charleroi and elsewhere, involving some 600 or 700 England fans, and within two weeks the Labour Government swiftly moved to introduce legislation that has been effective for the last 21 years. I do not quite understand how a Government with a majority of this size have failed to act on the promise made by the Prime Minister on 14 July. It is a pretty simple piece of legislation, as the noble Lord gave voice to in his response. Why have they not been able to find the opportunity to put that promise, made very clearly in the House of Commons, into effect? They could do so in this legislation now. We will help the Government to do it by helping them to perfect the amendment and get it right. This is a serious matter. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made that point very well. It is time that the Government fulfil some of the promises that they make. This is a relatively simple one to do.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I reiterate that the Government agree with the noble Lord. I can only repeat what I said earlier: we are working at pace and I commit to updating him before we get to Report. I hope that there will be a helpful outcome.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, has Amendment 292U on metal theft. This is an important subject and one that my noble friend Lady Williams recently discussed with the noble Lord, as he acknowledged. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Birt, for his contribution and his examples. I shall say a bit more about that meeting in a moment.

The Government recognise the impact of metal theft on infrastructure companies, including theft of cable from railway projects, construction companies and solar farms, as well as from heritage and community assets such as churches. The Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 was introduced to tackle the metal theft that was affecting many people’s day-to-day lives at that time. Under Section 12 of the 2013 Act, it is already an offence for a scrap metal dealer to pay for scrap metal using cash. The 2013 Act also places requirements on scrap metal dealers to hold a licence, verify the identity of those supplying scrap metal and retain records of metal bought and sold. These elements, together with powers for the police and local authorities to enter and inspect the premises of scrap metal dealers, make the Act an effective tool to tackle the sale of stolen metal.

The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to extend the provisions in the 2013 Act to make it an offence for anyone to sell scrap metal for cash. Although I understand the intention behind this amendment and the desire to have additional powers to tackle those who see metal theft as a profitable crime, the Government do not consider this amendment to be needed. The amendment would broaden the remit of the 2013 Act beyond the responsibilities placed on scrap metal dealers. Should an offender encourage, assist or incite the cash purchase of stolen metal by a scrap metal dealer, they could be found guilty of an inchoate offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007.

I will set this in a broader context. The noble Lord and my noble friend Lady Williams had a very productive meeting, as he acknowledged, on 9 November to discuss this important subject. They were joined by members of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Metal, Stone and Heritage Crime: the noble Lord, Lord Birt, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol and Andrew Selous MP, together with a representative from the British Metals Recycling Association. I understand that it was a constructive discussion and I hope that the noble Lord was left in no doubt as to the seriousness with which the Government view this crime.

At that meeting it was agreed that enforcement of the 2013 Act is key to tackling metal theft. The Government are committed to supporting partners to increase the enforcement of the Act. The Home Office provided £177,000 of seed-corn funding in the last financial year to establish the National Infrastructure Crime Reduction Partnership. The partnership is spearheaded by the British Transport Police and was set up to better co-ordinate police forces and other agencies to tackle metal theft from rail, telecoms and utilities companies.

At the meeting on 9 November, concerns were also raised about the disparity between metal theft figures published by the Office for National Statistics and figures held on the police national computer. We are looking into this and my noble friend Lady Williams—who, by the way, expressed to me that she would have liked to answer the noble Lord’s amendment—will write to the noble Lord when we have clarification on this. However, let me be clear: no one is trying to play down the problem or argue that statistics somehow show things are not as bad as some suggest.

The all-party parliamentary group agreed to provide the Government with a paper setting out its recommendations for tackling metal theft. My noble friend looks forward to receiving this and we will give it careful consideration. The right reverend Prelate and Andrew Selous, who is a Church Commissioner, agreed to see what more could be done to gather data and intelligence about thefts from churches, particularly of lead roofs. That is something that I welcome. I am sure that your Lordships all share my concern about these attacks on our heritage and recognise the particular vulnerability of churches, many of which are in isolated and remote areas. We look forward to continuing to work with the noble Lord and others who have contributed to the work of this all-party group. I hope that he is in no doubt of our commitment in this respect.

In the light of my comments and the undertaking to give sympathetic further consideration to Amendment 292S, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, to withdraw his amendment.