Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Committee stage
Monday 15th April 2024 Grand Committee

I hope the Minister can give us a more positive response on this and confirm that the Government take these issues seriously. I go back to the letter: we are pleased that he acknowledged the issues but, in terms of protections, I do not know whether the guarantees that we are looking at are there. Whether or not this is a sledgehammer, or whatever other expression the noble Lord may use about his amendment, it provides a simple solution. If the Minister is not going to support it, I would like to know what he proposes to do instead. I look forward to his response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)]

I welcome the Committee back after what I hope was a good Easter break for everybody. I thank all those noble Lords who, as ever, have spoken so powerfully in this debate.

I turn to Amendments 111 to 116 and 130. I thank noble Lords for their proposed amendments relating both to Schedule 5, which reforms the UK’s general processing regime for transferring personal data internationally and consolidates the relevant provisions in Chapter 5 of the UK GDPR, and to Schedule 7, which introduces consequential and transitional provisions associated with the reforms.

Amendment 111 seeks to revert to the current list of factors under the UK GDPR that the Secretary of State must consider when making data bridges. With respect, this more detailed list is not necessary as the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the standard of protection in the other country, viewed as a whole, is not materially lower than the standard of protection in the UK. Our new list of key factors is non-exhaustive. The UK courts will continue to be entitled to have regard to CJEU judgments if they choose to do so; ultimately, it will be for them to decide how much regard to have to any CJEU judgment on a similar matter.

I completely understand the strength of noble Lords’ concerns about ensuring that our EU adequacy decisions are maintained. This is also a priority for the UK Government, as I and my fellow Ministers have repeatedly made clear in public and on the Floor of the House. The UK is firmly committed to maintaining high data protection standards, now and in future. Protecting the privacy of individuals will continue to be a national priority. We will continue to operate a high-quality regime that promotes growth and innovation and underpins the trustworthy use of data.

Our reforms are underpinned by this commitment. We believe they are compatible with maintaining our data adequacy decisions from the EU. We have maintained a positive, ongoing dialogue with the EU to make sure that our reforms are understood. We will continue to engage with the European Commission at official and ministerial levels with a view to ensuring that our respective arrangements for the free flow of personal data can remain in place, which is in the best interests of both the UK and the EU.

We understand that Amendments 112 to 114 relate to representations made by the National AIDS Trust concerning the level of protection for special category data such as health data. We agree that the protection of people’s HIV status is vital. It is right that this is subject to extra protection, as is the case for all health data and special category data. As I have said before this Committee previously, we have met the National AIDS Trust to discuss the best solutions to the problems it has raised. As such, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will agree not to press these amendments.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Can the Minister just recap? He said that he met the trust then swiftly moved on without saying what solution he is proposing. Would he like to repeat that, or at least lift the veil slightly?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

The point I was making was only that we have met with it and will continue to do so in order to identify the best possible way to keep that critical data safe.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

The Minister is not suggesting a solution at the moment. Is it in the “too difficult” box?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I doubt that it will be too difficult, but identifying and implementing the correct solution is the goal that we are pursuing, alongside our colleagues at the National AIDS Trust.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I am sorry to keep interrogating the Minister, but that is quite an admission. The Minister says that there is a real problem, which is under discussion with the National AIDS Trust. At the moment the Government are proposing a significant amendment to both the GDPR and the DPA, and in this Committee they are not able to say that they have any kind of solution to the problem that has been identified. That is quite something.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am not sure I accept that it is “quite something”, in the noble Lord’s words. As and when the appropriate solution emerges, we will bring it forward—no doubt between Committee and Report.

On Amendment 115, we share the noble Lords’ feelings on the importance of redress for data subjects. That is why the Secretary of State must already consider the arrangements for redress for data subjects when making a data bridge. There is already an obligation for the Secretary of State to consult the ICO on these regulations. Similarly, when considering whether the data protection test is met before making a transfer subject to appropriate safeguards using Article 46, the Government expect that data exporters will also give consideration to relevant enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects.

Our rules mean that companies that transfer UK personal data must uphold the high data protection standards we expect in this country. Otherwise, they face action from the ICO, which has powers to conduct investigations, issue fines and compel companies to take corrective action if they fail to comply. We will continue to monitor and mitigate a wide range of data security risks, regardless of provenance. If there is evidence of threats to our data, we will not hesitate to take the necessary action to protect our national security.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, we heard from the two noble Lords some concrete examples of where those data breaches are already occurring, and it does not appear to me that appropriate action has been taken. There seems to be a mismatch between what the Minister is saying about the processes and the day-to-day reality of what is happening now. That is our concern, and it is not clear how the Government are going to address it.

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[Lord Bethell (Con)]

The Minister mentioned prosecutions and legal redress in the UK from international data transfer breaches. Can he share some examples of that, maybe by letter? I am not aware of that being something with a long precedent.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

A number of important points were raised there. Yes, of course I will share—

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend, but the point I made—this now follows on from other remarks—was that these requirements have been in place for a long time, and we are seeing abuses. Therefore, I was hoping that my noble friend would be able to offer changes in the Bill that would put more emphasis on dealing with these breaches. Otherwise, as has been said, we look as though we are going backwards, not forwards.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

As I said, a number of important points were raised there. First, I would not categorise the changes to Article 45 as watering down—they are intended to better focus the work of the ICO. Secondly, the important points raised with respect to Amendment 115 are points primarily relating to enforcement, and I will write to noble Lords setting out examples of where that enforcement has happened. I stress that the ICO is, as noble Lords have mentioned, an independent regulator that conducts the enforcement of this itself. What was described—I cannot judge for sure—certainly sounded like completely illegal infringements on the data privacy of those subjects. I am happy to look further into that and to write to noble Lords.

Amendment 116 seeks to remove a power allowing the Secretary of State to make regulations recognising additional transfer mechanisms. This power is necessary for the Government to react quickly to global trends and to ensure that UK businesses trading internationally are not held back. Furthermore, before using this power, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the transfer mechanism is capable of meeting the new Article 46 data protection test. They are also required to consult with the Information Commissioner and such other persons felt appropriate. The affirmative resolution procedure will also ensure appropriate parliamentary scrutiny.

I reiterate that the UK Government’s assessment of the reforms in the Bill is that they are compatible with maintaining adequacy. We have been proactively engaging with the European Commission since the start of the Bill’s consultation process to ensure that it understands our reforms and that we have a positive, constructive relationship. Noble Lords will appreciate that it is important that officials have the ability to conduct candid discussions during the policy-making process. However, I would like to reassure noble Lords once again that the UK Government take the matter of retaining our adequacy decisions very seriously.

Finally, Amendment 130 pertains to EU exit transitional provisions in Schedule 21 to the Data Protection Act 2018, which provide that certain countries are currently deemed as adequate. These countries include the EU and EEA member states and those countries that the EU had found adequate at the time of the UK’s exit from the EU. Such countries are, and will continue to be, subject to ongoing monitoring. As is the case now, if the Secretary of State becomes aware of developments such as changes to legislation or specific practices that negatively impact data protection standards, the UK Government will engage with the relevant authorities and, where necessary, amend or revoke data bridge arrangements.

For these reasons, I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response, but I am still absolutely baffled as to why the Government are doing what they are doing on Article 45. The Minister has not given any particular rationale. He has given a bit of a rationale for resisting the amendments, many of which try to make sure that Article 45 is fully effective, that these international transfers are properly scrutinised and that we remain data adequate.

By the way, I thought the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, made a splendid entry into our debate, so I hope that he stays on for a number of further amendments—what a début.

The only point on which I disagreed with the noble Lord, Lord Bethell—as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said—was when he said that this is a terrific Bill. It is a terrifying Bill, not a terrific one, as we have debated. There are so many worrying aspects—for example, that there is no solution yet for sensitive special category data and the whole issue of these contractual clauses. The Government seem almost to be saying that it is up to the companies to assess all this and whether a country in which they are doing business is data adequate. That cannot be right. They seem to be abrogating their responsibility for no good reason. What is the motive? Is it because they are so enthusiastic about transfer of data to other countries for business purposes that they are ignoring the rights of data subjects?

The Minister resisted describing this as watering down. Why get rid of the list of considerations that the Secretary of State needs to have so that they are just in the mix as something that may or may not be taken into consideration? In the existing article they are specified. It is quite a long list and the Government have chopped it back. What is the motive for that? It looks like data subjects’ rights are being curtailed. We were baffled by previous elements that the Government have introduced into the Bill, but this is probably the most baffling of all because of the real importance of this—its national security implications and the existing examples, such as Yandex, that we heard about from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope.

Of course we understand that there are nuances and that there is a difference between adequacy and equivalence. We have to be pragmatic sometimes, but the question of whether these countries having data transferred to them are adequate must be based on principle. This seems to me a prime candidate for Report. I am sure we will come back to it, but in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw.

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

117: Schedule 6, page 212, line 27, leave out “In section 72 (overview and interpretation),” and insert—
“(1) Section 72 (overview and interpretation) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1)(b)—(a) for “the special conditions that apply” substitute “additional conditions that apply in certain cases”, and(b) after “organisation” insert “(see section 73(4)(b))”.Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in my name inserting amendments of section 77 of the Data Protection Act 2018 into Schedule 6 to the Bill.

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

122: Schedule 6, page 217, line 27, before “this” insert “section 73(4)(a) or (b) and”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the controller’s duty to inform the Information Commissioner about international transfers of personal data made subject to appropriate safeguards does not apply where a transfer is made to a processor in reliance on paragraph (aa) of section 73(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (inserted by an amendment in my name).

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

128: Schedule 7, page 221, line 5, at end insert—
“6A In Article 46(2)(d) (transfers subject to appropriate safeguards: standard data protection clauses), after “Commissioner” insert “for the purposes of this Article”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in my name inserting amendments of section 119A of the Data Protection Act 2018 into Schedule 7 to the Bill.

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

131: Schedule 7, page 226, leave out lines 37 to 39 and insert “the requirement in section 75(1)(a) of the 2018 Act (binding legal instrument containing appropriate safeguards) would have been satisfied by virtue of that instrument.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment enables transitional provision in paragraph 30 of Schedule 7 to the Bill to be relied on in connection with transfers of personal data described in paragraph (aa) of section 73(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (inserted by an amendment in my name).

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, and his cosignatories for bringing this comprehensive amendment before us this afternoon. As we have heard, this is an issue that was debated at length in the Online Safety Act. It is, in effect, unfinished business. I pay tribute to the noble Lords who shepherded that Bill through the House so effectively. It is important that we tie up the ends of all the issues. The noble Lord made significant progress, but those issues that remain unresolved come, quite rightly, before us now, and this Bill is an appropriate vehicle for resolving those outstanding issues.

As has been said, the heart of the problem is that tech companies are hugely protective of the data they hold. They are reluctant to share it or to give any insight on how their data is farmed and stored. They get to decide what access is given, even when there are potentially illegal consequences, and they get to judge the risk levels of their actions without any independent oversight.

During the course of the Online Safety Bill, the issue was raised not only by noble Lords but by a range of respected academics and organisations representing civil society. They supported the cross-party initiative from Peers calling for more independent research, democratic oversight and accountability into online safety issues. In particular, as we have heard, colleagues identified a real need for approved researchers to check the risks of non-compliance in the regulated sectors of UK law by large tech companies—particularly those with large numbers of children accessing the services. This arose because of the increasing anecdotal evidence that children’s rights were being ignored or exploited. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, have given an excellent exposition of the potential and real harms that continue to be identified by the lack of regulatory action on these issues.

Like other noble Lords, I welcome this amendment. It is well-crafted, takes a holistic approach to the problem, makes the responsibilities of the large tech companies clear and establishes a systematic research base of vetted researchers to check compliance. It also creates important criteria for the authorisation of those vetted researchers: the research must be in the public interest, must be transparent, must be carried out by respected researchers, and must be free from commercial interests so that companies cannot mark their own homework. As has been said, it mirrors the provisions in the EU Digital Services Act and ensures comparable research opportunities. That is an opportunity for the UK to maintain its status as one of the top places in the world for expertise on the impact of online harms.

Since the Online Safety Act was passed, the Information Commissioner has been carrying out further work on the children’s code of practice. The latest update report says:

“There has been significant progress and many organisations have started to assess and mitigate the potential privacy risks to children on their platforms”.


That is all well and good but the ICO and other regulators are still reliant on the information provided by the tech companies on how their data is used and stored and how they mitigate risk. Their responsibilities would be made much easier if they had access to properly approved and vetted independent research information that could inform their decisions.

I am grateful to noble Lords for tabling this amendment. I hope that the Minister hears its urgency and necessity and that he can assure us that the Government intend to table a similar amendment on Report—as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, no more “wait and see”. The time has come to stop talking about this issue and take action. Like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I was in awe of the questions that the noble Baroness came up with and do not envy the Minister in trying to answer them all. She asked whether, if necessary, it could be done via a letter but I think that the time has come on this and some other issues to roll up our sleeves, get round the table and thrash it out. We have waited too long for a solution and I am not sure that exchanges of letters will progress this in the way we would hope. I hope that the Minister will agree to convene some meetings of interested parties—maybe then we will make some real progress.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, as ever, many thanks to all noble Lords who spoke in the debate.

Amendment 135, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bethell, would enable researchers to access data from data controllers and processors in relation to systemic risks to the UK and non-compliance with regulatory law. The regime would be overseen by the ICO. Let me take this opportunity to thank both my noble friend for the ongoing discussions we have had and the honourable Members in the other place who are also interested in this measure.

Following debates during the passage of the Online Safety Act, the Government have been undertaking further work in relation to access to data for online safety researchers. This work is ongoing and, as my noble friend Lord Bethell will be aware, the Government are having ongoing conversations on this issue. As he knows, the online safety regime is very broad and covers issues that have an impact on national security and fraud. I intend to write to the Committee with an update on this matter, setting out our progress ahead of Report, which should move us forward.

While we recognise the benefits of improving researchers’ access to data—for example, using data to better understand the impact of social media on users—this is a highly complex issue with several risks that are not currently well understood. Further analysis has reiterated the complexities of the issue. My noble friend will agree that it is vital that we get this right and that any policy interventions are grounded in the evidence base. For example, there are risks in relation to personal data protection, user consent and the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. Introducing a framework to give researchers access to data without better understanding these risks could have significant consequences for data security and commercially sensitive information, and could potentially destabilise any data access regime as it is implemented.

In the meantime, the Online Safety Act will improve the information available to researchers by empowering Ofcom to require major providers to publish a broad range of online safety information through annual transparency reports. Ofcom will also be able to appoint a skilled person to undertake a report to assess compliance or to develop its understanding of the risk of non-compliance and how to mitigate it. This may include the appointment of independent researchers as skilled persons. Further, Ofcom is required to conduct research into online harms and has the power to require companies to provide information to support this research activity.

Moving on to the amendment specifically, it is significantly broader than online safety and the EU’s parallel Digital Services Act regime. Any data controllers and processors would be in scope if they have more than 1 million UK users or customers, if there is a large concentration of child users or if the service is high-risk. This would include not just social media platforms but any organisation, including those in financial services, broadcasting and telecoms as well as any other large businesses. Although we are carefully considering international approaches to this issue, it is worth noting that much of the detail about how the data access provisions in the Digital Services Act will work in practice is yet to be determined. Any policy interventions in this space should be predicated on a robust evidence base, which we are in the process of developing.

The amendment would also enable researchers to access data to research systemic risks to compliance with any UK regulatory law that is upheld by the ICO, Ofcom, the Competition and Markets Authority, and the Financial Conduct Authority. The benefits and risks of such a broad regime are not understood and are likely to vary across sectors. It is also likely to be inappropriate for the ICO to be the sole regulator tasked with vetting researchers across the remits of the other regulators. The ICO may not have the necessary expertise to make this determination about areas of law that it does not regulate.

Ofcom already has the power to gather information that it requires for the purpose of exercising its online safety functions. This power applies to companies in scope of the duties and, where necessary, to other organisations or persons who may have relevant information. Ofcom can also issue information request notices to overseas companies as well as to UK-based companies. The amendment is also not clear about the different types of information that a researcher may want to access. It refers to a data controller and processors—concepts that relate to the processing of personal data under data protection law—yet researchers may also be interested in other kinds of data, such as information about a service’s systems and processes.

Although the Government continue to consider this issue—I look forward to setting out our progress between now and Report—for the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept this amendment. I will certainly write to the Committee on this matter and to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, with a more detailed response to her questions—there were more than four of them, I think—in particular those about Ofcom.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

Perhaps I could encourage the Minister to say at least whether he is concerned that a lack of evidence might be impacting on the codes and powers that we have given to Ofcom in order to create the regime. I share his slight regret that Ofcom does not have this provision that is in front of us. It may be that more than one regulator needs access to research data but it is the independents that we are talking about. We are not talking about Ofcom doing things and the ICO doing things. We are talking about independent researchers doing things so that the evidence exists. I would like to hear just a little concern that the regime is suffering from a lack of evidence.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am thinking very carefully about how best to answer. Yes, I do share that concern. I will set this out in more detail when I write to the noble Baroness and will place that letter in the House of Lords Library. In the meantime, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Bethell (Con)]

I am enormously grateful to the Minister for his response. However, it falls short of my hopes. Obviously, I have not seen the letter that he is going to send us, but I hope that the department will have taken on board the commitments made by previous Ministers during discussions on the Online Safety Bill and the very clear evidence that the situation is getting worse, not better.

Any hope that the tech companies would somehow have heard the debate in the House of Lords and that it would have occurred to them that they needed to step up to their responsibilities has, I am afraid, been dashed by their behaviours in the last 18 months. We have seen a serious withdrawal of existing data-sharing provisions. As we approach even more use of AI, the excitement of the metaverse, a massive escalation in the amount of data and the impact of their technologies on society, it is extremely sobering to think that there is almost no access to the black box of their data.

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[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, we have heard some fine words from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in putting the case for his Amendments 135A, 135B, 135C and 135D, which are grouped with the clause stand part debates. As he explained, they seek to test and probe why the Government have sought to extend the ability of the security and intelligence services to disapply basic data protection principles.

The new Government-drafted clause essentially, as well as disapplying current provisions, disapplies the rights of data subjects and the obligations placed on competent authorities and processors. The Explanatory Notes say that this is to create a regime that

“ensures that there is consistency in approach”.

Section 29 is designed to facilitate joint processing by the various agencies with a common regime. Like the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I well understand why they might want to do that. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has done the Committee a service in tabling these amendments because, as he said, during the passage of the 2018 Act assurances were given that law enforcement would always abide by basic data protection principles. On the face of it, that assurance no longer applies. Is this because it is inconvenient for the security and intelligence services? What are the Government seeking to do here?

Can the Minister explain from the Government’s perspective what has changed since 2018 that has led Ministers to conclude that those critical principles should be compromised? The amendments also seek to assert the importance of proportionality considerations when deciding whether national security exemptions apply. This principle is again raised in relation to the issuing of a national security certificate.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, with Amendment 135E effectively poses the question of where the balance of oversight should rest. Should it be with the Secretary of State or the commissioner? All that new Clause 29 does is oblige the Secretary of State to consult the commissioner with the expectation that the commissioner then makes public a record of designation orders. However, it strips out quite a lot of the commissioner’s current roles and responsibilities. We should surely have something more convincing than that to guarantee transparency in the process. We on these Benches will take some convincing that the Government have got the right balance in regard to the interests of national security and the security services. Why, for instance, is Parliament being sidelined in the exercise of the Secretary of State’s powers? Did Ministers give any consideration to reporting duties and obligations so far as Parliament is concerned? If not, why not?

Labour does not want to see national security compromised in any way, nor do we want to undermine the essential and vital work that our intelligence services have to perform to protect us all. However, we must also ensure that we build confidence in our security and intelligence services by making them properly accountable, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, argued, and that the checks and balances are sufficient and the right ones.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, got it right in questioning the change of language, and I want to better understand from the Minister what that really means. But why extend the range of exemptions? We could do with some specific reasons as to why that is being changed and why that is the case. Why has the Information Commissioner’s role been so fundamentally changed with regard to these clauses and the exemptions?

We will, as always, listen carefully to the Minister’s reply before we give further thought to this framework on Report, but we are very unhappy with the changes that are taking away some of the fundamental protections that were in place before, and we will need quite a lot of convincing on these government changes.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendments and thank the other noble Lords who spoke in this short debate. These amendments seek to remove Clauses 28, 29 and 30 in their entirety, or, as an alternative, to make amendments to Clauses 28 and 29. I will first speak to Clause 28, and if I fail to answer any questions I will of course guarantee to write.

Clause 28 replaces the current provision under the law enforcement regime for the protection of national security data, with a revised version that mirrors the existing exemptions available to organisations operating under the UK GDPR and intelligence services regimes. It is also similar to what was available to law enforcement agencies under the 1998 Data Protection Act. It is essential that law enforcement agencies can properly protect data where required for national security reasons, and they should certainly be able to apply the same protections that are available to other organisations.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked whether the exemption was in breach of a person’s Article 8 rights, but the national security exemption will permit law enforcement agencies to apply an exemption to the need to comply with certain parts of the law enforcement data protection regime, such as the data protection principles or the rights of the data subject. It is not a blanket exemption and it will be able to be applied only where this is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security—for instance, in order to prevent the tipping-off of a terror suspect. It can be applied only on a case-by-case basis. We do not, therefore, believe that the exemption breaches the right to privacy.

In terms of the Government taking away the right to lodge a complaint with the commissioner, that is not the case—the Government are not removing that right. Those rights are being consolidated under Clause 44 of this DPDI Bill. We are omitting Article 77 as Clause 44 will introduce provisions that allow a data subject to lodge a complaint with a controller.

In terms of how the subject themselves will know how to complain to the Information Commissioner, all organisations, including law enforcement agencies, are required to provide certain information to individuals, including their right to make a complaint to the Information Commissioner and, where applicable, the contact details of the organisation’s data protection officer or, in line with other amendments under the Bill, the organisation’s senior responsible individual, if they suspect that their personal information is being process unlawfully.

Amendments 135A and 135D seek to introduce a proportionality test in relation to the application of the national security exemption and the issuing of a ministerial certificate for law enforcement agencies operating under Part 3 of the Data Protection Act. The approach we propose is consistent with the similar exemptions for the UK GDPR and intelligence services, which all require a controller to evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether an exemption from a provision is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

Amendment 135B will remove the ability for law enforcement agencies to apply the national security exemption to data protection principles, whereas the approach we propose is consistent with the other data protection regimes and will provide for exemption from the data protection principles in Chapter 2—where required and on a case-by-case basis—but not from the requirement for processing to be lawful and the safeguards which apply to sensitive data.

The ability to disapply certain principles laid out in Chapter 2 is crucial for the efficacy of the national security exemption. This is evident in the UK GDPR and Part 4 exemption which disapplies similar principles. To remove the ability to apply the national security exemption to any of the data protection principles for law enforcement agencies only would undermine their ability to offer the same protections as those processing under the other data protection regimes.

Not all the principles laid out in Chapter 2 can be exempted from; for example, law enforcement agencies are still required to ensure that all processing is lawful and cannot exempt from the safeguards that apply to sensitive data. There are safeguards in place to ensure that the exemption is used correctly by law enforcement agencies. Where a data subject feels that the national security exemption has not been applied correctly, the legislation allows them to complain to the Information Commissioner and, ultimately, to the courts. Additionally, the reforms require law enforcement agencies to appoint a senior responsible individual whose tasks include monitoring compliance with the legislation.

Amendment 135C would make it a mandatory requirement for a certificate to be sought from and approved by a judicial commissioner whenever the national security exemption is to be invoked by law enforcement agencies only. This bureaucratic process does not apply to organisations processing under the other data protection regimes; forcing law enforcement agencies to apply for a certificate every time they need to apply the exemption would be unworkable as it would remove their ability to act quickly in relation to matters of national security. For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will not press his amendments.

On Clauses 29 and 30 of the Bill, currently, only the intelligence services can operate under Part 4 of the Data Protection Act. This means that, even when working together, the intelligence services and law enforcement cannot work on a single shared dataset but must instead transfer data back and forth, applying the provisions of their applicable data protection regimes, which creates significant friction. Removing barriers to joint working was flagged as a recommendation following the Manchester Arena inquiry, as was noted by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and following Fishmongers’ Hall, which also recommended closer working.

Clauses 29 and 30 enable qualifying competent authorities and an intelligence service jointly to process data under a single data protection regime in authorised, specific circumstances to safeguard national security. In order to jointly process data in this manner, the Secretary of State must issue a designation notice to authorise it. A notice can be granted only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the processing is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security and following consultation with the ICO.

Amendment 135E would make the ICO the final arbiter of whether a designation notice is granted by requiring it to—

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

May I just intrude on the Minister’s flow? As I understand it, there is a possibility that relatives of the families affected by the Manchester Arena bombing will take to court matters relating to the operation of the security services, including relating to intelligence that it is felt they may have had prior to the bombing. How will this new regime, as set out in the Bill, affect the rights of those who may seek to hold the security services to account in the courts? Will their legal advisers ever be able to discover materials that might otherwise be exempt from public view?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is a very good question but the noble Lord will understand that I am somewhat reluctant to pontificate about a potential forthcoming court case. I cannot really answer the question, I am afraid.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

But understanding the impact on people’s rights is important in the context of this legislation.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I say, it is a good question but I cannot comment further on that one. I will see whether there is anything that we can commit to in writing and have a further chat about this subject but I will leave it for now, if I may.

Amendment 135E would make the ICO the final arbiter of whether a designation notice is granted by requiring it to judge whether the notice is required for the purposes of the safeguarding of national security. It would be wholly inappropriate for the ICO to act as a judge of national security; that is not a function of the ICO in its capacity as regulator and should be reserved to the Secretary of State. As is generally the case with decisions by public bodies, the decision of the Secretary of State to grant a designation notice can be challenged legally; this is expressly provided for under new Section 82E, as is proposed to be included in the DPA by Clause 29.

On the subject of how a data subject is supposed to exercise their rights if they do not know that their data is being processed under a notice subject to Part 4, the ICO will publish designation notices as soon as is reasonably practical. Privacy information notices will also be updated if necessary to enable data subjects to identify a single point of contact should they wish to exercise their rights in relation to data that might be processed under a designation notice. This single point of contact will ease the process of exercising their data rights.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked which law enforcement agencies this will apply to. That will be set out separately in the subsequent affirmative SI. I cannot be more precise than that at the moment.

For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

The Minister left us on a tantalising note. He was unable to say whether the law enforcement organisations affected by these clauses will be limited to Counter Terrorism Policing and the NCA or whether they will include others as well. I am rather at a loss to think who else might be included. Do we really have to wait for the affirmative regulations before we can be told about that? It seems pretty important. As the Minister knows well, there are quite a few precedents—following some recent ones—for extending to those bodies some of the privileges and powers that attach to the intelligence agencies. I suspect that a number of noble Lords might be quite alarmed if they felt that those powers or privileges were being extended more widely—certainly without knowing, or at least having some idea, in advance to whom they might be extended.

While I am on my feet and causing mischief for the Minister, may I return to the rather lawyerly question that I put to him? I do not think I had an answer about the formulation in new Section 78A, which talks about an exemption applying

“if exemption from the provision is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security”.

What does “required” mean? Does it simply mean the same as “necessary”—in which case, why not stick with that? Or does it mean something else? Does it mean that someone has required or requested it? It could be a pretty significant difference and this is a pretty significant ambiguity in the Bill. If the Minister is not willing to explain it now, perhaps he will feel able to write to us to explain exactly what is meant by replacing the well-worn phrase “necessary and proportionate” with “required”.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for that. It is a lawyerly question and, as he knows, I am not a lawyer. With respect, I will endeavour to write and clarify on that point, as well as on his other good point about the sorts of authorities that we are talking about.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

Perhaps the same correspondence could cover the point I raised as well.

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

136: Clause 29, page 52, line 33, leave out “with the day on which it” and insert “when the notice”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the language of new section 82B(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) will apply to it.

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[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, we should be very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, for her amendment. I listened very carefully to her line of argument and find much that we can support in the approach. In that context, we should also thank the Police Federation of England and Wales for a particularly useful and enlightening briefing paper.

We may well be suffering under the law of unintended consequences in this context; it seems to have hit quite hard and acted as a barrier to the sensible processing and transfer of data between two parts of the law enforcement machinery. It is quite interesting coming off the back of the previous debate, when we were discussing making the transfer of information and intelligence between different agencies easier and having a common approach. It is a very relevant discussion to have.

I do not think that the legislation, when it was originally drafted, could ever have been intended to work in the way the Police Federation has set out. The implementation of the Data Protection Act 2018, in so far as law enforcement agencies are concerned, is supposed to be guided by recital 4, which the noble Baroness read into the record and which makes good sense.

As the noble Baroness explained, the Police Federation’s argument that the DPA makes no provisions at all that are designed to facilitate, in effect, the free flow of information, that it should be able to hold all the relevant data prior to the charging decision being made by the CPS, and that redaction should take place only after a decision on charging has been made seems quite a sensible approach. As she argued, it would significantly lighten the burden on police investigating teams and enable the decision on charging to be more broadly informed.

So this is a piece of simplification that we can all support. The case has been made very well. If it helps speed up charging and policing processes, which I know the Government are very concerned about, as all Governments should be, it seems a sensible move—but this is the Home Office. We do not always expect the most sensible things to be delivered by that department, but we hope that they are.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords for their contributions—I think. I thank my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes for her amendment and for raising what is an important issue. Amendment 137 seeks to permit the police and the Crown Prosecution Service to share unredacted data with one another when making a charging decision. Perhaps to the surprise of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, we agree: we must reduce the burden of redaction on the police. As my noble friend noted, this is very substantial and costly.

We welcome the intent of the amendment. However, as my noble friend has noted, we do not believe that, as drafted, it would achieve the stated aim. To fully remove it would require the amendment of more than just the Data Protection Act.

However, the Government are committed to reducing the burden on the police, but it is important that we get it right and that the solution is comprehensive. We consider that the objective which my noble friend is seeking would be better achieved through other means, including improved technology and new, simplified guidance to prevent overredaction, as all speakers, including the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, noted.

The Home Office provided £960,000 of funding for text and audio-visual multimedia redaction in the 2023-24 financial year. Thanks to that funding, police forces have been able to procure automated text redaction tools, the trials of which have demonstrated that they could save up 80% of the time spent by the police on this redaction. Furthermore, in the latest Budget, the Chancellor announced an additional £230 million of funding for technology to boost police productivity. This will be used to develop, test and roll out automated audio-visual redaction tools, saving thousands more hours of police time. I would say to my noble friend that, as the technology improves, we hope that the need for it to be supervised by individuals will diminish.

I can also tell your Lordships’ House that officials from the Home Office have consulted with the Information Commissioner’s Office and have agreed that a significant proportion of the burden caused by existing pre-charge redaction processes could be reduced safely and lawfully within the current data protection framework in a way that will maintain standards and protections for individuals. We are, therefore, actively working to tackle this issue in the most appropriate way by exploring how we can significantly reduce the redaction burden at the pre-charge stage through process change within the existing legislative framework. This will involve creating simplified guidance and, obviously, the use of better technology.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Is the Minister almost agreeing with some of my analysis in that case?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No, I think I was agreeing with my noble friend’s analysis.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

It does not sound like that to me.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. We acknowledge this particular problem and we are working to fix it. I would ask my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for his response. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Bassam, for their support. I hope that those watching from outside will be heartened by what they have heard. I think there is general agreement that this problem should be simplified, and the burden taken off policing.

I am interested to hear about redaction but, with bodycams and images, as well as the mass amount of data on items such as mobile phones, it is complicated. My noble friend the Minister mentioned that the Home Office and the Information Commissioner’s Office were consulting with each other to reduce this pre-charge redaction burden. Perhaps he could write to me, or we could have a meeting to work it out. The challenge in all this is that we have a debate in which everybody agrees and then it all slows down again. Perhaps we can keep the momentum going by continuing discussions outside, involving the Police Federation as well. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for tabling these amendments and raising important points about the Information Commissioner’s independence and authority to carry out his role efficiently. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, range widely, and I have to say that I have more sympathy with some of them than others.

I start by welcoming some of the things in the Bill—I am very pleased to be able to do this. It is important that we have an independent regulator that is properly accountable to Parliament, and this is vital for a properly functioning data protection regime. We welcome a number of the changes that have been made to the ICO’s role in the Bill. In particular, we think the move to have a board and a chief executive model, with His Majesty appointing the chair of the board, is the right way to go. We also welcome the strengthening of enforcement powers and the obligation to establish stakeholder panels to inform the content of codes of practice. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, also highlighted that.

However, we share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about the Secretary of State’s requirement every three years to publish a statement of strategic priorities for the commissioner to consider, respond to and have regard to. We share his view, and that of many stakeholder groups, that this crosses the line into political involvement and exposes the ICO to unwarranted political direction and manipulation. We do not believe that this wording provides sufficient safeguards from that in its current form.

I have listened carefully to the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, of Amendment 138. I understand his concern, but we are going in a slightly different direction to him on this. We believe that the reality is that the ICO does not have the resources to investigate every complaint. He needs to apply a degree of strategic prioritisation in the public interest. I think that the original wording in the Bill, rather than the noble Lord’s amendment, achieved that objective more clearly.

Amendment 140, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raises a significant point about businesses being given assured advice to ensure that they follow the procedures correctly, and we welcome that proposal. There is a role for leadership of the ICO in this regard. His proposal also addresses the Government’s concern that data controllers struggle to understand how they should be applying the rules. This is one of the reasons for many of the changes that we have considered up until now. I hope that the Minister will look favourably on this proposal and agree that we need to give more support to businesses in how they follow the procedures.

Finally, I have added my name to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which rightly puts a deadline on the production of any new codes of practice, and a deadline on the application of any transitional arrangements which apply in the meantime. We have started using the analogy of the codes losing their champions, and in general terms she is right. Therefore, it is useful to have a deadline, and that is important to ensure delivery. This seems eminently sensible, and I hope the Minister agrees with this too.

Amendment 150 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, also requires the ICO annual report to spell out specifically the steps being taken to roll out the age-appropriate design code and to specifically uphold children’s data rights. Going back to the codes losing their champions, I am sure that the Minister got the message from the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Harding, that in this particular case, this is not going to happen, and that this code and the drive to deliver it will be with us for some time to come.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, raised concerns about the approach of the ICO, which need to be addressed. We do not want a short-term approach but a longer-term approach, and we want some guarantees that the ICO is going to address some of the bigger issues that are being raised by the age-appropriate design code and other codes. Given the huge interest in the application of children’s data rights in this and other Bills, I am sure that the Information Commissioner will want to focus his report on his achievements in this space. Nevertheless, for the avoidance of doubt, it is useful to have it in the Bill as a specific obligation, and I hope the Minister agrees with the proposal.

We have a patchwork of amendments here. I am strongly in support of some; on others, perhaps the noble Lord and I can debate further outside this Room. In the meantime, I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and other noble Lords who have tabled and signed amendments in this group. I also observe what a pleasure it is to be on a Committee with Batman and Robin—which I was not expecting to say, and which may be Hansard’s first mention of those two.

The reforms to the Information Commissioner’s Office within the Bill introduce a strategic framework of objectives and duties to provide context and clarity on the commissioner’s overarching objectives. The reforms also put best regulatory practice on to a statutory footing and bring the ICO’s responsibilities into line with that of other regulators.

With regard to Amendment 138, the principal objective upholds data protection in an outcomes-focused manner that highlights the discretion of the Information Commissioner in securing those objectives, while reinforcing the primacy of data protection. The requirement to promote trust and confidence in the use of data will encourage innovation across current and emerging technologies.

I turn now to the question of Clause 32 standing part. As part of our further reforms, the Secretary of State can prepare a statement of strategic priorities for data protection, which positions these aims within its wider policy agenda, thereby giving the commissioner helpful context for its activities. While the commissioner must take the statement into account when carrying out functions, they are not required to act in accordance with it. This means that the statement will not be used in a way to direct what the commissioner may and may not do when carrying out their functions.

Turning to Amendment 140, we believe that the commissioner should have full discretion to enforce data protection in an independent, flexible, risk-based and proportionate manner. This amendment would tie the hands of the regulator and force them to give binding advice and proactive assurance without necessarily full knowledge of the facts, undermining their regulatory enforcement role.

In response to the amendments concerning Clauses 33 to 35 standing part, I can say that we are introducing a series of measures to increase accountability, robustness and transparency in the codes of practice process, while safeguarding the Information Commissioner’s role. The requirements for impact assessments and panel of experts mean that the codes will consider the application to, and impact on, all potential use cases. Given that the codes will have the force of law, the Secretary of State must have the ability to give her or his comments. The Information Commissioner is required to consider but not to act on those comments, preserving the commissioner’s independence. It remains for Parliament to give approval for any statutory code produced.

Amendments 142 and 143 impose a requirement on the ICO to prepare codes and for the Secretary of State to lay them in Parliament as quickly as practicable. They also limit the time that transitional provisions can be in place to a maximum of 12 months. This could mean that drafting processes are truncated or valid concerns are overlooked to hit a statutory deadline, rather than the codes being considered properly to reflect the relevant perspectives.

Given the importance of ensuring that any new codes are robust, comprehensive and considered, we do not consider imposing time limits on the production of codes to be a useful tool.

Finally, Amendment 150—

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

We had this debate during the passage of the Online Safety Act. In the end, we all agreed—the House, including the Government, came to the view—that two and a half years, which is 18 months plus a transition period, was an almost egregious amount of time considering the rate at which the digital world moves. So, to consider that more than two and a half years might be required seems a little bit strange.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I absolutely recognise the need for speed, and my noble friend Lady Harding made this point very powerfully as well, but what we are trying to do is juggle that need with the need to go through the process properly to design these things well. Let me take it away and think about it more, to make sure that we have the right balancing point. I very much see the need; it is a question of the machinery that produces the right outcome in the right timing.

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[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

Before the Minister sits down, I would very much welcome a meeting, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, suggested. I do not think it is useful for me to keep standing up and saying, “You are watering down the code”, and for the Minister to stand up and say, “Oh no, we’re not”. We are not in panto here, we are in Parliament, and it would be a fantastic use of all our time to sit down and work it out. I would like to believe that the Government are committed to data protection for children, because they have brought forward important legislation in this area. I would also like to believe that the Government are proud of a piece of legislation that has spread so far and wide—and been so impactful—and that they would not want to undermine it. On that basis, I ask the Minister to accede to the noble Baroness’s request.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am very happy to try to find a way forward on this. Let me think about how best to take this forward.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and, in particular, for that exchange. There is a bit of a contrast here—the mood of the Committee is probably to go with the grain of these clauses and to see whether they can be improved, rather than throw out the idea of an information commission and revert to the ICO on the basis that perhaps the information commission is a more logical way of setting up a regulator. I am not sure that I personally agree, but I understand the reservations of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and I welcome her support on the aspect of the Secretary of State power.

We keep being reassured by the Minister, in all sorts of different ways. I am sure that the spirit is willing, but whether it is all in black and white is the big question. Where are the real safeguards? The proposals in this group from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to which she has spoken to so well, along with the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, are very modest, to use the phrase from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I hope those discussions will take place because they fit entirely with the architecture of the Bill, which the Government have set out, and it would be a huge reassurance to those who believe that the Bill is watering down data subject rights and is not strengthening children’s rights.

I am less reassured by other aspects of what the Minister had to say, particularly about the Secretary of State’s powers in relation to the codes. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, we had a lot of discussion about that in relation to the Ofcom codes, under the Online Safety Bill, and I do not think we got very far on that either. Nevertheless, there is disquiet about whether the Secretary of State should have those powers. The Minister said that the ICO is not required to act in accordance with the advice of the Secretary of State so perhaps the Minister has provided a chink of light. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

139: Clause 32, page 58, line 24, leave out “with the day of the designation” and insert “when the Secretary of State designates the statement”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the language of new section 120F(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) will apply to it.

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

141: Clause 32, page 61, line 4, at end insert—
“(3A) In section 205(2) (references to periods of time), after paragraph (za) insert—“(zb) section 120H(3) and (4);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) does not apply to new section 120H(3) and (4) of the Data Protection Act 2018.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 146 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and I thank all noble Lords who have spoken.

These days, most children learn to swipe an iPad long before they learn to ride a bike. They are accessing the internet at ever younger ages on a multitude of devices. Children are choosing to spend more time online, browsing social media, playing games and using apps. However, we also force children to spend an increasing amount of time online for their education. A growing trend over the last decade or more, this escalated during the pandemic. Screen time at home became lesson time; it was a vital educational lifeline for many in lockdown.

Like other noble Lords, I am not against edtech, but the reality is that the necessary speed of the transition meant that insufficient regard was paid to children’s rights and the data practices of edtech. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, as ever, has given us a catalogue of abuses of children’s data which have already taken place in schools, so there is a degree of urgency about this, and Amendment 146 seeks to rectify the situation.

One in five UK internet users are children. Schools are assessing their work online; teachers are using online resources and recording enormous amounts of sensitive data about every pupil. Edtech companies have identified that such a large and captive population is potentially profitable. This amendment reinforces that children are also a vulnerable population and that we must safeguard their data and personal information on this basis. Their rights should not be traded in as the edtech companies chase profits.

The code of practice proposed in this amendment establishes standards for companies to follow, in line with the fundamental rights and freedoms as set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It asserts that they are entitled to a higher degree of protection than adults in the digital realm. It would oblige the commissioner to prepare a code of practice which ensures this. It underlines that consultations with individuals and organisations who have the best interests of children at heart is vital, so that the enormous edtech companies cannot bamboozle already overstretched teachers and school leaders.

In education, data has always been processed from children in school. It is necessary for the school’s functioning and to monitor the educational development of individual children. Edtech is now becoming a permanent fixture in children’s schooling and education, but it is largely untested, unregulated and unaccountable. Currently, it is impossible to know what data is collected by edtech providers and how they are using it. This blurs the boundaries between the privacy-preserving and commercial parts of services profiting from children’s data.

Why is this important? First, education data can reveal particularly sensitive and protected characteristics about children: their ethnicity, religion, disability or health status. Such data can also be used to create algorithms that profile children and predict or assess their academic ability and performance; it could reinforce prejudice, create siloed populations or entrench low expectations. Secondly, there is a risk that data-profiling children can lead to deterministic outcomes, defining too early what subjects a child is good at, how creative they are and what they are interested in. Safeguards must be put in place in relation to the processing of children’s personal data in schools to protect those fundamental rights. Thirdly, of course, is money. Data is appreciating in value, resulting in market pressure for data to be collected, processed, shared and reused. Increasingly, such data processed from children in schools is facilitated by edtech, an already major and expanding sector with a projected value of £3.4 billion.

The growth of edtech’s use in schools is promoted by the Department for Education’s edtech strategy, which sets out a vision for edtech to be an

“inseparable thread woven throughout the processes of teaching and learning”.

Yet the strategy gives little weight to data protection beyond noting the importance of preventing data breaching. Tech giants have become the biggest companies in the world because they own data on us. Schoolchildren have little choice as to their involvement with these companies in the classroom, so we have a moral duty to ensure that they are protected, not commodified or exploited, when learning. It must be a priority for the Government to keep emerging technologies in education under regular review.

Equally important is that the ICO should invest in expertise specific to the domain of education. By regularly reviewing emerging technologies—those already in use and those proposed for use—in education, and their potential risks and impacts, such experts could provide clear and timely guidance for schools to protect individual children and entire cohorts. Amendment 146 would introduce a new code of practice on the processing and use of children’s data by edtech providers. It would also ensure that edtech met their legal obligations under the law, protected children’s data and empowered schools.

I was pleased to hear that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has had constructive discussions with the Education Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Barran. The way forward on this matter is some sort of joint work between the two departments. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said that she hopes the Minister today will respond with equal positivity; he could start by supporting the principles of this amendment. Beyond that, I hope that he will agree to liaise with the Department for Education and embrace the noble Baroness’s request for more meetings to discuss this issue on a joint basis.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am grateful, as ever, to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for both Amendment 146 and her continued work in championing the protection of children.

Let me start by saying that the Government strongly agree with the noble Baroness that all providers of edtech services must comply with the law when collecting and making decisions about the use of children’s data throughout the duration of their processing activities. That said, I respectfully submit that this amendment is not necessary, for the reasons I shall set out.

The ICO already has existing codes and guidance for children and has set out guidance about how the children’s code, data protection and e-privacy legislation apply to edtech providers. Although the Government recognise the value that ICO codes can have in promoting good practice and improving compliance, they do not consider that it would be appropriate to add these provisions to the Bill without further detailed consultation with the ICO and the organisations likely to be affected by them.

The guidance covers broad topics, including choosing a lawful basis for the processing; rules around information society services; targeting children with marketing; profiling children or making automated decisions about them; data sharing; children’s data rights; and exemptions relating to children’s data. Separately, as we have discussed throughout this debate, the age-appropriate design code deals specifically with the provision of online services likely to be accessed by children in the UK; this includes online edtech services. I am pleased to say that the Department for Education has begun discussions with commercial specialists to look at strengthening the contractual clauses relating to the procurement of edtech resources to ensure that they comply with the standards set out in the UK GDPR and the age-appropriate design code.

On the subject of requiring the ICO to develop a report with the edtech sector, with a view to creating a certification scheme and assessing compliance and conformity with data protection, we believe that such an approach should be at the discretion of the independent regulator.

The issues that have been raised in this very good, short debate are deeply important. Edtech is an issue that the Government are considering carefully—especially the Department for Education, given the increasing time spent online for education. I note that the DPA 2018 already contains a power for the Secretary of State to request new codes of practice, which could include one on edtech if the evidence warranted it. I would be happy to return to this in future but consider the amendment unnecessary at this time. For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept the amendment and hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw it.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I thank everyone who spoke, particularly for making it absolutely clear that not one of us, including myself, is against edtech. We just want it to be fair and want the rules to be adequate.

I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for detailing what education data includes. It might feel as though it is just about someone’s exam results or something that might already be public but it can include things such as how often they go to see the nurse, what their parents’ immigration status is or whether they are late. There is a lot of information quite apart from this personalised education provision, to which the noble Baroness referred. In fact, we have a great deal of emerging evidence that it has no pedagogical background to it. There is also the question of huge investment right across the sector in things where we do not know what they are. I thank the noble Baroness for that.

As to the Minister’s response, I hope that he will forgive me for being disappointed. I am grateful to him for reminding us that the Secretary of State has that power under the DPA 2018. I would love for her to use that power but, so far, it has not been forthcoming. The evidence we saw from the freedom of information request is that the scheme the department wanted to put in place has been totally retracted—and clearly for resource reasons rather than because it is not needed. I find it quite surprising that the Minister can suggest that it is all gung ho here in the UK but that Germany, Holland, France, et cetera are being hysterical in regard to this issue. Each one of them has found it to be egregious.

Finally, the AADC applies only to internet society services; there is an exception for education. Where they are joint controllers, they are outsourcing the problems to the schools, which have no level of expertise in this and just take default settings. It is not good enough, I am afraid. I feel bound to say this: I understand the needs of parliamentary business, which puts just a handful of us in this Room to discuss things out of sight, but, if the Government are not willing to protect children’s data at school, when they are in loco parentis to our children, I am really bewildered as to what this Bill is for. Education is widely understood to be a social good but we are downgrading the data protections for children and rejecting every single positive move that anybody has made in Committee. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment but I will bring this back on Report.

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

149: Clause 42, page 76, line 14, leave out “with the day” and insert “when”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the language of new paragraph 4(A2) of Schedule 16 to the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) will apply to it.

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

151: Clause 44, page 78, line 17, leave out “with the day on which it” and insert “when the complaint”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the language of new section 164A(3) of the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) will apply to it.