Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Redwood

Report stage
Wednesday 8th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments stand in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. As we stated in Committee, we cannot have a perpetual sunset clause. A sunset that can be extended indefinitely and for an unlimited period at a time is not a meaningful sunset at all.

I welcome the Minister’s engagement on this aspect of the Bill. The amendment would provide an important safeguard by ensuring that any extension of the principal transfer powers can be for no more than two years at a time. That would provide greater certainty for investors, greater assurance for taxpayers and a clearer expectation that these exceptional powers are not intended to become a permanent feature of the Government’s industrial policy. It is also important that we have a Government who are confident in their stated aim of securing private investment for British Steel so that it can thrive on a commercial basis. Regular parliamentary approval for any extension will help to ensure that Ministers continue to focus on that objective.

I thank the Government for recognising these concerns and for working constructively with us to ensure that this amendment can be accepted. I beg to move.

[Lord Redwood (Con)]

My Lords, two years is quite enough for these powers, and it is generous of my noble friend to suggest allowing another two-year extension. As I understand it, these steel matters are being considered under a £2.5 billion multiyear estimate, which was meant to be for the modernisation of the steel industry. When it was originally agreed, people had in mind that this was going to be grant aid for new electric arc furnaces and other such investments—not to pay continuous and high losses on an older technology plant that may not have the long future we would like.

To get into better order with the Treasury, the Government might want to have some self-imposed restraint on the duration of this. We have been led to believe that the rate of loss is at least £500 million a year on the two blast furnace activities that are currently under the Government’s control but not in their ownership. That would be a totally unacceptable continuing rate of loss and would eat into what should be modernisation money. That would mean they would get to the end of this Parliament with very little improvement to show.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I echo my noble friend Lord Hunt’s comments on the previous group. I thank the Minister for his engagement, and the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for their amendments in this group. Amendment 17 is very welcome. It ensures that compensation regulations must provide for valuations to be carried out by an independent valuer rather than leaving that as an optional feature of the scheme.

I also welcome the Government’s work with opposition parties to ensure that relevant liabilities are properly reflected in the valuation process. In particular, Amendment 21 ensures that environmental and health and safety liabilities must be taken into account, as my noble friend Lord Redwood powerfully articulated on an earlier group.

[Lord Redwood (Con)]

My Lords, I too welcome this from the Government. I think they will find it very helpful because, should we move on to the full acquisition of British Steel at Scunthorpe, there remain, as I understand it, financial issues outstanding with the current Chinese owners. It will be very important to have an accurate and full account of all these long, deep-rooted and sometimes very expensive liabilities to provide some counter to what we read in the press is their rather extravagant idea of how much they ought to be paid.

Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Redwood

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 47 and 48 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. These amendments address two costs which bear directly on the viability and competitiveness of a transferred steel undertaking: the carbon border adjustment mechanism and the United Kingdom emissions trading scheme.

Amendment 47 would exempt a transferred steel undertaking from the carbon border adjustment mechanism in respect of iron and steel goods imported for use in its business. Amendment 48 would disapply the United Kingdom emissions trading scheme in relation to installations forming part of such an undertaking. These amendments go to a wider question which has run throughout our debates: whether the Government’s approach will genuinely secure steel-making in this country or simply add further costs to an industry already exposed to intense international competition.

The Government’s impact assessment on the free allocation review makes the point. It accepts that reducing free allocations increases businesses’ exposure to carbon costs. It accepts that energy-intensive industries producing globally traded commodities are particularly vulnerable because they cannot simply pass those costs on to consumers. It also recognises the danger of carbon leakage—production, investment, jobs and emissions moving overseas, rather than emissions genuinely being reduced. The assessment says that the traded carbon price could be approximately £25 per tonne lower by 2030 if free allocations do not fall in line with the industry cap.

This is a policy choice, and it has consequences for industry. The steel sector has warned of the effect of reducing free allocations. It has described the proposed changes as an “earthquake moment”. The Government must listen to that warning. CBAM can affect imports into the domestic market; it does not protect a United Kingdom producer competing in export markets. Moreover, higher costs can be passed down the supply chain to downstream manufacturers, reducing their competitiveness and risking the relocation of activity and jobs abroad.

We have now seen the Government introduce new trade measures with substantial tariffs and lower quota volumes. The Minister in the other place, Chris Bryant, said:

“We are determined to make sure that we have a proper steel production industry in the UK, and that means that we have to take some tough measures”.—[Official Report, Commons, 30/6/26; col. 767.]


But thus far the tough measures appear to fall on downstream manufacturers and therefore, inevitably, on British consumers. The Government cannot impose new trade barriers and costs on those who use steel while also increasing carbon costs for domestic producers, and then claim to have solved the competitiveness problem. When will they get tough on the ideological net-zero policies which are imposing substantial costs on the steel industry?

The Government need to make a clearer choice. Do they want a steel sector which can compete, invest and employ people in the United Kingdom, or do they want to continue a policy framework which makes domestic production more expensive and pushes activity overseas? This is particularly important as they pursue electric arc furnace production. If they want greener steel, they must ensure that the electricity required to make it is available at a competitive price. It is no good requiring industry to electrify while maintaining a policy environment in which power and carbon costs make that transition commercially unviable.

The Government should not use nationalisation to shield themselves from the consequences of their own industrial and environmental policies. They should instead create the conditions in which steel can be produced competitively in Britain, with lower energy costs, realistic carbon policy and a serious commitment to preventing industrial activity leaving our shores. I beg to move.

[Lord Redwood (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend. I have also referred to this in past interventions, so I need not say very much. Looking at the tragedy of the British steel industry under successive government policies, there is no doubt about it: the very high energy costs, carbon taxes, emission trading arrangements and CBAM coming in are the main reasons why we are not competitive and we have had this colossal collapse. If the Government will not accept that, they will never have a successful steel industry.

Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Redwood

Committee stage
Monday 29th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 1, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, is very simple. It seeks to confine the powers in this Bill to genuine steel businesses. Those are undertakings consisting predominantly of the manufacture or processing of steel—or iron for the purposes of steel manufacture.

As drafted, the definition catches any business which merely includes steel-making as part of its operations. That is a very broad formulation. It could, in principle, sweep up a diversified business in which steel was only a minor part of what it does. Businesses with a limited connection to steel production should not face uncertainty about whether it falls within the reach of these nationalisation powers.

When this point was pressed in the other place, the Secretary of State was asked whether a business with only 1% of its operations in steel would be caught by Clause 1. He did not say that it would not be. However, a statement of intent is not a limit on the face of the Bill, and future Governments are not bound by the assurances of this one. The Government say that these powers are intended for British Steel, and British Steel is obviously and predominantly a steel business. Therefore, this amendment should create no difficulty for that purpose. If the Government’s intention is genuinely not to use these powers against businesses with only a peripheral connection to steel, they should have no difficulty in accepting this amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Redwood (Con)]

My Lords, I fully support this amendment and hope that it will tease out from the Minister a little more about what the underlying purpose of the general legislation is, as I am not too enamoured of this becoming a fully nationalised industry with the ability to acquire all sorts of other steel interests.

I felt that the Government’s policy arose out of the circumstances of British Steel at Scunthorpe and the question of blast furnace-produced steel, where we are down to our last two blast furnaces. I did not think that the intention was to build an electric arc furnace set of businesses when progress has already been made in establishing these in the private sector and where there are plans in certain cases for government grant aid to achieve an electric arc steel additional business by that combination of subsidy assistance and private capital.

I hope that the Government will accept this quite substantial narrowing of such a broad piece of legislation, because there are many with general interests in steel whom we would not like to get caught up in this. I would also like clarification on whether there is any possibility that the Government might want to build a nationalised electric arc steel set of businesses. This would be an expensive and difficult proposition.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 30, 31, 43, 44 and 46 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Wigley—who I thought made a very powerful case—and Lord Fox, for their previous speeches.

Amendment 30 goes to the valuation of a steel undertaking and the need for that valuation to reflect the real commercial environment in which the undertaking will operate. That environment is not fixed; it is being shaped directly by government policy and, in particular, by the new steel trade measure coming into effect from 1 July. Only days ago, the Government changed the detail of that policy, relaxing the original proposals somewhat, with tariff-free quota reductions pulled back from the level first proposed. We will no doubt discuss that in more detail when the Statement is taken tomorrow, and I do not intend to rehearse that debate now.

However, the fact is that the Government’s choices on trade policy will have a material effect on the commercial position, and therefore the value of any steel undertaking. A tighter quota and a higher above-quota tariff will limit import competition. The way quotas are set will affect downstream industries, supply chains, customer relationships and the availability of particular steel products. The Government cannot, on the one hand, present their trade policy as central to the future of UK steel and, on the other hand, resist any requirement for that policy to be factored into what a steel undertaking is actually worth.

The need for clarity is made more acute by the uncertainty of recent weeks. Businesses have been trying to understand what the new quota levels will be, how quickly quotas may be exhausted, which products will be covered and what the practical effect will be for producers and steel-consuming industries alike. Do the Government accept that the new steel trade measure will affect the value of steel undertakings? If so, why should the independent valuer not be required to consider it?

On Amendment 31, electricity costs are among the central determinants of the viability, competitiveness and future value of steel. The position facing British industry is stark. The United Kingdom has had some of the highest industrial electricity prices in the developed world. UK industrial users pay substantially more than competitors in France and Germany, and—on the most widely cited international comparison—around four times as much as businesses in the United States.

For steel-makers, the gap remains significant. That is particularly serious as the sector moves towards more electricity-intensive production methods, including electric arc furnaces. A business may have the workforce, the plant, the orders and the ambition to modernise, but it cannot compete indefinitely if one of its principal inputs costs materially more than it does for its overseas competitors. These costs, I am afraid, reflect recent policy choices by the Government. The fact that the Government provided some limited relief from network charges to eligible energy-intensive industries rather demonstrates the point.

The Government now say that further measures will bring prices closer to those in competitor countries, but closer is not the same as competitive—and nor is a future scheme with questions of timing and eligibility still to be resolved an adequate basis on which to value a business today. This amendment would require the valuer to consider the prices paid by UK steel producers, the disparity with comparator countries and the effect of any support intended to reduce energy costs, including both the costs after existing reliefs and the risk that relief may be time-limited, incomplete or dependent on eligibility. It should also include a clear comparison with major competitor countries.

Is the Government’s objective genuine parity in industrial electricity prices with our principal competitors? If not, what continuing cost disadvantage do the Government consider acceptable for a strategic trade-exposed industry? How will the valuer assess the effect of support, which is prospective rather than guaranteed, particularly where broader measures are not expected to operate fully until 2027? The Government’s own impact assessment accepts the seriousness of this problem. It states that energy costs threaten the sector’s long-term viability and its ability to compete. It also acknowledges that UK steel producers face higher electricity prices than comparable countries, and that contributes to the uncompetitive production costs and pressure on margins.

On Amendment 43, as we raised at Second Reading, the Government’s impact assessment recognises the risk of a chilling effect on investment if businesses and investors perceive a greater risk of state intervention—a point very well made by my noble friend Lord Redwood in the last group. The United Kingdom has long depended on its reputation as a stable, predictable and rules-based place in which to invest. The risk is greater in the current climate. Steel businesses are already dealing with high electricity costs, rapidly changing trade policy and significant regulatory burdens. Adding an open-ended power of nationalisation can only increase the sense of risk for those considering whether to invest in the United Kingdom. If the Government are confident that their actions will strengthen confidence and attract private capital, they should have nothing to fear from transparency.

Amendment 44 addresses a basic point of fairness. If the Government take a steel undertaking into public ownership, that business must not receive selective advantages which place comparable privately owned steel businesses at an artificial disadvantage. Without this safeguard, there is a clear risk of distortion through subsidies, preferential access to public contracts, more favourable regulatory treatment or other support unavailable to private companies. The Minister in the other place stressed the need for flexibility and for the Government to act quickly, but flexibility need not mean unfairness. It is entirely possible to support a strategic undertaking in exceptional circumstances while maintaining a level playing field for the wider sector.

On Amendment 46, if we accept the Government’s central argument that British Steel is critical national infrastructure and that domestic steel production is essential to our national security and without it we cannot build our Navy, jets or submarines, they must accept the logic of what follows from that argument: you cannot declare something critical to national security then leave it defenceless. Amendment 46 states that, where the Secretary of State has exercised a principal transfer power where steel has been brought into public ownership precisely because it is in the public interest, the Secretary of State must have the power to prevent industrial action destroying the very thing that public ownership was meant to protect.

We have seen what happens when Governments are all too timid to act. We have watched the railways held to ransom by the RMT, and we have seen it in healthcare where the former Health Secretary himself felt compelled to call out what he described as “cartel-like behaviour”. The Government have made themselves more vulnerable still. The Employment Rights Act 2025 stripped away strike safeguards that existed for a good reason. The ballot thresholds are gone: the Government unlocked the door and then expressed surprise when it was pushed open.

If a steel undertaking is nationalised in the name of national security and a trade union then calls a strike that shuts down production, what will the Secretary of State do? Will he stand at the Dispatch Box and explain that our defence supply chains have been severed because he did not want to upset the unions? Do the Government seriously want domestic steel production halted because a union decides the moment of public ownership is the moment to press its advantage?

The Government cannot have it both ways: they cannot argue that steel is so vital to this country that it must be brought into public ownership and simultaneously argue that, once it is in public ownership, it should be just as exposed to industrial disruption as any other business. The whole point of this public interest test, if it means anything at all, is that some things matter too much to be left to the ordinary run of commercial risk. Industrial action that threatens critical national infrastructure is precisely such a risk.

I invite the Minister to tell the House that the Government have considered the risk. I invite him to explain what powers the Secretary of State would have on the day a strike is called at a nationalised British Steel to keep the blast furnaces lit. If he cannot answer that question satisfactorily, this amendment provides exactly the answer that is needed.

[Lord Redwood (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for raising the crucial issue of electricity prices. As the strategy is to convert more and more to electric arc furnaces, the price of electricity becomes the critical variant in determining how successful those businesses will be, how competitive their prices will be and whether they will generate cash and profit to reward those who ventured in them, or whether there will be problems for those businesses, just as there are problems in the British Steel carbon-based system through its blast furnaces. I hope the Minister can give us a little more background by way of reassurance, given that the steel strategy has been, and is still to be, based on electricity as the prime source of energy. There needs to be a policy that will consistently deliver competitive electricity prices because the current prices, without specific and targeted subsidy intervention, are way out of sync with the electricity prices in the more competitive world of our major competitor countries.

It is very important that this group of amendments raises the issue of tariffs. Of course, anybody valuing the assets that might be acquired under this legislation, or valuing what we already have by way of control and operating responsibility, will need to look at the impact of tariffs. It is a good idea to stress this because these are a very major change to the background for the conduct of steel businesses in this country, and we cannot be sure exactly what the impact is going to be. We have two types of impact arriving around the same time. There is the carbon border adjustment mechanism, which is, in effect, a fairly universal tariff based on the carbon content of imported material, which is clearly going to apply substantially to this industry. Then there are the specific tariffs which the Government have announced to come shortly, which target competitive steel coming into Britain with a very large increase in tariff and a rather low protected quota so that there will definitely be a substantial increase in cost for import.

You could argue, as I presume the Government do, that this is completely benign for our steel industry because it means that the combination of the immediate tariff and the soon to come CBAM tariff will make imported steel so much less competitive, and will therefore help reduce the pressures on our existing electric arc furnaces in the private sector and the two blast furnaces now, in effect, under the control—but not in the ownership—of the public sector. There will be some relief, as the policy intends. However, there can be other consequences which a valuer would have to take into account.

For example, the higher the cost of imported steel, the more difficult it will be for those many companies and industries that use and add value to steel in our wider steel-using industry. There will be limited scope for all users of imported steel to find exactly the right specifications of steel, and the right availability and pricing, from the rather limited-scale industry that the United Kingdom now has as a steel producer. There could well be financial difficulties, reductions in turnover and activity, or the collapse of steel-using businesses in the United Kingdom that face these very high tariff impositions on their main raw material. If they acquire more by way of import than at home and they cannot immediately substitute, you could have the paradoxical effect that the tariff designed to protect the British industry lost orders to the British industry as well as to the exporting industry from abroad. You could well have businesses here collapse—those that are substantial steel users but can no longer carry on the business efficiently to sustain their limited purchases from the UK, because of the cost of the expensive imports.

This needs careful policy examination. I am glad that the Government had one rethink about the tariff quota arrangements for this, but they probably need to do a bit more homework about the balance between the rather larger turnover at risk in steel-using businesses in the United Kingdom and the rather too small turnover available in steel production. They therefore probably need to consult a bit more widely over the medium- to longer-term impact on steel demand from domestic as well as imported sources.

I am interested in the proposals on impact on the economies, but I am not quite sure what is in mind and how it would work out. It is quite right, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said, that there will have been impacts from previous closures or redundancies, and there could be future bad impacts as steel plants become more productive and need less labour, or as the final conversion is made from blast furnaces to electric arc, when there would clearly be a substantial loss of employment. There will need to be assistance and help for those who lose their jobs or have lost them in the past but still have not been able to retrain or find good alternative employment. One needs rather more by way of detail, and I am not quite sure that this Bill is the right place to do that, because it relates to a series of other government initiatives, funds and programmes that are more generally available. However, the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, might be right that they need to be improved. That is a subject for another conversation on another day.