(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThank you. I think I was talking about Amendment 21 being prescriptive; it sets out exactly what must be done and by whom.
It has two sections. The first reduces the currently usurious SVR paid by mortgage prisoners by capping it at two percentage points above the bank rate. This is what, in the end, Martin Lewis thought was necessary. He said:
“Yet in lieu of anything else, I believe for those on closed-book mortgages it is a good stopgap while other detailed solutions are worked up, and I’m very happy the All-Party Parliamentary Group on mortgage prisoners is pushing it.”
He also said:
“This would provide immediate emergency relief to those most at risk of financial ruin … No one should underestimate the threat to wellbeing and even lives if this doesn’t happen, and happen soon.”
This is all necessary, but not sufficient. SVRs are not the normal basis for mortgages, as I have already mentioned. What is needed is access to fixed-rate mortgages, as provided by normal active lenders to 90% of mortgagees. The second part of Amendment 21 sets out how that is to be done.
This is, of course, all very prescriptive, and we understand the Government’s reluctance to write such details into the Bill. That is why we have also tabled Amendment 37B. This amendment takes a simpler and non-prescriptive approach. It places the obligation to fix the problem squarely on those who caused it—the Treasury. It is explicitly fuelled by the overwhelming and undeniable moral responsibility that the Treasury has for the terrible situation in which mortgage prisoners have long found themselves. The amendment sets out what must be achieved to relieve mortgage prisoners, by whom and by when, but it does not say how. It leaves that entirely for the Government to work out.
Amendments 21 and 37B give the Government a clear choice. Amendment 21 prescribes a detailed method of solution; Amendment 37B says what the Government must achieve but leaves the mechanism to them. The Government caused the mortgage prisoner problem, which has caused and continues to cause much suffering to many families. I hope that the Government will recognise their moral responsibility and adopt Amendment 21 or Amendment 37B.
This has all gone on much too long, and it has caused, and continues to cause, far too much misery and desperation. If the Minister is not able to adopt either amendment, or give equivalent assurances, I will test the opinion of the House. I beg to move Amendment 21.
My Lords, I speak in support of the amendments just proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, which I have signed. One’s heart goes out to him—it must be very difficult to make a speech of this complexity and passion with all these breaks. Despite the technical difficulties, however, he has made the case for action very well, and as co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on these issues he is very well briefed on the situation faced by these fellow citizens of ours, and the extra costs that they face. It is indeed a very difficult situation, and one hears a lot of despair when one talks to these people.
I am sure that when he responds the Minister will, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, hinted, dwell at length on the numbers of this group in various categories. There is of course a debate on how the prisoners can be split up—I think that the only thing that we agree on is that the total is probably about 250,000. As with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, however, my argument is not about the numbers. Simply put, it is clear that a significant number of people, through no fault of their own, cannot exercise the choices about their mortgage that the rest of us can. While some would argue that this is the direct fault of the Government, I think that someone needs to take responsibility for providing a fair outcome for those who are in a position to take advantage of it.
As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, says, this group of amendments offers two options: one that focuses on what the FCA might do within the parameters set by the Bill and another—37B, a late amendment that we drafted for Report—that suggests that the Treasury might wish to take powers to act in the way that is most suitable for it. Both have merits, in their ways. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, they have detailed implications that need to be followed through carefully. My preference would be for Amendment 37B, for the very good reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. If, as he said he might, the noble Lord decides to test the opinion of the House, we will support him.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 1 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Eatwell. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for adding their cross-party support on this important issue and look forward to their contributions to the debate. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, the Deputy Leader of the House, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, the noble Lord, Lord True, and their officials for making time to discuss this issue after Committee, which has helped us considerably and shed some light on the complex set of consultations that the FCA and the Treasury itself are conducting over the next few months, all of which are happening, of course, during the pandemic and at a time of significant change in duties and responsibilities in all quarters.
In his excellent speech in Committee, my noble friend Lord Eatwell set out the case for the introduction of a duty of consumer care to be placed on financial services providers, which he argued would strengthen the FCA’s consumer protection objective and introduce requirements to ensure that firms operating in the financial sector should not profit from exploiting a consumer’s vulnerability, behavioural biases or constrained choices. I can do little better than rehearse his main points again. Markets in financial products sold to individuals, households and small businesses are seriously inefficient, mainly because of asymmetric information, as the seller of the product typically knows much more about the risks involved in making a particular investment or other financial transaction than does the consumer.
Secondly, given that the FCA’s strategic objective is about promoting competition in the market, thereby improving consumer outcomes, it can either regulate each individual financial product to ensure that the consumer is probably informed, or it could adopt the principle enshrined in Amendment 1 and make general rules, including the power to introduce a duty of care owed by authorised persons to their consumers. The case for a duty of care for consumers was argued very strongly at the time the current regulatory structure was set up; indeed, I was present in many of those debates. But, absent primary legislation or changes to it, the FCA has, perforce, adopted the first option and attempted to deal with each consumer detriment issue as it arises. However, by its own admission, this has not gone very well. From its consultation entitled, Our Future Approach to Consumers in 2017, through to the feedback statement published in April 2019, the FCA has wrestled with the issue of duty of care and is still wrestling today, with a review scheduled to start, we understand, in May 2021.
My noble friend’s case was that the status quo is failing and a new approach is urgently required for two main reasons. First, new products are always coming on to the market, which means that the FCA is always playing catch-up to introduce new rules and has to take time for appropriate consultation and so on to deal with the new threats to consumers. The rush to get a handle on “buy now, pay later” products in this legislation speaks volumes about that approach. Secondly, financial products are now available with one click via the internet, with all that that implies about the failure of the conventional approaches of “know your customer” and the need for careful concern about going through the paperwork and understanding the terms and conditions of what you may be signing up to. In short, fintech, with all the benefits it can bring—well argued by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes— signals the end of the current FCA regulation as we know it. The case for a duty of care approach is unanswerable.
Amendment 1 provides the FCA with the means to end its failure to meet its consumer protection duty through dogged adherence to a failing competition objective. The enactment of the power to introduce a duty of care for consumers would rightly place responsibility for ensuring that markets function well firmly on the shoulders of those who have the information required to attain that goal. If the FCA has the power to introduce a duty of care for consumers, it could finally begin to live up to its strategic objective.
Far too many consumers are being treated inappropriately, whether by the mis-selling of products, by the denial of rights or by obstruction of responses to complaints and so on. If the Government wish to improve on the consumer protections previously enshrined in EU legislation, the introduction of a duty of care on consumers is a safe and sure way forward. It is a way to ensure that markets function well for the benefit of the consumer, as it should be.
I am sure that, in responding to this debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, will try to persuade us that there is no need for this amendment, as future consultations to be carried out by the FCA and the Treasury will cover all these points in detail and so all will be well. Indeed, either or both of these exercises may require primary legislation—that is quite likely—and we will be back again in a few months’ time debating the same issues all over again, when the Treasury has decided on its responses to the consultations and brings forward legislation to implement another generation of regulatory frameworks. I put it to the Government that, while the wording of the amendment may not be perfect, the intent—particularly the wording of subsection (2),
“that firms should not be profiting from exploiting a consumer’s vulnerability, behavioural biases or constrained choices”—
is worth holding on to and action should be taken now. I give notice that, in the absence of a positive response today, I am minded to test the opinion of the House on the amendment. However, if the Minister is prepared to commit to bring this back at Third Reading, with an agreed wording, we could work with her to settle this issue. I beg to move.
It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, and to support this amendment. The noble Lord has made a strong and compelling case for both parts of the amendment. The case for and against a duty of care was discussed extensively in Grand Committee and I do not propose to revisit the arguments in detail.
In his speech in Grand Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, made a simple but important point:
“The truth is that the industry has a systemic tendency to malfeasance.”—[Official Report, 22/2/21; col. GC 112.]
I listed in Committee some of the many serious instances of malfeasance over the last couple of decades—I am sure that they are familiar to us all—which amply demonstrate the truth of the observation made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. There can be no doubt that the temptation to malfeasance and the opportunities for malfeasance grow, and are deeply rooted, in the huge inequality of arms. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, emphasised that in Committee, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has just noted. There can be no doubt either that the culture within parts of the financial services industry is, to say the least, not oriented to serving the best interests of consumers. John Lanchester has graphically described the industry as treating its customers as “an extractive resource”. All this is true in an industry that is highly regulated. This inevitably leads to the conclusion that the regulatory regime is obviously and severely deficient.
The FCA has consulted on the duty of care at least eight times in the last five years and is about to do so again, starting in May, apparently. It is not clear, given the Treasury’s current consultation on the FSFRF, why we need two consultations covering the same ground. I know that some respondents to the HMT consultation have already proposed a new duty of best interest or duty of care. There is no reason to suppose that this new, and much delayed, FCA consultation will come up with anything more than equivocation, fence-sitting or long grass, if its previous efforts are anything to go by. Last time round, the FCA found that most respondents considered levels of consumer harm to be high and that change was needed to protect consumers. None of the financial services respondents wanted a duty of care, but 92% of consumers did, in a popular survey commissioned by the FCA’s own consumer panel.
The industry resists a duty of care for obvious reasons of self-interest, sometimes presented as a concern that such a duty would increase costs ultimately to the consumer. This does not say much for our financial services’ belief in competition, nor does it acknowledge the fact that, for example, PPI was sold at a commission rate of 87% or that the industry has had to find the funds to pay over £50 billion in redress for PPI alone.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, financial regulation has to ensure that consumers are well protected. It is with this principle in mind that I move the amendment in my name. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Holmes of Richmond, for their support. We have also had an aperitif, in the sense that Amendment 127 in the name of the noble Lord has already been debated in an earlier group, although its main focus is aligned with the amendments in this group and I look forward to his comments.
The recent report of the UK Mortgage Prisoners group referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, when he spoke on the earlier group of amendments, is graphic and shocking. It makes the case that the Government need to come forward promptly with a fair deal for the 250,000 or so mortgage prisoners who have been stuck for some 10 years paying higher interest rates than they needed to. The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Mortgage Prisoners has kept this issue alive, having been contacted by hundreds of mortgage prisoners who describe the worry and stress that comes from being trapped as they are. This is a shameful episode.
I am grateful to the Economic Secretary to the Treasury for meeting my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe, myself and others last month. The Economic Secretary told us that he has a keen interest in settling this matter. He explained that there are difficulties including moral hazard, which means that it is not easy to sort. However, while the issue continues, considerable injustice is occurring. The Government may well be right to say that the SVRs currently paid by mortgage prisoners are only a little higher on average than the SVRs of other lenders but, particularly during the pandemic, small differences matter. In any case, the assertion that the Government make that the differences are rather minor does not ring true in the light of the report from the all-party group. Its case studies, which include nurses, teachers, members of the Armed Forces and small business people, suggest that, for all those who are trapped and struggling with the consequences of the Government’s decisions when money is tight and margins matter, these things need to be sorted.
Surely the true comparison is that if mortgage prisoners were with an active lender and of course up to date with their payments, they would have access to a range of products to transfer to, which would give them a lower fixed rate for their mortgages. In the other place when this issue was discussed, the savings available were said to be in the order of £5,000 a year. That is not an inconsiderable sum. Why are these people being singled out for this penalty?
The problem also seems to be the inability to access the best market-matching deals, compounded by the fact that the prison effect is reinforced by the inability to prevent mortgages being sold off to so-called vulture funds, which are often unregulated. This matter has been left unresolved for far too long. The inability to seek out new deals and to limit costs is causing stress, and in some cases has caused families to lose their homes. As the Government have been involved throughout this process, is it too much to ask them to explain what the plan is, and what the timetable for resolving the incarceration of these prisoners will be?
In its recent report, UK Mortgage Prisoners says that it has put the record straight on what it calls a “Government made scandal”. It is for the Government to defend themselves on that charge. UK Mortgage Prisoners complains that the Government have “effectively ignored the issue” and that, where the FCA has intervened, it has done so in a limited and ineffective manner. Its asks seem very simple: an immediate cap on SVRs for closed mortgages; introducing a tailored mortgage product for those affected; giving credit to prisoners who have for a decade or more made overpayments; stopping penalty charges for any excess arrears; and adjusting credit ratings going forward. Those are five simple steps for 250,000 people whose lives have quite simply been blighted.
My Lords, I declare an interest as co-chair of the APPG on Mortgage Prisoners. Mortgage prisoners exist almost entirely because the Treasury made a terrible mistake when it sold the first tranche of former Northern Rock and B&B mortgages to an unregulated American vulture fund called Cerberus. Cerberus is the name of the multi-headed dog that in Greek mythology sits at the entrance to the gates of hell. That is not an inappropriate name, in view of what happened next.
Three things are needed to rescue mortgage prisoners. The first is to reduce immediately to comparable market rates the SVRs that they pay. The second is to make sure that transfers to much less expensive fixed-rate deals are properly available to them. The third is to make sure that new classes of mortgage prisoners cannot be created in the future.
Amendment 99, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, to which I have added my name, deals with the first of those things. My Amendments 116 and 117 deal with the second and third. Amendment 99, as he has so clearly and forcefully explained, would protect the thousands of mortgage prisoners stuck paying high standard variable rates. It would introduce a cap on the standard variable rates paid by customers of inactive lenders and unregulated entities. That would provide immediate relief for thousands of mortgage prisoners, and could give space for longer-term solutions to be found. It would help mortgage prisoners who took out loans with a fully FCA-regulated high-street bank which were then sold on to vulture funds.
Money-saving expert and consumer champion Martin Lewis supports this proposal, and on Monday he released a statement saying:
“While the government chose to bail out the banks in the financial crisis, it has never bailed out the banks’ customers who were victims of that collapse. Mortgage prisoners have been left paying obscene interest rates for over a decade through no fault of their own. They have been completely trapped in their mortgages and unable to escape the financial misery it causes … Coupled with the devastating impact of the pandemic on people’s finances, urgent action is needed to prevent the situation from becoming catastrophic. The independent LSE report I funded has a cogent argument as to why an SVR cap isn’t a balanced long-term solution. Yet in lieu of anything else, I believe for those on closed-book mortgages it is a good stopgap while other detailed solutions are worked up, and I’m very happy the All-Party Parliamentary Group on mortgage prisoners is pushing it. This would provide immediate emergency relief for those most at risk of financial ruin. No one should underestimate the threat to wellbeing and even lives if this doesn’t happen, and happen soon.”
The Government will no doubt say that some mortgage prisoners are already paying rates lower than 3.5%, so rates do not need to be capped. But those sold on by the Government to vulture funds like Cerberus are paying high rates. In the package sold by the Government containing more than 66,000 mortgage loans, 52% were paying rates between 4.5% and 5%, and 37% were paying rates of over 5%, when the mortgages were securitised.
The Government could have set strict conditions when selling the mortgages on the interest rates which could be charged. But when they sold £16 billion of mortgages to Tulip and Cerberus, they imposed only a 12-month restriction on increases to the standard variable rate. These have long since expired and the chief executive of Tulip Mortgages told the Treasury Select Committee that the firm now had
“complete discretion to set the interest rate policy.”
On the sale to Heliodor, the Government claimed that the organisation which bought the loans would be required to set their standard variable rates by reference to the SVR charged by a
“basket of 15 active lenders”.
But when you read the details of the securitisation agreements for the mortgage loans sold, you will find that, actually, the Government have required the SVR to be set only at the level of the third highest of the 15 active lenders. This is absolutely critical, as the third highest SVR is actually 4.49%. The lowest SVR among those 15 active lenders is 3.35%, and the average SVR weighted by market share is 3.72%.
The latest and final sale of the Treasury-held mortgages was announced in February. The book was sold to Davidson Kempner Partners and Citibank, with funding by PIMCO. The Government said that the SVR was going to be charged by reference, again, to a basket of 15 active lenders, but there are no details about how this will work in practice. If it reflects the practice in earlier sales, it will not actually provide any protection to customers. The Government will also say that the FCA has changed the affordability test to enable mortgage prisoners to switch to a different lender. But the progress has been very slow, with only a very small number of lenders willing to use these new flexibilities.
The cap on the SVR proposed by this amendment would provide immediate relief to mortgage prisoners who have been overpaying for the past 13 years. It would protect all mortgage prisoners, including those who are unable to switch. It would give time for other solutions to help mortgage prisoners to be developed. The SVR cap would apply only to mortgages owned by inactive lenders and unregulated entities. It would have no impact on active lenders competing to attract customers.
The cap is supported by the campaign group UK Mortgage Prisoners, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said. Members of the group have stated that this amendment is the difference between feeding their children and themselves or continuing to rely on food banks. The Government created the problem of mortgage prisoners and it is their moral responsibility to rescue them from the significant detriment that many still face. I urge the Government to accept the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson.
I now turn to Amendment 116, which would extend access to fixed interest rates to all mortgage prisoners, enabling them to gain control and certainty over their monthly mortgage payments. When the time came for the nationalised Northern Rock and B&B mortgages to be sold by the Government back to the private sector, they could have pursued an approach which ensured that these customers were in fact protected. They could have sold them to active lenders or secured a commitment from purchasers to offer these new customers new deals.
The risk to these customers was identified. In January 2016, the noble Lord, Lord McFall, wrote to the Treasury, UK Asset Resolution and the FCA to say that the customers affected by these sales should be protected, offered a fair deal and given access to fixed rates. UKAR responded that, by returning these mortgages to the private sector,
“the option to be offered new deals, extra lending and fixed rates should become available”.
But this requirement was not written into the contract when mortgages were sold to funds such as Cerberus, with the BBC reporting that UKAR is now claiming to have been “misled” by Cerberus.
A UKAR spokesman told BBC “Panorama” that Cerberus had the ability to lend to the former Northern Rock customers and that UKAR believed that it intended to do so. They said:
“The reply to Lord McFall sent on behalf of the UKAR board of directors was based on information presented to UKAR and the board had no reason to disbelieve this at that time.”
At the very best, this is evidence of catastrophic incompetence. At worst, it is evidence that UKAR heartlessly pursued profit over care for mortgage customers.
Consumer champion Martin Lewis lays responsibility for the treatment of mortgage prisoners squarely with the Government. He said that the Government
“have sold these loans to professional debt buyers who do not offer mortgages and left these people in these types of mortgages, which have been too expensive, crippled their finances and destroyed their wellbeing.”