Securitisation (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Deben

Monday 25th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I have only one brief question, which is to do with the transparency SI. I accept that we should approve both the SIs before us, but I regret that there has been no consultation on either instrument. As I remarked earlier, the engagement noted in both EMs is not a satisfactory substitute. However, I was happy to hear the Minister’s response to my suggestion of a more informative account of engagement becoming part of future EMs.

Reading the EM and the impact assessment for the transparency SI highlights one issue: the usual question of reciprocity. The EM for the transparency SI makes it clear that the Treasury can decide which third-country entities can access data on SFTs held in UK trade repositories. I assume that this provision means that all EEA entities currently with access will be allowed continued access. But what about the other way round? As things stand, if we crash out of the EU with no deal, will the UK still have access to data held in the three EEA trade repositories? If not, would it have significant implications for our financial services industry? Have the Government made any estimate of what the consequences of non-reciprocity might be? What assurance have the Government had from the EU, if any, that the UK would be allowed continued access after 29 March?

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, in the absence of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, I want to declare my interest as chairman of PIMFA, the organisation representing wealth managers and independent financial advisers, and to say to my noble friend that these are two very important SIs which we have to have—there is no doubt about that. This is a branch of our financial industry which was not, as my noble friend said, properly cared for. It did not have the transparency which it needed and it now does. Very sensibly, that was done over the whole European Union, because that is the area over which much of this—not all of it—is served.

It is crucial that we get reciprocity; it would be a serious blow to the industry if we did not. My noble friend reminded us with such elegance that this measure is here only should we crash out of the European Union. Every day, we recognise what a nonsense that would be and how unaware of the facts those who seem to want it really are, but we should not miss the opportunity of reminding the House of this fact.

My noble friend mentioned that all these powers will go largely to the Financial Conduct Authority but that some will go to the Prudential Regulation Authority. Yet again, we have a series of jobs being given to people without any price on them. I am sure that my noble friend will say what he has said on other occasions, which is that the authorities concerned are perfectly aware that they are able to cover this within their current budgets. I am beginning to wonder whether their budgets are not too generous, because they appear to be able to cover so many things without any extra costs. I merely say to my noble friend that it is becoming difficult for the House to recognise how this can be. If those authorities manage to get by for a relatively short period, I have no doubt that they will then ask the industry to pay the cost thereafter.

Again, it is perfectly reasonable to say that the industry is paying the cost towards the European Union at the moment and it will be in much the same place if we bring this to a British system. I have two things to say about that. First, I would rather like to know what that place is, because we do not seem to be told. Secondly, the industry is not in the same place. At present, it is paying towards a system which gives it access to the whole of the European Union. We are now suggesting that it should pay for one which will only give it access to itself. It would have been valuable to see what the difference in cost was there.

Equivalence Determinations for Financial Services and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Deben

Monday 18th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, the equivalence SI shares the same consolidated impact assessment with the next three SIs. I am grateful that this was published in advance of today’s debate and was available in good time in the Printed Paper Office. That is a significant and welcome improvement on last week’s lamentable performance. I would have preferred individual impact assessments, rather than this consolidated one. However, consolidation has the merit of making absolutely clear the unsatisfactory vagueness about the costs and benefits of these SIs and that this arises chiefly from the lack of consultation.

The summary sheet in the IA for this package of SIs notes that the likely cost for all of them is “Unknown: likely significant” in all three defined categories. The benefits are also unquantified, but are said to be “significant”. This rather dramatically illustrates the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, in his later amendments. There has been no real consultation on any of these instruments. This is unsatisfactory and is entirely the Government’s fault. Had the Treasury started preparing these entirely predictable SIs earlier, consultation would have been possible. Why has the Treasury left things until the last moment? Although I sympathise strongly with the spirit of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, I hope he will not press the fatal ones to a vote as we would not support him in a Division. It is critical to the functioning of our financial services that we make the changes—no matter how unhappily—set out in these SIs.

I turn to the detail of the consolidated impact assessment. The first 40 paragraphs are clear, but some questions arise in subsequent paragraphs and apply generally to all the SIs. Paragraph 44 explains that,

“it has not been possible to discuss the impact of the full package of changes with firms as this impact assessment was being produced, and has therefore not been possible to produce a monetised estimate of their full impact at this stage”.

This is more than a pity: it is tantamount to a dereliction of duty. It would not be the case if the Treasury had started the process earlier. It has had plenty of time to do this: the deadline can hardly have come as a surprise.

Paragraph 50 acknowledges explicitly that the impact assessment,

“is not able to fully quantify the potential impact of these SIs on industry”.

It undertakes, as a result of this self-generated inability, that if these no-deal SIs come into effect in March,

“it will at the appropriate time complete further analysis considering all of the relevant SIs as a package”.

The word “appropriate” is very vague; what does it really mean? Does it mean, for example, in less than three months after a no-deal Brexit?

I do realise that the promised analysis is shutting the stable door long after the horse has bolted, and even longer after the horse gave notice that it would bolt. Nevertheless, Parliament should still have a chance to review the real impact of these SIs on industry. Could the Minister help the House with an explanation of the limits implied by “appropriate” and confirm that Parliament will be given an opportunity to debate the subsequent analysis?

[Lord Deben (Con)]

I wonder whether the noble Lord is being a little too kind to the Government. Is not the reason we have not had these figures—and we have not had them because we did not start to do the figuring early enough—that when you actually add up the figures you discover that the cost of Brexit is enormously greater than anybody has pretended, and therefore it is to the convenience of the Government and of those who want Brexit not to provide the figures? Does he know of any other occasion when the Government have proposed huge changes and not provided at least some estimate of the bill?

[Lord Sharkey]

I am grateful for that intervention. The short answer to the final question is: no, I do not. I shall try to be slightly less kind as I move on.

Paragraph 52 of the consolidated impact assessment notes that each of the SIs covered,

“contains provisions with indefinite effect and this is the majority of the content. For this reason, we have concluded that the standard 10 year appraisal period is appropriate”.

This seems to me an entirely perverse conclusion. Ten years is far too long for an appraisal of the effects of instruments containing such wide powers in a complex and critical field, which were produced in very great haste and which lack proper consultation or impact assessment. It would make more sense, and reduce any inadvertent harm, if we were to appraise after, say, two years. I am sure that if the industry were eventually consulted, it would agree with this timing. I would be grateful if the Minister would say why he is proposing 10 years for appraisal and what is wrong with two. Will he reassure the House that he will reconsider the timing of the appraisals? Perhaps he will write to us with his conclusions.

Finally, paragraph 73 of the consolidated impact assessment deals with the impact on the public sector:

“Where changes to the regulators’ rulebooks, or to EU technical standards, are required as a result of leaving the EU, the regulators intend to consult on these changes wherever possible”.


This “wherever possible” is alarming, especially in view of the Treasury’s failure to consult in the preparation of these SIs in the first place. Can the Minister give examples of situations in which it would not be possible to consult on the changes to the rulebooks or the technical standards?

[Lord Deben]

My Lords, I declare my interest as chairman of the organisation that represents financial advisers and those who manage other people’s money. I come back to the point that the noble Lord has raised. It is very difficult for the industry to understand why the Government have not found it possible to talk in a lot more detail about the costs that are going to be placed upon the industry. After all, the industry pays these costs.

I am a great believer in regulation: I think good regulation is very important. I do not like the way that people sometimes mix bad regulation with the need to have no regulation, but if we are to have good regulation, there are two very important elements. First, it must be clearly understood, and, secondly, the cost must be clearly adumbrated so that people can make proper provision. I agree with the noble Lord who spoke last that it is unacceptable that, first, we do not know in advance; secondly, we will not know until after we have passed these things; and, thirdly, we will have to wait 10 years until we know whether or not we got it right. I have enormous respect for my noble friend, as well as enormous concern, given the difficulties he faces.

Deregulation Bill

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Deben

Tuesday 21st October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said, the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, of which I was a member, received a large amount of evidence on this clause. The effect of Clause 2 is to amend the Equality Act 2010 to remove the power of employment tribunals to make recommendations to employers in cases where there has been a finding of unlawful discrimination, harassment or victimisation, and where the successful claimant no longer works for the company.

In such cases, the claimant has redress. His former fellow workers may still be stuck with the conditions that led to the discrimination, harassment or victimisation of their former colleague, and that is in most cases. In 2013, only 16% of claimants in discrimination cases were still working for the employers against whom they made the claim. That means that in 84% of discrimination cases, the tribunal would no longer have the power to make recommendations to employers to take steps to improve their employment practices so as to avoid similar discrimination against their other employees.

Broadly speaking, evidence from business interests supported the clause and other groups opposed it. Business spoke in support of Clause 2, chiefly because it believed the wider recommendations to be beyond the information and expertise of the panel or that it was unnecessary because,

“the reputational risk of a wider recommendation is something an employer would take into account when making a decision whether or not to settle out of court”,

which is slightly grubby reasoning. Those who opposed the clause did so chiefly on the grounds that the system had been in operation for too short a time to provide any clear evidence about its merit or otherwise. The JCHR was opposed to the clause as was, perhaps not surprisingly, the EHRC.

At the time of our report, as the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said, there have been 28 such tribunal wider recommendations and I understand that in 2013 there was a total of 30. That may seem like a small number in absolute terms, but it represents one in every 12 cases in 2013 where these kinds of recommendations were made.

In their response to the Joint Committee’s report on Clause 2, the Government held to the view that the clause should remain and they disagreed that the removal of the tribunal’s power of recommendations was either unnecessary or punitive. The arguments that they advanced were first that there was a clear pattern visible in the existing recommendations; namely that they focused on training for management or updating the diversity policy, which is hardly a surprise. They asserted in a magnificently unproven and probably unprovable way that it is unlikely that this pattern will change going forward or that much more could be learnt about the use of the power by reviewing it and allowing it to run on for several more years. That is of course simply a non-evidenced assertion. More importantly, there is no evidence that it can be true. The sample is simply too small.

The Government’s second argument was based, as the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, pointed out, on a survey of employers—all 28, presumably, who then received wider recommendations because of breaking the law. Only eight responded. Six of these were from the private sector and all six had implemented the wider recommendations with an average cost of £2,000. The Government were silent about the two public sector respondents. I am at a loss to understand why the Government think that this is an argument in favour of removing the power to make wider recommendations. The response level is so low that it probably proves nothing at all, but if it proves anything then surely it shows the merit of these recommendations. It shows why the power to make them should be retained.

The Minister and his team have been helpful in providing additional briefing on the clauses that we will debate today as a Committee of the whole House. It included briefing on Clause 2 and I thank the Minister and his team for that. In a briefing note on the clause, the Government make four points in defence of the removal of the power to make wider recommendations. First, there are better and less burdensome ways to achieve the aim of helping employers comply with anti-discrimination. The response points to government-led workshops although it does not say how many and says that these workshops generated positive feedback from small business owners to the simple compliance message of “Do not discriminate”. That is not hard evidence, and not really evidence of any kind. How many workshops were there? How many small businesses? What positive feedback was there on agreement with the message that you should not discriminate? What follow-up was there to see if the workshops produced behavioural change?

The Government also point to the fact, which I have noted already, that employers think that the power is not needed. That is surely not a surprise to anyone. Nor does it amount on its own to a reason for abolition.

The Government’s third argument in defence of Clause 2 is essentially that the power added little and was not necessary. They go on to repeat that the cost of compliance with wider recommendations averaged £2,000. Presumably this is based on the six companies that actually replied to the Government. If that argues for anything at all, it is for retaining the power, if that is all it costs to put right discriminatory practices in a company.

Finally, the Government point out that any wider recommendations are unenforceable under the 2010 Act and are therefore of limited effect. In their briefing paper, the Government go on to say about the removal of the power to make wider recommendations that it will not stop tribunals from making observations in their judgments about how an employer might improve their practice to avoid breaching the Equality Act in the future. In other words, removing Clause 2 means that tribunals will not be able to make unenforceable recommendations any longer, but they will still be able to make unenforceable observations with exactly the same effect. Let me be clear about this: we are debating the removal of a power to make unenforceable recommendations and leaving in place the power to make exactly the same comments as unenforceable observations. This really does not seem to be sensible or a sensible use of legislative time.

The power to make wider recommendations is in its infancy. There is no evidence that it causes harm. In fact, there is no evidence either way because it is much too soon for that. There is no evidence to suggest that abolition is needed, appropriate or necessary. As the TUC said in giving evidence to the Joint Committee, it seems ridiculous to get rid of a piece of legislation that affects only employers who have broken the law. This is not sweeping through a whole swathe of businesses that are doing the right thing. Where businesses have broken the law, they quite often find it useful to have the tribunal help them get things right. But what seems even more ridiculous is that by the Government’s own admission, the removal of the power to make wider unenforceable recommendations will leave intact the power to make exactly the same recommendations as observations. There really is no need for this clause.

[Lord Deben]

My Lords, much of the discussion on health and safety has been around the issues of believed or real overregulation. I have already committed myself to the view that there is a great deal of overregulation which it is right to stop and that there is too much regulation which has caused real and proper anger. However, the Government have to be careful, when it comes to deregulation, not to fall into the same trap; in other words, for the deregulation efforts to look like an additional activity, as if to say, “Let us see how many things we can claim we have got rid of”. I must say, very delicately, that that is what this looks like.

Before my noble friend Lord Sharkey made his point, I was going to put it in the form of a question. I was going to ask what sanctions there are against a tribunal that decides that, irrespective of the fact that it does not have the power to do so, it is going to make a comment. I suspect that there are no such sanctions, which means that the tribunal can in fact say what it can say under this power that is being removed. It might be argued, when the power was originally put forward three years ago, that it would have been sensible to have had some kind of recall procedure to make sure that when the recommendations had been made, someone would listen to them. That might have been argued, but it was not.

It seems that we have here a power that is merely a statement of what is a power in any case. It is not onerous. So we are spending time removing a power that exists, whether you have it or not. Even so, it has a purpose, which is that tribunals ought to think through not just the case in front of them, but how the case fits into a pattern of behaviour or a way in which a particular company appears to approach certain things. It does not do any harm to say to the company, “Look, you’re guilty in this case but don’t you think it would be more sensible if you had somebody in charge of this, or if you recognised that in that particular factory in that particular place this was likely to occur?”. You can imagine the sorts of points that might reasonably be made by a reasonable tribunal.

If I may say so, this is so unimportant a change that if it is pushed to a Division, I shall be happy to support the Government on the basis that it does not mean anything. But I ought to say to the Government that it is not sensible to bring forward this proposal in these circumstances merely to add one to the number of deregulation activities that have taken place. I say that to my noble friend because I believe in deregulation and want to get rid of a whole lot of stuff that is not necessary and is telling people how to lead their lives, which they can do perfectly well themselves. But let us not bring that into disrepute by having the kind of discussion that we are, unnecessarily, having today and which I have, no doubt unnecessarily, prolonged.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Deben

Monday 15th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey]

Will the Minister clarify a point in sub-paragraph (3)(b) of paragraph 28 in Schedule 9, which would survive whether or not the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, were accepted? The sub-paragraph adds to the sentence in FiSMA the words,

“, or by 2 or more persons who include a person not directly involved in establishing that evidence”.

The whole paragraph now reads:

“That procedure must be designed to secure, among other things, that the decision which gives rise to the obligation to give any such notice is taken by a person not directly involved in establishing the evidence on which that decision is based, or by 2 or more persons who include a person not directly involved in establishing that evidence”.

FiSMA already permits a procedure that allows, in certain circumstances, the decision to issue a notice to be made solely by a person directly involved in establishing the evidence on which that decision is based. Why has the Minister felt it necessary to change this? Why, in particular, regularly allow the decision to issue a notice to be made by a person directly involved in establishing the evidence for the notice if he or she can persuade just one other person to agree? Does he have a particular type of case or set of circumstances in mind that would make this desirable or necessary, or is there some now apparent defect in the current regime as exemplified within the FSA by the Regulatory Decisions Committee?

[Lord Deben]

I hesitate to return to the previous discussion, but I just remark to the Minister that his whole list of examples of what this might have prevented of course misses the point. My point was that we could have done all those things with the RDC. The real question is: who makes that decision? I have never had an explanation of why it is necessary to have a power that is never referred to any independent group. That is all I am interested in and I feel very strongly about it. We have recently been trying to complete a very valuable thing called “treating customers fairly”. I want all customers to be treated fairly, and I entirely agree with the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, who is absolutely right.

I say to the Minister very personally and directly that when one of those most likely to be a senior regulator tells the industry that he intends to shoot first and ask questions later, he should understand why the industry has some concerns. That is all I say. All I am asking is that before such a decision is made, there should be reference to an independent body, and I think that the proposals put forward—albeit, as the noble Baroness rightly said, that they might need a little tweaking here and there—would seem to everyone to be fair.

We have the same situation—parallels have often been drawn—in police prosecution when someone outside asks whether this is a proper circumstance and whether it is likely to stand up. That is all that is necessary. Do that and most of us, I think, would be perfectly happy. Our issue is that, without making things more difficult in these debates, there are too many examples of decisions made that appeared to be hasty and when people have not looked too carefully at the details. This would make sure that they do.

All I say to the Minister is that he would have pretty overwhelming support for the changes that he wants if he were prepared to do what the noble Baroness has put forward. I would certainly be happy to argue that. If he does not do that, this will be difficult to support, and I am interested in the point that my noble friend has just made that there seems to have been an attempt to move even further away from what we should have.

I have one other point. The key thing is that the murmurings that somehow the RDC will disappear would be overcome by having this measure in the Bill. It is not unreasonable to have the concerns that people have, and I have not yet seen why introducing this measure would make things more difficult or less transparent. I would be happy to take the risk of people being warned and turning out to be guiltless, if it were done with this degree of protection. Then the Minister would have us all on his side.