Financial Services and Markets Bill

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Davies of Brixton

Committee stage
Monday 20th February 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I add briefly to my noble friend’s comments on the need for a proper and joint assessment of systemic risk in pension funds and their management strategies. I think the need is urgent, as the LDI debacle has shown. Indeed, there is continued turmoil and unrest in the sector. I notice that Risk.net reported last Friday that UK pension funds are exploring legal claims against LDI managers, their fiduciaries who they tasked with running the LDI strategies. Five law firms have told Risk.net that they have been approached by pension schemes invested in both pooled and segregated funds to investigate whether legal action can be taken against the relevant managers.

There are apparently also questions being asked, not surprisingly, about whether fund managers had fully explained to trustees the risks associated with LDI, a point raised by the chair of our Industry and Regulators Committee in his brief letter of 7 February to Andrew Griffiths. It is a point that has a direct bearing on the generation of systemic risk.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I intended to make a second point about risk. Everyone tends to think about risk in terms of systemic risk—the finances of the country come under some pressure—but there is another risk that is not given sufficient attention, which is the risk that pension funds will fail to deliver the benefits that people expect to receive. That risk is given insufficient attention, but I hope it will be covered if there is a system where someone is given responsibility to look at risk. There is the risk of not getting out the benefits expected, as well as the risk to the financial system.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Davies of Brixton

Report stage
Wednesday 14th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, these amendments are all on the same broad theme. As the previous speaker mentioned, there is a broad consensus that something needs to be done to provide a formal role for parliamentary scrutiny in the work of financial regulators. I do not want to detain the House, but I will take the opportunity to emphasise points that I have made at earlier stages. The basic question, to me, is: who regulates the regulators? The question is why we should trust the regulators; the answer is openness and engagement. Clearly, we have a particular interest here but can, I believe, contribute massively to the work of the regulator.

For us to raise these issues is not to question the expertise or good will of the people who serve on the regulators’ boards or work in their offices. It is simply wrong to assume that, once appointed, they can be left to get on with the job. As is apparent in the debate, there is clear consensus about the need for scrutiny. That is not contested. Obviously, there are clear reasons why they would benefit—the expertise of this House is a factor—but my particular concern is to establish systems that minimise the risk of regulatory capture. This is the experience, widely found, whereby regulators tend to become dominated by the interests they regulate and not by public interest.

I emphasise that this is not about corruption; it is more, in my mind, a social and cultural problem. I do not think the concept, in theory, is contested. The answer is to strengthen and develop the widest possible involvement of all sorts of bodies in the work of the regulators. Clearly, Parliament has a particular role and these amendments explore possible approaches to it. I hope the Minister can say a bit more than what was in the letter. Does the Minister consider regulatory capture to be something that occurs, and where the systems that are established address it and minimise the risk?

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 18, 19 and 20 in this group. I support them all but prefer the more prescriptive Amendment 20. In these matters, it seems to me that ambiguity is not our friend. Wide latitude in interpretation can easily frustrate intent. As my noble friend Lady Bowles has so forcefully explained, that intent here is to ensure that Parliament has some effective scrutiny role in the activities and rule-making of the PRA and the FCA, by requiring that the information Parliament may need to do this is properly supplied. At present, this is absent or insufficient or likely to be post hoc and ineffective.

This is a specific example of a much larger problem in the relations between the Executive and the legislature. There is an increasing tendency for the Executive to bypass, or try to bypass, Parliament or to reduce scrutiny to formulaic rituals with no real influence on outcomes, such as our SI procedures. The seriousness of this tendency has been commented on fairly widely and frequently in the past few years.